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In 1949, the Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino. Said order
provided a technical description of Sinacaban’s metes and bounds, according to which the Municipality would cut into the
southern portion of the Municipality of Jimenez.

In 1988, pursuant to said technical description, Sinacaban laid with the Provincial Board a claim to a portion of particular barrios.
However, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, asserted
jurisdiction over the same areas on the basis of an agreement it had entered into with Sinacaban. Said agreement was approved by
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 way back February 18, 1950. But The Provincial Board
declared the disputed area part of Sinacaban and that the resolution (resolution 77) approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries as fixed in E.O. 258.

Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with the RTC. Following the Pelaez v. Auditor General
doctrine, Jimenez contends that “the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative, and consequently, Sinacaban, which
was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.

RTC ruled in Sinacaban’s favor.

Issue #1. W/N Sinacaban legally exists

Yes, as a de facto corporation

Though, as ruled in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
cannot be created by the executive, the court has since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized, its creation can no longer be questioned. The case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr,
the SC took into consideration the following factors:

1. The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged;
2. The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive
order creating such municipality;
3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality in the Constitution apportioning the
seats in the House of Representatives.
4. That the Sec. 442(d) of the LGC was curative.

The same factors exist to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation. Sinacaban was created in
1949, and it has therefore been in existence for already 40 years before it was questioned. This is emphasized given that Rule
66(16), on quo warranto suits against a corporation, must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complained of was
done. On the contrary, the State and Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacaban’s existence as there was an agreement between
them. And in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: Sinacaban is constituted as part of the municipal circuit for purposes of
the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Moreover, Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is deemed to
have cured whatever doubts there may have been to Sinacaban. It provides:

"Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular

Issue #2. W/N Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is invalid in failing to conform to the constitutional and statutory requirement of plebiscite
in the creation of new municipalities


The requirement only applies to new municipalities created under the 1987 Constitution. And Sinacaban had attained de facto
status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. Lastly, the requirement of plebiscite was first introduced in the 1973
Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before,
such as the municipality of Sinacaban (1949).

Pakapin ra ni

W/N the agreement entered into by Jimenez and Sinacaban is valid will be determined by the result of the survey.

In Pelaez v. Auditor General, Power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature.”Thus it is
limited to implementing the law, and not amending it.

If any alterations of boundaries were made, Resolution 77 cannot be said to be merely administrative, nor valid. In gist, if
Resolution 77 is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for
opposing the claim.