Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
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Silverio v Republic
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs
and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP
Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner.
Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny
the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the
State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor
of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16
form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

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RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change
of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children
and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned
in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;
(c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

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Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to
have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument
about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters
of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his
Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the
Philippines. He took up Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in
Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the University of Hawaii,
in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2 This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral
oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes]
penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral
hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty [surgical
enhancement of the size and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5 Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7 Special Sixth Division.
8 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman
concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9 Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a
Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
11 Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005,
454 SCRA 155.
12 Id.
13 K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560
P.2d 1070 (1977).
14 Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or
nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more names in
addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term "first name"
will be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx
xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having
direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical
error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register
may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the
 Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
Page 4 of 13
city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil
changed is kept. Register of Manila, supra note 24)

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country
and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation
expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be
filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested
party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars
concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign
countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
30 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or
"female" but the genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31 Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that
he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians
have supplied.
32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
34 In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No.
2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio
App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing Webster’s II New College
Dictionary (1999).

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first 35 Id.
names or nicknames may be availed of only once.
36 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in L.Ed. 619.
the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person
authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts 37 Article 1, Family Code.
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively
that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The 38 Article 2(1), Id.
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are
sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made. 39 These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork
prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation
The petition shall be supported with the following documents: against marriage, among others.

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the
registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or
changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or
entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and
40 These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified
seduction, simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of
the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented
abduction, among others.
41 Section 3(jj)(4).

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil Republic v Cagandahan
registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the
approval of the petition. G.R. No. xgrno September xdate, 2008
xcite
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be Republic of the Philippines
supported with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding SUPREME COURT
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week Manila
for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate SECOND DIVISION
law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal
record. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

18 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA Petitioner,
189.
- versus -
19 Supra note 11.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
20 Id.
Respondent.
21 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
G.R. No. 166676
22 Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
Present:
23 Id.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
24 Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423
SCRA 420. Carpio Morales,

25 Id. Tinga,

26 Id. VELASCO, JR., and

27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964). BRION, JJ.

28 Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, Promulgated:
p. 238.
September 12, 2008
29 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412
of the Civil Code which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
decrees or the correction or change of errors including those that occur
after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth DECISION
are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the QUISUMBING, J.:
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of

Page 5 of 13
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female"
to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early
years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast
or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that
her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three
(3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and
she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition is
very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen
role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the
Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was
medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first
his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has
chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged
and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is
hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex
or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the
local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to
the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003
and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,8
respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to
be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is
allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or,
in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed
and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other
person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where
the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall
fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of
the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in
the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing
shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed
in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable
cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection
with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city

Page 6 of 13
where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule
108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of
the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During
the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The
term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is
the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In
most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either
a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science
in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male
or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered
as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to
mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground
between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither
truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is
no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.

Page 7 of 13
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself
as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but
he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course
in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus
help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
15 SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
16 Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
17 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a
Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Approved, March 22, 2001.
18 Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19,
2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.
21 (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome;
(3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6)
gonadal dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann
syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism
involving sex chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal
agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes (formerly called
"true hermaphroditism"); (14) partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15)
progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome.
[Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15,
2008).]
26 The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done
by taking a form of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or
hydrocortisone) every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed during
times of stress, such as severe illness or surgery.
xxxx
Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of
the side effects of steroid therapy. They should report signs of infection and
stress to their health care provider because increases in medication may be
required. In additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or
adrenal insufficiency will result.
xxxx
The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may
result even with treatment. Males have normal fertility. Females may have a
smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this
disorder must be continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)
27 The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of
Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)

Page 8 of 13
Corpuz v Sto Tomas
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26
of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to
file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15
and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court,
thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis
for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Page 9 of 13
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment
is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for
the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting
a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No.
3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve
in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make
the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in

Page 10 of 13
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case,
no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to
law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published
in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider
the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of
a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co
v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
420, 430.
Iwasawa v Gangan
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the September 4, 2012
Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa
with private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient
evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002
in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself
as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became
close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines
and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After
the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife
about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6 This
prompted petitioner to file a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to
private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following
pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked
as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on
November 28, 2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage
between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits
"C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent marked as
Exhibit "D" to prove that private respondent in fact contracted two
marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20,
1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above
documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered
the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only
petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a
complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent
and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that
petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since
he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of
the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of
the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could
be accorded evidentiary weight.

Page 11 of 13
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public
documents which are considered self-authenticating and thus it was
unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites Article
410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the
trial prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in
accord with law and established jurisprudence. It contends that both
Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil
Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising
from records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically
declared them as public documents. Being public documents, said
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need for
the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian or officer
from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further contends that public
documents have probative value since they are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of the Civil
Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public documents presented by
petitioner, considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent
indicated that she is not against her husband’s petition to have their
marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she
contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a
second marriage with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further
admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married
petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married. Private
respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo
passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to petitioner
about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner
are all public documents.1âwphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when
it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on
their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight
because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence
to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the beginning
as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it
was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo
was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private
respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are
hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the records of the
abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v Olaybar
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009
and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The
assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for
cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed
order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did
not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing
in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the
wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could
not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as
she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also
presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC,
Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that
the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor
of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged
marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to
straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:

Page 12 of 13
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office
of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned
government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not
be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36
of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN
THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED
OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of
marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s
personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the
wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by
respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the
guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only
questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the
doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not
call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the
parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner
raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in
1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all
persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation
or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye
Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The
Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in
turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in
some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made
a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was
established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki
v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
 Persons and Family Relations Jurisprudence/full text
Family Code Art 407-413 Civil Register
Page 13 of 13
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to

show the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any
way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order
dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.