JUSTICE ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE

CASE DIGESTS
ALTHOUGH EXPERT OPINIONS FURNISHED BY PSYCHOLOGISTS REGARDING THE
TEMPERAMENT OF PARTIES ARE USUALLY GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT BY THE
COURTS, THE EXISTENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST STILL BE PROVEN BY
INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 3014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 in Zamboanga del Norte. Their union begot
two children. On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo sought the declaration of nullity his marriage with
Natividad on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, that he was forced to marry Natividad barely three months
into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. When he decided to join and train with the army,
Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad lived
with a certain Engineer Terez, and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. Thereafter, Natividad
contracted a second marriage with one Antonio Mondarez. From the time Natividad abandoned them in
1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save
their marriage which, however, proved futile.

Natividad failed to file her answer as well as to appear during trial. Nonetheless, she informed the court
that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos. In her two–page
psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from
“utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from
persons who abide by established norms of conduct.” Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition
of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only

ISSUE:
Whether or not emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with
psychological incapacity.

HELD:
No. “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include

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their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

The psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Zalsos did not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply–rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad’s
condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties’ marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad’s behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations
sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos’s report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of
Natividad’s condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be
drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self–serving. Although expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight
by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.

To the Court’s mind, Natividad’s refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one’s duties is another

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NOTWITHSTANDING THE MOLINA GUIDELINES, AN EXPERT OPINION IS NOT
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IN A PETITION UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

RACHEL DEL ROSARIO vs. JOSE DEL ROSARIO

GR. No. 222541; February 15, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Rachel and Jose got married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they
renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya. In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper, only returning to the
Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot in
Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, alleging
that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. She claimed that:
during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father.
According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before
their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his
parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to
leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in
the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal,
which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly,
and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her
sister, Beverly A. Juan stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang
dito." Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag
sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with
their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual
intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.

Rachel presented the testimonies of Wesley and her sisters, which corroborated her allegations, as well
as the testimony of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, who prepared the Psychological Report on Rachel. The remarks
section of Dr. Tayag's Report, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD)
characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-
seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack
of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully
performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his
family's financial and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their
conjugal home. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and
their son. Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations.

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RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It
relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes with his capacity
to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions,
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against him.

CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not
enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for
violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which
nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the law requires.

ISSUE:
Whether or not irresponsibility, insensitivity and emotional immaturity of Jose amount to psychological
incapacity sufficient to declare the marriage null and void.

HELD:
No. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.

It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential
parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept
of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how
and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior
correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment,
making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to
what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply
with his marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived
childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological
incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the
marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior
during the marriage.

In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show
that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital
obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty
of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really

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accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

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IN ORDER FOR A DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE TO BE
RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISDICTION, IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THE DIVORCE DECREE
IS VALID ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE FOREIGNER

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," petitioner, vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE
G.R. No. 215723. July 27, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J P:

FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki),
a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore two
children. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before
the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in
the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code before the RTC.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several
foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and "Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the
Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy
of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila
that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the
City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in
the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English
translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.

The RTC denied Doreen's petition. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen
were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving
the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained abroad must be valid in accordance to the national law of the
alien spouse in order to be recognized in the Philippine courts

HELD:
YES. At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce

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is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Under the above-highlighted
paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court held that: The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of
the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of
fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

The case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

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PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGALITY DOES NOT OPERATE IF THERE IS NO SHOWING WHEN
THE PROPERTY ALLEGED TO BE CONJUGAL WAS ACQUIRED

MICHAEL A. ONSTOTT vs. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION (UTNAI)

G.R. No. 221047, September 14, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. (-2645-) M-
556 situated in the Province of Rizal. Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the subject property was sold
at public auction to Amelita A. De Serra, the highest bidder. Respondent UTNAI, an association
representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed the same from De
Serra.
UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation of the OCT under the name of Albert and the issuance of a new
title in its name. As Albert was not a resident of the Philippines, summons was served through
publication. Albert failed to file his answer and was, thus, declared in default. The RTC granted the
cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 and the issuance of a new one in its stead in the name of UTNAI.
The RTC Decision lapsed into finality and as a consequence, TCT No. B-9655 was issued in favor of
UTNAI.
Petitioner Michael Onstott, claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert with a certain Josephine Arrastia
Onstott, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment contending that the ruling in the complaint filed by
UTNAI was null and void for failure to implead an indispensable party, his mother Josephine. He posits
that his mother is an indispensable party for being the owner of half of the subject property, which was
registered under "Albert Onstott, American citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia,” and is thus, as he
claimed, is conjugal in nature.

ISSUE:
Should the presumption that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership arise by reason of
marriage alone?

HELD:
NO, marriage alone does not give rise to the presumption that a property forms part of the conjugal
partnership.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Michael invokes the presumption of
conjugality, but he fails to establish that the subject property was acquired during the marriage of Albert
and Josephine. Indeed, records are bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the
subject property can be ascertained.

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Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, the subject property is therefore considered to be Albert's
exclusive property. Consequently, Michael's insistence that Josephine who, the Court notes, has never
personally appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge the disposition of the subject
property sans her participation is a co-owner thereof and necessarily, an indispensable party to the
instant case, must therefore fail.

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ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, SHOULD REFER TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF
PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR
INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO
G.R. No. 209180; February 24, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to
finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Less than a year into
their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would
prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Reghis initially objected to the planned
marriage of Olivia’s parents as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents
assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are financially
able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits.
They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became
engrossed in his career and focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little
time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986,
the couple parted ways.

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC citing his
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. Reghis also testified that he
married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter’s parents who were kind and
accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was not prepared to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding
employment to support his parents and siblings. He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with a
certain Eddie Garcia.

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio, a clinical psychologist, who submitted a
Psychological Evaluation Report and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive-Compulsive
Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis’ behavioral disorder gave him a strong
obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities
and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’
OCPD was the root of the couple’s disagreements and that the same is incurable, explaining too that
Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the time and, as such, felt
cheated into marriage.

For her part, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also averred that the

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petition is barred by res judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed petitions for the declaration of
the nullity of their marriage on the ground the she is allegedly psychologically incapacitated, but said
petitions were dismissed. Olivia, however, was unable to present evidence due to the absence of her
counsel which was considered by the RTC as waiver of her right to present evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether the Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) of the husband in this case is
considered psychological incapacity.

HELD:
No. Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological
incapacity must:
1. Be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;
2. Have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
3. Be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do
not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply
with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological
incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque
City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that
he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love,
but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated
in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Moreover, the OCPD was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other than Dr. Basilio's conclusion
that Reghis' "behavioral disorder . . . existed even prior to the marriage or even during his adolescent
years," no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his
behavior during his marriage with Olivia.

In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis' disorder is incurable but failed to explain how
she came to such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept
of OCPD, its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the

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respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that Reghis' condition had no
definite treatment or is incurable.

Marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties. Article 36 of the Family Code must not
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume
and fulfil the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie.

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THE REQUIREMENT OF WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF CAN ONLY BE DISCHARGED UPON A
SHOWING OF PROPER AND HONEST-TO-GOODNESS INQUIRIES AND EFFORTS TO
ASCERTAIN THE DEATH OF THE SPOUSE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NILDA B. TAMPUS
G.R. No. 214243; March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) in Cordova, Cebu. Three days
thereafter, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to
locate him, but her efforts proved futile.

She filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, led
her to believe that he is already dead especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Due to
the absence of any opposition, Nilda was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. She testified on the
allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his parents,
relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his whereabouts. She averred that
she intends to remarry and move on with her life.

RTC granted the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Was Nilda able to establish the stringent requirement of well-founded belief that Dante was already dead
in order to correctly obtain a judicial declaration of presumptive death?

HELD:
NO. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive
years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the
present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites exist. The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying
with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.

Other than making inquiries from Dante’s family, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her
husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding

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him. Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were
not even named.

Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support
her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as
established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently
searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief that her
husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and
after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the
present spouse.

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ALL PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP, UNLESS IT BE PROVED THAT IT PERTAINS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE

BOBBY TAN vs. GRACE ANDRADE, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 171904 & 172017, August 7, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land situated in Cebu City
(subject properties), which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed. When the redemption period
was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the
subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso,
Jr.). Proceso, Jr. ceded unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties. Notwithstanding
the assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving
the latter a certain date to purchase the same. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his
ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name.

Rosario’s children (Andrades) filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance
and damages against Bobby before the RTC. In their complaint, they claimed that since they inherited
the subject properties from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were
conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In his
defense, Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely owned by Rosario per the TCTs issued
in her name and that he had validly acquired the same upon Proceso, Jr.’s failure to exercise his option
to buy back the subject properties.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the Andrades’ complaint. As regards the nature of the subject
properties, the RTC found that they "appeared to be the exclusive properties of Rosario."
The CA held that subject properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband,
Proceso, Sr., and thus, she co-owned the same together with her children, the Andrades. In this respect,
the sale was valid only with respect to Rosario’s pro-indiviso share in the subject properties and it cannot
prejudice the share of the Andrades since they did not consent to the sale. Accordingly, the CA ordered
Bobby to reconvey to the Andrades their share in the subject properties.

ISSUE:
Are the subject properties exclusive properties of Rosario?

HELD:
Yes, the subject properties are the exclusive properties of Rosario. Article 160 of the Civil Code states that
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking
the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage.

15
For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the
property was indeed acquired during the marriage.

In this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property was acquired by petitioner Josefina. Thus,
the Court agreed with petitioner Josefina’s declaration in the deed of absolute sale she executed in favor
of the respondent that she was the absolute and sole owner of the property. Records reveal that the
conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7,
1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979
and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare
allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were
procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds.
Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the
subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same.

Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were
exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.

16
AN EJECTMENT CASE, BASED ON THE ALLEGATION OF POSSESSION BY TOLERANCE
FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER

BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD v. SPOUSES VICTORIO and EMETERIA GURIEZA

G.R. No. 207525; June 18, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Herein petitioners, Bonifacio Piedad and Maria Piedad (Spouses Bonifacio) claimed absolute ownership
of the 1/3 middle portion of Lot 1227 (subject lot). Bonifacio acquired the same through intestate
succession from his late father who also inherited the same from the latter’s parents, Alejandro Piedad
(Alejandro) and Tomasa Villaray (Tomasa). The existence of a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication
and Partition (Deed of Confirmation) executed by Alejandro and Tomasa’s legal heirs also evidenced
Bonifacio’s ownership of the subject lot, the partition taking place and deed being executed even before
the death of Bonifacio’s father. On this lot, Bonifacio built a bungalow and assigned numerous caretakers
to look after it, the last of which were respondent spouses, Victorio Gurieza and Emeteria M. Gurieza
(Spouses Gurieza).

Spouses Gurieza declared the subject lot under their name for tax purposes after allegedly learning from
DENR that the same is public land. They also caused a subdivision survey of the lot, and filed an
application for survey authority and titling. Bonifacio filed a protest through an agent before the DENR
which deferred further action on Spouses Gurieza’s application before it. Bonifacio’s daughter, Maria
Inspiracion Piedad-Danao (Danao), personally demanded that Spouses Gurieza vacate the subject lot
unconditionally; and for this purpose, Danao initiated a complaint before the barangay court. However,
the same failed as the former refued to heed Danao’s demand, prompting the institution of this case.
Spouses Gurieza denied Bonifacio’s claim and maintained that in 1974, the subject lot was a vacant and
virginal public land and that the DENR allowed them to possess and occupy the same in the concept of
an owner. As such, they acquired the same through acquisitive prescription. They likewise assailed the
authenticity and validity of the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was only signed by a few heirs
of Alejandro and Tomasa.

Both the MTC and RTC ruled in favor Bonifacio deciding that there was sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to show that Bonifacio indeed had better possessory rights over the subject lot. The
CA however found, upon further scrutiny of the Deed of Confirmation, that some of the other heirs of
Alejandro and Tomasa did not sign the Deed of Confirmation. As such, the CA did not give credence to
the said document there being no credible proof as to the partition of the lot.

ISSUE:
Will a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer prosper despite the fact that the plaintiff allowed the defendant
to occupy the lot by tolerance?

17
HELD:
Yes, An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of
unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without
any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise.

Thus, under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must be filed "within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the defendant originally
had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the
plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment
thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this light, the Court shall solely resolve the issue as to who between the parties has the better right of
possession de facto over the subject lot. Corollary thereto, issues pertaining to ownership are better
threshed out in another action instituted for such purpose.

18
THE RIGHT TO HIRE A TENANT IS A PERSONAL RIGHT OF A LANDOWNER, EXCEPT AS
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW; THE CONSENT OF THE LANDOWNER SHOULD BE SECURED
PRIOR TO THE INSTALLATION OF TENANTS.

RICARDO V. QUINTOS vs. DEPARTMENT O F AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

G.R. No. 207525, February 10, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Golden Country Farms, Incorporated (GCFI) is the owner of a parcel of land (subject property) consisting
of a mango orchard and a rice plantation. Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos is the majority stockholder of
GCFI who managed its properties until management was taken over by Armando Romualdez. Thereafter,
Romualdez executed a real estate mortgage on the subject property to secure the loans obtained from
Philippines National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines.

In 1987, after the EDSA Revolution, PNB and DBP transferred their financial claims to Asset Privatization
Trust. Thereafter, APT Officer-in-Charge Cesar Lacuesta entered into a verbal agreement with 53
members of private respondent Kanlurang Mindoro Farmers’ Cooperative, Inc. (KAMIFCI), allowing the
latter to tend the standing mango trees, induce their flowering, and gather the fruits at ₱300.00 per tree,
the payment of which was to be remitted to Quintos. Subsequently, Quintos reacquired the possession
and management of the subject properties.

The controversy began when Quintos was informed by APT of the notice from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placing the riceland under compulsory acquisition pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. KAMIFCI filed an action for the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject property against Quintos before the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator.

ISSUE:
May a possessor of a land pursuant to a mortgage contract enter into a tenancy agreement binding against
the owner of the land?

HELD:
No. In this relation, it bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence, the consent of the landowner should be secured
prior to the installation of tenants.

Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of particular facts as required by law. For a
tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the following essential elements must be shown: (a) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent
between the parties; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and (f) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the above elements must concur

19
in order to create a tenancy relationship. Thus, the absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel
of land, a cultivator or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure under existing
tenancy laws.

The DARAB and the CA both considered ATP is legal possessor at the time tenancy was created. Records
are, however, bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the property’s landowner, GCFI, to
install tenants thereon. To be sure, APT only assumed the rights of the original mortgagees in this case,
i.e., PNB and DBP. It is settled that a mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged property
until he has foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. With
the foreclosure proceedings having been enjoined, APT could not have been regarded as the "landowner"
of the subject property. Thus, since the consent of the standing landowner, GCFI, had not been secured
by APT in this case, it had no authority to enter into any tenancy agreement with the KAMIFCI members.

20
UNLESS A NUISANCE IS A NUISANCE PER SE, IT MAY NOT BE SUMMARILY ABATED

LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG AND RUBEN ANG, AND SPS.
ROSARIO AND WILSON UY
G.R. No. 192861

SPS. ROSARIO AND WILSON UY, AND SPS. SHIRLEY ONG AMD RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS.
REYNALDO AND LINDA RANA
G.R. No. 192862; June 30, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong are co-owners pro-indiviso of a residential
land in Cebu City (Wong-Ong property), abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road).
On the opposite side of the subject road, across the Wong-Ong property, are the adjacent lots of Spouses
Wilson and Rosario Uy and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana. The said lots follow a rolling terrain with
the Rana property standing about two meters higher than and overlooking the Uy property, while Wong-
Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.

Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs between the Rana and Wong-
Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion with their gate. Sps. Rana likewise
backfilled a portion (subject backfilling) of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy properties
without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.

Wong, Sps. Ong and Sps. Uy filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps.
Rana before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No, CEB-20893, claiming that both the elevated and
cemented subject portion and the subject backfilling are "nuisances" caused/created by the latter which
curtailed their use and enjoyment of their properties.

During the pendency of the case, Sps. Rana filed with another branch of the same trial court a Complaint
for Recovery of Property and Damages against Sps. Uy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-21296, alleging
that a resurvey of their property showed that Sps. Uy encroached upon a portion along the common
boundary of their properties. They prayed that Sps. Uy be ordered to remove their fence along the
common boundary and return the encroached portion.

ISSUES:
1. In Civil Case No. CEB-20893, whether or not the subject portion is a nuisance.
2. In Civil Case No. CEB-21296, whether or not there was encroachment upon the Rana property.

21
HELD:
Civil Case No. CEB-20893
YES. With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same as a
nuisance – but not a nuisance per se that can be summarily abated.

Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as “any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs
or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders
or impairs the use of property.” Based on case law, however, the term “nuisance” is deemed to be “so
comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the
citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.”

Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they affect. In
this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which “affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal”); or (b) a private nuisance (or one “that is not included in the
foregoing definition” [or, as case law puts it, one which “violates only private rights and produces
damages to but one or a few persons”]).

Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement
(that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a)
a nuisance per se (or one which “affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity”); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which
“depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot
be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in
law constitute a nuisance.”)

By its nature, the elevated and cemented subject portion is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which
was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong
properties. By constructing the subject portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that
particularly transgressed the rights of Wong, et. al.

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily
abated. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se (but actually a nuisance per accidens), it cannot
be summarily abated. As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion remains
unwarranted.

Civil Case No. CEB-21296

YES, the Court finds that Sps. Uy had actually encroached upon the Rana property to the extent of 2 sq.
m. Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party

22
prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof. In the present
case, the Report of the court-appointed commissioner who conducted a relocation survey of the Rana and
Uy properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the two properties and showed that Sps. Uy’s
perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of the Rana property. Sps. Rana are therefore entitled to return of
the encroached portion.

23
LANDS BELONGING TO PUBLIC DOMAIN NOT COGNIZABLE BY COURTS IN AN ACTION
FOR QUIETING OF TITLE; JURISDICTION AS TO WHO HAS BETTER RIGHT WITH
DIRECTOR OF LANDS

BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ET AL. VS. ESTELLA AY-AY, ET AL.

G.R. No. 189950; April 24, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from a complaint for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by
respondents against the petitioners.

Respondents alleged that petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest sold to them separately various portions
of a 159, 496 square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio
City, and they registered the corresponding Deeds of sale with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City.
Respondents further alleged that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976
when they were delivered to them and that they have already introduced various improvements thereon.

Petitioners refused to honor the forgoing sales and continued to harass and threatened to demolish their
improvements. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordered the
dismissal of civil case No. 5881-R and dismissing the earlier filed civil case No. 3934-R where respondents
similarly sought to be declared the owners of the subject property. Respondents then appealed to the CA
which set aside the dismissal of the civil case and remanded the case to the court a quo for trial. The CA
concluded that while these cases may involve the same properties, the nature of the action differs; hence,
res judicata is not a bar to the present suit. The CA pointed out that in view of respondent’s allegation
that they have been in possession of the subject property since 1976, their action to quiet title is
imprescriptible.

ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in declaring that the subject property is within the RTC’s jurisdiction for quieting of
title?

HELD:
No. The CA is incorrect.

A review of the records shows that the subject property form part of a 159,496 square meter parcel of
land designated by Bureau of Lands situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City. Such parcel of land forms part
of the Baguio Town site Reservation, a portion of which was awarded to Iloc Bilag. RTC Br. 61 has no
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein seek to quiet title over lands which belong
to the public domain.

24
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or
interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and
to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity.

In this case, since the subject land belong to the public domain, respondents cannot be said to have legal
or equitable title over said land.

25
QUIETING OF TITLE; REQUISITES; LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE; REMOVAL OF CLOUD
THEREON

HEIRS OF JOSE EXTREMADURA v. MANUEL EXTREMADURA AND MARLON

EXTREMADURA
G.R. No. 211065; June 15, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Jose filed Civil Case for quieting of title with recovery of possession, rendition of accounting, and
damages, against his brother, Manuel Extremadura (Manuel), and his nephew, Marlon Extremadura
(Marlon), claiming that he (Jose) purchased three (3) parcels of agricultural land located in Sitio Ponong,
Barrio Rizal, Casiguran, Sorsogon from his aunt, Corazon S. Extremadura (Corazon), the widow of his
uncle, Alfredo H. Extremadura (Alfredo), through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 18, 1984. Since
Jose resided in Manila, he placed one parcel in Manuel's care, in exchange for which, the latter and his
son, Marlon, religiously delivered the produce of said land from 1984 until 1995. Unfortunately,
respondents (Manuel and Marlon) continuously refused to deliver the produce of the land or vacate the
same despite his repeated demands; hence, the complaint.

In their defense, respondents averred that they have been in open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, where their residential house stands, and in the concept of
owner for almost fifty (50) years; thus, Jose's action was already barred by prescription or laches. They
further claimed that the fact that they gave Jose portions of the land's produce was merely in keeping
with the Filipino culture of sharing blessings with siblings and relatives. Also, they argued that the deed
of absolute sale presented by Jose is not the legal or beneficial title contemplated by Article 476 of the
Civil Code.

RTC ruled that Jose had a better right over the land as proven by the deed of absolute sale executed in
his favor, which was notarized and, therefore, enjoys the presumption of regularity.

CA held that Jose failed to establish legal and equitable title over the subject land, observing that the
notarized deed of sale executed in Jose's favor did not transfer the land's ownership to him given that he
was never placed in possession and control thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has legal or equitable title allowing him to file an action for quieting of title.

HELD:
YES. In order for an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal
or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. For an action to quiet
tide to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a

26
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Jose satisfactorily established his equitable title over the subject land entitling him - and now, petitioners
as his successors-in-interest - to the removal of the cloud or doubt thereon, particularly, the claim of
respondents that they are the owners thereof.

Equitable title has been defined as "[a] title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on.
recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title
transferred to him. x x x. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show
that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. x x x."

In this case, Jose's title to the subject land was derived through a contract of sale, as evidenced by a
notarized document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale. Primarily, it should be stressed that
"[possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that
it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right." Jose exercised possession of the subject land through Manuel (and eventually, his son,
Marlon) whom he allowed to stay and care for the land in exchange for the delivery of the produce
thereof. Article 524 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.

In this relation, case law teaches that "[i]t is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should
himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when
another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy," as the parties in this case.

Jose - not only through the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, but also as evinced by his
exercise of the rights and obligations as owner thereof- was able to prove his title over the subject land.

27
A PERSON NEED NOT HAVE HIS FEET ON EVERY SQUARE METER OF THE LAND TO
ESTABLISH PHYSICAL POSSESSION

SPOUSES FAHRENBACH V. JOSEFINA PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 224549; August 07, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Pangilinan acquired from Felomina Abid a 5.78-hectare parcel of land through a Waiver of
Rights. Unknown to respondent, the same lot was apparently sold by Abid to Columbino Alvarez through
a Deed of Sale. However, Alvarez discovered that the Deed of Sale has erroneously described the land
subject of the sale, and what he bought was really a 8-hectare parcel of land elsewhere. Respondent,
however, was surprised to see that the 5.78-hectare land was being occupied by petitioners. Hence, a
complaint for forcible entry was filed against petitioners, who maintained that the land they occupied is
the 8-hectare land they bought from Alvarez, not the one owned by Pangilinan.

In any case, petitioner argued that Pangilinan had no right to file the forcible entry case because the latter
did not have prior physical possession of the lot. They claimed that the land was never fenced nor was a
caretaker appointed by respondent to oversee the land. Respondent argued that she has been paying
realty taxes and has been visiting the land every now and then.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pangilinan had prior physical possession of the land and as such may file an action for
forcible entry

HELD:
Yes, Pangilinan had prior physical possession of the land and thus may file a forcible entry case.

It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute. The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de
Jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or
actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must
prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the
defendant.

In this case, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot. Records
disclose that respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in
September 1995. She even paid the lot's realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey authority thereon.
In fact, she submitted old photographs showing herself on the subject lot, the identity of which petitioners
did not contest. Notably, jurisprudence states that the law does not require a person to have his feet on

28
every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor,
the Court held that "visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical
possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the
subject property." In contrast, petitioners themselves claim that they began occupying the subject lot only
in August 2005, after Alvarez executed the corresponding Deed of Sale in their favor.

Hence, there is no doubt that respondent had prior de facto possession.

29
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER TENANTED RICE AND/OR CORN LANDS AFTER
OCTOBER 21, 1972 IS ALLOWED ONLY IN FAVOR OF THE ACTUAL TENANT-TILLERS
THEREON

JOSELITO BORROMEO VS JUAN MINA

G.R. No. 193747; June 5, 2013
PERLAS – BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
Joselito Borromeo, petitioner, seeks to have his landholding exempted from the coverage of the
government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program since his landholding is within the retention limits
of the said program, as well as the cancellation of respondent Juan Mina’s title over the said property
based on an emancipation patent issued by DAR in May 1990.

Petitioner explained he purchased the subject land from Garcia, its previous owner in 1982 as evidenced
by a deed of absolute sale. He further assails that he was surprised of the grant of the emancipation patent
to the respondent for he alleged that he received no notice.

All of the administrative agencies such as DARAB and DAR Secretary among others found that the
petitioner is the true owner and ordered the cancellation of respondents patent among other reliefs.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the Secretary’s decision, and ruled that the
sale was null and void since PD 27 which forbids the transfers or alienation of covered agricultural lands
after October 21, 1972 except to the tenant-beneficiaries thereof, of which petitioner was not.

Petitioner then offered statements to the effect that there was already an oral sale made between him and
Garcia in 1976 and was formalized only in 1982, he then occupied the subject property in 1976 and allowed
the respondent to cultivate the said property out of mercy and compassion, in this regard the petitioner
claims that the respondent cannot be considered as a tenant and as such his emancipation patent be
cancelled.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is the true owner of the agricultural land he purchased in 1982?

HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands
after October 21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon.

Notably, the status of respondent as tenant is now beyond dispute considering petitioner’s admission of
such fact. Likewise, as earlier discussed, petitioner is tied down to his initial theory that his claim of
ownership over the subject property was based on the 1982 deed of sale.

30
Therefore, as Garcia sold the property in 1982 to the petitioner who is evidently not the tenant-beneficiary
of the same, in consequence the petitioner cannot present claim for land holding exemption because his
title spring from an null and void source for being contrary to law.

31
TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS MAY ONLY BECOME THE BASIS OF A CLAIM
FOR OWNERSHIP WHEN THEY ARE COUPLED WITH PROOF OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY

HEIRS OF ALEJANDRA DELFIN v. AVELINA RABADON, ET AL.

G.R. No. 165014 July 31, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession of Lot No. 8217, a
4,452 square meter parcel of land situated in Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu City (subject property) from
petitioners, seeking as well the payment of damages. Based on their complaint and the testimonies of
their witnesses during trial, respondents alleged that: (a) the subject property was owned by their
predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana Bacalso (Emiliana), pursuant to Decree No. 98992; (b) while the
foregoing decree was lost during the last World War, its existence could still be shown by a certification
(LRA certification) issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and a certified copy from page 19 of
the daybook of cadastral lots issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cebu City (daybook entry); (c) after
Emiliana’s death, Genaro Rabadon took over the possession of the subject property and upon his death,
his children, herein respondents, took over its possession until 1988; (d) in 1989, they discovered that the
said property was already in the possession of petitioner Alejandra Delfin (Alejandra) and some of her
children and their families already constructed their houses thereon; and (e) when they confronted
Alejandra, she claimed that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Remegio Navares (Remegio) previously
bought the said property; however, when they asked to see a copy of the deed of sale, she could not
produce the same.

For their part, petitioners countered that: (a) they inherited the subject property from their predecessor-
in-interest, Remegio, who bought the foregoing even before the second World War; (b) the subject
property was issued a certificate of title in the name of Remegio, however, the said title was lost; (c)
Alejandra inherited the subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and after its execution,
she and her children, petitioners Leopoldo, Francisco and Marcelito Delfin, took over the possession of
the same; and (d) the subject property had been declared by them for taxation purposes and they paid the
corresponding realty taxes due thereon.

RTC ruled that petitioners (Delfin) had the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject
property, on the reason that while tax declarations and tax receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become proof of ownership when accompanied by proof of actual possession such as
petitioners’ continuous declaration of the subject property for taxation purposes, their payments of the
corresponding taxes, and the construction of their respective houses thereon. On appeal, CA reversed the
RTC on the ground that the documentary evidence adduced by respondents outweighs the self-serving
testimonies of petitioners. CA stressed that tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess the land when not supported by other evidence of actual
possession which remained wanting in this case.

32
ISSUE:
Whether tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to establish right to ownership and right to
possession over the subject property?

HELD:
No. Against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive
evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title, which
indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail.

As may be gleaned from the records, the probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which consist of tax
declarations and tax receipts, pales in comparison to that of respondents’ evidence which consists of a
decree of ownership, i.e., Decree No. 98992, under the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana.
While the actual copy of the said decree was lost, the existence of the said decree was actually proven by
the LRA certification and the daybook entry. Likewise, the RTC itself observed that it is undisputable that
the subject property has been issued Decree No. 98992, for which an original certificate of title was issued
to Emiliana. It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and
title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration decree.
Accordingly, respondents’ Decree No. 98992 for which an original certificate of title was issued should
be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in
this case.

Besides, tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership when they
are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records are bereft of any showing
that petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been in actual possession of the subject
property prior to 1989 as they claim. The tax declarations and tax receipts are insufficient to prove their
proffered theory that their predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, was the lawful possessor and owner of the
foregoing property even before the last World War. In fact, petitioners altogether failed to prove the
legitimacy of Remegio's possession and ownership since they failed to present the pe1iinent deed of sale
or any other evidence of the latter's title. On the contrary, aside from the LRA certification and daybook
entry which prove the existence of Decree No. 98992, respondents' possession of the subject property
prior to petitioners' entry in 1989 was attested to by one Marcelina Tabora who. as the CA notes, appears
to be an unbiased witness. All told, by sheer preponderance of evidence, respondents have shown a better
right to the ownership and possession of the subject property and hence, must be awarded the same.

33
FOR A CASE OF FORCIBLE ENTRY TO PROSPER, COMPLAINANT MUST JUSTIFY HIS RIGHT
TO THE DE FACTO POSSESSION (PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL POSSESSION) OF THE DISPUTED
PREMISES

HOMER C. JAVIER V. SUSAN LUMONTAD

G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint filed by petitioner against respondent before the
MTC. Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the
owner of a 360 sq. m. parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-11458. Since his
birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicente’s death,
petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007,
respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey building on a 150 sq.
m. portion thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests.

Respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in physical possession
of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the subject building
was being constructed, as evidenced by a Tax Declaration in her name. Hence, she took possession of the
said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.

The MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. It found that
Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m.,
was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building
was erected, was given to one Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed
marriage, but was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through sale.

The RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the
disputed portion and surrender possession thereof to petitioner. The RTC found that petitioner, being the
owner and possessor of the property in question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that
respondent forcibly and unlawfully deprived him of the same.
.
The CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter court for trial on the merits. It held
that the issue of possession of the subject land is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership, such
that the former issue cannot be determined without ruling on who really owns such land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Complaint for Forcible Entry of the Petitioner must prosper.

34
HELD:
No. Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint,
nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right to the de
facto possession (physical or material possession) of the disputed premises.

As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from which petitioner
hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only covers his house and not the entire
land itself. Respondent had the subject building constructed in the concept of being the owner of the
172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject land. Petitioner gave a misleading description of TD No. 00-TY-002-
11458, considering that said tax declaration only covered petitioner’s family house and not the subject
land where said improvement was built, as petitioner alleged in his complaint. The subject land is
separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-9660, which was cancelled when the land was subdivided into
two (2) lots, namely: (a) the 187.20 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12825 given by Vicente to
petitioner; and (b) the 172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12824 given by Vicente to Anthony,
which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name.
Further, petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that respondent employed force and intimidation
in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject land as he failed to demonstrate the factual
circumstances that occurred during his dispossession of said property.

Nothing appears on record to show that he has the right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m.
portion which, on the contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in
view of TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her name. Thus, with no
evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing respondent's right to the de
facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must
necessarily fail.

35
NON-RIPARIAN OWNERS CANNOT ASSERT OWNERSHIP OVER LAND DEPOSITED
THROUGH ACCRETION.

HEIRS OF NARVASA VS. IMBORNAL

G.R. No. 182908; August 6, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Basilia Imbornal had four children, namely Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo. Francisco and Pedro
were the children of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra was the daughter of Balbina. On the other hand,
respondents Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal,
are the descendants of Pablo. During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land (Sabangan property),
which she conveyed to her three daughters Balbina, Alejanda, Catalina (Imbornal sisters) in 1920.
Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco, applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a riparian
land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was awarded with
Homestead patent and OCT No. 1462 which was later cancelled, and TCT was issued in the name his
heirs. Ciriaco and his heirs has since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while respondents
occupied the southern portion.

Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15,
1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte,
covering the First Accretion. In 1971, the Second Accretion, more or less, abutted the First Accretion on
its southern portion. On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the
respondents covering the Second Accretion.

Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., children of Alejanda and Balbina, filed on
February 27, 1984 an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against
respondents. They claimed that they agreed to sell the Sabangan property which they co-own with their
sister Catalina, to fund the pending homestead patent application of Ciriaco (Catalina’s husband) over
the Motherland. They averred that part of their agreement was for Ciriaco to hold the Motherland once
the patent was approved, in trust for the Imbornal sisters. Likewise, they alleged that through deceit,
fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and
the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said
accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did
not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to).

ISSUE:
Whether a non-riparian owner can assert ownership over the land formed through accretion even if it
did not possess the riparian land for the period prescribed by law to have acquisitive title.

HELD:
No. The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between

36
the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. An
implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to
satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.

In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony offered by
Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and
Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the presumed regularity of the award of the
homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered
by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al. would not effectively establish their
claims of ownership. Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights over the
Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second
Accretion, must likewise fail.

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters".

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, are not the riparian owners of
the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the
First Accretion. As the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no
right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties
through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore,
whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that
Francisco, et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been
substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so
since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering
the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the
superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyance with respect to both
accretions must altogether fail.

NB: SC citing Cantoja v. Lim: The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for
giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the
diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of
littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.

37
DISCREPANCY IN THE NUMBER OF PAGES WRITTEN IN THE WILL IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW.

IN THE MATTER OF PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF ENRIQUE LOPEZ v. DIANA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 189984; November 12, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Enrique Lopez (Enrique) died, left his wife Wendy Lopez (Wendy), and four (4) legitimate children,
including petitioner Richard Lopez and respondents Diana Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth)
and Victoria Tuazon (Victoria). Before Enrique’s death, he executed a last will and testament, and named
Richard as the executor and administrator. Afterwards, Richard filed for the probate of the will with
prayer for issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the same alleging that the last
will was not executed and attested in accordance with the law and was procured through the undue and
improper influence of Richard. The instrumental witnesses and the notary public testified in favor of the
allowance of the will.

The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which
requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written.
It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid
down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in
the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion
stated that the will consists of seven pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has eight pages including the acknowledgment
portion. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the discrepancy in the number of pages constitutes a failure to comply with the formalities
required by law.

HELD:
Yes. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some
of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written" 10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including

38
its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but
through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: x x x
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every
page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the
will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be
safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the ·attestation clause, being the only check against
perjuy in the probate proceedings. Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

39
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE KNOWN TO ALL HEIRS.

NERI v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES UY

G.R. No. 194366; October 10, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven (7) children: two (Eutropia and Victoria) from her marriage
with Gonzalo and five (Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas, and Rosa) from her marriage with Enrique.
During her second marriage, Anunciacion and Enrique acquired several homestead properties.

Anunciacion died intestate. As a result, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of their
common children, Douglas and Rosa, Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an extra-judicial
settlement of the estate adjudicating among themselves the homestead properties. Thereafter, they
conveyed these properties to the Spouses Uy. The children of Enrique then filed a complaint for the
annulment of sale of the homestead properties against Spouses Uy assailing the validity of the sale for
having been sold within the 5-year prohibited period from the issuance of the homestead patents. The
complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. In their
amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia
and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and
interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

The RTC ordered the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale.
It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because
Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority
to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision
holding that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of
the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and
Victoria belatedly filed their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge of their exclusion as
heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering
their legitimes from their co-heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial settlement was binding upon Eutropia and Victoria, the decedent’s children
from her first marriage.

40
HELD:
No. The extrajudicial settlement was not binding upon Eutropia and Victoria (children from the first
marriage).

All the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second
marriage with Gonzalo and Enrique, and consequently are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares,
pursuant to the following articles:

Art. 979: Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

Art. 980: The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.

As such, upon the death of Anunciacion, her children and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances,
entitling them to their pro-indiviso shares in her whole estate. Thus, in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the Spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacion should have participated. Rule 74, Section 1 provides that no extra-judicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
were not properly represented therein (Enrique only exercised powers of administration), the settlement
was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents
isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs
have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death
and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.

41
ONE CANNOT SALVAGE ANY RIGHTS FROM AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRANSACTION
KNOWINGLY ENTERED INTO.

WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. No. 195670; December 3, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years,
RTC declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the
former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated December 14, 2000 praying for
the distribution of the properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and
Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution. During trial,
petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit
since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint
affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the
Family Code, hence, invalid.

RTC rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land
to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his
exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties. CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, stressing the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity
to support his claim for reimbursement.

ISSUE:
Whether the COURT erred in not sustaining the petitioner’s attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right of half or whole of the purchase price used in the purchase of the real properties subject
of this case.

42
HELD:
No. The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt
the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should
not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement. Petitioner’s
statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the
veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s
personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were
used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner
has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.

Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

43
THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI, MELENCIA S. MAXIMO,
ALBERTO A. SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A. SARILI vs.
PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS
MOJICA,
G.R. No. 193517; January 15, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Lagrosa, represented by his attorney-in-fact Mojica via a special power of attorney (SPA), filed a
complaint against Sps. Sarili and the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan, alleging that he is the owner of
a certain parcel of land in Caloocan City and he has been paying the real estate taxes therefor since his
acquisition. He claimed that he is a resident of California, USA and during his vacation, he discovered
that a new certificate of title to the property was issued by the RD in the name of the Sps. Sarili by virtue
of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale between them and Sps. Lagrosa.

Sps. Sarili, on the other hand, maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased
the subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a SPA to sell/dispose of the
same which did not have Ramon’s community tax certificate CTC number, and, in such capacity, executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the said property in their favor.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Sps. Sarili are innocent purchasers for value.
2. What are the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house?

HELD:
1. No, Sps. Sarili are not innocent purchasers for value. The general rule is that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law
will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where
there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property,
or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto.

However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person who is not
the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. In such a case, the
buyer is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for
him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor. The buyer also has the duty to
ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the latter’s legal authority to convey
the property.
44
The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof
of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly
notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient
inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appears to be
flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer
must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its
execution.

2. The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine the rights
and obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built on the subject property in bad
faith in accordance with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article
546 of the Civil Code which respectively read as follows:

ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper
rent.
ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from
the builder, planter or sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses of preservation of the land.
xxxx
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he
builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.
It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry.

As for Sps. Sarili, they knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the very beginning that
they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering
45
the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and
without any further investigation on Ramos’s capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its
purchase and even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps.
Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently
built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal contemplation.

The case is, therefore, remanded to the court a quo for the proper application of the above-cited Civil
Code provisions.

46
LAURA E. PARAGUYA vs. SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO and EMETRIO CRUCILLO
GR No. 200265 December 2, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On December 19, 1990, Paraguya filed before the RTC a Complaint against Sps. Crucillo and the RD for
the annulment of OCT No. P-17729 and other related deeds, with prayer for receivership and damages,
alleging that Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. Paraguya claimed that she is
the lawful heir to the subject properties left by her paternal grandfather, while Escurel was merely their
administrator and hence, had no right over the same.

Sps. Crucillo filed their answer with motion to dismiss, averring that Paraguya’s complaint had already
been barred by laches and/or prescription. They further alleged, among others, that Escurel, through her
father, the late Angel Escurel, applied for a free patent over the subject properties, resulting in the
issuance of a Free Patent under OCT No. P-17792 in her name.

During trial, Paraguya testified as to how she came about owning the subject properties, presenting a
document entitled Recognition of Ownership and Possession dated December 1, 1972 executed by her
siblings, as well as a titulo posesorio issued sometime in 1983 or 1985 in the name of Estabillo. A
representative of the CENRO, by the name of Ramon Escanilla, also testified in Paraguya’s favor, stating
that aside from an affidavit dated December 17, 1976 executed by Escurel’s brother, Adonis Escurel
(adonis), there were no other documents of ownership presented before the Bureau of Lands in support
of Escurel’s application for title.

The RTC granted Paraguya’s complaint. The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and, instead, ordered the
dismissal of Paraguya’s complaint. Citing Section 32 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree), it held
that OCT No. P-17729 became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from its
issuance on August 24, 1979, thus barring Paraguya’s complaint. It pointed out that Paraguya was not
real-party-interest since she has not proven her title over the subject properties, stating that the titulo
posesorio she held could no longer be used as evidence of ownership.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Paraguya’s complaint for annulment of title.

HELD:
Yes, the CA is correct. It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is conclusive proof of
ownership. Verily, a party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However,
such action must be seasonably filed, else the same would be barred.

47
In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be
one (1) year from the date of its entry and that, after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate
of title issued thereon becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible, viz:

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration. Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by the reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court by reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the
court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent
phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become inconvertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree
of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or
any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the CA’s dismissal of Paraguya’s complaint for annulment is in order since it was filed only
on December 19, 1990, or more than eleven (11) years from the title’s date of entry on August 24, 1979.
Based on Section 32 of PD 1529, said title had become inconvertible and indefeasible after the lapse of
one (1) year from the date of its entry, thus barring Paraguya’s action for annulment of title.

The Court likewise took note that Paraguya’s complaint is likewise in the nature of an action for
reconveyance because it also prayed for the trial court to order Sps. Crucillo to "surrender ownership and
possession of the properties in question to [Paraguya], vacating them altogether x x x. Despite this,
Paraguya’s complaint remains dismissible on the same ground because the prescriptive period for actions
for reconveyance is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title, except
when the owner is in possession of the property in which case the action for reconveyance becomes
imprescriptible.

48
REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA vs. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON
G.R. No. 224515; July 3, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Julian and other respondents all surnamed Meliton are the registered owners of identified as Lot No.
1095-C located in Concepcion Pequeña, Naga City. During his lifetime, Julian sold a portion of the subject
land to Geñorga who took possession and introduced improvements on the portions respectively sold to
them. However, Julian failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT which led the petitioner to
file a Petition for the surrender for the said copy.

The petitioner obtained a favorable decision from RTC of Naga City ordering the administratrix of the
estate of Julian to surrender possession thereof enter the deed of sale and to issue the corresponding
certificates of title after compliance with the requirements of the law. It further held that should the
holder fail or refuse to comply with the court’s directive: (a) TCT No. 8027 shall be declared null and void;
and (b) the RD-Naga shall issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof, enter the deeds of sale, and issue
certificates of title in favor of the buyers. The administratix failed to comply. In an Order dated October
2, 2008, the RTC declared TCT No. 8027 null and void, resulting in the issuance of a new one, bearing
annotations of the buyers’ adverse claims. The new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 (subject
owner’s duplicate title) was given to petitioner in 2009.

On April 22, 2013, respondents filed a Complaint against petitioner alleging that they are entitled to the
possession thereof as registered owners, and suffered damages as a consequence of its unlawful
withholding, compelling them to secure the services of counsel to protect their interests.

In her Answer, petitioner averred that she and the other buyers are in the process of completing all the
requirements for the registration of the sales in their favor, and have paid the estate taxes thereon. They
had likewise caused the survey of the land but the first geodetic engineer they hired to conduct the same
failed to deliver his services, prompting them to file a complaint against him, and to hire another geodetic
engineer. Considering that their possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title was by virtue of a court
decision, and for the legitimate purpose of registering the sales in their favor and the issuance of titles in
their names, they should be allowed to retain possession until the completion of the requirements
therefor. The said title was eventually submitted to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013.

ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have the obligation to surrender and deliver possession of the subject owner’s
duplicate title to respondents?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when
Julian sold different portions thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of
absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers took
possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same in their names, and paid the realty

49
taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the
buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination
of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the segregation of their respective portions, and the
issuance of new certificates of title in their names upon compliance with the requirements of law.

Section 58. Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion of Land. - If a deed or conveyance is for a
part only of the land described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer
certificate to the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which
it has been subdivided and the corresponding technical descriptions shall have been
verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. Meanwhile, such deed may only be
annotated by way of memorandum upon the grantor’s certificate of title, original and
duplicate, said memorandum to serve as a notice to third persons of the fact that certain
unsegregated portion of the land described therein has been conveyed, and every certificate
with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee’s title
to the portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the corresponding
certificate in his name.

Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title in 2009, a
considerable amount of time had passed until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13,
2013. But even up to the time she filed the instant petition before the Court on May 6, 2016, she failed to
show any sufficient justification for the continued failure of the concerned buyers to comply with the
requirements for the registration of their respective deeds of sale and the issuance of certificates of title
in their names to warrant a preferential right to the possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title as
against respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion of the subject land.

Consequently, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the RTC Decision
directing petitioner or the RD-Naga to deliver or surrender the subject owner’s duplicate title to
respondents.

50
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO HABABAG, SR.
G.R. Nos. 172352 & 172387-88; September 16, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Alfredo Hababag, Sr. (Alfredo) was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate
area of 82.4927 hectares situated in Barangays Carriedo, Manapao, and Casili, in the Municipality of
Gubat, Sorsogon, and covered by TCT No. T-12107. The aforesaid landholdings were voluntarily offered
for sale (VOS) to the government under RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988," but only 69.3857 hectares thereof were acquired in 1990.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) initially valued the subject lands at P1,237,850.00, but Alfredo
rejected the valuation. After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of the amount
of just compensation, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Adjudication Board (DARAB) fixed the value of the subject lands
at P1,292,553.20. Dissatisfied, Alfredo filed a Complaint for the determination of the amount of just
compensation before the RTC.

As a matter of course, the RTC appointed two commissioners designated by each party to conduct an
evaluation and appraisal of the subject lands. Subsequently, the LBP-appointed Commissioner Corcuera,
who submitted his Commissioner's Report, fixing the amount of just compensation for the subject lands
at P2,358,385.48 based on DAR AO 6-92, as amended. On the other hand, the commissioner designated by
Alfredo, Commissioner Cuba of Banco Sorsogon, valued the lands at P5,420,600.00.

On December 20, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision13 (December 20, 1999 Decision) fixing the amount
of just compensation of the subject lands at P5,653,940.00.

On appeal, CA set aside the RTC's valuation for failure to give due consideration to the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR AO 6-92, as amended. Moreover,
contrary to the limitation imposed by DAR AO 6-92 - i.e., that the computed value using the applicable
formula shall not exceed the landowner's offer to sell - the CA found that the amount as recomputed by
the RTC was way beyond the landowner's offer of P1,750,000.00 as stated in the Claims Valuation and
Processing Form. Consequently, it gave more credence to the report submitted by Commissioner
Corcuera which made use of the DAR formula derived from the factors enumerated under Section 17 of
RA 6657. The CA likewise considered the government's obligation to pay just compensation to be in the
nature of a forbearance of money and, as such, additionally imposed interests on the just compensation
award at 12% p.a., to be reckoned from the time of the taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever is
earlier.

ISSUE:
1. Whether no interest can legally accrue to the Heirs of Hababag since they have already paid the
provisional compensation; and
2. Whether CA erred in setting aside the just compensation fixed by the RTC.

HELD:

51
1. No. The imposition of interest is correct. In the present case, the just compensation for the subject
lands was finally fixed at P2,398,487.24, while the payments made by the LBP only amounted to
P1,237,850.00. Hence, there remained an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just
compensation," warranting the imposition of interest.

In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, the Court reemphasized that just compensation contemplates
of just and timely payment, and elucidated that "prompt payment" of just compensation
encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as finally
determined by the courts. Hence, the requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit
by the LBP with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the
DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements
set forth bv RA 6657.

As to the reckoning point of the accrual of interests, in view of the LBP's alternative Motion for
Clarification, illumines that the interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred
to the Republic of the Philippines, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until
June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. However, while the LBP
averred that the landowner's title was cancelled in favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic's
title was not attached to the records of these consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby
directs the LBP to submit certified true copies of the Republic's title to the RTC upon remand of
these cases, and the latter to compute the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of
Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date of the issuance of the said titles/s.

2. CA was correct in setting aside the valuation of the RTC. RTC’s valuation contradicts the
definition of "market value" as crafted by established jurisprudence on expropriation.

In determining the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied the
Income Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the remaining productive life
of the crops therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases, and with the
expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be made by the
property owner.

The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of just compensation is
considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the property, which is, in turn, defined
as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who
desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

In this accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was "based
on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a property is dependent on the
potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership." Clearly, this approach, which is
largely characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of valuing the
expropriated property at the time of the taking.

52
RA 9700 SHALL NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS/CASES WHERE THE CLAIM FOLDERS WERE
RECEIVED BY THE LBP PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2009. IN SUCH A SITUATION, JUST
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 17 OF RA
6657, AS AMENDED, PRIOR TO ITS FURTHER AMENDMENT BY RA 9700.

WHERE THE JUST COMPENSATION DUE TO THE LANDOWNER HAS YET TO BE SETTLED,
JUST COMPENSATION SHOULD BE DETERMINED AND THE PROCESS CONCLUDED UNDER
RA 6657, AS AMENDED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOLONIO KHO, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS,
NAMELY: PERLA LUZ, KRYPTON, KOSELL, KYRIN, AND KELVIN, ALL SURNAMED KHO
G.R. No. 214901, June 15, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Apolonio Kho was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Lamogong, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. HT-556. A portion of the said land (subject
land) was placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
27. On December 6, 1993, a just compensation of Php 49,601.2 was offered, but Apolonio rejected the
valuations.

After a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just compensation, PARAD issued
an order fixing the value of the subject land at P109,748.35. Meanwhile, on May 27, 2002, TCT No. HT-
556 was partially cancelled covering the subject land, and the corresponding Emancipation Patents were
issued transferring ownership to the respondents-beneficiaries.
On appeal, DARAB affirmed the valuation of PARAD prompting the LBP to file a petition for the
determination of just compensation before the RTC of Bais City, Negros Oriental.

Subsequently, in view of the passage of RA 9700 and the issuance of the implementing guidelines under
DAR Administrative Order No. (AO) 1, series of 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Re-evaluation asking
the court to direct the LBP to conduct a revaluation of the subject land pursuant thereto, which the RTC
granted in an Order. In the course thereof, the RTC appointed three (3) Commissioners, who fixed the
just compensation for the land at P1,402,609.46, taking into consideration the valuation factors provided
under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, and the formula provided under DAR AO 1, series of 2010. RTC
adopted in toto the valuation submitted by the Commissioners. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
citing, however, the formula provided under DAR AO 5, series of 1998 instead of DAR AO 1, series of
2010.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the just compensation should be determined under DAR AO 1 of RA 9700, provided that
the unsettled claims were filed prior to its (RA 9700) passage.

53
HELD:
No. Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete, such as in this
case where the just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should
be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, as amended. For purposes of determining just
compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its
price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
However, DAR AO 2, series of 2009, which is the implementing rules of RA 9700, had clarified that the
said law shall not apply to claims/cases where the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1,
2009. In such a situation, just compensation shall be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its further amendment by RA 9700.

In this case, the Court has gone over the records and found that the RTC and the CA neither considered
the cut-off rule nor explained its reasons for deviating therefrom. Since the claim folders were received
by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent DAR
regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the
new DAR issuance, absent any cogent justifications otherwise. Therefore, as it stands, the RTC and the
CA were duty-bound to utilize the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations
existing prior to the passage of RA 9700, to determine just compensation.

This is without prejudice to judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation,
which cannot be restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR85 when faced with situations that do not
warrant its strict application. To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines
in the remand of the case: library1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking…, 2. Just
compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. 3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the
circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for
reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set in this
Decision.

54
NO NEW CERTIFICATE SHALL BE ENTERED OR ISSUED PURSUANT TO ANY INSTRUMENT,
WHICH DOES NOT DIVEST THE OWNERSHIP OR TITLE FROM THE OWNER OR FROM THE
TRANSFEREE OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS.

ALICIA P. LOGARTA vs. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS

G. R. NO. 213568 July 5, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Mangahis is the registered owner of a parcel of land (subject property) in Barangay Malitlit,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He authorized a certain Zamora to sell the subject property, who, in turn, delegated
his authority to Peña. Peña entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Carmona Realty and
Development Corporation (Carmona Realty) for the sale to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of land
in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Malitlit Estate) which included the subject property. Carmona Realty agreed
to deposit in escrow the total consideration of P1,476,834,000.00 within 30 days from the execution of the
MOA. The release of the escrow deposits was subject to Peña's submission of a number of documents,
among others. The MOA was annotated the TCT of the subject property.

Later, respondent filed a petition to cancel the annotation (subject entries) on the ground that the MOA
was a private document that had no legal effect because the Notary Public before whom it was
acknowledged was not commissioned as such in the City of Manila for the year 2001. In opposition,
petitioner contended that the MOA was duly notarized in Makati City where the Notary Public, Atty.
Loreto Navarro, was commissioned.The RTC granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the
subject entries. It found that the subject entries are adverse claims which ceased to be effective 30 days
after registration and should, therefore, be cancelled, pursuant to Section 70 of PD No. 1529.

The RTC also remarked that the MOA no longer has any force and effect, considering that Carmona
Realty failed to make the escrow deposits stipulated therein which rendered the same automatically null
and void. Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that the subject entries do not
constitute an adverse claim but a voluntary dealing which is governed by Section 54 of PD 1529. The RTC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC
ruling. It agreed with the trial court that the subject entries are akin to an annotation of adverse claim
which is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property and governed
by Section 70 of PD 1529.

ISSUE:
Should the subject entries in the TCT considered adverse claims which ceased to be effective 30 days after
registration and should, therefore, be cancelled, pursuant to Section 70 of PD No. 1529?

55
HELD:
No. An adverse claim is a type of involuntary dealing designed to protect the interest of a person over a
piece of real property by apprising third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the
land. It seeks to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy, where registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Property
Registration Decree. An adverse claim serves as a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding
the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Thus, before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it must be shown that there is no other provision in
law for the registration of the claimant's alleged right in the property.

A cursory perusal of the MOA shows that it is essentially a conditional sale where Carmona Realty's
payment is subject to the submission of certain documents by Peña, respondent's authorized
representative. It is settled that in a deed of conditional sale, ownership is transferred after the full
payment of the installments of the purchase price or the fulfillment of the condition and the execution of
a definite or absolute deed of sale. Verily, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to
transfer title in a conditional sale is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, such
that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. Given the foregoing, the MOA is essentially a dealing affecting less than
the ownership of the subject property that is governed by Section 54 of PD 1529, to wit:

Section 54. Dealings less than ownership, how registered. No new certificate shall be entered or issued pursuant
to any instrument which does not divest the ownership or title from the owner or from the transferee of the
registered owners. All interests in registered land less than ownership shall be registered by filing with the
Register of Deeds the instrument which creates or transfers or claims such interests and by a brief
memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title, and signed by him. A similar
memorandum shall also be made on the owner's duplicate. The cancellation or extinguishment of such
interests shall be registered in the same manner.

Being a voluntary dealing affecting less than the ownership of the subject property, Section 54 of PD 1529
- which states that the cancellation of annotations involving interests less than ownership is within the
power of the Register of Deeds - should have been applied. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA should have
dismissed the petition for cancellation of the subject entries for being the wrong remedy.

56
WHILE SHE HERSELF AS CO-OWNER HAD THE RIGHT TO MORTGAGE OR EVEN SELL HER
UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, SHE COULD NOT MORTGAGE OR
OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF THE SAME IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF OTHER
CO-OWNERS.

SPS. MAGSANO vs. PANGASINAN BANK

G.R 215038 October 17, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Spouses Roque Magsano (Roque) and Susana Capelo (Susana), the parents of petitioners, purportedly
loaned from the respondent P35,000.00 from respondent bank and executed a Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property to secure said loan.

The mortgagors defaulted on the payment of the loan. The bank extra-judicially foreclosed the property,
and won as the highest bidder. The mortgagors were unable to redeem the property and the bank sold it
to Spouses Manuel.

Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage against respondents.
They averred that Roque had already passed away before the execution of the Real Estate Mortgage, as
such, the said mortgage is null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether the REM entered into by Susana may is valid to the whole property?

HELD:
No. Although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the conjugal
partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself as
co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the subject property, she could
not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety without the consent of the other co-owners.
Consequently, the validity of the subject Real Estate Mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure
proceedings therefor conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which
may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor in-interest, in the event of partition, thereby making it a co-
owner with petitioners pending partition.

57
ABSENCE OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN OCT COVERING
A LOT REGISTERED UNDER TORRENS TITLE IS FATAL TO A JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION
PETITION SINCE THERE IS NO TITLE WHICH COULD BE “RECONSTITUTED”, RE-ISSUED,
OR RESTORED

REPUBLIC vs. HOMER AND MA. SUSANA DAGONDON

G.R. No. 210540, April 19, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents, as attorneys-in-fact of Jover P. Dagondon, filed a petition with the RTC for the
reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) of a parcel of land (Lot 84), alleging the following:
(a) Jover is the registered owner of Lot 84, having purchased the same from its previous owner, and
consequently, registered it under his name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 013775; (b)
respondents obtained two separate certifications from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), one stating
that Decree No. 466085 was issued in relation to Lot 84, and the other stating that it did not have a copy
of Decree No. 466085 on file, and that the same was presumed lost or destroyed as a consequence of the
last world war; (c) they secured another certification, this time from the Register of Deeds (RD) declaring
that the subject property had no existing OCT and that it was probably destroyed or dilapidated during
the eruption of Hiboc-Hiboc Volcano or World War II; and (d) they were filing the petition for
reconstitution on the basis of Decree No. 466085. The Land Registration Examiner from the RD identified
the certifications and testified that while the subject property had already been issued a decree, there is,
however, no existing title in their files covering Lot 84.

In opposition, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the OSG, prayed for the dismissal
of the petition for insufficiency in form and substance, considering that respondents, among others, failed
to establish the existence of the very Torrens Title which they sought to reconstitute.

ISSUE:
Is the absence or non-existence of an OCT as declared by the Register of Deeds fatal to a petition for
judicial reconstitution of a Torrens Certificate of Title?

HELD:
YES. RA 26 which governs the process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title,
presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under
the provisions of the Torrens System. Its application is contingent on the very existence of a previously
issued OCT which has been lost or destroyed.

Verily, case law provides that "[t]he reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by
law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA
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26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under
the provisions of the Torrens System."

The failure of respondents to satisfactorily prove that Lot 84 had been registered under the Torrens
System rendered judicial reconstitution under RA 26 inapplicable. Under the law, the following must be
present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
(b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the
lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had
an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and
(e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained
in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Here, respondents miserably failed to adduce clear and convincing proof that an OCT covering Lot 84
had previously been issued by virtue of Decree No. 466085. Accordingly, there is no title pertaining to
Lot 84 which could be "reconstituted," re-issued, or restored. Furthermore, respondents could not
predicate their petition for reconstitution on the basis of Decree No. 466085 alone because as mentioned
by petitioner, a copy of the same was not even presented as evidence before the trial court; hence, its
contents remain unknown. 33 Neither could the certification 34 issued by the LRA stating that Decree
No. 466085 was issued to Lot 84 be given any probative weight, considering that an ambiguous LRA
certification without describing the nature of the decree and the claimant in such case, practically means
nothing and could not be considered as a sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting a lost or destroyed
certificate of title.

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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF RA 26
DEPRIVES THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OR
NATURE OF THE CASE AND RENDERS ALL ITS PROCEEDINGS NULL AND VOID

REPUBLIC vs. SUSI

G.R. No. 213209; January 16, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On September 27, 2005, Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition for reconstitution of a TCT. She
claimed that the original copy was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
(RD-QC) on June 11, 1988; hence, the petition based on the owner's duplicate copy.

Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation stating that respondent filed
similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and 220 of the same RTC,
for which it had previously issued Reports.

RTC: the RTC granted Susi's petition, and directed the RD-QC to reconstitute the lost/destroyed original
copy of TCT No. 118999.

The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner's copy and the Certification from the RD-QC that the
original was burned during the fire were sufficient to warrant the reconstitution sought.

It held that the subject petition was not barred by the dismissal by Branch 220 of the same RTC of a
similar petition anchored on her failure to: (a) comply with the technical requirements of the law,
specifically, her omission to allege matters required under Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA)
26; and (b) convince the court that TCT sought to be reconstituted was valid and existing at the time it
was destroyed, holding that both objections have been sufficiently overcome in the present case.

CA: the CA found no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
granting the petition for reconstitution, considering that Susi was able to sufficiently establish that the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted was valid and existing under her name at the time it was
destroyed. The CA found the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to this case since the dismissal of
the prior similar petition was based on Susi's failure to comply with the technical requirements of the
law. Hence, the latter was not precluded from filing another petition to prove the necessary allegations
for the reconstitution of the subject title, which the RTC correctly found to have been fully established.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for reconstitution that fails to comply with the technical requirements under
Sections 11 and 2 of RA 26 should be granted.

HELD:

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No. The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land.
The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the
reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it
was at the time of the loss or destruction.

RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificates of title depending on the source of the petition for reconstitution. Before the court can
properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for, petitioner must observe the above procedures and requirements prescribed by the law.

The non-compliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the trial court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and. consequently, all its proceedings are
rendered null and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the
trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority to
proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must
be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.

The present reconstitution petition was anchored on a purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT which
is a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3 (a) of RA 26. However, as early as January 16, 2006,
the LRA had already called the court's attention the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88,
expressing serious doubts on the authenticity of Susi's duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of
other titles over the subject land. Trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-
bound to take into account the LRA's report.

The reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing. Jurisprudence is replete with
cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of the
reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court
with jurisdiction thereon. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order
of reconstitution is null and void.

Thus, in light of the LRA's report of the subsistence of other certificates of title over the subject land, it
behooved the RTC to notify the registered land owners of the reconstitution proceedings, in observance
of diligence and prudence. In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13
of RA 26, particularly, on the service of notices of hearing on the registered owners and/or actual
possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void.

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THE FACT OF LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE IS CRUCIAL IN CLOTHING THE RTC WITH JURISDICTION OVER THE JUDICIAL
RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS

JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN vs. SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ AND CRISTINA P. CRUZ and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN
G.R. No. 220940 March 20, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that respondent Spouses Cruz, is the registered owner a of land covered by Katibayan
ng Orihinal na Titulo Big. (OCT No.) P-415666 (subject land). Sometime in November 2009, Nelson,
through his father and attomey-infact, Lamberto P. Cruz (Lamberto), then sold the subject lot in favor of
Sebastian, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties. Upon Sebastian's payment of
the purchase price, Lamberto then surrendered to her the possession of the subject land and his General
Power of Attomey. Sebastian then paid the corresponding capital gains tax, among others, to cause the
transfer of title to her name.However, upon her presentment of the aforesaid documents to the Register
of Deeds, the latter directed her to secure a Special Power of Attorney executed by Spouses Cruz
authorizing Lamberto to sell the subject land to her. Accordingly, Sebastian requested the execution of
such document to Lamberto, who promised to do so, but failed to comply. Thus, Sebastian was
constrained to cause the annotation of an adverse claim in OCT No. P-41566 on August 2, 2011 in order
to protect her rights over the subject land.

According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with RD-Pangasinan about the
status of the aforesaid title when she discovered that: (a) Nelson executed an Affidavit of Loss dated
September 23, 2013 attesting to the loss of owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P- 41566, which he
registered with the RD-Pangasinan; (b) the Spouses Cruz filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance
of a second owner's copy of OCT No. P-41566, docketed as LRC Case No. 421; and (c) on March 27, 2014,
the RTC promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's petition and, consequently, ordered the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 in their names.

In view of the foregoing incidents, Sebastian filed the aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before
the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. CA denied the petition holding that the Spouses Cruz
complied with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and notice of hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate copy of title in favor of Spouses
Cruz despite the existence of the sale of the land and the surrender of the certificate of title by the Spouses
Cruz in favor of Sebastian.

HELD:
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Republic Act No. (RA) 26, Section 15 of which
provides when reconstitution of a title should be allowed: the following requisites must be complied with
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for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b)
that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e)
that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in
the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a
person to a piece of land.

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing
the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA ,the
Court reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or
destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the
court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

In this case, Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA clearly alleged that, contrary
to the claim of Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No. 421, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 was
not really lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's father and attorney-in-fact, and
was in her possession all along. Should such allegation be proven following the conduct of further
proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion than that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

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ALIENS, WHETHER INDIVIDUALS OR CORPORATIONS, ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM
ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS WELL AS PRIVATE LANDS

THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, through their legal representative, FELIPE G. CAPULONG,
vs. DUANE STIER and EMILY MAGGAY
G.R. No. 216491; August 23, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Donton is the owner of a parcel of land located in Cubao, Quezon City. While he was in the United States,
respondents, Stier and Maggay, took possession and control of the subject property, as well as the
management of the business operating thereat. Because of the respondents’ refusal to vacate the property,
Donton filed a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages against the
respondents and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Donton alleged that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 2001, by virtue of which he
purportedly sold the subject property to respondents, was a forgery. He denied signing or executing the
document in favor of respondents, considering that on the date of its purported execution, July 16, 2001,
he was allegedly still in the United States, having departed from the Philippines on June 27, 2001 and
returned only on August 30, 2001. Donton further alleged that Stier is an American citizen and a non-
resident alien who is, therefore, not allowed by law to own any real property in the Philippines. In their
Answer with Counterclaim, Stier argued that he extended a loan to Donton secured by a mortgage over
the subject property and its improvements; and that because Donton failed to pay his obligation, they
initially executed a “unilateral contract of sale.”

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, finding that the Deed of
Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. It also added
that Donton failed to prove that Stier is an American citizen since the only evidence presented as regards
thsis matter was a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration certifiying that one Duane Otto Stier, an
American citizen, visited the Philipppines on September 2, 2001 and left on October 6, 2001. The RTC
reasoned that the same was not sufficient to prove Stier’s citizenship since it merely proved the alleged
travel of the latter. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for annulment of title and reconveyance of property should be granted on
the ground Stier is an American citizen even if the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof.

HELD:
YES, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the title issued in respondents’ favor must be annulled insofar as Stier
is concerned. More than the Certification issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is an American
citizen, the records contain other documents validating the information such as the respondents’ Answer
with Counterclaim and the attachments to their Manifestation, both of which mention that Stier is an

64
American citizen and a non-resident alien. These statements are admissions against interest and therefore
binding upon him.

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution enshrines the rule against foreigners acquiring real property in
the Philippines, to wit:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Thus, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain as
well as private lands.

In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was a forgery, the sale of the subject property to Stier is in violation of the Constitution;
hence, null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Furthermore, Stier is barred
from recovering any amount that he paid for the subject property, the action being proscribed by the
Constitution. Nevertheless, considering that petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Maggay, the
other vendee, had no capacity to purchase the subject property, the sale to her remains valid but only up
to the extent of her undivided one-half share therein. Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half share,
which pertained to Stier, shall revert to Donton, the original owner, for being the subject of a transaction
void ab initio.

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