Compiled Cases

ONG CHIA vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE:
Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that these rules shall not
apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization.
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with
whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended.
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony
of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising,
in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner,
as well as the petitioner himself.
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
and annexed several documents in its appellant brief to support its contention against the granting
of the petition before the lower court.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented
in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule on evidence is applicable in naturalization proceedings
HELD:
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified
the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
1 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"[12] so it was argued, because
under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which
provides that –
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later
on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. [15]We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has
not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.

ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
CASE DOCTRINE::
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta
and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence
the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge
and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court’s decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court
ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that
case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner’s attorney, Alfonso Felix,
Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason, it is contended that the

Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent’s complaint.
Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE vs. YATAR
G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas
an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his
alibi.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite her
intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning.
At 10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn
stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin saw Yatar, who was then
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing
back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar
and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he
would not be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now
wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes were “reddish
and sharp”. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former
purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In
the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the
door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still
empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found
that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife,
and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and
naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the
crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and undergarments beside her
body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away
from Isabel’s house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyn’s
cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm
specimen is identical to Yatar’s genotype.
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quo’s decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that:
(1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him,
in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample
taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of
DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence
for Yatar’s conviction?
HELD:
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia
Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt,
and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband
of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt
coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The
door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim,
Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina
(Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to
be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of
the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, et al.
G.R. NO. 155208, March 27, 2007
CASE DOCTRINE:
The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus by either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade
FACTS:
On 1969, Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating.
As a consequence, title thereto was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in
her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972 to 1988.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988. On 1989, Daniela’s heirs herein respondents found a sworn
statement executed by Danila stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the
true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor
of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. On September 6,
1989, Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena,
and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. RTC rendered its
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. CA Affirmed its decision. Petitioner asserts that the sole
evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated
was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that
said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner
the right to cross-examine her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes
of deciding a complaint.
HELD:
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation
that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn
statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement
as part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great
probative weight to this document. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn
statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine the affiant.

For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves
are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the
CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer
available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of
sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them. Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently
prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner.
As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint
and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.
Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary
evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela
had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of
ownership over the disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that
petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO
G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample
authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the declarant is
competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
FACTS:
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del
Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that
Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that
his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital
Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed
at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was
personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex
at the time. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing
of Johnny Bolanon. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the CA. The basis of the conviction
is the testimony of the victim’s uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño that on their way to the hospital Bolanon
told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of murder before he died is
admissible as evidence.
HELD:
Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the
conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either
as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample
authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the declarant is

competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein.
Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person
who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death,
having sustained a stab wound in the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. Res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.
immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when
he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e.,
his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001
CASE DOCTRINE:
Rule 130, Sec 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Upon failure
of SCC to pay, SIHI filed an action for a sum of money. During Pre-Trial, SCC admitted the
existence of the loan executed through its officers. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim.
The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at
the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC
or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have
waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for
decision. Trial court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto
the judgment. SCC elevated the case before the SC with the following contentions: (1) that SIHI
introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not
established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not
demonstrated in violation of Sections 36, Rule 130; and (2) that due execution and authenticity of
private documents evidencing the loan was not proved during trial.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not a defendant who failed to conduct cross-examination due to its own fault may
questioned the admissibility of the evidence for violation of hearsay rule.
(2) Whether or not the due execution of loan documents is necessary when the existence of the
loan had already been admitted during pre-trial.
HELD:
(1) Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an
exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that
it is the opportunity to cross- examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a
party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial court’s finding that petitioner had waived its right to
cross- examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter
of hearsay evidence.
(2) No. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already
a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of
the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission
of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to
submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said
obligation.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS
ARENAS-BANAL
G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE::
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of
the opposing party, which are not obtaining here.
FACTS:
Spouses Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19+ hectares of agricultural land situated
in Camarines Norte. DAR, pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
compulsorily acquired a portion of the land. Petitioner Land Bank valued the expropriated portion
at P173, 918.55. Unsatisfied with the Land Bank valuation and the subsequent affirmance of such
by PARAD, Respondents filed before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation
impleaded, as respondents were the DAR and the Land Bank.
After the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties
to submit their respective memoranda. Trial court computed the just compensation for a total of
P703, 137.00, which is beyond respondent’s valuation of P623, 000.00. In concluding that the
valuation of respondents’ property, RTC merely took judicial notice of the average production
figures in another case pending before it and applied the same to instant case without conducting a
hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the records of one case pending before it and
apply the same to another case also pending with it without conducting trial and without the
knowledge or consent of the parties.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection
and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here.
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing
before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, to wit:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAILON KULAIS et al.
G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998
Case CASE DOCTRINE::

Courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before
the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with five (5) counts of kidnapping for ransom and three (3) counts of
kidnapping before the RTC. Trial court convicted the seven accused positively identified by the
victims.
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of
the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly
deprived of his right to cross- examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against him.
Issue:
Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one witness in a case pending
before it and use the same to another case also pending with it.
HELD:
No. It is settled that courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in any other
proceedings, even if tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually
pending before the same judge. It should be emphasized that in criminal cases, the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly
on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims. These witnesses were subjected
to meticulous cross- examinations conducted by appellant’s counsel.

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED
GR No. 114776, February 2, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE::
As a general rule, Philippine Courts cannot take judicial notice of the existence and
provisions/contents of a foreign law, which matters must be alleged and proven as a fact. If the
existence and provisions/contents were not properly pleaded and proven, the Principle of
Processual Presumption applies i.e. the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as Philippine
Laws and it will be Philippine Laws which will be applied to the case.
FACTS:
The plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano applied in 1978 as Director of Flight Operation and Chief Pilot
of Air Manila through its area manager. He was appointed for five years with extension of two
years from Jan 21,1979 to Jan 20,1984.
Due to economic recession in 1982, Air Manila initiated cost cutting measures to its (17) expatriate
captain in the airlines. They were not right away terminated but requested to have a leave of absence.
Upon evaluation for promotion for B-747 fleet, there were 12 found qualified. But unfortunately
Laureano was not one of them. The plaintiff was informed that he did not qualified and that he will
give 3 months’ salary for his leave and but lessened only to 2 months.
Disappointed, the plaintiff filed illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter in June 29, 1983. On the
other hand, Defendant on Feb 11, 1987, filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds.
Since he was employed in Singapore. Therefore, Singapore law should apply in his contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts may take judicial notice of foreign law.
HELD:
The answer is on the negative. The Philippine Law applies our law do not take judicial notice of
laws in Singapore. The defendant was not able to prove the application of Singapore law to this
case.

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING vs COMMISION ON ELECTIONS ET. AL.
GR No. 195649, July 2, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, Philippine Courts cannot take judicial notice of the existence and
provisions/contents of a foreign law, which matters must be alleged and proven as a fact. If the
existence and provisions/contents were not properly pleaded and proven, the Principle of
Processual Presumption applies i.e. the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as Philippine
Laws and it will be Philippine Laws which will be applied to the case.
FACTS:
The respondent Armando is a natural born Filipino citizen. But changed his citizenship upon his
stay in United Stated of America. But he applied for repatriation in the Consul of General of the
Philippines in San Francisco and took an oath of allegiance again to the Republic of the Philippines
on July 10, 2008.
On Nov. 30, 2009, Armando filed his certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. His opponent Lino Baluag filed a petition to disqualify him for using his US passport in
entering and departing in the Philippines.
Armado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor. Then Armando filed his answer that when his affidavit of Renunciation of
American Citizenship was executed he was already divested of his American Citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts may consider applicability of Foreign Laws to a case upon reference to it by
one of the parties
HELD:
The ruling of the court is in the negative side for it cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,
which must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an
official publication thereof”. The mere reference on it in a pleading is not applicable on Philippine
Law by virtue of doctrine of processional presumption.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GAMAL BAHARAN , et al.
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
Rule 130, Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (Rules of Court)
FACTS:
Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentine’s Day bombing. The
prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly
before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman - announced over
radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role
in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had
supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the
accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of
Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the conductor who identified the two accused
to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb exploded. Accused contend that the
testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during
trial may be admissible as evidence against a co- conspirator.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator
against a coconspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if
the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Distinction must
be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given
in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.
G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
FACTS:
In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos Family and cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion stating
that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits
presented and identified by them in another related case. This motion partly denied insofar as the
adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud for the reason
that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the respondents.
Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by the
Bane deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto.
This was again denied by the SB, to wit: Judicial notice is found under Rule 129. This provision
refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being
the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which
need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant. Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again
denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and
admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this
relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as
evidence in the "parent" case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and
evidence presented in one of the cases consolidated.
HELD:
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge.
This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the
adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner
by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of
it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take

judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records
of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.
The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood,
involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would
be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case,
which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed
lineage of the cases.

MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally settled
is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and
the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.”
FACTS:
Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the plantation of
belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at
Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas pleaded not
guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the one who cultivated such, he
further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking did not happen since
he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San
Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but later on when confronted
he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being a tenant of 1.5 to two
hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he himself cultivated.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November
21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona
fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally
offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of
the People of the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held
that “the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was not
supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him
and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.”
ISSUE:
Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken judicial
notice of in a criminal case for theft?
HELD:
YES. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner
and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest
the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. No less than the
Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty.
“It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.”
Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.” Equally
settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with
guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted.” In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662
SCRA 152 [2011])

RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G. R. No. 107372, January 23, 1997
CASE DOCTRINE:
PAROL EVIDENCE. Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “when the terms of
the agreement are reduced into writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence can be admitted other than the contents thereof.”
Although Parol Evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in writing – unless there be fraud or mistake.
FACTS:
Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land for a consideration of
P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively as evidence by two (2) deed of sale.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. When the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles, Private
respondents, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person,
and petitioner’s acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their
answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence relating to certain stipulated condition made orally may be admitted
in evidence in addition to those expressly provided in a contract.
HELD:
NO. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to
writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such
terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not
found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the
deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a
contract, it is the law between the parties. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a
party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable
unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language.
Parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that “the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to
the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of
the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.”
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake
exists in this case.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALLIED BANKING CORP
G. R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
PAROL EVIDENCE. While parol evidence is generally admissible to explain the meaning of a
written contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating unto said contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned in the writing, unless there be fraud or
mistake.
FACTS:
Respondent bank filed instant collection suit against Petitioner Foundation and previous president
Tan for failure to pay four matured loan as evidenced by promissory notes signed by Tan in his
capacity as president of the said Foundation.
In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that said loans were
contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity. On the other hand, while admitting that the
loans were his personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that the same is not yet due as he had an
unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year
basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Trial Court ruled petitioners are liable to the bank solidarily. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
judgment of the court a quo. CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an
unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the
proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alleged unwritten agreement between the creditor and the debtor which is not
reflected on the promissory note (PN) evidencing the loan is admissible in evidence in addition to
the terms of the PN.
HELD:
NO. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding
the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank.
Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over
annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms
and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,

contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ
G. R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the
parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless
did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
FACTS:
Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject
property, to wit: Petitioner Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 square meters and Respondent Casimero
Valdez – 7,544.27 square meters.
In 1996, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two TCTs: one
- covering an area of 3,020 square meters; and two - covering an area of 1,004 square meters. Thus,
respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the
petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion on the ground that the
petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties' Agreement.
In his defense, the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has agreed that the extent of their
ownership would be based on their actual possession; (2) that he actually possessed and
subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two
portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question; and (3) that respondent participated
in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of subdivision, which corrected the mistake in the
previously executed Agreement and confirmed the petitioner's ownership over the disputed
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary to those expressly stated in an agreement
may be used as evidence.
HELD:
NO. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity the Agreement entered
into between him and the respondent. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect
the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the
parties' true intention. Factual findings of the CA holding that such affidavit is spurious due to
discrepancy of respondent’s signature therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis
for the claim of ownership of both parties. The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of
the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written
agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be
admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing
is understood to have been waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the
parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless
did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.

SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G. R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts
in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
FACTS:
Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a construction firm that sells
concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered
into a contract where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at
₱240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this,
however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an
upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15,
1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras
were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
HELD:
YES. Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to
acquire from Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the
rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading:

a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be
introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant,
tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms
averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence
of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected
to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form
the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure
to express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing
admission of parol evidence.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO
G. R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing
all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.
FACTS:
Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she alleged having
a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and
US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to
withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige.
PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on
their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding
loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her
husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat branch, as follows:
Three Million One Hundred Thousand Peso (P3,100,000) loan on March 21, 2001; a One Million
Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000) loan on April 2, 2001; and a Thirty-One Thousand
One Hundred US Dollar (US$31,1 00) loan on December 7, 2001.
During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let
alone receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents
which turned out to be the Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory
Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit
Substitute and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan Documents), she
professed not understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan
documents in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch
manager and Customer Relations Officer led her to believe that what she was signing were related
to new high-yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo
Sun.
The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had
proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a
corollary, the trial court held that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan
proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum
of money
HELD:
YES. In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan proceeds,
the CA doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the
transaction embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit a
separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan proceeds. Indeed, a promissory note
represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the date
and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a person
who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him

through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his promise
without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead its sharp
repudiation.
The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear
and unequivocal manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow
the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence is
necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. Following this doctrine,
Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be upheld,
absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.
The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has
not questioned the genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes,
she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot
plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and receive the value of the notes
or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory notes.
But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the
existence of the loan. Here, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan
application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from
each other, these documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken together,
collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was
aware of their terms and conditions.
Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing.
Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a
written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a
written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence
of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to
overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents
embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be upheld.

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA et al.
G. R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003
CASE DOCTRINE:
The facsimile signature in this case, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
is but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Thus, even generally
pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies and not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic
will not apply to this case.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged that the disputed
property was owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of petitioners; that Marcos’ son Adolfo, for
humanitarian reasons, allowed respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez’ land without
paying any rental. On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, RTC reversed the said decision.
Affirming the RTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The CA
lend credence to the Certification issued by the DENR’s community environment and natural
resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was
still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Therefore, respondents after sufficiently
proving their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof since 1960 have better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Hence, this Petition, petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion in giving weight to the
CENR Officer’s Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain
Jose F. Tagorda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible
in evidence.
HELD:
NO. The rule stated in Garvida v. Sales Jr that – “Pleadings filed via fax machines are not
considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as
there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic” is not applicable to the instant
case. The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature
of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded
to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director
has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification
were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in
his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was under the former’s direct control and supervision.

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel.
It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) who was terminated due to his alleged
participation in padding of Credit Meter Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal dismissal. CSC held that
petitioner's appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he
sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found that a verification of one of
the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such
number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner
should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed
his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its
Comment.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13, 2007,
which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile
transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of
documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic
Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his
letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint before the CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is allowed.
HELD:
NO. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he
claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period
to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax
machines and ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x”
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD
G.R. No. 182832, April 20, 2010
CASE DOCTRINE:
Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to criminal actions. The said Rules applies only to civil
actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
FACTS:
Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
for purposeful sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic
picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was
attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish
Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not text messages to be admissible as evidence in a criminal case must be authenticated
following the Electronic Evidence Rule.
HELD:
NO. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present criminal action. The said Rules applies
only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. (A.M. No. 01-7-
01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.)
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed
to have already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.
FACTS:
The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked suspiciously in front of a
glass shop. Enojas provided the police with identification that the officers suspected to be fake. The
officers then asked Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed.
On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who went into the store
apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The other officer got out of the
car upon hearing the gunshots. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene.
Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the
messages on the phone and communicated with the other suspects, resulting in an entrapment
operation.
Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006 before the Las Pifias
Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The
accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.
HELD:
1. NO, it is admissible.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them.
In the case at bar, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the
other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.
2. Yes, it is sufficient for conviction.

This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that
meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the
circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of
all the accused.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014.
CASE DOCTRINE:
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any
subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.
FACTS:
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the instant case.
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) while
Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation as Accounting Manager of
BANFF, effective on February 3, 2006 and continued working for BANFF until March of the same
year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas).
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining
salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the
check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by
Syhunliong. Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to one of BANFF's official
cellular phones held by Lumapas.
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay,
gratuities and tax refund. On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case,
Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public prosecutor finds probable
cause to indict Rivera the crime of libel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the
complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication?
HELD:
NO, the court made no error.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any
subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. In order to prove that a statement falls
within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either
be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without
malice. Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's
text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was speaking
in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of
Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying
it to the party concerned.

ELLA M. BARTOLOME vs. ROSALIE B. MARANAN
A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014
CASE DOCTRINE:
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions
and may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has
personal knowledge thereof.
FACTS:
This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint of Ella M. Bartolome
(complainant) filed against Rosalie B. Maranan [respondent, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite], charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of ₱200,000.00,
which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of
marriage.
She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the
need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. In support of her allegations, the
complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint, among others, the transcribed electronic
communications (text messages) between her and the respondent; and a versatile compact disc
(VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence she submitted are sufficient to prove the respondent’s
anomalous activities, and prayed for the immediate resolution of her complaint.
HELD:
Yes. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain
conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chat room sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. Under
Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events,
acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the
court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or
by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
In the present case, there is no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence
in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and
who therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the
sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her
conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number
reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She
confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation conducted by the Imus
Cavite Police.

BBB vs AAA
G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic
if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages.
FACTS:
BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical
student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named CCC, a boy.
During their relationship, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on December 11, 1997)
and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their
relationship. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was amended to change their
civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Later on, their relationship turn sour and
they decided to live separately. Citing economic and psychological abuse and presenting text
messages likewise as evidence, AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC.
Finding good ground in AAA’s application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made
permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007.
BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but ordered the remand of the case for
the latter to determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody of the
children. The CA found that under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their
children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity
which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. Further,
BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. While BBB alleged that FFF
was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not
help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had
entered into a compromise regarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support
of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody over both children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA and the RTC correctly admitted into evidence the unauthenticated text
messages adduced by AAA.
HELD:
Yes, the court made no error. In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, it is stated that any
question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the
party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. In the case at bar, BBB
attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted
authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not
deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages were sent. Hence, while at
first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an
interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While
BBB had admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those
messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB's arguments are unbearably
self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to
assail what is already apparent.

ASTORGA & REPOL LAW OFFICES VS. VILLANUEVA
A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were admitted as
evidence and given probative value by this court. In those cases, the court considered the content
of the text messages and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to
prove the commission of administrative offenses.
FACTS:
This is an administrative Complaint filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against Alexander D.
Villanueva, Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City. Complainant Astorga and Repol Law
Offices is represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares.
Astorga & Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance Corp. in a complaint for damages against
NEC Cargo Services Inc. The RTC decided in favor of FGU Insurance which became final and
executory. Writ of Execution was issued in 2006 and in 2008. Judge Villarosa issued an order
granting Astorga & Repol Law Offices’ motion to appoint special sheriff, thus, Sheriff Villanueva
was assigned to execute the decision. On October of 2008, Sheriff Villaueva and Atty. Legares
started coordinating with each other for the execution of the decision. There were exchange of text
messages between the two and there was an alleged demand for money. Thus, Sheriff Villanueva
was charged with willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct due to graft and corruption or
extortion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the text messages from Sheriff Villanueva serve as sufficient substantial evidence
to hold him liable.
HELD:
Yes, there is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegation of neglect of duty. The
Supreme Court held that in previous administrative cases, text messages were admitted as evidence
and given probative value by the court. In those cases, the court considered the content of the text
messages and identification of person sending them as substantial evidence to prove commission
of administrative offenses. The content of the text message sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual
evasion of duty to implement the writ constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of
administrative liability of Sheriff Villanueva. Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages
he received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs of the screen of his cellular phone,
showing the messages as they were received. He submitted respondent’s calling card that contained
the same phone number seen in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove
that respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied meeting with Atty. Lugares,
but he never denied sending the text messages to him.

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS VS. HEIRS OF DR. ANDRES NAVARRO
G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those
who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them
incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest
or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications.
Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds
when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
FACTS:
Marcos and her sister discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject
lot. The heirs of Andres Navarro based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
where Andres, Sr. (common ascendant of both petitioner and respondent) donated the subject lot
to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting
examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the
deed of donation. After the pre-trial, The Heirs moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They
argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. RTC granted
respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Petitioners elevated the case before
the CA by way of petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition.
ISSSUE:
Whether or not an expert, whose examination is not authorized by the trial court, disqualified from
being a witness.
HELD:
No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of
a witness, i.e., all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses. The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies
those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them
incapable of being witnesses; (2) Section 20 of the same rule providesfor disqualification based on
conflicts of interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications; and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification
of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes
of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.

PEOPLE VS. SALVADO GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency
of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the
matter testified to.
FACTS:
Golimlim was charged and convicted of the crime of rape committed against Evelyn G. Canchela
(Evelyn), a mental retardate who is the niece of the accused’s wife. The accused, on being
confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not normal,"
she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her." The trial
court in convicting the accused gave credence to the testimony of Evelyn.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mental retardate is not qualified to become a witness due to her mental state.
HELD:
No. Sections 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. On the
other hand, Section 21 of the same rule provides that the following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental
maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her
as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ VS. SUSAN RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
CASE DOCTRINE:
Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. On June 30,
1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against
him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
HELD:
Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants
or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at
the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.[11]
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other.
Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may
be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of

interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for
arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State
aims to protect.

PEOPLE VS. CASTAÑEDA
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
CASE DOCTRINE:
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal
case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not
one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which
completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
FACTS:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document. At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that
the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted
the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against herein private
respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M.
Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not
— may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
HELD:
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a
criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife. The act
complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in
truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime
could have been charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his
wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which,
accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other
is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

RAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
CASE DOCTRINE:
The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” The rule, however, delimits the
prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint for the delivery of the certificates of stocks representing the
1,500 share holdings of his deceased father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. In the answer,
Razon alleged that he owned the shares and the same remained in his possession. It was alleged
that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question.
CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock
of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not questioned
(not until the demand was made) Juan’s ownership of the shares and had not brought any action to
have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer
and in his oral Testimony): After organizing E. Razon, Inc.,Razon distributed shares, previously
placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The
shares of stock were registered in the name of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the
agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the Razon (as he was the one who paid for
all the subscription). Juan was given the option to buy the same but did not do so. CFI (RTC)
declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and ruled that Juan
Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the dead man’s statute rule
(DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although such testimony was not
objected to during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule.
HELD:
No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate. The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate of
the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him
(deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false
or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” The
rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner
herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian,
the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan
Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless
the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule.

SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA
G.R. No. 164401, June 25, 2008
CASE DOCTRINE:
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind
FACTS:
Lamberto T. Chua verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto L. Sunga in the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and
Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship.
Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the
latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the
profits would be equally divided between them.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly
his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and
management of Shellite without respondent's consent. The trial court and the ca ruled in favor of
the respondent. Both court held that partnership existed between Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga
until the latter’s death.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence
of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners
argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness,
Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this
argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man’s Statute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josephine’s testimony is covered by the dead man’s statute.
HELD:
No. The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to
the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the

transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial
evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim] against respondent in their answer before
the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed
this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff,
herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason
that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine
is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party
means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before
any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter
being the party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that Josephines testimony lacks probative value
because she was allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor.
Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she
were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from
this candid admission that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is
the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since
relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established
between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary
evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent
as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.

CHAN VS. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended
to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and
provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to
court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam
up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
The right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed
are “not privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not
privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene,
does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow,
however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be
the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
FACTS:
Josielene filed before the (RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of
custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his
family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement
for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two
men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations
got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her
only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be
repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he
was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in
evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.
HELD:
RTC was justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital
records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

LACUROM VS. JACOBA
A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006
CASE DOCTRINE:
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author
of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had
been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s
assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await
the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. This
petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacoba’s handiwork.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
FACTS:
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion
("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30
where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in
favor of Veneracion. Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for
Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"),
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff
a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not
be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the
30 July 2001 motion. Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi
last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed
the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years
with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading turned out to be the 30 July
2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the
practice of law.
Judge Lacurom issued another order, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be
held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein
he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements

implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later
rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine
of P500.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, committed
contempt of court
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision.
We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a
more severe sanction.

SAMALA VS. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007
CASE DOCTRINE:
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.” The
reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment. One of the following grounds being that the respondent served on
two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals,
herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the
tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance
before the RTC. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty. The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. An attorney
owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in
the same case or in a different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared
for the former client.
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act
of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance
with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an
attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not
be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and
her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and
Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him
and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is required.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing
contending parties
HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct
and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of
herein Resolution.
ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995
CASE DOCTRINE:
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding “illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting.” Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the
EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke
to support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides
that the “only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential” is that which refers
to the “purchase of information and payment of rewards.”
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and
orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and
all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him
from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The
letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was
addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including
the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such documents are privileged matter
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined
in this decision.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
CASE DOCTRINE:
Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to
categories of persons. While the validity of claim of privilege must be assessed on a case to case
basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there
is, in an implied privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. Certainly, Congress has the right
to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. A claim of privilege,
being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must be clearly asserted.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire-tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?
HELD:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter
of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se.
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim,
it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of
inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
CASE DOCTRINE:
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of
approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts
of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the
pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege.
HELD:
Yes. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.”
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in
the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

OSCAR CONSTANTINO ET AL. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO
G.R. No. 181508, October 2, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions.
FACTS:
In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro
Constantino, Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240
sqm. The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to
exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr.
Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul
the 1992 extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also
heirs of Pedro Sr., were excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents
have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ already have their lawful
share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to partition
the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.’s Estate.
RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule
in favor of respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually
belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein
respondent), did not adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other
heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and
admissions during the pre-trial conference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of
the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting
the issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it
and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and
during the trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA
G.R. NO. 146111, February 23, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception;
Following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of the accused’s
parents in offering to compromise cannot prejudice the accused, since he was not a party to the said
conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim.
FACTS:
Amalia Loyola left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) and Kimberly (1 year old) at their
house. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the
afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any
information. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her from a grove of ipil-
ipil tree. She found Remelyn crying, naked, and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil
leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Upon closer inspection,
she found a whitish mucuslike substance coming from Remelyns private organ.
A witness stated he saw Rolendo Gaudia pass by her house and take Remelyn. At this point, the
parents of Rolando told Amalia to just just settle the incident and they are willing to pay the amount
of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offer of Rolando Gaudia’s parents to settle was tantamount to an admission.
HELD:
No. Gaudia’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant
to Amalia, and by Gaudia himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him by
the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise
allegedly made by Gaudia to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative
value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify
on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise
allegedly made by Gaudia’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia.
However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his
parents cannot prejudice Gaudia, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown
that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot
be considered as evidence against Gaudia but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse
the conviction of the Gaudia.

CONRADO C. DOLDOL VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164481, September 20, 2005
CASE DOCTRINE:
Partial restitution of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing
funds.
FACTS:
Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26. The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on
their examinations showing his shortages. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer
requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the
findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund
the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal
Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance
of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, andP884,139.66 on or before
November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise. Two information for malversation of
public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Cour of San Carlos City. Doldol
was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he had already
partially paid the alleged shortage.
HELD:
The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually
pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromised which must be treated as
an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his
personal use.
Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove
that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner
could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts
of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and
offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00
on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only
P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial
restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the
missing funds.

RICHARD A. CAMBE VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 6, 2016
CASE DOCTRINE:
Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction would suffice."
FACTS:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal
pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund of Sen. Revilla
for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.
The charges are contained in two complaints, namely:
1. A complaint for plunder filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod
2. A complaint for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 filed by the Fieled
Investigation Office.
(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of
fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles
JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects and for
receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his commission or "kickback;
(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for
processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and for
personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;
(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: 1. the
commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated
PDAF; 2. the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for
"ghost" PDAF-funded projects; 3.the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents
to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; 4. the falsification and
machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies and in
liquidating disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for
misappropriation;
(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing
and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs cralawred through, among
others, their designation as Presidents/Incorporators of JLN-controlled NGOs,
namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. and Ginintuang Alay sa
Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to
Napoles's control;and
(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the Department
of Budget and Management, for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's
PDAF, by acting as contacts of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the
release of the Special Allotment Release Orders and Notices of Cash Allocation covering
Sen. Revilla's PDAF.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case,
Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a
"commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.
The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed
through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the
IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the
said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds. Thus, the Ombudsman held that
probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld.
HELD:
It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary
investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it." It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level. Accordingly, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.
This Court has ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there
is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter
alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.
In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding
probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on
record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key
documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings;
otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary
investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that in dealing with probable cause at the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Overall, based on the foregoing
disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case.
As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayanin
the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were
charged.

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO DACANAY
G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016
CASE DOCTRINE:
An extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. In this connection, extrajudicial confessions are
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.
FACTS:
Antonio Dacanay was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC. Norma,
the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their
home by their son, Quinn, who came from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the
house was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting
that a robbery had just taken place. At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having
allegedly left the house at around six in the morning. Quinn went to the house of his aunt, Beth
Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma, and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio. Both
Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police officers who were
then already conducting an investigation on the incident. During the interview, Antonio informed
PO3 Santos that Php 100,000 in cash and pieces of jewelry were missing. Antonio mentioned the
name Miller as an alleged lover of Norma who may have perpetrated the crime but after several
investigation made, it was never ascertained that Norma knew this person. Antonio was again
invited for another investigation who was willing to confess about the killing of Norma. PO3 Santos
apprised Antonio of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. However, as
determined by both the RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio
nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately interviewed
him without PO3 Santos. The media representatives testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his
complicity in the crime without any intimidation or coercion exerted on his person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio guilty of the crime of
Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was
interviewed by the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers
within the proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted
by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the
crime in a candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in
him".
Antonio’s confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant.
They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and
reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead,

he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the
crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed
by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant
by the news reporters.
Hence, as extensively discussed above, considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption
of voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife,
Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

JOSUE R. LADIANA vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
CASE DOCTRINE:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the
accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during
a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during
the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
evidence against the affiant.
FACTS:
Josue Ladiana, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged with murder
before the Sandiganbayan for the death of Fancisco San Juan. During the trial, Cortez, the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, testified that the accused executed before
him a counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as
witness, Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness
of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to
before Cortez. However, Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. The same counter-
affidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused. The court a quo held that his Counter-
Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death,
may be used as evidence against him. On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counter-
affidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial confession as the same was executed during
custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in a
counter-affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel may
be admitted as an extrajudicial confession against him.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement
of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting
the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is
an admission, not a confession.
Ladiana admits shooting the victim, which eventually led to the latter’s death but denies having
done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether
categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him as the
voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY
G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
FACTS:
The case at hand is an automatic review of the Decision dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of qualified rape. In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two
counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to
indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000
for each count of acts of lasciviousness. Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano,
four informations were filed against her uncle, the appellant. The appellant, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases ensued and on December 15,
1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged. The trial
court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn statement the same
were admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. In view of the trial courts imposition of the
death penalty on the appellant, the said cases were brought to the Supreme Court on automatic
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement of the accused is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
Yes. Although counsel did not assist the appellant at the time he gave his statement to the barangay
chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he
was neither under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities, which will
include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellant’s statement before the barangay
chairman is inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO
G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, is
that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s
rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the
extrajudicial confession has been denounced.
FACTS:
On November 9, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, found appellant
Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death. It also found appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and
appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and
the accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs. The appellants argued that the extrajudicial confession of the appellant may not be
admitted in evidence against him because the lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office, who was
his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel for remaining silent during the entire proceedings, was not independent, as he
was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP
Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of the
accused when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel not by
an effective and vigilant counsel.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this
case. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:  ”Sec. 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. (2) These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition
for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly
complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for
this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations.
Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant
did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible. Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the
passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section
12, Article III of the Constitution. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional

principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he
might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational
attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control
of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

CARLOS TANENGGEE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 179448, June 26, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
The proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt is applicable only in
custodial interrogation, which means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after
a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner.
FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for Estafa were filed against the petitioner. The
RTC then entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea and the cases
were then consolidated and jointly tried. The prosecution alleged that on different occasions,
appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan.
Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch located at New Divisoria market building, Divisoria, Manila. Appellant affixed, forged or
caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the
back of the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the
checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were
forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged
loan and misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans,
an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of questions and answers.
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he
conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes;
that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should
be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him
(Exhibit "N"). After the joint trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. Petitioner
appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA. The CA promulgated its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence,
the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written
statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation
when the same was taken.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. The
constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation, which means any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed
certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, “(1) to remain silent, (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two
other rights above.” In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled

written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in
any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement as it was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer
in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment.
No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due
consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.

MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS Y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 190583, December 7, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence
of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal
mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on
its voluntariness.
FACTS:
The petitioner was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old Balara, Tandang Sora, Quezon City branch
(Old Balara branch) of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop (Cebuana). She was tasked to safe keep all the
pawned items and jewelry inside the branch vault. Likewise employed in the same branch were
Teresita Salazar (Salazar) and Jeannelyn Carpon (Carpon) who served as Branch Manager and
District Manager, respectively. Salazar was responsible for the overall operation of the Old Balara
branch and was also tasked to handle the appraisal of pawned items and the recording of such
transactions. Carpon, on the other hand, supervised the overall operations of the branches within
her district ensuring that they are operating within the objectives, procedures, and policies of
Cebuana; she also monitored the district bank account and handled the appraisal of pawned items
and the recording of cash. On October 27, 1998, a surprise audit was conducted at the Old Balara
branch by Cebuana’s internal auditors, Mila Escartin (Escartin) and Cynthia Talampas (Talampas).
The audit revealed that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of ₱1,250,800.00 were
missing. A cash shortage of ₱848.60 was likewise discovered. When the petitioner was asked to
explain the discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her explanation into writing. The
next day, an audit report was sent to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of Cebuana. Upon
receipt of the audit report on October 28, 1998, Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old Balara
branch to conduct an investigation. He called Escartin and the petitioner for a meeting during which
the petitioner handed over several pawn tickets while Escartin gave him a handwritten letter made
by the petitioner On May 10, 1999, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC
against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. Salazar and Carpon entered a “Not Guilty” plea upon
arraignment on July 13, 1999. The petitioner likewise pleaded “Not Guilty” during her arraignment
on August 9, 1999. Trial thereafter ensued the RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence
establishing that the petitioner perpetrated the offense. The petitioner’s co-accused Salazar and
Carpon were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
which the RTC denied but it reduced the penalty it had earlier imposed to four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum. Undeterred, the petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rejected the
petitioner’s arguments and upheld the RTC’s findings and conclusions. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but her motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a serious error in not finding that the trial court gravely erred in rendering
judgment upon conjecture and surmises vis-à-vis the absence of circumstancial evidence.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court stated that intent to gain can be deduced from the petitioner’s possession
of the foregoing pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by
their respective pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter

stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.
The tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances of the petitioner at the time she wrote
and signed it, all militate against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an administrative
case unless she admits her transgression. The petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter
spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if there are any problems in the Old Balara branch, the
petitioner answered that she will write down her explanation and will submit it to Escartin. The
petitioner also told Talampas that if she will escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go
after her and that she will just face the consequences. Talampas then saw the petitioner make and
sign the confession letter. When Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further investigation,
Escartin handed her the confession letter from the petitioner. The language of the confession letter
was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner.
Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than
risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for
one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The
petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her
confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus,
negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an administrative sanction. Under the law, it
is stated that a confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator
of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession,
thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case. The petitioner’s
extrajudicial written confession coupled with the following circumstantial evidence all point to her
as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DIONISIO SANTOS, appellant.
G.R. No. 127492, January 16, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses nor the veracity of the weight of their testimonies.
FACTS:
That on or about October 22, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery
and with the aid of armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault, and use personal violence upon the person of VALENTINO A. GUEVARRA by then and
there hacking and stabbing him with jungle bolos and samurais on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said Valentino A. Guevarra multiple hack and stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death.
At the trial, the accused invoked alibi, claiming that when tragedy struck on October 22, 1989, he
was in Balut, Tondo, where he worked as a plumber, far from the place of the killing. He admitted,
however, that he started work only on October 24, 1989, and returned to their house in Pepin Street,
Sampaloc, Manila on October 29.26 He claimed that prosecution witness Rodelio Dipana pointed
to him because they once had a quarrel during a drinking spree. After trial, Dionisio was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Dionisio appealed to Supreme Court and cites an inconsistency between the testimonies of Lucita
and the other prosecution witnesses. When asked what time the incident happened, Lucita
mentioned noontime. The two other witnesses, however, testified that the incident occurred late in
the afternoon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies affect the credibility of the witnesses no the veracity of
the weight of their testimonies.
HELD:
No. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses nor the veracity of the weight of their testimonies.
The fact that, immediately after the hacking, Ernesto del Rosario went to the victim’s house and
informed Lucita of the incident, does not lead to the conclusion that she was not present at the scene
of the crime. It is entirely possible that a well-meaning person may inform another of an incident
not knowing that the latter already had prior knowledge of the same. Indeed, there is no reason why
the victim’s mother would fabricate a story to accuse an innocent person of such grave a crime.
The natural interest of the witness, who is a relative of the victim in securing the convictions of the
guilty would deter her from implicating a person other than the true culprit. It is therefore highly
unlikely for her to lie as to the identity of one of her son’s assailants. Moreover, the defense did not
present any evidence of ill motive on the part of the victim’s mother. In the absence of any evidence
tending to question her motive and integrity, her testimony should be given fall credit. The absence
of improper or evil motive for a prosecution witness to make false imputations against the accused
strengthens her credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES
G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001
CASE DOCTRINE:
Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS:
Lorielyn Nardo, the Plaintiff, filed a case of rape against her father which happened on 24 February
1996 that at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente (Plaintiff’s grandfather)
left for work. Alfredo (Defendant) told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then ordered
Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father
followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts. Lorielyn pleaded,
“Papa, please stop it Have mercy.” Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed
her to the bed. Lorielyn started to cry, while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her
and had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck down. She tried to free herself
but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He threatened
to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did. Alfredo again asked Lorielyn for
another sexual intercourse but Lorielyn went to her aunt, Carol until she filed the case of rape
against her father. In the trial, after the prosecution and defense presented their witnesses, Lorielyn
was recalled to the witness stand by way of rebuttal evidence with regard to the allegation on the
unremitted salary. Then on clarificatory questioning, Lorielyn reiterated that her father, Alfredo,
had sexual intercourse with her.
The RTC ordered the Defendant of guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the Plaintiff is credible.
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudence provides that courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person
would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her
ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
In this case, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited
wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents’ permission to leave the
house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: “Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.” While lying may
constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the
moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s own
father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF ALEJAGA
G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002
CASE DOCTRINE:
A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person—the latter’s knowledge, belief, or
good or bad faith and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant
without violating the hearsay rule.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary,
for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact.
FACTS:
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondents, the PNB of
Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application (VI-
2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas
City. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the approval of Free Patent Application and issuance
of Original Certificate of Title in the name of Felipa Alejaga is by means of fraud, hence null and
void ab initio.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that
respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation. Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay the Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that
Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of
Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Isagani Cartegena that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not
conducted an investigation on the Free Patent Application is not admissible on the grounds of
hearsay.
HELD:
No. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person—the latter’s knowledge, belief,
or good or bad faith and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant
without violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay.
In addition, the doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth
or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary
but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the
existence of such fact.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of
justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC of Dumaguete City by Footlucker’s Chain of
Stores, Inc. (Footlucker’s). At the trial, Karen Guivencan, only other witness for the Prosecution
declared that Go, a former branch manager of Footlucker, had requested her to audit petitioner after
some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had
still reflected outstanding balances for them. She discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers
varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the
office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report denominated as “List
of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit
Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997” marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner
had misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92.
In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing
objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,
were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding
her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not
alleged in the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for
being hearsay.
HELD:
Yes.The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not
from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify
based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
In this case, Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive,
must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion, on the ground of
hearsay.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO D. CALINAWAN a.k.a. “MEO,”
G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001
CASE DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in
a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
FACTS:
At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice’s seven (7)-year-old
daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled
the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice’s brother and neighbor, was awakened
by shouts coming from his sister’s house. He rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After
bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor’s
house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and
she answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When
Darwin Silan, Janice’s husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she
reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the medical treatment
at the hospital.
The RTC convicted Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor positively and
categorically identified him as the one who stabbed her mother. It noted that she was able to identify
him because of his amputated fingers. In addition, the trial court pointed out that the dying
declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated Marigor’s statement that Calinawan killed her
mother. The RTC stated that his positive identification trumped his denial and alibi, which were
considered as inherently weak defenses
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Janice is admissible evidence.
HELD:
Yes. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his
a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
In this case, first, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never
had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately
identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place. Lastly,
the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing. Hence the dying
declaration is admissible evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GATARIN
G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014.
CASE DOCTRINE:
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the
rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending.
FACTS:
Sonny Gatarin, the accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together,
acting in common accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation of person,
did then and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away cash money
amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario
Castillo y Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said accused
with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y
Masangcay alias “Ka Maning,” thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior
chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly caused his death. RTC indicted the accused
guilty of homicide. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC however the CA considered Januario’s
statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who stabbed him and took his wallet,
not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Januario to SPO3 Mendoza is admissible evidence.
HELD:
No, not as a dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay
rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made,
the declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear
that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements.
The rule is that, in order to make adying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS alias “ABE”
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the other
hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another exception
to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
FACTS:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home
when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini,
Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused
ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running
at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the
policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when
it became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There
they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the
policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag
Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that
it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein,
while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large.
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition.
Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death.
CA affirmed RTC decision hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence.
HELD:
No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when
death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c)
the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear
that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and

impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL et al.
G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997
CASE DOCTRINE:
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: “(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true.”
FACTS:
Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During trial, the prosecution, in order to prove
that accused has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented Enriquez, a common friend
of both the accused and the victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him
that the latter is having an affair with accused’s wife. The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s
testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to the circumstances prior to the alleged
abduction, convicted the accused. Accused assailing the decision of the trial court and for admitting
the testimony of Enriquez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that is
against the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person.
HELD:
Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons." A statement may be admissible
when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made
said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. Openda, Jr.,
having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a
crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment.

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS &
TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
CASE DOCTRINE:
A declaration about pedigree is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
FACTS:
Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG), sold the
property originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. Thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name. When Martin Guerrero
died, herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s niece and nephew, filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation from TDG. During the trial, Corazon, one of the petitioners, testified that she is the
niece of TDG and submitted documentary evidence such as pictures, baptismal certificate etc. to
prove the alleged filiation. Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The
trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence. In upholding the dismissal, respondent
Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as
the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a hearsay
evidence.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy
in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status
cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The burden
of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but
on private respondent who is disputing the same. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining
the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the
effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made
ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no dispute with

respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that
is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very
declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship,
does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. We
are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the
estate of the declarant herself.

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
CASE DOCTRINE:
The common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. x x x [Thus] matters of pedigree may be
proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except
where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the
community.
FACTS:
Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison.
In her complaint, she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2) MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo;
(3) since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family; and (4) that FRANCISCO gave her support and
spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public
accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. At trial on the merits, MONINA
presented as documentary evidence letters written by Francisco’s relatives as proof of her
recognition as illegitimate daughter of the latter. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her
filiation as FRANCISCO's
illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record. Francisco
elevated the case before the SC and assailed the admissibility of the letters of his relatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible in evidence as part of the
family reputation.
HELD:
No. Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being
no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130, Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides: Sec.
40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied) It
is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing
the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether letter presented in this
case as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the
preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights and
family portraits," We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known
as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its

belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and
well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a
family tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private documents not constituting "family possessions"
as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these
exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having
been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is
a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be proved
by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the
pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
CASE DOCTRINE:
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately
after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma
Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of
them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information for murder was filed against several
members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial Court. A separate information
were also filed against them for the attempted murder and another for frustrated murder.
Issue:
Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible.
Ruling:
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this case.
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and
are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
immediately attending circumstances. x x x x
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general
way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact
and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the

circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately
after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons
have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points
in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362. April 4, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is
thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
FACTS:
Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide Cagatan. During the trial, prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) Remedios, sister-in-law of the victim, who testified that she
saw accused pointing their gun at the victim; (2) Lolita Cagatan, mother of the victim, who testified
that she was at the sala when she heard gunshots followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking
for help stating that he was shot by Berting (accused); (3) Francisco, father of the victim; who
testified that he also heard gunshots and saw accused aiming their guns upward and were about to
leave.
RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to
the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate review,
the CA modified the RTC's decision and convicted the accused with murder. The accused contend
that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony
is a hearsay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the victim immediately after the shooting
incident is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception
to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Statements
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.”
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res
gestaeincludes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance

inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is
thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act - the shooting of Haide - was
a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of
Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered
immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling
occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the
statement was reliable as part of theres gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction
to the startling occurrence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES
G.R. No. 136303, July 18, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE:
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.
The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered
in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the
statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence
or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5)
the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
FACTS:
The prosecution presented Sonny Boy Redovan who was the nephew of the victim. According to
him, he asked the victim what happened of which the latter answered that he had been waylaid.
When asked who was the assailant, the victim answered that it was Juany andTony Palmones which
were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. He also claim that there were nurses and
bystanders who were present in the room when the victim made such statement.
Another witness was Dr. Aguyao who said that the victim told him that he did not know the
assailant because it was dark. On cross-examination he stated that it was Sonny Redovan who was
with the victim at the time he interviewed the victim.
The third witness was Police Inspector Tagum, he testified that while chasing a suspected motor
vehicle PO3 Aniceta called him on the radio and told him that the accused-appellants were the
assailants. It was confirmed when he went to the house of the two whom he met Triny Palmones
and asked the latter if her brother owned a Kawasaki motor vehicle of which it affirms.
OSG ordered of the acquittal of the accused-appellants on the ground that the Trial Court erred in
admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the hearsay rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission by the victim be considered as dying declaration?
HELD:
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant
concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the
consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution.
It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim
whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny
Boy Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing
he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his two assailants.
For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the victim was if the
victim knew who had shot him. While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant
explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope of life, the circumstances surrounding
his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death. In the
instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition.

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we
rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered
the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time
that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements
attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements
not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment.
Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that
could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together,
indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity
in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. 92740, March 23, 1992
CASE DOCTRINE:
A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable
proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon
memory and recollection. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which
illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae
FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are
passengers of PAL Flight No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour
before the published departure time; (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before
departure; (4) upon checking-in, they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats
awarded to chance passengers; (5) they have to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered damages
due to the cancellation.
Petitioner disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said
flight was due to their having check-in late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented the
check-in counter clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk
testified that: (1) the respondents were late and that he noted the time of check-in on their tickets;
and (2) there were other passengers who came late before the respondents. In relation to the
testimony, two documentary evidence were offered, namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation “late
4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger manifest showing the other names of other passengers who
were also late.
Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-serving.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business
may not be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late
4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private
respondents and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation
of Capati and Go and the private respondents are entries made in the regular course of business
which the, private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other
than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that
speaks a uniform language

Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self- serving cannot be
sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying
or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate,
elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.

LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003
CASE DOCTRINE:
Entries in official records. An exception to the hearsay rule are entries in official records as
provided under Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Entries in police records made by a police
officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless
admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
FACTS:
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in
Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS-
917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was
bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around ₱110,692, while
the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at
₱35,000 more or less.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the
claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate
the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper
driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license
provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the
insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized
driver" clause of the insurance policy. Respondent cited a police blotter where it was indicated
therein that it was Leonardo Anit who is driving the insured vehicle.
Trial court dismissed the case for it lacks sufficient cause of action. CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for
the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor
Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself, attesting that it was
Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not police blotter is admissible and may be given probative value?
HELD:
Yes. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the
said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law
to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted
as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein
stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy.
Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number
FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that "entries in the police blotters should
not be given undue significance or probative value," since the Court there found that "the entries in
question are sadly wanting in material particulars".
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The
person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct
the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating
officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

SABILI vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193261 , April 24, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
Entries in official records, as an exception to the hearsay rule, is admissible when the following
requisites concur: a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.
FACTS:
COMELEC denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) Sabili for the
position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections for allegedly not complying with the
one-year residency requirement for local elective officials. When petitioner filed his COC for
mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city
for two (2) years and eight (8) months. One of the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner
is the Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC did not consider
in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador
Honrade that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight
was raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside
on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot
be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from
the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a
notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certification from the Barangay Captain shall be admissible in evidence
HELD:
Yes . The SC disagrees with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification
and find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a
notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also
be entitled to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC.
44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in
evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep
an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay." Regarding the second requisite, we have
explicitly that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own
barangay." Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and
duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay
Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider
Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

CERCADO-SIGA vs. CERCADO, JR
G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Entries in official records. It has been settled in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista that church
registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders
No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document
is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed,
or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties
to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Vicente
Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora) among the respondents. They claim that
they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married
last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal.
Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession,
ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share
was acquired by petitioners by operation of law.
To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents:
1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued
by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3) Certification of
non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Pililla, Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record
of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint
Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.
Respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married
on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties- interest to institute the
case because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the
marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was
married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches.
The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and it concluded
that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently,
the trial court held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the
property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners.
The appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private
document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the
appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive
proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco
attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court
for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action by
preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution
of the RTC.
Hence this petition.
Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law
to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim

to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be
regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate
presented by petitioners, and the open and public cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient
proof of their marriage.
Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said
document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the
requirement of authentication.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage
between Vicente and Benita.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of
U.S. v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it
must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution,
saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had
previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to
present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the
marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she
identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate
original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in
Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the
same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without
accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document
purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer
acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue
that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no
merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished
by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9
October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no
evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the requirement of proper
custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however,
we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented
a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated
with respect to her kinsfolk.

MERALCO vs. QUISUMBING
G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE:
Certain commercial lists and reports of matters of interest to persons engaged in a particular
occupation are admissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay rule, provided, they are made by
persons engaged in that occupation and are generally used and relied upon by them and those lists
and reports are published. (Sec. 45, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court).
FACTS:
There was a labor dispute between Meralco and Union due to an alleged unfair labor practice. The
Union insisted their economic and political demands. The Union relies on the estimate that All Asia
financial analyst had published that Meralco's net operating income for the same year was about
P5.7 billion to support its claim on the wage increase. Meralco alleged that its actual total net
income for 1996 was only P5.1 billion, The Secretary of Labor directed the parties to execute a
Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the 2,200 increase in wages and increase in other
benefits, such increases were based on the P5.7 billion Meralco’s net income as published by All
Asia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor’s reliance on the published report of All Asia regarding
Meralco’s net income in granting the increase in wages and benefits is misplaced
HELD:
Yes. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the
wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase.
Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only
"if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein." The report is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this
in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared
by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner,
newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be

admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering
that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.
The Secretary gravely abused his discretion in making this wage award by disregarding evidence
on record. He misappreciated the evidence in favor of claims that do not have evidentiary support.
The MERALCO projection had every reason to be reliable because it was based on actual and
undisputed figures. On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation that the
union failed to substantiate. The All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper report
that did not show any specific breakdown or computations.

PEOPLE vs. ORTIZ-MIYAKE
G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997
CASE DOCTRINE:
For Sec. 47 of Rule 130 (testimony or deposition at a former proceeding) to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or
desposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as
that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo
and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in
the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous
decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment.
Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, rendered in
Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision
was not appealed and had become final and executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional
Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal
recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier
decision as its own findings of facts and as its retionale for the conviction in the case before it.
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely for the
lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based
on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque where appellant was found
guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.
It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the
Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario
as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person,
particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal
recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the Parañaque
court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is
erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants
Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court may admit decision in the previous proceeding to prove guilt of the
accused in subsequent proceeding

HELD:
No. Rule 130 Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation.
Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to
allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or
produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay
rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice
orderly and expeditious.
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the
Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo
and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and
utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous
decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused
was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a
crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the
crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in
a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him.

GO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding – The procedure for taking depositions in criminal
cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite
the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or
unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. As provided under Section 15, Rule 119, the examination of witnesses must be done orally
before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures
to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. To take
the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings
but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is
crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
FACTS:
Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged for Other Deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) because of defrauding Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by
Li Luen Ping by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations to the effect that they
have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in
the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone
(BEPZ) in which they executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 in favor of ML Resources and Highdone
Company Ltd. They represented that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in
fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and
foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION.
Li Luen Ping is a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back
to the Philippines in order to attend the case hearings. Subsequently, trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral
Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia
and that upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill
health in which the MeTC granted.
RTC declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking
of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a
specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
CA held that MeTC did not committed grave abuse of discretion for allowing the deposition-taking
of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the
taking of depositions in criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the prosecution’s motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral
depositions in Laos, Cambodia must be upheld.

HELD:
No. The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot,
however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution
witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his
fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered

under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in
open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused
his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the
"safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of
their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of

witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. As exceptions, Rule 23
to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by
a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination
of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a
foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision
of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he
should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court
concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to

present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be
evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in
the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick
or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
While the SC recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to
prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for
a strict construction of the rules.
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both
civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular
official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances. However, the
suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable
prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1
of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal,
and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory
application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily
governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and
squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise."
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused
to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses The CA took a simplistic view on the use of
depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the
Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of
witnesses.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the
accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating
the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Child Witness Rule. Under Sec. 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child (A.M. No. 004-07-SC
15 December 2000), a statement of a child may be allowed in evidence in any criminal or non-
criminal proceeding. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging
the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell
the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.
FACTS:
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing
that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and
could barely read, and did not know how to tell time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rachel’s testimony may be admitted
HELD:
Yes. We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she
witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her
mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's
competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of
a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and
tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to
who killed her father.
We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination on the
competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was
attacked by accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she
saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the
happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was not
diminished.

PEOPLE vs. ESUGON
G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Child Witness Rule. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been
erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion
of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
FACTS:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his
younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house.
He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while
he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light
upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of
his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the
appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted
that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon being asked by the
trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure
of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through
the stairway.
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that after the incident she took Carl and had him sit on
her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who
it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw
somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed.
Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed
to appellant and said " siya po yung pumasok sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often
goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim.
PO1 Fabela also testified that when he went to the hospital and interviewed the persons thereat.
Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and
robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station. PO2 Sazon
meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the
suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted
out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant
to the police station but the latter denied having committed the crime.
RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged. The appellant posits that the adverse
testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful;
that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from
sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on

the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody
shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide
was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad,
whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had
entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
HELD:
Yes. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events
witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be
witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following

persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with
which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the
party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability
of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving
events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of
a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant
extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to
attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity
to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court.
Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the
appellant.

It seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and
peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the
inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Carl
positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy
to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his
obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the
child’s family.

PEOPLE vs. ABRIOL
G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001
CASE DOCTRINE:
An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the
inquiry relates and who possess special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express
an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a
witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. The question of whether a witness is properly
qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rest with the discretion of the trial court.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal possession of firearms at RTC of Cebu City
for killing Alexander Flores. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Romeo Sta.
Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard his jeep who heard a couple of gunshots; Po3 Celso
Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No.3 who found four(4) .45 caliber shells
some four(4) feet away from the victim’s body, and two(2) deformed slugs where the victim had
lain; Dr. Ladislao Diola Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory who had autopsied the
victim’s body; and SPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Accused-appellant Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No.
CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor.
He presented a Memorandum Receipt authorizing him to carry the government-issued .38 revolver.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP
Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot of the
victim.
The trial court found appellant’s version of the incident neither convincing and credible and, as
earlier stated, it believed the prosecution’s version. Petitioners were convicted of the offenses
charged.Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical doctor and ballistic expert should be stricken
down.
HELD:
No. The office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola’s testimony is supported by
Dr.Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could
make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include : (1) shooting in a contact or near fire;
(2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin sidewise;
and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller
than the firearms caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before
entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the skin. Dr. Diola testified that a .45
caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim’s head and extremities. Dr. Cerna
corroborated Dr. Diola’s findings in this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants theory
that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim.
An expert witness is “one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possess special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to
express an opinion. There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge
that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case;

and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of
whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistic rests with the discretion
of the trial court.
In giving credence to Caser’s expert testimony the trial court explained.
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms.
Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is
satisfied Caser’s examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser’s
conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of
the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at
the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet into the body of his victim, he
releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply
imprints on every bullet its characteristics marking peculiar to that gun a d that gun alone. These
markings might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they
are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger. An expert
witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his
findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence
bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.

BAUTISTA vs. CA
G.R. No. 158015, August 11, 2004
CASE DOCTRINE:
Expert Witness. The opinion of an expert, having special knowledge, skill, experience or training
may be admitted in evidence as stated under Sec. 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The court,
however, is not bound by the opinion of an expert witness. Expert opinions are not ordinarily
conclusive. When faced with conflicting expert opions, courts give weight and credence to that
which is more complete, thorough and scientific (Bacalso v. Padigos, 552 SCRA 185).
A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although
such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
FACTS:
The dispute involves a parcel of land which was previously owned and registered in the name of
the late Cesar Morelos. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother
of her mother, Rosario Morelos. Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any
children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and
conveyed the parcel of land in favor of Laura as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale" notarized
by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
petitioner Laura Bautista. Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos
with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale.
Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and invoke the testimony of Carmelita
Marcelino, the instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who confirmed that it was the
decedent Cesar Morelos who affixed his signature to the document.
On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedent's signature on the Deed was forged. He
presented the testimony of Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory
Service, that the signature of decedent on the questioned instrument, when compared to other
documents bearing the authentic signature of Cesar Morelos, did not match and appeared to have
been authored by a different person. Cruz, Jr. declared that the latest document bearing the genuine
signature of the decedent is dated March 31, 1982, while the alleged forged signature was made on
April 5, 1982, or a mere lapse of five days. According to him, it is not possible to have significant
variation between the two signatures, considering the proximity of time when the signatures where
affixed.
Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP, testified
that the thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing on the residence certificate indicated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale, when compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates issued to the
decedent, did not match and appears to be the thumbmark of another person.

RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Sale valid while the CA reversed and set aside the
judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a
duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale.
HELD:
No. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn
this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to
establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Due to the technicality of the
procedure involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned
document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not
mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.
Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue
of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a
highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist
on a highly technical issue.
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery
and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically
present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an
expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the
witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution
thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura
Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioners.
Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without

citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing, which
would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay person.
Authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity,
rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that may be found between
the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's
authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of
experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be
taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which
the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the
kind of pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of the signature.
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight
should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned
handwriting and an authentic one.
Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein
expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. The authenticity and due execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld.

BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO BULAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise,
and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert.
Minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative value of the testimony of
a witness regarding the very act of the accused.
FACTS:
On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a
tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to
board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio
and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left
lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type jeep owned by the barangay
and driven by its Chairman, Generoso Hispano, herein victim.
While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly
emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of
gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the
center island of the road.
Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby “Abel” Avelino, whom
he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his
chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene,
Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home. When the police arrived at the crime scene,
Chairman Hispano was already dead.
Denying tge accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2
Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D.
Cabamongan.
Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his
wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they planned to
go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the afternoon, instead of
going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night.
He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later, he woke up to transfer his car but his
car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the Anticarnapping Unit along U. N. Avenue to report
the incident.
After the trial, the RTC, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the RTC
decision with modification by increasing the award of actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position
of the gunman.
HELD:
No. The Court have carefully studied the records of this case and find no cogent reason to overturn
the ruling of the CA which is accord with law and jurisprudence.

The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the
gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to
Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an
ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place
where the empty shells were found is immaterial.
Expert evidence is admissible only if : (a) the matter to be testified to is one that required expertise,
and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to
make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do jot destroy the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused.
Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated
by Cañada, must stand.

PEOPLE vs. DURANAN
G.R. No. 134074-75, January 16, 2001
CASE DOCTRINE:
Ordinary Witness. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in
evidence regarding – (a) the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a
handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted (Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence).
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits,
and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors
and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon
his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or
other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.”
FACTS:
Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is
considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply
does household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's family in the
same apartment where he rented a room that he shared with several other people.
The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. Nympha was standing by the door of
her grandfather's house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged
her inside the common bathroom. Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed her and then
removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for
help because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did she claimed that
accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance. After the incident,
complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly home.
The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994, according to complainant.
She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her
from her house and took her to his room. According to complainant, accused-appellant asked his
brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his brother had left, accused-appellant
laid her on the floor and raped her. Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-
appellant's lust because of his threats. After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters
professing love her and telling her how beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters
after reading them.
In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her
inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them.
He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara,
complainant's mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp
Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by
accused-appellant. Virginia noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted
her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. They then filed
affidavits and two informations for the crime committed and then they took complainant to Camp
Crame for examination. Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant, submitted a report
which contained findings of some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to
intercourse indicating the possibility of intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity
within the last five days.
The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan,
accused-appellant's alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita
Duranan. With respect to the first incident of rape it is contended that accused-appellant could not
have committed such because he was not at home at that time. As to the second incident of rape,
accused-appellant contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his room because there
were at least six other people there at the time of the alleged rape. Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig
confirmed accused-appellant's schedule. Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-
appellant and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape could not have been
committed in a room where at least five other people were sleeping.
RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal two (2) counts of rape On
appeal, accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim's mental
age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential
element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainant's mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that
only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities
symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the opinion of the ordinary witness (mother of the victim) regarding the mental
condition or sanity of the victim be received in evidence
HELD:
Yes. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be
received in evidence regarding ---
a. the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical
and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits,
and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors

and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon
his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or
other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the
mental condition of her daughter that at the age of 25 she still thinks like a child but from her
narration or statement it can be seen that her declaration are true or believable.

PEOPLE vs. DIOPITA
G. R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE:
Religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because
of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved in the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty
of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rafael Diopita Guzman, a “Ministerial Servant” in the congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man
and a good Christian who preaches the word of God, Diopita dragged the victim Dominga Pikit-
pikit through the banana plantation towards the cornfields and sat on her thighs and proceeded to
divest her and her belongings – ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring
and P1, 000.00 cash. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and
frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. The defense denied
the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 o’clock in the
evening on April 16, 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses
Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible session
upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he
never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and testified on
his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith.
The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of crime charged;
consequently, accused appellant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diopita is entitled to acquittal because of his good moral character and exemplary
conduct.
HELD:
No. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such “sterling” qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of
“Ministerial Servant” in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous
proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an
acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The
affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the
prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since
the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more sufficient to convict, the evidence of good
moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
Credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses
and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in
question. This argument is as puerile as the first. The precision with which the witnesses for the
defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the
participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves
scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated.
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is at best and most competently
performed by the trial court.

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR CHANTE
GR. No. 170598, October 09, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely:
(a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden;
and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence,
or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
FACTS:
Instant complaint was filed by FEBTC against Chante to recover from Chan the principal
sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn
from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that Chan had withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00
from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the
withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at
P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were processed and recorded by the
respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following circumstances,
namely: (a)the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s
account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum withdrawal limit of
the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being
reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions from his current account with the
FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC asserted further that defendant took
advantage of a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.
Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the
withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed withdrawals,
citing a newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having
debited accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as
information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any
human being like him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil action be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant relies
on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation.
RULING:
No. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere
allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is
given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility
of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely
upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the
defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint
in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or

impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if
proved, would exculpate him from liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely:
(a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden;
and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence,
or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such
a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other
concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of
trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its
second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept
it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon
the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had
used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly
withdrawn from the ATM account.

IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 123817, December 17, 1999
CASE DOCTRINE:
When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an
obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.
FACTS:
Spouses Tarnate entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the
lots in question from its original owner Spouses Reyes. The Tarnates failed to pay the loan
and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the
bank was the sole bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was issued. The said certificate
stated that redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale.
Certificate of sale was registered on October 16, 1979.
Within the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots
and tendered the redemption amount. However, petitioner Bank refused and argued that the
right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of
the Certificate of Sale. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow
their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They argued that they were entitled to redeem the
foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before
October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption period stated on the certificate
of sale precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense to oppose the exercise of right of
redemption.
RULING:
Yes. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they
had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner
is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the
period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate
and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period
provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year
redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances
imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his
silence can be construed as consent.

SPOUSES ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN et al.
G. R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003
CASE DOCTRINE:
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.
FACTS:
Reynaldo leased a building from Esmeralda’s predecessor (Virginia). At the time of the
perfection of the contract, the Reynaldo, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not
Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the
same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed
their obligations as lessees for two years. After two years from the effectivity of the lease
contract, Esmeralda filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages against Reynaldo
for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the latter alleged that they paid the rent to the new
owners (Virgilio and Angelita) of the lot where the building stood and not to respondents
since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. They further
claimed that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilio’s assumption of
ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. MTC rendered
a decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed to show that the subject
house belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the respondents proved that the property in
question is registered in their name. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC
based on the petitioner’s failure to present any documentary evidence modifying or
amending the contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to
Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased
house is located.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a defendant in a suit to which the cause of action arises from a contract
assail the operation of such contract by disputing a previously affirmed fact.
RULING:
No. Reynaldo was aware that the lot in question was not owned by the lessors at the time
the lease contract was entered into. After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for
two years, the Reyanldo is barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract
on the ground that the Esmeralda lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title
over the lot. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption
that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
falsify it; xxx

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS ET. AL.
GR No. 194964, January 11, 2016
CASE DOCTRINE:
Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence,
however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an
established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. On the other
hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary
evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior.
Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and
courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that
may render the expectations wrong.
FACTS:
Guillermo B. Torres and Dolores P. Torres incorporated and operated two (2) thrift banks:
(1) First Iligan Savings & Loan Association, Inc. (FISLAI); and (2) Davao Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (DSLAI). Guillermo B. Torres chaired both thrift banks. He acted
as FISLAI's President, while his wife, Dolores P. Torres, acted as DSLAI's President and
FISLAI's Treasurer. Upon Guillermo B. Torres' request, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued
a P1.9 million standby emergency credit to FISLAI. On May 25, 1982, University of
Mindanao's Vice President for Finance, Saturnino Petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate
mortgage over University of Mindanao's property in Cagayan de Oro City in favor of
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. "The mortgage served as security for FISLAI's PI.9 Million
loan" It was allegedly executed on University of Mindanao's behalf. As proof of his
authority to execute a real estate mortgage for University of Mindanao, Saturnino
Petalcorin showed a Secretary's Certificate signed by University of Mindanao's Corporate
Secretary, Aurora de Leon.
The Secretary’s certificate states among others the authorizing of the chairman to appoint
Satunino Pactolerin to represent the University of Mindanao to transact, transfer, convey,
lease, mortgage, or otherwise hypothecate the subject properties. Saturnino Petalcorin
executed another deed of real estate mortgage, allegedly on behalf of University of
Mindanao, over its two properties in Iligan City. This mortgage served as additional
security for FISLAI's loans. FISLAI and DSLAI eventually merged with DSLAI as the
surviving corporation in an effort to rehabilitate the thrift banks due to the heavy
withdrawals of depositors. DSLAI later became known as Mindanao Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (MSLAI). MSLAI failed to recover from its losses. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas later on foreclosed the mortgaged properties. University of Mindanao filed two
Complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage. One Complaint was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and the other Complaint was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. University of Mindanao alleged that it did not
obtain any loan from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and that Aurora De Leon’s certification
was anomalous. That it never authorized Saturnino Petalcorin to execute real estate
mortgage contracts involving its properties to secure FISLAI's debts and it never ratified
the execution of the mortgage contracts. The Regional Trial Courts ruled in favor of
University of Mindanao. The Court of Appeals however ruled that "although BSP failed to

prove that the UM Board of Trustees actually passed a Board Resolution authorizing
Petalcorin to mortgage the subject real properties, Aurora de Leon's Secretary's Certificate"
clothed Petalcorin with apparent and ostensible authority to execute the mortgage deed on
its behalf. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas merely relied in good faith on the Secretary's
Certificate. University of Mindanao is estopped from denying Saturnino Petalcorin's
authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not University of Mindanao bound by the real estate mortgage contracts
executed by Saturnino Petalcorin.
RULING:
No. Petitioner argues that the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires. As an
educational institution, it may not secure the loans of third persons Securing loans of third
persons is not among the purposes for which petitioner was established.
In ruling in favor of the contract’s validity, this court considered the incidental powers of
the hotel to include the execution of employment contracts with entertainers for the purpose
of providing its guests entertainment and increasing patronage.
This court ruled that a contract executed by a corporation shall be presumed valid if on its
face its execution was not beyond the powers of the corporation to do. Thus:
When a contract is not on its face necessarily beyond the scope of the power
of the corporation by which it was made, it will, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be presumed to be valid. Corporations are presumed to contract
within their powers. The doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or against
a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the
ends of justice or work a legal wrong.
Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence,

however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an
established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are
conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. Rule 131, Section
2 of the Rules of Court identifies two (2) conclusive presumptions:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of conclusive

presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
falsify it;

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
On the other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by
contrary evidence.99 They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human
behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under certain
circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every
experience that may render the expectations wrong.
Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based

on the existence of certain facts on which they are meant to operate. "[P]resumptions are
not allegations, nor do they supply their absence[.]" Presumptions are conclusions. They
do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to support them.
If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may
accept the presumption. However, contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the
presumption.

HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO et al. vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al.
G.R. No. 194846, June 28, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1)
private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been
followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions
operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them.
FACTS:
Rosaroso filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Soria to sell the subject
disputed lots to Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into pursuant to the said SPA.
Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to them by their predecessor Luis
Rosaroso.
During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed of sale in favor of petitioners,
was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared
deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was necessary for a loan application.
RTC ruled in favor of Rosaroso. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed
to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied
on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or
consideration for the sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been tendered
when in fact no payment was made at all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of a contract be assailed on a mere testimony that it has no
consideration.
RULING:
No. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course
of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.
These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut
them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they
created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because
the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and
convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of
Court.

The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It
relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached
him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan
application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony,
however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required
by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient
consideration will not be disturbed.

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA
G.R. No. 175874, December 11, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution.
Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable.
FACTS:
Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H. Sometime in 1997, when the heirs of Cipriano,
herein petitioners, tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were informed
that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration
No. 23959 was issued in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property adjacent to
Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of
Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was encroached
upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration issued covers the
whole property of Cipriano. Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against
respondents for cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners
presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed
deed. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners had failed to
prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed,
being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution
and that the deed was an ancient document that remained unaltered after so many years,
bodes well for its authenticity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be
assailed by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial
court
RULING:
Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their
due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is
clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In this case, clear and convincing
evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed was
presented. First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the
assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the
RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise
supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation. Lastly,
when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed
deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from
where it was taken had turned yellow with age.

LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
The presumption established that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage (Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio
— Always presume marriage) may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence.
FACTS:
Luis Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with
Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and
Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of
Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were
married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed
by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of
their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of
consideration and consent.
Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real
properties using her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted
to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was
not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract. Spouses Lacsamana also filed
their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for
value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the
subject property. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor
of Spouses Lacsamana is valid.
RULING:
YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper Praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence.
In Pugeda v. Trias, it was held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by
one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced
from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the
marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show
a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the
documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife,
defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, the Court held that
persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and
defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to
submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally
failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca,
their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. The
provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary. Both the trial and appellate courts is correct in that Rosca
was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Based on
the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that
any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares.
The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to
sell the same even without Uy's consent.

DOLORES DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the legal presumption that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption
is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences.
FACTS:
Leticia S. Arcilla filed against Dolores Diaz before the RTC a information for estafa for
her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at
P32,000.00 received by her in trust. Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged
in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner)
under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to
her a month after they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth
P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter.
However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed
to make further remittances and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or
return the goods. Petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent
but not as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards
and gift checks from respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was
made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further
claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled.
However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent.
RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent
the amount of P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent
was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well
as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00,
or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having
been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held civilly liable for the value of the merchandise.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and
a trust receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed
to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence.
It is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
is not evidence.

On the contrary, respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the
transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such
merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes,
shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their
corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if
not sold.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this,
case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without
first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of
the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular.
This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before
he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create
the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which,
if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any
evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document
pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case
clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE
G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002
CASE DOCTRINE:
Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative
or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
FACTS:
Roberto Padrigone, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante broke into
the house of Rowena Contridas at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint
successively raped Rowena, then 16 year old. They threatened to kill Rowena and her 14
year old sister, Nimfa that they will be killed if they reported the incident to others. The
victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in Court thus it was
Nimfa who testified. The trial court, disregarding the Accused’s defense of denial and alibi,
convicted the accused. On appeal, Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution
suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have
had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police
of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for
the latter’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to present as witness the victim of a crime who became insane by
reason of such offense amounts to suppression of evidence.
HELD:
No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
"evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is
merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness.
Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified
to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand
judicial proceedings yet." The non- presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful.
Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 122899, June 8, 2000
CASE DOCTRINE:
When evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he
has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case
made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the
presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and
support the case of his adversary
FACTS:
Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage
wherein the latter assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. Respondent,
pursuant to the balance declared by Metrobank prior to the execution of the sale, paid
Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank in the amount of P116,416.71. This notwithstanding,
petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject
property despite repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for
specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. Metrobank refused
to discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures
"other unliquidated past due loans” as there exist a stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage
that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security.
Hence, the payment made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. The trial court ruled
in favor of the respondent. On appeal, CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the
mortgage estopped him from further asserting the existence of such liability
HELD:
Yes. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from
its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and
he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced,
would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. The scheduled oral
arguments before the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity to prove the
existence the "other unliquidated past due loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release
the mortgage property. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon. No rule of law is better
settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved,
would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not
exist."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BARTE
G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017
CASE DOCTRINE:
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in
the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to
credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful,
and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth
₱l00.00 to a police officer-poseur buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-
bust operation conducted in Consuelo Village, Mandaue City. The RTC convicted Barte as
charged giving credence to the arresting officers’ testimonies although no evidence has
been produced compliance of the procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No. Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements (Section 21 of
RA 9165) would not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid,
that is true only when there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Any departure
from the prescribed procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be
shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband.
Otherwise, the non-compliance constitutes an irregularity, a red flag, so to speak, that cast
reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
The State's agents who entrapped the accused-appellant and confiscated the dangerous drug
from him did not tender any justifiable ground for the non-compliance with the requirement
of establishing each link in the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of
presentation. The conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the shabu confiscated were consequently not preserved became unavoidable. The failure
to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very
same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.

DELOS SANTOS V. COA
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption
must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second
District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), appropriating to the hospital the
amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover
the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health
Program (TNT Program). Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of
forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under
the TNT Program surfaced. Petitioner herein succeeded Dr. Alquizalas as the Medical
Center Chief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of
P3,386,697.10.
RULING:
Yes. VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the
implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such,
has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF. Provisions of the
National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the
guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s PDAF authorized under Republic
Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as
other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption
must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. The Court finds that the
petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of
existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently,
petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the
validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-
rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent
irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CADIDIA
G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
"In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part
of the police officers."
FACTS:
During a frisk search in the Manila Domestic Airport, the officer/frisker noticed something
unusual and thick at the buttocks of accused Candidia upon her entry in the departure area.
When asked by the officer, Candidia answered it was her sanitary napkin. Unconvinced,
the officers brought Cadidia to the comfort room where the latter was asked to remove her
underwear. The officers discovered that there were two sachets of shabu inside her
underwear and the sachets were turned over to their supervisor. The specimen was later
submitted to a forensic chemist which identified the substance as shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican (the officers who searched and
frisked the accused) failed to overcome the accused’s presumption of innocence.
HELD:
No. In People v. Unisa, this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to
the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers."
The prosecution’s witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she
handled the accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no
pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JESUS EDUALINO
G.R. No. 119072, April 11, 1997
CASE DOCTRINE:
The moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape
FACTS:
Rowena, the complainant was in a party with her mother and was later joined by her cousin
Antero whom she asked to drink beer with. When Antero got drunk and fell asleep, the
accused Edualino approached the complainant and offered her a beer. She accepted the
beer and felt dizzy after drinking it. Edualino then dragged her toward a grassy area where
he allegedly raped her. The complainant alleged that she resisted the assault but Edualino
was stronger. The RTC held the accused guilty of the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of rape based on
his contention against the character of Rowena.
HELD:
No. The moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction
of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and
under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and
responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a
finding that she was raped.
Accused also contends that the victim, to save her marriage, concocted the charge of rape.
The Court held that it would not believe that a married woman would invent a story that
she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her
marriage. The Court failed to understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under
the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE
G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002
CASE DOCTRINE:
The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called.
The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further
examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter
to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the
trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination
merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
FACTS:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter
Marilou Fabre.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother
and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou,
along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the
criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the
presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself.
On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the
failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity of a testimony which was
not subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party.
HELD:
NO. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a
witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or
thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA
G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003
CASE DOCTRINE:
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant
lips.
FACTS:
For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty.
On appeal, Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular.
Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange
t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when
Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give
any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when
Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not
done with the usual police line-up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the minor-victim should be expunged on the ground that leading
questions were asked during her testimony in court.
HELD:
NO. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when
the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant
lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she
was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of
the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of
the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further
the interests of justice."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. et al.
G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003
CASE DOCTRINE:
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the
cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an
injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and
to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under
which they were made.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Ronald
Castillano alias "Nono" and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of murder of the Diosdado Volante.
On appeal, Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of
Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal
trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of
SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical evidence on record.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony
of Luz, the prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the
preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the
police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and
offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the
appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain
the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be impeached by asserting that the said
testimony is inconsistent with those made by the witness in the preliminary examination.
HELD:
NO. Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the
cross- examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an
injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and
to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under
which they were made.51 This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness
prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her
attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to
explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and
truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any

discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the
said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her
present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said
transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO
G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995
CASE DOCTRINE:
The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still
deserve due regard notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one
who personally may have heard the testimony; Reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes
should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. The use of memory aids
during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules
of Court states: “Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.—A witness may be allowed
to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded;but
in such casethe writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a
witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made;
but such evidence must be received with caution.” Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on
the sound discretion of the trial court.
FACTS:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with
homicide. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the
three accused of murder.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants. Appellants attack the
credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina
should not be given worth since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes
written on her left palm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of a witness, who during her testimony was seen looking at some notes
written on her palm, should not be given credence
HELD:
No. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed.
Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states: A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when
the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing
or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses,
cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from
such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must
be received with caution.
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case,
the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely
wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999
CASE DOCTRINE:
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. The entrant
was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and 5. The
entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
FACTS:
Canque entered into two contracts with Socor Construction Corp. Socor Construction Corporation.
Due to Canque’s refusal to pay the amount billed by the Socor Construction Corp., the latter brought
a suit to recover from the former the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
To prove the unpaid bills of the Canque, Socor Construction Corp. presented its Book of Collectible
Accounts and their bookkeeper, Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of the said book. During the
trial, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said
she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity
of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by
"an engineer for such functions.
The trial court, giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts, as well as Aday’s
testimony, ruled in favor of Socor Construction Corp.. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by
the CA. Canque contends that Aday’s testimony is considered a hearsay for lack of personal
knowledge of the entries made as the information entered was merely provided to her by the
engineers of the Socor Construction Corp..
It is nonetheless argued by Socor Construction Corp. that although the entries cannot be considered
an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court. On the other hand, Canque contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for
which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose.
Issues:
1. Whether or not testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on bills provided to
her is inadmissible on the ground of hearsay evidence rule.
2. Whether or not the testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on information
provided to her may be admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness
HELD:
1. YES. When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the
person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts
stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have
intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.

NO. Assuming that the book of collectible accounts presented by the Socor Construction Corp.
would qualify as a memorandum, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does
not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has
testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events
in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a
witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be
more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the
same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate
of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been
satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution,
if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is
doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such
evidence.

YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness; Not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. As
provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof
of their due execution and genuineness.
FACTS:
Iwasawa, a Japanese national married Custodio in 2002. In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife
become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he
confronted his wife about it. To his shock, Custodio confessed to him that she received news that
her previous husband passed away. This prompted Iwasawa to file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage to Custodio as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one
During trial, aside from his testimony, Iwasawa also offered the following pieces of documentary
evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between Iwasawa and Custodio to prove
the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of Marriage between
Custodio and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on
June 20, 1994
Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect
that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to Custodio
RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Custodio’s
prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while Iwasawa offered the certificate of
marriage of Custodio to Arambulo, it was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage.
The RTC ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of
Custodio’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the
marriage certificate between Custodio and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further
ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a
stranger to the preparation of said document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.
HELD:
NO. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Iwasawa are all public
documents. Art. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained.”

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the Iwasawa did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in
the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the Custodio nor the public
prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented
as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized
by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules: SEC. 20. Proof
of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
FACTS:
Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand
new Nissan Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The
shipment was insured with Philam against all risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded
by ATI, it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The shipment
was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors,
and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to the extent of the damage to said cargoes,
Universal Motors declared them a total loss.
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla
Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought
reparation from and was compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a
Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. On
appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. When the case was elevated to
the SC, Asian Terminal objected to the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation
Receipt for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the persons who executed them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication.
HELD:
NO. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented
as evidence in court.

In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition
or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document,
or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner
prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,

specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of
the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of
the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business.
Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in
these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly
authenticated.

LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M.
SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. “The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to
rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
FACTS:
Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar
Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for
the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could
be made, however, Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus, Johnny
filed a complaint against Lomises for specific performance with damages.
RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the
Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the
market stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA
agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the
lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements, however, was valid because
these were Lomises’ private properties.
Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it
involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements
should similarly be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government,
the owner of the improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was
presented only on appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case.
HELD:
NO. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease contract between
the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the
RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was
part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren
of probative weight." Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s
complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre- trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact,
a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision.

WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR. et al.
G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and
its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. It is elementary that
objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their
investments against Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank
Securities Inc. the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.
On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to
postpone the hearing. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have
waived its right to present evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise
denied.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp
solely liable to them. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an
MR with the CA attaching to the said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present
during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate court
may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case.
HELD:
NO. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified."
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered during the
trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that
has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the defendant-
appellant’s brief filed by defendant- appellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or
credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial
court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right to rebut them.

FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 192024 July 1, 2015
CASE DOCTRINE:
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and
the offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by
the appellate court, as documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be
considered in disposing the case. For the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not
offered by one party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of
the adverse party. Failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case. Clearly,
estoppel has already stepped in.
FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corp. is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997
were subject to ad valorem tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift
from ad valorem tax to specific tax. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were
subjected to specific tax. Fortune Tobacco Corp. later on filed a claim for tax credit or refund under
Sec. 229 of the NIRC for illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits the Court ruled
that it was contrary to law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund.
Fortune Tobacco Corp. elevated the case to the CTA but the latter found no cause to reverse the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant or grant the Fortune Tobacco Corp.’s claim
for tax refund.
HELD:
NO. The denial of Fortune Tobacco Corp.’s claim for tax refund in this case is based on the ground
that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and amount thereof. As a result,
Fortune Tobacco Corp. seeks the Court to re-examine the probative value of its evidence and
determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid.
This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law can be raised in a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of the SC. to analyze or weight all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The Court’s jurisdiction being limited
to reviewing only the errors of the law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
resolution of the factual issues is the function of the lower court whose findings on these matters
are received with respect. A question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELFIN CALISO
G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome and he is
entitled to an acquittal though his innocence may be doubted. A witness’ familiarity with the
accused although accepted as basis for a positive identification does not always pass the test of
moral certainly due to the possibility of mistake. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the
offender like the crime itself must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there
are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the
identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the
Court has distinguished two types of positive identification to wit: (a) that by direct evidence,
through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence,
such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime.
FACTS:
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found him
guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to
death.
On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC
had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back
being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive
identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at
noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not
been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by
merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction.
HELD:
NO. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by
a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that
moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances
showing him to be AAA’s killer.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established,
there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to

positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter
is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to
possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever
be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only
means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness.
To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical
features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos
on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the
rest of humanity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014
CASE DOCTRINE:
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. The
testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility
to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge
is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant testified that
she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was
repeatedly rape for 8 days. However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she testified that
in between those 8 days, she was able to visit her grandmother.
Furthermore, when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report,
he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark;
(2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any
injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell
whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed
lacerations.
On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who testified
that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and discussed plans
about marrying the accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with CA, conviction of
the accused was confirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony of victim
who positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant inconsistencies therein.
HELD:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The time-honored test in determining the value
of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common
experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation
and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.

The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to human
experience: (1) the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s house
where 8 family members of the latter also resides; (2) that she was not able to ask for help from
any of the family member nor any of them was able to realize that accused was keeping her against
her will; (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend after her ordeal; (4) admission that she
was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged abduction when she was supposed
to be kept inside accused’s house against her will; and (5) lastly, that she was repeated mauled by
accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of abduction but no physical
injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the incident. A conviction in a
criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty
that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness
of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or
intimidation.

SUPREME COURT vs. EDDIE V. DELGADO et al.
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.
FACTS:
On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused
the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-
SD).
The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during
the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting
the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Owing to the confidential nature of the
contents of an Agenda, the OCC- SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them. Thus, only
a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g.,
only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy.
Herein Delgado were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda
without being authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and
Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011
Agenda. Acceding to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy
of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo.
During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said
pages from the agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while respondents
Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for and, in fact,
obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda, they vehemently denied having been
involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation of the OAS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants prevails
against the contrary testimony of their co- respondent implicating them in the alleged deed.
HELD:
NO. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. It was never shown
that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and
Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR.
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
CASE DOCTRINE:
Standard of Proof — An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons.”
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with the offense of “accepting an advantage as
agent”. He also faces counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), which in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of
private respondent.
The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against Muñoz. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him.
Muñoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order
of Arrest.
The CA declared the Order of Arrest void.
The DOJ filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari praying that the Decision
of the CA be reversed.
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the DOJ and sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest
against Muñoz.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. For his part, Muñoz filed in the same case a petition for bail,
which was opposed by Hong Kong.
The RTC denied the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.”
Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by respondent judge, allowing Muñoz
to post bail.
Hong Kong filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
What is the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail in an extradition proceeding?
HELD:
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

PEOPLE VS. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO
G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012
CASE DOCTRINE:
Once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries
on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.— By invoking self-defense,
however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic
that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted
being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless
he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof.
He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the
Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the
killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State
until the end of the proceedings.
FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m., Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan,
La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood
called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and
Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and
Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder against
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk,
had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert,
had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking
up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face
down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no
longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had “no
necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death” due
to the victim attacking him only with bare hands.
ISSUE:
What is the standard of proof required in order for self-defense to be appreciated?
HELD:
By invoking self-defense, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of
Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction
of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having
thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally
liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge
the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence,

even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the
burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.
The plea of self-defense was belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent
or repel an attack from Olais.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ANTONIO B.
BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011
CASE DOCTRINE:
Preponderance of Evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth,
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. —In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the
evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 443 SCRA 293
(2004), defined “preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: Preponderance of evidence”
is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It
is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of
an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the
overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the
defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the
plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim.
Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant,
a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain
his cause of action. —Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s
scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received
from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented
by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not
suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be
established to achieve this result.
FACTS:
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against Antonio
Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged
that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager,
fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks.
PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the
recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. The RTC granted this
motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos
filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a
reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and
Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment
for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the
source of Balmaceda’s money.
RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence
existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.

ISSUE:
What is the quantum of evidence required in civil cases?
HELD:
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in
opposition.This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,defined “preponderance of evidence”
in the following manner:
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the
onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule
that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's
cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim.
Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank.
Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even
necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even
if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a
judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain
his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to
achieve this result.

DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA VS. REBECCA BIONG
G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013
CASE DOCTRINE:
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.—In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present
case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence
that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have
occurred.
FACTS:
At around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue,
Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when
the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the
car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra.
dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from
any other visible physical injuries.
The traffic investigation report identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was
recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent
Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of “Pongkay Trading” and was engaged
in a gravel and sand business.
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The
pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. She consulted with Dr.
Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her
that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running
to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her
condition.
Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores,
in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between
the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated
Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay. Thus, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. She alleged that she lost the
mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed medical expenses (as of the
filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00. She further prayed for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.

ISSUE:
Whether Dra. Dela Llana established her case by preponderance of evidence
HELD:
No. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict.”
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the
plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. She
should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only
after she has laid this foundation can the presumption — that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel — arise. Once negligence, the
damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the
application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, “an action
predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.” The rationale for these
graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden
of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The
reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of
her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial
evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce
the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can
be established.

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186659-710
CASE DOCTRINE:
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.
FACTS:
A team of auditors from the central office of the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an Expanded
Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-
ARMM) and the financial transactions and operations. It was found that illegal withdrawals as stated in
Special Audit Office (SAO) were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance
of checks payable to the order of the (Disbursing Officer II) petitioner Israel B. Haron, without the
required disbursement vouchers.
Criminal cases for malversation of public funds was filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against the (ORG-ARMM Regional Governor)
Zacaria A. Candao, (Disbursing Officer II) Israel B. Haron, (Executive Secretary) Abas A. Candao and
(Cashier) Pandical M. Santiago.
At their arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of malversation of public funds.
It was also explained that the procedure with respect to the processing of cash advances as follows: that
there were cash advances made in ARMM which cover travels, salaries, etc. but particularly it is for
"peace and order campaign," it starts with the ORG when the Regional Governor issues an authority for
cash advance, and then they process the voucher (Finance and Budget Management Services).
Heidi L. Mendoza (COA State Auditor IV), prosecution’s lone witness testified that their expanded audit
disclosed illegal withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of ORG-ARMM without the
required disbursement vouchers and have no assigned voucher numbers. Mendoza admitted the belated
submission of original vouchers to the COA Central Office but these are without supporting documents.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds
committed in conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners claim that the subject checks
were covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and received by the
COA Central Office.
The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioners allegation of advances intended for “peace and order
campaign” presented no proof that it were spent for public purposes. In fact the alleged disbursement
vouchers were not explained as to the nature of expense such as purchase of equipment, services, meals,
travels etc. and ultimately there were no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of
Voucher, Purchase Request and Inspection Report if the items said to be purchased. Disbursement
vouchers were not issued in accordance with the existing COA circulars due to it was all unnumbered and
undated.

Liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the Sandiganbayan held that by their
act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron was able to consummate the illegal withdrawals
without the required disbursement vouchers. Thus, by their collective acts, said court concluded that
petitioners conspired to effect the illegal withdrawals of public funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the equipoise doctrine applies to this case
HELD:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Haron’s
failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds. Petitioners
likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn, during the expanded
audit or any time thereafter. Also there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred
in not applying the equipoise rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.
Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that
Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand,
specifically for the ₱21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of malversation,
all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is
hardly necessary in malversation cases.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao,
that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to effect the illegal withdrawals and misappropriation
of ORG-ARMM funds. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their
signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and
release of public funds require their approval, as in fact checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had
to be countersigned by them. Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to
effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the
Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and
misappropriating such funds.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ANTONIO T. REYES
G.R. No. 170512
CASE DOCTRINE:
In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the
case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
FACTS:
Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit with the Office of the Provincial in Camigiun against respondent
Antonio Reyes (Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge) and Angelito Pealoza
(Clerk III) of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin but the same
affidavit was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter office ordered that Reyes
and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits within the ten days from notice.
In Pealoza Counter-Affidavit he denied the allegation of Acero telling that if the latter was willing to pday
additional costs, Reyes and him would reconsider his drivers license examination application. Also
Pealoza submitted the affidavit of one Rey P. Amper (driver examiner). In his affidavit he narrated that
Reyes verbally instructed him that all drivers who flunked the examination must be submitted to him and
gave Amper a piece of paper containing the rates to be charged to re-take the application with additional
costs. Pealoza and Amper allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo
but no action from the latter was made only expressing his regrets for having recommended Reyes to the
position. Amper left the LTO because of the practice of illegal exactions of Reyes.
In Reyes Counter-Affidavit he claimed that Aceros complaint was mere blatant distortion and fabrication
of the truth. In fact it was Pealoza who processed the drivers examination application of the complainant;
the money paid by Acero was allegedly given to Pealoza; and Reyes had no participation and was not
present when Pealoza and Acero changed hands for the additional costs of money. He allegedly
reprimanded and ordered Pealoza to return the money of the complainant. Reyes contended that he did
not ask or receive money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed the P500.00.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ordered that in view of the non-appearance of the respondents,
they were considered to have waived their right to preliminary conference. The case was then immediately
submitted for a decision. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision adjuging Reyes
and Pealoza guilty of grave misconduct and guilty and simple misconduct respectively.
Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and
Pealoza filed a motion for Reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order
denying the aforesaid motions. Reyes then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Review. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the assailed
Resolution. Hence, Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition.
The Office of the Ombudsman avers that the findings of the fact are entitled to great weight and must be
accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues

that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect
to the sufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by the substantial
evidence.
HELD:
No. The Court finds merit in Reyes’ contention. Petitioner settled this issue in the affirmative, while the
Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him a similar
opportunity to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and the other witness to
enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision on the basis of evidence that
were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that
imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered
with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well as the
affidavits of the witnesses. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents before
petitioner rendered its Decision. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was violated.
Department of Health v. Camposan restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the
decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration
of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate;
and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and
the various issues involved.
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly
apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision
that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for
Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his
right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of
his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had
otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoz and the witnesses, whether before or after the
Decision was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman
are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings,
only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.

XAVIER C. RAMOS VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK. And/or ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.
G.R. No. 203186
CASE DOCTRINE:
Substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that
"in cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
FACTS:
Petitioner Xavier C. Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became Vice-President
for Dealer Network/Auto loans Division. A client named Trezita B. Acosta who entered and obtain several
auto and real estate loans which were approved and promptly paid. However she did not authorize nor
personally apply for the subject loan for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle rendering the transaction
fraudulent.
BPI Family conducted an investigation and later on discovered that: (a) a person misrepresented herself
as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo
Branch, pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (b) Ramos
released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee; and (c) Ramos
was grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the bank’s safety protocols,
particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan applicant’s identity, and that the promissory
note was not even signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers.
Ramos shouldered the proportionate amount of P546,000.00 from BPI lost of P2,294,080.00 and was
deducted from petitioner benefits which accrued upon his retirement. Ramos filed a complaint for
underpayment of retirement benefits and non-payment of overtime and holiday pay and premium pay
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming that the deductions made were illegal. The
Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on the basis that the deduction made on his
retirement benefits was “legal and even reasonable”.
The NLRC reversed the LA Decision. It found Ramos’s consequent signing of the quitclaim to be without
effect. It ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00, with additional
payment of 10% thereof as attorney’s fees.
BPI Family moved for reconsideration which in turn was denied by the NLRC. BPI Family filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.
The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos. It also attributed negligence on the part
of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the
credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it
improper to deduct the entire ₱546,000.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably
reduced the same to the amount of ₱200,000.00
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conclusions of NLRC are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court
does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based
their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision.
However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC
if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if
they are not supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be
supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "In cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
The Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper.
BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled
is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue
It is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the approval of the credit
committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As
such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent ion his duties. To this end, it is well to note that in
loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the documentary
requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan applications.48 As BPI Family
"uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry
competition, it is but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.

JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS U. LUCAS
G.R No. 190710
CASE DOCTRINE:
A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. In cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance
of a court order for blood testing.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City to establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing). Lucas narrated that his
mother Elsie Uy worked in a known nightspot and later on had developed an intimate relationship and
got impregnated by respondent Jesus S. Lucas; and to whom she gave birth to petitioner. However, the
name of respondent was not stated in the certificate of live birth of Jesse U. Lucas. For a period of about
two years respondent allegedly extended financial support to the mother and petitioner but as soon as the
relationship ended, Elsie started to refuse the financial support and insisted that to raise petitioner on her
own. Respondent was not served a copy of the petition. Respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. Only his counsel went to the court and obtained a copy of the petition. Respondent then filed a
Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. The RTC also directed that the Order be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and that the Solicitor
General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent
the State in the case.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to
be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Respondent alleged that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have
personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still
unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case and held that Jessie failed to establish compliance with the
four procedural aspects for a parternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera vs. Alba, namely, a prima
facie, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
The RTC held in the new hearing that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown has not yet taken place.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of the respondent, it noted that the petitioner failed
to show the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:
Yes. It was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case visavis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature
to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such
order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present
evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood
group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural
aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did
not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what
his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by
respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he
was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity
case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
The CA view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken
and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement
the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in
paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana eloquently explained although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity.
As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA
GR No. 193250
CASE DOCTRINE:
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
FACTS:
Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB),
assigned at PNBs Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS) located
within the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Compound, Katipunan Road,
Balara, Quezon City.
MWSS opened current account No. 244-850099-6 at PNB-MWSS with initial deposit PhP
6,714,621.13. This became dormant by 16 April 2003.
Tria, one time requested for a list of dormant accounts and inquired about the irregularities
involving managers checks. On 22 April 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS
instructing to issue PhP 5,200,000 worth of managers check payable to Atty. Rodrigo Reyes. This
letter-request was evaluated and verified.
On 26 April 2004, despite sufficient available cash in PNB-MWSS, Tria accompanied Atty Reyes
to PNB Quezon City Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for the encashment of the managers check. Tria
proded the Sales and Service Office (SSO) of PNB-Circle, George Flandez to receive the cash the
same day and that Tria will just sign the check to prove that he identified Atty. Reyes.
In the same month, Tria revised the minutes of the meeting from 06 August 2004 after it has been
signed by all the attendees. He inserted the portion where he identified himself as branch manager
who “assists in accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for encashment of MCs
merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever we are short in cash.”
Tria then retired by November 2004.
On 14 February 2005 MWSS wrote to the new branch manger of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia Daway,
expressing surprise at the withdrawal and demanding the refund or restoration of the same amount.
PNB conducted its own investigation and sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft.
Tria contends that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2) there was no intent to gain on
his part; (3) the personal property does not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank; (4) there
was no grave abuse of confidence on his part; and (5) his alleged identification of the payee is not
the operative act that triggered the payment of the managers check by the PNB-MWSS Branch.
Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who approved and paid the managers check even beyond
his authority. He added that it was the other bank employees who should be held liable for the loss.
The Assistant City Prosecutor did not find probable cause to file information against Tria citing
that Tria’s identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of the Managers Check.
Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval of the
encashment. PNB elevated the matter to Department of Justice and Court of Appeals. Both affirmed
that no probable cause was established against Tria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ erred in failing to consider the existence of probable cause?
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. There was more than probable
cause to proceed against Tria for qualified theft.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused.
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against,
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without
the latter’s consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes
qualified. The elements of which are:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 185125
CASE DOCTRINE:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
FACTS:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu,
police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the
residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but
to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod
and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house
of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found
inside the nipa hut.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by
mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was
found?
HELD:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property
is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that
petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s
failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting
perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the
charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA
GR No. 178771
CASE DOCTRINE:
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred per reason and common experience
FACTS:
Conrado Estrella and his wife employed AAA and Sulpacio Abad as maid and driver respectively.
Sometime on the afternoon of 07 May 2002, the group of Fernando Fernandez (Lando), Alberto
Anticamara (Al), Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), and Fred Doe
entered the house of AAA’s employer whilst she was sleeping. Thinking that the intruders left the
house already, she attempted to run but Dick was still there. After a brief commotion, the group
decided to tie AAA and was led outside the house. AAA saw Abad tied and blindfolded inside a
vehicle.
AAA was brought to the fishpond, there she saw Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita). The group brought
Abad outside the vehicle and was led away. AAA heard the group discussing to make a decision
since Abad apparently has been shot four times. Later on, Lando and Fred boarded the vehicle
taking AAA with them to San Miguel, Tarlac. She was kept in Lando’s house until 09 May 2002.
On 09 May 2002, Lando told AAA that Fred and Bert has intention to kill her and he brought her
to a hotel. Through threat, Lando sexually molested AAA. Later on Fred, Bert and Lando
transferred AAA to the house of Fred’s niece in Riles, Tarlac. Fred kept AAA as a wife and
repeatedly raped her at night, threatening to give her back to Lando whom she knew killed Abad.
On 22 May 2002, Fred, together with his family, transferred AAA to Carnaga. AAA was made to
stay as a house helper in the house of Fred’s brother-in-law. On 04 June 2002, AAA escaped the
house and sought help from her friend who called AAA’s brother. Arriving Mandaue City, AAA
and her brother reported the incident to police authorities. The cadaver of Abad was autopsied and
cause of death was gunshot wounds on trunk.
Lando, Al and Cita pleaded not guilty during arraignment while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe
remained at-large.
The Regional Trial Court convicted both Lando and Al for the crime of Murder and
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention. Whereas Cita was found not guilty for both crimes due to
insufficiency of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Lando appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the court gravely erred in
considering the evidence presented by the accused-appellant which is more credible than that of
the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court erred in finding circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant sufficient
to convict them?
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter
“Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes
our way should be eliminated).”
Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his
participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones
who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al
also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the
body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on
various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim’s
death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped
around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the
remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas,
tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and
buried.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE OCAMPO
GR No. 185212
CASE DOCTRINE:
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion:
the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others
FACTS:
Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco found the place unlikely for
camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the house said that it was Maritess
and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco dug up the suspected spot. There
they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report,
Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was stabbed.
RTC found the four-accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and Edwin as principals and
Maritess and Elmer as accessories
ISSUE:
Whether the accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on
circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
Yes, the circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair
conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.
Here, those circumstances abound.

Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his
relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that house.
The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998. On May 28 they
were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night of May 27 or early
morning of May 28. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and
Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to
conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had
been cut. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what
seemed like the butchering of a pig. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod
kitchen.From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing
the old man’s watch. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and
subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were
of course buried in the garden. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on
a pile of red soil beside the house. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not
encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the
couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that
house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically impossible for
the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was
merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.

EDUARDO CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209137
CASE DOCTRINE:
A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, is owned by him.
FACTS:
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navetas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by
destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following one
gold bracelet 24K, 3 necklace 1 one 24K and 2 two 18K, 2 two digital cam Sony player, 1 one
DVD portable 1 one wrist watch Taugher, 1 one sun glass Guess,1 one camera Canon, 1 one
Gameboy advance, 1 one calculator, 1 one Discman Sony, 2 two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bill, 22
twenty-two pcs., 2 two necklace 18K worth, 2 two bracelets worth, 2 two gold ring, 1 one wedding
ring worth 14K, 1 one wrist watch swiss military, 1 one cellphone NOKIA 8250, 3 three pairs of
earrings, 3 three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars, 60 sixty pcs. Of Php50.00 bills, 100 one hundred pcs.
of Php20.00 bills, 15 fifteen pcs. Of Php100.00 bills owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE
GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the amount of
Php223,000.00.
ISSUES:
1) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
2) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES
RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
3) WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL- MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
1) Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the
police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a
reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.
2) no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen
items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up
operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen
items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police
officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any

force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio
himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items
were the stolen ones, he confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse
but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had
probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to
how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a
moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.
3) contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells us
that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it
is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

Compiled Cases

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Compiled Cases

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

ONG CHIA vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

1 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

2 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

3 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

4 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

5 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

6 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

7 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

8 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

9 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

10 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

11 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

12 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Case CASE DOCTRINE::

13 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

14 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

15 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

16 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

17 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

18 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

19 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

20 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,

21 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

22 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

23 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

24 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

25 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

26 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

27 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

28 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

29 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

2. Yes, it is sufficient for conviction.

30 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

31 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

32 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

33 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

34 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

35 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

36 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

37 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

38 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

39 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

40 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

41 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

42 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

43 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

44 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

45 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

46 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

47 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

48 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

49 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

50 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

51 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

52 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

53 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

54 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

55 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO

56 | EVIDENCE | CASE DIGEST | JUDGE BYRON G. SAN PEDRO