Dependent Arising

Designation
&
Prasangika
~
Dr. Alexander Berzin

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 ~ Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s ~

Emptiness and Dependent Arising ~ 3

Dependent Arising: Causality ~15
Dependent Arising in Terms of Mental Labeling ~ 38
Dependent Arising: Avoiding Nihilism and Eternalism ~ 47
Imputation, Mental Labeling and Designation ~ 55
Mental Labeling and Purification ~ 79
Elaboration of "Dependent Arising: Avoiding the Two Extremes" ~ 89
Chittamatra, Svatantrika and Prasangika: The Self ~ 128
The Subtle False “Me” Refuted Only by Gelug Prasangika ~ 152
Focus on Emptiness According to the Tenet Systems ~ 164
The Gelug Prasangika & Svatantrika Views of Emptiness ~ 178
The Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika ~ 183
Emptiness of All Phenomena ~ 200
How Cognition of Emptiness Liberates Us from Samsara ~ 209

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 Emptiness and Dependent Arising
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/vipashyana/emptiness-and-
dependent-arising

Emptiness Is an Absence of Impossible Ways of Existing

I’ve been asked this weekend to speak about the topic of voidness, which is of course
an advanced topic and a topic which is not terribly easy to understand. And in order to
understand it, we need to be very well prepared. If we’re not prepared – in other
words, if we don’t have the background and we don’t have a strong enough
motivation for wanting to understand it – it will remain something very confusing.
Therefore, if we look in terms of cause and effect, then we ask the question: What will
be the causes for being able to understand voidness?

We can’t say that the understanding is simply going to arise simply on the basis of
having a very clear explanation, or on the basis of having simply a great deal of
intelligence, or a great deal of background, or a great deal of effort on our parts, or
having the proper conducive circumstances. But our understanding is going to arise
dependently on all these factors. And so we need to seek out good explanations. But
first we need to be prepared to be able to understand them. And to be prepared to
understand them, we of course need conducive circumstances to make that
preparation in. So, although I will try to explain a little bit about voidness, don’t be
discouraged if you find it quite difficult to understand. Because, no matter how clear
an explanation may be, those who are unprepared won’t be able to understand it; and
no matter how confusing an explanation might be, those who are prepared may be
able to understand it.

Now if we ask “What is the need for understanding voidness?” then, from one point of
view or one level, we can say the importance of it is for helping us to overcome
suffering. So that of course is in the context of an understanding of cause and effect.
And here when we speak about cause and effect, then that of course is a complex
issue. Most systems of thought do explain cause and effect on a physical level. You
push a ball and the ball goes in a certain direction – this type of causality. And theistic
systems bring in God as a cause for various things to happen. But within nontheistic
explanations, then, Buddhism is quite unique in terms of explaining that what we
experience is caused by what we do.

Now that doesn’t mean that, just on a simple level, if we walk into a room then we
experience seeing what’s inside the room. We’re not speaking on such a simplistic
level. Everybody can understand that, pretty much. And we’re not speaking just in

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terms of physical causality, in the sense that you bang your foot against the chair and
then you feel pain. But we’re speaking on the level of our experience of happiness and
unhappiness, and this is caused by our state of mind, our actions. Actually, to be a little
bit more precise, it’s caused by our behavior, the way that we act and speak (or
communicate) and think; and all of those are affected and influenced very much by
our attitudes.

We speak in terms of disturbing attitudes, disturbing emotions, and even when they
are positive types of emotions, like love and compassion, usually there’s something
disturbing underlying them, like attachment. And underlying the disturbing emotions
and attitudes is our confusion, our simply not knowing various things. This is referring
to our unawareness of either cause and effect in terms of what we are speaking about
now – that the way that we behave, based on these emotions and so on, is going to
cause our happiness and unhappiness – so we’re unaware of that causal relationship or
we understand it in a reversed way.

Let me just give an example so we have a clearer idea of what I’m speaking about. We
think that, for instance, if I act on the basis of anger – say I’m not getting my way, and I
act on the basis of anger and yell at somebody and so on – that then I will get my way
and I will be happy. So either we don’t know that getting angry and yelling at
somebody is a cause for unhappiness, or we think (in a reversed way) that it will in fact
make us happy. But no one is happy while they feel anger; it’s a very unpleasant
feeling. And nobody feels happy being the object of our anger. And it doesn’t cause
them to be friendly and happy back toward us, even on the short term, even if they
might obey what we scream and yell at them to do. And we build up the habit to deal
with anything that we don’t like by responding on the basis of anger, and so we just
continue to create more and more unhappy experiences. So we’re unaware of this
causal relationship. And Buddhism is unique in speaking in terms of this type of
causality without bringing in God and these other external factors.

So when we speak about voidness, voidness is literally speaking about an absence. The
Sanskrit word for voidness is the same word that is used for the number zero. And
what it means is not that nothing exists and there is no such thing as causality – if we
speak in terms of, here, its application to causality – but it means that there is zero or
nothing backing up our false belief about how causality works. And so I usually explain
voidness as an absence – a total absence – of something impossible: an impossible
way of existing, an impossible way of functioning.

And we have to understand that when we speak about the mind, we’re speaking about
mental activity. We’re not speaking about an instrument or thing that does that
activity. We’re speaking of that activity. And that mental activity makes appearances of
things, and knows those or cognizes – sees these appearances in one way or another.

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And so, because of confusion, this mental activity creates appearances of what is
impossible. And although our confusion – I mean the habit of confusion – makes this
false appearance, and with our confusion, either we don’t know that there’s nothing
backing it up in terms of reality, or we believe in these false appearances and we think
that it actually does correspond to reality. And so the purpose of voidness here, and
our understanding of voidness, is to negate that there’s anything backing up what we
focus on, in terms of these appearances. So, in that sense, zero. There’s nothing behind
it.

When we talk about appearance, we’re not just talking about a visual appearance. We
don’t really have a good word for that, at least in English. Let me use an example of
how we would say it in English, at least: “It appears to me that if I yell at you, I will get
my way and I’ll be happy.” That’s an appearance. So it seems like that. It feels like that.
Well, perhaps I’m mixing two steps here. “It seems like that” is the first step. Then “It
feels like that” is when I believe it, when I believe that it corresponds to reality.

“It seems to me that, since I’m depressed, if I go and eat some chocolate ice cream it’s
going to make me happy.” It seems like that. I think that. That sort of comes up to, we
would say – it comes to my mind, and I believe that that’s true. So it really feels as
though that’s true. And so I go to the refrigerator or I go out to the store and I get
myself a chocolate ice cream, and I eat it with the hope that it will make me happy.
And afterwards, well, maybe I do feel a little bit happy, but that happiness certainly
doesn’t last, and it didn’t make all that work that was sitting by my desk – or it didn’t
make the dirty dishes in the sink – go away. They’re still there. The problem is still
there. So our hope for happiness here is misdirected, in terms of what would bring us
happiness.

And so the purpose here of understanding voidness would be to understand that,

although things might appear to me in a certain way, this is a projection based on
confusion. And what’s missing – this is what voidness is talking about: what’s not there,
and what was never there, and never will be there – is something backing it up in
reality that corresponds to what I think is there. And what we are talking about here is
a relationship between cause and effect. So that’s one aspect of voidness, one level of
voidness, and it’s speaking in a very general way. Voidness is not usually used, in a
technical sense, to refer to eliminating our understanding of cause and effect in terms
of just simple behavior. Because here what we’re speaking about in terms of
destructive behavior, destructive thinking, disturbing emotions leading to unhappiness
– this is dealing with what we would call conventional or relative truth of things. That’s
referring to appearances of what things are. So it appears to us that there’s this type of
behavior. It appears as though there’s this type of result. And it appears to us that this
cause brings this type of result: angry behavior brings happiness.

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If I call my friend, the one that I love so much – my partner – every hour, on the hour,
they’re going to love me even more, and it’s going to make our relationship happier.
There are many, many examples that we can cite here. This is an example of
attachment and clinging; that this is somehow going to bring us more happiness.
That’s dealing with what things are. We call that relative or conventional truth. “What
things are” I suppose is not exactly a precise way of saying it, but there’s not really an
easy way of saying it, what we’re talking about here. But in Buddhism we also speak
about the deepest level of truth about things, and that deals with how things exist –
not in terms of what exists, like causal relationships, but how they exist. So how I exist,
how you exist, how everything exists. And it’s not denying that things exist, when we
talk about voidness. But, again, our mental activity makes things appear to exist in a
certain way, and there’s nothing backing that up. That’s when our mental activity is
under the influence of the habits of confusion.

And we’re not speaking here so abstractly about how things exist. We’re speaking
more in terms of what establishes the existence of something. Now this is not an easy
concept to understand. The word here that I translate as “to establish” or “to establish
the existence of something,” it appears in many different grammatical forms in Tibetan
– and the original Sanskrit as well, it appears in many grammatical forms – and some
of the other forms of this word, drub (sgrub) in Tibetan or siddhain Sanskrit, have the
meaning of “to actualize” something. Now to actualize would be – like, for instance,
there’s these various attainments that we can achieve with Buddhist practice, such as
compassion for everyone, or understanding of everything, these sorts of things,
extrasensory perception, and this word is used: to actualize that, so you actually have
that. So when we speak in tantra of a sadhana (sgrub-thabs), it’s a method to actualize
ourselves as one of these Buddha-figures. To actually make it happen; actually make us
that way.

And so here, in terms of the discussion of voidness, when I use the word “establish”
we’re talking about what establishes the existence of something. So what do we
actually mean then in terms of this understanding of actualization? These are very
difficult words to translate into English or, obviously, into Latvian, or into any other
language. That’s why I’m explaining it a little bit elaborately. So if we look at an
example of what I’m speaking about here, we’re saying what establishes me as “me”?
What makes me “me”? Is there something special that makes me “me” and not “you”?
Well, obviously I’m not you and I’m not the table either. So if there is something that
makes me “me,” where is it? Is it on the side of my mind? Is it on the side of my body?
What makes me “me”? And this is the topic, here, of voidness, when we are speaking
on the deepest level. It seems as though there is something making me “me,” which
actually is impossible. And voidness is saying that there’s nothing backing that up.
Zero. Total absence.

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This is not easy to understand, so we need further examples. And I’m using voidness
here and introducing the topic in a very, very general way. I’m not speaking in terms of
any specific school or anything like that. Let’s use the example of low self-esteem. Low
self-esteem, that’s a disturbing attitude and it can lead to very destructive behavior,
self-destructive. We could become anorexic, for example: that “I’m terrible. I’m no
good. I have to look so thin,” and like that, “so then I’ll be loved and accepted,” etc.
And we starve ourselves. There are so many neurotic syndromes that can arise from
low self-esteem, and it’s based on confusion about how we exist. This is just to speak
in general, but we need to get more specific.

So it’s not just that I exist as being no good or not good enough, but more that there’s
something wrong with me that makes me not good enough. Or there’s something
wrong with you that makes you an idiot. “You’re an idiot.” And we have this judgment,
in a sense, and we relate to the other person: you’re an idiot; you’re whatever. We
always yell at them. There’s something basically wrong with you that makes you an
idiot.

Now, of course, we can analyze more deeply in terms of cause and effect relationships:
what is the causality relationship here, in terms of what establishes someone to be an
idiot or to be not good enough. But we don’t need to get into a technical discussion
here. We’re not talking really, here, in terms of creation, in terms of making something,
like you make a table. It’s more subtle.

This word “to establish” also is used for the meaning “to prove something,” or “to
affirm” or “reaffirm” something. So we have this very complex word that we’re using
here that is very intimately involved with the whole discussion of voidness. Well, when
we work with voidness and the understanding of voidness then the simplest level that
we need to understand is that there are all these projections – my mental activity, my
mind, is making all these projections – of something impossible. Impossible relations
between things in terms of causality, particularly in terms of my experience of life, and
impossible ways in which things are established as what they are and how they exist.
Let’s use a more subtle example because I think this also helps to illustrate what I’m
speaking about here.

If we analyze from the point of view of science, then we can speak in terms of
electromagnetic radiation; we can speak in terms of force fields; we can speak in terms
of atomic and subatomic particles, etc. So when I look out in this room and my mind
makes an appearance, there is an appearance. It’s like a mental hologram. This is what I
see. There’s all these photons and light rays coming in and transformed into electrical
impulses through the neurons going from my retina to the brain, and it’s sort of
reassembled into a mental hologram and that’s what I see. It’s an appearance. It’s like a
mental hologram.

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So what establishes this person’s body as something distinct from the background? I
can see this person’s hair. It’s a dark color. And behind this person’s head, I see the
black shirt of the gentleman sitting in the back of the room. Now, if it’s just a whole
bunch of photons coming in, what establishes that dark colored shape is part of this
person’s head and the other dark colored shape is part of that person’s shirt? Is there a
line that goes around the top of this person’s head that establishes it as a distinct
object? Or is it encapsulated in plastic that then separates it from the shirt that I see
behind? What makes it an object? What establishes it as a distinct individual thing? Or
is it established just simply in terms from the side of the mind? So, to speak on a more
subtle level, we’re speaking about that.

What makes somebody a good person – establishes them as a good person or a bad
person or a pretty person or an ugly person? We’re also speaking on an even more
basic level of what establishes anything as anything. So we get very, very subtle here
when we get into our understanding of voidness. And we have to go back to the way
that I started this discussion of, well, what’s the purpose of understanding voidness? It
is to eliminate the suffering and problems that arise based on believing that there is
something backing up and supporting our misconceptions, our false projections. So
we have to understand when we understand voidness that there is nothing backing it
up. There never was. There never will be. Zero. That’s why I prefer the – I don’t know if
there are two different words in Latvian – but in English I prefer the word “voidness”
rather than “emptiness.” It’s not that there is empty – like there’s a box that’s sitting
there, and inside it’s empty. But, rather, voidness means zero. It’s also the word for zero.
There’s nothing there on that level.

It doesn’t mean that nothing exists whatsoever, but it’s saying that these impossible
things don’t exist. Zero. Although our mind makes things appear in these impossible
ways and, unfortunately, we believe that it’s true. And we believe it’s true that “I’m not
good enough,” for example, because it really feels like that. And what’s really nasty is
the more that we believe in that, it reinforces that belief and it feels like that even
more; and so it perpetuates itself. This is part of what we call “samsara”: uncontrollably
recurring problems. And this belief “I’m not pretty enough,” “I’m not good enough,” all
these things – “I’m not thin enough” – then cause us to engage in self-destructive
behavior; destructive to others as well, in terms of our family, etc. And it results in
unhappiness. We are unhappy while we feel not good enough, and it just makes us
feel even more unhappy the more that we believe it and act on its basis.

Perhaps we can have some questions if you understand this or not. First let’s take a
minute to just digest what I’ve spoken about.

Let me give one more example that just came to me that maybe is helpful. I believe,

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for example, that there is such a thing as witches who have the power to change
people into frogs. And because I believe that there’s a thing as that, I’m very afraid of
these witches. And as I look around in my city and I see some women who are acting
not in the usual way as everybody else, then my mind makes it appear as if this is a
witch and she can change me into a frog. And there’s something on the side of this
woman that makes her a witch – maybe it’s the influence of the devil or something like
that – that establishes her as a witch with this satanic power to change me into a frog.
And so I live in terrible fear. And, because of that habit of believing in witches, then it
appears to me that various women are witches. And I think, in terms of cause and
effect, if I burn this woman alive that this will get rid of the influence of the devil. And
so I go around and I have these trials of witches, and there’s great fear and great belief
that burning them alive is going to save us all from being turned into a city of frogs.
Then we have witch burning. But with the understanding of voidness, we would
understand that although, because of my habit and the fear that it produces, it seems
as though various people are witches with this power, there is nothing backing it up in
reality. This appearance doesn’t correspond to anything real. Nothing. Absent. Never
was; never will be.

So the same type of analysis can be applied to: “There’s somebody who will be the
perfect partner, the prince or princess on the white horse. If I meet them and marry
them, then we will live happily ever after.” Or, “If I move to this wonderful city that I
think is going to be so great, or if I get the perfect job, that that also will make me
eternally happy.” These are all fantasies. They’re based on a belief in something which
is impossible. Shantideva has a nice analogy that he uses in terms of children crying
when the waves wash away the sandcastles that they build on the beach. And our
beliefs are like these sandcastles – there is nothing to substantiate them; nothing
holding it up.

So, what questions might you have?

Question: So, basically, everything which I see and everything which I cognize, we
could consider it kind of this mental projection which comes from habituation and
which comes from my mind; maybe from my previous karma. And so if I perceive this
and start recognizing that these are just projections and I start reacting accordingly,
and then I finally reach enlightenment, then the question is maybe this is still this
projection, the same kind of a film which is going on, but it’s just not really real.
Everything is basically just determined by our mind. Just by themselves, things aren’t
bad or good; everything is assigned by our mind.

Alex: Well, now we have to get into a discussion of appearance-making. When we

speak about basic mental activity, which is what mind means, there are two facets or
two aspects that are working together in connection with the two truths about things.

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What we call the “two truths.” One is what it appears to be; so what it is. And the other
is how its existence is established; how it exists. So what it is and how it exists. Now if
we use the Gelug explanation of this… There are many different variants of explanation
of how we classify these appearances, how you classify appearance-making, but let’s
just use one system. Since this is a Gelug center, we’ll use the Gelugpa explanation,
from Tsongkhapa:

We have to differentiate between accurate appearances and distorted appearances.

And so, basically, according to the Gelug explanations, the mind is making accurate
appearances – or it has the ability to make accurate appearances – but distorted
appearances are projected on top of it. So it’s an exaggeration or an interpolation;
something added on top. The word means a feather added to an arrow. So there’s
something, and then something extra is added that doesn’t need to be there.

Let’s use an example. There’s a girl, a woman, but this woman has a man’s haircut and
wears men’s clothing and is quite flat-chested, and it appears to me that this is a man.
Well, actually it’s a woman, but I can’t tell; and not only can I not tell by seeing this
person from a little bit of a distance but, in fact, it seems to me that that’s a man. So
there is a woman appearing but, projected on top of that, is also an appearance of a
man. Now it’s deceptive in the sense that it looks like a man; but it’s also distorted
because it’s not a man, it’s a woman. So there is an accurate appearance and there’s a
projection of a false appearance. So the same thing in terms of how things exist: an
accurate appearance and a projection of false appearance. So the mechanism of
mental holograms as how we actually – how a mind actually knows things, that stays
the same whether it’s an ordinary being, whether it’s a bug, whether it’s a Buddha.
That’s the same. What a Buddha doesn’t have are these false projections; everything is
accurate.

I mean, this example of a man or a woman – it’s very interesting in terms of what
establishes that it’s a man or a woman. Now we’re not seeing them in the sauna in
which they are naked, so we’re seeing them fully clothed, and so we’re basing our
understanding, our belief, in terms of: this woman is established as a man because of
the haircut and the clothes and the fairly flat chest. So it seems as though it’s
established from the side of the appearance, doesn’t it, that this is a man. But who
decided that a certain haircut means a man’s haircut and certain haircut is a woman’s
haircut? Where did that come from? And that a certain type of clothing is a man’s
clothing and a certain type of clothing is a woman’s clothing. I think that the most
wonderful example is buttons: that buttons on one side is man, and on the other side
is woman’s. Who decided that? That’s convention. It was decided by mind, by some
people who got together and decided that this is what men will wear and this is what
women will wear; and this is how men will have their hair and this is how women will
have their hair. It’s totally invented by the mind. It’s mentally established, established

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from the side of convention, not from the side of the object.

Mental labeling. My favorite example for that is: you go to a center, a Dharma center
or whatever, and there are two toilets. They are exactly the same inside, but one has
written on the door “Men’s” and one has written on the door “Women’s.” And the
men’s one could be completely empty, but the women will not use it because it says,
written on the door, “Men’s.” Perfect example. Actually, many women will use the men’s
one; it’s the men that won’t use the women’s.

Question: Another analogy is: I’m standing here and there’s a Buddha or a bodhisattva
standing next to me. We see a tiger coming after us; it’s clear that he’s hungry. Am I
accurately perceiving it to say, “He is hungry. He will realistically eat me if I don’t
move”? At what point am I perceiving it accurately? At what point would I be adding a
distortion to it? And would a Buddha perceive the tiger chasing us differently than I
would as a samsaric human?

Alex: Okay. Let me repeat that, since I don’t know if it came to the recording. If we’re
standing and we see a Buddha or a bodhisattva, and a tiger is running toward us, and
it’s obvious that the tiger is hungry and it’s going to eat us, then is that an accurate
perception or not? And how would a Buddha perceive it versus how I would perceive
it?

Well, if the tiger is indeed hungry and we are labeled by the tiger as lunch, it’s quite
likely that the tiger is going to eat us. But, I mean, you never know – the tiger could
have a heart attack before it reaches us; but let’s assume that that’s not going to
happen. A Buddha would see that; that is accurate. We would see that also; that is
accurate. Let’s not get into what has not yet happened in terms of the tiger eating us,
but certainly we’d see the tiger running toward us.

Now the question is: what is projected on top of that? Now obviously a Buddha would
have compassion, both for the tiger and for us, and a Buddha would not have fear, and
a Buddha wouldn’t just stand there and watch – he would handle it according to
whatever would be most beneficial in this situation. But here it’s not so much the
appearance of what’s happening that can be distorted. I mean, obviously if we thought
that this animal running toward us was a large pussy cat that was going to come and
lick us, as opposed to eat us – okay, that could be a bit distorted. Maybe, because of
the influence of the Buddha, the tiger would be tamed and not eat the Buddha, but
that’s getting a little bit in the realm of what’s silly. The point is that for us, we would
experience this probably with great fear. So the fear is based on a false projection on
top of the appearance of this animal running toward me. So it’s the projection that this
is a monster that’s running toward me, and the big solid “Me Me Me” – that if I get
eaten, then I won’t exist anymore, or whatever. I mean, there can be all sorts of false

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ideas of how we exist and what will happen to us. So if we don’t have that fear based
on that misunderstanding, then we could act in way which: either as a super
bodhisattva and feed ourselves to the hungry tigress, as the Buddha did in a previous
lifetime; or somehow try to avoid being eaten by the tiger; or we could start praying.

That reminds me of one of my favorite Buddhist jokes, so I cannot resist telling it. The
joke is told in terms of a bear, but we can use it in terms of the tiger. The tiger is
running toward us, running toward us, as we’re running away; and we trip and we fall,
and so we start to pray. And so we pray, “May the tiger be a Buddhist. May the tiger be
a Buddhist…” And so the tiger finally catches up to us, and is over us with claws out
and so on. Then we hear the tiger say, “I offer this food to the Buddha, Dharma, and
Sangha.” So we have to be careful what we pray for.

So any other questions?

Question: Is it true then that this mental hologram for Buddha is zero?

Alex: Is it true that the mental hologram for a Buddha is zero? No. A mind of a Buddha
certainly works in terms of mental holograms – that’s not the problem – but everything
is accurate in terms of the mental hologram. And so, for example, rather than seeing
things totally separate and isolated from each other, as if encapsulated in plastic, then
a Buddha would see the interconnection of everything. “See” meaning to understand,
to perceive. So Buddha perceives the tiger not just as this entity running at me or at
you, but sees all the history of the tiger; the tiger maybe has hungry babies or itself is
hungry; maybe it’s on the verge of extinction, and has been over-hunted and has been
terrified throughout its life; and it sees in terms of the person that’s about to be eaten
all the karmic causes and various things that has led to that situation. So Buddha sees
all the interconnected causes and circumstances, past, what the results would be, etc.

An example that I often use is the example of looking through a periscope in a

submarine. You look through this little pipe and you can only see a very small amount
of the vista. You don’t see 360 degrees; you see just a little bit. So, similarly, when we
have this type of body that we have and the type of brain that we have, then because
of that hardware – if we can use that terminology – our perception is very limited. We
only see what’s in front of our noses. And so it could be accurate, what we see within
that limited field. But what is inaccurate is to think that it’s encapsulated with plastic,
and that’s all that there is. That’s not backed by anything because, in fact, there’s the
whole vista – 360 degrees. That’s what a Buddha would perceive because a Buddha
doesn’t have the limited hardware of this type of body and brain and mind that only
can see things like through a periscope.

So you see, this is what is absent – what is impossible – is that things exist all by

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themselves, establishing themselves in isolation from everything else. That’s a very,
very important point, and we will develop that in the next portion of our teachings. So,
as I said, using this example of the tiger, what we see through the periscope is just an
animal running at us. But that’s not all that really exists, because that animal running at
us has its own background, we have our own background, there are the hunting
restrictions, there’s the global warming and cutting down of the forests, and the tigers
becoming extinct – a huge combination of factors that are going on, but we just see
an animal running at us. Not only that, but it appears as though there’s this monster
that’s going to destroy me.

So what is accurate then is that things don’t establish themselves in isolation from
everything else, but things are established dependently. That’s known as dependent
arising. And when we speak of dependent arising, when things arise or come about
dependently on other things, not just by their own power, then we can understand
that on three levels. We can understand this on the level of cause and effect: things
arise dependently on causes and conditions. We can also understand that things arise
dependently on parts. And we can understand that things arise dependently in terms
of what concepts and mental labels and names and conventions refer to. The third one
is very subtle, so we’ll get to that tomorrow. It’s the topic that is referred to usually with
the term “mental labeling” or “imputation.”

Participant: Unfortunately, “mental labeling” and “imputation” in Latvian is just one

word.

Alex: Fine.

All right. Let us first look in terms of causality. We only have a short amount of time left
in our first session, so I’ll just introduce the topic. We’ll speak about it in more detail in
the afternoon.

Now when we speak in terms of causality, as we spoke earlier this morning, there are
many different levels of causality. There’s the purely physical level: You throw a ball up
in the air, it comes back down. You plant a seed, a flower comes from it. So we have
that type of causality. We also have causality in terms of our experience, in terms of
you bang your foot against the chair and it hurts; you experience pain. And also in
terms of the experience of happiness and unhappiness being caused by our behavior –
destructive or constructive behavior. We bang our foot against the table; that,
although it’s painful, it’s an ethically neutral action, isn’t it? I mean it hurt us, but you
can’t say that it’s a destructive or a constructive action. It’s just a neutral action. But
when we are speaking on this level of happiness and unhappiness, we’re speaking
about what results from destructive or constructive behavior.

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Now when we face a situation in life, again there is a mental hologram – we get back
to our mental holograms – of what appears. And in this mental hologram we could –
I’ll use an example of someone that I know: That my child is anorexic and bulimic.
Bulimic is when you binge eat, you go eat a huge bag of chocolate and then throw up.
And anorexic is you don’t eat the chocolate, you just starve yourself, so it’s a similar
type of eating disorder. So our child has this, and our child even got so sick it had to
go into the hospital; starved herself to death. And so there is the accurate appearance
that the child has this eating disorder and the child is very, very sick, both physically
and mentally. And, okay, we could understand that the child is sick and the child has
such low blood pressure and such low heartbeat, and so on, that the child is practically
dead, and that is the result of the eating disorder. So we can understand that level of
causality. But, as a parent, what also appears to us, the mental hologram, is that it’s all
my fault: “I must have done something wrong in parenting,” and I take upon myself all
the guilt of what’s happened to my child, in addition to all the worry and the fear and
so on.

It doesn’t have to be such an extreme example. “My child is failing in school; it’s all my
fault.” Whatever. “My relation with this person is breaking up; it’s all my fault.” Or “it’s
all your fault.” And so this is a false appearance of the causal relationship, what’s going
on here; and we believe that it corresponds to reality: there’s something backing it up,
in reality, that establishes and makes this appearance (that it’s all my fault) true. And,
although we wouldn’t speak so technically in terms of voidness here, we could apply
our understanding of voidness in terms of causality – that this is impossible; how it
appears to me is false. And it requires understanding dependent arising, in terms of
whatever happens arises on the basis of an unbelievably large number of causes and
conditions.

And in order to really deconstruct the false appearance, and the unbelievable
unhappiness and the problems that result in believing in this false appearance, then
we have to approach this deconstruction process from many different angles. We have
to understand many different things that are impossible. Does a result come just from
one cause? Does it come from a cause that really is not in harmony with the effects –
so something which is an irrelevant cause? Did what happened come from nowhere?
Was it fated already, in the genes or whatever, that this is what was going to happen,
and it just waited to pop out and manifest? We have to analyze and recognize when it
feels like that, and deconstruct this appearance – that there’s nothing backing it up; it’s
not referring to anything real. But not deconstruct to the point of there’s nothing there.
If this situation arose based on, let’s say, a million causes and conditions, then perhaps
I did contribute some of those million, three or five of the million. So it’s not that I have
no responsibility whatsoever, but it is not solely due to the mistakes that I made as a
parent.

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So this is the general introduction to this topic of dependent arising in terms of
causality and, in relation with that, with an understanding of voidness. And we’ll
explore that further in our second session, after lunch.

Dependent Arising: Causality

Are there any questions left over from what we discussed this morning? We were
discussing how voidness means absence of impossible ways of existing, or impossible
relations of cause and effect, and that it’s the same word as is used in Indian languages
for the number zero. And we saw that when we speak of mental activity, which is what
we mean by “mind” in Buddhism, it’s individual and subjective and it works by means
of making what we call “appearances”: mental holograms. And due to the habits of our
confusion, these mental holograms – although there may be one layer of them which
are accurate, there’s projection of what is impossible. And when we focus on this
mental hologram then, because of the confusion, we believe that it corresponds to
reality; and then certain emotions, and destructive behavior, and so on, follow from
that belief.

And what voidness is negating when it’s saying that there is “no such thing” as
something backing or supporting what we’re focusing on. In other words, we seem to
be focusing on something that’s actually impossible and there’s nothing backing it up.
So it’s not based on anything real; it’s not corresponding to anything real. And when
we realize that there’s nothing holding up or supporting our projection, our incorrect
projection, then we stop believing in that projection. It’s like popping a balloon. And
eventually, the more that we realize that this appearance is complete garbage, then
eventually it breaks the habit of the making of that false appearance. So eventually the
mind stops churning out this garbage, these projections.

So whether we’re talking about a projection of “I’m not good enough,” or “I’m guilty
for what happened with my children,” or something more subtle than that – like we
were speaking about everything existing as if coated in plastic and separate and self-
establishing – the process of getting rid of a basis behind it is the same. There never
was a basis behind it. There never was anything holding up these false appearances.
Okay? So there are no witches who can change people into frogs. There is no Santa
Claus. There is no perfect partner on a white horse out there, waiting for me. And, like
a baby, we might cry when our “balloon gets popped” of this fantasy, but that’s life.
We’ll get over it.

But it’s interesting to see how persistent we are. We don’t want to believe that there’s
no such thing as reality corresponding to our fantasy. This partner didn’t turn out to be

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the prince or princess on the white horse, but the next one will; and if that didn’t work
out, well, maybe the next one will. We don’t give up hope for something that’s
impossible. So this could be on many levels, of course. “If I just do another hundred
thousand prostrations, then I will become enlightened.” “Well, that didn’t work; maybe
another hundred thousand will work.” Just doing prostrations isn’t going to bring us
enlightenment. You have to do much more than that. And I’m sure we can all think of
so many examples that this would apply to. So we shouldn’t just think that voidness is
something theoretical dealing with abstract philosophy. So many everyday examples.
“If I just have enough money then I will be happy.” “If you just said ‘I love you’ to me
enough times, then maybe I’ll feel secure.” So basically we’re talking about
understanding what’s impossible.

So were there any leftover questions?

Question: Here we’re talking just about mental constructs. Based on these wrong
mental constructions, we’ve done some kind of bad actions, for example, and then we
feel real pain. Isn’t that the proof that basically these mental constructions correspond
to some level of truth? Seemingly there are these mental constructions, and we kind of
understand that’s kind of wrong, but we have real results; we have real pains.

Alex: Well, the mental constructs do exist – we’re not saying that they don’t exist – and
our belief in them exists. And so this has an effect. What we’re saying is absent or
devoid is that there is a correspondence to these false appearances – that they refer to
something real. There’s no referent thing that they refer to. If I think that there are
witches who can change people into frogs, the fear that I experience from that is very
real. And the horrible actions that I might do to certain women, based on that, is very
real. What isn’t real is that there are actual witches who can turn people into frogs. The
idea is there. The concept is there. That exists.

By the way, I should just point out a Buddhist methodology, which is to use extreme
ridiculous examples like witches that can turn people into frogs. Because when we see
it with a ridiculous example, then we get the general idea. Then we can apply it to
examples that don’t seem so ridiculous to us because we actually believe them. Like
there will be the perfect partner. Or, in the realm of causality, if I can just always keep
up with the latest fashions then I will get a really good boyfriend or girlfriend; that is
the causal relationship there.

Any other questions?

Question: Okay now we’re turning back to your example with this periscope vision. So
is it correct – did I understand it correctly? – if I have a correct understanding of
emptiness, that means that I will still see just this small field of vision, but that would
be without any kind of wrong mental images. But then, when I become a Buddha, then

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I will see the whole 360 degree vision.

Alex: Well, it’s a little bit like that. There are stages for the understanding of voidness.
In the beginning – to use the example of the periscope – when we focus through the
periscope, then initially we will understand that that’s not really the way that things
exist. So what we focus on initially, what we’re trying to totally absorb our
concentration on, is that there’s no such thing as reality existing that way. If we just use
this simple example. So, at that time, there is no appearance when we focus on “no
such thing.”

Question: There’s no appearance?

Alex: No appearance. Nothing appears.

We think that there is chocolate in the house. When we think there’s chocolate in the
house, maybe we think of chocolate and so, maybe, a piece of chocolate appears in
our thought, and then we look in the house. We look, we look, and we find out, much
to our disappointment, there is no chocolate. And we don’t want to believe that, so we
look again, just to make sure, and eventually we give up. There is no chocolate. Now
when we focus – you close your eyes and you focus – and you think “No. There is no
chocolate,” what appears in your mind? All you’re thinking is “There is none.” What
appears?

Participant: I think chocolate, maybe.

Alex: No. Then you’re thinking “there’s chocolate.” You’re thinking, “There is none.”

Participant: Just the empty wrapping.

Alex: That’s “no chocolate in the wrapping.” Just think, “There is none.” Nothing
appears. Nothing. Blank. There is none.

Participant: You can’t say that nothing appears.

Alex: Now we get into a deep philosophical discussion. Is there a “nothing” which then
can appear? That’s actually not such a silly discussion that comes up particularly in the
discussion of cause and effect. Can “nothing” turn into “something,” in terms of a result
arising? There’s “nothing,” and then that becomes a “something”? And when it ends,
does “something” turn into a “nothing”? So it’s not such a silly discussion, actually. And
it has many repercussions, actually, in the discussion of abortion, for example: there’s
something, I get rid of it, and then it’s a nothing.

But we won’t get into this discussion of what does “nothing” look like. But they say it’s

17
like an empty space. The void. Like outer space. These are the analogies that are used.
So, initially, what we focus on is “there’s no such thing” in terms of the universe
existing just with a line around it, limited to what I see through the periscope. It’s not
just that there’s nothing appearing, but there’s understanding together with that: it’s
an absence of an impossible way of existing. It’s not an absence of a dinosaur in the
room, or like that. If you focus on “no chocolate in the house” and “no dinosaur in the
house,” the appearance is the same: just nothing. Our understanding is different;
simply, understanding has to go with it. So then, after that, we just totally, totally
absorb and focus on “no such thing.” This is the importance – that’s when you do
voidness meditation – there’s no such thing. I mean, we’re convinced of it and we have
full understanding.

So there’s nothing appearing – this focus on “no such thing” – then step back and,
subsequent to that, we still just see through the periscope, but it is like an illusion. It’s
like an illusion in the sense that it appears as though this is all that exists, but that’s not
the way that things really are. So it’s like an illusion. It appears to exist in one way, but
it doesn’t actually exist that way. When we speak about understanding that
appearances are like an illusion, this is subsequent to the total absorption on “no such
thing,” the total absorption on voidness. In other words, when we understand things
are like an illusion, that has to be immediately after the absorption on voidness. You
get rid of the false appearance; and then when that false appearance recurs, we
understand that it’s like an illusion. So the actual term for this is “subsequent
attainment” (rjes-thob). Subsequent or after total absorption on voidness, the
realization that we obtain is that everything is like an illusion. This term “subsequent
attainment” is what’s usually translated as “post-meditation period.” It’s a misleading
way of translating it. Post-meditation actually means after the total absorption on
voidness. It’s not as though we’ve stopped meditating and we’ve gotten up; although
it could be.

Okay. So now things still appear to me as in a periscope, but I know that that’s like an
illusion. Things don’t really exist like that. It only appears like that because of the
limitations of my hardware. I can only see through these two holes in the front of my
skull. I can’t see what’s behind my head, for example. So there are physical and mental
limitations here.

Actually, that brings up just a side comment: that if you – I think they have done
experiments like this to project what actually a fly sees through fly eyes, or spider eyes,
which have these multi-faceted prisms and all sorts of different angles and stuff; the
eye is not smooth like our eye. And so then, of course, the question that we would ask
is: “Is one more valid than the other, in terms of seeing?” And then you start to realize
in terms of mental holograms and appearances, etc. But so long as we are a limited
being, you know, as a sentient being – a limited being, that’s what sentient means; a
Buddha’s not a sentient being; but someone with a limited mind, limited body – then

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we can only have periscope vision. And although we don’t believe in it, that’s what we
are limited to. And it is in fact only a Buddha, an omniscient mind of a Buddha, that
can perceive the interconnectedness of everything.

If we simplify things very much then: with our ordinary minds, it can only make things
appear as if they had lines around them, separating one thing from another, like things
encapsulated in plastic. Like this example that I used of differentiating the top of this
person’s head from the shirt of the person behind them. So, with our limited minds, it
can only make things appear as if they had lines around them. And when we focus on
voidness, we would focus on, “There are no such things as these lines. This is
ridiculous. Things don’t exist with lines around them.” So, with our limited minds,
limited bodies, we can only focus on “no such thing as these lines” or “if we have
appearances, they have lines around them.” You can’t focus on both at the same time.
Lines and no lines can’t appear at the same time, so we have to alternate between the
two. When the lines appear, we know that this is ridiculous; it’s not referring to
anything real. That’s the best we can do here. And it’s only the omniscient mind of a
Buddha, which is not limited by this type of limited body and limited mind that we
have, that can make things appear with no lines. So makes things appear with no lines.
So, at the same time as appearing without lines, can understand, “no such thing as
lines.”

So this is why, when we speak about first noble truth – the truth of suffering, true
suffering – then we speak of three types of suffering: Suffering of pain and
unhappiness; sometimes just called the suffering of suffering. Then the suffering or
problem of change. That’s referring to our ordinary happiness. The problem with it is
that it doesn’t last, it’s never satisfying; we never have enough. And when it ends, we
have no idea what’s going to come next, so there’s no security, no certainty about it.
And what initially gives us happiness – like being out in the sun – the more that we
get, eventually it gives us unhappiness: we want to get out of the sun. But the third
type of suffering is what’s called the “all-pervasive affecting suffering.” It’s “all-
pervasive,” so it pervades the first two types of suffering, every moment of our
experience with its ups and downs of unhappiness and ordinary unstable fleeting
happiness. These two go up and down, happiness and unhappiness. And this type of
suffering is “affecting”; it affects them.

So what are we talking about? We’re talking about getting and having an
uncontrollably recurring limited body and mind. That’s uncontrollably recurring rebirth:
samsara. It’s on the basis of this limited hardware that we experience the ups and
downs of life. And we experience that on the basis of… This limited hardware produces
limited types of appearances, false appearances. We believe in them. It causes us to
have all sorts of disturbing emotions. We act on the basis of that, and that brings this
unhappiness or fleeting happiness. So we have to get rid of this uncontrollably
recurring basis. That’s really the focus of the Buddhist practice.

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Even animals want to avoid the suffering of pain, so it’s nothing special. And many
world religions aim to get rid of our ordinary unsatisfying type of worldly happiness by
striving to go to heaven. So there’s nothing special about that either. So what’s special
about Buddhism is aiming to get rid of this uncontrollably recurring basis, our so called
“tainted aggregates” (body and mind). They’re tainted with confusion or ignorance or
unawareness, however you want to describe that. They come on the basis of that,
they’re mixed with that, and they produce more.

These questions are useful because it brings up further type of explanation, so that our
explanation isn’t so linear, but we get different pieces of the picture from different
angles. That’s very helpful because the way that we understand things is partially
through linear explanations, but partially also through putting different pieces
together, and both ways of learning are helpful. And, as I have emphasized, we need to
work very hard to try to understand this stuff, put it together, apply it to our lives,
analyze.

Now we were talking about three different levels of dependent arising. And when we
talk about nonstatic phenomena – things that change, whether they last forever and
are constantly changing, or they last for a short time – these things are affected by
causes and conditions. So “dependent arising.” Dependently arise. “Arise” doesn’t just
mean the first moment; arise is – each moment in the continuity of something is
arising. And it is arising dependently on causes and conditions. It’s important to
understand that we’re not just talking about what creates something, but whatever we
are analyzing here is changing moment to moment – let’s say somebody’s mental state
or somebody’s problem, or whatever – it’s changing from moment to moment, and
each moment is arising on the basis of or dependent on various causes and
conditions.

We were using the example of my child’s anorexia. Well, what is anorexia? It’s not just
one moment. It doesn’t just arise, and there it is. It’s a whole mode of behavior. The
child is alive and experiencing twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and each
moment is going to be different in the child’s experience. And we’re just looking at it
through one variable, through the category “anorexia.” Or “bulimia.” Bulimia is a little
bit easier example because it involves what we call “binge eating” and then vomiting,
or even just eating ordinarily and then vomiting at the end. So each moment of course
is affected by causes and conditions. So the example that we were using was the
parent feeling that “it’s all my fault.” And we have to understand that – although we
wouldn’t use voidness, technically, here – that it is impossible that that is how this
situation has arisen, and how it is continuing to arise each moment, based on just me
as the guilty one that caused it. Because when we believe that, of course it makes us
very, very unhappy; very miserable. We feel what we call “guilt.” And it will probably
lead us to handling the situation very poorly.

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So we can ask: How has this situation arisen and what is sustaining it? Has the
situation arisen from no situation at all? So it’s just fate. It happened by chance; bad
luck. A punishment from God. What is the cause? So from no cause, or from an
inappropriate cause that we can do nothing about. These things don’t make very much
sense because usually it leads to the question, “Why me?” which of course is involved
with a very false idea of how we exist. “Me. I’m so special.” “Why should it happen to
me?” etc. So we’re making a big deal out of “me.”

So then we say – if we have studied Buddhism a little bit – well, it’s the karma of the
child. The child, from who knows what, but some destructive behavior in the past that
somehow was related to this, and the habit of some disturbing emotions, disturbing
attitudes about low self-esteem. And what’s involved here with anorexia and bulimia
are control issues. You want to be totally in control. You want to be perfect, but you’re
not perfect. Very low self-esteem, etc. So all of these are involved in the causal
connection. The situation has arisen dependently on that, and is sustained
dependently on all these karmic factors on the side of the child. True.

But then the question is: Are these the only causal factors that are there? Well, no,
they’re not. And it certainly isn’t, “Well, my child deserved that and so shut up and
accept it,” and I have to shut up and accept it. This certainly is not a correct
understanding of karma. But certain situations have arisen in the past of the mental
continuum of this person who in this lifetime is my child, and all of that has arisen
dependently on so many other causal things that happened in that lifetime and
previous lifetimes, and so on. So we have one side of the causal process. And there are
certain things on the side of the person who is experiencing karmic results that causes
the karmic tendencies, and habits and so on, to ripen. That’s discussed in the twelve
links of dependent arising. This isn’t really the appropriate place to go into that, but
there’s a whole very complex mechanism of what causes karmic tendencies etc. to
ripen, in terms of our mistaken attitudes.

But what’s relevant here in our discussion is the conditions. You need conditions,
external conditions – not just internal conditions, but external conditions – to give the
environment within which something karmic will ripen. So here’s where the discussion
of my role as the parent comes in.

Now the relationship between how causes and conditions meet each other is quite
subtle; quite difficult to understand. I’ll give you a simple example of a wrong analysis.
Let’s say I have the karma to be hit by a car. Is it my karma that has therefore caused
you to drive your car on the road at just that time where you will hit me? Is it? No. But
we could imagine that; could falsely believe that. So it’s not that my karma has created
those conditions or circumstances.

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I couldn’t have been hit by a car if somebody didn’t come along driving a car and hit
me, obviously. So there are all sorts of karmic reasons and conditions – whether we
want to explain it in terms of karma, or more broadly – of why somebody is driving a
car: They had to go to the store. They had to whatever. And they couldn’t have driven
the car if there wasn’t petrol available, and if there weren’t gas stations. I mean, there
are so many things that driving a car is dependent on. So here’s where the difficulty
comes, in trying to understand the mechanism. I have the karma to be hit by a car
driven by you. You have the karma to hit me with your car. But how do those two
connect? Well, it’s not just dependent on these two karmas. There are many, many
other factors which have been involved: that I bought the car, that I needed to go to
the store, that there was a road that was built. I mean, all these sort of things are also
involved in the causal connection here.

“If I hadn’t married my partner, then I wouldn’t have given birth to this child, and the
child would not be bulimic.” I mean, this is crazy thinking. Isn’t it? There are children
that have a genetic proclivity toward being alcoholic. So you could say, “Well, my
partner was alcoholic. Well, if I didn’t marry this alcoholic person then I wouldn’t have
given birth to a child that had the genes to be alcoholic. And so it’s all my fault that I
married this person. I married the wrong person.” These are the misconceptions that
arise here.

But there are many, many causes and conditions that are affecting things, and that
doesn’t mean that I am not in some way responsible and added some conditions
perhaps; but not all of them. “I gave birth to this child. Well, if I didn’t give birth to this
child, the child wouldn’t have the problem. Or I wouldn’t have the problem of having
to deal with a child like that.” This mental continuum who was born as my child would
be born as somebody else’s child. And if they had the karma to be born as my child – if
not this lifetime, another lifetime – well, maybe they would have been born to
somebody else and they would have experienced that bulimic syndrome or the
alcoholic syndrome or whatever, and I would have been finished with it, in terms of my
karma, to have that type of child; and so maybe I would have a different child or
maybe I would overcome that karma.

So, in any case, with something that has already arisen, there’s no point in trying to
analyze blame, especially when we have false ideas of how causality works. The point is
that: now here’s the situation; how do we deal with it? Because it’s dependently arising,
so each moment is also dependently arising. So how can I help to not provide the
conditions for the situation to continue? Well, obviously, if I have an alcoholic child,
you don’t keep beer in the refrigerator and vodka in the liquor cabinet. And you never
let the child be home alone if the child is bulimic; because you’re there, so the child
can’t just go and eat a whole box of chocolate or a whole box of candy and make
themselves sick and go throw up. You don’t even buy the stuff, so it’s not in the house.
So, in that way, we try to not offer the conditions that could perpetuate the problem.

22
But whether the child continues to be bulimic or not is not totally dependent on
whether or not we’re home all the time and police what the child eats and that they
don’t go to the bathroom and throw up after their meal. But we know if a child really
wants to do something, no matter how much the parent tries to control, the child will
figure out some way to do it, especially if it’s a teenager.

So, again, we have this false idea – It’s not just a false idea of causality here. There’s a
deeper misunderstanding that’s involved, which is that there’s a “me” who could
somehow control the whole situation that was the underlying problem with the
bulimic teenager. That she could be in control of what she looked like. And I want to
be in control of what goes in my body, what comes out of my body. And so, like this,
somehow make myself good enough to be loved and accepted by the other
teenagers, or whatever it is.

Question: Anorexia?

Alex: Anorexia or bulimia. Bulimia is the same thing. You throw up in order to remain
thin; but instead of always starving yourself, you have such attachment to food that
you also binge eat first and then throw up. So it’s two variants of the eating disorder.
It’s a very common type of problem among teenagers, especially exacerbated by these
very thin models and so on – which, in some places, they’re trying to control: this isn’t
the image of beauty for teenage girls.

So there’s a “me” that can be in control of everything, of what I look like, and I’m going
to control my body and I’m going to control everything. And there’s the parent who
thinks that somehow he or she can control everything. That there’s this solid “me” that
can control, determine what’s going to happen. So it’s a misplaced understanding of
how I exist, the “me” exists, plus a misunderstanding of cause and effect. So whatever
understanding we can have of this to deconstruct the situation, it will help.

So what do we understand then when we understand this level of dependent arising,

in terms of voidness or absence of something that’s impossible. We understand that a
situation has arisen and is sustained by a million different causes and conditions: not
just me, but the kids at school, the fashion magazines – so many things are influencing
the situation. And it’s not that I am totally not part of this causal connection – it’s not
that it’s completely my responsibility. You could have the thought, “Well, okay, I could
contribute a little bit,” but then we could start to feel guilty: “I didn’t do enough.” Well,
we have to have a realistic idea of what could we do. And we could contribute a little
bit. Like, for instance, being home when our child is home from school, so the child
won’t binge eat when nobody else is in the house. We can contribute a little bit. And
by not doing enough, in the sense that I’m not rescheduling myself so that
somebody’s home – we could change that, sure. But what’s happened in the past is
past; that’s history. There’s no point in blaming ourselves or feeling guilty. So we can

23
only change how we act in the future, and that can only be on the basis of what’s
realistic.

So this is directly related to our understanding of what it would be like to be a Buddha.

If we become a Buddha, does that mean that then we’re going to be in control of
everything that happens to others? Well, we have infinite compassion equally for
everyone; not just my own child who has this problem, but for everybody. And what
the advantage that a Buddha has is a Buddha is aware of all the unbelievable number
of factors that have contributed to this situation – let’s say of this bulimic child – all the
causes and conditions going back, with no beginning. And a Buddha knows that, of
the many, many possible things that a Buddha could do to help in this situation, what
would be the consequences of each particular thing that a Buddha could do, so that a
Buddha could choose what would be the most skillful thing to do to help. This
obviously is very important for being able to know what’s the best way to help. But
still, what happens to this child is going to arise dependently on the million other
causes and conditions, not on just what a Buddha does.

So it’s very important to understand that in terms of what happens to us, and what
happens to others, things arise dependently on causes and conditions and we cannot
be totally in control. But also we are, to a certain extent, responsible; we have to take
responsibility. The balance between these is very important, the two understandings.
Okay? Whether we’re talking about a failed relationship, whether we’re talking about
losing our job, whether we’re talking about how we do in school, how we deal in our
office – whatever we’re talking about, things arise dependently. And although things
might appear to us to exist in some weird way, like “I should be in control,” “It’s all my
fault,” etc., it’s not backed up by anything in reality.

So what we have to do is not only think about this, and try to understand it, and try to
become convinced that what we’ve been discussing is correct – not just that – but
when a difficult situation arises in which we are projecting this misconception
concerning causality and the role of “me” in the whole process, to recognize it – “Aha!
I’m projecting something which is ridiculous” – and then “pop the balloon” of our
fantasy.

“This friend rejected me. It’s all my fault,” or “It’s all their fault. They’re such a terrible
person.” You have to pop that balloon. Because the situation arose dependently on so
many things: the other person was very busy, the other person had family crises, or a
health problem, or a technical problem – their telephone broke or their computer
broke – or whatever. There are so many things that could affect the situation, not just “I
was a terrible person. I did something wrong,” or this other person was so terrible. So
when we pop that balloon of our fear, fantasy, and so on, we calm down. We let out all
the air from the balloon, as it were. It’s going “Ahhhhhhhhhh” – you know, like that –
and it allows us to approach the situation in a much more relaxed type of way. So if it’s

24
a friend that seemed to have rejected us, ask: “Are you angry with me? If I did anything
that offended you, I’m sorry.” Or just “What’s happening that you haven’t contacted
me?” And find out what are the other factors and so on that are involved.

I think of the example of parents with grown-up children, live away from home, and
the children don’t call often enough, don’t come to see the parents often enough. And
the parents get very upset with their children: “Why don’t they call?” And we expect
this. “It’s Mother’s Day and they didn’t call. Why didn’t they call?” They’re very angry.
My mother was a very, very wise woman. She died some years ago. She didn’t have
any Buddhist training, but had great wisdom. And she would say very simply, “If you
want to hear from your children, you call them. Don’t wait for them to call you. You’re
just going to get frustrated and angry. You want to speak to them, call. You know the
telephone number, call.”

Again, it’s an understanding of causality. If it is beyond us to be able to cause our

children to call us every week, why bother? There are other ways of handling the
situation if we want to have communication with our children. So, again, dependent
arising in terms of what’s possible, what’s not possible. What role can we play? What
role is beyond what we can play? Same thing with the anorexic or bulimic child, or any
situation that we’re in. We try – even though we’re not Buddhas and we don’t know
what is the best thing to do – we try our best, with a realistic understanding of what
role we can play. If the child continues to suffer – sure, it’s sad, but we don’t have the
magic ability to just come up with the magic solution and make everything better.
That’s a balloon we have to pop. Okay, let’s take a moment to digest that.

Okay. And remember here we’re speaking not just in terms of how we can affect what
happens with somebody else, really. Obviously we’re also speaking about how we can
affect what happens to us in our lives. We don’t live in a vacuum, encapsulated in
plastic, and not affected are affected by other people or our environment or the
weather or everything that is happening around. We are. So we have to take that into
consideration in terms of what’s possible, what’s not possible. Age factor is there. So
many factors that affect what happens to us and what we can do.

Okay. Any questions?

Question: I’m not sure whether I have it correctly, but anyway: What then is the
relationship between dependent arising – if we are thinking about this 360 degree
vision – and this emptiness or zero?

Alex: What is the relation between the 360 degree vision and past, present, future, etc.,
and voidness? We have dependent arising. Everything is dependent on everything
else. We have a projection, on top of that, that things exist just in isolated little pieces,
establishing themselves independently of everything else around them. And what’s

25
absent is that those projections are referring to anything real. If we put this in very
concrete terms, what appears – I mean, when we talk about this 360 degrees – is
what’s possible, and what is also there is not impossible; an absence of impossible.

For instance – now the analogy isn’t exact, but let me use this, in any case – I see a
dog. Now the dog appears to me. Now what I also know, when I see a dog, is “not a
cat.” So “dog” is what is reality. “Not a cat” is true, but it’s absent; there’s an absence
here. Not a cat. So they go together. I mean we can understand the two of them: “Dog,
not a cat.” So, similarly, “360 degrees, not just 20 degrees.” So, although the analogy
isn’t exact, it’s a way of approaching the understanding here. Possible; not what’s not
possible.

This is perhaps a good place to end, and we will continue tomorrow. So we end with a
dedication. We think whatever positive force, whatever understanding has come from
this, may it act as a cause to reach enlightenment for the benefit of all.

Dependent Arising: Parts and Mental Labeling

We have been speaking about voidness, which is an absence of impossible ways of

existing, and we have been presenting it in a very general way, using the term a bit
loosely, so that we can incorporate in our discussion of voidness the various levels of
understanding of dependent arising.

And I have been basing this on the fact that there are two types of unawareness or
ignorance. The first is unawareness about cause and effect, and this is referring
specifically to behavioral cause and effect: the effects of our behavior on ourselves.
And the second form of unawareness is unawareness of how things exist. And
unawareness can be explained either as not knowing, or knowing these things
incorrectly. And although voidness technically is used only in terms of an absence of
impossible ways of existing – so with respect to countering the understanding of
voidness; countering the second form of unawareness: unawareness of how things
exist – we’ve been adopting the idea of voidness (in other words, an absence of what is
impossible) to explain how we counter the unawareness about cause and effect.

And when we started to relate this presentation to the presentation of dependent

arising, we saw that there are three levels of dependent arising. The first is things arise
dependently on causes. This is referring to nonstatic phenomena – phenomena that
change from moment to moment and are affected by things, namely causes and
conditions. And then the second level of understanding dependent arising is that
things arise dependently on parts. And that refers to everything, both static and
nonstatic; in other words, things that don’t change from moment to moment and

26
things that do change from moment to moment. And this understanding of these first
two levels of dependent arising regard the conventional or relative truth of things: of
what things are, how they function, etc. And then the third level of dependent arising
is things arise dependently in terms of or in relation to mental labeling. And this deals
with the deepest truth about things: how they exist. And it’s in this third area that
voidness technically is applied.

So, anyway, that’s the theoretical framework within which our discussion has taken
place. And when we get down to the actual discussion of these three levels of
dependent arising, then we can see more easily the practical application. But I always
think that it’s helpful – in any presentation – on a practical level to understand how it
fits into the general picture of Buddhist theory, then one has a little bit of a sense of
context. And when we have a sense of a larger context, then we can fit many different
teachings together. Without that larger picture of the context, then it’s hard to see how
different teachings from different texts or different teachers or different traditions fit
together.

Now we have covered the first level of dependent arising. That is referring to things
that change from moment to moment, whether we’re talking about situations or
objects or people or types of behavior – whatever – that this arises dependently on
causes and conditions. And the reality is that whatever arises, it has been influenced by
an unbelievably large number of causal factors. In fact, one could say that everything is
causally related to everything else in either a closer or more distant way. For example:
if we drove a car here or took a bus here, then the dinosaurs and the vegetation of the
period when the dinosaurs lived are one of the causes for our being able to get here
because these substances decomposed and made the oil, the gasoline, that drove the
car. So, without those dinosaurs and the vegetation of that time, we couldn’t have our
ride in an automobile or a bus. And obviously the dinosaurs didn’t live their lives in
order to be able to decompose so that we can drive our car now. And so these causal
relationships don’t have necessarily to be conscious and intentional.

Now, of course, when we speak technically about unawareness of cause and effect, we
are speaking specifically about behavioral cause and effect. In other words, what are
the causes for primarily our experiences of happiness and unhappiness and of
uncontrollably recurring samsara or rebirth. And when we speak about dependent
arising in terms of causality, then it’s specifically the discussion of the twelve links of
dependent arising that explains the whole mechanism of how we experience
happiness, unhappiness, and recurring samsaric rebirth. And here when we speak in
terms of dependent arising in terms of causes and conditions, then this explanation of
the twelve links is just a subcategory within that, speaking about something specific.
But when we talk about dependent arising in terms of causality, then we extend the
scope of the discussion.

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Just to repeat, if that’s not clear: When we speak about the dependent arising from
causality, from causes and conditions, then the discussion of the twelve links is
speaking about just one subcategory of this, particularly the category that’s involved
with karma and the experience of the three types of suffering that are described in the
first noble truth. But when we speak about dependent arising in terms of causality, it’s
a larger scope of causality.

Now, of course, we can debate this because within the five aggregates of anyone’s
experience can be included all nonstatic phenomena. So therefore all the causal factors
that are involved in the arising of each of these factors would be included within the
scope of this presentation of dependent arising. And so, of course, this brings in a
whole complicated discussion (which I don’t want to get into) which is: absolutely
everything that happens and that everyone experiences, is that arising dependently on
karma? In other words, are all causal relations included within the discussion of karma?
But this is far too complicated a debate. But we touched on that discussion when we
raised the question of whether or not everything I experience is due to my own karma,
or is everything that I experience due to the interaction of everybody’s karma? And the
latter was the case: My karma doesn’t cause you to drive your car and hit me. My
karma doesn’t cause my child to have anorexia.

And so there are many karmic reasons why somebody else – from their whole history,
and the interaction of everything that has affected that, and their karma – which has
caused them to drive that car and hit somebody, namely me. And then, of course,
there are all the various causal factors of the people who invented cars, who built the
cars, who built the roads, the dinosaurs that produced the petrol, and so on – that we
could relate to the karma of the dinosaurs and the karma of the people who invented
cars and built the cars, etc. So we find that the complex here is very, very vast – of
causal factors.

The practical application of this is when we are faced with a situation of something
happening, either to us or to one of our loved ones, that we don’t have misplaced guilt
– I guess guilt is always misplaced, but that we don’t have a misplaced idea of
causality. In other words, we realize the absence of what’s impossible. So here’s our
concept of voidness being used in a loose sense. And what is impossible is that these
tragedies which happened are due to either no cause whatsoever (they’re just sort of
bad luck), or due to some irrelevant cause (like some higher being punishing us). And
we don’t place the causality on just one factor, namely me – “It’s all my fault, therefore
I am guilty” – and we don’t place the blame of causality on just one external thing
either, like “It’s all because of the government policies. It’s all because of society.”

So if we see a much, much broader perspective of dependent things arising

dependently on so many causes and so many conditions, then we are a little bit more
relaxed; our minds are much more open and broad in facing a difficult situation. But

28
we realize that we do contribute some of the causes; it’s not as though we don’t
contribute anything to the causes. So there is a certain sense of responsibility for our
behavior. Therefore we can add a few more new causal factors into the mixture here,
by taking certain steps that could help the situation, but we don’t exaggerate the
ability of what we do – of the causal factors that we add – to control and determine
what is going to follow.

This is a very common mistake that people make. It’s the syndrome of being – to use
the colloquial term – a “control freak,” that we think that somehow I should be able to
control the situation; and just in terms of my own willpower and what I do, I will
control what happens. But that’s impossible because whatever happens is arising
dependently on a million different causes and conditions, not just on me and what I
do. That’s very important to understand when especially we are a position of authority
– we’re the manager of a business, or the director of some sort of enterprise, or a
Dharma center, or whatever – to think that everything is my responsibility and what I
do is going to totally determine the outcome of an event or our business. This is a
perfect topic to apply voidness meditation to: That this is impossible. No such thing
can possibly exist. So it’s like there’s a big stew pot and many people have thrown
ingredients into it, and all we can do is maybe add a few ourselves, but what’s there in
the pot is contributed by so many other factors.

Now the second level of dependent arising is that everything, both static and
nonstatic, arises or exists or is established dependently on parts. So this is the case
whether we speak of physical parts – getting down to atoms and subatomic parts, and
so on – or we speak of grosser physical parts, like all the parts of our car engine. But
also we need to speak in terms of the temporal, the time dimension. And so an event
arises dependently on each tiny little moment. And so what is absent, if we use the
word “voidness” here in a loose sense, is that an event arises and establishes itself all
by itself, independently of its parts, each moment that makes up that event. Well, let’s
look at some examples of this and the practical application.

We have an ongoing relationship with someone. We won’t talk about how the
relationship exists – does it exist by itself independently of us? – let’s leave that
discussion aside. How people sometimes make a big self-existent thing – “our
relationship” – and then they talk about “You’re not relating to ‘our relationship,’” and
“How do you relate to ‘our relationship?’” This is concretizing things that it’s not
appropriate to concretize. But if we look in terms of the ongoing interaction that we
have with another person that we are close with, then sometimes what happens is that
we have an argument or the other person says some nasty cruel words, and then, all of
a sudden, we identify that person with these cruel words that they said; and our whole
relationship, we identify and characterize just by that one argument. “You did such a
terrible thing. You said such a terrible thing. You don’t love me.” And we become very,
very upset, which of course makes us very unhappy, and we may act on the basis of

29
that and break the relationship, for example, or say something really nasty back. And
what we need to understand here is that this relationship, this interaction with this
other person, is made up of parts, of many, many, many moments, and we’ve lost sight
of that here. We need to remember that we’ve had a thousand moments ( just to use
an arbitrary number) of interactions with each other: some have been very nice, some
have been a little bit uncomfortable. There was this one argument – okay, that was
really unpleasant, but we have to see that the relationship arises and continues to
arise, moment to moment, dependently on this whole thing. And so we don’t
exaggerate one little incident and characterize the entire relationship by that.

Let me speak a little bit more technically, but not absolutely precisely with technical
language. This is the Buddhist method – when we explain something, then you give a
provisional explanation that maybe is not so accurate but it’s easier to understand, and
then you go to another level of provisional explanation that maybe also is not so
accurate but it’s a little bit more accurate, and this way it becomes easier to
understand. So sometimes when I’m explaining, I’m not explaining the most precise
accurate description. So one has to understand the methodology here.

What I want to introduce here is the whole discussion of conceptual cognition.

Conceptual cognition consists of thinking with a category. So here in our example we
have the category “our relationship.” Now, in conceptual thought, what happens is that
we have what’s called a “conceptual isolate” (ldog-pa). In other words, we isolate
something that will represent that category of the relationship. So we have an isolate
that isolates it, and then we use something – an image or whatever – to represent that
category. This is quite easy to understand if we use an example.

I will ask everybody in the room to think of a dog. Now when we think of a dog, a dog
is a category, isn’t it? But each of us has our own – what we would say in our Western
language is our own “idea” of what a dog looks like, that represents the category of
dog, don’t we? Or the category of a good meal, or whatever. We each have something
that we isolate to represent the category. And then, of course, we perceive various
things around us through this mixture of the category and what we think represents it,
and then we judge things: “This is not a good meal; this is a good meal; that’s really a
terrible looking dog; or whatever.” The category of a “real man”: a “real man” goes in
the water even if it’s freezing cold. We judge ourselves and we judge others by these
categories and what we isolate conceptually to represent that category.

And so this is the problem here in our example of the relationship. We think in terms
of the category “our relationship,” and now we represent it and isolate just this one
incident – the argument – and now, all of a sudden, this represents our relationship.
And we look at the person and our whole interaction just in terms of that – “We have a
terrible relationship” – and then we act on the basis of believing that. Now it would be
equally misleading to isolate the really good time that we had with the person to

30
represent the relationship, also, in the sense that it might deny and we are in denial of
the difficult aspects in the relationship.

Now here’s where I’m not being 100% precise. But what would be better is, in this
situation, would be to see that the relationship dependently arises, moment to
moment, on all the different causal factors and all the different incidents; and then try
to interact with this person – and here’s where I’m being a little bit imprecise –
nonconceptually. In other words, don’t work through the concept, this category “our
relationship,” and what it should be, what represents it, but just interact.

Now one has to be a little bit careful here – here’s where I’m saying the imprecision
comes in my description – that one needs to not just interact blindly, but what I’m
speaking about here is with an understanding of dependent arising. So it’s not as
though we are ignoring the times when we are acting destructively, when the other
person is acting destructively – we’re not ignoring that. So we do take measures to try
to improve the relationship. Whether that’s conceptual or nonconceptual, we won’t go
into that discussion. So we are aware of the basis here, of all the different moments, all
the different episodes in our interaction. And we realize that if we want to speak about
“our relationship,” the category – well, it’s arising dependently on all of this. You can’t
say that any one incident represents “our relationship.” Therefore you don’t identify the
relationship with just one incident that happens, whether it’s a horrible incident or a
wonderful incident. And we also don’t interact in a conceptual way in which we
represent a relationship by – we isolate something from a fairytale, of Prince and
Princess Charming on white horses living happily ever after, and then we view our
relationship in terms of that concept, and say, “But you’re not the perfect princess,”
“You’re not the perfect prince.” And then we expect that they should be like that, and
then we get very disappointed and angry when they are not like that, and so on. Then
we have real suffering.

So this type of analysis applies not just to relationships with others but it applies to our
job: Our job should be perfect. Or we have a tough day at the office and “Oh, my job is
so terrible.” These types of applications are very helpful. And the same thing in terms
of moods, or “I’m an unhappy person,” or “I’m this,” or “I’m that.” We have the category
of “me” and then we’re representing it by something that we isolate which is just,
whether it’s true or not true – I mean, this is the point. It could be either an accurate
thing that we use to represent ourselves – in other words, some aspect – or something
totally unreal. But, nevertheless, we are not open to the whole scope of everything that
happens. So this is another facet of things arising dependently on parts. And our
application of voidness type of understanding here is that it’s impossible. This is an
impossible way of existing, that the whole is identical to just one part – in other words,
the category is identical to one thing that represents it.

Another application of this analysis of things arising dependently on parts can also be

31
understood with the example of a relationship with someone. Often we have the
misconception or the misunderstanding that I am the only person in this other
person’s life – in other words, their whole life revolves around me – and we are totally
oblivious to the fact that they have many other friends and relatives and other
relationships. So, with great attachment, we don’t want the other person to have
anything to do with anybody else. Just me.

Or a classic example is that if we are the person at home in a partnership. Let’s say a
traditional one in which the woman might be at home, although nowadays it could be
the man at home – whatever, it doesn’t matter. But the worker comes home and we’re
totally oblivious that they’ve had a whole day with interacting with other people, and
we only think in terms of: “Now you’re here. So now you should be totally enthusiastic
to be with me,” and so on. And the other way around: the worker comes home, and
the one who is at home – totally oblivious that they had a day dealing with the
children and shopping, and all these other things, and: “Now you should have the
dinner ready on the table. And you should be totally there just for me.”

This is ignorance. This is impossible, that somebody’s life is just restricted to me and
the relationship with me. A person’s life arises dependently on all the parts, and so all
the different relationships with all the different people that are involved in this person’s
life, and therefore they have obligations to spend time with their parents, with their
relatives, with other friends, etc., not just with me. So this is a big problem that arises
when we have attachment to somebody. So, again, something similar to voidness:
There’s no such thing as somebody having a life that is only restricted to a relationship
with one person.

Now we need to apply that same understanding to ourselves when we have

attachment to somebody and we think just in terms of this relationship. Let me explain
that a little bit more clearly. We may have many people in our lives who like us, who
even love us. But there’s this one special person and “I want you to love me,” and
“If you don’t love me, then that’s the end of everything” – and that all these other
people love me, that doesn’t really count. And if that relationship ends with this special
person, then it’s like our whole life is over, and we have great difficulty acknowledging
that we still have friends and we still have our dog who loves us, and we still have
relatives, or whatever. And so, again, we have to see that a life filled with relationships
with others arises dependently on parts; not just identify it with one part, like this
relationship with this special person.

Okay. That’s the discussion of the second level of dependent arising. Do you have any
questions? Let’s first take a few moments to reflect on what we have been discussing.

Okay. Now please keep in mind that when we talk about voidness style meditation
here, what we’re focusing on is “this is impossible.” This is impossible that I’m the only

32
person in this other person’s life, or that this person is the only one in my life. That’s
impossible. That is the style of meditation here. No such thing. Pop the balloon of this
projection of fantasy, and then accept the reality of dependent arising – or the truth of
dependent arising (we don’t want to make it into a solid thing).

Question: [missing]

Alex: The question is: do I have this topic on my website? Not yet. It will be on the
website as soon as this lecture gets edited. But these two levels of dependent arising,
and the examples that I’ve been using in terms of an analysis of relationships, this is in
my book Developing Balanced Sensitivity. I developed it in there in terms of, again,
popping the balloon of our fantasies. So there is a presentation there already.

Question: So we have a situation (we were talking about these relationships). If there is
a person who considers that relationship is the most important thing in life, and family
is the top priority in their work and in their life, and nothing outside that’s important,
but this other person does not consider it exactly like that. Then should that person,
the other one, try to change this relationship through changing himself or herself? Or,
in addition to that, should he explain that to the other person?

Alex: I think that everything, of course, depends on the individuals who are involved,
how open-minded they are, and so on. This can be a big source of conflict in a
relationship. I’m thinking of a specific example of a relationship in which one person
considers friends in their life very important, and spending time with their friends. And
the other partner says, “You spend too much time with your friends. You don’t consider
me important enough. You should spend all your time with me.” And so big arguments
go on about that, and the person who considers other friendships important in his life
is certainly not willing to give that up and stop spending time with his friends. He’s
invited the partner to come with, but the partner’s not interested. And the partner is
willing to spend a little bit more time with the partner, but not totally give up the
friends. And the one who’s so attached, who says “Spend all the time with me” –
although she might say, “Well, I’ll try to change,” and “It’s all right,” but still the
argument comes up. She feels very badly and lets the other person know that she feels
badly and neglected.

So explaining to the other person, and even if the other person says, “Okay, I’ll
compromise. I’ll try to change,” doesn’t mean that they will change. We have to go
back to our discussion of things arising dependently on causes and conditions.
Someone has a deep habit of attachment and insecurity, and so on – just somebody
saying “Well, change,” and then you say “Oh yeah. I’ll change,” is not going to break
the syndrome. It might improve it for a couple of days, but then the old patterns
relapse.

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So if the relationship is an important one and one that we want to sustain, particularly
if it happens to be with our family, like our parents insisting that we spend more time
with them and with our relatives, then we certainly need to make some compromises.
But both sides need to compromise. But without the misconception that making a
compromise is going to totally change each side’s feeling and tendencies.

But what is a helpful method in this type of situation is to give some security by giving
a guarantee of a special time. “I can’t give you all my time, but every Sunday I’ll come
to visit,” or “We’ll have breakfast together every day,” or whatever it is. So we offer
something and we make it secure – as much as possible, I will do that – so that the
other person feels secure in that they are getting at least something. You see, what is
most difficult in this situation is the insecurity of the person feeling neglected: “I don’t
know when you’re going to come.” But if there is a guarantee that at least there’s some
time that they can count on, that they will get, that helps in most cases. Not always, of
course. And, of course, a little trick that we can use is – if we’re the person that needs
to give the guarantee – is that if I have a dog, I have to walk the dog every day. So if I
have parents, I have to visit them every week or call them at least every week. In other
words, don’t take it as a punishment or a big “I’m the martyr. I have to do this.” It’s just
part of the package of having a dog or having parents, or having children for that
matter. We need to guarantee that we spend some time with the children.

A friend of mine, not Buddhist – one doesn’t have to be a Buddhist to be able to give
good advice – gave very good advice. He said that if you’re in a partnership relation
with somebody, whether it’s a marriage or not necessarily a marriage, one of the ways
to help that relationship to succeed is every day spend at least a half hour with your
partner. Not with anybody else, just alone with your partner. And that, I think, is very,
very good advice.

Okay. Let us go to the last topic. We don’t have too much time, but this is traditional:
one doesn’t spend too much time on the most sophisticated level. And this is
dependent arising in terms of mental labeling. How do we establish the existence of
anything? Is there something on the side of the object that is establishing itself? Or is
it established dependently on other things?

Well, we have seen that things are established dependently on causes and conditions,
if they are nonstatic, and everything arises dependently on parts. But when we speak
really about the topic of voidness as it’s used technically, and we speak in terms of the
Gelug Prasangika understanding of it, then we have to get more precise. Now one
thing that we have to remember is that in the Buddhist tenet systems there are many
different presentations of what are impossible ways of establishing the existence of
something. In other words, the voidness is understood on many, many different levels
– in terms of negating something impossible. And in each of the Tibetan traditions,
and sometimes even within one Tibetan tradition, various authors will have different

34
interpretations and understandings of each of these Indian philosophical positions
within Buddhism. And, of course, all of them are useful. We can’t say that only one is
correct. In other words, when we try to get rid of our belief in impossible things, we
have to realize that we project and believe many, many different levels of impossible
ways of existing. You have to negate – you have to get rid of – all of them. So let’s
speak about the Gelug interpretation of the Indian system called Prasangika.

Now when we speak about mental labeling, we are talking about a conceptual
phenomenon. It is talking about names and concepts; concepts referring to categories.
Names or mental labels apply to a basis. Right? We give a name to something. We
name it. That’s mental labeling. And, of course, the basis is made of many, many
different parts, and so on. And we have to make a difference here between what the
name refers to and a referent thing that could be found that is corresponding to the
name.

Let’s use an example. I often use the same example because I think it illustrates this
quite easily. Colors. Now there’s a whole spectrum of light, and we have names and
concepts of different colors. So we have red, we have orange, we have yellow, we have
blue, we have green, we have purple. We have all these colors. So these are mental
labels that are labeled onto certain wavelengths, from this wavelength to that
wavelength of light. And the referent object ( btags-chos) – in other words, what the
name is referring to – is red, yellow, orange. There is such a thing as red, yellow, and
orange.

Now if we talk about a referent “thing” (btags-don) – these are difficult words to
translate, but I’m making a difference between a referent object and referent “thing”:
you know, in quotations; a “thing” out there – that would be… Okay, so there is
conventionally red, yellow and orange. We have, by convention, by mutual agreement
within a society, we have the conventions of these different colors. But a referent
“thing” would be that on the side of the light, that there is such a thing as red, yellow,
and orange. In other words, there’s the spectrum of light, and there’s a big wall making
a boundary at one wavelength and at another wavelength, and that, from the side of
the light, is red. And then there’s another wall further down, and within those two walls
is orange; and then the next one is yellow. In other words, that there is something on
the side of the basis that’s establishing these colors. Obviously there’s no such thing.
There are no such walls on the side of the spectrum of light that establishes, from the
side of the spectrum of light, the different colors. But does that mean that there are no
colors? No. There are colors. Red, orange, and yellow. What establishes red, orange,
and yellow? Merely the name or concept of “red,” “orange,” and “yellow.” And even the
defining characteristic of red, orange, and yellow is just a convention. Some people
just decided that from this wavelength to that wavelength we’re going to call this
name. So that even the defining characteristic is mentally labeled.

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Okay. So this is not so easy to understand, obviously. But I think if we work with this
example of colors it’s a little bit easier to approach. Different societies are going to
divide the light spectrum differently. Some societies may have three colors there: red,
orange, and yellow. Other societies might have only two colors there. And the
boundaries of what’s really red and what gets into the color of violet – that could
change with different societies, and not only does it change with societies but with
individuals as well. In other words, remember we isolate something to represent… If
you think of red, each of us will have a different image of what represents red.

So when we speak about mental labeling, mental labeling doesn’t create things. Things
are created by causes and conditions. All right? The colors are created in terms of
atmosphere and the refraction of light, and light sources, and all these sort of things.
But that’s why I emphasize, in our translation here, we’re talking about what
establishes the existence of something, not what makes it exist. What establishes –
how do you prove that there is such a thing as red? Well, there’s a word for it, and it’s
what the word refers to on the basis of light waves. But is there a red existing out there
between two boundaries? No. So whether we mentally label it “red” or “orange”
doesn’t make any difference. You don’t have to actively label something to make the
true statement that what establishes red and yellow is the word or concept “red” or
“yellow.” We don’t have to go around saying, “Red, red, red, red…” in order for Boris’s
shirt to look red. A Buddha doesn’t have conceptual cognition. A Buddha doesn’t
mentally label anything. However, a Buddha would agree that what establishes red,
orange, and yellow is mental labeling.

Now we can apply the same type of analysis and understanding to emotions. There’s
this broad spectrum of emotions, and then we have the concepts within it of loyalty,
jealousy, pride, attachment, and so on. Is there such a thing as jealousy or pride or
anger? Sure. What establishes it? Well, the words and concepts. What the words and
concepts refer to. That’s the only thing that we could say. What establishes that there’s
anger? Well, it’s what the word “anger” refers to, the concept that “anger” refers to.
But is there something on the side of emotions, in absolutely everybody, that sort of is
walls – that from this side to that side, that’s anger; and then, on the other side of that,
is hatred, and so on. I mean, there are no walls there. There are no – remember we
were using the example of solid lines around things, or things encapsulated in plastic –
there’s nothing like that in terms of emotions. Even the defining characteristics of
anger or jealousy or hatred, that’s mentally created by a group of people, cave people
or whatever, who decided that within human emotion – and animal emotion as well –
we’re going to categorize in some sort of way in order to communicate. But,
nevertheless, there are emotions. There is jealousy. There is anger. So what’s
impossible, when we talk about voidness, is that there is a referent “thing” out there,
on the side of the basis, that is establishing love, or establishing anger, or establishing
orange.

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Well, on a practical level, we start to apply these things. Like “good mood,” “bad
mood.” What’s a good mood? What’s a bad mood? Well, I mentally labeled something
as a “bad mood.” Was there something solid there, “Ohhh, a bad mood,” a big heavy
cloud over our head? No. So we may conventionally be in a bad mood – what we have
labeled “bad mood” or somebody, in the dictionary, has labeled this “bad mood” – but
we realize that, with the understanding of voidness, it’s not that there’s this heavy black
solid mood that I’m in. But we see – now we combine the other levels of dependent
arising – that it’s arisen from all these causes and conditions, and it changes from
moment to moment, so there’s all these different parts, and so on. Well, maybe I don’t
feel so nice, but this understanding, this deconstruction, allows us to have equanimity
toward it. So what? So who cares if I have a bad mood? Whether it’s arisen from this or
from that, it’s not “Ohhh, this heavy bad mood,” that’s there solidly. And then I can
change. In the stew pot, throw in more different causes and conditions to change what
I feel like.

We feel sick. There is the convention of what it means to be sick. And so what is being
sick? It’s what the word “sick” refers to. Obviously there’s a wide basis here of labeling.
So I’m sick. So, okay, then you lie down, or you go to bed, or you go to the doctor, or
whatever. You don’t make a big deal out of it. This is what is so helpful with this
understanding of voidness, if we speak just on a very superficial beginning level. And
then we extend this analysis to other things, like what about “friend,” what about
“partner”? What is a friend? What is a partner? Well, it’s what the word “friend” or
“partner” refers to, on the basis of a convention that somehow has either been defined
in the dictionary, or maybe we have our own definition of what a partner should be or
what a friend should be. Do we have friends? Do we have partners? Sure. But is there
something on the side of the person that should make them like that, and if they don’t
have it then there is something wrong with them, and so on? No.

So, in the end, what we need to do is combine our understanding of all these different
levels of dependent arising. Someone has become our friend or our partner
dependent on so many causes and conditions, and there’s so many different parts and
aspects to the relationship, and it’s merely – well, partner, the relationship, the
friendship, whatever, that’s just what the word refers to. Because the only thing that –
It’s established by all these things, but there’s nothing actually sitting there solid:
“Ohhh, friend!” “Partner!” Everything is fluid; everything is flowing. We tend to want to
take a still picture, a still photograph, and sort of stop it at one thing and make it –
whatever exists is this still photograph. Whereas everything is a movie – if I can speak
in a very broad generalization – and affected by a million different things, including
our concepts of how we label things, parts, causes, conditions, etc.

Okay. So that brings us to the end of our session; the end of our lecture. And these are
topics that require a great deal of thought and reflection, but if we wish to achieve a
true stopping of our confusion, and the disturbing emotions, and all the karmic junk

37
that follows from acting out these disturbing emotions, etc., the understanding of
voidness in terms of dependent arising is utterly essential. And it’s important not just
merely to understand these points about voidness and dependent arising. We need to
be convinced that it is correct. And not just be convinced that it’s correct, but then
actually internalize it and apply it in our daily lives. And if we do this with the aim of
ourselves overcoming our own suffering, our own samsaric existence, and so on, then
it acts as a cause for reaching liberation – obviously in connection with many other
causes. And if our mind that understands voidness has the force of bodhichitta behind
it – we want to reach enlightenment in order to benefit everyone – the basis of great
compassion and love, then that understanding acts as a cause for reaching the
enlightenment of a Buddha.

Now let’s end here with a dedication. We think whatever understanding, whatever
positive force has come from this, may it grow greater and greater and act as a cause
for not only my own enlightenment but the enlightenment of everyone for the benefit
of all.

Dependent Arising in Terms of Mental Labeling

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/vipashyana/the-emptiness-
of-the-false-me/dependent-arising-in-terms-of-mental-labeling

Review of the Conventional “Me” Being an Imputation on the Five Aggregates

We’ve been speaking about voidness (emptiness) and we have seen that voidness is a
negation phenomenon, something that we know by negating or refuting something
else. What we are refuting, when we know voidness, is impossible ways of existingwith
respect to everything: ourselves, others, and all objects in general. We started to look
in terms of the person or “me” and the voidness of the person, and the relationship
between a person or “me” and the aggregate factors that make up each moment of
our experience, because when we first start to try to understand voidness, we start
with trying to understand the voidness of the self, the person, because that is a bit
easier to understand than the voidness of all phenomena, although voidness is the
same with respect to both.

We saw that the self of a person is an imputation on the basis of all the aggregate
factors that make up each moment of our experience, and we looked a little bit more
deeply about what that actually meant. If we look at our experience, the question is,
“What’s happening; what’s happening each moment?” All that is happening at each
moment is that we are on some “channel of consciousness,” when we’re seeing,
hearing, thinking, or whatever. There are various objects that we are aware of,

38
particularly here in terms of sense objects: sights, sounds and so on. Within the sense
field – because when we see, we take in a whole sense field – there is distinguishing
certain colored shapes from other colored shapes, for instance, if we think in terms of
vision. And how do we actually experience these various shapes, and objects, and so
on, that we distinguish? We experience them with some level on the spectrum
between “completely happy” or “completely unhappy.”

Feeling some level of happiness is defined as that which ripens from our karma. In
other words, depending on the positive force from constructive behavior that we’ve
done in the past, or on the negative force from the destructive behavior we’ve done in
the past, we experience things with happiness or unhappiness. After all, two people
can be served the same food: one person experiences it with happiness and pleasure,
they like it, the other person hates it, is very unhappy, “I don’t like this.” This is the
ripening of karma. It’s quite interesting, if you think in terms of a computer that is
dealing with information. How is that different from a mind dealing with information?
A computer doesn’t experience happiness or unhappiness with that information,
whereas a mind does. Although we might think that the computer is very unhappy
with us when it loses our data.

And then also what is part of our experience is this last aggregate, the aggregate of
everything else, all other affecting variables: all the emotions, and concentration,
sleepiness, and interest, and all these other things in there. And what is “me?” “Me” is
found in this last aggregate, by the way, in the aggregate of other affecting variables.
It’s not that it’s outside the system. It’s not something extra, like icing put on the cake
of the aggregates. The “me,” the self, is an imputation on each moment of all these
aggregate factors that are changing all the time. In a sense, it is like the imputation of
a whole on parts. Like, if we have a movie: a movie is made up of one moment after
another moment, after another moment, and the content of it is changing
continuously. And what is “a movie?” A movie is an imputation on the whole thing,
isn’t it?

This was what we covered last time, and we saw that this “me” is what’s known as the
“conventional me,” a specific imputation on a particular stream of continuity of
aggregate factors – that this is something which conventionally does exist. What we
are refuting is an impossible way, a false way, in which that “me” exists.

Mental Labeling with Concepts and Designation with Words

Voidness (emptiness) deals with the question: How do we establish that there is such a
thing as a person or “me?” According to the Prasangika explanation, as asserted in the
Gelug tradition, we can only establish that there is such a thing as a person or “me” in
terms of mental labeling with concepts or categories and in terms of designation with
words.

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A person or “me” is not just a concept – a concept is just a mental label; it’s not just a
name or a word – a name or word is just a designation. A person or “me” is merely
what the concept of a person or a “me” refers to on the basis of a basis for labeling; it
is merely what the word “person” or “me: refers to on the basis of a basis for
designation.

When we talk about mental labeling or designation, there are three things that are
involved. To make it simpler, let’s just discuss this in terms of designation with words.
The three are: a word, a basis for designation and what the designation or word refers
to. In the example of an orange,

• an orange-colored sphere, a certain smell, a certain taste – these are the basis for
designation of an orange. None of them are an orange.
• The word “orange” is simply a word and it’s not the orange.
• What the word “orange” refers to on the basis of a certain colored shape, smell
and taste is the actual conventional orange. An orange is the referent object of the
word “orange.”

The only way that you can establish that there is such a thing as an orange is that it is
the referent object of the word “orange” on the basis of a certain colored shape, smell
and taste. You can’t establish that there is such a thing as an orange purely from the
side of the word “orange” – it could be a nonsense word – or from the side of an
orange-colored sphere – it could be an orange tennis ball.

Do you follow? There is an actual orange. The orange is not an orange-colored sphere,
it’s not a smell, and it certainly is not just the word “orange.” That’s just a combination
of sounds, but those sounds designated on the basis of these orange-colored spheres,
and smells and tastes – they refer to the conventional object “orange.” The orange isn’t
the basis; the orange isn’t the word. It’s like an illusion. It’s somewhere in between, isn’t
it? But there are oranges.

It’s the same thing in terms of there are all these moments of experience: seeing,
talking, and thinking and all these sort of things, and there is the name “me,” which in
this particular life is also given the name Alex, and that refers to a person. I am not a
name. A person is not just a name. A person is what the word “me” refers to, on the
basis of a stream of continuity of experiences. Like in a movie theater – you sit there
and you only see one moment at a time on the screen. That’s the basis for designation.
The designation is “a movie,” “Star Wars,” or whatever movie you want to talk about.
“Star Wars” is not just the name “Star Wars.” I actually saw a movie “Star Wars.” This
moment wasn’t it, and that moment wasn’t it, and it wasn’t the name either. What the
name, the title of the movie refers to – that is the movie “Star Wars,” on the basis of the
sequence of moments. “Who am I?” I’m what the word “me” refers to, on the basis of
my whole life experiences. This is very important to understand. If you don’t
understand this, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to understand what voidness
is talking about.

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This is what the whole issue of voidness is all about. It is the relationship between what
a word lis referring to and the basis for its designation. If the orange is just an orange-
colored sphere, then the taste or smell could not be an orange, an orange could only
be that orange-colored speher. If the orange was not just the orange-colored sphere,
but was also the smell and also the taste, then there would be three different oranges.
The orange would be three different things. We are talking about the conventional
object, an orange, a commonsense object, an orange. When somebody says, “Would
you like to eat an orange?” we don’t think in terms of eating an orange-colored
sphere. We think of eating a fruit. The visual form, an orange-colored sphere, is the
basis for designation. The actual, conventional, commonsense object, an orange, is
what the word “orange” refers to. Of course, it could be referred to by many names in
different languages. It’s just a convention, made up by a society. Do you follow?

“Who am I? Am I my body?” Well, this body, when I was a baby, and this body now as
an older man, they’re not the same at all. There is not a single cell in the body that is
the same.

[See: Imputation, Mental Labeling and Designation]

Valid Conventions

Where do the limits lie of the conventionalities of conventionally true

phenomena, because all of us, we can sort of try and imagine a blue
orange? It’s sort of OK, so we can have a blue orange. Or an orange
with a salty taste, we can also try to imagine. So, we can substitute the
basis for designation and still have the orange behind it. So if the idea
of an orange that sits behind the term, is it kind of a Platonic idea thing,
which is self-sufficient, independent, standing on its own?

No, not at all. This gets into the discussion of voidness. So we have to jump ahead in
order to answer your question. When we talk about voidness, what we are talking
about is what is it that establishes the existence of something? “Establish” is the same
word as “to prove.” We are not talking about what creates the object. Voidness is
saying that there is nothing on the side of the referent object that establishes the
existence of that object as that object, as a validly knowable item.

We are not talking about calling this table an orange. When we talk about objects, we
are talking about something that is validly knowable, which can be known correctly,
and other people who know correctly would agree. Nobody would agree that this
thing in front of me is an orange. It’s a table.

Let's use an example to illustrate what I'm talking about. Think of an emotion. An
emotion that I usually use is jealousy, but it could be any emotion. What is jealousy?
Or let's use the simpler example first, the color red. If you think of the light spectrum,
there is absolutely nothing on the side of the light spectrum that has boundaries and

41
markers, that from the side of the light, divides the spectrum into yellow, orange and
red: on this side of the line it’s orange and on that side of the line it’s red. There is
absolutely nothing on the side of the light. So, what establishes it as red or yellow or
orange are merely concepts and words– nothing on the side of the object.

A group of people, thousands of years ago, got together and they decided that they
were going to refer to a certain bandwidth of color with a certain set of arbitrary
sounds, totally arbitrary sounds, “rah eh dah,” with no meaning in these sounds. But
they said, “Brilliant idea!” We will use these sounds to represent something with which
– in their minds – they divided the light spectrum.

Different groups of people maybe had a similar idea, but they didn’t necessarily divide
the light spectrum in exactly the same way – maybe, a few angstroms in this direction,
a few less in that direction. That, they decided, was the concept “red,” and they used
another arbitrary set of sounds to refer to it. And even the definition of “red” is made
up by some group of people with the concept they made of the definition. The
defining characteristics – you can’t find them on the side of the object,
“from this wavelength to that wavelength.” So, “red” is established not at all from the
side of the object. “Red” – it’s established from the mental label, the concept “red.”

Nevertheless, if we ask, “What color is this table?” “It’s red.” “Is it red?” “Yes,” we would
all agree, if we were “valid cognizers,” it’s called. Somebody who is color-blind might
not think that this is red. But that would be contradicted by somebody who had good
eyesight. So, the same thing with your example of the oranges. There are many
different varieties of oranges that are found around the world. Some convention
decides that this group of different kinds are all labeled with the category “orange” –
the concept of “an orange” – and called “oranges.” In fact, it’s even weirder – I mean,
aside from hybrids and all of that – because what makes all of these orange-colored
spheres that we see in the store next to each other, what makes each of them an
orange? Why don’t we have a different word for each one of them? We have groups –
that’s getting into this whole topic of categories. Words are what we use to refer to
categories, and then within that category, to items within the category, particulars.

If this is true with respect to colors, if it’s true with respect to different types of fruit, we
can see, when we start to talk about emotions and these sort of things, and really,
“What is jealousy?” It’s just some group of people came up with this concept “jealousy.”
But do we always experience exactly the same thing when we experience what we
would call “jealousy?” Not really, do we?

Now, of course, if we understand this, this is incredibly helpful. We have been in this
situation and we feel something, and so, what do we say? “Oh, I am so jealous. I am
feeling so much jealousy.” So, “what am I feeling?” It’s just one moment after another
in which all the factors are changing, constantly. I am just using some sort of concept,
the word “jealousy,” that I was taught as a child, and “here it is” in the dictionary. “OK,
that’s what I am feeling,” using it to organize what I am feeling, to understand it. Now,

42
conventionally that is correct, because our society has agreed upon this definition of
this word. So it is referring to something.

There is jealousy, even though it is just established by a word of a concept. Dealing

with it in terms of this concept, I can apply various methods that are used for
overcoming jealousy. But because there is nothing on the side of this “jealousy” that is
making it “jealousy,” then I don’t make a big deal out of it. There is no “solid thing like
a big rock inside me,” called “jealousy,” and “there it is sitting,” and “Oh my god! This is
such a problem,” and so on.

What about small children that have no concepts yet? Does it mean
they are free of emotions, before they learn what, let’s say, jealousy is?

Oh no, it’s not like that. It’s important to understand that when we talk about concepts,
and labels, and so on, they don’t necessarily have words associated with them. The
existence of things is established merely in terms of mental labeling, regardless of
whether anybody is actively labeling them or not. Actively thinking “jealousy” or saying
“jealousy” is not relevant here. “I am feeling something.” It doesn’t matter whether or
not I can identify and give it a name “jealousy.” I am still feeling something. But if we
ask the question, “What is it?” then we have to bring in mental labeling and
designation. But I don’t have to label and designate it in order to feel it. A baby feels
hunger, an infant feels hunger, it doesn’t know the word “hunger,” but it certainly feels
it.

Is it correct to compare such things as colors, for instance the red of this
table, with emotions? Emotions are totally individual experiences. We
can’t expose them and judge them or compare them. But with this
table, we all can reach the conclusion: this is the weight, the length,
number such and such, like fifteen. No one can disagree with that. It can
be proven scientifically with an experiment and repeatedly, which is not
the case with emotions. So is it justified to compare such things? They
seem to be different.

When we try to understand a basic mechanism, such as mental labeling, of course the
defining characteristics that are also made up by concepts, which are used in relation
to different objects, will be different. So, with a color, yes, we have certain wavelengths
where we can say, “That’s the dividing line.” With emotions, that’s much more difficult.
With oranges, perhaps there you can get into a genetic “thing” that might be more
specific. But whether it is something which is very specific like that or just more
abstract like with “jealousy,” what we are talking about here are defining characteristics.
So there are many types of defining characteristics. It could be a wavelength; it could
be something that someone puts in a dictionary and says, “This is the defining
characteristics of jealousy.” The principle is the same.

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But there are certainly different societies that divide the color structure quite
differently. There are some societies that don’t have “orange,” for example. It’s just
“yellow” and “red.” So the dividing line is quite different. There are societies that have
not just “green” and “blue,” but they have three colors there. Experiments were done
like that at my university, when I was at school, taking people from different cultures
and showing them different colors and saying, “What color is this?” And they found
that different cultures certainly divide the color structure differently, and individuals do
that as well.

OK, let’s say for the Australians, it’s a red table and for the Chinese it’s a
dark yellow table. And then the spark of nevertheless comes. So, but
conventionally for one group of people it functions as a red table. For
the other group of people, nevertheless, it functions as a dark yellow
table. So there are two correctly fully functional tables of different
colors. How is that possible?

Why not? For one person, let’s say you take this item in my hand. I look at it and I give
it the label “watch.” Other people around here might also agree that this is a watch and
it functions as a watch. The baby looks at it and labels it as a “toy,” and other babies
would agree and they could play with it and it would function as a toy. So what is it? Is
it a watch or is it a toy? And, it is only established as a watch or a toy by mental
labeling concepts alone. There is nothing on the side of the object that establishes it as
a watch or a toy; because if it did, if there were something on the side of the object,
then it would have to be two different objects, or a toy would be a watch, it would
have to be one of them.

Do you follow that? Because it is only established by mental labeling, then it can
function as both, and there is no problem. But if I think that this is established from its
own side as “a watch,” then I would get very angry with the baby, “You stupid baby,
this isn’t a toy!” It’s perfectly valid for the baby to think of it as a toy. If I don’t want it to
break it, I take it away from the baby, but I don’t get angry. For me, it’s a watch; for the
baby, it’s a toy. It’s established merely by concepts and labels.

So we can say that all is relative, basically?

All is relative, yes. That’s another way of saying it.

Dependent Arising

Is it that the orange came into being through dependent arising and so
there’s no truly existent “orange” established from its own side? Is it
that then we label it as an “orange,” so it appears as an orange? Is that a
correct understanding I have?

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When we talk about dependent arising, that has several meanings. Things can arise in
terms of causes and conditions, and so certainly the orange arose dependently on
causes and conditions. And so, certainly, we had to have the causes and conditions
first, the seed, and the earth, and water, and sunlight and so on, before we got the
orange.

Another meaning of dependent arising is things arise dependent on parts. Now, in the
case of an automobile, perhaps you have the parts first, and then you get the whole,
because you put them together. But that is certainly not the case with an orange. It
isn’t that you put together the meat and the skin and paste it together and then get an
orange. In this case, the parts and the whole are simultaneous.

But when we speak of dependent arising on the deepest, most profound level, we are
thinking in terms of items that can be validly known arise dependently on mental
labeling, which does not mean that the mental label creates them. A common mistake,
which is refuted in the Buddhist teachings, is the mistake that is the position of one
Indian philosophical non-Buddhist school, the Samkhya school, which is basically,
everything is this primal soup, an undifferentiated soup. And our concepts are like a
cookie cutter, and it cuts objects out; it makes objects out. But without that, it would
be just this big, undifferentiated glob of soup. And Buddhism says, “No, that’s not the
case.”

There are, conventionally, oranges and apples, and red and green, but they are not
established from the side of the objects, because the referent object of words and
labels can’t be found. There is nothing on the side of the referent object that makes it
the referent object. I was indicating earlier on, when I cited Shantideva and we gave
the example of the Vaibhashika position. If we can understand that this chair is made
of particles and my body is made of particles and nothing solid about it
whatsoever. Nevertheless I don’t fall through this chair, it functions. If we can
understand that and accept that, then, although there is nothing on the side of the
chair that makes it a chair and there is nothing on the side of my body that makes it a
body, all in terms of what words and concepts refer to, nevertheless, I am sitting on a
chair, and everybody would agree. That’s why this “nevertheless-factor” is very
important and not easy at all to really understand.

The qualities of the object like the hardness or the parts of the chair are
not naturally projected from the side of the object. So, somehow if we
realize the emptiness of the qualities of the object, we push our hand
through the chair, or something like that? Is it that possible? Or those
are true and not changeable qualities of the matter or of the chair?

There are several parts to your question. It is true that the qualities of an object are not
established from the side of the object. But they are established by the concept of
hardness/softness, and there can be all sorts of scientific measurements that people

45
five hundred years ago didn’t even know that there were. So it’s established by
concepts; nevertheless – here it is again, our nevertheless, which is the most difficult
aspect – nevertheless things do have qualities. Now we get back to our dependent
arising. Various qualities, especially physical qualities, will be affected by gravity, and
the speed of the object, and the speed of the observer and all these sorts of things,
getting back to relativity here. But it doesn’t mean that there is nothing there on the
side of the object. It doesn’t mean that there is a findable “nothing.” We are not going
to the extreme of nihilism.

Now it’s a whole different issue whether or not, through an unbelievable development
of the mind, it becomes possible to have control over the elements: that is something
else. Whether you can put your hand through something – that is something different.
But that is extremely, extremely difficult to understand how Milarepa could shrink
himself into the size of going into a yak-horn, and certainly that’s not something that
we are going to be able to do.

Dissolving into Emptiness

In many sadhanas we use the words and the visualizations of dissolving

ourselves into emptiness. What would be the practical advice from your
side, what we should use to be more successful in this dissolving
visualization that we do in our daily practice?

Again, there are many points to your question. As I indicated before, the steps for
meditating on voidness are first to think of the basis for the refutation, which is
basically the basis of the imputation. The analysis for imputation and for mental
labeling are the same. And so you think of, for instance, “My body is the body of a
Buddha-figure, a deity.” We could start here with, although one is not supposed to do
this, because supposedly one is visualizing oneself as a deity all day long, but if we
have forgotten that and are conceiving of ourselves in terms of our ordinary body;
then first we think of our ordinary body. So, our ordinary body is – of course – imputed
on parts, and “me” is imputed on the body.

The second object to be refuted, which is the appearance of the body and “me,” as if
there is something on the side of the body, something on the side of “me” that made
it “me,” that made it “my body.” The example that I always use is, “as if these things
existed, sitting here like a ping-pong ball, with a little label on it saying me!” Some
solid thing, encapsulated in plastic, “There it is me, my body.” This is the object to be
refuted.

Now, when we are actually doing the tantric practice, that’s not the time to do the
analytical meditation, we need to have done this before, so that we are convinced
through logical reasoning that “This is absurd that there is something existing solidly,
from its own side, me and my body,” and then you just – with your understanding – cut

46
that off, very forcefully. This is how His Holiness always describes it, very forcefully, just
“RAH! There is no such thing! This concept that I have that is like some sort of ping-
pong ball is not referring to anything that’s real, this is absurd!” And we focus on
“there is no such thing.” Then the dissolution process is dissolving this appearance of
solidity in stages. It gets more and more subtle so that there is no appearance of
solidity.

Dependent Arising:

Avoiding Nihilism and Eternalism

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/emptiness-
advanced/dependent-arising-avoiding-nihilism-and-eternalism

Basics

Voidness (emptiness) is a total absence of something impossible. But it is not the total
absence of some impossible object, like chicken lips. Nor is it simply the total absence
of an impossible way of existing, like independent existence. Voidness is the total
absence of impossible ways of accounting for or establishing the existence of validly
knowable objects. It deals with the issue of how to account for the fact that there are
validly knowable things and that they can be validly known as “this” or “that.”

When we ask, what accounts for the fact that things exist and can be validly known,
what kinds of things are these referring to? They refer to things such as teachers and
students, teaching and learning, Buddhism and Christianity, easy and difficult, long and
short. How do you account for there being such things that we can validly know?
Some ways in which you might imagine that you can account for them are impossible.
Voidness negates those impossible ways – it is the total absence of an actuality that
corresponds to them. But, to understand voidness more precisely, we need to know
the definitions of the factors involved.

What is a validly knowable object? It is defined as something that holds its own
essential nature. It is equivalent to a conventional object. What is a conventional
object? It is something that, for ease of communication and other practical purposes, is
agreed upon by custom as being something, like “a religion” or “a spiritual teacher.” A
validly knowable object, then, is something that can be validly known as “this” or
“that,” based on what has been agreed upon by custom. For instance, a teacher is a
validly knowable object, based on a convention, agreed upon by custom and

47
dependent upon context, of what a teacher is and what the word for one is. A teacher
is not a validly knowable object all on its own, independently of all these factors.

If something needs to hold its own essential nature so that, for ease of
communication, it can be agreed upon by custom as being this or that, then what is an
essential nature? Actually, all validly knowable conventional objects have two essential
natures: a superficial essential nature (concealer nature, relative nature, conventional
nature) and a deepest essential nature (ultimate nature).

• The superficial essential nature of objects is what validly knowable phenomena

conventionally are, for instance a teacher or a student. The question is, how to
account for these superficial natures? What is confusing and deceptive is that
these superficial natures appear to be accounted for by inherent natures – in other
words, by something findable on the sides of conventional objects that have the
power to make them what they are. Thus another way of translating the term
“inherent nature” is a “self-establishing nature” – a nature inside a validly knowable
object that, all by itself, establishes it as being what it conventionally is. For
instance, although someone is conventionally a teacher, and this is valid, it appears
as though what accounts for them being a teacher is that they’re just naturally a
teacher; it’s their inherent nature. This appearance is false.
• The deepest essential nature of objects is their voidness of self-established
existence (inherent existence). Because there are no such things as self-
establishing natures findable on the side of validly knowable objects, it is
impossible that they account for their conventional existence as “this” or “that.”

You can only account for something being validly knowable as a conventional object in
relation to something else or dependently on something else. This fact is called
“dependent arising.”

Dependent Arising in Terms of Relativity

Many validly knowable conventional objects can only be established in relation to

something else. For instance, your fourth finger is not inherently long or short from its
own side, unrelated to anything else. You can only account for it being validly
knowable as “long” in relation to your little finger. But, in relation to your middle finger,
it is “short.” So, your fourth finger being long or short is not established or accounted
for by something on the side of your finger. It arises or conventionally exists as long or
short only in relation to something else.

Suppose you have what would be conventionally considered a long fourth finger. You
could validly say your fourth finger has the superficial nature of being long and others
would agree. And when you look at your fourth finger all by itself, it doesn’t just
appear just to be relatively long; it appears naturally to be long – really long all on its
own. Others might even agree, “My goodness, what a long fourth finger you have!”

48
But it’s impossible to establish your fourth finger as being long, all on its own, by the
power of some self-establishing nature inside it. Why? Because there is no such thing
as a self-establishing nature. In this example, you can only establish your fourth
finger’s superficial nature of being long dependently on or relative to other people’s
fourth fingers. Fingers can only be relatively long, never naturally long.

Dependent Arising in Terms of Relativity and Functionality

Consider the case of teachers and students of Buddhism. You can only account for
someone being validly knowable as a “teacher of Buddhism” if the person has
students, is teaching them something of Buddhism and they learn something from it.
This is the case whether the students study with them in person, or whether they just
read their books or their website and learn something from them. So someone can
only be established as a Buddhism teacher dependently on their students, on their
performing the function of teaching, and further, what they do can only be established
as “teaching” if it produces the effect of students learning from it.

If no one comes to this person’s teachings and no one looks at their website and no
one actually learns anything from their website, can they still be validly known as a
Buddhism teacher? No. But even if someone has students, is teaching them Buddhism
and they are learning, and so they can be validly known as a Buddhism teacher, their
conventionally being a teacher is only accounted for dependently on these factors. It
cannot arise based on some inherent nature inside the person that by its own power
establishes their conventional nature of being a teacher. There is no such thing as a
self-establishing nature that accounts for someone being a teacher.

Similarly, you can only account for someone being validly knowable as a “student of
Buddhism” if the person has a teacher, is studying something of Buddhism with them
and they learn it from them. Again, this is the case whether the person studies with a
teacher in person, or only through the teacher’s books or website, but they need to
learn something from it. So someone can only be established as a student of
Buddhism dependently on their teacher, on their performing the function of studying
and learning something of Buddhism from them, and further, what they do can only be
established as “studying” if it produces the effect of their learning something.

If the person doesn’t go to a teacher’s teachings or read the teacher’s books or

website, and even if they do, if they don’t learn anything from them, can they still be
validly known as a student of Buddhism? No. But even if someone has a teacher, is
learning the Buddhist teachings from them, and so they can be validly known as a
student of Buddhism, their conventionally being a student is only accounted for
dependently on these factors. It cannot arise based on some inherent nature inside the
person that by its own power establishes their conventional nature of being a student.
There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature that accounts for someone being a
student.

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From this analysis, we see that it is impossible to be a student of Buddhism
independently of having a teacher of Buddhism, the teacher actually teaching
something of Buddhism and the student actually learning something from it.
Therefore, we can validly conclude that someone definitely needs to rely on a teacher
of Buddhism in order to learn anything about Buddhism and be conventionally
considered a student of Buddhism.

We can define the two extremes of nihilism and eternalism in terms of the above basic
presentation of dependent arising. As we have seen, validly knowable objects have a
superficial nature of what they conventionally are, for example a Buddhism teacher or
a student of Buddhism. But, to the minds of everyone other than Buddhas, their
superficial natures as teachers and students of Buddhism appear to be established by
self-establishing natures findable on their own sides. These findable self-establishing
natures seem to account for their validly existing as teachers and students of
Buddhism, but they do not since they don’t exist.

The extreme of nihilism is that not only do those who are conventionally known as
teachers and students of Buddhism lack self-establishing natures findable on their own
sides that account for them being teachers and students, they even lack the superficial
natures of being teachers and students.

What are the implications of this nihilist extreme? Despite the facts that you have
students, you are teaching them something of Buddhism and they are learning it, you
cannot be validly known as a teacher of Buddhism. You don’t exist even conventionally
as a teacher, because there are no such things as teachers. Likewise, despite the facts
that you have a teacher and are studying and learning the Buddhist teachings from
them, you cannot be validly known as a student of Buddhism. You don’t exist even
conventionally as a student, because there are no such things as students.

Here, a superficial nature of conventionally being something, despite only deceptively

appearing to be established by an inherent self-establishing nature, is tied inseparably
together with an actual self-establishing nature. Because of that, when refuting the
self-establishing nature, one also refutes the superficial nature of what these people
conventionally are. This is an example of over-refutation – refuting not only a self-
establishing nature, but also a superficial essential nature of being conventionally a
teacher or a student of Buddhism.

The extreme of eternalism can of course be that these people have both superficial
natures of being a teacher and a student of Buddhism as well as self-establishing
natures findable on their sides that establish these superficial natures.

Under-refutation, however, would be to refute only a findable self-establishing nature

on the side of a person that, by its own power alone, can account for their being a
Buddhism teacher or student. But you leave unrefuted a findable self-establishing

50
nature on the side of a person that, in conjunction with other things, accounts for their
conventionally being a Buddhist teacher or student.

For example, you might consider yourself basically to be natural Buddhism teacher,
although you realize that your inherent nature of being a natural Buddhism teacher by
itself doesn’t establish you as a teacher of Buddhism. You refute that it has that power
by itself, but you under-refute it. This is because you still believe that you have that
inherent nature, but it only establishes you as a teacher of Buddhism in conjunction
with having students, teaching them Buddhism and them learning something of
Buddhism from you.

You can under-refute inherently being a natural student of Buddhism in the same way.

Mental Labeling with Categories and Designation with Words

As we have seen, someone’s superficial nature of conventionally being a teacher or a

student cannot be accounted for by some self-establishing nature findable inside
them, although it deceptively appears as though this is the case. Their superficial
natures can only be accounted for dependently on other things – teachers and
students being formulated in relation to each other, and both being formulated in
relation to their performing certain functions: teaching and learning.

But we have also seen that even if you acknowledge that you can only be a student if
you have a teacher and are studying with and learning something from the person,
you might still consider that there’s something findable in you that enables you to be a
natural student in these circumstances. Because of the danger of this under-refutation,
we need to look at dependent arising on a subtler level – on the level of mental
labeling and designation.

Mental labeling with categories and designation with words are functions of
conceptual cognition. Conceptual cognitions are cognitions of validly knowable
phenomena through the medium of categories. They are always with mental
consciousness, not with sensory consciousness.

When you think of yourself as a student, in Western terms you would say that you
have a concept or an idea of what a student is, based on certain defining characteristic
features and qualities, and you think of yourself as also having those features and
qualities. So they fit your idea of what a student is. The defining characteristic features
would be, for instance, you have a teacher, this person has been teaching you
something, and you have been learning it. The qualities would include having an open
mind, wanting to learn something, being respectful of the teacher and what they are
teaching you, and so on. This is your idea of what a student is; it accords with what has
been agreed upon by convention as to what a student is; and you fulfill these defining
features and qualities.

51
In Buddhist terms, when you think of yourself as a student, you are thinking in terms of
the category “student.” A category is a class of phenomena having common, shared
defining characteristic features and qualities. If someone such as yourself also has
these features and qualities, you mentally label yourself with that category. You
consider yourself as a member of the set of people who can be validly labeled as
students.

You also have a combination of sounds in your language, such as “stu+dent” in

English, that have been conventionally considered as a word and assigned a definition.
You then designate the category of “students” with the word “student” since they have
matching defining characteristic features and qualities. You also designate yourself
with the word “student” since you too conventionally have the defining characteristic
features and qualities of this category.

Although you may have the defining features and qualities of what is conventionally
known as a “student,” nevertheless, if there were no concept of students and if that
concept were not defined in terms of those features and qualities, you could not have
the superficial nature of being a student and you could not be validly known
conventionally as a student.

The nihilist extreme comes from over-refuting. Not only do you refute that the defining
features and qualities of a student are findable in yourself and they are what accounts
for your being a student all by themselves, you also refute that you can be validly
known conventionally as a student. You might still be learning something from
someone, but you wouldn’t be a “student” and you couldn’t validly be known as a
“student.”

The eternalist extreme comes from under-refuting. You only refute that these findable
defining features and qualities have the ability just by themselves to account for your
being a student, but you do not refute that they are findable inside you and that in
conjunction with the concept of a student, they establish you as a student. You still
think of yourself as basically a student and identify yourself with your idea of a
student.

A More Refined Discussion of Mental Labeling

Mental labeling comprises three components:

a mental label – a category, such as “student”

a basis for labeling – yourself

the referent object of the label – a student.

The category “student” has, by custom, been defined by certain commonly agreed
upon characteristic features, such as having a teacher and studying and learning
something from the person, and certain commonly agreed upon qualities, such as

52
being open-minded and wanting to learn. The category has also, by custom, been
designated with a word “student.”

Suppose, among the many things about your life, you have a teacher of Buddhism and
are studying and learning something of Buddhism from the person and among your
many qualities, you are open-minded and want to learn something about Buddhism.
Now, there are many other aspects of your life as well: you have a family, a job, many
friends and you do many things other than study and learn Buddhism: you work at
your job, you train at the gym, you eat, you sleep and so on. Moreover, you don’t
study with your Buddhism teacher every moment of your day and night. In addition,
you also have many other qualities besides being open-minded and wanting to study
Buddhism: you’re busy most of the time, you’re neat, you love swimming, you’re well-
traveled and more.

You, as a person, are imputed on every moment of your life and on all your qualities,
regardless of what you are doing or what qualities you are demonstrating at any
moment. Unlike the category “student,” which can only be known conceptually, you as
a person can be known both conceptually (you can think about yourself) or
nonconceptually (you can see yourself in a mirror). An individual person is quite a
different type of knowable object form the category “persons.”

In any case, mentally labeling yourself with the concept or category of “student”
functions somewhat like a cookie-cutter. Of all the facets of your life and all your
qualities, the conceptual thought singles out as its basis for labeling those features and
qualities in your life that fit the definition, or at least most of the defining
characteristics, of the category “student.” More precisely, the conceptual thought
mentally labels the category “student” onto yourself as its basis for labeling. In that
case, you are imputed as a person on those defining characteristics of the category
“student” found in your life and in your character. The referent object of the label is
your superficial nature of being a student.

Whether or not anyone activity mentally labels you as a student, your superficial
nature as a student appears to be accounted for by a self-establishing nature. This is
because, being the referent object of the label or concept “student,” your superficial
nature as a student is based on certain features and qualities about you as if they
constituted a separate entity, a self-established “identity” isolated from everything else
about you and your life. In a sense, with conceptual cognition, mental labeling projects
a self-established box (the category “student”) onto a self-established entity (you as a
student) as if you fit in this box.

Voidness negates any self-establishing nature that accounts for or establishes your
superficial nature as a student. A person, you, with a self-establishing superficial nature
as a student is the implied object of the mental labeling and is known as a “referent
‘thing’.” But it is totally absent because there is no such thing as a referent “thing.” Your
superficial nature as a student, as the referent object of the label “student” only

53
appears to be a referent “thing” corresponding to the mental label. It appears as
though this referent “thing” – a self-established student with a self-establishing nature
as a student – is backing up, supporting and accounting for your superficial nature of
being a student; but nevertheless it is totally absent. The only thing that accounts for
your superficial nature as a student is the mental label “student” – the concept of “a
student” labeled on you as imputed on certain characteristic features and qualities of
your life.

The nihilist extreme is to refute not only a referent “thing” (a self-established student
that corresponds to the mental label “student”), but to over-refute and also refute the
referent object of the mental label (your validly knowable superficial nature as a
student). In other words, you refute that it is valid to call yourself “a student,” even
though you are studying with and learning from a teacher, because there are no such
things as “students.”

The eternalist extreme is to refute, as accounting for your superficial nature as a

student, only a self-establishing nature based merely on imputing your “self” on
certain isolated features and qualities about you and your life, totally independently
from the mental label and concept of “a student.” In other words, you accept that
studying and learning with a teacher constitute a self-establishing nature that accounts
for your being a student, but not by itself alone. It constitutes a self-establishing
nature of being a student only in conjunction with the mental label and concept of “a
student.”

Voidness and Dependent Arising Eliminate the Two Extremes

We have seen that dependent arising refers to the fact that you can only account for
and establish the existence of any validly knowable phenomenon dependently on
factors other than itself. Nothing can establish its own existence by means of a self-
establishing nature.

We have also seen that there are many ways of specifying dependent arising. The
superficial nature of validly knowable phenomena being conventionally “this” or “that”
arises dependently on:

• being relative to something else, such as “long” and “short,” or “teacher” and
“student”
• performing a function, such as studying and learning something
• mental labeling with concepts or categories and designation with words.

Although not discussed here, dependent arising also encompasses products arising
dependently on causes and wholes arising dependently on parts.

From one point of view:

54
• voidness of self-established existence eliminates the extreme of eternalism – since
eternalism means things being self-established.
• dependent arising eliminates the extreme of nihilism – since validly knowable
phenomena arise and appear.

From another point of view:

• voidness eliminates the extreme of nihilism – voidness is not the absence of

everything, just the absence of self-established existence.
• dependent arising eliminates the extreme of eternalism, namely that self-
established phenomena can arise independently of everything – dependent
arising is the arising of validly knowable conventional phenomena that merely
appear to be self-established, but are not.

Imputation, Mental Labeling and Designation

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/emptiness-
advanced/imputation-mental-labeling-and-designation

Mental Labeling and Imputation

To understand the Gelug Prasangika presentation of dependent arising (rten-‘byung

‘brel-ba) and the voidness of self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa;
inherent existence), we need to understand the distinctions this school draws between
imputation, mental labeling and designation. All three are referred to by the same verb
in Tibetan (‘dogs-pa, past tense: btags-pa), which in the colloquial language means: “to
tie,” “to ascribe,” or “to be tied,” “to be ascribed.”

This threefold division is suggested by the Gelug Prasangika assertion of three types of
definitional imputedly knowable phenomena:

•Imputedly knowable as something imputed on a basis (rten-nas btags-pa’i btags-

yod) – such types of phenomena are involved with “imputation,”
•Imputedly knowable as something imputed by conceptual cognition (rtog-pas
btags-pa’i btags-yod) – such types of phenomena are involved with “mental
labeling,”

55
 •Imputedly knowable as something posited by names and labels (ming-dang
brda’i bzhag-pa’i btags-yod) – such types of phenomena are involved with
“designation.”

An imputedly knowable phenomenon (btags-yod, Skt. prajnaptisat) is a validly

knowable phenomenon that, when cognized, relies on actual cognition of something
else (namely a basis for imputation, gdags-gzhi):

•Either both immediately preceding and simultaneously with it

•Or only immediately before it in the case of voidness (emptiness), lack of an
impossible soul (bdag-med, selflessness) and true stoppings (‘gog-bden, true
cessations).

According to Gelug Prasangika, this is the coarse level of being imputedly knowable.
The subtle, definitional level refers to all three types of phenomena arising
dependently on a basis for imputation, not existing independently of their basis for
imputation and totally lacking anything on the side of its basis for imputation, such as
its individual defining characteristic mark (mtshan-nyid, Skt. lakshana), that has the
power to establish its existence. In this more subtle sense, the Tibetan term “btags-
yod” is better translated as “imputedly existent,” rather than as “imputedly knowable”
as used for the more coarse sense of the technical term. From the point of view of this
subtler level, all three divisions are equivalent; but from the point of view of the coarser
level, there are differences, and this is what we shall explore.

Imputation

Nonstatic Noncongruent Affecting Variables and Static Phenomena

Nonstatic, noncongruent, affecting variables (ldan-min ‘du-byed), such as persons,

periods of time, and impermanence (nonstaticness) and certain static phenomena,
such as voidnesses and space, are phenomena that are imputations on a basis. Such
types of imputed phenomena cannot exist independently of their bases for imputation;
and, likewise, their bases for imputation cannot exist independently of what are
imputations on them, otherwise they wouldn't be bases for their imputation. And
although the non-Prasangika tenet systems assert that the defining characteristic
marks of such phenomena are findable in their bases for imputation, Prasangika
refutes this soundly. Thus, noncongruent affecting variables and certain static
phenomena are “imputedly existent”

• A noncongruent affecting variable is a nonstatic phenomenon that is neither a

form of physical phenomenon nor a way of being aware of something, and which
does not share five things in common, such as cognitive object, with the primary
consciousness and mental factors that it accompanies.

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For example, a person (gang-zag) cannot exist independently of five aggregate factors
of experience (phung-po lnga; five aggregates) and the five aggregate factors of
experience cannot exist independently of a person that is an imputation on them. For
the sake of simplicity, let us refer to the five aggregates as just a body and a mind,
since in any cognition in which only one of the five aggregates is cognized, the person
is also simultaneously cognized.

A body and mind cannot exist as a body and mind independently of there being a
person as an imputation on them, and a person cannot exist independently of a body
and mind. In other words, something that is an imputation on a basis and the basis on
which it is an imputation arise dependently on each other. One does not create the
other. A body and mind do not first exist by themselves and then create a person, and
a person does not first exist by itself and then creates a body and mind. Moreover,
conceptual thought does not create a person either. Whether or not a foetus is aware
of itself as a person or thinks "I am a person," it is still a person.

Among noncongruent affecting variables and static phenomena, however, we must

differentiate:

(1) Those that last as long as their bases of imputation, for instance a person as an
imputation on an individual continuum of five aggregates or the impermanence,
voidness or space of an apple.

• A person lasts as long as the individual continuum of five aggregates on which it is

an imputation lasts: namely, forever, with no beginning and no end.
• The nonstaticness, voidness and space of an apple lasts as long as the apple on
which they are imputations last: they have a beginning and an end simultaneously
with the arising and ceasing of the apple.

(2) Those that are adventitious, arising and ceasing at different times from the basis on
which they become imputations, for instance tendencies, constant habits, and object
and audio categories.

• The tendencies of the disturbing emotions, including those of unawareness, and

the constant habits of grasping for truly established existence are imputations,
roughly speaking, on a mental continuum. Like the mental continuum on which
they are imputations, they have no beginning, but unlike their bases for
imputation, they can have an end with a true stopping of them.
• Karmic tendencies and object and audio categories are also imputations, roughly
speaking, on a mental continuum. Unlike the mental continuum on which they are
imputations, however, karmic tendencies have a beginning immediately after a
karmic action and can have an end with their total purification and thus a true
stopping of them. Object categories, such as the category of "computer," have a
beginning when we first learn of computers; and audio categories, such as the

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 category of the sound of the word "computer," have a beginning when we learn
the word. All categories can have an end with the attainment of enlightenment.
• The mental continuum on which tendencies, constant habits and object and audio
categories are imputations serve as bases for imputation only so long as these
imputations last. Before the arising of these imputations and after their ceasing,
the mental continuums still exist as mental continuums, with no beginning and no
end, but they do not exist as bases for imputation of these tendencies, constant
habits and categories.

Nonstatic, noncongruent affecting variables and static phenomena, as imputed

phenomena, are imputedly knowable in the coarse sense of the term. When we see the
body of a person, for example, the focal object (dmigs-yul), equivalent to the
appearing object (snang-yul), of the cognition includes both the body and the person;
they exist inseparably from each other. In other words, we see the combination of a
body and a person as an imputation on it and that combination appears in our
cognition. Nevertheless, we first explicitly apprehend (dngos-su rtogs-pa) the body
and then explicitly apprehend both the body and the person.

• Apprehension of an object means cognition of it that is both accurate and

decisive.
• With explicit apprehension, a cognitive appearance (rnam-pa, a mental hologram)
of the involved object (’jug-yul) appears in the cognition.
• The involved object of a cognition is the main object that the cognition engages
itself with.

Thus, the explicit apprehension first ascertains (nges-pa) the body that appears to it: in
other words, it decisively cuts the body off from everything else that is simultaneously
seen around it. Thus the explicit apprehension is accompanied by implicit
apprehension of “not something else.” Thus nothing else is apprehended with it.

• “Not something else” is called an “individually characterized object exclusions of

something else” (don rang-mtshan-gyi gzhan-sel, object exclusion).

Then the explicit apprehension ascertains both the body and a person. In doing so, it
decisively excludes apprehending something else that is an imputation on the body,
such as its impermanence. In the first moment, then, the involved object of the
cognition is the body and in the second moment the involved objects are both the
body and the person. This is the case despite the fact that the combination of the
body and person as an imputation on it is the focal object and appearing object of
both moments of the explicit apprehension.

The same analysis applies to seeing a nonstatic object and its nonstaticness
(impermanence) or its motion. For instance, in the first moment of seeing a car pass
by, our explicit apprehension ascertains the car; and in the second moment, when it

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has moved, it ascertains both the car and its motion. Nevertheless, while the car is
passing by, the car and its motion do not exist independently of each other.

In the case of non-conceptual cognition of voidness, an object and its voidness also do
not exist independently of each other. When seeing the object, in the first moment we
ascertain the object. In the second moment we ascertain both the object and the
impossible way of existing that is projected on it. In the third moment, with the correct
and decisive understanding that this impossible way of existing does not correspond
to anything real, we cut off all appearances of both the object and this impossible way
of existing. We apprehend only its voidness – the total absence of this impossible way
of existing. In this case, cognition of voidness relies on an immediately preceding
cognition of its basis for imputation, namely the object, but does not occur with
simultaneous cognition of its basis.

• Note that the above explanation pertains only to when we apprehend voidness.
This does not mean that every time we apprehend the basis for imputation of a
voidness, we will also apprehend its voidness. Every time we see our body, for
instance, if we lack the discriminating awareness of voidness, we do not cognize
accurately and decisively its voidness.

[See: Objects of Cognition: Gelug Presentation]

Whole Objects

Also included among imputed phenomena are whole objects (cha-can) as imputations
on physical and/or temporal parts (cha). Parts of a whole cannot exist as parts of that
whole independently of the whole that they are parts of, and a whole cannot exist
independently of its parts. There may be just a piece of a pie left when the rest of the
pie has been eaten; however, a piece of a pie can only exist as a piece dependently on
there having been a whole pie that it was a piece of.

As another example, when we look at a room, although we can see only part of it at a
time; nevertheless, conventionally we say we are looking at the room. The part that we
see is not a part of nothing; it is a part of the room. The room as a whole does not
exist as identical to only the part that we see in our field of vision, nor does the room
exist as something totally separate from the part that we see. The room as a whole is
an imputation on the parts and pervades all the parts. Although one part of the room
may have been built before the rest; nevertheless the whole room and its parts exist
dependently on each other. The technical term is that they are dependent arisings
(rten-cing ‘brel-bar ‘byung-ba); in other words they arise or exist dependently on each
other.

The same analysis applies to a whole as an imputation on temporal parts, for instance
watching a ball game. We see only one moment of the game at a time; we cannot see

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the entire game all in one moment. But each moment of watching, we conventionally
call “watching the game,” despite the fact that we are seeing just a temporal part of the
game. The whole game is not identical with any moment of it, nor does the game as a
whole exist separately from any moment of it. Rather, the whole event is an imputation
on each moment of what we are watching and pervades or extends over all the
moments.

Unlike imputedly knowable objects, such as motion, however, we do not first cognize a
part of something and then in the next moment cognize both that part and the whole
that is an imputation on it. We cognize a part and the whole as an imputation on it
simultaneously. When we see part of a room, we are simultaneously seeing a room;
and when we watch a few moments of a ballgame, we are watching a ballgame. We
might not even have seen every part of a room when we just looked in, and we might
not have seen an entire ballgame; nevertheless, conventionally we saw the room and
we watched the ballgame.

The same analysis applies to seeing a person. Although we may see someone for only
a moment or for only a short time, the person as a whole, validly knowable object
extends not only over this entire lifetime, but also over all lifetimes, with no beginning
and no end. When I am having a meeting with Mary, for instance, I am not just seeing
one moment of Mary; in each moment I am seeing the Mary who has a whole life, as
well as countless past and future lives, despite the fact that she is saying or doing
something different in each moment of the encounter.

Further, when I see Mary, I am only seeing Mary as an imputation on the form
aggregate of her body. Although I do not cognize the other four aggregates on which
Mary is an imputation – her consciousness, feelings, distinguishings and emotions –
nevertheless, I am seeing Mary as a person that is an imputation on all five aggregates.

Conventional, Commonsense Objects

Likewise included among imputed objects are conventional objects (tha-snyad-pa,

Skt. vyavahara). These include forms of physical phenomena that extend over the
information gathered from all the senses and over time, and which are imputations on
the data from any one sense in any one moment. Such types of conventional objects
are also known as “commonsense physical objects” (‘jig-rten-la grags-pa).

For example, when we see an orange, we not only see a colored shape, but we see a
commonsense orange that has other characteristic sensory qualities as well, such as a
smell, a taste and a tactile sensation. Moreover, although we see an orange only one
moment at a time, a common-sense orange does not exist for just one moment. Its
conventional existence extends over time.

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As is the case with seeing a room and watching a ballgame, seeing the colored shape
of an orange and seeing the orange occur simultaneously. We might never smell or
taste that orange or hold it in our hand; nevertheless, when we see an orange colored
sphere, we are seeing a commonsense orange that can be smelled, tasted and held.

Such phenomena as wholes and commonsense conventional objects are known as

“collection syntheses (tshogs-spyi).”

There are also kind syntheses (rigs-spyi) of what kind of object something is, although
we might not know what kind of object it is when we cognize the object. An animal,
for instance, cannot exist as an animal without being some kind of animal – a dog, a
cat, and so on. A word cannot be simply a word without being a word of some specific
language. Or more generally, a validly knowable object cannot exist as a validly
knowable object without being some kind of validly knowable object, for instance a
person or a door. Kind syntheses are imputations on collection syntheses.

The question, however, is how can we account for some validly knowable object being
a person and not something else, for instance a door? According to the Gelug
Prasangika assertions, when we analyze from the point of view of either superficial
truth or deepest truth, we cannot find anything left on the side of the object.

• The superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa, concealer truth, obscurational truth,

apparent truth) of any phenomenon is its appearance as having its own essential
nature (rang-gi ngo-bo) – its nature of being what it is – established by a findable
self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa) that is taken as true by
unawareness (ignorance). This appearance of a self-establishing nature is a
concealer (kun-rdzob-pa); it conceals a deeper truth about the object.
• The deepest truth (don-dam bden-pa) of any phenomenon is its actual nature
(chos-nyid), namely its self-nature (rang-bzhin) voidness (emptiness) – the total
absence of such a self-establishing nature, since there is no such thing.

We cannot find anything on the side of the person or on the side of its basis for
imputation (a body and a mind) that establishes it as a person, either by its own power
or by its own power in conjunction with being mentally labeled as a person. Nor can
we find its voidness. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate that there are persons as
conventional objects and we can validly cognize them. The only thing that can account
for there being persons as conventional objects is mental labeling alone.

In more detail, conventional objects, or commonsense objects, are also called

“dharmas” (chos), phenomena. A phenomenon is defined as something that holds its
own essential nature (rang-gi ngo-bo ‘dzin-pa). The only thing that can account for
phenomena holding their own essential natures of what they conventionally are is
mental labeling alone. Therefore, we need to understand correctly what exactly mental
labeling is.

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Mental Labeling

Categories as Imputations on the Status of Being a Specific Member of a Category

Mental labeling involves a category as an imputation on the status of being a specific

member of a category. Both categories and the status of being a specific member of a
category are static phenomena – phenomena that do not arise from causes and
conditions, do not change from moment to moment, and do not produce any effect –
and both can only be cognized conceptually.

There are two types of categories or, in terms of set theory, two kinds of sets: audio
categories (sgra-spyi) and meaning/object categories (don-spyi).

• An audio category would be, for example, the category of the sound of the word
“dog.”
• A meaning/object category would be, for example, the category of all objects that
can be classified as dogs and as the meaning of the audio category “dog.”

Each of these two types of categories is an imputation on the status of being a specific
member of the category. This means that a category and the status of being a specific
member of a category arise dependently on each other. A category cannot exist
independently of the status of being a specific member of a category, and the status of
being a specific member of a category cannot exist independently of a category.

• Note that the object category “dog” is the category of all dogs as commonsense,
conventional objects.
• The specific members of the category “dog” are also all dogs as commonsense,
conventional objects, and not just the information from one sense cognized in one
moment.

Further, a category does not create the status of being a specific member of the
category, and the status of being a specific member of a category does not create a
category. In fact, neither categories nor the status of being a specific member of a
category can create anything, because they are static phenomena. They are not
affected by anything and do not affect anything else.

A new object category and the status of being a specific member of that new category,
such as with the object category “dark matter,” may have a start to their existence as
validly knowable objects with the initial proposal of the theory of dark matter. But,
being static phenomena, categories and being a specific member of that category do
not grow organically from causes and conditions like a flower does from a seed, water,
soil and sunshine. Moreover, they do not change from moment to moment like a
flower does as it grows and then withers.

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The Meaning of “Mental Labeling”

Mental labeling involves a category, the status of being a specific member of a

category, and an item that can be fit into a category as a specific member of it. With
mental labeling, a category as an imputation on the status of being a specific member
of a category is mentally labeled on an individual item. This is the meaning of “mental
labeling.” It is somewhat like pasting something on something else.

Items that can be fit into a category as a specific member of it include both static and
nonstatic phenomena, although they do not necessarily have to be fit into a category
in order to be validly cognized. Except for categories themselves, other static
phenomena and all nonstatic phenomena can also be cognized non-conceptually.

• Items that can be mentally labeled with the package of an audio category as an
imputation on the status of being a specific member of this category include all
vocalizations of the sound of a word in all voices, all volumes and all accents.
Whenever we hear someone say “dog,” it is through mental labeling with the audio
category “dog” as an imputation on the status of being a specific member of this
category that no matter how the person utters the sound, we are able to
understand it as being the sound “dog.”
• The structure is the same with object/meaning categories such as the object
category “dog,” which is also the meaning category of the audio category “dog.”
Items that can be mentally labeled with the package of this object/meaning
category as an imputation on the status of being a specific member of this
category include a large assortment of animals that look quite different from each
other. Yet, through mental labeling with an object/meaning category as an
imputation on the status of being a specific member of this category, we are able
to understand all of them as being “dogs.”
• This is the case even if the category is a null set: a category in which the number
of items that can be assigned with the status of being a specific member of that
category is zero. For instance there is the category “dark matter,” even though no
items have yet been found that can be labeled with this category and the status of
being a specific member of this category. In the case of the category “self-
establishing nature,” specific members of this category can never be found
because none have ever existed, none presently exist and none can ever exist.

Conceptual Cognition

Conceptual cognition (rtog-bcas) of something is always through the medium of a

category as an imputation on the status of being a specific member of a category and
it entails mentally labeling the package of the two onto some individual item. Non-
conceptual cognition (rtog-med), in contrast, is cognition of something without any
such intermediaries.

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Consider the case of collection syntheses and kind syntheses, for instance the
conventional object “a dog.” We can see the combination of a colored shape plus,
imputedly existent on it, the collection synthesis and kind synthesis “dog.” This is non-
conceptual sensory cognition of the conventional object “a dog.” We may then think,
either verbally or nonverbally, “This is a dog.” That is now conceptual cognition of the
conventional object “a dog.” The dog we see is conceptually cognized through the
package of the object category “dog” as an imputation on the status of being a
specific member of this category. In a sense, when we mentally label the conventional
object “a dog” with the object category “dog” as an imputation on the status of being
a specific member of this category, we fit what we see into a category, like fitting it
into a fixed box.

Often there are many associations that go along with a category, which in this case
would be the various meaning categories of what dogs mean to us, for instance “cute”
or “danger.” But when we just see the animal, although that animal is in fact a dog, not
a cat, we do not yet think, “This is a dog” and we do not yet make any associations.

The Difference between Imputation and Mental Labeling

The difference between imputation and mental labeling can best be illustrated by
comparing non-conceptual and conceptual cognition of a person.

Noncongruent affecting variables such as persons are imputations on an individual

body and mind. For the sake of simplicity, let us just speak of an individual person as
an imputation on an individual body. The imputation (a person) and its basis for
imputation (a body) are inseparable from each other. We cannot cognize one without
also cognizing the other. As such, the “package” of a person and the body on which it
is an imputation can be cognized either conceptually or non-conceptually. In this way,
as an imputedly knowable object, we can think of a person or see a person.

A category such as “person” and the status of being a member of the category
“person” on which it is an imputation are also inseparable, but the package of the two
can only be imputedly known conceptually, never non-conceptually. This package is
mentally labeled by conceptual cognition on the package of a person and the
individual body on which it is an imputation. As a mental labeling, it is also imputedly
knowable only in conceptual cognition, never non-conceptually.

• We cannot cognize the package of the category “person” as an imputation on the

status being a specific member of this category without that package mentally
labeled, conceptually, on some specific item. In this case the item that this package
is labeled on is the package of a specific, individual person as an imputation on a
specific, individual body.
• However, we can cognize non-conceptually the package of a specific, individual
person as an imputation on a specific, individual body, as in the case of seeing

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 someone, without mentally labeling the person with the package of the
object/meaning category “person” as an imputation on the status of being a
specific member of this category.

This is one of the main differences between imputation and mental labeling:

• The two items in an imputation relationship with each other cannot be cognized
separately.
• Of the two items in a mental labeling relationship with each other, although the
package containing the category cannot be cognized separately from what it is
mentally labeled on, what it can be labeled on can be cognized separately from
the package of a category.

Detailed Analysis of the Three Main Components of Mental Labeling

The Mental Label

What we have so far been calling “the status of being a specific member of a category”
is actually a static conceptual isolate (ldog-pa, conceptually isolated item, specifier),
namely a “nothing other than” (ma-yin-pa-las log-pa) or more literally, “what is the
reverse of being not something.” The “nothing other than” specifies and isolates an
item as being a specific, individual member of a category: for example, “nothing other
than a specific, individual member of the category ‘person.’” This conceptual isolate is
called a “conceptual isolate for a specific member of a category” (rang-ldog) or the
“conceptual isolate of a category” (spyi-ldog). The two terms are equivalent.

The mental label (btags) in this case is the object category “person.” The conceptual
isolate, however, although dependently arising with the category that is an imputation
on it, is not the mental label.

The Basis for Labeling

Both the object category and the conceptual isolate are static phenomena and, as
such, have no form. Nevertheless, some mental form appears in a conceptual
cognition, whether that conceptual cognition occurs while seeing someone or simply
thinking about him or her. The mental form that appears in the conceptual cognition is
a representation (snang-ba) of the actual person. Since a person also has no form and
is imputedly existent on a body, the representation of the actual person takes the form
of the body on which the person is an imputation or it might take the form of the
sound of his or her voice on the phone, for instance. In fact, the person cannot appear
or be cognized separately from the body or voice on which he or she is an imputation.
Let us consider again just the case of the person as an imputation on the body.

The representation is like a mental hologram (rnam-pa, aspect) and is fully transparent.
Through it appears the package of the actual person as an imputation on a body.

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Whether or not the actual person is present at the time of the conceptual cognition,
the actual person and the body are the involved objects of the conceptual cognition.
Thus, not only the mental hologram representing a person as an imputation on a body
appears in the conceptual cognition, but the actual person as an imputation on the
actual body also appears.

The object category and the conceptual isolate on which the category is an imputation
are semi-transparent. Through them, the consciousness cognizes, in a semi-concealed
manner, the mental hologram and the actual person as an imputation on a body.
Because of this semi-concealment, the hologram and person are not as vivid as when
seeing the person. Through the mental hologram, the package of the object category
“person” and the conceptual isolate on which it is an imputation mentally labels the
actual person as a specific member of the category “person.”

Since the person is imputedly existent on the basis of a body, the body, then, is both
the basis for imputation of the person and the basis for labeling a person. The Tibetan
term for basis for imputation and basis for labeling is the same, gdags-gzhi.

The Referent Object of the Mental Label

Conceptual isolates are negation phenomena (dgag-pa, negatingly known

phenomena): phenomena that are defined in terms of the exclusion of something else
(gzhan-sel). Specifically, they are implicative negation phenomena (ma-yin dgag):
exclusions of something else in which, after the sounds of the words that exclude the
object to be negated have negated that object, they throw in their tracks, explicitly or
implicitly, something else.

To understand something thrown in the tracks of a negation (bkag-shul), consider the

negation “the person I am thinking of is not a woman.” The object to be negated is “a
woman.” After the words of the statement have excluded that it is a woman I am
thinking of, they explicitly throw in their tracks that I am not thinking of a non-person.
Implicitly, the words of the statement imply that I am thinking of a man, because I am
thinking of a person.

In the conceptual cognition of a person, the validly knowable object I am thinking of is

nothing other than a person. The object to be negated in this implicative negation
“nothing other than a person,” which is equivalent to “not a non-person,” is “anything
other than a person.” After the sounds of the words of the conceptual isolate “not a
non-person” have excluded everything other than a person, what is explicitly thrown in
its tracks is that I am not thinking of something that cannot be validly known. What is
implicitly thrown in its tracks is the person I am thinking of. In this way, through the
category and conceptual isolate, we implicitly know the actual person as represented
by a mental hologram of the person.

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The actual person that the conceptual isolate implicitly throws in its tracks is the
referent object of the mental label (btags-chos), and also the implied object (zhen-yul;
conceptualized object) of the conceptual cognition.

Summary of the Three Main Components of Mental Labeling

The three main components of mental labeling, then, are:

• A mental label
• A basis for labeling
• A referent object of the mental label.

A person is imputedly existent on a body. This is a fact about persons that is the case
whether we see a person with non-conceptual sensory cognition or think about a
person with conceptual mental cognition.

With conceptual cognition of a person, however, a mental label (the object category
“person”) is labeled (pasted) on a basis for labeling (the specific individual body on
which the person imputedly exists). This occurs through the medium of a conceptual
isolate (nothing other than a specific person as a member of the category “person”)
and a mental hologram (a mental representation of the actual person, appearing in the
form of the body on which he or she imputedly exists).

• Note that the form of the body in the mental hologram may be a representation
of the form that we see when the person is standing in front of us
• Or it may be an arbitrary form of what the body of the person looks like that
merely represents the person when we think of him or her when the person is
absent.

The referent object of the mental labeling of the category “person” on a specific
individual body as the basis for labeling is the actual person. In detail, the referent
object (the actual person) is what the conceptual isolate has implicitly thrown in its
tracks after it has excluded all other members of the category “person.”

The mental labeling interpolates (sgro-‘dogs) onto the actual person the status of
being a member of the category “person.” The mental labeling, however, does not
create the person. The person is imputedly existent on the basis of a body whether or
not the person is mentally labeled as a member of the category “person.”

• Interpolation means adding or projecting onto something something else that is

not naturally there or not naturally the case, like adding a feather to an arrow.

Thus, the existence of the referent object of the mental label is not established in the
manner of an affirmation phenomenon (sgrub-pa).

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• An affirmation phenomenon is an item defined in terms of the establishment of an
item (for instance by it having a findable defining characteristic mark or it being a
findable referent “thing” [btags-don]), without an object to be negated being
explicitly precluded by the sounds that express it.
• Note that “established” (grub-pa) and “affirmation phenomenon” (sgrub-pa) are
two inflections of the same word in Tibetan.

Instead of being established as an affirmation phenomenon, the referent object is

simply accounted for in terms of an implicative negation phenomenon. This does not
mean, however, that the referent object is established as a negation phenomenon. It is
simply what is implicitly thrown in the tracks of the negation phenomenon “nothing
other than itself.” When you conceptually exclude everything other than the referent
object, the referent object is what is left.

Designation, Delineation and Interpolation

Designation

Names, Words and Tags

Designation involves the application of a name (ming; word) and/or a tag (brda; label,
term) to some item, whether or not that item is validly knowable. Unicorns and self-
established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa), after all, do not exist, but have the
names “unicorn” and “self-established existence.”

•Since “ming” in Tibetan, “nama” in Sanskrit, can be translated as either “name” or

“word,” and since, in English, “word” has a wider usage than “name,” we shall use
“word” as their translation for the rest of this presentation.

Words are equivalent to word syntheses (ming-gi-tshogs), which means that a word is
a synthesis or imputation on one or more syllables (yi-ge). Thus, words are
noncongruent affecting variables (ldan-min ‘du-byed): nonstatic phenomena that are
neither forms of physical phenomena nor ways of being aware of something. Words
can be spoken or written, in which cases the sound of a word and the colored shapes
representing the word are forms of physical phenomena on which the word is also an
imputation.

Words arise dependently on meanings (don) or on signified objects (don). Here, “don”
in Tibetan and “artha” in Sanskrit mean both “the meaning of a word” and “an object
signified by a word.” A word cannot exist independently of a meaning or of something
it signifies; otherwise any sound representing it is just a non-communicative sound.

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 •According to some texts, the terms “word” and “tag” are equivalent and are used
interchangeably.
•According to others, a word (for instance, “mongoose”) is designated on an audio
category, and its meaning/significance is ascribed to a corresponding
object/meaning category. When we learn this audio category and its
corresponding object/meaning category, then when we mentally label some
animal as a member of this object/meaning category, we designate the referent
object of the object/meaning category with the tag “mongoose.”
•According to yet other texts, what is designated on an audio category is a “tag”
and what is designated on the referent object mentally labeled as a member of the
corresponding object/meaning category is a “word.”

Here, to make the analysis less complicated, we shall adopt the first variant, namely
that “word” and “tag” are equivalent; and so we shall just use “word” for both usages.
We shall also simplify the discussion by explaining only in terms of object categories
and signified objects, rather than in terms of object/meaning categories and both
meanings of words and what words signify.

Designating Words on Sounds and on Objects

Being omniscient, a Buddha non-conceptually and explicitly cognizes all validly

knowable objects simultaneously, including all the words with which limited beings
designate each object. For everyone other than a Buddha, however, designation with
words occurs only with conceptual cognition. Here we shall limit our discussion to just
those who are not yet Buddhas.

Words are designated on audio categories through which we conceptually cognize all
communicative sounds that are mentally labeled as members of those categories. Such
communicative sounds may occur in any voice, volume or pronunciation. We may or
may not know the meaning of a word or what it signifies. But even if we do not know,
for example, what a mongoose is; nevertheless, no matter who utters the sound
“mongoose” or how loudly he or she says it, we can cognize all these sounds through
the audio category “mongoose” on which the word “mongoose” is designated.

The word “mongoose” is not only designated on the audio category “mongoose.”
Through the audio category “mongoose,” the word “mongoose” is also designated on
the sound “mongoose,” the referent object mentally labeled by the audio category.

Note that:

•The word “mongoose” is a word synthesis as an imputation on the syllables

“mon” and “goose.”
•The sound “mongoose” on which the word “mongoose” is designated is a whole
as an imputation on the sounds “mon” and “goose.”

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When we know the meaning of the word “mongoose,” we can then also conceptually
designate a certain animal we see with the word “mongoose” designated on the object
category “mongoose.” We do this while simultaneously designating the word
“mongoose” on either the sound “mongoose” we utter aloud or on a mental hologram
representing the sound “mongoose.” Such an audio mental hologram is what we
conventionally call a “voice in our heads.” Whether designated on a vocalized sound or
a mentally represented sound, the word is designated on the sound through the audio
category on which it is designated.

Delineating Conventional Phenomena through Distinguishing

Designation with words is only possible by relying on the mental factor of

distinguishing (‘du-shes, recognition). Distinguishing is one of the five ever-functioning
mental factors (kun-‘gro lnga) and is part of every moment of cognition of both limited
beings (sentient beings) and Buddhas. Here we shall analyze distinguishing only in the
case of those who are not yet Buddhas.

For those who are not yet Buddhas, distinguishing occurs as part of every moment of
both conceptual and non-conceptual cognition.

• In non-conceptual cognition, distinguishing cognitively takes an uncommon

characteristic (mtshan-nyid) of the appearing object (snang-yul) of the cognition.
The appearing object in a non-conceptual cognition is a validly knowable object
other than a category or a name.
• In conceptual cognition, distinguishing cognitively takes a composite feature
(bkra-ba) of the appearing object of the cognition. The appearing object in a
conceptual cognition is a category, in which case the defining characteristic mark
of the category is a composite of the defining characteristic marks of the members
of the category.

In both cases, conceptual and non-conceptual, on the basis of this distinguishing of an

uncommon or composite defining characteristic, the consciousness of the cognition
delineates a conventional object (tha-snyad ‘dogs-pa).

• Note that although conventional objects have uncommon characteristic marks or

composite features, these marks or features cannot be found upon investigation
and lack the power, either by themselves or in conjunction with mental labeling, to
establish the existence of the conventional objects they delineate.

In this definition of “distinguishing,” “delineate” translates the same Tibetan term

“‘dogs-pa” as we have previously been translating as “impute,” “mentally label,” and
“designate.” Delineating a conventional object on the basis of distinguishing a defining
characteristic mark means to single out a conventional object that the defining mark
characterizes. A defining characteristic mark and something characterized by it (a

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conventional object) arise dependently on each other: there cannot be one without
the other.

Similarly, words, as well, have definitions that delineate their meanings and the objects
they signify. The Tibetan word for “definition,” “mtshan-nyid,” is the same word
translated as defining characteristic mark. Correct designation with a word entails
correctly matching the definition of the word with the defining characteristic mark of
the conventional object it signifies. Correct designation, then, depends on the
conventions (tha-snyad) adopted by a specific group or society.

In non-conceptual sensory cognition, the mental factor of distinguishing differentiates

a conventional object within a sense field from all other items that appear in that sense
field. For instance, when we look at someone, we distinguish the colored shapes of the
body from the colored shapes of the door next to the body. This it is called “the
distinguishing that cognitively takes a characteristic mark concerning an item” (don-la
mtshan-mar ‘dzin-pa’i ‘du-shes).

• Note that the Tibetan term for an item, “don,” is the same term translated earlier as
both the meaning of a word and an object signified by a word,

The colored shapes we distinguish as a conventional object have as an imputation on

them the kind synthesis “body.” What we see is not simply a conventional object, but it
is some kind of conventional object. Nevertheless, with non-conceptual sensory
cognition, we do not distinguish what kind of conventional object it is.

In conceptual cognition, distinguishing differentiates the object category to which a

conventional object belongs from all other object categories. It is called “the
distinguishing that cognitively takes a characteristic mark concerning a conventional
object” (tha-snyad-la mtshan-mar ‘dzin-pa’i ‘du-shes). Only with conceptual cognition
do we distinguish what kind of conventional object we saw and ascribe to it the
convention of a word and a meaning. Non-conceptual cognition lacks this type of
distinguishing.

We may cognize an object (don), however, without knowing the word for it, in which
case we might designate it merely as a “thing.” Or the object might not yet have a
specific name, for instance a newly discovered galaxy, but it still has the general name
“galaxy.”

Interpolation

The Two Facets of Mental Activity

Mental activity cognizes an object by giving rise (‘char-ba) to a mental hologram

(rnam-pa; mental appearance, mental aspect) of the object. Giving rise to a mental
appearance of an object is equivalent to cognitively engaging (‘jug-pa) with the object.
In technical language, giving rise to a mental hologram of an object and cognitively

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engaging with an object are two different conceptually isolated ways of describing the
essential nature (ngo-bo) of mental activity. They both refer to what mental activity is.
For instance, if we ask, what is the mental activity of thinking, then “the mental activity
of giving rise to a thought” and “the mental activity of thinking a thought” would be
equivalent ways of describing the same happening.

Moreover, mental activity occurs without a separately existing “me” that is making the
activity happen, controlling it, or just observing it. It also occurs without a separate
entity, called “mind,” that, like a machine, does the activity.

[See: Mind As Mental Activity]

According to the Gelug Prasangika presentation, giving rise to a mental hologram of a

cognitive object and engaging with the cognitive object each has two facets that can
also be conceptually isolated. From the point of view of giving rise to a mental
hologram or mental appearance, there is the arising of:

• The facet of the appearance that concerns what something is ( ji-snyed-pa),

• The facet of the appearance that concerns how something exists ( ji-ltar-ba).

Correspondingly, from the point of view of cognitively engaging with an object, there
is the cognitive engagement that is:

• The cognition of the appearance of what something is

• The cognition of the appearance of how something exists.

Either aspect of the cognition may be accurate or inaccurate.

Any moment of cognition is made up of many parts, both on the side of the mental
activity itself and on the side of its objects:

• The primary consciousness (rnam-shes) and attendant mental factors (sems-

byung), such as distinguishing, jointly give rise to and cognitively engage with the
facet of the mental hologram that concerns what something is. In conceptual
cognition, however, mental consciousness also gives rise to and cognitively
engages with a category as an imputation on a conceptual isolate.
• Except in the case of non-conceptual total absorption on voidness, grasping for
truly established existence (bden-‘dzin) gives rise to and cognitively engages with
the facet of the mental hologram that concerns how something exists.

Truly Established Existence

When we speak of truly established existence (bden-par grub-pa), we are talking about
something that establishes the object as truly being what it is – in other words,
something findable on the side of the object that establishes that the object exists as a
person, and not as a door.

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In technical terms, truly established existence refers to the existence of something not
being established merely imputedly, dependent on mental labeling or designation
alone, but established through the power of something findable on the side of the
object.

Truly established existence is equivalent to:

• Self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa; inherent existence),

• Existence established by something’s own essential nature (rang-gi ngo-bos grub-
pa).
• Existence established by a self-defining characteristic mark (rang-gi mtshan-nyid-
kyis grub-pa),

Self-established existence means that the existence of an object is established by there

being a referent “thing” (btags-don) findable on the side of the object, that one can
point to and which serves as a focal support (dmigs-rten) holding up the object, like a
support behind a piece of scenery in a theater play.

Existence established by something’s own essential nature means that the existence of
something is established by its own essential nature of being what it is, for instance its
essential nature of being a body, a mind, or a person.

Existence established by a self-defining characteristic mark means that the existence of

an object is established by a defining characteristic mark findable inside the object,
which distinguishes it as an individual object, distinct from all other objects.

Grasping for Truly Established Existence

As stated above, in every moment of conceptual and non-conceptual cognition, except

in the case of non-conceptual total absorption on voidness, grasping for truly
established existence gives rise to and cognitively engages with the facet of the mental
hologram that concerns how something exists. It gives rise to and engages with an
appearance of truly established existence (bden-snang). Since truly established
existence does not exist at all, the appearance merely represents truly established
existence.

There are two ways, however, in which this grasping (‘dzin-pa, Skt. graha) cognitively
engages with this mental hologram:

• It simply cognizes the appearance as merely an appearance of truly established

existence (bden-snang ‘dzin-pa).
• It cognizes the appearance as if it actually were truly established existence (bden-
grub ‘dzin-pa), although it is not.

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The former occurs in both conceptual and non-conceptual cognition. The later occurs
manifestly only in conceptual cognition and is equivalent to unawareness (ma-rig-pa;
Skt. avidya; ignorance).

Identifying Interpolation

Interpolation (sgro-‘dogs) means adding or projecting onto an object something that

is not there. Note that the second term in the Tibetan compound for “interpolation” is
“’dogs,” which is the same term used in the expressions for imputation, mental
labeling, designation and delineation.

Mental labeling interpolates, as a package, a category imputed on something having

the status of being a specific member of that category. It interpolates this package
onto the facet of the mental hologram concerning what something is.

Designation interpolates, as a package, a word as an imputation on something having

the status of being an object signified by the word. It also designates this package
onto the facet of the mental hologram concerning what something is.

One aspect of grasping for truly established existence interpolates an appearance of

truly established existence, also known as a dualistic appearance (gnyis-snang),
meaning an appearance that is dual in the sense of being discordant with how things
actually exist. The aspect of grasping for truly established existence that is equivalent
to unawareness interpolates the existence of truly established existence. In both cases,
the grasping interpolates this onto the facet of the mental hologram concerning how
something exists.

Thus, mental labeling and designation on the one hand, and grasping for truly
established existence on the other, interpolate separate things onto separate facets of
the mental hologram that a cognition gives rise to. This is the case despite the fact
that all three – mental labeling, designation and grasping for truly established
existence – occur together in one moment of conceptual cognition and are all focused
on the same mental hologram.

• In the case of mental labeling and designation, except when thinking of such
nonexistent things as a unicorn or chicken lips, the implied object concerning the
facet of what something is does conventionally exist.
• In the case of grasping for truly established existence, the implied object
concerning how something exists does not exist at all.

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Summary of the Differences between Imputation, Mental Labeling with Categories,
Designation with Words, Delineation of Conventional Phenomena and Interpolation

Imputation

All phenomena, whether known conceptually or non-conceptually, are imputations on

a basis for imputation. Imputed phenomena and their bases for imputation cannot
exist independently of each other. Imputed phenomena include:

• Wholes as imputations on parts

• Conventional objects, such as an orange, as imputations on data from the various
senses extended over a period of time
• Words as imputations on syllables
• Words as imputations on meanings or objects signified by them
• Noncongruent affecting variables as imputations on a basis, such as persons as
imputations on bodies and minds
• Static phenomena as imputations on a basis, such as a category as an imputation
on the conceptual isolate “nothing other than an individual member of the
category,” or a voidness as an imputation on a validly knowable phenomenon.

Mental Labeling with Categories

All phenomena, when known conceptually, are the referent objects of the package of a
category as an imputation on a conceptual isolate mentally labeled on a basis for
labeling.

Designation with Words

All phenomena, when known conceptually, are the signified objects of a word
designated on a category and, through the category, designated on the referent object
of the category.

Delineation of Conventional Phenomena

All phenomena, whether known conceptually or non-conceptually, are delineated as

conventional objects by the cognitions of them inasmuch as they have distinctive
defining characteristic marks differentiated through the mental factor of
distinguishing.

Interpolation

Categories and words are interpolations projected in conceptual cognition onto the
facet of any phenomenon concerning what it is.

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An appearance of truly established existence is an interpolation projected in both
conceptual and non-conceptual cognition – except in the case of non-conceptual
cognition of voidness – onto the facet of any phenomenon concerning how it exists.

The existence of truly established existence is an interpolation projected manifestly by

unawareness in conceptual cognition – and according to the Jetsunpa textbook
tradition, subliminally in non-conceptual cognition – onto the facet of any
phenomenon concerning how it exists.

Note that the interpolation of a mental appearance of truly established existence or of

the existence of truly established existence is not a case of mental labeling.

Note also that imputation, such as the imputation of a whole on parts or a person on a
body and mind, is likewise not interpolation. It does not add something that is not
there.

Existence Posited Dependently on Mental Labeling Alone or on Designation Alone

The Existence of Something Cannot Be Established by Nonconceptual Cognition of It

The existence of phenomena can only be posited (bzhag-pa; set) dependently in terms
of mental labeling alone or designation alone. This means that the existence of
something can only be posited merely as its being what a word for it refers to on a
basis of designation of it, or merely as its being what a category that can include it as a
member refers to on a basis for the mental labeling of it as a member of that category.

You cannot establish that something exists, for instance a whole object such as a body,
or a person, by the fact that it can be cognized non-conceptually, for instance by
sensory cognition. This is because to establish that the whole body exists unimputedly
on the basis of its parts (arms, legs, head and trunk), it would absurdly follow that you
would need to distinguish the defining characteristic mark of the body as a whole
existing on the side of each of the parts, or the defining characteristic mark of the
person on the side of each of the aggregates (body, consciousness, mental factors).

If the defining characteristic mark of a body as a whole or of a person could be found

on the side of the parts or aggregates, and not just labeled there, it would be by the
power of such a mark that one would establish that there was a whole body or a
person. But such a self-defining characteristic mark cannot be found, because if it
could be found, it would have to be either identical with the defining characteristic
marks of the parts or aggregates, or it would have to be totally separate and
independent of them. Both of these possibilities are unreasonable and therefore
impossible. Because of that, there is no self-defining characteristic mark of a body as a
whole findable on the side of the parts that, by its own power, establishes the
existence of the whole. Likewise, there is no self-defining characteristic mark of a
person findable on the side of the aggregates that, by its own power, establishes the
existence of the person.

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Similarly, you also cannot establish that something, such as a body as a whole object
or a person, exists by the power of a self-defining characteristic mark on the side of
the parts or the aggregates, which serves as the basis, when mentally labeled and
designated as a whole body or a person, for establishing the existence of a whole
body or a person.

The only way to posit the existence of a body as a whole on the basis of parts, or a
person on the basis of aggregates is that a body as a whole or a person is what the
object category “whole body” or “person” refers to on the basis of the parts and the
aggregates, and they are what the words “whole body” or “person” refer to on the
basis of the parts and the aggregates. Thus, a whole body or a person arises
dependently on mental labeling alone or on designation alone. And even the defining
characteristics of a whole body or a person arise dependently on mental labeling
alone.

Dependent Arising

Dependent arising has five meanings:

• The causal relationship between the twelve links of dependent arising, which
describes how uncontrollably recurring rebirth (samsara) arises and is perpetuated
and how it can be brought to a true stop
• The relationship between causes and effects
• The relationship between wholes and their parts
• The relationship between mental labels (categories), bases for labeling and
referent objects
• The relationship between words, bases for designation and designated objects.

To understand the Gelug Prasangika presentation of dependent arising in the context

of voidness, it is essential to differentiate the subtle level of all phenomena being
imputedly knowable from the coarse level of nonconguent affecting variables and
static phenomena being imputable knowable as phenomena that are imputations on a
basis.

When we understand dependent arising in terms of the subtle level of being imputedly
knowable, which means understanding dependently arising in terms of all phenomena
being imputedly existent, we understand that:

• Samsara does not occur independently of the twelve links, and nirvana cannot be
attained independently of bringing about a true stopping of the twelve links
• Causes and effects cannot exist independently of each other
• Wholes and their parts cannot exist independently of each other
• Mental labels (categories), bases for labeling and referent objects cannot exist
independently of each other

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• Words, bases for designation and designated objects cannot exist independently
of each other.

The deepest meaning of voidness understood in terms of dependent arising, however,

is not simply the total absence of any phenomenon existing independently, all by itself,
and not dependently on or in relation to something else. The deepest understanding
of voidness in terms of dependent arising requires, in addition, understanding that the
existence of conventional objects can only be posited dependently merely in terms of
mental labeling with categories or merely in terms of designation with words.

It is not the case that conventional phenomena lack any self-natures and are therefore
nonexistent. The self-nature or actual nature of conventional phenomena is their
voidness – the total absence of their self-natures being self-establishing natures. In
other words, conventional phenomena exist and can be validly cognized. But their
existence is not established by their self-natures. Voidness is not an unaffected self-
nature found on the side of phenomena that establishes that these phenomena
conventionally exist. Nor do phenomena have findable affected self-natures that
establish that they exist dependently on their being mental labeled with categories or
designated with words. Such a self-nature that was affected by mental labeling would
be a referent “thing” findable on the side of a mentally labeled phenomenon: a focal
support propping it up. The existence of conventionally existent phenomena cannot
be established directly by anything we can find with analysis.

However, that does not mean that conventional phenomena do not exist. But we can
only posit their existence in terms of mere mental labeling alone or mere designation
alone. They can only be posited as the referent objects of categories labeled on bases
for labeling or as the objects signified by words designated on bases for designation.
As referent objects of categories and words, conventional objects can merely be
specified as what are implicitly thrown in the tracks of the conceptual isolates “nothing
other than themselves” after the sound of the words “nothing other than themselves”
have negated “everything other than themselves.”

Further, conventional phenomena do not have self-natures that are established by the
power of defining characteristic marks found on the side of the phenomena
characterized by them. Nevertheless, it is not the case that conventional phenomena
lack any defining characteristic marks and consequently they are impossible to
distinguish from one another. The defining characteristic marks of phenomena can
only be posited merely as the referent objects of the category “defining characteristic
mark” as an imputation on the conceptual isolate “nothing other than a specific
defining characteristic mark” when mentally labeled on a specific basis for labeling.

• Such a conceptual isolate is called an “item conceptually isolated as a signifier

(don-ldog).”

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Thus, similar to how the existence of conventional phenomena themselves are posited,
the defining characteristic marks of conventional phenomena can merely be specified
as what are implicitly thrown in the tracks of the conceptual isolates “nothing other
than their defining characteristic marks” after the sound of the words “nothing other
than their defining characteristic marks” have negated “every defining characteristic
mark other than their own.”

The superficial truth about conventional phenomena is that when they appear to those
who are not yet Buddhas, they appear to have their existence established by a self-
establishing nature, and that appearance of a self-establishing nature is taken to be
their actual self-natures by those with unawareness. The deepest truth about
conventional phenomena, however, is that they are totally devoid of such a self-
establishing nature. Their voidness means that their conventional existence can only be
set in terms of mental labeling alone or in terms of designation alone. In this way we
can understand voidness in the sense of dependent arising.

Thus, the obliterating opponent (gnod-pa’i gnyen-po) – the opponent that rids us
forever of beginningless unawareness – is not merely the understanding that there is
no such thing as self-establishing existence; it is not merely the understanding of
voidness. It is the understanding of voidness to mean dependent arising in terms of
mental labeling alone or designation alone. This understanding is the antithesis that
can turn away (bzlog-phyogs) the unawareness that interpolates an implied object of
the appearance of a self-establishing nature onto the facet of the appearance of
conventional phenomena concerning how they exist. In doing so, however, the
obliterating opponent does not invalidate the existence of conventional phenomena.

Mental Labeling and Purification

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/emptiness-
advanced/elaboration-of-how-cognition-of-emptiness-liberates-us/mental-labeling-
and-purification

Gaining Liberation

To gain liberation from uncontrollably recurring rebirth, samsara, we need to reverse

the mechanism of the twelve links. We do this by ridding ourselves of the first link,
unawareness or ignorance about how the self – me and all others exist. When we have
rid ourselves of unawareness, we no longer develop disturbing emotions and attitudes
that lead to the second link, affecting impulses. Because of that, we no longer plant
further karmic aftermath on our consciousness and so we no longer generate the first
phase of the third link, causal loaded consciousness.

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When we no longer have disturbing emotions and attitudes, we also no longer have
the eighth and ninth links, thirsting and obtainers, the links that activate previously
planted karmic aftermath and bring about the tenth link, further existence. The tenth
link, further existence, refers to throwing karma and, without any throwing karma, we
no longer experience the eleventh and twelfth links, conception and aging and dying.
That means we no longer have the second phase of the third link, resultant
consciousness and the sequence of the fourth through the seventh links, which
describe the development of the foetus. That seventh link, feelings of levels of
happiness, are ripenings of karmic aftermath and were the focus of the eighth link,
thirsting, which helped to ripen yet other clusters of karmic aftermath. But because we
no longer experience any tainted feelings of levels of happiness and no longer have
any thirsting after them or obtainers, then from this point of view as well, we are
liberated from samsaric rebirth.

There are several, successively subtler levels of grasping for an impossible self and so
there are successively subtler levels of unawareness. We are either unaware that these
impossible “me’s” do not correspond to reality or we are unaware that our belief that
they do correspond is false. In either case, to rid ourselves of each level of grasping
and unawareness, we need to have non-conceptual cognition, with combined
shamatha and vipashyana, on the voidness of that level of impossible “me” and a
certain amount of build-up of positive force. We always need to build up the two
networks: positive force and deep awareness, often translated as the “collection of
merit” and “collection of wisdom or insight.” In this way, we deconstruct the impossible
“me” in steps.

Each step of the deconstruction of what’s impossible is beneficial and alleviates us of a

certain amount of disturbing emotions and a certain degree of suffering.
Deconstructing in steps is the most stable way to gain liberation and further,
enlightenment. In doing this, it’s important that we don’t under-refute the impossible
“me,” to use Tsongkhapa’s term for not going deeply enough in our deconstruction,
and we don’t over-refute by deconstructing so much that we’ve refuted even the
conventional “me.”

We can only establish the existence of the conventional “me” in terms of mental
labeling with categories and designation with words. That means that the conventional
“me” is merely what the object category ( don-spyi) “me” refers to as a mental label
labeled on the basis of the five aggregates as its basis for labeling. And it is merely
what the word “me” refers to as a designation designated on the basis of the meaning
category (don-spyi) “me” labeled on the five aggregates. There is nothing findable on
the side of the basis for labeling or basis for designation that, by its own power, or in
conjunction with labeling and designation, establishes that it exists.

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Categories and Mental Labeling

When we speak about mental labeling with categories, such as the object category
“me” or the object category “love,” these object categories are like mental boxes. It
seems as if all the items that we conceptually fit in these boxes – like all the “me’s”
labeled onto pictures of ourselves spanning our lives – are truly established as existing
in these boxes. “Fit into boxes” is just a simpler way of explaining cognizing something
through the medium of a category into which it fits.

It seems as though there is something findable on the side of people that allows for
them to be validly fit into this box “me” and not that box “you.” Remember, we
discussed the example of not labeling a beggar as a king and the three criteria
Chandrakirti explained for establishing valid labeling? There’s no need to repeat that
now. The conclusion, however, is that nothing is established from its own side as
existing in a box; things are only fit into mental boxes and designated with words by
the power of conceptual cognition alone. It is only through the conceptual mechanism
of mentally fitting things in boxes that we establish conventions and language and are
able to communicate with each other.

We used the example of the full spectrum of emotions. There are no boxes on the side
of the emotions that divide them into this emotion and that emotion: loving someone
or just liking them. There are no findable dividing lines and on this side of the line we
like someone and on the other side we love them. It’s merely by the power of mental
categories and words that there are these conventional divisions and that we can
speak of the conventional existence of loving and liking someone.

Conventions and Communication

A convention is something agreed upon by a group of people having valid cognition.

For instance, a group of people agreed on certain defining characteristics for loving
and other characteristics for liking. They assigned an arbitrary set of sounds as a word
to signify each and, eventually, even put these words and definitions in dictionaries.
Having learned these words and their definitions, people then conceived of objects in
terms of object categories and words having these defining characteristics. Through
conceptualization with categories and words, people were then better able to
understand their experience and communicate it to others.

Communication with words, by the way, works with audio categories ( sgra-spyi) and
meaning categories (don-spyi). Conceptually, we fit into the audio category “love” the
sound “love,” no matter what voice, what accent and what volume we hear it in.
Otherwise, how could we possibly understand what word they are saying when two
people say the same word. In addition, we use the word “love” to designate a feeling
we can have toward our partner, our parents, our children, our pets, our favorite food,
favorite music, our country and so on. There are so many different meanings, but we
conceptually fit them all into the same box, the meaning category of “love.”

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Sometimes, we even get into trouble, because when our partner says she or he loves
us, they might mean something quite different from what we understand by the word.

Do words and categories create the emotions of loving and liking? No. Did no one
experience loving or liking someone before they had these concepts or words? No.
Even without these categories and words, people still felt emotions. They felt what we
conventionally call “loving someone” and “liking someone.” Dogs, after all, feel
emotions – dogs love their masters – but dogs don’t have a word for it. Each time they
see their master, they see him or her through the category “my master” despite not
having a word for it. But we humans have a conventional word for it, “love.”

So, loving and liking conventionally exist. They are not non-existent objects, like turtle-
hair or chicken-lips, that cannot be validly know. People experience them. But their
existence can only be established in terms of conventions as what the categories and
words for them refer to. Although categories labeled on the spectrum of emotions and
words designated on them are like cookie-cutters on a piece of dough, there is
nothing on the side of the spectrum of emotions and nothing on the side of the
dough that establishes the existence of individual emotions or individual cookies.

Two Aspects of Mental Labeling

There is one more important point we need to understand. As we’ve explained,

conceptualization with categories and words establish the conventional existence of
validly knowable objects. Conventionally existent validly knowable objects are
the referent objects (btags-chos) of the categories and words for them. But, although
conceptualization makes things appear as truly existing in mental boxes, it doesn’t
establish that their defining characteristics are findable on their side and have the
power to fit them into these boxes. In simpler terms, mental labeling establishes the
conventional existence of validly knowable objects, but it does not establish their true,
self-established existence. Their truly self-established existence is impossible.

The Imputation “Me” and the Category “Me”

What about “me?” As we’ve discussed at length, the person “me” is an imputation on
an individual continuum of five aggregates. But how can we establish that there is such
a thing as a person, or that it is “me?” Like “love,” a conventionally existent person is
merely what the category “person” refers to as a mental label labeled onto an
individual continuum of five aggregates. The same is the case regarding “me.” My
conventional existence as “me” is established merely as the referent object of the
category and word “me” labeled and designated on all those photos spanning my life
from when I was an infant till now. There is no findable uncommon characteristic
feature on the side of the each of these photos that establishes that it’s me, either by
its own power alone or by its own power when I identify all of them as “me.”

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The referent objects of the category “me” and the word “me” are both the
conventionally existent “me.” That conventionally existent “me,” in turn, is an
imputation on the five aggregates. Although mental labeling establishes the
conventional existence of “me” as its referent object, it doesn’t establish the true
existence of “me.”

Referent Objects and Referent Things

In conjunction with mental labeling, there are two different words in Tibetan – referent
object (btags-chos) and referent thing (btags-don). The referent object is what a
mental label refers to as a mental label labeled on a basis for labeling ( gdags-gzhi). In
this case, the referent object is the conventional “me.” The referent thingwould be a
truly existent, findable “me” with findable characteristic features as a focal support
(dmigs-rten), backing up or propping up the referent object, the conventional “me,”
like holding up a piece of scenery in a theater. That referent thing is what we have
been calling the impossible “me.” There is no such thing as a referent
thing corresponding to the mental label “me,” but that doesn’t negate the
conventional existence of the referent object of the mental label, namely the
conventional “me.”

To understand and appreciate the difference between the impossible “me” that is the
object of refutation and the conventional “me,” which is not to be refuted, requires a
lot of thought and analytical meditation.

Mental Labelling and Conceptual Cognition

How does mental labeling with categories work, for instance the category “me?” First,
we look at a series of photos spanning our lifetime. The visual forms we see non-
conceptually are the basis for imputation of the conventional “me.” We see both the
pictures and me simultaneously. Following that phase of seeing, we think, “That’s me in
all these photos.” What we are actually doing is conceptually cognizing all of them
through the category “me.” We’re fitting them all into the mental box “me.”

The conventional “me” is also an imputation on the five aggregates involved in both
looking at the photos and thinking they’re “me.” There’s no separately existing “me”
that is doing the looking or thinking. When we think, “I’m looking at these photos of
me,” we’re also conceptually cognizing the “me” that is looking and also thinking that
through the category “me.” Again, we’re fitting all these conventional “me’s” into the
mental box “me.”

Categories are static phenomena, which means they’re not created by causes and
conditions and aren’t affected by causes and conditions either. The category “me” can’t
do anything. But the conventional “me,” as the referent object of that category and
which is an imputation on the photos and on the aggregates involved in the
experience of looking at it, can do things. For instance, it can look at the photos and

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label them all as “me.” But labeling them all with the category “me” doesn’t make them
me. Whether we label them or not, in fact they are all photos of me. Anyone who knew
me over the period the photos were taken and has a good memory would not
contradict the fact that they’re all photos of me. Mental labeling doesn’t create
anything.

Together with the category “me” is a static conceptual isolate ( ldog-pa), which is sort
of a specifier. For easier understanding, I sometimes call it “nothing other than ( ldog-
pa).” It’s the conceptual exclusion of everything and everyone other than me, so
“nothing other than me.” The category and conceptual isolate are static phenomena,
so they have no form. So along with conceptual cognition, there’s also a mental image
that represents “me” when I think “me.” That mental image could be a visual form with
color and shape, or it could be the mental sound of a voice talking “in my head,” as it
were, and saying, “me.”

Through the mentally labeled category “me,” the conceptual isolate and the mental
representation – for instance the mental sound of the word “me” – our mental
consciousness focuses on the body and person in each of the photos as its basis for
labeling. In a sense, our conceptual consciousness projects onto this basis the
combination of the category, conceptual isolate and representation.

The conventional “me” is the referent object of the mentally labeled category. A truly
existent “me,” with an uncommon defining characteristic feature that is findable in the
basis for labeling and has the power to establish the existence of that conventional
“me,” would be the referent thing in this example. But there is no such thing. There is
no such thing as this referent thing functioning as a focal support backing up the
referent object, the conventional “me.” The conventional “me” is devoid of existing as a
truly existent, self-established “me.”

But please don’t misunderstand. The conventional “me” does has an uncommon
characteristic feature, otherwise our aggregate of distinguishing would be unable to
distinguish my “self” from someone else. But we can’t locate that feature on the side of
the conventional “me” or on the side of any basis for validly labeling “me.” We can only
establish the conventional existence of the uncommon defining characteristic feature
of “me” in terms of it being what the mental label for it refers to. The mechanism is the
same as with establishing the conventional existence of “me.” In short, the
conventional existence of all validly knowable things can only be established merely in
terms of mental labeling.

[For further detail, see: Objects of Cognition: Advanced Presentation]

So, to rid ourselves of our unawareness of all this – in other words, to rid ourselves of
the first link of dependent arising and have the whole mechanism of samsara fall apart

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and end – we need non-conceptual cognition of voidness, both explicitly in total
absorption and implicitly with subsequent attainment.

Arising within a State of Voidness

In tantric sadhanas, after total absorption on voidness we often find the translation,
“out of voidness” or “out of the sphere of voidness,” I arise as this or that Buddha-
figure. This refers to the subsequent attainment period of our meditation where we
explicitly imagine our body to be that of a Buddha-figure, like an illusion, and implicitly
understand or apprehend its voidness and the voidness of “me” as an imputation on
the Buddha-figure. It doesn’t mean that there was a “me” sitting inside of voidness, like
in a room, and now I come out of the room of voidness and stand onstage and forget
all about the voidness room I came out of. It means, literally, “after a taste of voidness,”
I arise as the Buddha-figure.

The Tibetan word “ngang” translates the Sanskrit word “ rasa,” taste, and the Tibetan
postposition after it, “las,” indicates that taste is in the ablative case, which in Sanskrit
can mean “from,” but also “after.” So, after we have had the explicit taste of voidness
during total absorption, then subsequent to that, with subsequent attainment we arise
as the Buddha-figure with an “aftertaste,” as it were, of voidness, which we now
implicitly apprehend. In this sense, our minds remain focused on the sphere of
voidness in both phases of the meditation, first explicitly and then implicitly.

Purification: Tendencies and the Results

As for how that understanding of voidness actually purifies away the karmic
tendencies – that process is not so simple.

From the first and second links, we have the first phase of the third link, causal loaded
consciousness – it is loaded with karmic tendencies as imputations on it as its basis for
imputation. These karmic tendencies can give rise to many different types of results.
There’s the ripened result, which refers to more aggregates – a body, various types of
consciousness, cognitive sensors and so on. These develop from the second phase of
the third link through the sixth link. The aggregate of feeling some level of happiness,
as a ripened result, is link number seven.

There are also results that are similar to their cause in terms of our experience. There
are two types of this. There are results similar to the cause in terms of our conduct: we
experience feeling like repeating our previous actions. And there are also results similar
to their cause in terms of our experiencing others doing similar things to us. There also
are comprehensive results of experiencing something more general in terms of the
environment or the society and so on in which we’re born or live in.

There are all these different types of results from karmic tendencies. Some tendencies
will give stronger results, some will give weaker results, some will give results only one

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time, and some will give results many times. There are many factors that affect the
ripening.

Provisional Purification of Karmic Tendencies

We need to apply opponent forces to our negative or destructive tendencies. We start

by applying provisional forces. This means applying the so-called “four opponent
forces.” As a prelude before the four, we need to acknowledge that what we did was
mistaken. It isn’t that we are bad, but how we acted was mistaken. It was based on
unawareness or ignorance.

The first opponent is regretting what we did. “Regret” is not the same as guilt. Guilt is
identifying an impossible “me” with what we did and holding on to both “me” and
what we did as being bad, and not letting go. Holding on to that feeling that we’re bad
and what we did was so bad, we feel horrible. That’s guilt. Regret is just, “I wish I hadn’t
done that.” For example, when we eat bad food, food that makes us sick, we regret it
and think, “I wish I hadn’t done that. I regret that.” It’s not that we think we’re bad
because we ate it.

The next is that we decide that we’re going to try our best not to repeat the behavior.
Third, we reaffirm the positive direction that we’re going in life, namely refuge, a safe
and sound direction. We’re working toward a true stopping and true pathway mind,
the deepest Dharma Gem. We are going in the direction of a true understanding that
will bring about the true stopping of true suffering and its true cause; that’s the
direction we’re going in. On top of that, we can reaffirm our bodhichitta aim: “I’m
working toward enlightenment to be able to best benefit everybody.” Then we apply
some counteracting opponent force, for example, Vajrasattva practice where we
graphically imagine that all the negativity leaves us, while reciting the 100-syllable
mantra of Vajrasattva a hundred thousand times..

[See: How to Practice Vajrasattva.]

It’s very important for the purification process, as my teacher Serkong Rinpoche
pointed out, to imagine that we have done every possible negative thing whatsoever
and purify all of that. If we’ve had beginningless rebirth, no beginning, then at some
time we’ve done every possible destructive action. We want to have a full purification,
not just a purification of a few incidents when we said something cruel to this or that
person. It’s important to go through as much as possible the mistaken destructive
things we can remember we’ve done, and then expand the list.

The Result of the Provisional Purification

Successfully applying the four opponents so that they actually bring about a
provisional purification means applying them with total concentration and total
sincerity, and always being mindful of the four opponents. That’s pretty difficult. It’s not

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just going, “Blah, blah, blah” – say the magic words of the Vajrasattva mantra a
hundred thousand times and we’re purified. That’s really very difficult to do properly;
but, if we do it properly, then those tendencies on our mental continuum will not ripen
into the various types of suffering.

If we haven’t applied the four opponents perfectly, then even by applying them
imperfectly, we still will weaken the tendencies, so that they’ll ripen into less severe
results. Karmic tendencies, after all, are non-static phenomena and are affected by
causes and conditions. Through our practices and conduct, we can either strengthen or
weaken them.

Even if our previously built-up karmic tendencies can no longer ripen, that doesn’t
mean that we won’t develop more destructive behavior. It just means that those
tendencies we’ve already built up won’t ripen into the type of results that they could.
Still, we could very easily develop more destructive behavior in the future, because we
haven’t rid ourselves of our unawareness and the disturbing emotions and attitudes
that come from it. We still have the first link, unawareness, and it could still bring on
the second link, affecting impulses, and again causal loaded consciousness, the third
link. So, more karmic tendencies. With the four opponent forces, we’re just
provisionally wiping the slate clean of the karmic tendencies already there.

Actual Purification through Attaining True Stoppings

To stop building up any further karmic tendencies, we need to gain non-conceptual

understanding of voidness and the true stoppings that we attain through it. That rids
us of the unawareness that brings on the disturbing emotions and attitudes that lead
to more karmic impulses and the disturbing emotions and attitudes – namely thirsting
and the obtainers – that activate any further remaining karmic tendencies we build up.
If those tendencies can no longer give a result, because with the understanding of
voidness we’ve gotten rid of what could activate them, they no longer can function as
a cause of anything. Cause and result are relative to each other. If something can’t give
a result, it can’t be a cause anymore.

With non-conceptual cognition of voidness and the first zillion eons of building up
positive force or “merit,” we gain a true stopping first of doctrinally-based unawareness
and doctrinally-based disturbing emotions. We become an arya, a highly realized
being. But we have not rid ourselves completely yet of the first link and rebirth. We still
have automatically-arising unawareness. Because of that, we can still build up more
karmic tendencies.

When through further non-conceptual cognition of voidness and a second countless

eon of positive force we gain a true stopping of automatically-arising unawareness and
automatically-arising disturbing emotions, we attain liberation. We become arhats,
liberated beings. We completely rid ourselves of the link of unawareness and all
disturbing emotions and so no more samsaric rebirth.

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Remember, according to Prasangika, both grasping for a self-sufficiently knowable
“me” and a self-established “me” have doctrinally-based and automatically-arising
forms. So, to become either an arya or a liberated arhat, we need to have non-
conceptual cognition of the voidness of true, self-established existence.

Constant Karmic Habits

Once the karmic tendencies have been deactivated through successfully applying the
four opponent forces, they become “burnt seeds.” The word I translate for tendency is
literally “seed.”

According to Tsongkhapa, these burnt karmic seeds are still imputations on our mental
continuum. They undergo a transition, however, and now become constant karmic
habits. Tendencies give rise to their results only intermittently, not all the time. We
don’t repeat our destructive behavior every moment, just sometimes. Constant habits
give their results every moment.

Constant karmic habits, as so-called “obscurations of karma,” give rise to appearances

of self-established existence. We don’t rid our mental continuums of these until, with a
third zillion eons of positive force, we attain enlightenment and are able to sustain our
non-conceptual total absorption on voidness all the time and while simultaneously
cognizing all conventional objects with our omniscient awareness.

Concluding Remarks

How cognition of voidness liberates us from uncontrollably recurring samsaric rebirth

is not a simple or speedy process. That’s because purifying our minds of unawareness,
ignorance, is not a simple or speedy process. Although it’s complicated, life is also
complicated. What can we expect?
Although it’s complicated, when we understand how liberation works, we can follow
the path that leads to that with more confidence. We can be confident that, if we
practice correctly and hard enough, liberation is possible, enlightenment is possible.
Then it’s just a matter of getting on with the challenge and putting in the time and
effort. Thank you.

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 Elaboration of "Dependent Arising: Avoiding
the Two Extremes"
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/emptiness-
advanced/elaboration-of-dependent-arising-avoiding-the-two-extremes

Identifying Eternalism and Nihilism in Daily Life

Introduction

If we want to summarize the Buddhist teachings in one word that would describe what
Buddha was trying to impart to us, I think that word would be “realism.” Realism means
seeing clearly what is reality, and getting rid of our unawareness and confusion about
that. When we are confused about reality and don’t really understand or accept it, we
create a tremendous amount of problems for ourselves and for others.

Reality, though, is not very easy to accept, or even to see. The first thing that we need
to realize is that life is really difficult. It’s so complicated; there are so many things
going on in the world. And, as the world becomes more interconnected with
globalization, the internet, social media and the like, it seems that our lives are getting
more complex all the time. When we realize that on so many levels we are
interconnected and affected by everybody and by everything that’s going on, that
makes the reality of our lives even more complicated.

In our Information Age, there is so much information available now, compared to the
past, it really does make life more complicated, doesn’t it? For most of us, it’s just
overwhelming; it’s too much. We can’t take it all in; we can’t process it all and put it all
together.

Being in the Moment Does Not Change the Fact That Life Is Not Simple

Now the natural way in which we perceive things – given the fact that as humans we
have this type of body and this type of sense apparatus – is that we can only see
what’s in front of us. Our vision, our hearing and so on are quite limited in scope. And
although many of us can multitask, there’s a certain limit to how many things we can
juggle at the same time.

If we consider the combined effect of the Information Age and our natural biological
limitations, it’s no wonder that we find that there’s too much to deal with in life. So
mentally, emotionally, we want to simplify things. We don’t want to take into
consideration the enormous number of factors that are going on at the same time in

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our lives and in the world. We want to limit it down to a small number of things that
perhaps we can handle – just our family, or just our job, or just whatever’s going on
right now at the moment. Because of this desire for things to be simple, we are
attracted to such practices as “mindfulness,” which over-simplify things to “just be here
in the present moment,” as if that present moment wasn’t being affected by everything
else and existed all on its own.

Although simplifying things through mindfulness practice might make life, on the
surface, easier to deal with, the danger is that we can get out of touch with reality.
That’s because the reality is that everything is interconnected and what’s happening in
life is unbelievably complex. So, if our wish to simplify things so that life becomes
easier to manage is based on the belief that life itself is simple, then our belief is based
on naivety and confusion about reality.

Another aspect of reality, as I mentioned, is that in the present moment we are limited
beings. If we look at the word that’s usually translated as “sentient being,” it means
someone with a limited mind and limited body compared to a Buddha. So, we have
limitations. This is the reality of having this type of body, even if it’s a precious human
one, and this type of mind. We get tired; we can’t understand everything; things
become too much for us – clearly, we are limited. That’s reality. We can certainly go a
little bit beyond the boundaries that we think we have, but with this type of body and
mind, there’s a certain limit to how much we can perceive at once, how much we can
deal with at once,

The Unawareness of Imagining Simplified Models to Correspond to the Complexity of

Life

In our natural drive to simplify things so that we can deal with the complexities of life,
that simplified version of reality seems to us to be the extent of what is real. Reality
seems to us to be that limited picture that our minds are capable of dealing with at
present.

When we speak about ignorance, or unawareness in Buddhism, we’re unaware that

how things appear does not correspond to how things exist – they do not correspond
to the full reality, the complexity of life. We are confused: we think that it does
correspond – “this is it” – our simplification, our little model, our economic model, or
whatever model we have is the actual reality. We think that reality actually corresponds
to our simplified model, and that’s where we get into trouble, because it doesn’t
correspond.

To deal with the complexity of life, we have various concepts, like an economic model.
We try to put things into words to explain what’s going on; but conceptual models and
words, in fact, are also very limited when we’re talking about the total complexity of all
of life, of everybody, in the whole universe. It’s hard to put the complexity of
everything in life into just a few words; but we need to, in order to be able to

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communicate, in order to be able to somehow deal with it, process it. This is necessary,
given our limited minds and bodies.

Emptiness and Impossible Ways of Existing

Voidness, or emptiness, refers to the total absence of any mode of existence in actual
reality that corresponds to our simplified version or model of life. That way of existing
is totally absent; it never was the case. The simplification made by limiting our
consideration to just a few factors in life is like encapsulating in plastic a portion of
reality so that we can deal with it; and then we believe that our model is reality. But
those plastic boundaries isolating portions of life are merely projections from our
limited minds. There is no encapsulation in mental plastic on the part of reality.
Voidness, or emptiness, is the total absence of this encapsulation of things. It’s just not
the way things are.

However, with our limited minds, things appear simplified. The problem comes when
we believe that that simplification corresponds to reality. We need to stop believing
that what we project corresponds to reality. Nevertheless, our projections are what
appears to us, because of the limitations of our body and mind. In technical terms,
that’s an incorrect consideration; we’re considering something false to be true. What
we need to realize is that, nevertheless, this is how things appear to us, so it is like an
illusion – it appears to be true, but it’s not. But it is what appears.

Now, what’s really interesting is that the way that things appear to me is a little bit
different from how things appear to you. You can think of a simple example, like in a
family where there’s some conflict going on. Each person in the family simplifies the
situation into a model and then perceives anything happening in the family in terms of
his or her own simplified model – models such as “you never listen to me” or “you
never appreciate me.” The way it appears to the husband, the way it appears to the
wife, the way it appears to the child are all quite different. Each one has a limited,
simplified view of what’s going on, but that’s how it actually appears to each of them.

An Example of the Extremes of Eternalism and Nihilism in Daily Life

If we want to be able to deal with others, given the fact that things appear differently
to different people, we need to avoid two extremes:

The extreme of eternalism is that “the way that it appears to me is the only one that’s
correct; everybody else is wrong.” “I don’t care what my wife thinks or what my
children think.” “The way that the family problem appears to me, that’s true.”

The other extreme is nihilism, which means in this example either “the way that it
appears to me doesn’t count for anything” or “the way the others perceive it is correct;
mine is wrong.” This nihilist position denies even the relative validity of how things
appear to us.

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If we want to avoid these two extremes, we need to realize that for each person
involved in the family, to use this example, each view has its own relative validity. It’s
not that one is true and all the others are false, or that “my opinion is false” or that
“my opinion doesn’t count.” If we want to deal with a difficult situation in a family, we
need to take into consideration the validity of everybody’s experience, how it appears
to each member. That’s because life is complex, isn’t it, and given our limitations, we
simplify our lives with concepts into models, like “you don’t really love me.”

Even if we just consider the points of view of how things appear to each person within
the family, these points of view don’t exist encapsulated in plastic, isolated from and
unrelated to what’s going on in society. There could be an economic crisis, there could
be a war, there could be all sorts of things going on, not only in our country, but in our
globalized world, everywhere – global warming, etc. All these affect each person in one
way or another, and may affect different people differently. Family problems don’t exist
in a vacuum all by themselves.

Again, the two extremes: eternalism, what we experience in our family is true and none
of the other things going on in society has any effect. Or nihilism: what’s going on in
our family doesn’t count at all, because our problems are all due to external factors.
Again, to see reality we need to avoid the two extremes. At the same time, we need to
accept that the way that it appears to each person, that is the reality that we need to
deal with – that’s so-called “conventional reality.” But, it’s like an illusion, since it seems
to be absolute when, in fact, it is not; it is just relative.

Meditation to Recognize the Two Extremes in Life

This is a simplified version of the topic that we want to look at, but I think that it’s
perhaps helpful to give a simplified version first, even though that too is like an illusion
– the topic of avoiding the two extremes is not that simple.

I suggest that we take five minutes to think about these points and try to relate them
to something that is emotionally charged in our personal lives. I think the easiest is
some emotionally charged relationship that we’re in with somebody, whether it’s a
family relationship or a loving friendship or even a relationship at work. Try to
appreciate the fact that the way the situation appears to us and the way that it appears
to the other person are both limited, and neither one corresponds to the full picture of
reality. Nevertheless, we need to respect both points of view and try to understand
where they came from and how they arose. Both are like an illusion in the sense that
neither corresponds to the total reality of the situation – each is a simplified model.
But still we need to deal with these varying points of view and take them seriously if
we’re going to handle the situation. We need to avoid the two extremes, not thinking
just “mine is valid” or “mine is totally irrelevant, stupid” and denying it.

Try to understand how we want to avoid the two extremes here. One way of
formulating the extremes is that “the way it appears to me, that’s the only way that is

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real, that counts, and yours doesn’t count for anything” – we deny your side. Or we
could do it the other way around, that “only your side is valid and mine doesn’t count
at all.” We need to respect both, while realizing the limitations of each.

In other words, we need to deal with the illusion-like truth, the superficial truth, the
conventional truth, the relative truth of each point of view – however you want to
translate it. Remember, life is not the same as an illusion – it’s merely like an illusion:
the way things appear seems to be true, but that’s deceptive. What is an illusion is a
true reality that corresponds to the way things appear – that’s an illusion.

Let’s spend about five minutes trying to relate this to our own experience, particularly
in an emotionally charged relationship, then we will get a feeling for what we’re talking
about and for the relevance of it.

[meditation]

The Order of the Steps in Meditating on the Emptiness of How Things Appear to Us

The order in which we meditate on this is first we need to clear out the misconception
that we have about how things appear to us. We need to refute that how it appears to
me is truly how things exist and then we need to cut off completely not only our belief
that it corresponds to reality, but the deceptive appearance that it does. This is the
meditation on “space-like voidness,” the explicit understanding that there is no such
thing as a reality corresponding to how my limited mind makes things appear.

After this, focus on “no such thing.” Then, when the deceptive appearance arises again,
focus on it with the understanding that how things appears to me and how they
appear to you are just relatively true. Technically, we focus on “illusion-like voidness” –
we perceive things to appear as if encapsulated in plastic, but implicitly we understand
that they are devoid of actually existing in the way they appear. In this sense, they are
like an illusion. Only then can we properly go on to understand how each of these
ways of appearing is arising dependently on innumerable causes and circumstances
and then go on to analyze what those causes and circumstances may be.

The Necessity to Meditate on Space-like Voidness before Illusion-like Voidness

A common mistake is to think that we can meditate on illusion-like voidness first,

without clearing out our misunderstanding beforehand with the correct understanding
of space-like voidness. What is the mistake here?

If we meditate on these two steps in reverse order, we would be starting the

meditation focusing first on the two points of view as if each were encapsulated in
plastic, or each were like a ping-pong ball. The danger here is that, without explicitly
refuting that things cannot possibly exist like ping-pong balls, we would just
understand that neither ping-pong ball is absolute and that the illusion is that only
one of them is absolute. We would then be focusing on the two ping-pong balls as

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interacting in conflict with each other simply because each is relative to its own causes
and conditions. But, because we haven’t explicitly cleared out first the misconception
that there actually is a corresponding reality in which these two points of view exist like
ping-pong balls, we would be analyzing how two ping-pong balls dependently arise,
when there is no such thing as ping-pong balls.

We need to first understand that there are no such things as ping-pong balls and then,
when things appear like ping-pong balls and we analyze how they dependently arise,
our analysis will not be infected with the belief in ping-pong balls. It’s like if we’re
moving into a new apartment, first we need to clean out all the garbage that’s there.
We can’t just move all our things into a garbage-filled apartment and then, when
everything is all set up, clean out the old garbage.

Thinking about How a Situation Appears to Someone Else

It’s not easy to think about it how the relationship we have with someone appears to
that person. I’m not limiting “relationship” here to refer only to an intimate physical
relationship with someone, but to include any relationship – family, friendship or work.

Actually, it’s very hard to conceive of what it’s like to look at us all the time during
interactions. I think very few of us really have a clear mental image of what we look
like. In any relationship, I only see the other person; I don’t see myself. So, it’s a
simplification of what is occurring. It appears as though what the other person looks
like is all that’s happening, as if the reality were a movie shot by me. It’s hard to
conceive of what it looks like visually from the other person’s perspective or what it
looks like from someone else’s perspective seeing the two of us together. These are the
limitation that I was referring to that occur with the type of bodies and minds we have.

Imagining things from the other person’s perspective – not just visually, but
emotionally as well – is extremely important. Shantideva teaches this extensively in the
eighth chapter of Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior. There he says that if we have a
great deal of arrogance or jealousy toward others, try to look at ourselves acting that
way from the point of view of the person who’s the object of our negative emotion.

Shantideva presents this as a provisional method for overcoming disturbing emotions

in the chapter before his ninth one on voidness, emptiness. This is very skillful, since by
applying provisional methods for overcoming disturbing emotions first, we weaken
them. Then, by applying ultimate methods to overcome ignorance, we can rid
ourselves of them completely. But, we can also apply Shantideva’s method of
exchanging our viewpoint with someone else’s to help us understand relativity in our
meditation on voidness and dependent arising and avoid the extremes of eternalism
and nihilism. We would apply it after clearing out our misconceptions first with
meditation on space-like and illusion-like voidness.

Shantideva’s method of exchanging our viewpoint with that of others is based first on
equalizing self with others. The principle behind this equalizing is that my point of view

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and your point of view are both equally valid. Your opinion might be completely crazy,
but still it appears that way to you, so we need to deal with it. Just as we need to take
my suffering and your suffering equally seriously – the principle of equalizing self with
others – likewise, we need to take the way that things appear to me and the way they
appear to you equally seriously. Even though it might be very difficult to even conceive
of what it looks like from the other person’s point of view looking at us all day long, we
can’t deny that such a thing exists – to deny it is the nihilist extreme.

With this approach of equalizing and exchanging self with others, we can go much
deeper. We can analyze to understand that what’s behind my limited view is grasping
for a solid “me.” It’s as if we think I’m the only one that’s real; you’re not real. “Only my
feelings count; yours don’t.” All the disturbing emotions come from thinking like that.
We’re attached to our own position. We argue angrily, “Your position is wrong”; or
we’re totally naive, we don’t even accept the reality of someone else’s viewpoint. We
can be very aggressive, not even wanting to hear about it, and we just criticize,
criticize, criticize with sarcasm. We feel, “Mine is right,” so we have attachment. The
three poisonous disturbing emotions all come from this misconception, because we
unconsciously think, “I’m the only one that’s real; you’re not real.”

Fitting This In with The Four Immeasurables, Tong-len and the Six Perfections

Then we can connect our analysis with all the rest of the teachings – it’s beautiful. Here
we have the four immeasurables, very clearly. Immeasurable equanimity: freedom from
attachment, repulsion, and indifference. We’re not going to be attached, thinking, “My
viewpoint is the only one that’s right” and repulsion: “I’m going to argue against yours”
or indifference: “I don’t care what you say.”

When the Seven Point Mind Training teaches tong-len, giving and taking, it says take
from others attraction, repulsion and indifference, and give them freedom from those
three. As for the order, start with yourself. This is what comes first, you take it from
yourself first.

Then, on the basis of “I’m taking you seriously,” comes immeasurable love: “May you
be happy,” immeasurable compassion: “May you be free from suffering,” and
immeasurable joy: “May you attain not just freedom from ordinary suffering, but may
you attain the unending joy of enlightenment.” With these four immeasurable
attitudes, we have the proper motivation and, on top of that, we deal with the other
person’s viewpoint with the six far-reaching attitudes, the six perfections.

Everything fits together. Taking both sides seriously, not denying one or the other, and
being generous and having ethical self-discipline, patience, perseverance, mental
stability (which is not only concentration, but also emotional stability) and
discriminating awareness (to see what is actually going on – what’s helpful, what’s
harmful.)

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Conclusion

I think it’s important to get the general principle of the topic of dependent arising, like
this, before going into a tremendous amount of detail of levels of dependent arising.
The point we will learn is how, with a correct understanding of voidness and
dependent arising, we will avoid the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism, and then
be best able to deal with the complexities of life.

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What Emptiness or Voidness Negates

Question about Mediation of Disputes at Work

When we try to apply this principle of looking at the validity of

others’points of view, particularly in a work situation when you’re a
manager, sometimes we can be overwhelmed by the view of the
workers and it’s hard to actually deal with it. How do we make a
balance?

In general, there’s the principle of equalizing self and others, so you don’t go to either
extreme of “I’m the only one that’s valid,” or “they’re the only one that’s valid” – so you
all have equal validity. What that leads to is taking both sides equally seriously. That
doesn’t mean that how you handle the situation, what you decide to do, is going to be
affected only by that – only by the fact that both sides are equally valid from the point
of view of each side.

First of all, to deal with the situation, you need the four immeasurables and the six far-
reaching attitudes. On that basis, you analyze the reasons why they experience the
situation the way that they do? And what are the reasons why I feel that my way is
more valid? So, you evaluate with discriminating awareness.

You described a work situation. Let’s say the workers are on strike, they want more
salary. Is that because of greed? Or because they don’t have enough to live on? Then
look at your side. Is it because you’re being miserly? Or is it because the company
doesn’t have enough money to pay more?

The situation exists within the context of the economic situation of the whole country,
and what are the prospects and so on of the company making more money? You take
into consideration all these factors. As for the factors that are based just on disturbing
emotions, you can’t give that more weight than the factors that are based on reason.
Then you come to some sort of compromise with the workers. But the compromise is
based on the principle that the way I experience it is real to me, and the way you
experience it is real to you. You don’t deny that.

Here’s where you need to apply this wonderful teaching of the four ways to gather
disciples, which we can rename “the four ways to be a positive influence on others.”
The first one is be generous: give them something, anything. If you just say “no, no, no,
no, no,” they become completely turned off. So, give them something, not just
material, but give them the acknowledgement that something of what they say is
correct.

Then speak kindly, don’t just yell at them. Speak meaningfully. Then, set the example
by following the advice yourself. Don’t say, “I can’t give you a higher salary,” but then

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take an outrageously high salary for yourself. Better to negotiate, “I’m willing to take a
cut, are you willing to take a cut, because the company just doesn’t have the money?”

This is applicable not just in work situations, but in personal relationships as well.
These four pieces of advice are fantastic. That’s the way to be a positive influence on
others: be generous, speak kindly, speak meaningfully, and practice what you preach.

Life Is Not Like a Still Photograph

Does the understanding of voidness imply that the way that we

understand now is upside-down; “upside-down” meaning reversed
from the way things normally are?

That’s correct. This is what I was referring to in terms of seeing everything like an
illusion. Things appear to exist in a certain way, but they don’t actually exist like that.
What we’re seeing is just what 's in front of our eyes. We see various people in this
room, and just their superficial appearance is what we see. We have no idea of each
other’s family lives, no idea of the relationships that each of the others have, no idea of
their childhoods. None of that appears. But all these things – a childhood, etc. –
happened and they influenced each of you.

None of you exist like a still photograph that I see just now. That’s upside down, it’s the
reverse of actuality. And that’s what we need to always keep in mind, that things are
not like a still photograph, or a current movie that’s playing. There’s a lot more.

The Phenomenon of Selfies

This makes me think, by association, of why we have this almost “epidemic” of people
taking selfies. So many people take pictures of themselves with their mobile devices
and constantly take photos of everything they encounter and send it to everybody, as
if life was so complicated that we want to simplify it into still photos or short video
clips. It’s very interesting. If you analyze it in terms of voidness, it’s as if we’re trying to
establish our true solid existence by taking a photo. “If I take a photo and post it to
everybody, that makes me real.” This analysis becomes very applicable for identifying
the object to be refuted with the understanding of voidness. How does taking a selfie,
sharing it with others and getting many “likes” make you real? It’s absurd!

The response, if you want to deal with that issue properly, is not to say that all these
people who take selfies are stupid, and be very critical and arrogant about that. Such
people are truly objects of compassion – their lives are so complicated and so difficult
and stressful, that somehow they want to hang onto something that somehow makes
them feel secure, and so they take a selfie. The appropriate response to them is
compassion rather than “how stupid you are.”

I look at it another way. Posting selfies and other photos on social

media is a kind of a new language, a visual language that’s right now

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 coming up into the world. Isn’t connecting with others and
communicating with them something positive? Also, if we’re viewing
things incorrectly, sort of like “upside down,” can’t we just simply turn
things right-side up? And are there other images that might be useful
for understanding reality besides the fact that we see things upside-
down, for instance the analogy of thoughts being like waves on the
ocean of the mind?

In terms of the sense of connectedness when you post selfies and pictures, yes there is
a sense of connectedness, but you could also analyze it as a way to try to establish our
existence by being connected. The more people we’re connected with, the more “real”
we feel we are. For sure, there are positive sides to being connected via social media,
but it all depends on how you view what you’re doing. We often assume with our
posts that other people are really interested with seeing the nice meal we prepared,
which they may not be, so there’s a bit of self-importance there. Sharing, if it’s going to
be proper, should be sharing with people who would like to receive what we share. It
doesn’t make you more real, it merely allows you to interact with others. So the
motivation behind our taking a selfie and posting it or sending it to friends is very
important. It shouldn’t just be a compulsive relfex,

As for this image of how we perceive reality as upside-down and that, if we use that
image, we just need to turn it right-side up – there’s a problem with that. The
underlying false assumption is that corresponding to the upside-down appearance is
something findable that all we need to do is to turn right-side up. The problem is there
isn’t anything findable that we can turn right-side up!

But, this image of things being upside down could be helpful as a start. Look at how
Buddha taught and how the understanding of his teachings and their later
commentaries became codified as the Indian tenet systems. And look at how the
Tibetans approach their study in a graded way. First you gain a very rough
understanding of how things exist with the Vaibhashika system and then you refine it,
and refine it, and refine it. Many of the images that we start with, like this image of
things being upside-down, can be very helpful, but they need to be further refined. As
I explained, it’s not as though there’s something concrete that’s actually there that’s
upside down and could be turned right-side up. But as an initial way of understanding,
this image can be helpful.

As for the image of waves on the ocean, this is something found in the teachings in
one of the presentations of mahamudra, the great sealing nature of the mind. In this
presentation, the mind is like an ocean and the movement of the internal winds or
energies, when they’re very disturbed, makes like waves on the ocean. These are like
the disturbing emotions and the distortions in our perceptions and so on. One of the
methods is just to let the waves quiet down and then we’re left with the calm, vast and
deep ocean.

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But, of course that image can also be refined, because in this process, where am I? Am
I a boat on top of the ocean being tossed by it? Or am I a submarine that I want to just
go underneath and escape the turmoil? The image of the ocean can be refined in
terms of the relation between the self and the mind. But it’s a useful image.

Let’s go back to our discussion of dependent arising.

Emptiness or Voidness – A Total Absence of Something Inpossible

Voidness, or emptiness, is a total absence of something impossible. It never was the

case, it’s just impossible. It never existed before, it doesn’t exist now, it will never exist.
It’s impossible. But it’s not a total absence of some impossible object, such as chicken
lips or turtle hair. Nor is it simply the total absence of an impossible way of existing,
like independent existence. That can be an initial way of understanding voidness, but
the absence of an impossible way of existing is not precise enough. If one really
analyzes the terminology that's used in both Sanskrit and Tibetan, what it’s talking
about is the total absence of impossible ways of accounting for or establishing the
existence of validly knowable phenomena. This is very subtle, but it’s very important to
understand.

How do you account for the fact, how do you explain the fact, how do you establish
the fact that there are validly knowable phenomena and that they can be validly known
as this or that? That’s the issue that voidness is dealing with: what establishes that
there are such things in the universe as teachers and students, and that we can validly
know somebody as a teacher and we can validly know somebody as a student? How
do you account for such things?

Do you understand that? It’s very interesting. We have such things as teachers and
students. We have such activities as learning and teaching – we do a million things
during the day – how is it that out of all those things that we do, somehow some of
those things are grouped together and called “learning” or called “teaching?” And out
of all the things that somebody does, how can you validly know somebody as a
teacher? There are certain ways of accounting for that that are valid and possible, and
certain ways that are not valid and impossible. Voidness is the absence of those
impossible ways: they don’t correspond to anything valid.

An Example of Emptiness or Voidness

Here’s an example of what we’re talking about. The question we’ll analyze is: what
makes what I just explained easy or difficult? How do you account for the fact or
explain the fact that you find it easy or you find it difficult? Is it something on the side
of what I explained – the topic, the words I chose to explain it, the sound of the words,
the movement of my tongue and mouth that makes it easy or difficult? Is it something
findable in any of those that inherently – in other words, by its own power alone –
makes it easy or difficult? Is that what makes it easy or difficult? When you think about

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it, that’s impossible. The absence of anything valid that corresponds to that way of
establishing what I explained as easy or difficult is what voidness is talking about.

If what established it as easy or difficult were really something from the side of the
words that I said, they would be easy for everybody, or difficult for everybody to
comprehend. But easy or difficult depends on many, many factors. It arises
dependently on you, the listener’s level of understanding, your background in the
Buddhist teachings or in philosophy in general, etc. It also depends on the skill of me,
the teacher, in explaining it and, of course, on my level of understanding. And it also
depends on your state of mind – are you sleepy, are you alert?

So, how is it that you or I find it easy? How is it that you or I find it difficult? There’s
nothing on the side of the words that necessarily make them easy or difficult. Words
are just words and the sound of words are just sounds. Being easy or difficult can only
be established dependently on other factors, not on something inherent in the words
or their sounds.

Things Are Relative

Further, things like easy or difficult are relative. The example that His Holiness the Dalai
Lama always uses is your fourth finger. Is it long or short? Well it’s long compared to
your little finger, but short compared to your middle finger. It’s only long or short
dependently on something else, or compared to somebody else’s fourth finger. But by
itself, it’s not long or short.

This idea of relativity is not so difficult to understand in terms of adjectives: long, short,
easy, difficult, good, bad. So, it’s a good place to start to understand dependent
arising. Long or short, easy or difficult arise not just dependently on “the eye of the
beholder,” but also in comparison with something else. What is good and bad, in any
case? What do they mean? It all depends on how they are defined, and different
people and cultures will define them differently. There are many levels of
understanding when we talk about dependent arising.

As I say, it’s easiest to understand this with adjectives, like good or bad and long or
short. But then we need to apply relativity to nouns – like being a mother or a father,
or being a teacher or a student. We also need to apply it to activities. Out of
everything that I do, what does it mean that I’m learning? What does it mean that I’m
doing anything? How can we validly know that?

These are very interesting, but much more difficult to understand – if I may use that
word “difficult.” First, we need to understand dependent arising and relativity with
adjectives, and from that, we get the general idea of dependent arising. Then we can
consider what makes me a mother or a father? Well, you can’t be a mother of a father
without a child, to start with. They depend on something else.

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Once you start examining questions like, “What am I doing now?” you could say, “I’m
learning.” But, you’re also sitting, you’re also listening, you’re also paying attention,
you’re also breathing. Do we draw some sort of circle and put a plastic over some part
of that and call that “learning?” You can’t isolate any of these from each other; none of
them are happening all on their own. Nevertheless, conventionally, we’re learning,
we’re listening.

Reflection on Emptiness or Voidness

Let’s try to digest this very important principle here of what emptiness or voidness is
actually talking about. We’re not talking about some impossible object, like chicken
lips. We’re not just simply talking about an impossible way of existing, like
independently. We’re talking about how do you account for the fact that you can
validly know things as this or that. How can you validly know that this is long or this is
short? You can only validly know it dependently on other things; it’s relative. There is
nothing on the side of an object that establishes it as long or short, or good or bad, or
easy or difficult, by its own power or influence alone. You can only establish something
as validly long or short, or good or bad, relative or dependent on factors other than
the object itself.

In saying this, we want to avoid the two extremes. It’s not that there’s only one way for
everybody – the object is long for everybody or good for everybody. That’s the
eternalist, absolutist extreme. Or that it could be anything – that’s the nihilist extreme.
It’s not that the object could be anything. The object, from its own side, isolated from
everything else, cannot be established as either long or short, either both or neither.

Let’s spend a few minutes trying to let that sink in. Once we can understand the
general idea, in this general way, then we can refine our understanding further and
further.

And please apply this to emotionally-charged issues. Not just is my fourth finger long
or short. Apply it to “I’m a good person, I’m a bad person. I’m pretty, or I’m ugly.”
These kinds of things.

[pause]

Let me give an example. Let’s say you’re 40 years old. To your children, you’re old. To
your parents, you’re young. What are you? Are you young or old? Are you nothing?
We’re not nothing. We’re 40 years old. And it’s valid that to our children we look old,
and to our parents we look young. Everything is dependent. Even being 40 years old is
dependent on how many times the earth went around the sun.

The problem is when we identify ourselves inherently with anything, for instance: “I am
truly old.” Then we convince ourselves that “I’m too old to learn a new language, I’m
too old to do this or that.” Or we still think, “I’m young” – I can stay out and dance all

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night and only function on two hours’ sleep, as if I’m 20 years old. See the relevance of
understanding voidness and dependent arising?

These are helpful examples, I find. To our children, we’re old. To our parents, we’re
young. And we’re 40 years old. All of those are relatively true, conventionally true,
aren’t they?

Accounting for the Conventional Identity of Things

Review

We’ve been speaking about voidness or emptiness, and we’ve seen that voidness is the
total absence of impossible ways of accounting for, or establishing the existence of
validly knowable objects. It deals with the issue of how to account for the fact that
there are validly knowable things, and they can be validly known as this or that. How
do we establish that something is long or short, or that somebody is a teacher of a
student, or that some activity is teaching or learning, and that we can validly know
those things?

Validly Knowable Conventional Objects

Voidness, then, is negating an impossible way of establishing this. To understand that a

little bit more precisely, we need to go further with definitions. What is a validly
knowable object, such as a teacher or a student, or long or short? It’s defined as
something that holds its own essential nature, and it’s equivalent to a conventional
object. “Essential nature” is the way I translate the Tibetan word “ngowo” (ngo-bo).

Then we need to look at what do those words in the definition mean. What’s a
conventional object? It’s something that, for the ease of communication and other
practical purposes, is agreed upon by custom as being something – like a teacher. A
validly knowable object, then, is something that can be validly known as this or that–as
a teacher or a student, as studying or as teaching. And it’s based upon what has been
agreed upon, by custom.

By custom or convention, a society has agreed upon what a teacher is, and has agreed
upon a certain set of sounds to be the word that is used to communicate what this is.
Think in terms of cave people who thought up these categories of things and
somehow made words for them. That’s how you need to approach this whole topic –
where did this all come from? People had to agree that certain sounds were words,
and they had to agree upon certain things, like teachers, a tool, danger, love; they had
to agree upon them and make concepts and words for them. This is true not only for
humans, but even many kinds of animals have a concept of “danger” and have the
accepted convention of a sound they make that communicates it to warn other
members of their species.

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If you think about that, it’s quite extraordinary. Think of the word “dog.” There are so
many animals that look really quite different. How did it come about and what
established that a group of them are all called dogs? What established that they were
all put in the same category, and that there’s a word assigned to that category and
that covers all its members? That’s really quite amazing, if you think about it. Who’d
have thought that up? They all look quite different.

These are conventional objects, like “dogs” Their existence as dogs and being validly
knowable as dogs arise dependently on custom, conventions, context, definitions, and
so on. Remember, we’re not just dealing with general knowledge about objects, such
as dogs. We’re also dealing with things like stupid, ugly – these types of things that are
emotionally charged. These emotionally charged categories and words clearly have
arisen dependently on social convention, a context and many other things. These are
conventional concepts – dumb, stupid, ugly– and their meanings are agreed upon by
custom. They can be validly known, but of course, they are each relative concepts and
terms. Like we’ve seen, we’re old to our children, we’re young to our parents. Both are
valid, relative to many things, such as the age of the person who’s looking at us,
culture, etc. “I’m stupid compared to Einstein” or “I’m very smart compared to the
dog.” These relative words and concepts make communication possible.

Validly Knowable Conventional Objects Have Two Essential Natures

A conventional object, a validly knowable object, is something that holds its own
essential nature. What does that mean? Well, actually, validly knowable conventional
objects have two essential natures. Now, of course, everybody will translate these
terms differently, but I would suggest calling them a “superficial essential nature” –
what something appears to be, this or that, like on the surface. This superficial
essential nature conceals something deeper, and that's the “deepest essential nature,”
the object’s absence or lack of being established as this or that in impossible ways.

The more commonly used terms for these two essential natures are conventional
nature or relative nature, and ultimate nature, but I don’t think they convey the exact
meaning. They are the essential nature that’s on the surface – it’s superficial, it’s on the
surface, it’s what it appears like – and the deepest essential nature.

The Superficial Essential Nature of Objects

The superficial essential nature of objects is what validly knowable phenomena

conventionally are – it’s what objects conventionally are: a teacher, a student, long or
short, smart or dumb. It’s superficial, it’s what something appears to be, but obviously,
what it appears to be to someone.

Then the question is how to account for these superficial natures? What’s confusing
and deceptive is that these superficial natures appear to be accounted for by inherent

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natures; in other words, by something findable on the side of the objects, conventional
objects, that has the power to make them what they are. For instance, it seems like
there’s something inside me that makes me stupid – there’s something wrong with me.
And we believe that. “I’m really, really stupid” or “I’m really, really so beautiful” or
“I’m really the teacher.”

Another way of translating the Tibetan word for “inherent nature,” “rangzhin” (rang-
bzhin) is a “self-establishing nature,” which is the translation I prefer. It’sa nature inside
a validly knowable object that all by itself establishes it as being what it conventionally
is. Somebody could conventionally be a teacher; that’s valid. Or they can
conventionally be a student; that’s valid. But, it appears as though I’m just a natural
teacher, there’s something inside me that makes me a great teacher, or that makes me
a great student – that’s false. It appears like that, but that’s not true. Ignorance, or
unawareness, is when you believe it to be true.

Please note that this Tibetan term, rangzhin, is also sometimes used as a synonym for
this superficial essential nature. In that case, it needs to be translated and understood
as a “self-nature.” But, the self-nature of things is not a self-establishing nature. In other
contexts, such as in some dzogchen texts, when ngowo and rangzhinare
differentiated, ngowo is somethings superficial essential nature – what something is –
and rangzhin is its functional nature – what it does. It’s important to differentiate these
different meanings and usages of these terms; otherwise, we can get very confused.

The Deepest Essential Nature

The deepest essential nature of objects is their voidness of self-established existence.

There’s no such thing as a self-establishing nature findable on the side of validly
knowable objects. Their self-natures do not function as self-establishing natures.
Therefore, when we talk about voidness, it’s impossible that the conventional existence
of something is accounted for by a self-establishing nature. Why? Because there’s no
such thing as a self-establishing nature.

A simple example: on your computer screen, or on your mobile device, you see a little
person. How do you establish that there’s an appearance of a person there? The
superficial essential nature is the appearance – it looks like there is a little person there
on the screen of our smartphone. And it’s valid, that’s correct. Anybody who looked at
the screen would agree, “Yeah, that looks like a little person.” The superficial nature is
that that’s a person; it’s an appearance of a little person, of a human being.

How do we account for the fact that there’s this appearance on the screen of my
smartphone? Can it be accounted for by the fact that there’s actually a little person
inside the phone that’s looking out of the screen at me? That would be a self-
establishing nature. “Hi, I’m inside your smartphone, hello!” – that’s impossible, there is
no such thing. It’s only established by some sort of computer program, and internet,

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and all sorts of things, but not by some little person sitting inside your smartphone.
Voidness means that it’s impossible that it’s established by something inside, inherent
and self-establishing, that “Here I am” – to put it in a very simple example. But it is
valid, conventionally, that this is what appears, and it seems like there is someone
there, but not really, if you really think about it.

You could take this to a very profound level. It seems as though there’s a little “me”
sitting inside my head talking, the author of the voice that’s talking like somebody
inside the smartphone. It appears like that, but there’s actually no little “me” sitting
inside my head talking. But it is valid that it’s me–it’s not you. How do we account for
the fact that this is me? Is it because there’s a little me sitting inside my head, talking?
No. It’s dependent on many other things. But it’s still validly me – it’s not you.

This is very deep, very profound, when we apply this analysis to “me,” but this is where
the analysis is leading to, starting from a silly example like a smartphone. That’s how
we approach this material; we can understand it by easy examples, and then go deeper
and deeper. The smartphone, I think is a good example. In earlier times, it would have
been a television.

This is quite important to understand. Conventionally knowable objects have two

essential natures: superficially, what it conventionally is. But it also appears as though
there’s some self-establishing nature on the side of the object that holds it up, that
accounts for it, all by its own power. Its superficial essential nature, its self-nature,
appears to be a self-establishing nature. But that is a false, deceptive appearance.
There’s no such thing inside any object propping it up. Its existence as what it
conventionally is and its existence as a validly knowable object cannot be accounted
for by something findable by analysis inside it. The absence of such a manner of
establishing its existence is its deepest nature, its voidness or emptiness. Its
conventional existence as what it is and even its conventional existence as a validly
knowable object can only be established dependently on many other things. This is
known as “dependent arising.”

Let’s take a few minutes to try to reaffirm our understanding of that. It’s very basic; its
fundamental in our Buddhist training. This is the source of all our problems: we believe
that the way that things appear to exist is the way they actually do exist. It appears like
there’s a little person inside my smartphone – well this is absurd. It appears like there’s
something inside of “me” that makes me dumb or stupid, as if that’s my inherent
nature. Well, being dumb is only relative to someone else, like Einstein. I may be stupid
in a certain area, but smart in another area. Everything is relative.

Look at myself. I’m really stupid when it comes to how to use mechanical devices. I’m
hopeless, stupid. But I’m very smart with Sanskrit grammar. Am I inherently stupid or
am I inherently smart? “I’m such a smart person” or “I’m such a stupid person?” I can
only be established as smart or stupid dependent on the context and subject matter.
Are we talking about how to repair a bicycle or about how to recognize what case a

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certain Sanskrit noun is in? There’s nothing on the side of “me” that makes me
inherently smart or stupid. But when we identify with one or the other, then we get
real emotional problems. We think, this is the true “me”: “I’m smart.” Or the true “me”
is “I’m stupid.” That’s the real “me.” That’s absurd. Try to apply that to yourself – think
about it.

[pause]

Questions about a Self-established “Me”

As part of our developmental process, we become self-aware. Cats, for

instance, don’t recognize themselves in a mirror, but children, about the
age of three or four, can recognize themselves as being separate from
others. How is that possible?

The interesting question from that is: before young children have a sense of self-
recognition, do they have grasping for an inherently established self? You’d have to
say, yes. Otherwise, when babies feel the discomfort of being hungry, why do they cry?
Don’t they have an automatic sense of “me,” as in: “I want this hunger to go away?”
Very small toddlers can be very self-willed and stubborn even before they can talk.
They can even be possessive and selfish: “This is my toy, mine.” Even cats have a sense
of a self-established “me”:“This is my bowl of food, not the other cat’s bowl of food;
this is mine.”

It becomes interesting how our grasping for a solidly-existent “me” gets stronger and
stronger as we get older. A preverbal infant doesn’t think verbally, but like the cat, still
has the concept of a solid, self-established “me.” But when the toddler reaches a
certain age and learns language, it starts to talk in its mind. That helps to solidify a
sense that there’s some solid “me” inside there, talking. Then as they get older, there
are all sorts of things that make that grasping stronger and stronger, for instance the
number of “likes” their posts get on their Facebook page.

When deconstructing the solid sense of “me,” how do you avoid the
danger of losing self-confidence?

We lose our self-confidence when we go to the extreme of nihilism, the extreme of

denying our conventional existence. Then we need to analyze, what would establish
my self-confidence? Is it something inside me that makes me strong from my side? Or
is self-confidence dependent on many, many other things? For instance, what I’ve
studied, what I’ve trained in, whether I’m tired, whether I’m alert. There are all sorts of
things that our self-confidence would depend on in any specific situation or with
respect to any specific task. This is realistic; it’s conventional reality.

When we have a sense of self-confidence, what is the conventional

reality of that?

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Conventionally, we might feel that we’re self-confident. That’s how we feel, and other
people might even perceive us that way. For instance, we might speak with great self-
confidence, and that could be true, we do speak self-confidently.

Now, we need to make a differentiation here. There are two aspects of conventional
truth: there is the conventional truth of what something is and there is the
conventional truth of how something appears to be established. It seems to me that
what being self-confident is based upon, what accounts for it, and what supports it, is
that inherently, by the power of my own inherent self-nature, I’m really great. After all, I
can work seven days a week without taking any days off and without ever taking a
vacation. It seems like I can do anything and that my abilities are established by the
power of my self-nature of being so great. But this feeling of self-confidence is not
established by something like that. It’s established by the fact that I’m doing
something that I’m good at and that I like. But there are other things that I’m not good
at and that I don’t like having to do. So, although it might feel as though I could do
anything and that might give me a sense of self-confidence, it is not valid.

For self-confidence to be healthy, it needs to be based on reality; it needs to be

realistic. To feel self-confident that we can do things that we’re not really able to do
just leads to making mistakes. For instance, to feel so self-confident that even though
we’re absolutely exhausted, we can still drive our car can easily lead to having an
accident. On the other hand, if we’re a brain surgeon, we’d better feel self-confident
that we know what we’re doing. But we could be very confident in doing brain surgery,
but not at all self-confident in fixing our car if it breaks down. Being self-confident, in
this case, in doing brain surgery is conventionally true and is based on conventional
reality. And it is conventionally true that our ability seems to us to be self-established
by our nature of being so great, but that’s deceptive. The deepest truth is there is
nothing inherently on our side that, by its own power, makes us so great. If we
understand that, then we can use our talents and abilities in a realistic way, and not
feel arrogant by identifying solidly with what we’re good at.

Accounting for Something Being Validly Knowable

Accounting for Validly Knowing Objects as Being This or That

How do we account for something being validly knowable as this or that? We can’t
account for it by means of some self-establishing nature inside something that makes
it this or that. We can only account for it dependently on other factors. That fact about
things is known as “dependent arising.” The object arises and is known as this or that
dependently on other factors, not just independently by itself, by its own power.

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For instance, in Buddhism we have a great emphasis on the spiritual teacher. We need
to rely on a spiritual teacher and we need to be a proper disciple or student. What
makes somebody a spiritual teacher? And what would make us a student?

How do we account for someone being validly knowable as a teacher of Buddhism?

First of all, they need to have students – how can a person who has no students be a
teacher? Someone can advertize that they’re a teacher, but if they have no students,
what makes them a teacher? This is a clear indication of this false way of thinking, that
something inside of them makes them a teacher by its own power, even without their
having any students. But nobody can be a teacher without students – student and
teacher are dependent on each other. The person might have had students in the past,
and dependently on that, they were previously a teacher. But if they have no students
now, they aren’t presently a teacher.

Even if they have students now, if they’re not teaching them anything, are they still a
teacher? No, they need to actually be teaching something. But do they need to be
teaching that every moment of the day and night to still be a teacher? What about
when they’re sleeping, are they still a teacher? And even if they are teaching
something to other people at the moment, if the students don’t learn anything, are
they still a teacher? These are questions we need to analysis in meditation.

Validly Knowable Objects Arise Dependently

Being validly knowable as a teacher arises dependently on presently having students

and fulfilling the function of being a teacher. We need to teach something and the
students need to learn something. Independently of those things, how can somebody
be established as a teacher?

It doesn't matter if people are learning from someone’s books or website – even if their
author is dead, that person is still validly established as a teacher. There’s a teaching
and people are learning from it. And what the teacher is doing can only be established
as a teaching if somebody learns something from it. Even the way the teacher is
eating, if somebody learns something from it, the teacher is teaching; if nobody learns
anything from it, it’s not teaching, it’s just eating.

In the Eight Verse Mind Training, it says when people give us a hard
time, we should regard them as our teachers. What establishes them as
a teacher then?

If somebody does something that somebody learns something from, that establishes
them as a teacher. Whether they think of themselves as a teacher or not is irrelevant. A
dog can be our teacher. We can learn something from a dog. A dog can lie down and
go to sleep anywhere; it teaches us something. The dog isn’t picky about where it lies
down, is it? The dog isn’t fussy. We’re fussy. We can learn from the dog to not be so
fussy.

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It’s impossible that there’s something on the side of the dog, or on the side of my
Buddhism teacher, that establishes them as a teacher. We can only account for them as
being validly knowable as a teacher if they are teaching something and somebody
learns something – so they are fulfilling the function of a teacher. To validly be a
teacher, someone needs to perform the function of teaching. And being a teacher is
also dependent on whether anyone learns anything from us.

Now, it becomes very interesting when we apply this analysis to ourselves, “Am I a
student of Buddhism?” How do we establish that it’s valid to call ourselves a student of
Buddhism? We can only be a student of Buddhism if we have a teacher of Buddhism –
we can’t exist independently as a student unless we are studying with a Buddhism
teacher and learning something. We can see this point from the fact that standard
lam-rim graded path texts start with the instructions for relying on a spiritual teacher.
We can understand why it’s there at the beginning in many different ways, but if we
understand it in terms of dependent arising, then it’s quite clear. We can only exist as
students dependently on having a teacher; otherwise we’re not students.

Now the teacher could be the one who wrote the book that we’re reading, the author
of the website we’re viewing, or the person giving the lecture we’re attending. There
could be many different forms of teachers, many different media. But we can’t be
students without a teacher. That answers the question: “Do I need a teacher?” Of
course, we need a teacher. How can we learn anything without a teacher, without
somebody who tells us something, who shows us something, even if just in their
behavior?

If we say, “I have a teacher” but we’re not studying anything with them, then we’re not
a student. What about if we’re in the classroom, but we’re texting all the time during
the lecture and we don’t learn anything, are we a student at that time? No. To be a
student, we need to fulfill the function of being a student, which means we are
presently learning something. Then of course, this raises the whole issue of what does
it mean that we are learning something?

It’s very interesting, the more that we investigate. Let’s say I don’t go to a Buddhism
teacher’s teachings, I don’t read any Buddhist books, I don’t look at any Buddhist
website. And even if I do, I don’t learn anything from them. Can I still validly consider
myself a student of Buddhism? No. Can I consider myself to be a Buddhist? Well, what
does it mean to be a Buddhist? These are interesting questions. Does wearing a red
string around my neck make me a Buddhist?

If we were born as a Christian, does that make us a Christian? It’s an interesting

question – if we don’t practice anything of Christianity, or whatever religion we were
born in, what accounts for us validly being known as a Christian or a Buddhist? Well, it
arose dependently on factors other than ourselves. For instance, it depended on us
having been born in a family where our parents were Christian. That would make us a
Christian by birth. When an infant comes out of the womb, there’s nothing inside of

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the infant that makes it a Christian from its own side, does it? Even if we think in terms
of previous lives – “well there’s the instinct” – but that arose dependently upon
something else, a previous life. Everything arises as what it is dependently on factors
other than itself. Think about that.

[pause]

Establishing What Can Be Considered as Validly Knowable

How do we account for the fact that we can be validly known as a student of
Buddhism, or a Buddhist? “I consider myself a Buddhist” – well, why? Just because I call
myself a Buddhist, does that make me a Buddhist? If I call myself a Tibetan, does that
make me Tibetan? Even if I dress in Tibetan clothes and speak Tibetan and eat tsampa,
does that make me a Tibetan?

It’s very interesting actually. You move to another country _ for instance, I moved to
Germany. Well, what could make me German? And if being German means that I live
there a certain length of time and I gain citizenship – it’s like taking refuge and
becoming a Buddhist – then being German has arisen dependently on that. There’s
nothing on my side by its own power that made be a Buddhist, or a German, or a
Tibetan, or a doctor, or whatever I am. It arose dependently on other factors.

And if I don’t practice being a Buddhist, I just call myself a Buddhist, but I don’t
actually do anything Buddhist – I say I take refuge, but they’re only words – if I don’t
actually implement it in my life, am I a Buddhist? Well, that’s questionable, isn’t it?
Think about that.

[pause]

The more we think about it, the more amazing this whole thing becomes. How do we
account for our being a student of Buddhism, or for our being a Buddhist? What we’ve
seen is that there are many things that need to be present, that it’s dependent on. Not
just one thing. Or is it? It depends how we define things, doesn’t it? In the case of
being a Buddhist, do we define it just in terms of “I participated in a ceremony, in a
ritual in which I took refuge, and chose to participate in that ceremony.” Is that
sufficient to say that I’m a Buddhist? If I never study anything about Buddhism, I
haven’t learned anything about Buddhism, and I don’t practice anything about
Buddhism, but I participated in this ceremony and got a Tibetan name, and I wear a
red string around my neck, am I a Buddhist? If I wear a cross around my neck, does
that make me a Christian? If a dog wears a cross around its neck, does that make the
dog a Christian? How do we establish validly that anything is this or that?

Avoiding the Two Extremes When Establishing Validly Knowable Phenomena

We need to avoid the two extremes. The eternalist extreme is “It’s just this that makes
me a Buddhist” – something on my side, or just this aspect. The nihilist extreme is that

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“I’m nothing, I’m not even conventionally a Buddhist.” We need to avoid the two
extremes.

A lot depends on the context of how things are defined. To save ourselves from being
slaughtered as an infidel, for instance, we might need to say, “I accept Jesus Christ as
my savior” or “I accept Islam.” And if we say that, we’re spared; we’re not going to be
burned at the stake or have our heads chopped off. Well, in that context, that makes us
a Christian or a Muslim to our inquisitors. But are we actually practicing the religion?
What does it really mean to be a Christian or a Muslim? It arises dependently on a
context, on a definition, on how the function is defined. But, in that context, we said
that we were a Christian, we said that we were a Muslim, and it was valid. It was correct
and we weren’t burned at the stake. Interesting, isn’t it?

When we consider ourselves a student of Buddhism, or a Buddhist, what accounts for

us being that? Is there something findable inside me, on my side, something that
others would agree with? What establishes it? What accounts for it? If we answer and
say, for instance, what accounts for it is that we recited the refuge formula, is that
sufficient? What may be sufficient for one group may not be sufficient for other
groups.

These are just various things to consider, but we need to apply this questioning to
relevant things in our lives. Think about it. Try to figure it out. What are the
implications of this discussion in terms of “Who do I think I am?” … “Who am I?” …
“What am I?” There’s my profession, my role as a mother, a father, my gender as a man
or as a woman, there’s this country or that country, this religion or that religion – what
establishes who I am or what I am? What accounts for it? What is the context? “Am I
nothing?” – that’s nihilism. “Am I just this in every context, in every situation?” – that’s
eternalism. These are the extremes; we need to work with these points and avoid these
extremes.

Why don’t we think about this for a couple of minutes, and then, if it’s not clear, please
ask questions. To put it in the classic form, there is a superficial nature – what we are,
what somebody is, a teacher or a student. It has a conventional validity. It seems as
though there’s some self-established nature there that establishes it, but there’s no
such thing. The eternalist position is that there really is a self-established nature there.
And the nihilist position is not only is there no self-established nature there, there’s not
even a superficial conventional nature either – we’re nothing.

Think about that for a few minutes. Am I a student? Am I really, truly a student? Or am
I nothing?

[pause]

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Questions about Identities

From my experience, I was having difficulties with my wife, and at one

moment, she said something to me and I understood something from
that and resolved something. In that moment, was my wife the teacher
and was I the student? In another situation, I said something about
meditation to somebody else and it clicked with them. In that situation,
was I the teacher? Does that make me a student or a teacher?

Yes, we can validly say that in one situation you were a student and in the other, you
were a student. But I think it’s important to recognize that conventionally being a
student arose dependently on many other factors besides just the words that your wife
spoke. There were many other things going on in your life so that you were receptive,
so that what you heard clicked and you learned something from them. Otherwise, if
she had said the same thing, but at a different time, it might not have made any
difference. For instance, your wife may tell you something and it doesn’t make any
impression upon you. But when your friend tells you the same thing, it does make an
impression. So, when we speak of dependent arising of cause and effect, we need to
understand that things arise from many, many causes and conditions coming together,
and not just from one cause.

If somebody says something and we learn something from it, and from
our side we regard that person as a teacher, does it make any difference
whether they regard themselves as a teacher in that situation?

It doesn’t depend on what they consider themselves as. The dog didn’t consider itself
a teacher when it taught us to be more flexible and not so fussy. Our computer taught
us impermanence when the hard drive crashed. Did the computer intend to do that?
No. But we learned something from it.

We need to consider what is necessary to account for somebody being our teacher in
this example. What is needed, and what is extra? This becomes relevant when
meditating. What do I need to have in my room for meditating? What’s necessary, and
what is extra? Do I need candles, do I need incense? What do we need to establish it
as our place of meditating? If we start to think about that, we become much more
flexible. If we insist that it must have incense and we don’t have incense, “Oh, I can’t
meditate” – well, come on.

It’s very interesting, the more we start to think about this. We just put up a new
website, and what we put up [studybuddhism.com) is what’s known as a “minimum
viable product.” What needs to be there in a website for it to validly be called a
minimum viable product? What has to be there to be the minimum viable product for
being a Buddhist? What has to be there, and what is extra? It’s all dependent on how

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being a website or being a Buddhist is defined, and what function we expect the
website or ourselves to fulfill.

What’s the minimum viable product for being a good person? What’s the minimum
viable product for being an intelligent person? What’s the minimum viable product for
being a pretty or a handsome person? Now we start to think. It really is relative, isn’t
it?

What’s the minimum viable product for being a real man or a real woman? The
minimum viable product for being a mother or a father – just giving birth to
somebody? What do we need to do to really be the parent? Just be a sperm or an egg
donor? These are quite relevant questions nowadays.

When talking about identification, is there some sort of identification

that is not samsaric?

That’s a wonderful question. In the case of an identification with being truly self-
established as a student for instance –this is really who I am, truly established from my
own side – this is not valid. It is samsaric in the sense that believing we have a self-
established identity makes us inflexible and often defensive, and brings us
uncontrollably recurring rebirth. But there’s a conventional identity or superficial
identity, a dependently arisen identity, such as being our mother’s son and our
daughter’s father. These are valid conventional identities and believing them to be
correct and accepting the responsibilities that go with these identities do not bring
about uncontrollably recurring rebirth, samsara. We need to differentiate the two.

And even with superficial identities, some are valid and some are not. For instance,
pretending to be a doctor when we’re not is certainly a false identity. And believing we
have that identity, even just conventionally, not truly, and then performing a brain
operation would cause major problems, wouldn’t it?

Validly Knowable Objects Are Not Self-established

Review

We’ve been speaking about conventional objects, which are things that can be validly
known as this or that: as a teacher, as a student, as a given activity such as learning or
teaching, as a given object such as a table or a chair, and as an adjective as well, such
as long or short.

We’ve been considering the question: how do you account for the fact that
conventionally there are such things and that you can validly know them? After all, if

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there are no such things as teachers and there is no such thing as learning, what are
we doing here? If there’s no such thing as Buddhism and no such thing as any of the
teachings – what are we studying, what are we actually doing? This is not just a
theoretical abstract topic. It has to do with how we deal with our conventional reality.

If there is no such thing as Buddhism, then what am I studying? What is it that I want
to learn? If there’s no such thing as learning, what can I do? What am I doing? If there’s
no such thing as teachers, who can I learn from? Or can just anybody say that they are
a teacher? These are essential questions in terms of how we deal with our lives.

Validly Knowable Objects Are Not Self-established

We’ve asked the questions: what establishes that there are these things? What
accounts for the fact that there these things? What explains the fact that there are
these things? Are they just self-established all by themselves, or do they arise
dependently on other factors?

We’ve seen that it’s impossible that they are self-established. We haven’t gone through
all the logical reasons to demonstrate that, but that is an important facet of the study
of voidness. We need to become convinced logically that there are certain ways of
establishing things that are just impossible, and one of them is that they are self-
established all by their own power, independently of any influence form anything other
than themselves. The total absence of an actuality that corresponds to self-established
existence – that’s voidness, emptiness.

We also saw that everything has two essential natures.

• The superficial one is what they appear to be – conventionally this or that– and
their deceptive appearance of being established by a self-establishing nature,
despite there being no such thing.
• Their deepest essential nature is the total absence of an actual valid way of
establishing their conventional existence that corresponds to this deceptive
appearance.

When we say something appears to be established in an impossible way, I think we

can understand it more easily as being a subjective experience – it feels like that, it
seems like that. We’re talking about how things are experienced. It feels as though
there’s something solid there inside the object or phenomenon that makes this one
inherently good and that one inherently bad, for example.

Like, for instance, when we’re in a bad mood, what does it feel like? It feels as though
there’s some big solid bad mood sitting inside me that establishes that I’m in a bad
mood. We make a solid thing out of this bad mood, and then we act on that basis:
“Don’t bother me, I’m in a bad mood.” Like a dog, we bark at anybody that comes near.

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But there’s no self-established bad mood sitting inside me, like some sort of monster,
is there? A bad mood has arisen dependently on other factors: what happened to us at
work, what’s happening to us physically – we have a headache, we didn’t sleep enough
– we might be having problems in our family, our psychological history, all sorts of
things.

Under-refutation and Over-refutation as the Two Extremes

It’s not that we’re not in a bad mood, conventionally we are in a bad mood, so we
don’t want to go to the nihilist extreme of just ignoring it and not doing anything
about it. That’s the over-refutation: we refute not only the monster sitting inside of us
that’s establishing this bad mood, but we tie together with that the conventional truth
that I’m in a bad mood, and throw both of them away. When we do that, we don’t deal
with the fact that conventionally we are in a bad mood. We don’t apply any further
opponent forces to change the mood that we’re in. It’s a gross denial.

When we understand that the bad mood has arisen from all sorts of causes and
conditions – there’s nothing solid there – then we can go further and realize that if we
change the causes and conditions, change what’s going on, that will affect our mood.
So, we take steps to deal with and alter the bad mood by applying our understanding
of cause and effect – dependent arising.

The other extreme that we could go to is the under-refutation: “I’m in this solid
horrible mood, but it’s arisen by causes and conditions, and it’s dependent on other
things; but still there it is, sitting inside me, solid.” This is the eternalist extreme. So, we
refute it just a little bit, we refute that it’s there by itself and conclude, “Okay, it arose
from causes and conditions, but still there’s something solid there.” If we under-refute
and conclude like that, we’re left with the conclusion that there’s nothing we can do.
Over-refutation is that I don’t have to do anything, it doesn’t exist. Under-refutation is
that there’s still nothing that I can do to change this mood, because although it’s
arisen from causes and conditions, it’s still solid.

This is the general idea of the relevance of this topic: dependent arising, the
understanding of voidness, and the understanding of voidness as implying dependent
arising – it’s actually very practical in terms of how we deal with anything in our lives.

Let’s just spend a few minutes to digest that and to see if we really understand this
most general idea, even more general than how we were discussing it up to now.

Examine yourself. How do you account for being in a bad mood? Is it just that “Well,
that’s just the way it is, I’m in a bad mood” – or has it arisen from causes and
conditions? And have those causes and conditions just produced this bad mood that
we’re in, and now we’re really solidly locked into this bad mood, or is there nothing
solid holding it up and we can affect how we feel by altering the causes and conditions
affecting it? If we think like the latter, then without denying we’re in a bad mood, we
do something to change the causes and conditions that affect how we feel. To change

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our attitude, we might try going out and getting a breath of air, or taking a nap,
whatever. We don’t just identify with this solid “Oh, I’m in a horrible bad mood” and
just bark at anybody who comes near us.

Let’s think about this for a few minutes, and reflect on how we deal with being in a bad
mood. I’m sure we all experience bad moods. As Tsongkhapa emphasized, we need to
recognize the object to be refuted – so this feeling of there being some solid bad
mood that we’re in, as if it were self-established, just sitting there.

[pause]

Popping the Balloon of Our False Projections

Once w recognize this object to be refuted, this solid bad mood – what seems to be a
solid bad mood established by its own power within us – and we understand that this
is impossible, there’s no such thing, then we realize it’s as if there’s a balloon that’s
been inflated around this situation, around this bad mood, making it into a solid thing.
And now our understanding that there’s no such thing, that this is impossible, pops
the balloon. This is one way of imagining this understanding of voidness. There’s just
no such thing, and this fantasy is gone. But don’t do it in a dualistic way of a “me”
separately with a pin popping the balloon. Just “pop!” there’s no such thing.

Once we pop the balloon, then we can focus on dependent arising, that the bad mood
has arisen from causes and conditions that can be changed, and so on. But first, we
need to recognize the fantasized balloon that we’ve projected and felt and believed
that it was there, and then we need to have our understanding pop it. The balloon has
to pop before we focus on dependent arising – otherwise, we have the under-
refutation that the balloon is still there and we merely accept that it has come from
causes and conditions, and our understanding goes no further.

This also gives a bit of an indication why I prefer, in English, the word “voidness” to
“emptiness.” Emptiness could imply in this image that we still have the balloon, but
there’s nothing inside it, it’s empty. But it’s not that. We want to pop the balloon,
there’s no such thing as this balloon. That’s why I prefer “voidness” over “emptiness.”
It’s not that conventional reality is sitting there – “there it is!” but there’s nothing inside
it. And this word “voidness” doesn't deny, either, conventional reality, that there’s this
and that, and that I’m in a bad mood. There’s nothing solid there; it’s not that there is a
solid thing there that has nothing inside it holding it up.

This is why Madhyamaka, the “middle way” is so difficult to understand correctly; it’s
really very subtle to avoid these two extremes: that’s there’s a solid conventional reality
that has nothing inside it – the eternalist extreme – or that there’s no conventional
reality – the nihilist extreme. We want to avoid the two extremes. And it’s not that from
one point of view it’s one, and from the other point of view, it’s the other. Or that it’s
neither; it’s something transcendental, that if we get rid of all this and see everything

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pure like a mandala, that then we transcend everything and escape into some pure
realm. That’s also not the case.

The Four Extremes

These are the so-called “four extremes”: not this, not that, not both ( just from one
point of view it’s this, and from the other point of view it’s that), and not neither, which
means that somehow there’s an alternative.

It’s quite interesting – I’m not sure whether it’s worthwhile to pursue this, but I think it’s
relevant – Tsongkhapa points out the difference between either/or and neither/nor.
Those are very different. When I say, “This is either a table or a chair,” it has to be one
or the other; there’s no other possibility. But if I say, “This is neither a cat nor a dog,”
then it leaves open the possibility that it’s a table. Neither/nor implies an alternative.
Either/or doesn’t imply an alternative. These are quite different.

Think of the example in physics – it’s beautiful if we think about this: either a wave or a
particle. What are things? It’s not that it’s only a wave, and that’s truly what it is,
because in other situations it’s a particle. It’s not that it truly is a particle, because in
other situations it’s a wave. And it’s not truly both, but just looked at from this way or
that way. And it’s not neither, which would mean that it must be something else. And
it’s not nothing, either. Then we get into dependent arising in a much more
sophisticated Madhyamaka way.

Conventionally, if we measure it with limited equipment, like our limited bodies and
minds, then it comes up either as a wave or a particle, so conventionally it’s like that,
and others would agree if they looked at it with the same type of instrument. And it
seems as though it’s really only one of these two, self-established, but it’s not. It’s
dependent on the equipment that it’s this or that – dependent arising.

With that example, then we apply it to things that are relevant to our lives. Am I a
mother? Or am I a scientist? Am I only a mother? Am I only a scientist? Am I truly a
mother when I’m home, and when I’m at the office I’m truly a scientist – that’s
either/or. Am I neither of them, and then I’m something else? Am I nothing? How is it
that, conventionally, I’m a mother, and also I’m a scientist. What establishes that? If
you’re going to try to deal with these two roles, you need to understand how they’re
established. Otherwise they seem conflicting, or you just don’t know how to handle it.
So, this topic is very practical, actually. You go to the office, “Oh, but I’m a mother!”
and you identify with one or the other, and feel frustrated, thinking things are self-
established. And there’s the problem, because it feels like that.

Now it becomes even more sophisticated, because now if conventionally you’re a

mother, and conventionally you’re also a scientist, you need individualizing deep
awareness. “In one situation, I’m a mother, and in the other I’m a scientist. If I’m with
my children, it’s inappropriate to be with my children and still be the scientist and
regard my children as an experiment. But on the other hand, these two roles don’t

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exist with big walls between them. I’m still rational with my children, I still care about
everybody at the office, but I don’t mother my co-workers.” How do you balance these
different roles without making them self-established? Pop that balloon.

Are the children an experiment? Are you the mother in the office and you have to
make everybody coffee and make sure everybody has a good chair to sit in, and stuff
like that? Wipe their noses? What are you going to do?

[pause]

Questions about Being in a Bad Mood

If we’re in a bad mood, it’s helpful to try to recognize which disturbing

emotion I am under the influence of: attachment, aversion/anger, or
ignorance/naivety, isn’t it?

Yes, when we are in a bad mood, then of course we need to try to recognize what are
the causes of it, how has it arisen, and so on. The bad mood could be mixed with one
of these disturbing emotions, or it may not. The disturbing emotion could simply be
the naivety of thinking, “I am really, solidly, in a bad mood.” But it could be a bad mood
mixed with anger, or a bad mood mixed with attachment, “I am missing somebody so
badly,” so we’re in a bad mood. Or we could be a bad mood simply because we don’t
feel well. By analyzing, we have an idea what to work on.

When I’m in a bad mood, I have a problem to identify what the cause of
the problem is. It’s not because of the surroundings; it’s not because of
some specific problem with my relationship, or in my work. If I could
identify what’s causing my bad mood, then I could deal with it. But if
there are no problems and everything is fine, yet still I’m in a bad mood,
how do you deal with it?

This is an important question. In some situations when we’re in a bad mood, we can
identify the trigger that has caused it – somebody said something, or something
happened at work, or I didn’t get enough sleep, whatever it might be. But in other
situations, the bad mood just seems to arise from no particular cause at all – as we say
in English, “I woke up on the wrong side of the bed.”

What is a bad mood? this is the first question. I think that the main characteristic of it
is our being unhappy. Happiness and unhappiness, how are they defined? They are
defined as the ways in which we experience the ripening of our karma – more
specifically, the ripening of our karmic potentials. What we experience during the day,
like being in this situation or being in that situation, that’s something ripening from
karmic potentials, in addition to many other causes. What ripens from karmic
potentials is our experiencing something.

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For instance, if somebody yells at us, our karmic potentials ripened in experiencing
somebody yelling at us. They didn’t ripen in causing the other person to yell at us –
that came from their history, their disturbing emotions, and all that. Our karmic
potentials just ripen in what we experience. Then, how do we experience this ripening
happening? – that’s either with happiness or unhappiness, somewhere on the
spectrum.

For instance, I eat the same meal every day for breakfast. That’s coming from some
sort of tendency – I always have muesli for breakfast. Sometimes I experience being
happy while eating the muesli and sometimes I’m not happy while eating it. How do I
experience the ripening of that tendency to always have the same thing for breakfast?
If I experience it with unhappiness, I could describe that experience as being in a bad
mood.

This unhappiness that I experience while eating my breakfast is not self-established – it

doesn’t come from nowhere. It’s a ripening of karmic potential, so there are certain
causes that bring it about. It’s very difficult to really understand why during this
specific karmic ripening in the form of my experiencing eating breakfast does
something else ripen, the feeling of unhappiness. How did these two go together, how
does one trigger the other? Or is the eating of breakfast just the context for this
ripening of a bad mood, and there are many other circumstances and conditions that
are triggering the ripening of a different karmic potential into my experience of being
in a bad mood? That’s quite difficult to ascertain. Only an omniscient Buddha knows all
the details of karmic cause and effect.

The point is how to deal with that unhappiness that seems to have come from
nowhere? We need to understand that the unhappiness we experience of being in a
bad mood is a ripening from some destructive behavior in the past, whether this
lifetime or a previous lifetime. But this is samsara, and the nature of samsara is that it
goes up and down. Sometimes we feel happy, sometimes we feel unhappy – nothing
special, so what? It’s not that we ignore feeling unhappy, but we see it as nothing
special and just eat our breakfast. “I’m unhappy, so what?”

We acknowledge it, it’s not the nihilist extreme. We realize it’s not that “Oh no, the
whole day is going to be horrible” – we realize that it can change. Now comes the
understanding of impermanence. Impermanence doesn’t mean that things are always
going to get worse, it can also get better. Especially when we’re talking about feeling
happy and unhappy – it goes up and down. Again, we pop that balloon that “Oh, I’m
unhappy, I’m in a bad mood, now the whole day is going to be horrible.”

It’s also very interesting if we analyze very deeply, when I’m in a bad mood, is there
some sort of low-grade or subtle disturbing emotion that’s there – “I’m annoyed about
something” or “I’m missing someone” and thinking “poor me” or something like that?
Because when we have a disturbing emotion, we’re not really happy – it’s disturbing,
it’s disturbed. We can look in that way to give us an idea of what to work on. Even if we

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can’t identify what we feel annoyed about, we’re just annoyed – I’m sure we’ve all
experienced that. Or “I want something” – “I don’t know what I want, but I want
something.” Then we think, “What can I eat,” or “What can I find on the internet, or
what song can I listen to,” whatever it is that we turn to. “I just want something” or “I’m
just annoyed about something” or “I’m bored” – which means that I want something
interesting, some satisfaction. Interesting, uninteresting, dissatisfaction, dopamine –
however we want to analyze it.

Understanding dependent arising, we understand that effects don’t exist

independently of causes and circumstances. So, we look at the causes: if disturbing
emotions are the circumstance for unhappiness arising, then we work on our
disturbing emotions. If we realize that unhappiness arises from the karmic aftermath of
our destructive behavior as their so-called “obtaining cause” – they are that from
which we obtain the result – then we work on ridding ourselves of any further
destructive behavior, and act constructively as much as we can. Destructive behavior is
motivated by disturbing emotions, so it’s all connected. If I don’t want to be in bad
moods all the time, I try to be engaged in constructive behavior and work on my
disturbing emotions.

Then we find examples of people like His Holiness the Dalai Lama, with all the protests
and the Chinese, and all these other things, he’s always happy and laughing. How is
that? Is it self-established? Or is it the result of a tremendous amount of work on
himself, over many, many lifetimes. And it’s possible to become like that, or even more,
to become a Buddha. But for most of us, if we could become like His Holiness, we
would be satisfied!

Different Types of Dependent Arising

We’ve been speaking about dependent arising, and we’ve seen that it fits together
with the topic of voidness – there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature that, by
its own power, establishes the existence of conventional objects and what they
conventionally are. Their existence and what they conventionally are arise dependently
on factors other than themselves.

Just as things are not established by something findable inside them, these other
factors that they dependently arise from also are devoid of self-establishing natures.
We need to look at dependent arising in a much broader sense, with a much broader
understanding.

Dependent Arising in a Relative Sense

Dependent arising is a fact on many, many different levels. We’ve discussed how things
are relative, that short and long, good and bad, and so on, can only be established

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relatively, in comparison to something. Something is not just long or short on its own,
like our ring finger. We’ve seen that teacher and student are dependent on each other,
we can’t be a teacher without students, nor can we be a parent without children –
these things arise dependently on each other.

The eternalist extreme here would be to consider ourselves short in an absolute sense,
regardless of the fact that there are people shorter than we are. The nihilist extreme
would be not to accept the fact that we are too short to qualify for the military forces.
Another set of examples would be to consider ourselves a teacher when we have no
students or not to accept the responsibilities of being a parent when we have a child.

Dependent Arising from Fulfilling a Function

We’ve also seen that being a teacher is dependent on teaching. In other words, to be
something is dependent on fulfilling the function of that something. To be a student is
dependent on studying and learning something. A picture of a computer is not a
computer, because it can’t function and operate as a computer.

The eternalist extreme would be to consider ourselves an accomplished Buddhist

practitioner when we still can’t get along with our parents. The nihilist extreme would
be to deny that we were wrong when we made a mistake.

Dependent Arising in Terms of Cause and Effect

Cause and effect are also dependent on each other. A bad mood can’t arise
independently of causes. Something is not a cause unless it produces an effect.

The eternalist extreme would be to think that using artificial no-calorie sweeter in our
coffee when we have coffee and cake every coffee break at work will make us lose
weight. The nihilist extreme would be to smoke and think it will not affect our health.

Dependent Arising of a Whole and Parts

Also, although we haven’t gone into any detail about it, a whole can’t exist
independently of parts. A bad mood, as a whole, is dependent on many parts, many
mental factors, such as unhappiness, lack of attention, mental dullness and so on. It
also extends over time, and each moment we don’t feel exactly the same. A whole,
then, is dependent on parts.

The eternalist extreme would be to still consider ourselves as part of a married couple
after our spouse has died and so we don’t want to meet other singles. The nihilist
extreme would be to not take seriously being a member of a team at work and acting
independently without consulting the other team members.

Imputation, Mental Labeling and Designation

Another level of dependent arising that I’d like to discuss is dependent arising in terms
of mental labeling, but first we need to understand what mental labeling is.

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Mental labeling is something that involves categories. We have a category of “a
teacher,” or we have a category of “a bad mood.” In the West, we would say that we
have an idea of what a teacher is, or what a bad mood is. Now, that idea is defined in a
certain way: what a teacher is and what a bad mood is. We designate that category, or
idea, with a word, which is just a combination of sounds that some society has agreed
upon to call that category.

Then, as we experience various things in our lives, we mentally label them as being a
member of this or that category. Here’s this person, and we fit them into the category
of “a teacher.” And the word, or name, that we’ve given to the category is “teacher,”
and now we designate the person with that name.

To differentiate these two processes, I think it’s helpful to use different terms for them:
“mental labeling” is with categories, “designation” is with words. Being with categories,
mental labeling is with a concept of what constitutes those categories – our concept of
what a teacher is, our concept of what “good” is or what “bad” is. These are fixed ideas
of what that category means. Our fixed ideas of what they mean could be replaced
with other fixed ideas about them but ideas don’t grow organically like flowers do.
They’re static entities, from the point of view of Buddhist analysis. Both mental
labeling, with an idea or a concept or category of something, and designation with a
word, then, are conceptual processes.

Just so that we are clear – because often this differentiation is not mentioned – I use
the term “imputation” for something else. For instance, we impute a whole on parts;
we impute motion on seeing an object progressively located in slightly different
consecutive places. These sorts of things that are imputed can be known non-
conceptually, not just conceptually. We can see a whole table or think of one; and we
can see the motion of a thrown ball and remember it. But a category or an idea of
something can only be known conceptually. And a word designated on a category can
also only be known conceptually. We can hear non-conceptually the sound of
someone saying a word. But we only know that sound to be the sound of a word by
fitting it into the audio category that encompasses the sound of every voice saying the
word in every accent and every level of volume and the meaning category of what it
signifies.

In Sanskrit and Tibetan, there is only one word that encompasses these three
meanings: mental labeling, designation and imputation. This is because what the three
have in common, from the non-Prasangika point of view, is the assertion that the
defining characteristic of what is mentally labeled, designated, or imputed is findable
on the side of its basis for labeling, basis for designation or basis for imputation.
According to the Prasangika view, this is an eternalist extreme: the defining
characteristic is not findable on the side of the basis in all three cases. Despite this
shared point, it is important to distinguish them from each other to avoid
misunderstanding.

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The Imputation, Mental Label and Designation “Me”

Consider, for instance, a person, me. A person, me, is an imputation on all the different
moments of what makes my experience. When I look at a photo of myself, I can say,
“That’s me.” I can see that that’s me, it’s not just conceptual. But, having some idea of
myself, of who I am – that’s mental labeling of a concept or an idea. Or we look at
different pictures of ourselves at different times of our life, they all look very different;
but with each one we can say, “That’s me.” How is that possible? It’s possible because
we have some category, some fixed idea, some concept of “me” and we’re fitting all
these pictures into that category. That’s mental labeling, and calling them all “me” is
designation. But “me” is an imputation on the form of the person that we see there –
the body.

These are very fine distinctions, but unless we understand them, we can get terribly
confused with the whole topic of mental labeling. “Me” as a person is quite different
from the fixed idea of “me” that I or anyone who knows me has. It’s also different from
the word “me.”

The Analogy of Seeing Only Part of a Room to Be Seeing the Room

Conventionally, I exist as an individual person. There’s “me,” but that “me” arises
dependently in relation to a body, mind emotions and so on. No one needs to impute
“me” on this body, mind and emotions for “me” to exist and be validly knowable as an
imputation on the basis of them. The relation of “me” with a body, mind and emotions,
though not precisely the same, is quite similar to the relation between a whole and the
parts.

When you look in front of yourself, what do you see? You would have to say you see a
room. Do you see the whole room? No, you don’t see what’s behind you. You see part
of a room. A part of a room is not the same as the whole room. But, the imputation of
a room on its parts extends over all its parts as the basis for imputation. So, it extends
over the part of the room that you see.

When we see just this part of the room, we conventionally say that we see the room.
We are fitting the part that we see into the concept or idea of the whole room – or, in
technical language, we are mentally labeling it with the category “room.” And because
we designate that category with the word “room,” we designate the part of the room
we see as “I see the room.” This is conventionally valid. It’s not that we’re seeing
nothing – that would be a nihilist position. We’re seeing a room. But a room is
different from the category or concept of a room and likewise different from the word
“room.”

Similarly, “me” is an imputation on a body, mind, emotions and so on, and it extends
over time. But when we see a picture of our body, we can validly mentally label it with
the category “me” and validly call it a picture of “me.” “Me” as the imputation of a
whole person on the continuum of a body, mind and emotions extends over this

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representation of one moment of my body as well. So, this imputation “me” is a valid
member of the category “me.”

When I look at the picture and recognize it as “me,” I am certainly not seeing the
totality of myself as a person. Yet, like the example of the room and part of a room, I
recognize it as “me” because I fit it into the concept or category “me” that I have of
myself. And because I designate that idea of myself with the word “me,” I can validly
say when I look at the photo, “That’s me.” Do you see the difference?

When I see a part of a room, I can validly say I am seeing the room, even though I’m
only seeing part of it. That’s because the whole room is an imputation on the parts and
the part is one of the members of the set that fits in the category “this room.” Likewise,
when we’re speaking to somebody on our smartphone, all we’re hearing is a sound.
Nevertheless, it’s valid to say that we are speaking with the person, because a person is
an imputation of a person based on parts and what we hear is one of the parts that fits
in the category “this person.” And it’s not actually even their voice that we hear, it’s
some electronic representation, and still we validly call that “I’m speaking to this
person, I’m hearing them.” It’s amazing, isn’t it?

Then, we have a fixed idea of the person and all the associations and all the emotions
that go with it, and so on. That’s mental labeling, with an idea, a concept, a category.
It’s quite different from who am I listening to? I’m listening to Denis, I’m not listening
to Mary. Conventionally it is Denis, it’s not Mary. That’s quite different from my idea of
Denis, and all the emotional associations I have with that. Every time I see him, I
mentally label him with that fixed idea, that concept.

Let’s think about that for a few more minutes. This is terribly subtle, but really very
important. It’s going a bit outside of our topic, but that distinction between
imputation, mental labeling and designation is not often made. There is “me.” I’m a
person, not just the concept of a person. There is me and the concept of “me,” me and
my idea of myself, me and what other people’s ideas are of “me.” They’re quite
different. But the question we’ll be asking is, is there a true me, findable inside me,
making “me” me and not you?

Let’s take a few moments to think about all this.

[pause]

Dependent Arising in Terms of Mental Labeling

With this as a background, now we can get to the heart of the matter. Let me use the
analogy of a cookie cutter. Do you know the word cookie cutter? You have dough and,
with a cookie cutter, you cut out a piece to make a cookie. That’s the analogy.

Now consider the fact that there are so many different things that we are doing as a
person and they’re changing all the time. These are like the dough. Then we have the

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conceptual cookie cutter of mental labeling. From all these different things that we’re
doing, we cut out a cookie and give it a definition and a name, for instance “learning”
or “teaching.” But really, they’re just cut out and isolated from all the different things
that we’re doing, aren’t they? Conventionally, you are learning and conventionally I am
teaching. To deny that would be the nihilist extreme. To imagine that that’s all that
we’re doing this moment – and that we’re not also sitting and breathing, etc. – or that
learning and teaching are all that we do would be the eternalist extreme. Okay?

Now, what establishes that we’re studying or teaching? Well, it’s this mental cookie
cutter of a concept. The existence of what you’re doing as “learning” arises
dependently on the mental label of the category “learning” labeled on what you’re
doing. If there were no such thing as a category that people defined and assigned the
word “learning” to, you would still be learning here. To deny that would be the nihilist
extreme. You’re not doing nothing; you’re doing something: you’re learning.

But what establishes it as learning is that we put a boundary around it by fitting it into
the category “learning”; we cut it out of the dough of everything we do and call it with
the sound of a word. It appears as though what we’re doing is self-established as
“learning,” but really it only exists as learning dependent on mental labeling with a
category and designation with a word that’s defined in a certain way, agreed upon by
convention. And what is “learning?” It’s merely what the concept and word “learning”
refers to on the basis of sitting here and listening to my words.

Again, it’s not that you’re doing nothing – you’re learning. And you don’t have to
actively think, “I’m learning,” or say, “I’m learning” for it to be correct and valid that
you’re learning something. Mentally labeling it doesn’t create the fact that you’re
learning. The superficial essential nature of what you’re doing here is learning – it’s not
playing football – and it seems to us that “learning” is an activity that is self-
established as the activity “learning” all by its own power. It seems as if there were a
boundary around this activity establishing it as a solid entity, encapsulated in plastic,
and separating it from all other activities. But that doesn’t correspond to what actually
establishes it as a specific activity and as “learning,” It arises as “learning” dependently
only on the fact that there is a conventionally agreed-upon concept, a category,
“learning,” which like a cookie cutter isolates something specific out of the entirety of
what you’re doing. But that entirety is not sitting there like a big piece of dough, either.

When we have a concept of something, an idea of something, in a sense our minds

isolate it from everything else. Because of that, it appears as though it’s self-
established. That’s why we say a conventional nature appears to be self-established,
but it’s not – it arises dependently on mental labeling, either with or without a name.
This is valid even for a worm, though a worm doesn’t give anything a name. Out of all
the things a worm sees, there’s a category food – mental labeling, but no word.

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This is what we mean when we say that the existence of things can only be established
as what a category, a concept, a mental label refers to on the basis of a “basis for
labeling.”

Practical Application of Understanding Dependent Arising in Terms of Mental Labeling

Now we try to think of practical applications of this. One thing that comes to my mind
is, can we be both a parent and a friend to our children? Or a boss and a friend with
our employees? Out of every moment of every interaction that we have with our child,
which parts of all those interactions are we going to cut out with our cookie cutter and
call interacting as a “parent” and which are we going to cut out and call interacting as
a “friend?”And are they totally separate from each other? Do they overlap? How does
our child perceive it?

Now it becomes really very interesting. If I can be both a parent and a friend to my
child, how to manage that without it being completely difficult and problematic for me
and for the child? Do I have to be just one? And what does it actually mean to be a
parent or to be a friend? A lot depends on how we define friend, doesn’t it? If we
define friend as “both sides are equal” and “just as I will listen to the problems of my
child, I can tell all my problems and difficulties to my child, because that’s my idea of
what a friendship is,” then that’s inappropriate. But there could be parts of what
friendship entails that could be appropriate, like playing ball together. All these issues
are very relevant in terms of the roles that we play with each other. After all, it’s a role
that we play, they’re just a cookie cutter thing.

If we have fixed ideas of “I’m a parent” and “this is truly how a parent is defined” and “I
always have to be like this,” then we’re totally inflexible. We’re making a solid thing out
of the concept, out of the category “parent.” There are all sorts of complications that
come from misunderstanding this whole point about mental labeling, concepts and
categories.

It becomes particularly complex and difficult when we play multiple roles with
someone else. I know I have this in my experience with a few people. I’m their teacher,
their boss (because I employ and pay them) and their friend. Well, sometimes I’m
speaking as a friend, but from their side they’re mentally labeling me as a boss, and
“Why is my boss talking me like a friend? He should act like a boss.” That becomes very
tricky and difficult in an interpersonal relationship when we play multiple roles.

One solution is to just play one role. That’s the easy solution. But to play multiple roles
in which both sides don’t get confused is much trickier. But in fact, in life, we have
many different roles that we play with people. So, this idea of no role being self-
established and just being established by convention is helpful. This is something to
work with, not just something that we can solve in detail here. But we can get the tools
to start thinking about it, to start analyzing. A role is a concept, it’s a category, like a

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cookie cutter. It appears as though it’s self-established, isolated from everything else –
but t’s not.

I’ll just give one more example and then we need to stop – His Holiness the Dalai
Lama, when he teaches, he says, “I’m just a human being like everybody else.” When
he’s giving an initiation and he sits on a high throne, he says, “Now, please look at me
as the tantric master” – and that’s a completely different role. So, he helps people in
terms of saying which role now to regard him in. That’s a clue, if we’re playing multiple
roles with someone and it’s getting confusing, we can sort of indicate, “Now I’m
speaking to you as a friend” or “Now I’m speaking to you as a parent” or “Now I’m
speaking to you as a woman” or “Now I’m speaking to you as a man.”

And the Dalai Lama is not truly established as one, or the other, but conventionally he
can be this or that. So that gives us an idea of how to work with this material. By
understanding dependent arising in terms of mental labeling, we can avoid the
extreme of eternalism, that we just playing one role as our “true” role in life, and the
extreme of nihilism, that conventionally we play no roles in anyone’s life.

Dedication

Let’s end with a dedication. We think that whatever understanding, whatever positive
force has come from this, may it go deeper and deeper and act as a cause for
everyone to overcome their confusion about how things exist, how we account for
things, and reach the enlightened state of a Buddha for the benefit of us all. Thank
you.

Chittamatra, Svatantrika and Prasangika: The

Self
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/abhidharma-tenet-systems/the-
indian-tenet-systems/the-four-buddhist-tenet-systems-regarding-the-self/chittamatra-
svatantrika-and-prasangika-the-self

Unawareness of How We Exist and Disturbing Emotions

We are talking about the self, “me;” how do I exist? This is a very crucial question that
is asked in Buddhism. When we are unaware of how we exist and how everyone exists,
when either we don’t know or we know in an incorrect way, then we have all sorts of
disturbing emotions. The way that we experience being unaware or confused is that
we feel insecure; and because we feel insecure, we feel, compulsively – and now the
karma or habit comes in – that we have to somehow try to make ourselves secure.

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Actually first comes the disturbing emotions, and these disturbing emotions are
mechanisms with which we feel that we can somehow make ourselves secure. Some
disturbing emotions are destructive, some are neutral. For instance, the disturbing
emotion of anger and hostility would be the mechanism of if I can just get certain
things away from me that would make me feel secure. That leads to compulsive
aggressive behavior. Or we feel that if I can just get certain things around me, or keep
certain things around me, that that will make me feel secure. That leads to longing
desire to get what we don’t have. We have attachment, that we don’t want to let go of
what we have; and greed, we want even more. We’re never satisfied. So, these are
destructive. These lead to destructive behavior.

There are also certain disturbing attitudes which underlie both destructive and
constructive behavior. That’s why they’re considered neutral, or more specifically,
unspecified; they can go in either way. For instance, there is one which is vey
dominant. It’s a very technical term: a deluded attitude toward a transitory network.
What that’s referring to, in a sense, is that we throw out this net of “me” and “mine”
onto everything. That transitory network is referring to the network of our aggregates,
body and mind and so on. We’re always throwing out this idea of “me,” as in I’m the
possessor; or onto to objects that I have to have as “mine.” Based on that, we can have
either the destructive emotions or we can also have constructive disturbing ones. For
example, “me,” I have to be perfect; that’s my body, that’s “me,” and it has to be
perfect. Muscle building and so on can be neurotic and compulsive because we’re
identifying “me” with a body and always on how we look – this type of thing.

The definition of a disturbing attitude or emotion is that which when it arises makes us
lose peace of mind and makes us lose self-control. We act compulsively. The problem
is that we’re trying to make something secure which doesn’t even exist so it can’t be
made secure. So, it’s futile. We’re trying to make secure an impossible self, something
that just doesn’t exist at all. We don’t exist like that. This is the reason why this topic is
so important.

We have covered the coarse impossible self and the subtle impossible self. In
Buddhism, the Vaibhashika will only refute the coarse one. Everybody else refutes both
the coarse impossible self and the subtle one. The gross one is something that we had
to be taught. The subtle one automatically arises, although we could also have learned
it and been taught it from Vaibhashika.

The Understanding Needed to Attain Liberation and Enlightenment

Now, except for Prasangika, all the other Buddhist tenet systems say that this is all that
we need to understand in order to gain liberation. We just need to understand that the
self is devoid of existing in these impossible ways. If we understand that, then we no
longer will have disturbing emotions or disturbing attitudes. Therefore we will not
have compulsive behavior; we will not have any more karma. We won’t build up more
karmic tendencies and potentials. We won’t have any disturbing emotions or attitudes

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that would trigger these tendencies and attitudes at the time of death and therefore
we won’t have uncontrollably recurring rebirth, samsara.

That whole mechanism is described by the “twelve links of dependent arising.” The
Mahayana schools state that there are not only these impossible ways of existing for a
self. There also are impossible ways of existing of all phenomena. That needs to be
refuted as well. When we come to the Mahayana tenets, if we want to attain
enlightenment, we need to refute and understand the voidness of all phenomena
including the self.

So, we have to further deconstruct the self. The Chittamatra and Svatantrika say that,
for attaining liberation, we still need only the same understanding that we had before
with Sautantrika. The self is devoid of existing as this coarse or subtle soul. That is
sufficient for attaining liberation. But, if we want to attain enlightenment, we have to
understand voidness of all phenomena including the self. Prasangika disagrees, stating
that that even to attain liberation we have to understand the voidness for all
phenomena including the self. That is quite a difference actually.

Further Deconstruction of the Self

Let’s look at Chittamatra. First of all what they add here, refining the Sautrantika view,
is that the self does not have an end to it, as in parinirvana; whereas, both the
Vaibhashika and Sautrantika say that the self does have an end. Chittamatra says that it
continues beyond when we die, even if we’ve achieved liberation or enlightenment.
Chittamatra also says that the self lacks existence as a self that is externally existent.
When we spoke about the five things that the self and consciousness may or may not
share, then according to Sautrantika, they don’t share the same natal source; but,
nevertheless, we can only know the self on the basis of also knowing simultaneously its
basis for imputation. So, I can only see you at the same time as seeing a body.
However, your body comes from an external source, whereas my consciousness of it
comes from an internal natal source, a seed of karma on my mental continuum.

Chittamatra says that both the body I see and my consciousness of it come from the
same natal source. They come from the same seed of karma; the consciousness, the
body and the self. From that same seed of karma, that karmic potential, comes both
the consciousness and the mental hologram of the body. And since the self is an
imputation on the body, the hologram will also be a hologram of the self, of you or
me. For example, when I see myself in the mirror, or I look at you, or I think of
somebody, a mental hologram of the body and of the self are coming from that same
seed as the consciousness of it. All the mental factors that are involved also all come
from that same seed. That self is a dependent phenomenon, like the body that is its
basis for imputation. It changes from moment to moment, and its existence cannot
just be established in terms of the conceptual cognition of it. We can see ourselves.
But, according to Chittamatra, the self still has a barcode that establishes its existence.
That barcode, exists on the side of the basis for imputation for the self.

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Here in Chittamatra, instead of that basis that is there in all lifetimes being mental
consciousness, they speak of something called foundation consciousness. Of course
they accept that there is mental consciousness that continues; but, they’re saying that’s
not the basis for imputation of the self, or what contains the barcode of the self. What
contains it is this foundation consciousness which is alayavijnana in Sanskrit.
Sometimes it’s called “storehouse consciousness” in English. This is the basis for
imputation of the tendencies of karma, memories, and all sorts of things. But, in any
case, it’s the same idea that the barcode of the self and the self itself are found on the
side of this basis for imputation, which is some type of consciousness.

Chittamatra, however, says that the barcodes the self and all phenomena have are just
the barcodes of being individual validly knowable objects. They don’t have the barcode
information of being male, female, human, worm, dog, ghost, or the barcode for good,
bad, large, small. All of that comes in conceptual cognition from the side of categories.
That’s very important actually. We’re not inherently any particular life form or any
particular gender or anything like that. But, the self goes on lifetime to lifetime in
whatever body it is associated with, and that is generated from karmic tendencies.
There’s nothing inherent on the side of the barcode itself that makes it any particular
life form or gender or quality of good, bad, large, small, etc.

This is very important. When we don’t understand that, then we throw out this net of
“me” onto some aspect that we identify with like “I am a man” or “I am a woman.” “A
man must act like this” or “a woman must act like that,” and then we get really quite
neurotic with compulsive behavior trying to prove it. We feel we have to prove it. We
have to establish it by what we do and how we act but we never feel secure so we’re
always neurotically trying to prove something. That can lead to destructive behavior,
compulsive constructive behavior, or some neutral behavior such as just paying
attention to your hair because a man’s hair should look like this or a woman’s hair
should look like that.

The Myth

It’s all based on myth. That’s what we have to understand. There’s nothing here to
prove. Conventionally I’m a man, everybody would agree, and although now I have
characteristics of a man or if I were a woman, those of a woman, it doesn’t establish
this gender permanently as my inherent identity. Okay? So, it starts to get quite
interesting from a psychological point of view here. This insight from Chittamatra
explains quite a lot about compulsive behavior. If we want to become an enlightened
Buddha and help everybody, we have to overcome this type of incorrect view about
ourselves and about everybody else. We have to overcome this if we want to be able
to help them achieve liberation and enlightenment as well. But, remember,
Chittamatrins say that there’s still is “me” findable on the side of its basis for
imputation.

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Now we go to Svatantrika, which has two branches Sautrantika Svatantrika and
Yogachara Svatantrika. Sautrantika Svatantrika – says that the natal source of the self
and the body as its basis for imputation is external not internal. Although
consciousness and the mental factors give rise to the mental hologram, that’s just
mental activity, how mental activity works. But the source of the body is external
elements such as those of your parents and all of that. They serve as the circumstance
for the mental hologram of them to arise. So this is in opposition to the Chittamatra
assertion.

Svatantrika says that what is impossible is that we can establish the existence of the
self either only from the side of the object or only on the basis of mental labeling. It
has to be a combination of the two. To put it in very simple language, objects have
individual defining characteristics on their own sides, not only the characteristics of
being individual knowable objects, but also specific characteristics, like the physical
features of a body. Cats have certain physical features and dogs have others. But these
features by themselves cannot be cognized as cat or dog features independently of
the concepts or categories of cat and dog. Only in the context of the mental labels of
the categories “cat” or “dog” can they be established as cat or dog features.

Physical features are just shapes of flesh. Just seeing them, without the concepts of cat
or dog, you wouldn’t cognize them as establishing an animal as a cat or a dog. A baby,
for instance, just sees the creature as some living thing. You need the concepts of cat
and dog in order to regard it as a cat or a dog. But just the concepts of cat and dog on
their own, with no physical features on the side of a living creature, also cannot
establish the creature as a cat or a dog. You need a combination of the two – both
defining characteristic features and concepts or categories with mental labeling.

So, how do I establish that I am a man? Svatantrika says it’s not that we have just some
sort of neutral self and then in this lifetime I’m living as man. There’s never a blank self.
The point here is that there’s never a time when I’m a blank self. When would there be
a time when it’s blank? There is no time like that. Always in each moment, the self is
going to be an imputation on aggregates and the aggregates, for instance the body,
are going to have physical characteristics. Those characteristics, in the context of
mental labeling, establish me now as a man. This brings us a little bit more into each
moment of experience, doesn’t it?

Now I am a man with the characteristics of a man and what establishes that I am a
man are these characteristics and the label man, the category man. Now I am talking,
so there is the characteristic on the side of what’s going on with my body, the sound
coming out, and the concept of talking and communicating. I’m not just making
sounds. Hopefully, now I’m saying something that is constructive. On the side of the
sound of my words and their meanings there are features that can be validly labeled as
constructive and there is the concept of “constructive.” Together, that establishes by
words as constructive. Of course, what I’m saying is changing from moment to

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moment to moment, isn’t it? So, sometimes I’m saying something constructive and
sometimes something that is sheer nonsense. In each moment, it’s like that. The same
analysis is true for the self. There are findable characteristic features of a self and these,
in combination with the concept or category of a “self” establish the existence of a self.

Where can we locate the self? Svatantrika says the self is still a referent thing and it
returns to the position that the defining characteristics of the self is in the continuity of
the mental consciousness. So, what is said here in Svatantrika, gets quite subtle.
Svatantrika states that conventionally things appear to be what they are and that
establishes that it exists. That’s conventionally existent. In other words, when you
examine and analyze conventionally, that’s what you find, the conventional “me” which
is appearing with the basis for imputation like this. It appears to exist independently of
names, cognition, and the mental label. But when we analyze the deepest truth of it,
the voidness of it, then we can find this total absence of this impossible way of
existing. You find the voidness of it. So, conventionally you can find it and on the
deepest level you can’t find it. Conventionally you can find the referent thing. There it
is behind what the mental label refers to sort of holding it up. There it is. And on the
deepest level when you analyze, you can’t find it existing by itself.

The Prasangika Position

Of course now Prasangika comes along and says no, no, no. An impossible self, that
impossible self doesn’t exist. You’re saying that just because it appears, it
conventionally exists. Prasangika says that is confused, because the deceptive
appearance of truly established existence also appears. Whether we analyze on the
conventional level or on the deepest level you can’t find the referent thing.

So, what establishes that I exist according to Prasangika? The only thing that you can
say that establishes is what the category “me” and the word “me” is referred to on the
basis of the ever-changing aggregates, body and mind. You can’t find anything on the
basis for labeling. You can’t find anything establishing “me” findable on the side of
“me” or on the side of the basis. Nevertheless, the self has, in a sense, a barcode that
makes “me” an individual. Therefore. I’m not you, I’m “me,” I’m not a table, I’m “me.”

But, the self, just like anything else doesn’t have its existence established by the
barcode. Remember all the other schools say the barcode, in a sense, establishes your
existence or the existence of something because it’s like it wraps it in plastic. So, it
makes it into a thing, a referent thing which is there wrapped in plastic and the
barcode inside is doing that. Prasangika says no. There’s no such thing. It has a
barcode because it is individual and the only thing that the defining characteristic does
is it makes it individual so that I’m not you. It doesn’t make a solid boundary around
things, around “me.” This fits into the whole discussion of dependent arising because if
I were in fact wrapped in plastic and all my characteristics were there, I couldn’t
change, I couldn’t interact with anybody, and couldn’t do anything. I would be frozen
in plastic.

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So, Prasangika is taken as the most profound, most subtle understanding. In order to
understand Prasangika we need to go step by step by step with the refutation in the
various schools because if you don’t do that, then the Prasangika position becomes
trivial. It says you can’t find the self; so, you look. Is the self under your arm? Is it up
your nose? Is it in your stomach? No, you can’t find it. That’s trivial isn’t it? Of course
you can’t find it. Okay? So, it’s very trivial.

But, I can understand that it’s talking within the process of mental labeling about that
the referent thing inside the basis for labeling. It’s very very specific, very subtle what
we’re talking about. There’s nothing on the side of this body that makes it “me,” no
little barcode that says that’s “me,” that’s Alex. There’s nothing on the side of the body;
Alex, the whole category of Alex the baby, the teenager, the young adult, etc, can be
imputed on a basis and given a name. Is that Alex? Yes, that’s Alex. It’s not Patrick. But,
there is no referent thing behind it inside that body.

This is the Prasangika position and if one understands that, one doesn’t get the
disturbing emotions. One doesn’t get compulsive behavior etc. Then we understand
really that there’s absolutely nothing to prove, nothing to be made secure. So, we can
stop worrying. There’s nothing to worry about. Just get on with life, do it. That of
course is not so simple; however, the solution to understanding and overcoming all the
various problems that we have is merely to understand how we exist and how we’re
devoid of existing in impossible ways.

The Importance of All Four Schools

All of these four tenet systems originate from the Buddha according to the traditional
Buddhist explanation. Buddha taught many different methods, many different
explanations to suit different mentalities, those of intelligence, and so on. He didn’t
teach them in order to bore people. He taught them in order to help overcome their
problems. These so-called lower schools will help us to overcome certain level of
problems. But, we need more subtle ones. That’s why we need to go all the way down
or all the way up depending on how you look at it, and that leads to mental labeling,
to the Prasangika position in order to get rid of the most subtle misunderstanding.

Questions

How long does it take to really understand this?

You’re not going to like the answer. In order to understand it, you need to build up a
tremendous amount of positive force. Positive force is usually translated as merit but I
find that a horrible word. It sounds like a business transaction. You have to do work
and then you’ve earned this as your reward. It absolutely has nothing to do with that.
We’re certainly not talking about a collection of merit either. I don’t know if you have
that here in Austria, but elsewhere you can go to the supermarket and every time that
you buy something you get these little stamps. You collect them in the book and when

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you collect a certain number of them then you win a toaster oven or you win a prize.
It’s not like that.

We’re talking about a network. A network is a very useful term here. If we use the
example from physics it’s like we’re talking about a phase transition. A phase transition,
for example, is if you put enough energy into ice it will eventually reach a certain
critical point and then turn into water. Then you put more energy into it, it will reach a
certain point when it will go over the critical level and become steam. That’s phase
transition. So, it’s the same thing with our minds, our understandings. The positive
force from acting in constructive ways network with each other and build up stronger
and stronger potential so eventually we overcome all our mental and emotional
obstacles and get an new level of understanding. That’s how it works.

It makes a lot of sense if you think more deeply about it. When we’re thinking just
selfishly about me, me, me, me, me, our mind is closed. We’re very fearful and
suspicious like, for example, the dog growling about his bone feeling that somebody is
going to take it away. When our mind is very closed like that and our emotions are
very closed, you really can’t understand very much. It makes a mental block. But when
one does things for others, in a very large scope of others, and doesn’t think of
oneself, one in a sense opens up mentally and emotionally. So, we become more open
mentally and emotionally and if that openness builds up strongly enough we will get
over our mental and emotional blocks that prevent us from really understanding
something.

It does make sense. But, according to the teachings, we speak in terms of three zillion
eons of this positive force that we have to build up. That’s the answer you won’t like.
Literally the word zillion is countless but it doesn’t mean that it’s countless. It’s just the
largest finite number in the Indian mathematical system. Point being that you have to
build up an awful lot of this positive force and it’s going to take a very long time. So,
be patient. Don’t expect instant results.

And when we read in the Mahayana sutras – I don’t know if any of you read any of
them – but at times it says, for example, that if you recite this, then you build up
sixteen billion eons of positive force, and if you recite that, it’s twenty-three million and
gives all these incredible numbers. I don’t think that’s to be taken totally literally. But, I
think it’s very helpful in guiding us to understand that we’re not talking about a day to
day to day build up of three zillion of something. Certainly there are things that we can
do that will build up a tremendous amount of positive force. They give a number so it
offers encouragement to people that you can actually do it. By saying this one builds
up thirty-two million, that is a little bit of a dent in the zillion. It’s a skillful method.

So, these three zillion are to bring us to further and further stages until we have non-
conceptual cognition of it and until we have the full removal of all this obscuration.
And each of the various schools will have a different opinion of how that works, so let’s
not go into that. Yes?

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 What is the role of meditation in this?

You have to understand that we have a threefold process, three steps. First we have to
listen to an explanation, a correct explanation, and on the basis of that we will get
discriminating awareness that comes from listening. This is what the teaching is. It’s
this, and it’s not that. We become very certain about that, confident that this is the
actual teaching, this is the actual explanation. You have to have that first otherwise you
don’t know if you heard it right or if it is the correct explanation or not.

Then, we have to think about it. That’s the second step. So, first we have just the words,
these are the actual words of the teachings. That comes from the listening. Now, we
have to have meaning to the words and we use the thinking process. The result of the
thinking process is that we understand what it actually means, not just what the words
are. We perceive conceptually the words through a meaning category, and work to
understand what it means. The hearing was through an audio category, whether it was
written in this script, or that script, or spoken, or so on. All of that is in the category of
these are the words of the teaching and now everything fits into the meaning
category.

Not only do we need to understand correctly what then teachings about voidness
mean, but we have to be convinced that it makes sense, that we believe it, that it’s true.
I can understand complete nonsense and not believe it to be true at all. We’re not
talking about that. We have to be convinced that if I really could internalize this, that it
would be beneficial. In addition, we have to have the aspiration, the motivation that I
want to do that.

Then we can meditate. That’s the next step. Meditation is a repetitive process you do
over and over again. Usually we use the word practice, like practicing the piano, in
which we over again trying to generate that understanding and confidence that this is
correct and apply it to some situation in life. We try to discern that situation in the
light of this understanding.

For example, I’m having a problem with somebody. I didn’t get my way. I wanted the
interaction with you to turn out a certain way and it didn’t happen like that. So, I’m
upset and I am blaming you and the organizers and this and that and the weather. I’m
very upset and I’m putting the blame on everything. So, now, with meditation we sit
and we analyze and we have this analysis of the self. Do I exist as some solid thing
inside me, inside my mind that somehow should always have its own way? Why should
I always have my way? Who says that I should always have my way? What makes “me”
the most important person in the world that things should always go my way? That’s
absurd. That’s impossible. It’s all based on this conviction that there is a solid me
sitting somewhere inside my head, on the basis of imputation, that exists from its own
side and therefore it’s actually sitting there and thinks it should always have its own
way. There is no such thing.

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So, we focus in meditation on the voidness of that and that I don’t exist in that way.
There is the situation. I’m certainly experiencing it, so I can label “me” in terms of this
individual experience. The situation has dependently arisen on all sorts of causes and
circumstances and so then there’s nothing to be upset about. I can’t place the blame
on anything. So, we’re not upset about it, that it didn’t go the way that we wanted it to
and we just deal with the reality of the situation and make the best of it. So, it makes
us very flexible. If you think in terms of a solid “me,” that this is the way that I want it,
this is the way it should be, it has to be this way and I didn’t get my way, then you get
very angry. So, then you say things you regret that are compulsive. You lose control.

Meditation means to build up something constructive that’s a positive habit. The more
that we repeat it, the more that this becomes the habit, this application and
understanding, so that automatically eventually we will be able to apply it in all
situations and not get upset anymore. We won’t need to sit down and settle ourselves
before we can calm down by this deconstruction meditation. You can do it all the time
on in any situation. You just have to remind yourself. That’s called mindfulness. Now-a-
days, that word mindfulness has taken a different meaning in the West. It’s become to
just sort of pay attention. It doesn’t mean that in the original. It’s the same word as to
remember. It’s the mental glue that keeps you from forgetting something. It’s always
remembering and we’re not talking about recalling information. We’re talking about
actively holding it in our attention. That’s why I describe it as mental glue. So, always
remember that I don’t exist in this impossible way. There’s nothing to be made secure,
so relax. Okay?

The Four Buddhist Tenet Systems Regarding Emptiness

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/abhidharma-tenet-systems/the-
indian-tenet-systems/the-four-buddhist-tenet-systems-regarding-emptiness

Voidness, also known as emptiness, is obviously very difficult to understand.

Understanding it requires a great deal of positive force, and concentration, and
preparation, and strong motivation to really want to understand it, based on seeing
how absolutely essential it is. In the beginning we just might get a general idea, we
might not really understand too much, but that is okay, that’s how everybody begins.
But slowly, slowly, over time, and putting in a lot of work on it, eventually it will get
clearer and clearer. The way it is studied among the Tibetans is through graded levels
of understanding.

Different Buddhist Traditions Have Different Interpretations

We’re going through what’s called the Indian Buddhist tenet systems, or philosophical
systems based on Buddhist teachings, which Buddha taught to help different people of
different dispositions and different stages of development. And as Atisha put it so
nicely, everything that Buddha taught is intended for our own gradual development by

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stages – not just for these stupid people over there, but I don’t need it. And we saw
that – as Shantideva, the great Indian master, pointed out – that if we can work with
certain common themes that you find in all of these systems, then if we can get an
understanding of it in a simpler system, we can use that same analogy to get a deeper
understanding. And we saw that the example that Shantideva uses, which is the most
common and probably important example, is the example that everything is like an
illusion and yet, nevertheless, it functions. And we saw that the most basic example of
this is that from one point of view things are solid – body, chair, and so on – but that’s
really just the superficial appearance because, when we look at it deeper, everything is
made of tiny little atoms. So it is like an illusion that our body is solid and the chair is
solid but, nevertheless, we don’t fall through the chair, even though these are two
collections of atoms with lots of space in-between. And we shouldn’t leave it at just the
level of: “Well, it’s a miracle that I don’t fall through the chair!” We need to try to
understand what is meant here by “reality” and things being “like an illusion.” We
shouldn’t belittle or trivialize this initial level, because actually to really digest that
emotionally and deal with our lives with that understanding is already very, very
advanced.

There are four tenet systems within Indian Buddhist philosophy. Two are Hinayana
schools, two are Mahayana. Vaibhashika and Sautrantika are the two Hinayana schools;
they’re from a different brand of Hinayana than Theravada, so don’t at all confuse it
with the teachings that you have of Theravada in Southeast Asia, a different brand of
Hinayana. There were eighteen schools of Hinayana, Theravada was just one. These are
subdivisions of another one Sarvastivada that stayed mostly in North India. The two
Mahayana ones are called Chittamatra, which means “mind-only,” and Madhyamaka,
which means “middle way”). Within Madhyamaka there are two subdivisions:
Svatantrika and Prasangika.

And, to make things even more delightfully complicated, each tradition of Tibetan
Buddhism has a different interpretation of all of these. So this evening we will just
speak about Gelugpa. And within Gelugpa, unfortunately or fortunately, to make it
more useful for developing the mind, there are different textbooks used in the
different monasteries and they have slightly different interpretations of many of the
points. I will follow just one of those, that of most of my teachers – it’s the textbook
tradition called Jetsunpa. And that’s what’s used by the Geshes in Sera Je monastery
and in Ganden Jangtse monastery.

I point this out because you really should be aware of this. Geshe Sopa comes from
Sera Je, the same textbook tradition. So does Serkong Rinpoche, my teacher. At
Loseling, in Mexico City, the Geshe uses a different textbook system Panchen. So
sometimes you might hear different explanations from the Geshes from different
monasteries. You shouldn’t get confused by that; try to keep everything in its proper
place. It’s just a little bit different, not a lot different, but a little bit different on certain
points. There’s actually four different Gelugpa textbook traditions. Jeffrey Hopkins’s

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books follow yet another of these Kunkhyen, and Michael Roach follows yet another
one Tendarma. So be aware that there are differences. As I say, this is very useful,
actually, because if there was just one explanation then that’s dogma, and you don’t
really learn, you don’t get challenged by trying to figure out, “Well, why did they say
what they said? Why do they have these differences?” and so on.

Voidness Is an Absence of Impossible Ways of Existing

In the discussion of our unawareness or ignorance, what happens is we are always

making mental holograms of things; that’s how we know them. And among these
mental holograms, often there is the appearance of something that is impossible. And
our unawareness is either: “I didn’t know that it was impossible” or “I thought it was
possible,” like the difference between: “I didn’t know that there were no apples on the
table” or “I thought there were apples on the table.” So the deepest thing that we have
to get rid of is thinking that there are apples on the table, when there aren’t – thinking
that this appearance of something impossible actually refers to something real. That’s
what we really have to get rid of.

Voidness is saying that there is no such thing; that is what voidness is all about – an
absolute absence. There is no such thing as an actual real reference to this appearance
of something impossible. So we’re talking – if we put it in Western terms – about
projections of fantasy. They’re not referring to anything real. And in a different type of
terminology, what’s impossible is an impossible “soul.” So there is an impossible “soul”
of persons and an impossible “soul” of all phenomena. And each school progressively
asserts what is impossible. So the impossible “soul” is slightly different in the different
schools; it gets more and more profound. And so we have to realize that although it
appears, it’s impossible – that this is not referring to anything real. We have to negate
it with the understanding of voidness – there is no such thing, even though it appears.

The Hinayana schools only talk about an impossible “soul” of persons: ourselves and
everybody else. And the Mahayana schools speak, in addition, of an impossible “soul”
of all phenomena. The Hinayana schools say that to achieve liberation, or
enlightenment, all you have to do is get rid of this belief in an impossible “soul” of
persons. The only real difference with the Buddha is that for enlightenment you need
to know all phenomena, but there is nothing discussed in terms of getting rid of some
impossible “soul” or impossible things about phenomena. In Hinayana they say a
Buddha has to get rid of any wrong ideas that a Buddha has, but it’s not presented in
the same way as in Mahayana, in terms of voidness.

Then the Mahayana schools say that to achieve liberation you have to get rid of the
grasping for this impossible “soul” of persons, but for enlightenment you also have to
get rid of grasping for an impossible “soul” of all phenomena. And Prasangika says,
well, actually you need to get rid of this grasping for an impossible “soul” of both
persons and all phenomena to achieve liberation, and actually what is impossible
about both is exactly the same – the other Mahayana schools say that it’s different. The

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other Mahayana schools say that what is impossible about persons and what is
impossible about all phenomena are different. Obviously, persons are part of all
phenomena, so eventually you have to understand that about persons too. But to
achieve liberation you have to understand something impossible about persons, which
is less profound. So to achieve enlightenment, according to Prasangika, what you have
to get rid of are the habits of unawareness that make these impossible appearances –
and that you do after you have gotten rid of this grasping. The other Mahayana
schools say you can get rid of the two together, gradually all the way.

The Gross Impossible “Soul” of Persons

Let’s talk about the impossible “soul” of persons first. A “person” (gang-zag,
Skt. pudgala) is what we would call any individual mental continuum. That mental
continuum is going to be connected with physical elements of a particular life form.
There is nothing inherent in a mental continuum that makes it always a human or an
animal, or male or female, or anything like that. We would also call an insect a
“person.” It’s not inherently an insect – it’s a mental continuum that in this particular
lifetime happens to have the aggregates of an insect. Now this is very profound, if you
get into it, in terms of rebirth. It is not Alex the human is now reborn as Fifi the poodle.
But in this mental continuum is one lifetime as Alex a human and then another lifetime
as Fifi the poodle. There is a big difference in terms of how you view rebirth.

Now there are two levels of an impossible “soul” of persons: gross and subtle.
Prasangika has yet a third one. The first of the levels, the gross level or coarse level of
what is called the “grasping for an impossible ‘soul’” here is the doctrinally based
grasping for an impossible “soul.” So this is very, very specific. This is based on learning
about and accepting and believing in the doctrines taught by a non-Buddhist Indian
philosophical system. Now, of these eight non-Buddhist Indian schools, seven of them,
like Buddhism, accept karma and rebirth. Rebirth going on and on and on, over and
over and over again, on the basis of karma. This is assumed. There is only one school,
the hedonists, that don’t accept karma and rebirth, and they are called the nihilists –
“let’s have a good time because at the end of this lifetime that’s it.”

So the question really is, well, what is it that is going from lifetime to lifetime under the
force of karma? Or what is it that is just going on in this lifetime? These other schools
are asserting an impossible “soul” that does that, and Buddhism says no, there is no
impossible “soul.” If you hear about, and learn about, and accept and believe in one of
these theories about an impossible “soul” – that’s what they are talking about, that
type of grasping for an impossible “soul.”

What are the qualities of this impossible “soul?” And all these Indian schools accept in
common and say that there are three qualities. Besides those three qualities they have
differences, but they all, in common, say the impossible “soul” has three qualities. One
just says that it’s only in this lifetime. First of all the soul is static, doesn’t change; it’s
not affected by anything. Second one is that it is a partless monad. So either it is one

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with the universe, no parts, atman is Brahman – this type of Brahmanic belief, pre-
Hindu. Or that it is a tiny little monad, like a spark of light or something like that. So
that’s usually translated as “permanent and one.”

The third quality is that it is separate from the body and the mind and the emotions
(the aggregates). So this type of soul either possesses the body, mind, and emotions,
or it controls them, it’s the boss, like a machine, or it inhabits them – or, obviously, it
could be some combination of these three. “Now I am in this body, this soul, and I
possess this body and mind, and I am going to use it and control it, and I live in my
head.” And then this separate “me,” this separate “soul,” flies off from this body and
mind, and now is going to inhabit another one which it will possess as mine and use it
and control it – push the buttons inside.

Now some parts of this we might automatically think, we might automatically feel like.
But the whole package – which is what they are talking about here – the whole
package, that’s something that you wouldn’t just automatically think. An animal
certainly wouldn’t automatically think this. You have to be taught that by some
doctrinal systems. That’s why it’s called “doctrinally based.” Now this is what you have
to get rid of first. And this type of soul, according to the seven schools, not the
hedonists, is the one that can be liberated from rebirth. Then it is liberated from the
illusion that it is separate, and now it is, according to the Hindu and Brahmanic views,
one with the universe. And, based on this belief, we get what’s called “doctrinally based
disturbing emotions and disturbing attitudes.” So we get very attached to our view, our
religion, and we get very defensive about it, and we get angry with anybody that
disagrees or challenges us – maybe we even go to war over it – and we can get very
arrogant about it, and we get many disturbing attitudes based on this belief – like
grasping for this body to be “mine,” or something of our body or our mind to be “me.”
This is “my” car – these types of thing. That sort of impossible “soul.” This is “my”
religion, “my” church; this is “my” whatever. And then there’s also a disturbing attitude
that such a soul is eternal, or this disturbing attitude of grasping for ascetic practices
to be the path to liberation – like if you torture yourself, and whip yourself, and
standing on one foot for a year – so this is going to bring you liberation.

So although we might not have the full-fledged Indian version of this, if you look at
some of our Western religions and beliefs there is a lot that is very similar, isn’t there.
So either we are complete hedonists – live for this lifetime, have as much fun as you
can, make as much money as you can. Or, although we don’t believe in rebirth over
and over and over again, there is rebirth in heaven or hell – and that’s according to
slightly different versions of karma: reward and punishment based on actions. And that
there is an eternal “soul” that’s separate from the body and mind that’s going to go
flying off to this. And perhaps if we torture ourselves and whip ourselves that will help
us to get to liberation in heaven more quickly. And we certainly get disturbing
emotions based on such beliefs – that our belief is the best, superior, and we go to war
with great hatred and anger against anybody who disagrees. Before, we had the

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hedonists – “I’m going to live forever, and it’s separate from this body because I never
get old, and just have as much fun as I can.”

So when we realize that this is impossible, that there is no such thing as this type of
soul – that’s not what I am; I am not just this gross impossible “soul” – so what do we
know after that? This is very important in the understanding of voidness. You always
have to look at, well, what do we know after something has been negated? It’s a
person, that’s a “me,” that’s the “me” that actually exists in our persons, individual
mental continuums. So there’s a person, “me” – the name you can give it – and
everybody uses that type of idea, whether you have a word for it or not. So “me”; what
is “me?” I am something that is imputed on the aggregates – the body, mind, and
emotions. The five aggregates, I’ll just say very quickly here, that’s the body and mind.
So it’s imputed on it, it’s labeled on it – I’ll explain that in a minute. So if the basis –
that’s what we call “me” – now, if the basis is nonstatic (we saw that all the aggregates
are changing all the time), what’s imputed on it has to also be nonstatic – it can’t be
static. And because the basis has parts, what’s imputed on it (“me”) can’t be a partless
monad – that also has to have parts. And because it’s imputed, that means that it’s not
independent of a body and mind. Non-Buddhist schools would say it’s independent,
could be separate.

Mental Labeling

We have to understand – it is very important – what we mean by imputation or mental

labeling. There are three things involved: The basis for imputation – that would be the
body, the mind, the emotions (the five aggregates). Then there is the mental label –
this is the word, or category, or concept “me.” Now that mental label, that’s not me;
that’s a word or concept. The third thing is the object designated by the label. It is
what the word or concept “me” refers to; the object designated by the label is me.

This is obviously something you are going to have to work with, so I am just throwing
it out now. I’ll give a simple example: This collection of three hundred and sixty-five
and a quarter days, that’s a basis for labeling, for imputation. The mental label by
which we put it together and organize it so we can talk about the whole thing is the
mental label “year.” But a “year” – that’s only a category, that’s only a word. A year is
not a category or a word. A year is something, isn’t it? So what does the label “year”
designate? What’s designated by it is an actual year. It’s equivalent to, it’s what you call,
three hundred and sixty-five and a quarter days, in order to deal with the whole thing.
But it is not just the word – it’s what the word signifies, what it means. So here you
have the basis, and here you have the word (the mental label), and then what the
mental label refers to – me. Well, that’s like an illusion. It seems to be static, and
without any parts, and independent, and so on – but that’s like an illusion. That’s a
complete false illusion. But even just that it is mentally labeled and it’s just what is
designated by a word – that’s like an illusion, isn’t it? And yet it functions – I see, I hear,
I know, I walk, I do things – it functions.

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Let’s state it differently; it wasn’t so clear, the way that I said it. The impossible “me,”
the coarse impossible “me,” the gross “soul” – that is an illusion; that doesn’t function
at all. That is an illusion, the impossible “me.” But the actual me, which is designated by
the label “me” on the basis of the body and mind, that is like an illusion. So here we
have to work with another level – of things being like an illusion. I’m like an illusion
and yet I function; I do things. So be careful here. The false “me,” the impossible “me” –
that is an illusion. The actual me – that’s like an illusion, and yet it functions. And
another very important point to know about mental labeling: labeling does not create
the object designated by the label. It doesn’t matter whether you call it “me” or not,
there’s the actual me. You don’t need the label. The label doesn’t create it. The label
doesn’t create a year. Before there was the word or concept “year,” were there years?
Yes. The word “year” didn’t create it. The earth went around the sun. And you could
call it “year.” “Year” is applicable to that, but it doesn’t create a year.

The Subtle Impossible “Soul” of Persons

Now the subtle impossible “me.” This is the one that automatically arises. You don’t
have to be taught this; animals have it too. Whether or not we know that the self is
imputed on the aggregates, it doesn’t matter. Whether we think that there is this
impossible “soul” or we know that there is no such thing, it doesn’t matter, because
this is more subtle. So without having to be taught, it appears to us that a person can
be known self-sufficiently. That means that it can be known without the body, the
mind, or the emotions, or something appearing simultaneously.

Let’s put this into the type of image and language of a mental hologram. It
automatically appears, the mental hologram of just “me” – or, at least, we think it does.
It feels as though there is a hologram of just “me,” without it being a hologram of
body, mind, emotions, or something, also appearing, and me being what can be
imputed on it. This is what it seems like, this is what we believe. Let me give examples:
“I don’t know myself very well,” or “Oh, now I know myself very well.” – as if “myself”
were something that I could know independently of knowing my body, or knowing my
mind or my emotions, and knowing myself in terms of that. That’s very subtle, but
actually very profound.

“Do you know Maria?” “Yes, I know Maria.” – as if Maria were something that you could
know. But we don’t say, “I know Maria’s body,” unless we’ve had relations, but you
know what I mean. When we think, “I know somebody,” we just think that we know this
person. What is it that we know? It’s as if we could know Maria self-sufficiently, without
simultaneously at least having a mental hologram of her name. You can’t think of
Maria. How do you think of Maria? Either it has to be with a mental hologram of what
she looks like, the sound of her voice, the name – something. You can’t just think Maria
or just see Maria, that you could know her self-sufficiently, without a basis appearing.

Even though we might know that I am imputed on the aggregates; nevertheless,

automatically it appears as though I can know “me” self-sufficiently. I can know

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“myself.” I can see “myself” in the mirror. You see yourself in the mirror? Sure, I see
myself in the mirror. That’s my body. Now I do see myself in the mirror, but I see myself
in the mirror on the basis of the body appearing in the mirror – we feel that it’s
“myself”; it’s not that it’s just a body.

So we have many expressions that reveal this automatic way of thinking: “I am not
feeling like myself today,” “I am out of touch with myself,” “I am looking for my true
self,” “Be yourself.” And that’s automatically how we think and how we feel. And, of
course, based on believing this, that this appearance of a subtle impossible “soul,” that
we get automatically arising disturbing emotions: attachment (in terms of myself and
others), and anger, and so on. This is the automatically arising type. Animals have that
too.

So this actual me, it’s like an illusion. It’s not only imputed but it is imputably knowable,
it’s not self-sufficiently knowable, it’s imputably knowable. It’s imputed, but more than
that, it is imputably knowable. The basis is imputed on the aggregates (the body and
mind). And, in addition, it is only imputably knowable. Something, some basis
appearing. It is not like the body – aside from the relation of the whole and parts,
which is a whole other discussion. It is not like the body, that you can just see the
body. So it is like an illusion; nevertheless, it functions. And we do see ourselves in the
mirror; it’s not that we are looking at somebody else or even a dead body.

Now that’s more subtle – it’s like an illusion, yet it functions. And according to all the
non-Prasangika schools, if you understand just that much – that this is impossible, no
such thing – and you get that non-conceptually, and you get really, really familiar with
that so that you have that every single moment of your existence, then you gain
liberation. You don’t gain liberation just when you’ve had it non-conceptually for five
minutes or four hours. That’s not enough. You have to have it always. So when you get
it always, then you’re liberated.

What Establishes That Something Exists?

This is difficult enough to understand, obviously. So now the question is, well, just with
that much understanding, well, what type of actual self do we have? Who is “me”?
What is “me”? So now we get into this thing of – what’s usually spoken of in terms of –
how do things exist. This is a misleading translation. That’s not really the issue. The
issue is much more subtle than that. The issue here is what establishes or proves that
something exists: how do you know something exists? We are not talking about what
makes it exist. We’re talking about what – it’s the word “establish” (sgrub) – what
proves that it – it’s the same word as “prove” and the same word as “affirmation,” the
affirmation phenomenon – what affirms, what proves, what establishes that it exists?
“Exist” means that it is validly knowable. What establishes that it’s validly knowable –
that’s it’s not just garbage, an illusion.

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So this is what Mahayana is talking about with voidness. It is saying that, well, there are
certain things that you might believe establish or prove that something exists, but that
is impossible, that doesn’t prove it. Voidness is the total absence of – in terms of
phenomena – it’s the total absence of this being what proves that it exists. That’s not
only in Prasangika, that’s all Mahayana. But it gets more and more subtle, what they
are refuting. The manner of establishing that something exists gets more and more
subtle – I mean the impossible manner that they are refuting. That, you’ll have to chew
on for a while. But this is what voidness is all about, if you want to be precise. This is
what they are actually talking about, otherwise it’s too vague: “the way of existing” –
that’s not precise.

Now let’s go back to Hinayana. Vaibhashika and Sautrantika talk about what
establishes that various things exist. Everybody says, except Prasangika, that what
establishes that something is validly knowable is that there is something on the side of
the object that makes it a validly knowable object. This is what I have been describing
for years as a solid line around it that makes it specific – not something else – that
makes it a specific, validly knowable object. That would be equivalent to a line around
it. This table doesn’t just merge into the background as part of one big soup. What
proves that it exists is that, well, yes, on its side there’s some line around it that
individualizes it from everything else. That’s general – everything has that, everything
that we could validly know. There’s only one characteristic feature, the most basic
characteristic feature, the individual characteristic feature of something – it’s just that
it’s an individual knowable object. It doesn’t merge into everything else. Including “me”
– that has a line around it. And, in addition, the referent object for the label, for the
word for it, can be found. There’s the table! There’s a line around it. There’s the table.
“Me.” There’s a line around “me” – I’m not merging into the wall or becoming you. So
the referent of that word “me” can be found, on the side of the object. So this, in
general, everybody accepts about everything, except Prasangika.

Vaibhashika

Now Vaibhashika says, “Let’s get more specific.” That, of course, establishes that
something exists, proves that it exists. But what really proves that everything exists is
that it functions, performs a function. Because it does something. And the most basic
thing that everything does, including static phenomena, is serve as an object to be
validly known. And so because it functions, that proves it exists. (My “invader from the
fifth dimension” doesn’t function, doesn’t exist.) It functions, so that I can validly know
it. That proves that it exists.

It makes sense – all of these positions make sense. So even the actual “me” is like that.
There is a line around it, making it separate from everything else; and it makes it a
knowable object; and it functions. That proves that I exist. I do things, I see things, I see
you – that proves that I exist. And that “me” can be found. Where? In the aggregates,
somewhere in the aggregates, the collection of the whole aggregates – well, that’s

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“me.” Although that’s the basis but, nevertheless, you can find it. The basis serves as an
example for it; that’s where you can point to.

Sautrantika

Now Sautrantika says that, well, we have to differentiate between objective

phenomena (rang-mtshan) and metaphysical phenomena (spyi-mtshan). So what we
understood about Vaibhashika, well, that’s just talking about objective reality – what
functions, what we would say is “real.” Body, mind, persons – those are real. That’s
objective reality. And, well, metaphysical phenomena – what are those? Those are
these categories, static categories that we were talking about. These categories,
Sautrantika says, well, sure, they have a line around them. The category “table” is not
the category “chair.” And here they start to get into a hint of Prasangika but, after this,
everybody steps back from it. But they say that these categories, well, you can’t find a
referent object of the category “tables.” So what establishes that the category “tables”
exists? What proves that it exists is that it is applicable, it can be mentally applied; it
can be mentally labeled on individual tables. Individual “me’s”, they’re objectively real.
The actual “me,” according to Sautrantika – that’s real, it functions. I function, I do
things – that proves that I exist, even though it’s like an illusion. Even though the “me”
is imputed on the aggregates and even though it is not self-sufficiently knowable. But
if we talk about the category “me,” the category “persons,” well, that’s a category. But
what proves that it exists is that it can be applied to many, many different persons,
many different “me’s”; everybody calls themselves “me.” Whether or not anybody
labels it, it doesn’t matter.

Now we get to the Mahayana schools. Now we start talking about impossible ways of
proving that something exists. That’s impossible, although it might appear as though it
is like this. Now we are getting into the impossible “soul” of a person.

One thing that I left out, and I have to go back: In the Sautrantika, it says, well, come
on, you can’t talk about the collection of the aggregates as being what you find, the
basis of labeling, for “me” – what you can point to. You can say, well, it’s mental
consciousness, because mental consciousness, that’s really what goes from lifetime to
lifetime. The thing is, you have to find something that is always available, to be the
basis for labeling. So what’s always available is mental consciousness, so that’s where
you can find the “me.” That’s where you can point to the referent object of the word
“me.”

Chittamatra

Now we get to Chittamatra and Mahayana. Chittamatra says, “Well, yes, we agree what
you have to get rid of – the impossible gross and subtle ‘souls’ the way that’s defined
in Hinayana. You get rid of that type of grasping, you’re liberated. But to gain
enlightenment, you have to understand the voidness of all phenomena.” Chittamatra
says, “Well, there’s two levels here. What is an impossible way of proving that validly

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knowable phenomena exist? What’s impossible is that when we know something –
when there’s a mental hologram of something, the mind produces a mental hologram
– that the object that appears is coming from its own independent external source.”

What proves that something exists? Hinayana would say, “Well, the thing exists
objectively out there without my seeing it, before I see it.” So the source of that mental
hologram is coming from the thing that was there before, plus from my karma. Now
the question is: “How do you know that?” How do you know that it objectively exists
out there before you know it? That is impossible. How do you know that, in a room
where there is absolutely nobody, that there’s furniture, that there’s a bed in there?
What proves that it’s there? The only thing that would prove that it’s there is you open
the door and look. It is only when you actually have a mental hologram, or somebody
else goes into the room, that it proves that it exists. You can’t prove that it exists by
saying, “Well, it’s objectively there before anybody knows it.” So there is no objective
reality.

For example, there’s a donkey in the middle of the room and we’re sitting in a circle
around it, and everybody takes a picture with a Polaroid camera. Every picture is
different. Well, what does the donkey really look like? It’s not objective. It’s not that it
looks like something separate from anybody looking at it. That’s impossible. All you
can say is that the sources of the appearance of things are from karmic tendencies. So
this is the source of the object that appears in the mind – that’s the source of the
hologram, basically. And the knowing of the hologram comes from a karmic tendency.
And that’s all you can say that it comes from. And, of course, we have shared karma,
collective karma. So we’re all in the same room, but what we’re seeing is not the same;
nobody is seeing the same thing. But we would say – this is like an illusion – we would
say we’re all in the same room; so collectively we’re all in the same room, but what
we’re experiencing, what we’re seeing, what we’re hearing, are all very individual
mental holograms.

So now we’re getting much more subtle here. Everybody sees me, but they are seeing
something different. What appears is coming from their side, from the side of the
mind. But you can’t say that I exist only in each person’s mind. What appears comes
from their mind. If I only existed in your heads, then there would be as many Alex’s as
there are people in the room – this is absurd. So it’s like an illusion that you’re all
seeing the same person sitting here. And yet you can all see me. I’m talking to you –
everybody hears something different and remembers something different. It’s like an
illusion. Woo-woo-woo.

But still they say that there is a solid line around me and you can find me. What you
find the person or find yourself as, they say it’s alayavijnana, it’s the storehouse
consciousness, the foundation consciousness. I will not go into what that is because
that’s a long discussion, but that’s more subtle than the mental consciousness. It’s what

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carries the karmic tendencies, and that’s why it’s very important. This is what is
specified here.

Now Chittamatra has something else here, which is also going a little bit in the
direction of Prasangika. We have the second, the more subtle type of impossible “soul”
of all phenomena. The Hinayanas say that what establishes that something exists is the
characteristic mark that just makes it a knowable thing, like a line around it, from the
side of the object. The image I use which I think is helpful is that there are hooks,
characteristic marks, of any name that you could validly apply to it, on the side of the
object. So, like there is a hook somewhere within me; because of that hook, which is a
hook for the word or the label “Alex” or for “Alexander” (that’s another hook), and
another hook for “Alejandro,” and another hook for “Berzin,” and another hook for “Fifi
the dog,” and another hook for “person,” and another hook for “nice person,” and
another hook for a color – a hook for every quality and every name in every language
that establishes that I’m Alex or that I’m Alejandro, or that I’m a nice person or a
person, that establishes it. And Chittamatra says, “Come on, no way! Things would be
so crowded with hooks. No, there’s no hooks on the side of the object. That names
and qualities and so on are just applicable. It’s not that there is a hook on the side that
allows you to hang the name on it.”

This is not so farfetched, the Hinayana point of view. I mean, how is it that you can give
different names for things, and then different languages? This is a “table,” this is a
“mesa,” this is a “piece of junk,” this is an “antique,” this is “beautiful,” this is “ugly.” How
is it that you can apply all these words to it and they are all valid? It’s not just arbitrary.
This is a “dog” – no, it is not a dog. So there has to be appropriate hooks in there. So
you can have relative judgments: it’s a “piece of junk” or a “beautiful antique” – both
can be applied, but not “dog.” So what is this? Is this a table or is this a mesa? It’s an
interesting question. And on which side is it a table or a mesa – is it on the side of the
object or on the side of the mind that is labeling it? What proves that it is a table?
What proves that it is a mesa? So you see why you really have to, in order to
understand what Buddhism is talking about with voidness, you really have to
understand this concept of what proves it exists as something. What proves that it
exists at all? Chittamatra says, sure, on the side of the object there’s a line around it
that makes it knowable; but what establishes it as being a table or a mesa, well, that’s
in terms of the mental labeling. But it’s not merely a mental label, because it actually
functions. It is not that we’re mentally labeling it, making it a knowable object – that’s
not just mentally labeled, according to Chittamatra. It’s something on the side of the
object that establishes that; it’s not just that it can be mentally labeled a knowable
object. It is a knowable object – from its own side – even though it is just appearing
out of karma.

So let’s summarize this. Here we have the karmic tendencies, often called the “seed.”
Karmic tendencies producing a mental hologram. And from the side of that object
that’s been produced, the appearance – we’re talking about the appearance – the

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appearance has come from the side of the mind. Now what’s appeared has a solid line
around it. But what I call it, that’s something else. That’s coming from – there is
nothing on the side of the object that’s there that allows you to hang the words on
them. Independent of whether I know it or not, it always comes out with a line around
it. But it functions. That also establishes that it’s real – not like a category – if I put the
paper on top of it then the table holds it.

Okay, it’s taking a little bit of time, but I think let’s complete this then you have the
whole picture to work with. So this Chittamatra is extremely profound, actually. And
what is the real importance of it, in terms of our progression here, is that now from
Chittamatra we understand that the appearances of things are coming only from the
side of the mind. So it’s like an illusion that it is coming from out there. If we can deal
with that, then that prepares us for Prasangika, which is saying, “Hey, that’s not quite
right!” Chittamatra says the appearance is not proven or established from the side of
the object; it’s only established from the side of the mind. So if we can understand
that, and work with that, then that sets the way for us to be able to understand that
what proves that something exists is not at all from the side of the object – it’s totally
from the side of the mind. And so it prepares us. It’s easier to understand.

Svatantrika Madhyamaka

Now onto Svatantrika Madhyamaka. Earlier, all the other schools are saying, “Well, only
some things are imputed.” Madhyamaka comes along, both divisions of Madhyamaka,
and says, “Hey, no, what establishes that everything exists is that it is imputed, it’s
imputable; it can be labeled.” So everything can be imputed. What’s impossible is that
it has unimputed existence. What’s impossible is that it objectively exists: it functions
and that proves that it exists, independent of that it can be mentally labeled. They the
two Madhyamaka divisions say, “No, no, no, it’s all imputed on parts, and so on.
Everything – a table is imputed on the parts and causes, and all these sorts of things.”

So now we have imputation being a much larger thing. It is not just imputing names
and categories, it is imputing everything. Because, remember, the others were saying
that the line around it, that’s not imputed. Chittamatra was saying, “Hey, come on, only
the names are imputed, the categories; but the line around it, hey, that’s there, on the
side of the object.”

So, now, Madhyamaka says that what proves that things exist is they can be labeled,
they can be given a name. A knowable object. The non-Madhyamaka are saying that
whether or not you give a name to something, or anything like that, that doesn’t
establish that it exists. They do exist. It’s only categories that are imputable. The actual
table is not imputable, this table. The category “table,” well, that’s imputable. How do I
know that there’s a table? Well, it’s not just because I can label it “table.” There is a
table, it functions. Excluding categories – categories, well, they don’t function, it’s just
that they can be applied. So Madhyamaka says you can’t establish that something

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exists independent of a name or a concept. I know that there are tables because I can
label tables; it is what the concept refers to, the name refers to.

Now Svatantrika says what establishes that things exist is that you can give them
names, but there is still a line around things, and there are even hooks on things.
Things don’t exist independently of – how can you establish that tables exist
independent of the concept “table”? You can’t. The earlier schools say that you can
establish that tables exist independent of the concept “table” – well, that’s impossible.
What are you talking about? What are you establishing? It can only be established in
terms of words. How do I know these tables exist? Well, because there’s the word
“table.” What are tables? It’s what the word refers to. If there wasn’t the word “table,”
how would I know that there are tables? It is like an illusion that it exists independent –
that what establishes it is independent of a label.

Svatantrika says it can’t just be by that itself; there has to be something on the side of
the object as well. A line around it and a hook for “table,” and so on. So it’s the two
working together, interdependent with each other: there’s a word “table” and there’s
something on the side of the object that makes it a table. There is something on the
side of me that makes me “me” and not “you.” Something on my side. Something on
the side of this person driving a car and beeping and trying to pass me on the road
that makes this person an idiot. Of course he’s an idiot in terms of the concept “idiot,”
but there absolutely is something on the side of this person, wrong with him, that
makes him an idiot – so that I can actually call him an “idiot” because he is driving like
an idiot.

Something special – what kind of special thing that makes me unique in me? So
Madhyamaka says, “Come on, it’s only in terms of the concept that you can say he is
an ‘idiot.’” Svatantrika says there has to be something also on the side of the object.
And in terms of “me,” you can actually find me. What makes me specially me? And here
they go back to the mental consciousness, so that’s the basis – you can always find it,
you can always point to it – that’s me. The referent object for the name can be found,
you can point to it. It’s on the side of the object. You can point to the mental
consciousness as the findable basis that has the characteristic feature of a “me.”

Prasangika Madhyamaka

Now it’s only when you have gotten that far in your understanding, in terms of
gradually getting to this point, that now you can go to Prasangika. You have already
understood that the “me” is imputed and can’t be known by itself. You know about
appearances. You know about categories. You know, in general, about mental labeling.
And you know about these hooks, and so on. Prasangika says even within the context
of mental labeling, there is nothing on the side of the object that establishes it, that
proves that it exists. What establishes that there’s a table? Well, the fact that there is
the concept of “table,” the fact that there’s a word “table,” and that it is applicable. It’s
not from the side of the object that we know that it is validly applicable – it is only

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from the side of the mind that you know whether it is a valid implication or not. So
whether it is correct or not, whether it is valid or not, is established by – I mean, let’s
not go into that, but different criteria from the side of the mind.

If we understand this correctly, then we know that the label “me” doesn’t create me.
And I can know me – of course, we have to know the body, and these things, in order
to know me. And we can know things without giving them names; you can know
things non-conceptually. But what establishes, what proves that things exist is that,
well, there are names and concepts for them – they are what those names and
concepts refer to. However, what they refer to – that referent object of the name or
concept – can’t be found. Everybody else said that you can find it on the side of the
basis, you can find it as the mental consciousness, or something, the collection of the
parts – you can find it. “No, no, no – you can’t find a referent object. It’s only with
names and concepts. You can’t find it on the side of the object.”

This is really getting subtle there. So it’s an illusion that it can be found. It’s an illusion –
I mean, it appears like that – but it’s an illusion that what’s designated by the label can
actually be pointed to and found as the basis. Because the basis is labeled on its parts,
and that is labeled on its parts, and it goes on forever, yet everything functions – like
an illusion.

I don’t expect, and so you shouldn’t expect, that you understood everything that we’ve
covered here. But what I’ve tried to do is give you a good chunk of material, in perhaps
a little bit more precise way of explaining, so that you have a lot of food to chew on.
And from this we can also appreciate that Prasangika is very, very, profound. It’s not
this trivialized thing, “Well, can you find the ‘me’ up your nose or in your armpit?” – the
subtlety of what they’re talking about.

So let’s end with a dedication. We think whatever understanding we have gained, may
it go deeper and deeper, grow and grow, and act as a cause for reaching
enlightenment for the benefit of all.

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 The Subtle False “Me” Refuted Only by Gelug
Prasangika
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/vipashyana/refuting-the-
false-me-experiencing-the-four-noble-truths/the-subtle-false-me-refuted-only-by-
gelug-prasangika

Review: First Level of the Four Point Analysis: Refuting the Coarse Impossible "Me" and
the Subtle Impossible "Me"

We have refuted now the coarse impossible "me," which is doctrinally-based and
coming together with that are the twenty forms of this deluded attitude towards the
transitory network – throwing out "me" or "mine" onto the different aggregates. And
we have now identified, hopefully, the subtle impossible “me.” Everybody says that it
automatically arises, and Prasangika says it could also doctrinally arise. When it’s in this
doctrinally arising form also you get these twenty deluded outlooks towards a
transitory network.

When you have automatically arising forms of these types of unawareness – some level
of unawareness – then the deluded outlook toward a transitory network is not divided
into these twenty. It is just a more general thing directed at the five aggregates in
general – not specified in terms of each of the aggregates and not specified in terms of
controller, possessor, or inhabitant. I mention that because that will come in the
meditation – what you work with.

Also I should mention – but I will not go into any detail about it – that from the non-
Prasangika point of view – and remember we’re always talking about the Gelugpa
version of these; other Tibetan traditions have quite a different understanding of these
four Indian schools – this deluded outlook toward a transitory network is throwing out
this net of "me" and "mine" onto the aggregates. The deluded outlook toward a
transitory network – that is this throwing out of the net of “me” onto any of the
aggregates; or that "They’re mine" – my possession, my thing to control, or my
residence – onto the aggregates. So it’s throwing it onto the aggregates.

Tsongkhapa says that the Prasangika position is that this deluded outlook throws this
out onto the conventional “me” – not onto the aggregates – “me” is identical to the
aggregates, or “me” as the possessor, the controller, or the inhabiter of the aggregates
– rather than the aggregates as “me,” or the aggregates as the possession of “me,”
what is controlled by “me,” what is inhabited by “me.” There are many reasons for that
and one has to work with it to see why this Prasangika view is far more sophisticated. It
has to do with the fact that the same understanding of voidness is required for both

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liberation and enlightenment; for both how the self exists and how all phenomena
exist.

What is Left Over Once We Have Refuted the Subtle Impossible "Me?"

Now, what is left over when we have refuted this subtle impossible “me?” This is now
exclusively the Prasangika assertion according to Gelugpa. What are we left with? We
understand:

• The self is non-static; it’s changing form moment to moment.

• It has parts.
• It can never exist independently of a body and mind. It’s imputed on it and we
understand what that means.
• We also understand that it is imputedly knowable; it can’t be self-sufficiently
knowable.

And yet – now here is what’s to be refuted – there is a referent thing findable in the
basis for imputation. That really has to be explained. The conventional “me" is what the
designation "me" refers to on the basis for labeling. In a sense it’s a bit like an illusion,
isn’t it? A referent thing would be an actual findable thing that you could point to that
establishes itself. It would be like for instance – let’s go back to our example of motion
– there is motion, isn’t there? Motion is an imputatiopn on an object that is moving in
space over time. It can only be known and observed by observing the object that it’s
imputed on. So the referent object of the designation "motion" is motion,
conventionally existing motion that you can see. But if we make that object into a
“thing” in quotation marks, it is as if it were a concrete thing that existed by itself
independently of, for instance, space and time. We make motion into a thing – there it
is by itself and now we can study its properties and so on – but you don’t think of it in
terms of it being something relative, relative to space (because the ball has to move
through space) and over time etc. So it’s just a “thing” there by itself, establishing itself
from its own side.

So it is like for instance, in a movie or a play or drama on stage. You have the scenery
just standing there – that would be like the referent object; and the referent thing
would be like a prop that is holding it up. (There is a Tibetan terms that this is referring
to, dmigs-rten.) It is something that is holding up the object – self-established by itself
– that is holding up the referent object. There is nothing behind our various objects
that we know. There’s nothing behind it holding it up.

One way of understanding this is in terms of something more general, since this point
about there being no referent "thing" holding up the referent object pertains not only
to the self, but it pertains to everything. That’s why we have to understand the
voidness of everything here. Let’s say, love. There’s the designation "love" and we have
so many different moments of experience that have some sort of emotion in it. And of
course in each moment it’s something slightly different; what I experience, what you

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experience – it’s a little bit different. But we have the designation “love” and it refers to
something; there is love. I feel love; it’s not that I feel nothing. That’s the referent
object. The referent thing would be now making a concrete thing out of “love.” Love –
"I’m looking for love" – as if "love" is something that’s a thing, existing encapsulated in
plastic somewhere by itself and that’s what I’m looking for. That is what I imagine is
backing up and holding up what I’m experiencing in each moment. I experience “love;”
I do experience “love.”

So we are confusing the referent object with the referent thing. We’re confusing the
conventional self with the false self – but it’s a very very subtle false self. So it is a
misconception about the self that changes from moment to moment, has parts, can’t
exist separate from a body and mind, can only be known with a body and mind – and
yet still we have a misconception about it: that there’s something holding it up when
you can’t find that. So when you say that the self can’t be found, that’s what can’t be
found; not that you can’t find yourself up your nose – this is trivial, it's obvious.

That’s one aspect. Digest that a little bit. Conventionally there are things, just
imputedly knowable. There is “me,” but it’s not a “me” wrapped in plastic by itself. It’s
very subtle. Anyway, just the general idea; we will have our meditation on this. As I say
you can’t really work with this unless you’ve worked with the grosser levels.

This belief – this unawareness of the fact that this doesn’t refer to anything (and this is
impossible) – that will automatically arise. In other words, the unawareness about a
findable referent thing, which doesn’t correspond to reality, that doesn’t refer to reality
– either we don’t know that such a referent thing does not refer to anything real or
Gelug Prasangika says that we know it in the incorrect way: we imagine that it does
refer to something findable and real – that automatically arises. Prasangika also says
that can be doctrinally-based as well; it can be doctrinally-based on the tenets of the
Sautrantika, Chittamatra or Svatantrika systems.

Defining Characteristics of an Object According to Sautrantika, Chittamatra and

Svatantrika

Now of course you have to understand these other systems. All of them are going to
agree that the self is designated on the aggregates; it’s changing, etc.; and it cannot be
self-sufficiently known. They all agree on this. We’ve left behind Vaibhashika now. But
what they are saying is that the characteristic features, the characteristic mark for
being able to distinguish and either non-conceptually see "me" or conceptually label
"me" with the category "me" and designate "me" with the word "me" is findable in the
basis for imputation. What is the basis that contains the characteristic feature of “me?”
It’s a technical term: according to Sautrantika, it’s the "mental consciousness;"
according to Chittamatra, it’s the "foundational consciousness," alayavijnana; according
to Svatantrika, it again is "mental consciousness."

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Now, when we distinguish things – remember we had the aggregate of distinguishing
– when you distinguish something you are distinguishing characteristic features.
Objects do have qualities; we’re not denying that they have qualities. So, body – we
have the sixteen characteristics of the four noble truths and four pertain to the body as
an example of true suffering – so it’s non-static and it’s suffering and all of this. So
these are characteristic features. And we distinguish that characteristic feature and that
is how we consider it in terms of that characteristic feature. It can either be accurate or
inaccurate. Discriminating awareness, remember, just adds certainty about it. So you
can be certain about something that’s incorrect or you can be certain about something
that is correct. And your level of certainty could be not so strong, so you have
indecisive wavering – maybe, maybe like this, maybe like that.

According to these three schools – and I don’t want to get into the more subtle
differences of these three schools – Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Svatantrika – they’re
different – let’s just talk about Svatantrika. Everybody asserts that the basis for
imputation – the mind or the body, the aggregates, or whatever – they have defining
characteristics. The non-Madhyamika systems say that the defining characteristic has
the power to establish by itself what something is. It has a defining characteristic so
that establishes it is a dog. It has the genome of a dog and that establishes that it is a
dog – on the side of the basis, on the side of the cells and so on of this animal, this
thing. That has the power to establish by itself that it’s a dog. You can find it on the
side of the basis.

Svatantrika says that the defining characteristic on the side of the basis doesn’t have
the power to establish what something is by itself. It has the power to establish it in
conjunction with mental labeling. What they're saying is there has to be something on
the side of, let’s say a person, that in conjunction with mental labeling would make
them a king. Otherwise anybody could be labeled a king. This is coming out of the
caste system in India and that type of culture. There has to be something that makes
somebody of the ruling class from their side, otherwise you could label a sweeper, you
could label a beggar, as a king. So there has to be something also on the side of the
object. It's like any belief in aristocracy, there has to be something on the side of the
person that they are nobly born, they are aristocracy; otherwise a commoner could be
the king. So together with imputation, there has to be the conception of a king –
animals don’t have that concept – so there’s the concept of the king and something on
the side of the object that allows for correct mental labeling. And on the side of the
mental consciousness – now it’s Svatantrika – it has the defining characteristic both of
mental consciousness and of a person, of the conventional “me.” Both of them are
findable in the basis and because of that, that is equivalent to saying that there is a
findable referent thing; that there is somehow not just mental labeling alone, which is
the Prasangika point of view; but something on the side of the object in connection
with mental labeling that establishes something, and that would be a referent thing.

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It becomes very subtle, very sophisticated. Let’s go back to our example of love. Is
there something on the side of the object – what I’m feeling – in each moment that
makes it love? We have all sorts of emotions; even emotion – what in the world is that?
We have every moment of experience. How do we understand that? Most people
don’t even try to understand it. But we see that each part of experience is not
something with no parts – it has parts; it’s made up of various components. From its
own side does it have these lines that divide it into parts? Does it? No, obviously it
doesn’t. It’s mentally labeled. But it refers to something because we have emotion, we
have consciousness, we have some level of happiness. You can divide it into parts but
they’re no dividing lines on the side of the object; it’s just moments of experience. But
there are defining characteristics of the various things that we are dividing it into.

We have it in the dictionary. Defining characteristics; the definition of love: the

Buddhist one – wish for others to be happy and have the causes for happiness. And
now I’m feeling something and it fulfills that definition; there’s the defining
characteristic. Where’s that defining characteristic? Is it in what I’m experiencing? Well,
yes, but it is mentally labeled on it; it’s not just sitting there from the side of my
experience. So even the defining characteristics are mentally labeled. Does the object,
the basis, have defining characteristics? Sure it has defining characteristics, the same
way as there is a referent object of the designation “me.” There’s also a referent object
of the designation of defining characteristics.

Just as there is a referent object – the actual conventional “me” – there are the actual
conventional defining characteristics of things, but somebody made that up. So, where
are the defining characteristics? Somebody or some group of people made up
definitions. First of all some primitive cave people came along and made up words, just
out of meaningless sounds. It’s really interesting how in the world did they come up
with the various concepts of the various emotions to start with? That’s extraordinary.
Did cave people experience love before somebody had come up with the concept of
love and defined it? Well, yes; but... They made up a word and made up a definition.
And we experience things and you can mentally label onto it correctly. Others would
agree – it has the defining characteristics. But can you find the defining characteristics
on the side of the object? No.

So do those defining characteristics have the power by themselves to establish things

as what they are? No. Sitting there on the side of the object, do they have the power,
findable on the side of the object, to establish something as love? No. Are those
defining characteristics sitting on the side of mental consciousness establishing both
the person and the mental consciousness? Well those are different defining
characteristics but are both of them sitting there, and one defines mental
consciousness and one defines a person? No.

Or even the Svatantrika understanding of it, that these defining characteristics are
sitting on the side of the object, findable there, and it’s only when they are combined

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with mental labeling that it establishes what something is. This is where the confusion
comes from; that you think – this is why I put it in simple language – that there’s
something inside “me,” findable, that makes “me” “me” and doesn’t make “me” you.
And then we have all sorts of disturbing emotions that come from that. "There’s
something in me that makes me special. I’m special; better than you, more important
than you, and therefore I should always have my way, not you. I should come first
because there’s something in me that makes me me, by its own power." Even if I
understand that it’s in conjunction with mental labeling, still I think there’s something
findable in “me” that makes “me” special; that makes “me” “me.” That’s a defining
characteristic, and the Svatantrika says, where is that defining characteristic found? It’s
found in the mind. Maybe Western scientists would say that it’s found in the genome.
Do you follow that? It's very subtle.

The Prasangika Position

Prasangika says that things are established merely in terms of mental labeling. It's very
very important to understand the terminology here. We tend to use the term that
things exist by mental labeling or by mental labeling alone, and that leads to the
misconception that unless somebody mentally labels it, it doesn’t exist. If it is not
actively mentally labeled, it doesn’t exist, so that the mental labeling creates it. That’s
incorrect. It doesn’t matter whether it’s actively mentally labeled or not. That’s not the
point.

How do you establish or prove – it’s the same word as "prove;" it’s not the word "exist"
– how do you prove, how do you establish that something exists? There’s nothing on
the side of the object that you can point to. You can’t find the defining characteristics
on the side of the object or the basis for imputation that establishes it either by its
own power or in conjunction with mental labeling. It’s not on the basis of imputation
like this misconception about this self of a person being on the basis of mental
consciousness; and it’s not a referent thing encapsulated in plastic behind the referent
object that’s holding it up, that is establishing that it exists – a findable thing. The only
thing that establishes that something exists is what the mental label refers to on the
basis for imputation.

How do you establish that there is such a thing as love? We’ve had love regardless of
the mental label "love;" but how do you establish that there is such a thing as love?
Well, there is the concept; there is the word "love;" and it is labeled on the basis of
certain emotions that people experience; and it refers to something – love. So that’s
how you establish that there is love; it is what the label refers to on the basis of these
emotions. But there’s nothing on the side of the emotions that is from its own side
establishing that it is love. You can’t find those defining characteristics; there’s no such
thing as love by itself, encapsulated in plastic, sitting out there somewhere, and that is
establishing – backing up – that there is love. It’s simply mental labeling; that’s the only
way that you could specify or demonstrate that there is such a thing as love.

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This is true of everything, and it is also true of the self, “me.” It’s more complicated and
more dangerous with the “me” because they’re saying that in the basis for imputation,
the mental consciousness, it has defining characteristics that make it both a
consciousness and a “me,” which is not a consciousness. Svatantrika and Chittamatra
and Sautrantika all say that. (Chittamatra is saying that that’s with alayavijnana, but it’s
the same idea.) That is what you’re refuting on this subtlest level, and it could arise
either doctrinally-based – we learned it from these Sautrantika, Chittamatra, or
Svatantrika systems; or it will automatically arise; or in addition it will automatically
arise. For everybody it automatically arises but it also have been doctrinally-based.

So this is the real thing Dharma; this is the full package of what we need to work with
in order to understand the first point of the four point analysis: identifying the self to
be refuted. It's not so simple, not so obvious.

• We have to work with first excluding that it’s not the coarse impossible “me,” as
asserted by the non-Buddhist Indian schools; and not just leave it on the level of
'Well, these stupid people over there thought like that but I don’t think like that' –
try to identify it in yourself. You have to identify it in yourself.
• Then what is left over, which is correct understanding, but there’s still something
imprecise about it.
• Then you refute that; see what’s left; understand what’s left; and then understand
what is the further imprecision that’s there and exclude that.

So, you have to be careful not to exclude or – as Tsongkhapa says – under-refute it,
which is that you don’t go to the deepest level: you have refuted the coarse and the
subtle but you haven’t refuted the super subtle level. And you have to not over-refute,
which means you’re left with nothing; that you have refuted in fact as well that there is
such a thing as a conventional “me.” You can’t find a conventional “me” but you don’t
say that it doesn’t exist at all.

Now we go back to my point about the difference between emptiness and voidness.
Svatantrika says that conventionally you can find the conventional “me,” because the
defining characteristics are there in mental consciousness. But on the deepest level,
you can’t find it; on the deepest level, you understand it in terms of mental labeling so
it’s like the glass, which is empty of water. There is the glass but it’s empty of water.
There is a self, where you can find in the defining characteristics in the consciousness,
but it is devoid of existing independently of mental labeling in conjunction with this
defining characteristic. This is consistent with the Svatantrika assertion that although
all validly knowable phenomena have self-establishing natures (rang-bzhin), these self-
establishing natures do not establish the existence of these phenomena outside of the
context of mental labeling. Svatantrika made that assertion to refute the Chittamatra
position that dependent phenomena (gzhan-dbang) (namely, nonstatic phenomena)
and thoroughly established phenomena (yongs-grub) (namely, voidnesses) have self-
established natures that establish their existence outside of the context of mental

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labeling, since such phenomena appear to the non-conceptual cognition of aryas; but
you can only establish what these phenomena are (their names and so on) in the
context of mental labeling.

Further, Svatantrika asserts that within the context of mental labeling, the fact that
conventional objects appear also establishes that they conventionally exist. Prasangika
refutes that because, conventionally, deceptive appearances of self-established
existence also appear and Prasangika refutes self-established existence – how it
appears does not correspond to how it actually exists.

So, it’s not just that when I am analyzing with a mind that’s analyzing the deepest level
– deepest truth – that I can’t find a self encapsulated in plastic. Analyzing the deepest
truth, I can’t find the referent object – the “me” – encapsulated in plastic, or "love"
encapsulated in plastic. But even when I examine conventionally, the conventional
truth, I can’t find a self encapsulated in plastic. Whereas the Svatantrika says, yes you
can find it on the conventional level. This is a very important, very subtle difference. If
you haven’t refuted that Svatantrika level, you haven’t gone deeply enough. You have
under-refuted. Tsongkhapa makes a huge point about this.

So it really gets into very very subtle discriminations that we need to be able to
recognize in ourselves. We might understand, 'Well, the way that I experience myself is
sort of like an illusion. You know, I understand that ultimately I can’t really find “me” in
the basis, or some solid “me’ holding up this “me.” But that conventional “me” – well,
here I am. I can point to it.' So we make that illusion into a thing. The thing that is like
an illusion we make into a thing because then it feels more secure.

So this is very very subtle actually, and we have to understand that there are
conventional defining characteristics. I am an individual. I’m not you; and so there are
defining characteristics – genome or whatever. There are defining characteristics but
they have just been labeled, imputed as defining characteristics. They don’t have the
power by themselves, nor do they have the power in conjunction with mental labeling
to make me an individual, to make “me” "me." Yet I am an individual, but there’s no
plastic around "me" making “me” and individual, just as there’s no plastic enwrapping
anything making it what it is. There is dependent arising on many many levels, but that
doesn’t mean that there’s no individuality; it’s not that it’s all one big undifferentiated
soup. These are very difficult things to understand, and these are the things that we
need to work with.

That is the presentation of the object to be refuted – the first point of the four point
analysis.

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Questions

Clarifying the Prasangika Position

I just want to clarify whether I got the Prasangika view right. Things are
only established as existing through our mental labeling, and they do
exist regardless of our mental labeling.

Right.

Then what would be the proof of them existing regardless of our mental
labeling? Our experiencing them? And if so, does that refer to our
experiencing them through moments of non-conceptual cognition?

No. Some of the lower schools, the less sophisticated schools like Vaibashika, say that
everything has substantially established existence because it can be known. This word
that’s translated as "substantially established existence" means that it’s established as a
thing because it can be validly known – both static and non-static phenomena,
whether conceptually or non-conceptually; it doesn’t matter. Sautrantika comes in and
says that it gets very very complicated so I don’t want to get into it in too complicated
a level – things can produce and effect, and because they can produce an effect, then
that establishes that it exists. That’s primarily with non-static phenomena; they do
something. And static phenomenon – well that’s established in another way. I don’t
want to get into that, that’s even more complicated. This is complicated enough.

So anyway, the ability to produce an effect establishes that things exist. Everybody
accepts that going up; but then Prasangika says, 'Hey, if you say that that is what
establishes that something exists, that’s speaking from the side of the object' – so that
is again that there is an actual findable referent thing.

Prasangika says that if there is something on the side of the object, you are just using
that to try to establish that things exist from their own side by their own power that
they have an ability to produce an effect. In other words, the assumption behind
saying that the fact that something has the power to produce an effect is that
conventionally it’s findable and there it is; by its own power it can produce and effect
and that establishes that it exists. So that’s incorrect.

You can only establish that things exist merely from the side of the mind. What
prepared us to be able to understand that is the Chittamatra view that there’s nothing
on the side of the object that establishes the appearance; that the appearance and the
consciousness that cognizes it come both from the same natal source – the karmic
tendency, the seed. So Prasangika would say, 'Well that’s not really precise, it's not
quite correct,' because Prasangika does assert external phenomena – physical objects
come from the elements and so on; but it prepares us to be able to understand that

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you can only establish the existence of things not from the side of the object but from
the side of the mind.

You have this in Chandrakirti’s explanations. How do you validate your cognition?
Svatantrika would say, "Well, there has to be something on the side of the object that
allows you to label correctly a king the king." "No, no, no, no, no, no" – Chandrakirti
says, "It’s all from the side of the mind."

There are three criteria for validating correct cognition of something:

• First there has to be a convention agreed upon by a group of beings. So a group

of beings have the concept of "king," the convention of "king." Animals don’t have
it and certain societies don’t have; but our society has that concept of "king." So
there has to be a convention that’s agreed upon – that’s coming from the side of
the mind, of course.
• Then it has to be not contradicted by minds that validly see the conventional truth.
So everybody in the society agrees that this guy is the king. One crazy person
comes along and says, "No, no, I’m the king, I’m the king" and puts a paper crown
on their head – nobody would agree that this crazy person is the king. A valid
mind that sees validly conventional truth would not agree. You know, a little child
that puts a paper crown on his head and says "I’m the king." So that’s again
validated from the side of the mind.
• And it has to be not contradicted by mind that sees the deepest truth. Somebody
says, "Well, I have the right to be the king because I’m from this caste and I was
born like this and so on, so it’s something from my side that makes me the king."
Then a mind that validly sees that there is no such thing would contradict that. 'I
am the son of the king or the queen, so therefore from my side I should be king' –
this is false.

So we can only validate and establish things from the side of mental labeling, from the
mind. But that doesn’t mean simplistically the Chittamatra view or this view that
everything exists in your head, and nobody else exists. This is narcissism, solipsism;
there are many aspects of it.

Cognizing Conceptually Through Categories

So much depends on how we label things with regard to the label we

use or the word we use to designate something. That raises the
question of how a little baby, for example, starts developing attachment
or desire towards its toy or its bottle of milk even though it hasn’t yet
developed verbal thinking that would allow it to either label itself or the
object that it clings to.

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That is why we speak of automatically arising deluded outlook toward a transitory
network. Automatically you throw the net of “me” and "mine" – "This is my toy" –
whether you have a word for it or not. A dog doesn’t have a word for it but this is "my
bone," "my master," "my house." So that gets’ into the whole discussion of conceptual
cognition. Conceptual cognition is done with categories. We have audio categories
and we have meaning categories and object categories; meaning and object
categories are the same.

An audio category would be the category of the sound of a word. We can have a
sound which has been mentally labeled to be a word. It’s just an arbitrary sound;
sound from its own side doesn’t have any meaning. Regardless of what voice is saying
it, regardless of the volume in which it is said, we’re able to understand it in the
category of being the sound of the word “me.” It fits into this audio category of the
sound and it’s associated with the word. The category is not the word, but the word
represents the category for us. Category is a static abstraction. Now, various sounds –
regardless of the volume and type of voice and so on – we all recognize as being the
sound of the word “me.” And if we think of that category, we represent it with our own
individual mental sound "me," or the sound of our own voice saying “me.” That’s the
sound of a word.

Now, that word has a meaning, and we have a meaning category like the meaning of
the word "love." What it means is also an object – a knowable object, validly knowable
object. And every time that we experience some emotion or that you experience some
emotion, it fulfills the defining characteristics. We understand it in the category of
"love" – the meaning of the word "love." So the baby will have the meaning category
of “me” even though it doesn’t have the audio category of “me;” it hasn’t learned the
word. And the same thing applies to "mine." The same as the dog: the dog will have
“me” – "my bone," "my master." It doesn’t have a word; there’s no audio category
going on but there’s a meaning category, an object category.

So it has to be taught the word, and then it has the category that whoever says the
word in whatever voice, it has the same meaning. That’s conceptual cognition – very
important to understand it. Very often it’s not very clear what conceptual cognition
really is talking about. That’s what it’s talking about – how we understand things; how
we work in general.

So designation with words for everybody except the Buddha is conceptual; it’s with a
category. Words are designated on categories. For a Buddha, designation with words is
non-conceptual; it is not on the basis of categories. Buddha knows that this is called a
"table" in English; it’s called a "Tisch" in German; it’s called a "stohl" in Russian. But a
Buddha is not thinking of that in terms of the category of "table" – just in terms of the
name, so it’s non-conceptual, but it’s still designation. But for everybody except the
Buddha, designation is conceptual, and because it’s conceptual it throws together with
it an appearance of truly established existence. Every instance of "love" seems to exist

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in the box – meaning the category – of the emotion "love" as if various emotions were
self-established boxes – the box of "love," the box of "hate," the box of "loyalty" – and
now the emotion exists as something in that box. That’s the appearance of self-
established existence.

That’s the difference between a referent thing and a referent object. Our designations
refer to something – conventionally existent things; but there’s nothing that
corresponds to these designations sitting in a box that is made up by a dictionary. You
have it in the dictionary: "good," "bad," "nice," "not nice" – this is in the dictionary.
Then we think that objects exist like things that are in that box. That’s the object to be
refuted on this deeper level. How could you establish that something exists by the fact
that it is found in a box when there aren’t even boxes. There are not even boxes; so
how could it establish that it exists, that from its own power it’s in this box of "love" or
this box of “me,” not you? Things don’t exist in boxes. Our mind makes it appear like
they exist in boxes but they don't.

The Origin of Meaning and Object Categories

Is it right then that that meaning category that a baby has has to do
with his karmic imprints that he or she brought from previous lifetimes?

That’s an interesting and difficult question because the categories are static
phenomena. You could say that there are previous tendencies to think in terms of
these meaning and object categories, but do the categories come from previous
lifetimes? That would be difficult to say. So where do the categories come from? That’s
a very difficult question because now we have the category of "computer;" did people
have the meaning category of computer five hundred years ago? No. So there are
certain categories that we have to learn about, like "computer;" and there are other
categories which will just sort of automatically arise as part of the mechanism of how
cognition works, and one of those would be the category of “me” and "mine." So there
are many different more and more subtle levels of conceptual cognition; it’s not just
one level of that. That’s also analyzed in more and more subtle levels.

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 Focus on Emptiness According to the Tenet
Systems
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/vipashyana/negation-
phenomena-how-to-focus-on-emptiness/focus-on-emptiness-according-to-the-tenet-
systems

What Do We Know after Negating Something

We have been speaking about affirmations and negations and we have seen that
they’re very important. There are quite a few things that came up from yesterday and
some questions that are still there. A negation is one in which there’s an actual
previous preclusion, or getting rid of an object to be negated, and that’s done by our
minds, basically, by conceptual mind. So the question really is what do we know at the
end of that?

I wanted to illustrate this with an example, a very common example. We are surfing
through the stations of the television looking for something to watch, or going
through a menu. What do I want to eat? And we look at each item, each channel, each
item on the menu. The television is a much better example. We look at each program
that’s on and we see that “this is not what I want to watch” and we go on to the next,
and we go on to the next, flicking from channel to channel. Do we have to know what
we want to watch in order to see these programs that are there as “what I don’t want
to watch?” When we look at the menu, do we have to know what I want to eat in order
to be able to look at various things on the menu and say, “This is not what I want to
eat?” So at the end of eliminating all the possible stations on the television, do we
know what we want to watch? No we don’t, do we. What are the two possibilities?

You could turn the TV off.

Yes, you could turn the TV off. Stop looking.

Or just go through again and choose something which is of minor

quality.

Or make do with something you didn’t really want to watch, but you take it because
there isn’t anything else. But it’s a negation, isn’t it. “This is not what I want to watch.”

It’s based on the vague idea of what I want to watch.

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That’s very good. It’s based on the general category of what I want to watch, but not
on something specific in that category. What we would specifically want to watch
within that category will change. We’re talking about a general category of “what I
want to watch.” Even that might not be so well defined because you might find
something that you didn’t think you wanted to watch, but actually it’s quite interesting.

It’s kind of fuzzy.

It’s kind of fuzzy. Same thing like what I want to eat. What I want to do today. What I
want to do this weekend. Some things are definitely excluded. I don’t want to fight in
Iraq this weekend, for example; that’s pretty definite. I don’t want to die this weekend.
But we don’t necessarily know what we do want to do.

Now we have to get a little bit technical in order to understand more deeply what’s
going on here. First we have to go back to the discussion we already started about
specifiers. What is it that I want to do? Well we can specify “what I want to do” by the
double negative; what I want to do is “not what I don’t want to do,” or we found an
easier way of expressing it as “it’s nothing but what I want to do.” Now “nothing but
what I want to do” or “nothing other than what I want to do” is actually an implicative
negation. It leaves in its wake “what I want to do,” which is an affirmation
phenomenon. However, as we saw, we’re specifying here only the general category
“what I want to do” or “what I want to eat” or “what I want to watch on the television.”
And actually, if we get more technical, this comes down to “what I like to watch” and
“what I like to eat” and “what I like to do.” It’s on the basis of “what I like” that we want
to do something, usually. But let’s not get too far into that distinction here. But when
we’re going through choices and making a choice “not what I want to do,” “not what I
want to do,” “not what I want to do,” then “not what I want to do” is a nonimplicative
negation – it doesn’t leave any affirmation phenomenon in its wake. And if we
formulate it as “dying today is not what I want to do” then, although that might be an
implicative negation, what it leaves in its wake is “dying today”; it doesn’t leave in its
wake “what I want to do today.” So we have to be very delicate here, and careful, in
how we understand this whole issue.

If we ask, “How do you specify the possible way of existing?” Now you would specify it
by saying that it is “nothing other than the possible way of existing,” in other words it
would be “not what is an impossible way of existing.” Now as we’ve seen, you don’t
have to know absolutely every impossible way of existing in order to specify the
possible way of existing. The possible way of existing is that things function and also
that things make logical sense. From a Buddhist point of view, that’s the only thing that
is possible. Now how that actually works – that things function and things make logical
sense – that’s a totally different issue. Furthermore, when we talk about excluding what
is impossible, obviously each tenet system is going to agree that what would be
impossible would be that things don’t function at all and don’t make any sense. Now
how each system is going to specify a way in which things would not make sense and

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things would not function, that’s going to be different. But all of them would be
refuting impossible ways of existing.

But when we’re doing voidness meditation, we’re not working with specifiers. Nor are
we working with impossible ways of existing. We’re working with one specific way of
existing, which happens to be in the category of “impossible ways of existing.” And
then we are negating that with a non-implicative negation, “there’s no such thing,” and
this doesn’t leave any affirmation phenomenon in its wake – such as what is the
specific possible way of existing, such as dependent arising. So although the actual
way in which things exist is in terms of dependent arising, it’s not that we had to know
that before eliminating the impossible ways of existing, and it’s not that we know it
after eliminating them. All that we needed to have was some general category of
“possible way of existing.” It didn’t need to be defined in a terribly specific way, just as
when we spoke about the general category of “what I would like to do” or “what I
would like to eat.” So knowing the equivalency of voidness of true findable existence
and dependent arising is not so simple.

Remember, in order to get rid of our suffering we have to get rid of the cause of our
suffering, which is grasping for true findable existence. And so we have to negate that
in order to get rid of the suffering. But that doesn’t imply that we do know, at the end
of that negation, how things actually do exist. The negation itself doesn’t throw in its
wake (to go back to our technical terminology) the way in which things actually do
exist.

If I negate “pink elephants,” we have no referent object. Do I know more

than before?

When we negate “pink elephant.” And what did we know before? The problem is, what
is the effect of negating it? And the effect is, if we were freaked out and frightened and
really upset because of thinking that pink elephants were real, that they were invading
me from the fifth dimension, if we realize that, hey, there is no such thing, it would free
us from that fear – eventually, when we really became convinced of it. And eventually it
would cause us to stop fantasizing that there were pink elephants. Because it’s just a
habit of believing in pink elephants that causes us to continue to not only believe in
them, but it can cause us to hallucinate them. Remember the whole point of
understanding voidness is to get rid of the causes of suffering. It’s not just an
interesting intellectual exercise.

Comparison with the Realization of Nonstaticness

When we refute true existence, are we refuting that things are static
and, in the end, we’re left that things are nonstatic, that things are
impermanent?

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Well, knowing you, and knowing that you come from a strong Theravada background, I
think that maybe you’re confusing a few things here in the Prasangika system that
we’re talking about with certain assertions in some of the Hinayana tenet systems. First
of all, if we look at the Sautrantika system (within Hinayana), they say that static
phenomena are metaphysical, whereas the nonstatic phenomena are objective. And so
perhaps what you are thinking is that when we’ve refuted metaphysical phenomena
we’re left with objective phenomena, and that’s really what the refutation is all about.
But actually I think that also you’re getting a bit confused here, because in Sautrantika,
what they say is that the metaphysical phenomena are non-truly existent and the
objective phenomena are truly existent. So it’s a little bit backwards here in terms of
perhaps what you’re thinking.

It’s like our example of Tenzin, “not my Tenzin,” “not your Tenzin.” So we’re not talking
about the true existence of the Hinayana tradition. We’re not even talking about the
true existence of the Chittamatra or Svatantrika systems. We are talking about the true
existence in the Prasangika system. So which Tenzin then are we talking about? This is
why it’s very important to identify the object to be refuted, the object to be negated,
so that we are not talking just about your Tenzin, we’re talking about my Tenzin. All of
these are impossible ways of existing, but we have to understand what is meant by
“impossible” here. “Impossible” is defined in terms of the negation of what we think is
possible, and what we think is possible might not be possible. So what’s impossible to
me is different from you – what I don’t want to eat isn’t what you don’t want to eat, is
it? What you need to appreciate is that each school of philosophical tenets really has
quite a different idea of what true existence means.

Also, you know, there’s another very fundamental difference between nonstaticness
and “no true existence.” According to the Jetsunpa textbooks and definitions,
“nonstatic” is an affirmation because in satipatthana (close placement of mindfulness
meditation), you can observe it. Each moment of physical sensation, and so on, is
changing, and from that you can just observe that it is nonstatic. You didn’t have to
have a clear idea of what static was, and negate it, in order to observe the changing of
each moment of your sensations. That’s why it is an affirmation. So that’s why there is a
big difference between nonstatic and actually thinking “not static” – in which you knew
what static was, and then through a line of inference you refuted it, like refuting that
sound is permanent, that sound is static. The Hindu schools say that sound is static
because of the sound of the Vedas being eternal and forever and never changing.

Also you should know that there are two definitions of unawareness. Unawareness is a
negation phenomenon, but what is it actually negating? According to the abhidharma
tradition of topics of knowledge, both in the Hinayana version of it by Vasubandhu or
in the Mahayana version of it by Asanga, unawareness is simply “not knowing.” It’s the
negation of knowing something – I just didn’t know. Whereas in the pramana system,
that’s the system of valid ways of knowing according to Dharmakirti, unawareness is
knowing in an incorrect way. So what’s being negated by unawareness is this type of

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negation phenomenon. It’s quite different from just simply not knowing, and it brings
much more emphasis on the logical refutation of incorrect ways of knowing – and
specifically, here, incorrect ways of knowing how things exist. But even though
unawareness is defined in terms of being unaware or knowing incorrectly karmic cause
and effect or ways in which things exist, I think we can also apply this distinction to
unawareness of nonstaticness. So we could simply correct not knowing that things are
nonstatic, or we could correct thinking that things which are not static are actually
static. And then we have to refute staticness, which means that we have to know
staticness before that.

These schools have their own definitions of what they see as true
existence.

Correct.

And they are all negating that.

No. They are not all negating true existence. They’re all negating what they consider as
impossible; and for most of them “true existence” means “real,” so they don’t want to
negate true existence.

Meditation on Voidness of the Person in the Sautrantika System of Hinayana

To really appreciate what’s going on in the Buddhist process of trying to get rid of
suffering, now we can bring in the background that we’ve covered, in the previous
years, of the schools of tenets, because this really makes things a little bit more clear.
Do you remember we had a discussion of self-sufficiently knowable phenomena (rang-
rkya thub-pa’i rdzas-yod) and imputably knowable phenomena (btags-yod)? Self-
sufficiently knowable phenomena can be known without that cognition having to
make anything else appear at the same time. Whereas imputably knowable
phenomena can only be known with the cognition making something else appear at
the same time.

The Sautrantika system, which is one of the Hinayana systems of tenets, asserts that
forms of physical phenomena and ways of being aware of something are self-
sufficiently knowable. Whereas nonstatic phenomena that are neither of these two, for
instance persons, can only be known when the consciousness also makes appear the
aggregates on which they are imputed. And, likewise, all static phenomena are
similarly imputably knowable. The absence of somebody from a room can only be
known with a room appearing and, similarly, the absence of a static monolithic “soul”
that’s separate from the aggregates can only be known on the basis of the aggregates
appearing. And Sautrantika says that they have to appear at the same time,
simultaneously.

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Now the Mahayana tenets refine this and they say for imputably knowable
phenomena, this Sautrantika assertion – that something else has to appear
simultaneously when knowing this object – is true for nonstatic phenomena that are
neither ways of being aware of something nor forms of physical phenomena, such as
persons, and is also true for static phenomena other than voidnesses. But for voidness,
and whether that’s voidness of a person or voidness of phenomena, something else
has to appear in order to cognize voidness, and this is namely the basis for voidness,
but it doesn’t have to appear simultaneously – in fact, it doesn’t appear
simultaneously, it appears the moment before – and then one can know voidness
explicitly by itself.

Now because of this difference, then there is a great difference in the way in which we
meditate on voidness of a person. I’m using the term “voidness of a person” here to
also describe what we are meditating on in the Hinayana systems, like Sautrantika, as a
shorthand, rather than saying “the lack of a static monolithic ‘soul’ separate from the
aggregates.” In Sautrantika, as well as in the Mahayana tenet systems of Chittamatra
and Madhyamaka, the voidness here is a non-implicative negation – “no such thing.”

In the Sautrantika system, when we meditate on voidness, then the basis for voidness –
let’s say the person – now the person and the aggregates are both going to appear
explicitly in that cognition of the voidness of the person and, at that same time, one
would know implicitly the voidness of the impossible way of existing of that person.
This is the case whether we know voidness of a person conceptually or non-
conceptually. That’s talking about the total absorption on voidness. And in the
subsequent attainment (realization), again we have the aggregates and the person
appearing, and we know implicitly the voidness of the person.

In the first case, in the total absorption, voidness there is a non-implicative negation
and our main focus is on that implicitly known voidness as a non-implicative negation;
but, of course, the basis for voidness is what we know explicitly – that’s what appears.
Whereas in the subsequent realization, it’s the exact opposite way; we’re knowing a
person that doesn’t exist in this impossible way, as an impossible “soul,” and our focus
is on what is explicitly affirmed there. This is an implicative negation – in other words,
the person – and implicitly we know that the person doesn’t exist in this impossible
way. So the difference between the total absorption on voidness and the subsequent
realization of voidness is the total absorption on voidness is with voidness as a non-
implicative negation, and in the subsequent realization it’s on voidness which is an
implicative negation. But what appears, what is taken by the mind, is the same; it’s just
that the main emphasis of the focus is different. In the total absorption the focus is
primarily on what is implicitly known, and in the subsequent attainment the focus is on
what is explicitly known.

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Contrast with the Prasangika System of Mahayana

This is of course very different from what I described yesterday, which is basically the
Mahayana presentation. And I was speaking more particularly about the Prasangika
presentation, but it’s true for all the Mahayana systems that the moment before the
total absorption on voidness, the basis for voidness appears; but at the time of the
total absorption on voidness, voidness itself is explicitly known and appears explicitly,
and nothing is known implicitly. And when this cognition of voidness is conceptual,
then, although the basis of voidness can appear here, nevertheless it doesn’t appear
and is not known by that same cognition of voidness. It’s either appearing and being
known by a separate cognition occurring at the same time (according to the Panchen
explanation), or it’s being known by subliminal cognition which is also occurring at the
same time and which is also a different cognition. But that cognition of voidness, itself,
does not apprehend the basis for voidness, either explicitly or implicitly.

But in the Mahayana systems, when we talk about how do we know static non-
implicative negations, such as the absence of somebody from the room, then the
Sautrantika analysis is the case. So what does this mean? This means that with a non-
implicative negation, when the sound of the words have negated the object to be
negated, they do not imply or leave in their wake any affirmation phenomena; but,
nevertheless, an affirmation phenomenon can appear to that mind that is knowing
that non-implicative negation.

Let’s look at an example. When we think “Renata is absent,” we’re thinking of a Renata
who is absent. This is an implicative negation. What appears to that cognition is a
Renata; that could be a visual image of Renata or just the sound of her name. And
what is implicitly known in that cognition is her absence; the absence doesn’t actually
appear. And what we have negated is her presence. We could also think of a “room
without Renata.” “Room without Renata” would also be an implicative negation. What
it leaves in its wake is the affirmative phenomenon, the room; that’s what would
appear explicitly. And the negation phenomenon, the absence of Renata, would be
something which is known implicitly; it doesn’t actually appear. And the object
negated here would be a Renata being present. An absence of Renata from the room
can’t actually appear, because an absence is a static phenomenon in this case – it
doesn’t have a shape or a form – only something which is with a shape or a form can
actually appear. It’s like when we see an empty cup – what do we actually see? The
sides of a cup appear and implicitly we know there’s nothing in the cup, it’s empty.
Actually that’s the Sautrantika position. There’s a big discussion on this in Chittamatra;
it says that an empty space can appear and be known explicitly. Even though it’s a
static phenomenon – it doesn’t have any shape or form – it can still be known non-
conceptually and explicitly.

But here let’s talk about a room without Renata. What appears is the room. And if we
follow the Chittamatra explanation, we would say that an empty space also appears,

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and what we know implicitly is the absence of Renata. After all, if we saw or thought
about a room without Renata and a room without Mary, what appeared would be
exactly the same, wouldn’t it? A room and some sort of empty space. And implicitly we
would know, in the one case, that there was an absence of Renata; in the other case,
we would know there’s an absence of Mary. That’s why we say this is implicitly known.

Now what about when we know just the absence of Renata. This is a non-implicative
negation. After the sound of the words “the absence of Renata” have negated the
object to be negated, namely the presence of Renata, all that they leave in their wake
is the negation phenomenon “the absence of Renata.” Now how do we focus on that?
We would have to focus on that only implicitly; it couldn’t actually appear. What would
appear and would be known explicitly would be something representing Renata, either
a mental image of her or just the name “Renata.” Let’s say we’re thinking, “Renata’s
absence from class has occurred many times now.” Now you can’t think of Renata’s
absence or the absence of Renata without actually simultaneously thinking at least the
word “Renata.” That’s because the absence of Renata is a static phenomenon and it is
imputably knowable, and so something else has to be known explicitly at the same
time as knowing it. So in that case what’s explicitly known and appearing is Renata, or
some representation of Renata, or in this case the word “Renata,” and what’s implicitly
known is her absence. An absence or an empty space doesn’t actually appear. But still,
the absence of Renata is a non-implicative negation; it hasn’t thrown in its wake
Renata, the basis for the negation. When the sound of the words of the negation – in
other words, “the absence of Renata” – have negated what they are going to negate –
in other words, Renata or the presence of Renata – what do they leave in their wake
after they have done this negation? They don’t leave Renata. They just leave the
absence of Renata. But because the absence of Renata is an imputably knowable
phenomenon, it can’t be known without something else appearing simultaneously
when we know it. And in this case it would be Renata or something representing
Renata, like the word “Renata.”

Now the same analysis holds true for when we see “There’s no Renata in the room.”
This is also a non-implicative negation. What are the words of the negation “no Renata
in the room?” What do they leave in their wake? They don’t leave any affirmation of
Renata; they don’t leave any affirmation of the room; they just leave in their wake the
negation phenomenon “no Renata in the room.” Now how do we see that? In other
words, what do we see? We see the room and we also see an empty space in it, and
these are known explicitly; and implicitly we know the absence of Renata in the room.
And so this also is because this absence of Renata from the room is a static
phenomenon and it’s knowable only imputably.

Now I know that all this is really complicated and you might think, well, why are we
going into so much detail, and what difference does it really make? But it does make a
difference in terms of how you meditate on voidness and, after all, we want to be able
to meditate correctly on voidness in order to overcome our suffering and be able to

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benefit others, as much as is possible, by attaining enlightenment. So let’s look at it
again, but this time let’s restrict ourselves to just the discussion of how we focus on
voidness as a non-implicative negation.

How to Focus on Voidness as a Non-implicative Negation

First let’s look at it in the Sautrantika model. We think of a person, let’s say “me.” So we
first think in terms of my body, for instance, or name, or something like that. And on
that basis, we also think of “me.” “Me” after all, a person, is something which is only
imputably knowable; you have to have something else appear and be known explicitly
at the same time, in order to think “me.” So it has to be either our body, our mind,
name, or something like that. So, anyway, we’re thinking of “me” on the basis of a
name; and because of the influence of some doctrinal system, that “me” appears as
though it is static, monolithic, and separate from the aggregates.

Now what we want to refute here, what we want to negate, is “there’s no such thing as
a static, monolithic, separate ‘me’”; that’s what is to be negated. And so, in the end,
what we want to focus on is “no such thing as a static, monolithic, separate ‘me.’”
That’s a non-implicative negation. After we have negated a static, monolithic, separate
“me,” all we are left with is the absence of a static, monolithic, separate “me.”

Now according to Sautrantika, in order to be able to focus on that absence, that “no
such thing,” then we have to have appear explicitly the “me” and, of course, the basis
of the “me,” which would be the aggregates, a name, or something like that. But what
we’re really focusing on here is this absence, this “no such thing,” or voidness (if we
want to put it in simple terms), which we only know implicitly. So we’re really focusing
on “no such thing.” But while we’re focusing on “no such thing as this static,
monolithic, separate ‘me’,” what is appearing is a “me,” but that’s not our main focus –
we’re focusing on “no such thing.”

Now that’s the total absorption. But, subsequent to that, what we are focusing on is a
“me” that is devoid of existing as a static, monolithic, separate “me.” So here, this
negation phenomenon is an implicative negation, and our main focus is on “me,” this
“me,” and that’s the affirmation that is left over after the sound of the words of the
negation have negated what they’re to negate. We’re left with a “me.” So our main
focus is on “me”; and implicitly how it exists, it is without being a static, monolithic,
separate “me.” That negation phenomenon that is thrown in the wake is known
implicitly. So our way of knowing in the total absorption and in the subsequent
realization is quite different.

Now if we look at the Mahayana way of meditating, and for ease of discussion let’s
speak in terms of the Prasangika system, then we would start out the same way as I
just described with the Sautrantika system. We would think of “me” and something
from the aggregates that would be a basis for imputation of “me,” such as the word
“me,” or my body, or mind, or whatever. And we would also have an appearance here

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of true findable existence. And what we would negate is that true findable existence –
that there is no such thing as this true findable existence on the basis of the “me.”
Once our certitude that there’s no such thing has cut off the object to be refuted,
namely true existence, then we just focus (whether conceptually or non-conceptually)
on “no such thing.” This is what we are explicitly focusing on. It can be an appearance
of a blank space, or something like that; and with that thought “no such thing,” in the
case that it’s conceptual, then nothing else is appearing or known by that thought. The
basis is not known. However, subliminally, or by another cognition, we would have an
appearance of the basis of voidness here, the “me” on the basis of some sort of
aggregates. But that subliminal awareness (or awareness through another cognition)
that we have at that time of the basis for voidness would be similar to when we are
sitting totally absorbed on listening to music – the type of awareness that we would
have of our clothing next to our skin, or of the wall in front of us. In other words, this is
very, very minimal; we are not really aware of these things, although they are
appearing to our subliminal consciousness or this other sense cognition.

So that’s quite different from the Sautrantika total absorption, when the mind is
actually making an appearance of the basis for voidness and, at the same time,
implicitly knowing “there’s no such thing as the impossible way of existing that we are
refuting.” Although in the Sautrantika way of meditating, the basis for imputation is
not the main focus; our main emphasis and our

focus is “no such thing” – it’s the implicitly known negation phenomenon – but that
basis is much more prominently known than in the Mahayana way of meditating. And
as for how we actually meditate during the subsequent attainment, then it’s the same
in Mahayana as it is in Sautrantika. So maybe this is a little bit clearer.

And I used the example of focusing on the absence of Renata in the room just to
illustrate how we could have something appear at the same time as when we’re
focusing on a non-implicative negation. And that thing that appears, the affirmation
phenomenon, is nevertheless not thrown in the wake of the negation when the sound
of the words of the negation refute or negate the object to be negated.

Further Clarification of Implicative and Non-implicative Negations

Could you explain a little bit more about the difference between the
implicative and the non-implicative negation? It still isn’t completely
clear.

The difference is in how the negation is made. A non-implicative one is basically “there
is no…,” and an implicative one is something such as “this is not that” or “a this without
that.” When you focus on voidness, it’s a “there is no.” And it’s not in terms of a “there
is no something that could be here, but it’s not here now.” The focus is on “there is no
such thing as….” So there are two types of non-implicative, whether the object to be

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refuted is existent or nonexistent. And then even within “nonexistent,” “there is no such
thing as an invader from the fifth dimension” – it’s not a nonexistent object – or it’s a
nonexistent way of existing.

“There is no X” is non-implicative. And “X without Y” or “X is not Y,” that’s implicative.

And “there is no X,” it doesn’t matter how long that X is in terms of the words in which
we define it – a “Renata in the room,” or whatever – but it’s basically saying “there is no
X,” whatever that expression might be. That’s non-implicative. In the other one, in the
implicative one, we’re saying a “Y without X” or a “Y that is not X,” so it’s a different
type of negation of X in the expression, in the formula that we write, like an algebra
formula.

Now that’s more clear. In an implicative, you have two variables.

In an implicative you have two kinds of variables, you have Ys and you have Xs in the
expression: an affirmation and a negation. In a non-implicative, all you have is one
variable, an X. “There is no X.” Now that X could be a long expression within
parentheses; it could be a whole big long formula. It doesn’t matter. That’s your X here.

An implicative would be, for example, a self that is not truly existent.

Correct. A self that is not truly existent. That there is no such thing as a truly existent
self – that’s not implicative.

The Ways of Focusing on Voidness in the Various Tenet Systems

What are you focusing on in going through these schools of tenets? In the Vaibhashika
they don’t even accept that there are non-implicative negations; they only talk about
implicative ones. And so what you need to realize is that “the person is not an
impossible ‘soul’” – that’s implicative. You know what I mean by impossible “soul,” the
coarse and subtle impossible “soul.” The coarse one is a static monolithic entity
separate from the aggregates. The subtle one is, even if it’s not separate, even if it is
imputed on the aggregates, that it’s self-sufficiently knowable – you have to refute that
it’s self-sufficiently knowable. So what it is, is a self without that, like a room without
Renata.

But what do you understand in terms of phenomena? You would say that… the two
truths. Solid things are not like atoms, or mental states are not like these tiny
moments, these kshanika, or khanika (or however you call it in Pali), and vice versa. The
two truths are not each other. It’s implicative: “X is not Y.” What is the reason for this?
One has parts, the other doesn’t have parts. It’s also an implicative negation.

Now you go to Sautrantika. Sautrantika is saying that, well, they do accept non-
implicative. So there is no impossible “soul” of a person – the meditation is slightly
different. But in terms of all phenomena, still they are only dealing with implicative

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negations. Nobody will assert that knowing an implicative negation is going to free
you from a true cause of suffering. Forget about the Vaibhashika. In Sautrantika, they
say “there is no impossible ‘soul’ of a person” – it has to be a non-implicative.

Now what do they understand about phenomena, about all phenomena? Well, it’s just
implicative ones, which is that both of these – what Vaibhashika’s talking about – solids
and atoms, these are objective things. They are real and they are not like metaphysical
things: categories and so on. Categories are not like these objective things. These
metaphysical things are not like objective things. So it’s implicative: two truths, two
true types of phenomena – they’re not the same. And accordingly, to them, the
objective are real – they are using the term “truly existent” – they’re real. Why? They’re
truly existent because they are functional. So what’s the difference between the two?
Why are they not like each other? The objective are real; they’re truly existent; they’re
functional. Metaphysical are unreal, which is, they say, that means not truly existent. It’s
unreal. They don’t function. They are only imputed. But everything is of course
findable; nobody gives up findable. They’re still findable. You can still find the referent
object of the words for them.

Now we get to Chittamatra, and it’s only with Chittamatra, which is Mahayana, that you
start getting non-implicative negations in terms of phenomena. Because they say
you’ve got to get rid of not just in terms of self, your unawareness, but also
unawareness in terms of phenomena, in order to become a Buddha. To just get
liberation, you only have to understand non-implicative ones regarding the self.

So what type of thing do we understand with a non-implicative? The absence of an

external source of these objective things that you guys were talking about – they are
not objective. So the importance of that is you are getting into the understanding that
it is not just these metaphysical things that come from your mind, but even the
objective things, in a certain sense, come from your mind. No such thing as an external
source of them separate from the source of the cognition; they both come from a seed
of karma.

Now you still get a lot of implicative negations, which would be – they’re called
dependent phenomena or other-arising phenomena; they arise dependent on other
things – these objective things are not like conceptual things, since objective things
aren’t imputed. These conceptual things, like categories, are imputed, so they are not
the same; X is not like Y. But conceptual things, the categories, are not like the
objective things and voidness, since they are unreal. You see Sautrantika puts
categories and voidness into the same group. Chittamatra says, hey, no, come on, it’s
different; these objective things, this table and voidness of this table coming from an
external source, that’s not the same as a category. Why? Because both the table and its
voidness are real, they’re truly existent. All these categories aren’t truly existent, they’re
not real.

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What do they mean by “truly existent?” They mean that’s what an arya would realize,
what an arya would know, non-conceptually – you can know them non-conceptually.
That makes them real. It’s a different idea of what’s real. So the Sautrantikas were
saying that all metaphysical phenomena are unreal. And the Chittamatra says, no, they
are not all unreal – voidness is real because that’s what an arya sees. But although both
objective and voidness are real, they’re truly existent (an arya sees them). Objective
phenomena are not like voidness, however, because the objective phenomena are
functional; voidness isn’t functional (which is what the Sautrantikas were calling “real”).

And you have even a subtle voidness of all phenomena, when they say there is no such
thing as the characteristics of names on the own side of objects. In other words, you
don’t find some definition, some “thing” on the side of the object that is the basis for
the name. There is something on the side of the object that makes it into a knowable
item, but there is not something on the side of the object that makes it into what
corresponds to a name, like “Alex,” or “Fido,” or “Alexander,” or “Mr. Berzin,” or anything
like that. So it’s starting to get even further into this thing of mental labeling, I mean
what’s going on in terms of defining characteristics and so on.

So then you go to Svatantrika. And Svatantrika says, hey, you were saying that, okay,
these categories, these conceptual things, they’re imputed; and objective things and
voidness, they’re not just simply imputed. Okay, voidness has to be imputably known,
and these sort of things, but it’s not quite the same – what Chittamatra is saying, that
voidness isn’t just imputed, it’s real, what the aryas see. So Svatantrika comes along
and says, well, everything is imputed. What really has to be negated – here, again, a
non-implicative – is that “there’s no such thing as the unimputed existence of
anything.” So this they call “true existence.” What you guys were saying was “real”
before, well there’s nothing that’s real in that sense. There is nothing that is just
imputed. There is nothing that is unimputed and there’s nothing that’s just imputed.
Nothing is real, in your sense. But actually, although they don’t use the word “real”
here (they use “inherent existence”), they say that still things are findable. Everything’s
imputed but in addition it is findable. Everything is void of being unimputed, yet it is
findable as the referent object of what the words for them and concepts for them refer
to.

So now what does Prasangika say? What’s the object of refutation in Prasangika?
What’s the basis of refutation? The basis of the object to be refuted in Prasangika is
your Svatantrika idea of imputed phenomena – what’s devoid of unimputed existence,
according to Svatantrika. And it’s saying your Svatantrika imputed phenomena, which
you say are findable, what you have to cut out from that is that they’re findable. So it’s
the absence of the findability – of the findable existence – of imputed phenomena.
That’s why it’s so important to work through the tenet systems, because otherwise you
don’t identify clearly the object to be refuted and the basis of the refutation. What you
think are findable imputed objects are devoid of being findable. Now what are you left
with? What you’re left with is that they are only imputed. That’s dependent arising.

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They are only imputed without being findable. This way, you get to how things exist.
They exist as only imputed, devoid of being findable, and that’s enough.

Now what the non-Gelugpas say is that, well, you have to go beyond mental labeling.
So they are saying you have to negate something further. These unfindable merely
imputed phenomena, they’re beyond the conceptual mind – the conceptual mind
imputes. So what they’re saying is that these not findable, only imputed objects are
devoid of being an object of a conceptual mind. That’s one side of the picture. That’s
why when they talk about pure existence, you can just see pure phenomena with the
non-conceptual arya mind. So they really throw away our usual conventional truth,
conventional phenomena. And the absence of conceptual knowability of not findable,
only imputed phenomena, that can’t be known conceptually – non-conceptual.

Gelugpa points out that if you start saying that you have to go beyond what can be
imputed – they’re saying that basically there’s something wrong with imputing merely
imputed existence of phenomena. How can you impute merely imputed existence?
You’re still imputing. But they say, well, if you go beyond it, what you are saying is that
it is unimputed, because that’s in fact the language with which they say it. But to say
it’s unimputed, well, come on, you’ve gotten back to unimputed existence, true
existence. You’ve made your “voidness” into “real,” something real – this is the problem
here. How do you know that you’ve gotten to the final point? Where do you stop? And
this is a big problem because how can you answer that? You can only answer that by
saying, well, this is what aryas see; aryas are beyond conceptuality, so this is what they
see – that these objects – voidness and the basis of voidness – are beyond
conceptuality.

And Prasangika comes back and says, hey, you sound like a Chittamatra. This is what’s
the final thing simply because that’s what aryas see – that’s what the Chittamatra said.
On the basis of what aryas see are findable existence. Then you could accuse the
Prasangikas of the exact same thing – you’re saying that what you’ve come up with is
true because that’s what aryas see. And everybody says that the other people don’t
get a true stopping of samsara based on what they get, so their aryas aren’t real aryas.
Like we had this big long discussion about tenet shravaka arhats are not really
liberated. And I must say this is a very difficult thing to settle. But I think that this
shows you an overview of how important the tenet systems are.

And what I was trying to do in these weekends about the person, the self – that you
always have to look at what’s left over because that becomes the basis of the
refutation of the next level. After you’ve refuted something, you’ve negated something,
you are left with the basis; the negation didn’t imply the basis, but there is a basis.
Then you haven’t taken away enough, so you have to take away more. And the
problem is, when have you taken away enough? And what the Gelugpas are accusing
the non-Gelugpas of is that, come on, you’ve taken away the basis as well. It can only
be known non-conceptually beyond all of this stuff, come on, you’ve taken away the

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basis; be satisfied. Prasangika says that things are only in terms of what can be
imputed, that’s all. That means that – what establishes that they exist? What the words
for them refer to. Can you find what they refer to? No. All you can say is that they are
what the words for them refer to. It doesn’t mean that you can only know them by
words and concepts. Be satisfied with that and don’t go off into some mystical realm
and just get back to the practical Gelugpa position of helping people.

In summary, then, I hope that you can see from this material how important it is and in
fact how crucial it is to understand these negation phenomena, because it is with this
understanding of negation phenomena that we actually gain liberation and
enlightenment, because voidness is a negation phenomenon and almost all the
realizations that we gain on the path are likewise in terms of negation phenomena.
We’ve only started to deal with the topic, there’s a tremendous amount more to the
topic, but I hope that this introductory weekend gives you some incentive to go
deeper and deeper into the topic of negation phenomena.

The Gelug Prasangika & Svatantrika Views of

Emptiness
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/abhidharma-tenet-systems/the-
indian-tenet-systems/the-gelug-prasangika-svatantrika-views-of-emptiness

What’s voidness (emptiness) all about? What is it talking about? It’s talking about how
do you establish or prove that something exists. How do you know it exists? How do
you prove it exists? What establishes its existence?

Most translations present voidness as being about how things exist: Do things have
inherent existence? Is it this type of existence, is it that type of existence? That’s one
way of discussing it. But you can also look at it a little bit more technically, which is
revealed by the terminology, both in Sanskrit and Tibetan. And the word that’s
translated as existence, whether you have these expressions like true
existence, inherent existence, and so on – is the same word (it’s a variation of the word
grammatically) as the word which means an affirmation or a proof of something, you
prove something. It's the Sanskrit word siddha, Tibetan "drubpa" (grub-pa). So it’s how
you establish something.

How do you establish or prove that something exists? The lower tenet systems say,
“Well, it produces an effect (or these sort of things), so you know that it exists. That
establishes that it exists.” Now, in the Madhyamaka schools, Svatantrika and

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Prasangika, they say that “What establishes that it exists? Well, it can be mentally
labeled. It is what a mental label refers to. What establishes that it exists? Well, we have
a concept, we have a word for it, and it’s the referent object of the word or concept.”

So because we have a conventionally accepted word or concept for something, you

can establish that it conventionally exists as what the word or concept for it refers
to.The example I love to use for this is jealousy. What establishes that there’s such a
thing as jealousy? Well, you think about it. Think of our experience of things. In the
experience of living beings – now, that’s a huge spectrum of experience. How do you
divide that into things?

So the cave people got together, and they took acoustic patterns, and somebody got
the idea that this is going to be a word and this is going to have meaning. And so
arbitrarily they make up a definition, and they take the whole spectrum of experience –
they’re probably talking about human experience, maybe a little bit of animal
experience as well – and they arbitrarily make a line on this side and on that side, and
they say, “This parcel of experience, that’s going to be the meaning that we’re going to
assign to this totally meaningless, arbitrary acoustic pattern, and that’s a word.” And
the definition is also made up by the mind, because they made up the definition of it.
Every group of cave people had different conventions, so they divided human
experience and animal experience differently, with different boundaries. And language
evolved that way, and conceptual thinking evolved that way. Animals have concepts
too – otherwise the cow could never find its barn or identify its baby – but they don’t
do it with acoustic patterns; they do it with smells or visual things. But anyway it’s the
same thing, the same idea. It’s arbitrary. Convention is what we call it.

So now we have this convention arbitrarily set up by a group of cave people, and they
take the absolutely meaningless acoustic pattern “je-al-ou-sy” – jealousy – make it into
a word, assign it a meaning (write in the dictionary that that is the meaning of it, the
defining characteristic of what it is), and then there is this thing jealousy. And so we all
feel jealous, and we think that jealousy is a thing and that it’s established from its own
side. Nothing establishes it from its own side. There are no boundaries in human
experience or animal experience that parses it into things, although conventionally you
experience jealousy.

Everything is like that, any object. Table. What’s a table? There are so many different
items that could be called a table. Some people would call this couch a table because
it has four legs, and you can put something on it and it will hold it, and you could eat
off of this. So this is a table. What’s a table? Out of all the items and things, you sort of
make up a defining characteristic, and now you have a category of table. Okay? So it’s
convention only.

Now, Madhyamaka says that “What establishes that things exist, that there is such a
thing as jealousy? Well, it’s the referent object of the word or concept jealousy.” In

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other words, the emotion jealousy is established as what the word and
concept jealousy refers to. That’s jealousy.

When we talk about mental labeling, there are three things involved:

•the basis for labeling,

•the label, which is just an acoustic pattern or a concept with a conventionally

assigned definition to it, defining characteristic to it.

•the referent object of the label, what the concept jealousy and the
word jealousy refer to. But what they refer to is really like an illusion because it’s
not the basis, and it’s not the concept or word; it’s what the concept and word
refer to.

Okay. So now the basis. Can you find the referent object in the basis? Where can you
find it? Where can you point to it? Svatantrika says that what the concept and word
refer to appears, and you can point to that appearance. According to Prasangika, this is
the problem with Svatantrika.

Now, when you talk about inherent existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa), that’s jargon.
You have to look at the definition, otherwise you’re confused by the English
connotations of the word inherent, which are a bit irrelevant. The definition of it is that
“the referent object of a word or concept can be found, and its findability establishes
that it exists.” That’s the definition of inherent existence, or perhaps more clearly
translated as "self-established existence." So that inherent existence is what Svatantrika
is talking about and what Prasangika is refuting.

Okay. So can you find the referent object of the word? Well, where can you find it? You
find it in the basis. So what Svatantrika says is that the basis appears. Not only the
basis appears, the thing appears; the labeled object appears. And then you have to
refute something about it, which is that it exists independently of being the referent
object of a word or concept. This is what Svatantrika is all about; it’s the combination
of the two.

But what the Prasangika really objects to is that you put the fact that it appears as part
of what establishes that it exists. The referent object appears, and then you refute it.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama explained that according to Prasangika you can’t say, “Hey,
come on, the object of refutation is what appears.” You can’t say the object of
refutation, which actually doesn’t exist at all, appears – as if the invaders from the fifth
dimension appear, and then you refute that they come from the fifth dimension. It’s
not like that. So that’s what’s wrong with the Svatantrika view. You can’t say that just
because something appears – and in addition it’s the referent object of the word or
concept – that establishes that it exists, because everything that appears to the mind is
an appearance of true existence. So everything that appears to the mind is false.

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Prasangika says the only thing that establishes that anything exists is that it’s the
referent object of a word or concept for it. How do you know that there’s such a thing
as jealousy? Well, we have a word or concept for it, and it can be validated by other
valid cognitions. There are three things that it has to satisfy, according to Chandrakirti:

1.The first one is that it has to fit a pattern, a convention. So you didn’t just make
up the word. Everybody has agreed. There it is in the dictionary: jealousy. So we’ve
agreed on a convention of what to call it.
2.Then it has to be not contradicted by a mind that validly cognizes the
conventional appearance of things (the relative truth, or superficially what
appears). The simplest example is: just because I see a blur when I take my glasses
off, that doesn’t prove that a blur actually is existing there. I’m seeing a blur, but
the fault is a faulty sensor, my eyes. Well, if you look later and check, and other
people that are wearing their glasses or can hear properly experience it or that
they're not crazy with paranoia or whatever, then it’s okay.
3.The third criterion is that it’s not contradicted by a mind that validly knows the
deepest truth of things. That’s often translated as ultimate truth, but His Holiness
indicated that you want to be careful with that because then you can get the idea
of this transcendental realm that’s the ultimate... The real thing. So if it’s not
contradicted because of an appearance of true existence – well, everybody sees an
appearance of true existence, but that’s contradicted by an arya’s total absorption,
that “Hey, that’s not the case. That’s not valid.”

So it's only from the side of the mind can you establish that something actually exists;
you can’t establish it from the side of the object. So this is very important.

It’s quite interesting. His Holiness in another teaching – where he was talking about the
tenet systems – was saying this is why Chittamatra (Mind-Only) is such an important
school, because it’s a stepping-stone. This is exactly what Shantideva says at the
beginning of the ninth chapter of Bodhicharyavatara. He says that if you can
understand something on a relative level and you can accept it, then you can have a
deeper understanding that is similar to it. The example that he gives is it’s like an
illusion. If you can understand that things are like an illusion on a simple level, you can
understand it on a more profound level. So here what His Holiness referred to earlier
was that if you can understand, from Chittamatra, that appearances are not established
from the side of the object (appearances are established from the side of the mind),
then you can go to understanding that how you establish something exists is not from
the side of the object (it’s from the side of the mind).

Once, I challenge my classes to prove that we’re all in the same room. Can anybody
here prove that we’re in the same room? And I say that if everybody in this room took
a picture of what they see, and then they give it to an impartial person – you lay out all
these pictures – this person would say, “Well, you’re all in a different place. Look here.
They’re different pictures.”

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But you could define the room, define the people, and then they’re there. You’ve
defined it.

Well, how are you defining it? Is it from the side of the object or from the side of the
mind?

It doesn’t matter how you define it. Once it’s established as a convention, it’s an
established convention.

Just because there’s an established convention of a group of crazy people deciding

that they’re all in the same place, that doesn’t prove it.

Then nothing can be proved.

Well, that is the big question. How do you prove anything? That’s the big, big question.
And this is one of the arguments as well between Svatantrika and Prasangika.
Svatantrika says that there is logic on the side of the universe. That’s a very, very
important thing to think about. Are the laws of nature – if we can use this word that I
was saying is better to avoid – inherent in the universe, or are they only conventions
made up by the mind to try to understand how the universe works? Prasangika says
no, logic is not inherent in the universe; it is not self-established from its own side and
findable in the universe. This is what they argue about with the Svatantrika. Because
the Svatantrika is saying in their logical arguments that there is such thing as self-
established logic and that you can use it to prove something about a self-established
object, and the only thing that you have to refute is that you’re using wrong logic, that
you’ve come to a wrong conclusion. Prasangika says, “No, no, no. You can’t do that,
because neither self-established logic or self-established objects you are applying it to
exist. The only way that you can get the mind to stop making an incorrect belief is to
show the absurd conclusion that follows from that belief, and then you realize that it
was ridiculous, and then you stop.”

Is that the same as asserting that you can’t prove anything?

That would be a non-Gelugpa way of saying it.

So you can only establish that things exist because they are the referent objects of the
words and concepts for them. There’s nothing on the side of the object that
establishes that it exists, that proves that it exists. Just because it appears, doesn’t
prove or establish that something exists.

This is very crucial when you get to the tantra. It’s expressed most nicely in the Sakya
view of inseparable samsara and nirvana, which is that the clear-light mind is the
source of all appearances, pure and impure. Everything of samsara and nirvana is an

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appearance of the clear-light mind. The clear-light mind makes these appearances. So
either the appearances are pure (which means without appearing to have self-
established existent, inherent existence) or impure (which means without an
appearance of self-established existence). And by having the appearance of a Buddha-
figure, it helps you to not think in your ordinary way. So pure and impure – it’s not just
our usual body, the one that gets sick, and then the pure appearance of a Buddha-
figure or a deity. That’s just taking it on the conventional level. What you want to do is
do that on the deepest level, where this helps you to understand what really it’s talking
about, which is the difference between an appearance of self-established existence and
not an appearance of self-established existence.

If you do this with a Svatantrika understanding of tantra, then you would say, “Well, the
clear-light mind made this appearance of a Buddha-figure as having self-established
existence, so that establishes that a self-established Buddha-figure exists, and it’s what
the word and concept for it refers to.” So that’s why it’s so important to have the
Prasangika understanding with tantra, because there’s that danger that you’ll go to a
Svatantrika view when you learn about how all appearances are coming from the clear-
light mind. You'll take the fact that clear-lighht mind makes appearances of self-
established existence to prove or establish that this deceptive appearance corresponds
to reality and there really is self-established existence. This is a very important point.

The Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/abhidharma-tenet-systems/the-
indian-tenet-systems/the-two-truths-gelug-prasangika

The Two Essential Natures: Gelug Prasangika

The Need for Understanding Correctly the Two Truths

To gain a true stopping (‘gog-bden; true cessation) of suffering and thus attain
liberation, we need to gain a true stopping of unawareness (ma-rig-pa; ignorance) and
of the rest of the emotional obscurations (nyon-sgrib) that arise based on
unawareness. These obscurations include all the disturbing emotions and attitudes
(nyon-mongs, Skt. klesha; afflictive emotions), such as anger and attachment, as well as
their tendencies (sa-bon; seeds). These disturbing emotions and attitudes bring on the
compulsive behavior of karma that drives us to undergo uncontrollably recurring
rebirth with even more suffering.

Even if we gain liberation ourselves and are free of unawareness and disturbing
emotions and attitudes forever, still we are unable to help everyone else gain liberation

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and enlightenment. We are unable to do that because of being unable to know and
comprehend all phenomena simultaneously, especially behavioral cause and effect. To
gain a true stopping of this inability, we need to gain a true stopping of our mental
activity giving rise to and cognizing appearances of self-establishing natures (rang-
bzhin) that seem to establish the findable existence of all phenomena. When our
mental activity gives rise to such deceptive appearances, everything appears to us as if
frozen in a still photo, existing by itself, disconnected from everything else. We do not
see the connection between what we encounter and everything that previously
happened that led to it and we have no idea what the outcome would be from any
intervention we might make. This is why we are severely limited in our abilities to help
others. Therefore, to overcome these limitations requires gaining a true stopping of
these cognitive obscurations (shes-sgrib) and attaining omniscient enlightenment
ourselves.

If we consider the four noble truths, we understand that true sufferings and true
causes of sufferings are based on unawareness of the two truths (bden-gnyis) about all
phenomena, while true stoppings and true pathway minds (true paths) are based on
correct discriminating awareness (shes-rab, Skt. prajna; wisdom) of the two truths.
Therefore, to gain liberation and advance further to attaining enlightenment, we need
a correct understanding of the two truths. Tsongkhapa explains that specifically we
need to understand the Prasangika assertion of the two.

The following explanation of Tsongkhapa’s assertion is based on his Middle Length

Lam-rim (sKyes-bu gsum-gyi nyams-su blang-ba’i byang-chub lam-gyi rim-pa; The
Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of the Three Scopes of
Motivation) and on the commentary on the Second Jamyang Zhepa’s (Kun-mkhyen
‘Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa rdo-rje II, dKon-mchog ‘jigs-med dbang-po) text on tenet
systems written by the 20th-century Geshe from Rong-bo Monastery in Amdo, Geshe
Jamyang Dragpa (‘Jam-dbyangs grags-pa): A Mirror to Give Rise to the General
Meaning of the Tenet Systems: An Explanation of the Manner of Assertions of the
Propounders of Tenet Systems, Based on (Jamyang Zhepa II’s) “Jewel Garland of Tenet
Systems” (Grub-mtha’ rin-chen ‘phreng-ba-la brten-nas grub-mtha’ smra-ba-dag-gi
‘dod-tshul bshad-pa grub-mtha’i spyi-don ‘char-ba’i me-long).

All Knowable Phenomena Have Two Essential Natures

The basis for division (dbye-gzhi) of the two truths is all knowable phenomena (chos
thams-cad, Skt. sarvadharma). A “basis for division” refers to what it is that the two
truths are truths about. For instance, the basis for division of location and speed is all
moving objects.

A knowable phenomenon is defined as something that holds its own essential nature
(rang-gi ngo-bo ‘dzin-pa). These knowable phenomena are equivalent to conventional
objects (tha-snyad-pa), for instance a “human,” a “lake,” an “emotion” and “blue.”
Conventional objects, however, is a broad category and includes conventional qualities

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as well, such as “good,” “large” and “frightening.” It also encompasses conventional
actions, for instance “working,” “walking,” “understanding” and “enjoying.” In other
words, conventional objects embrace everything that we could possible validly cognize
and know.

• The Sanskrit word “vyavaharika,” translated here as a “conventional object,” has the
connotation of something that, for ease of communication and other practical
purposes, is agreed upon by custom as being something.
• Conventional objects, then, are the usual objects and things that we know,
including abstract ones such as a “religion,” “justice” and “fun.”

All conventional objects not only hold their own essential natures, they have, in fact,
two essential natures: a superficial essential nature (kun-rdzob-pa’i ngo-bo; concealer
nature) and a deepest essential nature (don-dam-pa’i ngo-bo; ultimate nature).

The Superficial Essential Nature

The superficial essential nature of objects, sometimes called an object’s identity-nature

(bdag-nyid), is what knowable phenomena conventionally are, for instance a human, a
lake or a religion. The superficial essential natures of conventional objects appear to be
established by self-establishing natures (rang-bzhin) findable on their own sides,
although they are not. This self-establishing nature – something findable in an object
that by its power makes it a human, a lake or a religion – is equivalent to a soul or a
self (bdag; Skt. atman).

The Deepest Essential Nature

The deepest essential nature of objects is their voidness (stong-pa-nyid, Skt. shunyata;
emptiness) of self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa; inherent existence).
Voidness is the total absence of an impossible mode of existence, in this case existence
established or proven or affirmed by there being findable on the side of an object a
self-establishing nature and not dependently arising (rten-cing ‘brel-bar ‘byung-ba,
Skt. pratityasamutpada) in relation to something else. There is nothing findable on the
side of a conventional object that by its own power establishes or makes it a human, a
lake or a religion.

• A limited being (sems-can; sentient being: a living being with limited body, speech
and mind compared to a Buddha) is a human only relative to its not being a
Neanderthal or a dog.
• A body of water is a lake only relative to its not being a pond or a sea.
• A set of beliefs is a religion only relative to its not being a philosophy.
• A color is red only relative to its not being orange, and so forth.

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In short, nothing is what it conventionally is without being what it conventionally is
relative to being something else. There are no such things as self-establishing natures.

The deepest essential nature of all knowable phenomena, their voidness of being self-
established, is also called their self-nature (rang-bzhin, the same term used in Tibetan
for a self-establishing nature), their actual nature (chos-nyid), and their abiding nature
(gnas-pa-nyid).

Examples

Consider more deeply the examples of a human, a lake and a religion.

Their superficial essential natures are their essential natures of being something. These
superficial natures are facts: some objects conventionally are humans, some
conventionally are lakes, by convention there is such a thing as a religion. After all, it is
widely agreed upon that certain knowable objects are humans, not Neanderthals or
dogs. Moreover, there isn’t any object that is a nothing. These superficial natures
appear to be established by self-establishing natures that seem to exist and be
findable on the side of these objects. They seem to be that which, by their own power,
make these objects what they in fact conventionally are: a human, a lake or a religion.

But there are no such things as these self-establishing natures. In fact, there aren’t
even self-establishing natures that make things knowable objects at all. After all, there
isn’t a plastic coating around anything that makes it something knowable, isolated
from everything else. There aren’t findable boundaries on the sides of limited beings
that, on one side, make them humans and on the other Neanderthals. The same is the
case regarding findable boundaries on the sides of bodies of water separating lakes
from ponds, on the sides of sets of beliefs differentiating a religion from a philosophy,
on the side of emotions dividing loving someone from merely liking the person, or on
the side of light demarcating blue from green.

The deepest essential nature of conventional objects, then, is their total absence of
self-establishing natures that establish their superficial essential natures as a human, a
lake or a religion, rather than their superficial essential natures as a human, a lake or a
religion just dependently arising in relation to something else.

Dependent Arising

We can understand “dependently arising in relation to something else” in several ways.

One such way was in comparison to something else, for instance our fourth finger is
large compared to our little finger, but small compared to our middle finger. Another
way entails what things are dependent on in order to exist at all. Wholes can only arise
and exist dependently on parts; and products can only arise and exist dependently on
causes and conditions.

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The Prasangika assertion, however, is much more profound and subtle. The superficial
essential natures of what knowable phenomena are can only be accounted for as
dependently arising merely in relation to mental labeling with categories (spyi;
generalities) and designation of those categories with words (ming; names). But what
does this mean?

To understand dependent arising in this more profound and subtler sense, we need to
know a few points:

• Mental labeling with categories and designation with words are functions of
conceptual cognition (rtog-pa).
• Conceptual cognitions are cognitions of knowable phenomena through the
medium of categories.
• Categories and, through the categories, knowable objects conceptually fit into
them as members of the categories, may or may not be designated with a word.
Snails, for instance, conceptually cognize certain items through the category of
“food,” but do not associate a word with the category.

The conceptual cognitions that mentally label and designate things as a “human,” a
“lake” or a “religion” give rise to appearances of the conventional objects as being self-
established as what the categories and words refer to. In other words, when we look at
an object and conceptually cognize it through the category “human” or “lake” and
designate it with the word “human” or “lake,” the conventional object appears to us as
actually being a human or a lake: me or you, Lake Michigan or Lake Baikal. When we
think of something through the category a “religion” and designate it with the word
“religion,” what we are thinking of in terms of this convention appears to us as actually
being a religion, for instance Christianity or Buddhism.

In addition, these conceptual cognitions conceive that there actually are self-
establishing natures on the sides of the conventional objects that, by their power,
actually establish them as a human, a lake or a religion. Conceptual cognitions imagine
this because they interpolate (sgro-‘dogs; superimpose, project) the defining
characteristic marks (mtshan-nyid) of the categories “human,” “lake,” or “religion,” and
of the words “human,” “lake” or “religion,” as being findable on the sides of both the
categories and words themselves, as well as being findable on the sides of the
conventional objects that they mentally label and designate them with.

• In other words, the categories that appear in conceptual thought, such as

“religion,” seem to have self-established definitions, not merely definitions agreed
upon by convention.
• The objects labeled as members of these categories, such as Christianity and
Buddhism, seem also to have findable within them these same defining
characteristics that, by their own power, make them fit into the category “religion”
as members of this category.

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• However, whether or not Buddhism fits into the category “religion” is dependent
on the definition of a religion and such a definition can only be one that is agreed
upon by convention. There are no absolute defining characteristic features
findable already inside the category that have not been agreed upon by
convention. In short, something being a religion all depends on how you define a
religion.

To the conceptual cognitions, these defining characteristic marks findable on the sides
of conventional objects actually establish the existence of the conventional objects as a
human, a lake or a religion, either by their own power alone or by their own power in
conjunction with mental labeling and designation. Mental labeling and designation as
a human, a lake, or a religion, however, do not make or truly establish conventional
objects as being humans, lakes or religions. Nor do they create conventional objects.

Conventional objects, however, conventionally do exist as humans, lakes or religions.

But how is it that they are a human, a lake or a religion? Their existence as a human, a
lake or a religion can be accounted for only in relation to their being mentally labeled
with the categories “human,” “lake” or “religion” and designated with the words
“human,” “lake” or “religion.” Nevertheless, they do not have to be actively labeled or
designated as “human,” “lake” or “religion” by anyone in order for there to be such
conventional things.

So, what then is a human, a lake or a religion? All we can say is that they are merely
what the categories and words “human,” “lake” and “religion” refer to, when labeled
and designated on an appropriate basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi). An appropriate basis
would be a certain type of limited being, a certain type of physical object and a certain
set of beliefs, all of which have certain conventionally agreed-upon defining
characteristic marks. But even their being a certain type of limited being, physical
object or set of beliefs also only dependently arises in relation to mental labeling and
designation alone.

In short, all knowable phenomena are devoid of being self-established as what they
conventionally are. Nevertheless, they are conventionally something, not nothing. And
they do have the conventionally agreed-upon defining characteristics of what they are
mentally labeled and designated as. Otherwise, the absurd conclusions would follow
that nothing could be distinguished from anything else, and everything could be
anything: a human could be a lake!

[See: Imputation, Mental Labeling and Designation.]

Grasping for Truly Established Existence

In the Gelug Prasangika system, then, self-established existence is equivalent to:

• Truly established existence (bden-par grub-pa)

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• Existence established from something’s own side (rang-gi ngos-nas grub-pa)
• Existence established by a self-defining characteristic mark (rang-gi mtshan-nyid-
kyis grub-pa)
• Existence established by an essential nature (ngo-bo-nyis-kyi grub-pa).

When we speak of “grasping for truly established existence” (bden-‘dzin), this grasping,
however, has two layers:

• Giving rise to the interpolation of an appearance of a self-establishing nature and,

in doing so, cognizing it. An interpolation (sgro-‘dogs; superimposition, projection)
is the addition of something that is not there. This layer of grasping is a cognitive
obscuration (shes-sgrib) preventing omniscience.
• In addition, giving rise to the interpolation of the findable true existence of that
self-establishing nature, and in doing so, cognizing it. This layer is equivalent to
unawareness according to Tsongkhapa and is an emotional obscuration (nyon-
sgrib) preventing liberation.

Definitions of the Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika

Definition of the Two Truths

Deepest Truth

A mind that analyzes the deepest nature of a knowable phenomenon takes as its
involved object (‘jug-yul) its deepest essential nature, i.e. it takes the voidness of the
phenomenon as the main object with which it cognitively engages. Although voidness
does not stand up to this analysis with reasoning, since no self-establishing nature or
self-defining characteristic mark can be found on the side of voidness establishing its
existence; nevertheless, voidness, as the involved object of the analysis, is deepest
truth (don-dam bden-pa: ultimate truth). It is the deepest true fact about a
conventional object, namely how that object actually exists – i.e., totally devoid of a
self-establishing nature, since there are no such things.

Superficial Truth

A mind that analyzes the superficial nature of a knowable phenomenon takes as its
involved object its superficial essential nature. Its superficial essential nature, for
instance as a human, a lake or a religion, also does not stand up to this analysis with
reasoning, since no self-establishing nature or self-defining characteristic mark can be
found on the side of this superficial nature either, establishing its existence.

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Nevertheless, when not analyzed, this superficial essential nature appears to be
established by a self-establishing nature, although it is not.

Self-establishing natures, when considered actually to exist, although they do not, are
superficial truths (kun-rdzob bden-pa; concealer truth, obscurational truth,
conventional truth, relative truth). In fact, however, they are not true at all.

Cognition of the Superficial Essential Natures of Knowable Phenomena by Different

Minds

Depending on the degree to which the deepest essential natures of knowable

phenomena is obscured, different minds cognize the superficial essential natures of
knowable phenomena differently.

Mundane Minds

If the mind that analyzes the superficial or deepest essential natures of knowable
phenomena – for instance, a human, a lake or a religion – is a mundane one, then
when not analyzing, it takes these appearances of self-establishing natures to
correspond to something that exists.

• A mundane mind (‘jig-rten-pa’i blo; worldly mind) refers to the mental activity of
someone who does not have a complete true stopping of all degrees of
unawareness and occurs when the person is not totally absorbed (mnyam-bzhag;
in meditative equipoise) non-conceptually on voidness.

Mundane minds contain both the emotional obscurations and the cognitive
obscurations. They grasp for truly established existence in both senses of the term.
Such minds give rise to appearances of self-establishing natures and take as true facts
what these appearances seem to be. In other words, they take as a true fact that there
actually are self-establishing natures located findably inside knowable phenomena and
establishing the superficial essential natures of what these knowable phenomena are.
Thus, they take as true that there actually is something findable inside certain limited
beings, certain objects and certain sets of beliefs that, by its own power or also in
conjunction with mental labeling and designation, make them humans, lakes and
religions.

In short, to such minds, superficial truth is that the superficial essential natures of
things actually are established by self-establishing natures. Superficial truth, then, is
actually false.

For Liberated Minds (Arhats)

Consider the case of when the mind that analyzes the superficial or deepest essential
natures of knowable phenomena is a liberated one, i.e. one with a true stopping of

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unawareness, but not yet enlightened. This is the case of a liberated being (arhat; foe-
destroyer): either a shravaka, pratyekabuddha or bodhisattva arhat.

• A shravaka (nyan-thos; listener) is someone who aims for liberation and

progresses on the path to this goal by listening to the teachings of a Buddha,
either from a Buddha himself or from subsequent teachers, or from reading texts.
• A pratyekabuddha (rang-rgyal; solitary realizer) is someone who aims for
liberation and, because of living in a dark age in which a Buddha’s teachings are
unavailable, progresses on the path to this goal by relying on instincts left from
hearing a Buddha’s teachings in some previous world age.
• A bodhisattva (byang-chub sems-dpa’) is someone who aims to attain the
enlightenment of a Buddha in order to best be able to lead all others to liberation
and enlightenment. Before attaining enlightenment, however, bodhisattvas need
first to attain liberation themselves.

Arhats have rid themselves forever of the emotional obscurations, but not the
cognitive ones. They have grasping for truly established existence only in the sense
that their minds still give rise to appearances of self-establishing natures and, in doing
so, they cognize them.

When not analyzing, such a mind takes the appearances of self-establishing natures
merely to be the appearances of something that those with unawareness consider to
actually exist. Liberated beings, however, know that self-establishing natures do not
exist at all and so they do not consider them true. They know that these deceptive
appearances are merely like illusions (sgyu-ma lta-bu).

The appearances of self-establishing natures are dualistic appearances (gnyis-snang),

because they are different from and thus dual to the deepest essential nature of how
things actually exist. In other words, dualistic appearances are those in which the
manner of appearance (snang-tshul) and manner of abiding (gnas-tshul) are two
different manners.

Liberated beings, then, cognize mere superficial objects (kun-rdzob-pa tsam; mere
concealer objects). These are conventional objects that merely appear to be self-
established, but actually are not. But because they appear like that, their appearance is
only superficial: they still conceal these objects’ deepest essential natures of voidness.
The superficial objects that appear to them are called “tainted” (zag-bcas), because
they are tainted with an appearance of self-established existence.

In short, liberated beings cognize what conventionally are humans, lakes and religions.
These knowable objects appear to them to be self-established, but they know that
those appearances of self-established existence are distorted. They know that these
objects are merely conventionally existent as humans, lakes and religions in relation to
mental labeling and designation alone.

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Arhats do, however, still cognize the superficial truths of these merely conventional
superficial objects, but only in the sense that when they cognize these objects they
know that mundane beings consider their appearance of being self-established to be
true.

For Buddhas

To the omniscient deep awareness (rnam-mkhyen ye-shes) of Buddhas, all knowable

phenomena arise simultaneously, without any appearance of self-establishing natures.
This is because Buddhas have attained a true stopping of both the emotional and the
cognitive obscurations and, consequently, experience neither form of grasping for self-
established existence.

What Buddhas cognize, then, are untainted phenomena (zag-med-kyi chos), i.e.
knowable phenomena unstained by any appearances of self-establishing natures. It is
because they do not give rise to appearances of self-establishing natures that the
omniscient deep awareness of Buddhas cognizes simultaneously all knowable
phenomena and the void sphere of all phenomena (chos-dbyings, Skt. dharmadhatu),
including the voidness of their own deep awareness.

Buddhas also cognize that for both liberated minds and mundane minds, the
superficial essential natures of conventional objects appear to be self-established and
they also know that liberated beings do not take these tainted appearances to be true,
whereas mundane minds do take them to be true. In this way, Buddhas cognize
simultaneously the two truths, but without self-establishing natures appearing to their
minds.

In other words, when Buddhas cognize anything, although they themselves no longer
have any conceptual cognition, nevertheless they know all the conventions by which
others cognize something and all the words that others use for it. This is because they
simultaneously cognize a total absence of anything findable on the side of the object
that establishes its conventional existence as just one thing, designated by just one
word. Nothing appears to a Buddha’s omniscient deep awareness as fitting into just
one category or as being designated with just one word. Thus, although Buddhas
cognize individual conventional objects with what is known as “individualizing deep
awareness” (so-sor rtogs-pa’i ye-shes), yet because there are no findable boundaries in
their cognitions isolating things from each other and locking them into any one
category by means of some self-establishing nature, Buddhas cognize all knowable
phenomena all at once.

In the same way as other knowable phenomena, the Form Bodies that Buddhas
spontaneously manifest and appear in also are conventional objects that, like illusions,
appear to be self-established to all who are not yet Buddhas. Mundane minds take
these Form Bodies actually to be self-established.

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Summary of the Two Truths

In the formulation of the two truths, the term “truth” has two different meanings.

• In terms of superficial truth, “truth” means true to mundane mental activity.

Superficial truths, however, are deceptive. They are not true.
• In terms of deepest truth, “truth” means non-deceptive.

The two truths, then, are posited in reference to these two essential natures:

• Superficial truths are what mundane minds viewing the superficial essential
natures of conventional knowable phenomena consider to be true.
• Deepest truths are what non-deceptive minds viewing the deepest essential
natures of conventional objects consider to be true.

To the mental activity of all those who are not yet enlightened, superficial objects
conceal their deepest truth. This is because superficial objects appear to them to be
established by self-establishing natures, whereas the deepest truth is that there are no
such things as self-establishing natures.

Fine Points about the Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika

The Two Truths Have the Same Essential Nature

When the statement is made that the two truths have the same essential nature (ngo-
bo gcig), but different conceptual isolates (ldog-pa tha-dad), it does not mean that
they are referring to the same essential nature. It is not that the two truths are referring
to the same superficial object or the same voidness of the same superficial object, but
just viewed from the perspective of two different minds: a mind stained with
unawareness and the mind of a Buddha.

Rather, the two truths share the same essential nature of both being devoid of self-
established existence. In other words, their deepest essential natures of voidness are
the same; it is just that the basis that their voidnesses are in reference to (ltos-gzhi) can
be conceptually isolated as these two different items.

• Conceptual isolation is a phenomenon that occurs merely in thought as a tool for

analysis.
• Two items that share the same essential nature but which can be conceptually
isolated from each other do not, in fact, exist or occur separately from each other.

The reason why the two truths cannot be of two different deepest essential natures is
the following. If superficial truths were of a different deepest essential nature from
deepest truths, i.e. if superficial truths were of a different deepest essential nature than
voidness, then the absurd conclusion would follow that only voidness would be devoid

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of self-established existence and superficial truths would not be devoid of self-
established existence. This would absurdly follow because the two would have to have
different deepest natures: if one is voidness, the other could not be voidness.

Although the two truths are different conceptual isolates, nevertheless, being of the
same essential nature, they are inseparable (dbyer-med). “Inseparable,” in its technical
sense, means that if one is the case, so is the other.

• If it is the case that minds stained by unawareness take as true the existence of
self-establishing natures that establish the superficial essential natures of things, it
is also the case that non-deceptive minds will nevertheless take as true the
deepest essential natures of things, i.e. their voidness.
• If it is the case that non-deceptive minds take as true the deepest essential natures
of things, it is also the case that minds stained by unawareness will nevertheless
take as true the existence of self-establishing natures that establish the superficial
essential natures of things.

The Conventional Existence of Superficial Knowable Phenomena

We have learned that superficial knowable phenomena conventionally exist (tha-

snyad-du yod-pa). However, they appear like illusions because their superficial
essential natures appear to be self-established, whereas in deepest truth they are not
self-established.

But how is it that there are superficial objects conventionally known as a “human,” a
“lake” or a “religion?” In other words, how do they conventionally exist as a human, a
lake or a religion? The conventional existence of superficial objects can only be
accounted for in terms of their being the referent objects (btags-chos) of mental
labeling with categories by conceptual cognition and designation with words, in which
case the referent objects appear to be self-established.

• A referent object is what a category and a word refer to. For instance, the referent
object of the category “human” mentally labeled on a limited being imputed on
an everchanging continuum of a body and mind and designated with the word
“human” is a conventionally existent “human.”
• The category “human,” however, is conventionally defined by agreed-upon
characteristic marks and designated by a word, “human.” Based on these defining
characteristic marks, which conceptual cognition conceives as existing findably
also on the side of a certain limited being, the conceptual cognition mentally
labels, designates and thinks of that being as a “human” and not as a
“Neanderthal” or a “lake.”
• Although the limited being conventionally exists as a “human” merely in terms of
this mental labeling and designation, nevertheless it seems to have on its own side
a findable self-establishing nature that establishes it as a “human.” It seems like

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 there is something inside it that makes it a “human,” not a “Neanderthal” or a
“lake,” although there is not.
• To a mundane mind, the limited being truly is a “human,” because it believes that
there actually is such a self-establishing nature inside the being that establishes it
as a human, either by its own power or in conjunction with the mental label and
designation “human.”

The Division between What Conventionally Exists and What Is Non-existent

Not everything that appears to a mundane mind, however, conventionally exists.

Chandrakirti explains that what conventionally exists (tha-snyad-du yod-pa) must fulfill
three criteria:

• It must be widely known to cognitions of conventional objects (tha-snyad-pa’i

shes-pa), although not necessarily understood by those cognitions. Most modern
educated people have heard of quarks, for instance. They are widely known,
despite the fact that not many people understand what they are.
• As an object widely known like that, other cognitions of conventional objects must
not invalidate it. Although objects seen as blurs by people with poor vision are
widely known, the conventional existence of objects actually being blurs is
invalidated by unimpaired vision.
• The widely known object must not be invalidated by reasoning when reasoning
analyzes the object accurately in terms of its voidness or when it analyzes whether
or not the object has a self-establishing nature. Although self-establishing natures
are widely thought to exist by those with unawareness of voidness, such natures
are invalidated by analysis of them with reasoning.

Non-conceptual Cognition of Deepest Truth Does Not Negate Conventional Existence

Let us look more deeply at this third criterion. Non-conceptual cognition of voidness
negates the existence of self-establishing natures that establish the existence of the
superficial essential natures of knowable phenomena. Thus, it invalidates self-
establishing natures. It does not, however, negate the conventional existence of
knowable phenomena. Analysis with the reasoning of voidness does not invalidate
conventional objects.

In more detail, when reasoning analyzes whether or not a conventional object has a
self-establishing nature that establishes its existence, then despite the fact that the
object appears with a representation of a self-establishing nature, it concludes there is
no such thing as a self-establishing nature. One focuses, then, on “no such thing as a
self-establishing nature”; in other words, one focuses on its voidness. At such a time,
neither the conventional object nor the representation of a self-establishing nature
appear. This is because the object being negated is the existence of a self-establishing
nature that corresponds to the representation of one that appears. With voidness, one

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is focusing only on the total absence of such a nature: there is no such thing; it does
not exist.

The object being negated is not the existence of the conventional object that appears
with a representation of a self-establishing nature; only the findable existence of an
actual self-establishing nature is being negated. Thus, although the analysis with
reasoning invalidates the existence of a self-establishing nature that corresponds to
the representation of such a nature that appears in cognition, it does not invalidate
and obliterate the conventional object that appears with a representation of such a
nature. This is because the conventional object is not the object of negation by
voidness.

Valid Cognition of the Appearance of a Self-Establishing Nature

As already explained, when a mundane mind cognizes a superficial object, equivalent

to a conventional object, both the superficial essential nature of the object and an
appearance representing a self-establishing nature establishing that superficial
essential nature appear. Although there is nothing findable on the side of the object
that actually corresponds to this representation; nevertheless, the cognition of the
appearance of a representation of a self-establishing nature is still a valid apprehension
(rtogs-pa). It is a valid apprehension because this appearance, a representation of a
self-establishing nature, actually does appear and is accurately and decisively cognized
as what appears.

Nevertheless the cognition is deceptive (‘khrul-ba) with reference to this appearance of

a representation of a self-establishing nature, since the appearance conceals the
deepest truth, that there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature. For a mundane
mind, the cognition is doubly deceptive because the unawareness that accompanies
the cognition takes the self-establishing nature actually to exist.

Accurate and Distorted Superficial Truths

Not all cognitions of the superficial essential natures of conventional objects by

mundane minds, however, are valid cognitions (tshad-ma). Superficial phenomena –
both ways of knowing and objects known – can be divided into accurate superficial
phenomena (yang-dag-pa’i kun-rdzob) and distorted superficial phenomena (log-pa’i
kun-rdzob). But this division of what is and is not conventionally valid is made only
from the perspective of mundane minds. A mundane mind, as explained above, is one
that still contains unawareness and thus still grasps for the existence of self-
establishing natures.

Within the context of the belief that there actually are self-establishing natures on the
sides of conventional objects, the distinction between distorted and accurate
superficial objects is made in terms of whether or not the mundane mind cognizing
the superficial object is affected by shallow causes for deception (‘phral-gyi ‘khrul-
rgyu).

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• There are both internal and external shallow causes for deception with respect to
sensory cognition. Internal ones include cataracts, jaundice, astigmatism, tinnitus,
mental and physical illness and hallucinogens; external ones include mirrors in
which images are reflected, caves in which sounds echo and magic tricks.
• Shallow causes for deception with respect to mental cognition include false
doctrinal systems, incorrect lines of reasoning, and sleep.

Thus, visual cognition of a blurry face and of a face in a mirror and also mental
cognition of a face in a dream are all valid cognitions from the point of view of their
cognizing an appearance of a blur, a reflection and a dream image. However, these
appearing objects are distorted because they do not correspond to actual faces. The
cognitions of them are likewise distorted, not valid, when they take these appearances
to be an actual face.

To the mind of a liberated being, however, there is no distinction between accurate and
distorted superficial objects. This is because, having so-called mental bodies (yid-
lus), they are no longer subject to shallow causes for deception. To such a mind, all
superficial objects are distorted only from the point of view that they all appear to be
self-established, although cognition of them is never distorted, because they know
that they are not self-established.

The Object of Refutation by Voidness

In the Prasangika system, as explained by Tsongkhapa, the object of refutation by

voidness is the existence of self-establishing natures that establish the existence of the
superficial natures of conventional objects.

• The refutation of such self-establishing natures is not merely that such natures do
not exist, since one might conclude that because of their non-existence, nothing
exists. Thus, one might fall to the nihilist position (med-lta).
• Nor is the refutation of self-establishing natures a refutation of such natures
defined as something other than how Prasangika defines it. The Svatantrika
system, for instance, refutes merely self-establishing natures that establish the
existence of the superficial natures of conventional objects by their own power
alone and not in conjunction with mental labeling. Thus this system still asserts the
existence of self-establishing natures that establish the superficial natures of
conventional objects in conjunction with mental labeling.

The object of refutation in Prasangika is a self-establishing nature that establishes the

existence of the superficial nature of conventional objects (either by its own power
alone or in conjunction with mental labeling), as opposed to the superficial nature of
conventional objects dependently arising and being accounted for merely in relation
to mental labeling and designation alone.

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Moreover, it is not that the refutation is a self-establishing nature is the negation of
something that existed and the refutation makes it non-existent. Voidness does not
make anything be devoid of self-established existence. Self-establishing natures never
existed. Further, the refutation does not replace a self-establishing nature with
something else, also as if the self-establishing nature existed before and now
something else, namely dependent arising, has taken its place. The object of refutation
has never existed.

Thus, it is crucial to identify correctly and decisively the object of refutation and to
neither over-refute nor under-refute it.

Over-refutation of the Object to Be Refuted

Over-refutation is when, in refuting self-establishing natures that establish the

superficial essential natures of conventional objects, one also refutes superficial
essential natures as well. In doing so, one refutes the existence of conventional objects.
If conventional objects do not exist, the absurd conclusion follows that there is no such
thing as constructive or destructive behavior and no such things as their results. Thus,
ethics would be meaningless and liberation would be impossible. Tsongkhapa
adamantly defended the conventional existence of ethical behavior, since many at his
time mistakenly thought that voidness justified a lack of ethics.

This is the extreme of annihilation (chad-lta). It comes about from incorrectly asserting
that since the superficial essential natures of things can only be established by self-
establishing natures, then the negation of self-establishing natures also negates the
conventional existence of superficial essential natures. This extreme also follows from
taking overly literally statements in the prajnaparamita (far-reaching discriminating
awareness; perfection of wisdom) literature, for instance The Heart Sutra, “No eye, no
ear, no nose, no tongue, no body, no mind.”

Under-refutation of the Object to Be Refuted

There are many examples of under-refutation. One might refute only the objects
refuted by lower tenet systems, such as:

• Partless particles and partless moments

• Self-establishing natures that establish the superficial essential natures of things
merely by their own power, rather than in conjunction with mental labeling.

Both these refutations leave as unrefuted the existence of any kind of self-establishing
nature at all.

One might refute merely the objects of doctrinally based unawareness (kun-btags-kyi
ma-rig-pa) about persons, as formulated by the lower tenet systems, such as static,

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monolithic persons that can exist independently of a body and mind when liberated.
One might even refute in addition the objects of automatically arising unawareness
(lhan-skyes-kyi ma-rig-pa) about persons that these lower systems formulate, namely
self-sufficiently knowable persons (rang-rgya ‘dzin-thub-pa’i gang-zag) – persons that
can be known without their bases for imputation (gdags-gzhi) simultaneously
appearing and being cognized. But still, one might leave unrefuted self-established
persons that are nonstatic, non-monolithic, incapable of existing independently of
being imputed on bodies and minds, and impossible to cognize without some basis
for their imputation also appearing and being cognized simultaneously.

Another under-refutation is that voidness merely refutes self-establishing natures that

establish the superficial essential natures of conventional objects, but does not also
refute self-establishing natures that establish the deepest essential natures of objects.
In other words, the refutation still leaves voidness as being established by its own self-
establishing nature. In short, it is an under-refutation to assert the voidness of
superficial truth, but not the voidness of voidness.

Yet another under-refutation is that voidness merely refutes that the superficial
essential natures of conventional objects are their deepest essential natures, or that
the superficial natures are the self-establishing natures that establish the deepest
essential natures of conventional objects. Again, this is an under-refutation because it
does not also refute the actual self-establishing natures of conventional objects.

Conclusion

Understanding the two truths correctly and decisively, then, is essential for correctly
and decisively identifying the object to be refuted in order to attain a true stopping of
the true causes for suffering and so to attain liberation and enlightenment.

To attain either liberation or enlightenment, we need to cognize correctly and

decisively the deepest truth of all phenomena as the voidness of the existence of self-
establishing natures that establish the existence of conventional objects. This means
that we need to understand superficial truth correctly and decisively. We must
apprehend that the superficial essential natures of conventional objects can only be
accounted for by dependent arising. In other words, they can only be accounted for in
relation to mental labeling and designation alone, without the existence of self-
establishing natures establishing their existence. This is the case despite the fact that
conventional objects appear, like illusions, to be established by self-establishing
natures.

In correctly and decisively identifying the two truths, then, we avoid the two extremes
of annihilationism and eternalism (rtag-lta), by neither over-refuting nor under-refuting
the object to be refuted in superficial truth when we correctly and decisively cognize
deepest truth. We neither annihilate the conventional existence of superficial objects,
nor leave as still true the manner in which their existence appears to be established.

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When we have attained a true stopping of both the doctrinally based and
automatically arising unawareness that interpolates the actual existence of self-
establishing natures, we attain liberation. When, due to further familiarity with this
correct view and a further build-up of positive force (bsod-nams, Skt. punya; merit)
dedicated to enlightenment, our mental activity stops giving rise to an appearance of
self-establishing natures, we attain enlightenment.

Emptiness of All Phenomena

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/vipashyana/incorrect-
consideration-and-emptiness/emptiness-of-all-phenomena

We’ve discussed the impossible ways of existing of a person, and the absence of any
actual “referent thing” to these impossible ways is what voidness is. If we wish to go
deeper, then we need to discuss impossible ways of existing of all phenomena, which
would include persons and individuals. Again, we can, with some of these, learn them
from a system, doctrinally based, and also can be automatically arising. We won’t get
into fine distinctions here. We can also go deeper and deeper and get more subtle in
our recognitions of what’s impossible and our refutations of them.

First we would need to understand that phenomena that are dependent on other
things, that are nonstatic, change from moment to moment, arise based on causes and
conditions – that these are devoid of existing in the manner of some totally conceptual
object, like a category. Something that is dependent on other things, changing from
moment to moment, doesn’t exist as just something like a category, which is totally
conceptual.

A category is something which is fixed. We have a category like “a table,” and it’s just
“a table,” defined in a certain way, and then that can be applied to various things; it
doesn’t change. So, things that are dependent on other things, and arise dependent
on causes and conditions, don’t exist like some sort of category. “Me” – I’m not just
some sort of conceptual category. There is a “me.” It changes from moment to
moment, and so on. Even though it is imputed on a continuum of ever-changing
aggregates, it’s not like the category “table” imputed on something, not just some
fiction of the imagination.

According to this view – this initial view that we would work with – the “me” does have
defining characteristics on it’s own side that make it an individual, knowable person,
“me,” not “you.” There are certain defining characteristics, general ones like age, and so
on. Like a body – also as we talk about all phenomena – has a certain characteristic like
size, and so on. But, what’s also absent is that… technically what we say is that it lacks a
basis for fixing a name or a quality. What that means is that, on the side of the object,

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it’s not “Alex” or “Fifi,” or anything like that, that arises dependent on various things. I’m
an individual, but the name is not established on the side of the object. There is a size
on the side of the object, but “big” or “small” is not established on the side of the
object. That’s in relation to something else: big compared to an ant, small compared to
a dinosaur.

Here we have an object and it has defining characteristics. An individual object has
defining characteristics: a flat top and legs that it stands on, can perform a function of
holding something on top of it. But from its own side it doesn’t exist as a “table,” or a
“tavolo,” or a “Tisch,” or anything like that. These are names that are imputed onto it,
that are labeled onto it. From its own side, it doesn’t have its own specific name or a
quality like “good,” or “bad,” or “big,” or “small.” All of that’s relative.

This is quite significant when we apply this to a “me.” “I’m stupid.” “I’m no good,” I’m
this, I’m that. There is nothing on the side of a “me” that’s like that. All of that’s relative,
it’s labeled, and so on. But there is a “me” and a defining characteristic that makes
“me” an individual, and so on. It’s not just something that’s a fiction of the imagination
or a category.

This becomes very interesting if we look more deeply into this field. We can only talk
about an object in terms of our experience of it. “What is this table?” and “What’s a
person?” If I talk about it, that’s in relation to a mind talking about it. If I see it, that’s in
relation to a mind seeing it. If I think about it, it’s in relation to a mind thinking about
it. It doesn’t make any sense of this table independent of a mind, because we talk
about it. And it is related to the mind. “Well, but the Big Bang,” or “the Earth before
there was any life on it.” Well, we’re not seeing it, but we’re talking about it, and so it’s
in relation to a mind.

All that we can really deal with are the appearances of things, in terms of a cognition
of them. Within that context then it sounds as though we’re saying, from this initial
description, that I gave, that objects are just like a blank disk, diskette, or something
like that, that has size and is an individual diskette, and then on it, is labeled, or printed
“good,” “bad,” “Alex,” “Fifi,” or whatever. Although it’s like that, you have to realize that
all of this is within the context of a mind. It’s not that objects exist as blank cassettes
out there by themselves, like diskettes.

This is the Chittamatra view, the “Mind-Only” view. Let’s say I have a loved one,
somebody that I love. It’s not that they exist out there as some sort of blank diskette,
as an individual with size and age and stuff like that. Because, if I’m thinking of them,
or loving them, or seeing them, or anything like that, we can only deal with this person
in terms of experiencing this person, seeing, thinking, etc.

We can only talk about, think about, or anything, within the context of my perception
of them, or thinking of them, and so on. And so in that perception, well, I might
conceptualize “good” or “bad,” “nice” or “not nice,” “pretty” or “ugly,” or things like that,

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but from it’s own side, within that appearance, they’re not like that, I’m just projecting
that. In my perception I can point to them, from their side it’s like a blank thing that all
these judgments and so on are being projected on, but it’s not that they exist out
there as some blank diskette.

We are talking about our perception of people, our perception of objects, and so on,
and within that perception, or cognition, we have to differentiate that the person, or
the object doesn’t exist in the manner of these categories, like “good,” “bad,” “pretty,”
“ugly,” and so on. This is a very complex view, not a very easy one to understand, but
actually very profound.

We don’t have so much time, and the customary way is to go fairly quickly at the end
with the most complicated, difficult stuff. The theory behind that is, either you’ll
understand it, or if you aren’t quite ready to understand it, even if we spend hours and
hours, you’re still not going to understand it, because it requires a great deal of
reflection and thought. If we at least get the point from this – that, from the person’s
own side they don’t exist as wonderful, or horrible, or as Claudia, or as some other
name, or as an angel, or a bastard, this sort of thing, that’s not from the side of the
object, this is just being thrown on top of it, from their own side nobody exists like that
– that, at least, is a great help.

It’s just in now my moment of experience of this person, of thinking of them, or seeing
them, I am projecting on top of just a person “bastard,” or “angel,” or “wonderful,” and
so on, but there’s a person, and in each different time that I experience them, I think of
them, I may project other things on them, and when somebody else perceives them,
they project yet other things on them. So what’s absent is that these objects
themselves are established as “that’s what they really are.” It’s not like that. Although a
person is imputed on an everchanging stream of aggregates, body, mind, and so on,
it’s not the same as “good” or “bad” being imputed on something, labeled on
something.

One brief question – I don’t want to do too many questions, because then we’ll never
finish. There are two more positions to explain.

It’s impossible to fall in love, if you only think of things in this way.

Yes, in a sense. Falling in love is rather a disturbing state of mind. We can love
somebody, but falling in love is usually so exaggerating the person. It’s a disturbed
state of mind, because when they’re not there, we suffer, and we lose all self-control,
because we ignore everybody else in our life, and we ignore our work, and so on.

No more love songs.

No more love songs. But it doesn’t refute love. Love is the wish for the other person to
be happy, to have the causes of happiness, regardless of what they do. Regardless of

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what they do to me, regardless of what they do to anybody, just because they are a
living being, and everybody wants to be happy, and nobody wants to be unhappy.

If we get rid of all projections, then the person is still there?

Correct. According to this view, yes. In the beginning I was just using “projection” as a
general word, but we have to differentiate here between a mental hologram of a
person, when I’m seeing them, and a projection of good, bad, nice, wonderful, horrible,
etc. It’s not that these labels “good,” “bad,” etc. are incorrect. They could be
conventionally correct, according to a certain convention of “what is good behavior”
and “what is terrible behavior” and so on. But it’s relative. It’s not established on the
side of the person. An example: you serve somebody a meal and at the end of the
meal they burp, they belch. In Arab society that’s very polite. It shows that you enjoyed
the meal. In Western society that’s very impolite. A burp is just a burp, regardless of
what name we give it, but it is valid within the context of a convention, of a society: it’s
either “polite” or “impolite.”

Then if we don’t cognize the object, the object doesn’t exist?

No, it’s not that the object doesn’t exist if we don’t cognize it, but how can you talk
about an object out of the context of talking about them. How can you think of an
object outside of the context of thinking about them? It doesn’t make any sense. So
what’s the consequence of this? The consequence of this is – Don’t worry about what
objects are like out there by themselves. If we want to overcome suffering, deal with it
in the context of something that I’m talking about, or thinking about, or seeing or
hearing. That’s the context. What’s the point of Buddhism? It’s to overcome suffering.
That’s in terms of our experience.

If we take the table as an example and we get rid of all concepts like “good,” “bad,” “big,”
“small,” and so on, then what is left of the table?

From this point of view – the defining characteristics, an individual item within our
perception of it that we can point to and “There it is,” “Here is the object.” It has a size
and it has a color, but what we call it is, in a sense, subjective. I may call it “yellow”; you
may call it “brown.” What difference does it make? Why should we argue about that?
Now, you could say, “Does the table exist in the room when nobody is here looking at
it?” But we’re talking about it. We’re asking the question, so that’s related to a mind. If
you are asking the question about it, “Does it exist in the room when nobody is there?”
– here it is, in the context of a mind asking that question.

If in the other room there is an individual who is suffering, then are they suffering?

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Yes, in my thought of the person in the other room suffering, the person is suffering.
You don’t exist only in my mind, that other person doesn’t exist only in my mind.
However, we can only consider the other person in the context of my thinking about
them, or seeing them, or speaking about them. It doesn’t make any sense outside of
that kind of context.

It’s Mahayana. There’s compassion, there’s love, there’s helping all beings. It’s not just
something that is like a fictional thing in your head. However, as I mentioned, this is a
very, very difficult view to understand. It requires a great deal of thought and
consideration, and so if you haven’t heard about this before, this is an introduction to
that. Don’t expect that you will instantly understand it. It’s difficult, and very, very, very
subtle.

The simple version: as long as we understand that somebody from their own side isn’t
“good,” or “bad,” or “wonderful,” and so on, that’s a start. And obviously, when we
believe that they do exist from their own side, “You’re truly a terrible person,” then we
get the disturbing emotion of anger.

Of course, this has to be understood within the context of voidness of an impossible

soul of a person, so that’s also not that you are permanently, statically terrible,
independent of what’s happened to you in life, and what you’ve done, and stuff like
that. Our understanding of how the self exists, or things exist, is in the context of this
larger presentation.

We’ll take just one minute, swallow, digest, and then we’ll go on.

[meditation]

The next question that we have to consider is, “What establishes that something
exists?” “What proves that something exists?” We’re not talking about “What creates
something?” We’re talking about, “What establishes that it exists.” Some less
sophisticated views would say, “Well, if it performs a function, it exists. That establishes
that it exists. Obviously performing a function, doing something doesn’t create it.”
What establishes that the fire is hot? I stick my finger in it and it gets burned. My
finger getting burned doesn’t make the fire hot; it didn’t create the fire to be hot. It
just establishes that it’s hot. This is not a terribly sophisticated view. We can look much
more deeply. There are some problems here, which we won’t go into.

The next view is saying that, “Well, you were already talking about the relation with the
mind, and that has to do with the appearance of things. Now let’s talk about the
relation with the mind in terms of how you establish that something exists.” This gets
into the sophisticated discussion of mental labeling. So, what establishes that it exists?
It is that there is a name or label, or a concept, that when applied to an appropriate
basis, it refers to something. It is imputable, the existence of something is established,
if it is imputable on a basis – validly, because you could impute anything. The classic
example is that I could impute onto somebody “a king,” I could impute on a beggar “a

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king,” I could impute on the dog “a king.” So, according to this view, there is some
characteristic on the side of the object that, in connection with the concept of “king,”
establishes that it’s a “king.”

There are words and concepts for things. Words and concepts for things don’t create
things. How do you know, how do you establish that there is such a thing as a wall?
Well, there is the concept “wall.” I can impute it on this flat surface between the floor
and the ceiling, and there is a defining characteristic in this context that I’m labeling
“wall” on top of – “flat surface between the floor and the ceiling.” The combination of a
findable defining characteristic on the side of the object, plus word or concept “wall,”
which is a category after all, that establishes that there’s a wall existing, establishes the
existence of a wall.

“Wall” is a category. It has a definition. But in order for that to be correctly labeled on
an object, that side has to have those defining characteristics, according to the
definition. So, maybe “muro” and “wall” are defined in the same way. Maybe they’re
not. But to be able to call it a muro or a “wall” or anything, there has to be some
defining characteristic on the side of the object, in connection with the label, that
establishes that it’s a wall. It doesn’t create the wall. The wall is made out of stone and
plaster.

Even if we don’t deal with calling it a “wall,” or a “muro,” or anything like that, there is
something on the side of the object that makes it a “knowable object.” For instance, it’s
like there is something on its side that separates it from the ceiling and from the floor,
that makes it an individual, knowable object – a defining characteristic of a “knowable
object,” and in connection with the label “knowable object,” “thing,” or something like
that, that establishes that it’s a thing.

If we apply this to persons, what is a person? I can label a “person.” It’s what the word
“person” refers to, on a basis of the everchanging aggregates. But there’s something
on the side of the aggregates that, like a defining characteristic, that makes it an
individual, so it’s “me,” not “you.” The basis of the table is not a basis for labeling “me,”
not a valid basis, although sometimes we have really crazy ways of speaking, I don’t
know if you express it like this in Italian, but in English you park your car somewhere.
“Where are you parked?” “I’m over there.” I’m over there? The car is over there. It’s
really quite funny.

Anyway, within Madhyamaka philosophy, this is the Svatantrika point of view. So,
“Sure, me, I’m not just a category.” If we apply a label of a category, it’s applied on
individual objects like a table. This object here has the defining characteristics of a
table, that object in front of you has the defining characteristics of a table. And it also
has the defining characteristics of an individual, knowable object. This table
isn’t thattable. But what establishes it as a table is the word or concept “table” and the
basis having the defining characteristics of the word, or concept “table.”

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Is the object something that can only be known conceptually? No. I see it, and I see it
as a knowable object. And what establishes that it’s a knowable object? Well there’s a
label, there’s a concept of a knowable object, plus its characteristics. If I call it “a table”
and think of it as “a table,” then that’s conceptual. But I don’t have to say “table” or
anything like that in order to see this object. This is not a very easy explanation to
understand, something that we really have to work with – mental labeling. Mental
labeling is what establishes the existence of something; it doesn’t create things. I don’t
create the table just because I give the name “table.” How do we establish the
existence of the table or of a knowable object? Well, it’s what the word “table” refers
to, on a basis, and the basis must have the defining characteristics that allows for a
correct labeling.

“I am in love with a person.” What’s a “person?” Well, a “person” is what’s labeled on

the everchanging aggregates of a mind and a body, and so on. It’s not that I’m in love
with a table or that object there that I’m calling a “person.” If I am in love with this
person and I consider them, and I label them as beautiful, that’s on the basis of some
characteristics in my definition of what’s beautiful that I find in the other person. We
can only establish that anything is anything, that something is something, in terms of
concepts, words, and labels. If that weren’t the case, we couldn’t communicate with
each other.

Prasangika view, within Madhyamaka, goes a step further and says that, “The only
thing that establishes it is merely that it is what a word or label refers to, but there is
no definable characteristic that you can find on the side of the object. Even the
defining characteristic is imputed.”

The example that I always use, which I think is an example that’s easy to understand, is
“color.” What color is this rug? Well, I could label it “red” and another person could
label it “orange.” What establishes that it’s red or orange? Is there a certain wavelength
on the side of the object that is red or orange? Well, if you look at light, wavelengths
of light, there is no boundaries on the side of light that says, “On this side of the
boundary it’s called red and that side of the boundary is called orange.”

The category is made up by a mind: it’s defined in that way. This becomes quite
profound, the more that you think about it. Emotions – do emotions exist in boxes? On
this side of the line it’s love, and on that side of the line it’s something else. Even the
defining characteristics are mentally labeled: it’s made up by a mind.

We experience jealousy. Every moment and every incidence of jealousy in our life, was
it exactly the same? And what I experience and call “jealousy,” is it the same as what
you have experienced and called “jealousy?” No it isn’t, but there is a concept
“jealousy,” and there is a word “jealousy,” and it refers to something. But it’s not
established from its own side, with a big line around it, or a big plastic coating that
makes it this individual thing called “jealousy.”

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We have to differentiate here in this view between an “object that a label refers to”
from a “referent thing.” A “referent thing” is some sort of … If I use the word “jealousy,”
or I use a word “good,” or “red,” or “orange,” or something, it’s referring to something,
an object that it refers to. What is a person? A person is what the word “person” refers
to, on the basis of the aggregates, for example. That’s an object that something refers
to. A “referent thing” would be something that from its own side is “in this box.” I think
that that’s the difference in a very simple language. Things don’t exist in boxes, which
is what our dictionaries and our words would imply. “Here it is, in this box in the
dictionary, and so it must exist out there in this box.” But things don’t exist like that.

But words and concepts refer to something, and the only way that we can establish the
existence of anything is in our communication and thinking – it’s what our words and
thoughts refer to.

Even words are just made up by convention. The sounds themselves don’t have any
meaning in them. Some ancient people put together some sounds and said,
“Thissound means that object over there.” So, even the meaning of words is just
mentally established, established through labeling. Nevertheless –same thing we had
with “you don’t fall through the chair” – nevertheless, words communicate, don’t they?

So, “Who is this person that I love?” Well, there is a person. There’s a whole history, like
a whole continuum of moments of awareness and objects that they are aware of, and
all of that’s been influenced by all the people that they’ve ever met, and all the things
that they’ve ever done, and their emotions, and stuff like that. So, who am I in love
with? Well, the person. I could label the person. Everybody else could label a person,
but whatever characteristics and things I ascribe to this person is based on my own
personal dictionary of these concepts. Is there a person? Yes, there is a person. How do
you establish that there’s a person? Well, because I have this concept “a person.” How
do I know this person? Well, on the basis of a body. I can’t just know the person, so a
body is appearing, or I’m thinking about something that they did, or something like
that. We don’t have to fill in everything that we’ve discussed before.

When we come across explanations, which say, “Try to find your mind. Is it up your
nose? Does it have a color?” – things like this, if you don’t have all this background, as I
said earlier, the conclusion of that is to say, “So what?” But if we understand it in the
context of this whole presentation, this whole progression of understanding, then what
is it talking about? It’s talking about, “You can’t find a thing called mind, with “plastic”
around it, with something on its own side, a defining characteristic that’s making
it mind, that you can give the word “mind” to.

Where is the hand? Well, is the hand in this finger, or that finger, or that finger? Where
is the finger? Can you find a finger? Well, there’s the joints. Is it just that joint, or that
joint? You can’t find anything. Is there a hand? Sure, there is a hand. So how do you
establish that? Well, the concept “hand,” and it refers to something: it can do things,
and so on. Then we get into trouble, “Oouh! My hand is ugly,” and “Uuah! My fingers

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are too short,” and so on. Then we have to go back to what we were saying before,
“Well, it’s relative to various things. There’s nothing on its own side that makes it ugly,
or short, and so on.”

We are not denying the existence of things. When we talking about voidness, we’re
talking about an absence of these impossible ways of existing, as a real
referent thingthat you can find, that you can point to, that the words and concepts are
– you see, in English we can make the difference – that the words and
concepts correspond to. They don’t “correspond” to these things; they “refer” to
something. “To correspond” would be that it actually sits out there in a box called
“red,” or the box of “good,” or the box of “bad,” like in a dictionary entry. So, it’s devoid
of that. That’s impossible. Nothing exists like that. But our words do refer to
something, and we know them, and other people would agree, and so on.

This is very, very subtle. I exist; you exist; but what establishes that I exist? Is it
something on my own side? Is it findable, a defining characteristic that makes
“me” me? “I’m special,” we have all these very funny concepts. We’re individual, that’s
true. I am not you, but is there something special that makes “me” me. We could say,
“Well, this genome.” But what’s the genome? It has all the parts, and is it this part, or
that part? What is there that’s findable, that makes “me” me. But we think that there is
something that makes “you” you, therefore you are special, and I need to be loved
by you. Somebody else doesn’t count. I have to be loved by you. When we understand
this view, we’re able to deconstruct on a much, much deeper level the confusion that
causes our suffering.

If we have a very disturbing type of love, with attachment and desire, and we feel
miserable when we’re not with the person, and so on, then we have to apply these
gradual stages of analysis to “Why do I love this person?” “What’s a person?” “What is
it that I’m loving?” “What is it that I’m so attached to?” and “Who is the me that feels
that somehow I’m going to gain something from having this love.” This is the way that
we work with this understanding, this understanding of voidness, and deconstruct
these various things.

Then we find a more reasonable basis for loving the other person, not because “You’re
so special!” or this or that, what I have as a concept of “beautiful,” and so on. We’re left
with everybody wants to be happy and nobody wants to be unhappy, so we wish you
to be happy.

“Maybe some karmic connection..,” so then we have to get into the voidness of cause
and effect of the special connection that we might have. ”Where is that special
connection?” “What is it?” “How does it exist?” “Is it some findable bond between us,
like some sort of stick that attaches two balls?” “What is it?” – analysis, further and
further and further.

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Why do I love you? Well, I could say, “Because you’re nice to me and make me feel
good. You show affection to me,” and so on. But that’s my own definition. Maybe you
could find it in a dictionary also, of “What is lovable.” But, from your own side, are you
really lovable? And what is it “you show me affection.” Is it always the same in every
single moment? What did you actually do? Was it your finger touching me? Was it
your palm touching me? Was it another part? What was it? Where was it? So we
deconstruct, “Ooh! I love you, because of this and that,” and so on, and it’s not that
we’re left with no emotion whatsoever. But there is no exaggeration there; there is no
disturbance there. And we’re left with warm affectionate feelings for everybody.
Everybody is equal.

On this basis of an equal attitude toward everyone, with no favorites, then we can
function as a Buddha, eventually, to be able to help everybody. Of course some people
will be more receptive to us than others. That’s something else. But our willingness, our
attitude toward everybody is the same – no favorites.

Let’s end here with a dedication. We think, whatever understanding, whatever positive
force, may it go in this direction, to be able to understand voidness like this, so that we
are best able to help everybody with this equal attitude and understanding.

How Cognition of Emptiness Liberates Us from

Samsara
https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/emptiness-advanced/how-
cognition-of-emptiness-liberates-us-from-samsara

Detailed Analysis of the Mechanism for Samsara

Introduction

By nature, everyone wants to be happy and no one wants to be unhappy. No one

wants to suffer. That nature is what drives an infant to suck milk; it drives us to eat, to
find shelter, etc. – it is a natural drive. In order to rid ourselves of unhappiness and
suffering that none of us want, however, we need to recognize what are true sufferings,
what are their true cause, what their true stoppings would be, and what are the true
pathway minds that lead to the attainment of those true stoppings. In other words, we
need to understand correctly the four noble truths.

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True Sufferings

True sufferings can be understood in terms of the three scopes of motivation outlined
in the lam-rim graded stages of the path to enlightenment:

Initial Scope

With an initial scope, we aim to attain a better rebirth because of fear of experiencing
the worse rebirth states, we focus on avoiding the suffering of unhappiness (the
suffering of suffering), especially of the worse rebirth states.

Intermediate Scope

With an intermediate scope, we aim to gain liberation from uncontrollably recurring

rebirth altogether. Motivated by a determination to be free (renunciation of all
suffering and its causes), we focus on ridding ourselves completely of not only the
suffering of unhappiness, but also the suffering of change (ordinary happiness that
doesn’t last, never satisfies, changes into unhappiness, etc.) and the all-pervasive
suffering (khyab-par ‘du-byed-kyi sdug-bsngal) of uncontrollably recurring tainted
aggregates (samsara) that are the basis for experiencing the sufferings of unhappiness
and change.

Animals aim to eliminate the suffering of unhappiness. Many religions aim to eliminate
the suffering of ordinary happiness by attaining the bliss of heaven or paradise. Many
non-Buddhist Indian systems aim to eliminate uncontrollably recurring rebirth. But
even if they assert ignorance as the cause of such rebirth and that correct
understanding will bring liberation, they do not attain a true stopping of rebirth. This is
because they do not correctly identify the true cause of this all-pervasive suffering, nor
do they correctly identify the true pathway of understanding that will eliminate that
cause. Because of that, they do not attain a true stopping of uncontrollably recurring
rebirth.

Advanced Scope

With an advanced scope aim, we focus on ridding ourselves of the inability to fully
help all limited beings rid themselves of their experience of the three types of
suffering. Our love, compassion and bodhichitta aim (to attain enlightenment in order
to be best able to help everyone attain liberation and enlightenment) motivate us to
rid ourselves of this inability. The suffering of this inability arises because our limited
minds make everything appear to have self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis
grub-pa), independently of each other. Because of that, we do not fully know
behavioral cause and effect and therefore do not know how best to help all beings.

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True Causes of Suffering

The true cause or true origin of suffering is unawareness (ma-rig-pa) or ignorance,

namely unawareness of two facts: behavioral cause and effect and how we and others
exist. Either we simply do not know these facts or we know them in an inverted
manner, contrary to fact.

The true cause of the suffering of unhappiness is unawareness of behavioral cause and
effect. On the basis of this unawareness, we develop disturbing emotions (nyon-
mongs, afflictive emotions), such as longing desire, anger, and naivety (gti-mug). These
disturbing emotions bring on the type of compulsiveness of karma that drives us to
act, speak or think in destructive ways. The karmic aftermath of destructive behavior
ripens into our experiences of unhappiness.

The true cause of the suffering of change, in other words the true cause of ordinary
happiness, is unawareness of how we and others exist and not being under the
influence of disturbing emotions. This unawareness underlies the suffering of
unhappiness as well. Unawareness of how we and others exist brings on and is
accompanied by grasping for an impossible soul of persons (gang-zag-gi bdag-‘dzin).
This grasping leads to and is often accompanied by disturbing attitudes (nyon-mongs
lta-ba-can) concerning ourselves. These disturbing attitudes lead to the
compulsiveness of karma that drives either destructive behavior (when also
accompanied by unawareness of behavioral cause and effect and by disturbing
emotions) or constructive behavior (when not accompanied by either of these two.)

A common example of such compulsive constructive behavior is being a perfectionist,

with the attitude of “I must be perfect, I must be ‘good.’” Because of such a syndrome,
we neurotically are always cleaning our house, washing our hands, correcting the
paper we’re writing for school, being stiff in our good behavior because of being afraid
of not being good enough and making a mistake, etc. Although we might experience
temporary ordinary happiness at having washed our hands, for instance, that
happiness quickly turns to dissatisfaction and unhappiness, and we compulsively have
to wash them again.

This unawareness of how we and others exist is also the true cause of the all-pervasive
suffering of uncontrollably recurring tainted aggregates. “Tainted” (zag-bcas) means
they derive from unawareness of how we and others exist. Before attaining liberation,
such aggregates are also known as tainted, obtaining aggregates (zag-bcas nyer-len-
gyi phung-po) – “obtaining” (nyer-len) means that they contain within them the
unawareness that will perpetuate and bring on or obtain for us the aggregates of
further uncontrollably recurring rebirth. This all-pervasive suffering is what we need to
rid ourselves of in order ultimately to be rid of the suffering of unhappiness and the

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suffering of change. That is because it is on the basis of tainted aggregates that we
experience these two types of suffering.

The Twelve Links of Dependent Arising

Let us look at the true origin of all-pervasive suffering more closely. It is explained
through the mechanism of the twelve links of dependent arising.

Link One: Unawareness

The first link of dependent arising is unawareness, specifically unawareness of how we

and all beings (all individuals) exist. This unawareness includes both doctrinally-based
unawareness (ma-rig kun-brtags) and automatically-arising unawareness (ma-rig lhan-
skyes).

• Doctrinally-based unawareness arises from having learned and accepted the

explanations of a non-Buddhist Indian philosophical system or, according to the
Gelug Prasangika tenets, the explanations of any of the non-Prasangika Buddhist
tenet systems.
• Automatically-arising unawareness is experienced naturally by everyone, including
insects. No one has to teach us them.

In both case, we either don’t know how we exist or we know it in an inverted way.
Except when we focus non-conceptually on voidness (emptiness), this unawareness
accompanies every moment of our cognition, both conceptual and non-conceptual.
We experience that unawareness as insecurity; and feeling insecure, we intermittently
develop disturbing emotions and attitudes. These mental disturbances are states of
mind, which, when we develop them, cause us to lose our peace of mind and self-
control.

Disturbing emotions include:

• longing desire, with which we exaggerate the good qualities of something or

someone or add good qualities that are not there and then strongly want to
acquire that thing or person in the hope that it will make us secure
• anger, with which we exaggerate the bad qualities of something or someone or
add those not there, and want very strongly to rid ourselves of that thing or
person in the hope that that will make us secure
• naivety, with which we deny behavioral cause and effect or understand it in an
inverted manner, so that we believe either (1) there are no consequences of our
behavior, so we imagine we can be secure because we are not affected by what we
do, say or think, or (2) we believe that happiness and security will come from
destructive behavior.

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Disturbing attitudes include a deluded outlook toward a transitory network (‘jig-lta),
which, according to the abhidharma teachings, casts the net of “me” and “mine” onto
various aspects of the aggregate factors of anything that we experience. According to
Tsongkhapa, it casts onto the conventionally existent “me” the net of “me as identical
with the aggregates” or “me, the possessor of the aggregates as ‘mine.’”

Link Two: Affecting Impulses

The second link, affecting impulses (‘du-byed), refers to the compulsive impulses of
karma that affect what we do. Because disturbing emotions and attitudes, based on
unawareness, cause us to lose self-control, then when we feel like acting destructively
(for instance, saying something nasty to someone), compulsiveness takes over and we
act destructively. Or when we feel like acting constructively in a neurotic manner (for
instance, cleaning the house yet again, or correcting our paper yet again),
compulsiveness again takes over and we act compulsively constructively.

Link Three: Loaded Consciousness

The third link, loaded consciousness, refers to the consciousness on which the karmic
aftermath from our compulsive behavior is an imputation. The karmic aftermath
includes negative potentials (sdig-pa), positive potentials (bsod-nams, “merit”), and
karmic tendencies (sa-bon, seeds). The Mahayana systems also include constant
karmic habits (bag-chags).

The consciousness loaded with these karmic aftermath as imputations carries over into
future lives and, from this aftermath, develop the five aggregate factors of the fetus, if
we are to be reborn as a human. The imputations on the loaded consciousness include
not only the karmic aftermath, but also the potentials for the components of the
aggregates of distinguishing (‘du-shes; recognition), feeling a level of happiness and
other affecting variables (‘du-byed). The unspecified (lung ma-bstan) components of
these aggregate factors (those components that Buddha did not specify as being
either constructive or destructive, but which can be either of the two depending on
what other factors accompany them) are the ripened results (rnam-smin-gyi ‘bras-bu)
of this aftermath and constitute all-pervasive suffering. As such, they are the basis for
experiencing the suffering of unhappiness and the suffering of change. The
development of these aggregate factors is described by the next four links.

[See: Causes, Conditions and Results.]

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Link Four: Nameable Mental Faculties with or without Form

The fourth link, nameable mental faculties with or without gross form, refers to the
consciousness aggregate before it is differentiated into the various types of
consciousness (sensory, mental).

As the basis for that consciousness (unless we are born in the plane of formless
beings), the form aggregate, for instance, when constituted by a joined human sperm
and egg, is also present at this stage, before it differentiates to the point at which
there are the various cognitive sensors (dbang-po).

Link Five: Stimulators of Cognition

At the stage of the fifth link (stimulators of cognition (skye-mched)), the consciousness
aggregate has differentiated into:

• the six types of consciousness (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind
consciousness)
• the mental consciousness has developed to become the mental cognitive sensor

The form aggregate has differentiated into:

• the five types of physical cognitive sensors (photosensitive cells, sound-sensitive

cells, smell-sensitive cells, taste-sensitive cells, the physical sensation sensitive
cells)
• the six types of cognitive objects (sights, sounds, smells, tastes, physical sensations
and all changing phenomena that can serve as objects of mental consciousness).

Primitive cognition merely of cognitive fields occurs at this stage.

Link Six: Contacting Awareness

At the time of the sixth link, the aggregate of distinguishing and some components of
the aggregate of other affecting variables ripen from their potentials and start to
function:

• With the mental factor of distinguishing, we can distinguish specific objects within
a cognitive field.
• With the mental factor of contacting awareness (reg-pa), we differentiate contact
with these objects as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral.

In terms of the various types of karmic results, the experiences of the various types of
contacting awareness are results that are similar to what we have experienced
previously (myong-ba rgyu-mthun-gyi ‘bras-bu).

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Link Seven: Feeling a Level of Happiness

The sixth link, feeling a level of happiness, refers to the feeling aggregate, which is the
mental factor that experiences pleasant contacting awareness of an object with
ordinary happiness, unpleasant contacting awareness of an object with unhappiness,
and neutral contacting awareness of an object with a neutral feeling. The feeling
aggregate is a ripened result of karma and, as such, is unspecified – neither
constructive nor destructive – as are all ripened results. Note that this feeling of
unhappiness is the suffering of unhappiness and this feeling of ordinary happiness is
the suffering of change.

Although they are not included as part of the twelve links, the constructive, destructive
and other unspecified components of the aggregate of other affecting variables, such
as love, patience, longing desire, anger, concentration, intelligence, and so on, also
develop from each of their respective potentials or tendencies, which are also
imputations on the loaded consciousness.

The next three links refer to what occur at the end of a lifetime, regardless of how long
that lifetime may be. The first two are disturbing emotions and attitudes at the time of
death that activate the third of these links, throwing karma (‘phen-byed-kyi las): the
compulsive impulse that perpetuates uncontrollably recurring rebirth by “throwing us”
into another rebirth. These activators of throwing karma are what we need to rid
ourselves of in order to stop uncontrollable recurring rebirth with the all-pervasive
suffering of more tainted aggregates.

Link Eight: Thirsting

The eighth link, thirsting (sred-pa), is usually translated as “craving,” but the original
Sanskrit term “trshna” actually means “thirsting.” It is a subcategory of longing desire
and arises in response to link seven, the aggregate of feelings. In general, longing
desire is the wish to acquire something, based on regarding the object as pleasant and
attractive by its very nature. It is preceded by a conceptual cognition that interpolates
(projects) something on the object. Interpolation (projection) (sgro-‘dogs) is an
exaggeration of the good qualities of something that are there or an addition of good
qualities that are not there. Thus, interpolation is accompanied by the mental factor of
incorrect consideration (tshul-min yid-la byed-pa). It is also accompanied by grasping
for impossible existence, for instance grasping for self-established existence (rang-
bzhin-gyis grub-pa).

There are three types of thirsting

• Thirsting in relation to what is desirable. This is the thirst not to be parted from
tainted ordinary happiness. It is preceded by an exaggeration of the good qualities

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 of ordinary happiness and of not being parted from it. Good qualities (yon-tan) in
the case of a “non-parting” refers to the length of time that a state of not being
parted from ordinary happiness lasts. The incorrect consideration involved here is
that both ordinary happiness and this state of not being parted could last forever.
It is like when we are very thirsty and have a sip of water and then, because of
thirst, we don’t want to be parted from the glass or bottle. We don’t want it to be
taken away.
• Thirsting because of fear. This is the thirst to be parted from unhappiness. It is
preceded by an exaggeration of the good qualities of the state of being parted
from unhappiness by ordinary means and interpolates that if we replace it with
ordinary happiness, which we interpolate as being able to last forever, then the
unhappiness will never return.
• Thirsting in relation to higher planes of compulsive existence. This is thirsting for
the neutral feeling that we are experiencing in a state of deep meditative
absorption associated with the form or formless planes of existence not to
degenerate (mi-nyams). On an ordinary level, perhaps we can think of the thirsting
that might occur when we are drugged on a painkiller and we thirst for that
neutral feeling not to wear off. Again, this thirsting is preceded by an exaggeration
of the good qualities of the neutral feeling and its non-degeneration, and
interpolates that the neutral feeling and the non-occurrence of its degeneration
could last forever. Underlying this thirsting, however, is nervousness that we will
experience unhappiness and unsatisfying ordinary happiness in the future.

Note that thirst for the non-degeneration of a neutral feeling that lacks any
unhappiness or ordinary happiness is not the same as renunciation of unhappiness
and ordinary happiness. Renunciation is the determination to be free of the all-
pervasive suffering of uncontrollably recurring aggregates that are the basis for
experiencing the sufferings of unhappiness and ordinary happiness. Renunciation,
then, aims for a true stopping of all three types of suffering through the correct
understanding of the four noble truths or, more specifically, with a correct
understanding of voidness. Therefore, renunciation does not exaggerate the negative
qualities of suffering, is not overwhelmed by this suffering and is not accompanied by
any disturbing emotions. On the contrary, it entails knowing correctly how to truly rid
ourselves of suffering forever, and has the determination to pursue this goal of
liberation. Thirsting for the non-degeneration of a neutral feeling, on the other hand, is
a variety of attachment and therefore is a cause for perpetuating all-pervasive
suffering.

Note also that all three types of thirsting are thirsting for a negation phenomenon
(dgag-pa) – a non-parting from ordinary happiness, a parting from unhappiness, and a
non-degeneration of a neutral feeling. Like the negation phenomenon “not my
mother,” which to know requires knowing “my mother” beforehand, each of the
negation phenomenon that are the objects of thirsting entail knowing beforehand the

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three types of feelings. The partings (bral-ba), non-partings and non-degenerations
that we aim for with thirsting are just the endings of these feelings. Unlike
renunciation, we are not aiming for a parting attained by applying opponent forces,
such as a correct understanding of the four noble truths and, more specifically, a
correct understanding of voidness.

A parting attained by applying opponent forces lasts forever, whereas a parting that is
simply an ending of something recurrent is temporary. Note that a temporary ending
of something recurrent can happen naturally, like the temporary ending of an episode
of anger when it naturally passes, or it can happen by applying ordinary methods, such
as meditating on patience and love.

Thus, thirsting is accompanied by several types of incorrect consideration. It incorrectly

considers a temporary ending to be an eternal parting. It also incorrectly considers
each of the three types of feelings that we are experiencing to be eternal, for instance
that ordinary happiness could last forever. In other words, thirsting is accompanied by
incorrect consideration of something impermanent to be permanent.

Note also that thirsting to be parting from unhappiness is not the same as anger or
repulsion directed toward unhappiness. Thirsting exaggerates the good qualities of
being parted from unhappiness, whereas anger exaggerates the negative qualities of
not being parted from unhappiness and aggressively wants that state to end.

Link Nine: An Obtainer

The ninth link, an obtainer (nye-bar-len-pa), refers to either an obtainer disturbing

emotion or an obtainer disturbing attitude. It is a state of mind that “obtains” for us
the tainted, obtaining aggregates of a future rebirth. It arises in response to thirsting
and is usually translated as “grasping,”

There are four types of obtainers:

Obtainer Desire

Obtainer desire (‘dod-pa nye-bar len-pa) is a disturbing emotion and is aimed at some
desirable sensory object. For instance, when we are unhappy while experiencing the
discomfort of the physical sensation of hunger, we want to experience the taste of
delicious food; or when we have ordinary happiness while experiencing the warm
physical sensation of being in a comfortable bed, we want to keep that sensation.

Note that when thirsting is aimed at not being parted from ordinary happiness,
obtainer desire is aimed at the desirable sensory object we are experiencing with
ordinary happiness. When thirsting is aimed at being parted from unhappiness,
obtainer desire is aimed at the desirable sensory object that we want to experience

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instead and which we wish will make us happy. In both cases, obtainer desire is
preceded by an interpolation that exaggerates the good qualities of the desirable
sensory object we wish for and incorrect consideration that the ordinary happiness
that would accompany our experience of that object will last forever.

An Obtainer Deluded Outlook

An obtainer deluded outlook (lta-ba nye-bar len-pa) may be any of three disturbing
attitudes, each of which has two varieties. According to Tsongkhapa, these three and
the next two obtainer disturbing attitudes focus on the person, the conventional “me,”
who experiences thirsting, and latch on to it with a certain type of conceptual
cognition, as well as with grasping for that “me” as if it had self-established existence
(rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa). According to the abhidharma tradition, the deluded
outlooks focus on the aggregate factors (body, mind, etc.) associated with that “me”
and latch on to them with those conceptual cognitions. They also latch on to them
with grasping for the “me” experiencing them to exist in the manner of either a coarse
or subtle impossible “me” as asserted by the non-Prasangika tenet systems. Let us
explain primarily in terms of Tsongkhapa’s presentation.

A Distorted Outlook

A distorted outlook (log-par lta-ba) focuses on the conventional “me” and latches on
to it with grasping for its self-established existence and with a conceptual cognition
that is a repudiation (skur-‘debs), in other words a denial. The denial may be either:

• a repudiation of behavioral cause and effect. This denial may be simply in terms of
this lifetime, which we incorrectly consider to be the only lifetime for this self-
established “me.” Or, if we believe in rebirth, this would be the repudiation that, in
its next lifetime, this self-established “me” will experience any effects of its
behavior in this lifetime. This latter variation would be like imagining that the “hard
disc” of our mental continuum will be wiped clean when we die and continue like
an empty disc with each rebirth. With the denial of the continuity of behavioral
cause and effect, we have the incorrect consideration of something existent to be
nonexistent.
• Or a repudiation of any continuity of aggregate factors (a body and mind)
associated with the self-established “me” after we die. With the denial of rebirth
and imagining that this lifetime is the only one for a self-established “me,” we have
the incorrect consideration of something with eternal continuity (namely a
continuum of aggregates and a continuum of the state of a self-established “me”
being associated with a continuum of aggregates) to be something that comes to
an end at death. We could then go on to incorrectly consider that this self-
established “me” continues eternally after death, but independently of any

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 aggregates. We might believe that we live on eternally either in a heaven or in a
state of liberation as conceived by some non-Buddhist Indian systems. Or we
might believe that we pass into a big “nothing” when we die, which is frightening
because now “I,” which we still grasp at as having self-established existence, am
dead forever.

An Extreme Outlook

An extreme outlook (mthar-‘dzin-par lta-ba, mthar-lta) focuses on the conventional

“me” and latches on to it with grasping for its self-established existence and with a
conceptual cognition that is either:

• a repudiation of the gross impermanence of death. Thus it has the incorrect

consideration that the aggregates (the body and mind) associated with the self-
established “me” in this lifetime will last forever, as will the self-established “me”
identified with our present body and mind.
• Or the repudiation that there is any continuity of a self-established “me” after
death once the present body and mind associated with that “me” come to an end.
So there is the incorrect consideration that the continuity of “me” ends with death,
now that it is no longer associated with the present body and mind.

Holding a Deluded Outlook as Supreme

Holding a deluded outlook as supreme (lta-ba mchog-tu ‘dzin-pa) focuses on the

conventional “me” with grasping for its self-established existence and with a
conceptual cognition that interpolates that holding one of the above variations of a
distorted outlook or an extreme outlook will lead to the liberation of this self-
established “me” from all suffering. Thus, it has the repudiation that these are false and
the incorrect consideration of something false to be true.

According to another explanation, we might accompany this deluded outlook with an

incorrect consideration of the aggregates – namely our bodies, and so on. Either we
incorrectly consider them as totally pure, clean, and a source of true happiness, or not
just that they are impure, dirty and a source of suffering, but that they are repulsive, so
we exaggerate their negative qualities. This deluded outlook then focuses on the
conventional “me” with the conceptual cognition that interpolates that such an
attitude is supreme: we think it is totally true and will lead to the liberation of the self-
established “me” if we fully realize it.

Holding Deluded Morality or Conduct as Supreme

Holding deluded morality or conduct as supreme (tshul-khrims-dang brtul-zhugs

mchog-tu ‘dzin-pa) includes two varieties:

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• Concerning deluded morality (tshul-khrims), this deluded outlook is accompanied
with the mental factor of morality (ethical discipline) to refrain from some trivial
manner of behavior that is meaningless to give up, particularly under the
circumstance of dying. An example would be giving up unhealthy food when we
are in the final stages of terminal cancer. This deluded outlook focuses on the
conventional “me” and latches on to it with grasping for its self-established
existence and with the conceptual cognition that interpolates that such morality is
supreme and will lead to the liberation of the self-established “me” if we hold it
strictly.
• Concerning deluded conduct (btul-zhugs), this deluded outlook is accompanied
with the mental factor of a decisive urge (bsam-pa) that draws us to dress, act, or
speak in some trivial manner that is meaningless to adopt in the face of imminent
death. Examples of such conduct might be clutching a good luck charm or bathing
in the Ganges River before we die. This deluded outlook focuses on the
conventional “me” and latches on to it with grasping for its self-established
existence and with the conceptual cognition that interpolates that conduct as
supreme, with the certitude that it will purify the self-established “me” of anything
negative, liberate that “me” from all worries, and definitely deliver that “me” to a
better fate.

Asserting One’s Identity

Asserting one’s identity (bdag-tu smra-ba), or more literally, asserting oneself to be

an atman (a soul), refers to a deluded outlook toward a transitory network (‘jig-lta).
The transitory network refers to the network of the five aggregate factors (five
aggregates).

A deluded outlook toward a transitory network focuses on the conventional “me” with
grasping for its self-established existence and latches onto it with a conceptual
cognition that interpolates that it is either identical with the aggregates as being “me”
or totally separate from the aggregates as a “me, the possessor, the controller, or the
inhabitant of these aggregates.” Thus, it is also accompanied with the incorrect
consideration of what does not exist as a self-established “me” – namely the
conventional “me” – as being a self-established “me.”

Link Ten: Further Existence

Links eight and nine (thirsting and an obtainer) activate the karmic tendencies for our
next rebirth. These activated tendencies are known as “throwing karma” (‘phen-byed-
kyi las). In the system of the twelve links of dependent arising, activated throwing
karma constitutes the tenth link, further existence (srid-pa). This name is an example of
a result, namely “further existence,” being given to the cause, namely the compulsion

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to continue to exist that throws us into death, bardo and a next rebirth until we die
once again.

Link Eleven: Conception and Link Twelve: Aging and Dying

Our next rebirth into which our throwing karma propels our mental continuum is
summarized by the eleventh link, conception, and the twelfth link, aging and dying.
Conception lasts for only the first instant of the new rebirth. Aging starts from the
second moment and continues onwards all the way to the moment of death.

The true origin of all-pervasive suffering, then, is thirsting and an obtainer disturbing
emotion or attitude, both of which are based on unawareness of how we and others
exist. When we understand this, then we rid ourselves of misconceptions about the
true origin of suffering: that our suffering has no cause, or comes from a discordant
cause like the economy, or has just a single cause, such as because I’m bad, or that it
comes from an all-powerful creator.

True Stopping (True Cessation)

The true stopping of rebirth is such that it never occurs again. Thus, the true stopping
of the twelve links on the mental continuum means their removal forever and we
understand all the implications of what this means. Firstly, we understand that there is
a possibility to eliminate forever uncontrollably recurring rebirth if we remove its true
causes. It’s not that there is no stopping of it; it is not that we just suppress the causes
(disturbing emotions) by going into deep meditative absorptions or trances; but rather
we understand that true stopping means ridding ourselves, completely and forever, of
the disturbing emotions and attitudes that are the causes of uncontrollably recurring
rebirth. We also realize that just to attain a state of formless absorption in which no
suffering of unhappiness or of ordinary happiness occur is not a true stopping since
we still have all-pervasive suffering and rebirth. Further, we understand that because of
the basic purity of the mind, the causes of suffering are adventitious, fleeting taints
and can be removed forever, such that they never recur.

To attain a true stopping of true suffering (namely, a true stopping of the all-pervasive
suffering of more tainted aggregates), we need to attain a true stopping of the links
that are their true causes. In other words, we need to stop forever any more activated
throwing karma (link ten, further existence). To stop that, we need to stop what
activates them (the disturbing emotions and attitudes that are link eight: thirsting and
link nine: an obtainer). Also we need to stop link two (affecting impulses, the
compulsion that affects what we do) which is brought on by disturbing emotions and
attitudes. To get rid of these three links, we need to attain a true stopping of link one
(unawareness of how we and others exist). We gain this by non-conceptual cognition
of the lack of an impossible way of existing of persons.

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True Pathway Minds

True pathway minds refer to non-conceptual cognitions of the four noble truths. These
non-conceptual cognitions explicitly apprehend the four aspects of each noble truth as
what they are, and implicitly apprehend each not to be the four distorted ways of
understanding them. Moreover, these non-conceptual cognitions need to be with a
mind that has a joined pair of shamatha (zhi-gnas, a stilled and settled state of mind)
and vipashyana (lhag-mthong, an exceptionally perceptive state of mind), focused on
the voidness of oneself experiencing the four noble truths:

• In terms of true suffering (namely the uncontrollably recurring aggregates), the

voidness of oneself as either identical with or totally separate from them as their
inhabitant, possessor and controller
• In terms of true origins of suffering, the voidness of oneself experiencing
unawareness, disturbing emotions and attitudes, and the compulsiveness of karma
• In terms of true stoppings, the voidness of oneself experiencing them
• In terms of true pathway minds, also the voidness of oneself experiencing them.

Such non-conceptual cognitions with joined shamatha and vipahsyana also need to
have the force of either unlabored determination to be free (rtsol-med nges-‘byung;
unlabored renunciation) or both unlabored determination to be free and an unlabored
bodhichitta aim (rtsol-med byang-sems). “Unlabored” (rtsol-med) means that these
minds are generated without need to rely on a line of reasoning or on building up to
them in stages.

Further, our non-conceptual cognitions with joined shamatha and vipashyana and
unlabored determination to be free, when also with unlabored bodhichitta, further
needs the force behind it of one zillion eons of building up positive force (merit) in
order to rid us of doctrinally-based unawareness and a second zillion eons of positive
force to rid us of automatically-based unawareness and thus attain liberation. This
positive force is built up through constructive behavior motivated by bodhichitta
and/or renunciation.

• Because renunciation is the strong determination to be rid of our own suffering,

with the aim of attaining liberation, the positive force built up from acting,
speaking and thinking on the basis of renunciation functions to rid us of suffering
and its causes.
• Because great compassion is the determination to help all beings be rid of their
suffering, and bodhichitta based on it, aims to attain enlightenment, the positive
force built up from acting, speaking and thinking on the basis of great compassion
and bodhichitta rids us of suffering in an even more powerful way.

If, with the force of such a mind, we attain non-conceptual cognition of this voidness
of ourselves, then because we have rid ourselves of the unawareness of how we exist
(link one)

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• there is no more link two (affecting impulses of karma) and thus no more
accumulation of new karmic potentials or tendencies,
• no more links eight (thirsting) and nine (obtainers) that would activate karmic
potentials tendencies that are not yet ripened,
• and so no more throwing karma (link ten) that could give their result the suffering
of unhappiness, the suffering of change (ordinary happiness), or the all-pervasive
suffering of further aggregates.

So, we understand that there is a pathway leading to liberation; we don’t think there is
no way to be freed. We realize that if we understand there is no such thing as an
impossible soul of a person, then we understand that we don’t exist as an impossible
soul. Then although we want to be happy and do not want to suffer, nevertheless we
realize that the one who wishes that is merely the conventional “me.” It is not this
impossible “me” that needs to be made secure through disturbing emotions,
disturbing attitudes and compulsive karmic behavior, when it is impossible for
something that doesn’t exist to be made secure.

It is when we believe that we exist as an impossible “me” that we thirst for that
impossible “me” not to be parted from happiness and to be parted from suffering, etc.
We have longing desire for sensory objects that we think will make that impossible
“me” happy and secure. We cast the net of that impossible “me” on to ourselves and
then imagine that we are either one with the aggregates (we consider our body, for
instance, as our true identity), or totally separate from the aggregates, which we use as
our habitat, possession and objects to control. We think that this impossible “me” can
be liberated by various means, and so on.

When we understand that there is no such thing as this impossible “me” – it doesn’t
refer to or correspond to anything real, then there is nothing backing the disturbing
emotions. By means of that realization, the whole chain of twelve links falls apart. It
cannot recur, because once we cognize non-conceptually, with a mind that has joined
shamatha and vipashyana, unlabored bodhichitta and/or unlabored renunciation, and
a zillion eons of positive force, that there is no such thing, then that is a stable
realization (rtogs-pa). We are absolutely convinced, and not just on the basis of logic
and inference. We attain a true stopping of doctrinally-based unawareness.

The more frequently we have that non-conceptual cognition and the more we build up
the second zillion eons of positive force, the more we weaken the strength of our
belief that what automatically arises and appears to be and feels like an impossible
“me” corresponds to reality. Moreover, this correct understanding of how we exist is
more stable and stronger than the unawareness and confusion. It can be verified by
valid means of cognition.

We attain liberation when we have attained a true stopping of automatically-arising

unawareness as well. We attain this when, without any break in continuity, we have
alternatingly (1) non-conceptual total absorption on voidness (the total absence of

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that impossible mode of existence, there is no such thing), during which we explicitly
apprehend voidness, and (2) non-conceptual subsequent realization of voidness,
during which we implicitly apprehend voidness.

Emptiness of the Various Levels of an Impossible “Me”

Three Layers of Unawareness

Voidness (stong-pa-nyid, Skt shunyata; emptiness) is a total absence of impossible

ways of existing: impossible means there is no such thing. Here, we are speaking
specifically about the voidness of impossible ways in which the conventionally existent
self (“me,” a person), either ourselves or others, could exist. The impossible ways it
might exist are as

• a coarse impossible soul (atman) as asserted by the non-Buddhist Indian tenet

systems
• an impossible soul that, according to the Gelug explanation, the non-Prasangika
Buddhist systems classify as subtle and the Prasangika system classifies as coarse
• an impossible soul that the Prasangika system classifies as subtle.

We grasp for our conventional “me” to exist in these three impossible ways, which
means

• our minds give rise to the appearance of a false “me” (one that couldn’t possibly
exist) as being the one who experiences true sufferings, true origins of suffering,
true stoppings and true pathway minds
• simultaneously, we cognize them as corresponding to reality.

Certain forms of grasping for an impossible way of existing may be doctrinally based
(kun-btags), which means based on having learned and accepted a non-Buddhist
Indian tenet system in either this or some previous lifetime. Thus, it is not necessary
that we have learned and accepted this system in this lifetime. We retain tendencies
for doctrinally-based grasping even when we are reborn in some other life form
besides human. This grasping may not manifest in this lifetime as adherence to one of
the full-blown non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems, considering that we might never
encounter any of them in this life. But certain aspects of these doctrinally-based
assertions may arise even without studying and accepting one of these systems. An
example is belief in a static, unchanging self (“me”) that we might have been taught
and accepted as who we are from a Western self-help system for discovering “your real
self.”

Doctrinally-based grasping, however, arises only intermittently, just when supporting

conditions are present for it to arise. Certain forms of grasping, on the other hand,
may automatically-arise (lhan-skyes). That means they accompany every moment of

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our cognition, conceptual or non-conceptual, except when are focused non-
conceptually on the voidness of any of the three levels of these impossible ways of
existing.

But there is a voidness of those impossible ways of existing – there is a total absence
of any way of existing that corresponds to them. In other words, they do not
correspond to reality. No person can exist in any of those ways. We need to
understand and cognize the voidness of each of these three levels of impossible ways
of a person existing.

Presently, our minds give rise to a deceptive appearance of the self that is a complex
composite of these three levels or layers. To understand this composite, we need to
understand several technical points:

• The word “grasping” (‘dzin-pa, Skt, graha), occurring in both the terms “grasping
for an impossible soul” (bdag-‘dzin), whether of persons or phenomena, and
“grasping for truly established existence” (bden-‘dzin), is the term for “cognitively
taking an object of cognition.” It simply means to cognize something, and that
means merely giving rise to an appearance (a mental hologram) of something,
which is the same as having a cognitive engagement with something.
• Both types of grasping are accompanied by incorrect consideration ( tshul-min yid-
byed) of them, which takes (cognizes) what does not correspond with reality as if it
did correspond.
• Such cognitions are also accompanied by unawareness, with which we either do
not know that they do not correspond to reality or we believe that they do
correspond.

Thus, our incorrect consideration and unawareness about these three are like three
layers, each one deeper and underlying the ones above. When we remove belief that
the top layer corresponds to reality, we might still have unawareness about the two
other layers appearing underneath.

The Three Layers of Impossible Souls of Persons

The Non-Prasangika Assertions

The Coarse Impossible Soul of Persons

According to the non-Prasangika traditions, the coarse impossible soul of a person has
three characteristics:

• It is a static, unaffected phenomenon, which means that is not affected by causes

and conditions and never undergoes change.
• It is partless, which means a monolithic monad, unlike composite matter or
composite ways of being aware of things. Depending on the non-Buddhist Indian
tenet system, it is either the size of the universe or a tiny spark.

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• It exists as an entity independently of a body and a mind, and not as an
imputation on them. Consequently, it can be separated and liberated to a state in
which it continues to exist all by itself, without a body or mind. In relation to any
body and mind it might take, it temporarily inhabits that body and mind,
possesses it, controls it and makes use of it to experience and understand things
and to enjoy pleasures.

Grasping for a soul or self that has all three of these characteristics is purely doctrinally
based. There is no automatically-arising variant of it, although incorrect consideration
of something nonstatic to be static or something imputed to be unimputed has both
doctrinally-based and automatically-arising forms.

On the basis of doctrinally-based grasping for the coarse impossible soul of persons
(ourselves and others), we experience doctrinally-based disturbing emotions and
attitudes (nyon-mongs kun-btags) as the ones that bring on affecting impulses (link
two) and thirsting and obtainers (links eight and nine). For instance, we thirst for a
parting from unhappiness for “me,” mistakenly believed to exist as a static, partless,
independently existing “me” inhabiting our body.

The Subtle Impossible Soul of Persons

The subtle impossible soul of a person is one that is self-sufficiently knowable ( rang-
rkya thub-pa’i rdzas-yod), which means it can be cognized by itself alone, without its
basis for imputation also simultaneously appearing.

When we grasp for ourselves to exist in this impossible way when we still have
grasping for a coarse impossible soul, we grasp for ourselves to exist as a static,
partless, independently existing “me” that is self-sufficiently knowable.

But, even when we have achieved a true stopping of this doctrinally-based grasping
for a coarse impossible soul of a person, we still grasp for ourselves to exist as a self-
sufficiently knowable “me” that is

• an imputation on the aggregates as a noncongruent affecting variable ( ldan-min

‘du-byed), which means it does not share five things in common ( mtshungs-ldan
lnga) with the consciousness and mental factors that accompany it – the same
focal object, mental hologram, cognitive sensor, time and having the same slant
• unable to exist on its own, independently of a body and mind
• nonstatic, and therefore affected by causes and conditions
• and has parts, since it is an imputation on five different aggregates.

Grasping for a subtle impossible soul of a person automatically arises. There is no

doctrinally-based form of it. On the basis of grasping for a subtle impossible soul of
persons (ourselves and all others), we experience automatically-arising disturbing
emotions (nyon-mongs lhan-skyes) as the ones that bring on the links of affecting

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impulses, thirsting and obtainers. For instance, we thirst for a parting from
unhappiness for “me,” mistakenly believed to be self-sufficiently knowable.

The Prasangika Assertion

The Coarse Impossible Soul of Persons

According to the Gelug tradition, all tenet systems except Prasangika assert a lack of
coarse and subtle impossible souls of a person as above. Prasangika is unique in
asserting that grasping for the non-Prasangika subtle impossible soul of a person (one
that is self-sufficiently knowable) is still grasping for a coarse type of impossible soul.

Moreover, Prasangika uniquely asserts that not only persons, but also all phenomena
are devoid of being self-sufficiently knowable: all phenomena are imputations on a
basis for imputation and all phenomena are imputedly knowable. Therefore, the lack of
this type of coarse impossible soul of persons and the lack of this type of coarse
impossible soul of phenomena are equivalent: they both have “being self-sufficiently
knowable” as their objects of negation (dgag-bya). They differ merely in their basis of
negation (dgag-gzhi).

• The object of negation in what the non-Prasangikas regard as the lack of a coarse
impossible soul is “existence as something static, partless, unimputed on a basis,
and existent independently of a body and mind.” Although persons are
appropriate bases that are devoid of this object of negation, all phenomena, such
as categories, are not appropriate bases, since categories are static and
imputations on bases.
• Although Prasangika accepts that it is necessary to gain a true stopping of what
the non-Prasangika schools call “grasping for a coarse impossible soul of persons,”
the attainment of a true stopping of it automatically occurs when we gain non-
conceptual cognition of the voidness of all phenomena being self-sufficiently
knowable. If no phenomenon, including a person, can be known by itself without
its basis for imputation also appearing simultaneously, there can be no such thing
as a static, partless, unimputed soul of a person able to exist independently of a
body and mind.

Two Types of Grasping for a Self-Sufficiently Knowable “Me”

Automatically-arising

In common with the non-Prasangika Buddhist tenet systems, Prasangika asserts that
grasping for a self-sufficiently knowable soul (self) automatically arises.

• The non-Prasangika systems assert that this grasping automatically arises with
respect only to persons. According to these systems, when we cognize as self-
sufficiently knowable appearances of forms of physical phenomena, such as our

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 body, or ways of being aware of something, such as anger, these cognitions are
unmistaken regarding those items being self-sufficiently knowable. They are not
accompanied by the incorrect consideration of taking something imputedly
knowable to be self-sufficiently knowable and thus are also not accompanied by
unawareness of this facet of how things exist.
• Prasangika asserts that grasping for a self-sufficiently knowable soul arises in the
same way with respect to all phenomena, including persons. Namely, this grasping
arises accompanied by incorrect consideration and unawareness.

Doctrinally-based

Moreover, also unlike these non-Prasangika systems, Prasangika asserts that this
grasping can also be doctrinally based – based not on non-Buddhist Indian tenet
systems, but on the Buddhist Vaibhashika tenet system.

• The non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems assert that all phenomena can be
cognized without that cognition simultaneously giving rise to something else, for
instance a basis for imputation.
• Nevertheless, because these non-Buddhist systems do not assert a division of
phenomena into self-sufficiently knowable and imputedly knowable phenomena,
we cannot have grasping for a self-sufficiently knowable person that we
developed based on learning and accepting the doctrines of those systems.

Thus Gelug Prasangika explains that there are:

• what the non-Prasangika Buddhist systems call the “doctrinally-based coarse

impossible soul of a person” (one that is static, partless, independent, and
unimputed, as asserted by non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems), and
• a doctrinally-based coarse impossible soul of a person asserted by the Buddhist
Vaibhashika tenet system. Vaibhashika asserts that all noncongruent affecting
variables, such as a person, are imputed phenomena that are self-sufficiently
knowable.

According to the Vaibhashika tenets, a person is the mere collection (network) of the
five aggregates upon which it is an imputation. As such, a person is self-sufficiently
knowable because, when we see a person, we do not simultaneously see the entire
collection of the five aggregates upon which he or she is an imputation.

More fully, Vaibhashika asserts direct cognition ( dngos-su rig) of phenomena, which
means cognition of an object requires direct contacting awareness of it, and not
cognition of it through the intermediary of a mental hologram ( rnam-pa, aspect) of the
object as all the other Buddhist tenet systems assert. Thus, although a person is an
imputation on the mere network of the aggregates, when we have cognition of a
person, the consciousness just has direct contacting awareness of the person and not

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of the entire network of five aggregates that are the basis on which he or she is
imputed.

Stages of Ridding Ourselves of Grasping for a Coarse Impossible Soul of Persons

According to Gelug Prasangika

First, we rid ourselves of the grasping for the impossible soul of a person (a person
that is self-sufficiently knowable) that is doctrinally based on the Vaibhashika
assertions and which Prasangika calls “coarse.” In doing so, we also rid ourselves of
grasping for what the non-Prasangikas call the “coarse impossible soul of a person,”
which is a soul that is doctrinally based on the assertions of the non-Buddhist Indian
tenet systems. This is a soul or self that is static, monolithic, and unimputed on the
aggregates.

Secondly, we rid ourselves of the automatically-arising grasping for the impossible

soul of a person (a person that is self-sufficiently knowable) that non-Prasangika calls
“subtle grasping” and Prasangika calls “coarse grasping.”

The Subtle Impossible Soul of Persons Asserted Exclusively by Gelug Prasangika

When have rid ourselves forever of both these levels of what Prasangika calls coarse,
we still have grasping for a subtler impossible soul of a person – a subtle level of
grasping that had underlain both these levels. In other words, even if we have realized
that a soul of a person is nonstatic, has parts, is an imputation on the aggregates and
is only imputedly knowable simultaneously with its basis for imputation (and not self-
sufficiently knowable), yet we grasp for such a soul to be truly established ( bden-par
grub-pa, truly existent), self-established (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa, inherently existent),
established by characteristic marks (rang-gi mtshan-nyid-gyis grub-pa) findable on the
side of the self and of its basis for imputation, the aggregates.

Two Types of Grasping for a Self-Established “Me”

Unawareness of the lack of this subtler impossible soul of a person, which is also
equivalent to the lack of the impossible soul of all phenomena, can also either
automatically arise or be doctrinally based on either the Buddhist Sautrantika,
Chittamatra or Svatantrika tenet systems. On the basis of this mistaken belief that such
an impossible “me” corresponds with reality, we experience subtle disturbing emotions
and attitudes (nyon-mongs phra-mo), either doctrinally-based or automatically-
arising. These still constitute links eight and nine (thirsting and obtainers), and bring
on link two (affecting impulses). For instance, we thirst for a parting from unhappiness
for “me,” mistakenly believed to be self-established.

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Which Levels of Unawareness Are Included in the Link of Unawareness

All Buddhist tenet systems consider the link of unawareness in the twelve links of
dependent arising to be included in the emotional obscurations ( nyon-sgrib)
preventing liberation. Emotional obscurations refer to the disturbing emotions and
attitudes, as well as their tendencies ( sa-bon). According to Gelug, the non-Prasangika
schools consider unawareness of the lack of both coarse and subtle impossible souls of
persons, as they define them, as emotional obscurations. Thus, they include these two
levels of unawareness as the first link of dependent arising.

• Although unawareness of behavioral cause and effect is also a disturbing emotion

and is also included among the emotional obscurations, it is not included in the
link of unawareness.
• Although we need to rid ourselves of unawareness of behavioral cause and effect
in order to attain not only better rebirths, but also liberation, just ridding ourselves
of this unawareness alone is not sufficient for attaining liberation.

Out of unawareness concerning the impossible soul of persons and the impossible
soul of all phenomena, the non-Prasangika schools consider only unawareness of the
impossible soul of persons to be a disturbing emotion. Thus, of these two types of
unawareness, we only need to rid ourselves of the coarse and subtle levels of
unawareness concerning the impossible soul of persons in order to gain liberation.

To gain enlightenment, we need also to rid ourselves of the cognitive obscurations

(shes-sgrib), which do not include disturbing emotions but, according to the non-
Prasangika Mahayana systems, do include unawareness concerning the impossible
soul of all phenomena, including persons.

• Vaibhashika and Sautrantika do not even assert cognitive obscurations preventing

enlightenment. So there is no place in their system for subtle disturbing emotions
and attitudes.
• Chittamatra and Svatantrika do assert cognitive obscurations preventing
omniscient enlightenment, and they assert that they include unawareness of the
lack of impossible soul of all phenomena, including persons. They each define the
impossible soul of all phenomena in their own unique ways. But they assert that
this unawareness is non-disturbing ( nyon-mongs-can min-pa): it is not counted as
a disturbing emotion. It is not included in the first of the twelve links. They do not
assert any subtle disturbing emotions that are based solely on grasping for the
impossible soul of all phenomena in the way that they define such grasping.

According to Gelug Prasangika, unawareness of the lack of an impossible soul of all

phenomena, including persons, is a disturbing emotion and is included among the
emotional obscurations preventing liberation. Thus it is also included in link one of the
twelve links. Based on that subtle unawareness, there arise subtle disturbing emotions.
Because of that, to attain liberation from the all-pervasive suffering of the tainted

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aggregates of uncontrollably recurring rebirth, we also need to rid ourselves of the
subtle disturbing emotions, including subtle unawareness.

The Lack of a Coarse Impossible Soul of a Person Asserted by Non-Buddhist Indian

Tenet Systems

In every moment of cognition other than when non-conceptually cognizing voidness,

the self appears to be established as a static, partless, unimputed, independently
existing entity that can be cognized by itself alone, with its existence established by
the power of its individual defining characteristic mark findable on its own side. We
need to deconstruct and abolish, layer by layer, our belief that this deceptive
appearance refers to and corresponds to reality.

First, we need to refute the coarse impossible self of a person asserted by non-
Buddhist Indian tenet systems – a self of a person that is static, partless, unimputed,
and independently existent. All Buddhist systems assert that such a self is impossible
and doesn't exist at all. It is a soul that is not an imputation on the aggregates, but is
either

• identical with one of them, usually the mind or the body, and consequently such a
soul has no rebirth: when the body ends, the soul or self ends
• or separate from the aggregates and is its inhabitant, possessor, and controller,
and thus it takes rebirth and can be liberated as a separate entity independent of a
body or mind.

According to the Buddhist analysis, then, a deluded outlook toward a transitory

network (an obtainer) casts out the net of a coarse impossible soul onto the
conventional “me” and considers it to be either identical with one of the aggregates or
totally different from them as their inhabitant, possessor and controller. Thus, we have
the situation of the self and the aggregates being either one or many – in other words,
either identically the same thing or totally different things.

Analysis of the Self and the Aggregates Being Identical

The assertion that the coarse soul of a person is identical with one or more of the
aggregates is the Charvaka (rgyang-‘phen-pa, also known as Lokayata) view, which
does not accept karma, rebirth or liberation. It just asserts a static monolithic soul as
an essential feature of the mind, and the mind is something that arises from the
material elements of the body. Because such a self is identical to the mind and body, it
cannot exist independently of a body and a mind.
The refutation of such a soul is as follows: Since the soul is static and unaffected by
anything, the mind or body would have to be static and not affected by anything – it
could never get sick or grow old. This is impossible. Non-conceptual cognition of this
fact, with the force of mind described before, rids us of

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• the doctrinally-based obtainer extreme outlook (link nine) that either (1) our
present body and mind will last forever, which is a repudiation ( skur-‘debs) of the
gross impermanence of death; or (2) the static, unaffected self ends when the
body ends, which is a repudiation of there being any continuity of the self after
death
• a doctrinally-based obtainer distorted outlook that either (1) repudiates that in a
next life we will experience the effects of our behavior in this life, because the self
is unaffected by what it does; or (2) repudiates rebirth, because since the self is
unaffected by what it does in this life, there are no results of it.

If the self is a monad with no parts and identical to the body and the mind, then the
body and mind would have to be identical with each other as a partless monad. But
subjective experiencing is not the same as the chemical and electrical processes in the
nervous system and brain. If the self is identical only with the body and we lose part of
the body, for instance an arm, then losing a part of the body would mean losing a part
of the self, but that contradicts the assertion that the self is partless. If it is identical
with the mind and we lose part of our minds, for instance our memory, again that
contradicts the assertion that the self is partless.

When we refute this view of the self and the body and also the mind being identical,
we rid ourselves of

• the aspect of the doctrinally-based obtainer deluded outlook toward a transitory

network with which we cast the net of a static, unaffected “me” onto the
aggregates (the non-Prasangika Buddhist assertion) or onto the conventional “me”
in relation to the aggregates (Prasangika);
• the doctrinally-based disturbing emotions, such as thirsting not to be parted from
happiness and longing for desirable sensory objects that are based on believing
that the static, unaffected self is identical with the body. For example, by
identifying ourselves as “I am my body,” we are so attached to it as true source of
happiness that we become angry if someone causes it injury, which of course
contradicts the belief that the self is static and is not affected by anything.

Analysis of the Self and the Aggregates Being Totally Different

Other non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems, such as Samkhya ( grangs-can-pa) and

Nyaya (rigs-can-pa), assert that the self is separate and totally different from the
aggregates and just inhabits, possesses and controls them; but it could be liberated
and then exist independently of a body or mind. If this were so, then the following
contradiction arise:

• If the self is static and unaffected by anything, it couldn’t do anything or respond

to anything, and so it couldn’t control any aggregates and couldn’t possess one
network of aggregates and then another, or a network that is constantly changing.

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• The self couldn’t be monolithic and partless, if sometimes it is multitasking for
example, like seeing and hearing at the same time.
• When we understand that the body is impure (dirty inside) and not happiness (it
can hurt) (these are aspects of the true suffering), then it doesn’t make sense for a
“pure” self to inhabit it and make use of it.

Non-conceptual cognition of this last point rids us of:

• holding a doctrinally-based obtainer deluded outlook as supreme, with which we

think that by realizing that our aggregates, our bodies, and so on, are totally pure,
clean, and a source of true happiness, this is the supreme view that will bring us to
liberation from them
• a doctrinally-based obtainer holding of deluded morality or conduct as supreme,
with which we believe that if we indulge the body as the source of true happiness,
it will lead to liberation. Or we think the body is horribly unclean and a source of
suffering, so if we purify the body in the Ganges River or mortify it with extreme
ascetic practices, we will attain liberation.

When we refute this view of the self and the body and mind as being totally different,
we rid ourselves of:

• the aspect of a doctrinally-based obtainer deluded outlook toward a transitory

network with which we cast the net of an impossible “mine” (non-Prasangika) onto
the aggregates or the net of a static, monolithic “me, the possessor” (Prasangika)
onto the conventional “me”
• doctrinally-based disturbing emotions such as thirsting not to be parted from
happiness and longing for desirable sensory objects, when both are based on
believing that the self is totally separate from the body and mind. We become so
attached to them as “my” possessions, we become angry if someone causes them
injury. We cling to happiness as a possession, something for a separate “me” to
enjoy and we thirst not to be parted from it.

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Meditation on the Voidness of the Coarse Impossible Soul

With meditation on the voidness of a coarse impossible soul (self) of a person, we

need first to identify correctly and decisively what is the object to be refuted, namely
the existence of the conventional “me” as a static, monolithic, independent, unimputed
soul. Then we need to analyze such a self with the line of reasoning “neither one nor
many.” If such a self exists, it must constitute, together with aggregates, either just one
static monolithic entity or many separate static monolithic entities. If neither is the
case, then such a self does not exist.
Total conviction that there is no such thing as such a self cannot occur simultaneously
with belief in such a self. Thus our total conviction cuts off our grasping for it, which
means it cuts off as well both our incorrect consideration that it corresponds to reality
and our unawareness about it. We cognize accurately and decisively that there is no
such thing that it refers to or corresponds to: nothing.

When we focus on this nothing, nothing appears, not even the appearance of such an
impossible “me.” But when we focus on this nothing, we need to understand it to be
the absence of this impossible way of existing. This eliminates the extreme of total
nonexistence: that this absence actually is a nothing or that it is the total absence of
the conventional “me” as being impossible and nonexistent.

When we arise from total absorption ( mnyam-bzhag) on such a total absence, we

appear to ourselves like a seemingly static, monolithic, unimputed, independent self
that is self-sufficiently knowable and self-established by the power of findable defining
characteristic marks on its own side. With subsequent realization ( rjes-thob, “post-
meditation”), we realize at this stage of our understanding of voidness that one layer
of this appearance of the impossible self is like an illusion. The aspect of this
appearance that the self is static, partless, unimputed and independently existent does
not refer to or correspond to anything real.

But we must differentiate what the self appears to be from how it appears to exist.
What it appears to be is “me,” and this is conventionally true. It appears to be me and
not someone else or not nobody. Thus the appearance of what it is does refer to
reality. It is just the appearance of how it exists that doesn’t correspond to reality.
Therefore, the appearance of “my self” during subsequent realization eliminates a
coarse level of the extreme of total concrete existence.

The Lack of an Impossible Soul of a Person That the Gelug Non-Prasangika Buddhist
Systems Assert as Subtle and Gelug Prasangika Asserts as Coarse

Here, “non-Prasangika” includes only Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika, but not
Vaibhashika. This is because Vaibhashika does not assert a lack of a subtle impossible
soul of a person, though it does assert automatically-arising unawareness of the lack
of what the others call the “coarse” impossible soul of a person. With that
unawareness, although we might understand that non-Buddhist Indian assertions of a

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soul do not refer to anything real, yet according to Vaibhashika we still do not know
how the self exists, we are still unaware.

Whether or not we realize that the conventional “me” is nonstatic, has parts and is
imputedly existent on the aggregates as its basis for imputation, we automatically
grasp for it to be self-sufficiently knowable, with its existence established by the power
of its individual defining characteristic mark findable on its own side. Therefore, next in
this sequence we need to deconstruct the second layer of this deceptive appearance
and rid ourselves of the belief that the self is a self-sufficiently knowable entity. We
need to realize that, as a nonconguent affecting variable, the conventional “me,” as a
nonstatic imputation, can only be imputedly known.

The Object to Be Refuted

As a noncongruent affecting variable, the conventional “me,” as a nonstatic imputed

object, can only be cognized with first its basis for imputation appearing (one or more
of the aggregates) and then immediately after that the conventional “me” appearing
simultaneously with its basis for imputation. But automatically we think, “I see myself, I
hear myself, I know myself,” when we see our body, hear our voice or think the mental
word “me.” We do not think, when seeing, hearing, or thinking “me,” that we are
cognizing something that is an imputation on the basis of the sight of a body, the
sound of a voice, or the mental sound of a word that we are cognizing simultaneously
with that seeing, hearing or thinking. When we think, “I want you to love me for ‘me’
and not for my body or my money,” we imagine that someone could love us without
simultaneously loving our body, mind, personality or something about us that is the
basis for focusing on “me.”

The Refutation

Again, there are two possibilities: either the self-sufficiently knowable “me” is identical
with the aggregates or totally separate from them. If they are totally identical, then
when someone sees the dead body, he or she would see “me” and the “me” could not
be an imputation on the next set of aggregates (since here we accept rebirth). If they
are totally separate and separable from each other, then we should be able to take
away all the aggregates and still see “me.”

What Non-conceptual Cognition of the Lack of This Impossible “Me” Rids Us of

The non-conceptual cognition of the voidness of a self-sufficiently knowable “me” rids

us, in stages, of automatically-arising unawareness of the lack of a subtle impossible
soul of a person, the automatically-arising grasping for a subtle impossible soul of a

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person and the automatically-arising disturbing emotions and attitudes based on
them.

Note that there is only doctrinally-based indecisive wavering, since it is indecisive

about the correct view of a coarse lack of an impossible soul of persons. Once we have
non-conceptual cognition of the four noble truths and the correct view, we are no
longer indecisive about whether the non-Buddhist view is correct or the Buddhist one
is correct. So there is no automatically-arising indecisive wavering, since such wavering
is indecisive about the correct view of how we exist as a person, which we experience
because of an incorrect view that we have been taught and have believed to be true.

There are only doctrinally-based variants of:

• a distorted outlook (of a view that was doctrinally-based),

• holding a deluded outlook as supreme
• holding deluded morality and conduct as supreme (that these will lead to the
liberation of a coarse impossible soul, which is based on what we were taught).

Now our non-conceptual cognition of voidness rids us of:

• automatically-arising thirsting for a self-sufficiently knowable “me” not to be

parted from ordinary happiness and other such automatically-arising disturbing
emotions such as longing desire and attachment to desirable objects
• an automatically-arising deluded outlook toward a transitory network, which casts
on the conventional “me” either the net of a self-sufficiently knowable “me” as
identical with the aggregates or the net of a self-sufficiently knowable “me, the
possessor of the aggregates,” and thus totally separate from them;
• an automatically-arising extreme outlook (according to Mahayana, Sautrantika
says this too is only doctrinally-based), which is to automatically believe that the
self-sufficiently knowable “me” or “me, the possessor of the aggregates as mine”
will either last eternally or end totally at death, with no continuity.

When we focus on an absence of a conventional “me” established as something self-

sufficiently knowable, again nothing appears. However, we realize that it is not just
“nothing,” but is the total absence of the object to be negated. During subsequent
realization, when we focus on our conventional self that appears, it still deceptively
appears to be a static, partless, unimputed, independently existent, self-sufficiently
knowable, self-established entity. However, we realize that two layers of this deceptive
appearance are like an illusion and do not correspond to reality. These are the layers of
being:

• static, partless, unimputed and independently existent

• self-sufficiently knowable.

But we do not yet realize fully that a nonstatic, imputedly existent, imputedly knowable
self lacks self-established existence. In other words, even though we may understand

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that the self, “me,” is an imputation on the aggregates and can only be cognized
simultaneously with the aggregates, we do not yet realize fully that it is impossible that
it is cognized like this and exists like this by the power of findable defining
characteristic marks on its own side and on the side of the aggregates.

The Prasangika Assertion of a Lack of a Subtle Impossible Soul of a Person

Prasangika asserts that not only persons (conventional “me”s), but also all phenomena
are imputedly knowable and further, both persons and all phenomena are merely
imputedly existent. Thus, just as the lack of a coarse impossible soul of persons is
equivalent to the lack of a coarse impossible soul of phenomena, the same is true of
the lack of a subtle impossible soul. Thus, according to Gelug Prasangika, all
phenomena, including persons, are imputedly knowable and merely imputedly
existent: all phenomena are devoid of being self-sufficiently knowable and of being
self-establshed.

It is important to understand the difference between imputedly knowable and merely

imputedly existent.

Imputedly Knowable Phenomena

Prasangika asserts three types of imputedly knowable phenomena, those that are:

• imputedly knowable as something imputed on a basis ( rten-nas btags-pa’i btags-

yod)

• imputedly knowable as something set by names and labels ( ming-dang brda’i

bzhag-pa’i btags-yod)
• imputedly knowable as something imputed by conceptual cognition ( rtog-pas
btags-pa’i btags-yod).

Names and Categories Are Actively Imputed by the Cognitions of Them

Consider the case of names and categories as imputedly knowable phenomena and
consider the use of names only in the case of limited beings, not Buddhas. In such
cases, names, labels and categories are involved only in conceptual cognition. The act
of cognition “imputes” (‘dogs-byed; labels, designates) them on a basis for imputation
(gdags-gzhi).

More fully, sounds (sgra) on their own do not constitute names (ming; words). Sounds
only constitute names (words) when, through some convention ( tha-snyad), they are
designated on a significance (meaning/object) ( don). Then, as names (words), they
mean something. Sounds cannot be names (words) unless they are the names (words)
for something. Thus, if we know that a sequence of sounds constitute a name (word),

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we know that they must mean something, although we might not actually know what
the word means or what or whom the name signifies.

Names (words) are designated not just on one sound, but on audio categories ( sgra-
spyi) and on all members of those categories. For example, the audio category of the
sound “table” is imputed on the sounds “table” vocalized in any voice, accent or
volume. No matter in what voice, accent or volume, the sound “table” is vocalized, they
all are sounds of the name (word) “table.” The name (word) “table,” then, is imputed
on both the audio category “table” and on all its members.

A similar situation is the case with the meaning of the word “table” and the objects it
signifies. The meaning category ( don-spyi, object category) of the meaning or
significance of the word “table” is imputed on all objects that appropriately fit into the
meaning/object category “table.” And the name (word) “table” is also designated on
the meaning/object category “table” and on all members of that category.

Individual objects do not naturally have names (words) imputed on them. They may be
cognized, however, through the media of names (words) and their significances. In
such cases, the names (words) are known as tags ( brda). For limited beings, when a
name (word) is imputed on an individual object as its basis for imputation, it is with
conceptual cognition. This means also imputed on the object are the audio and
meaning (object) categories on which the name (word) is itself imputed. Thus,
conceptual cognition actively imputes names (words), significances (meanings,
objects), audio categories and meaning (object) categories on individual objects.

In conceptual cognition, a name (word), and an audio category or meaning (object)

category can only be known simultaneously with their object of imputation (a member
of one of these categories) appearing simultaneously with the cognition of them. In
this sense, names, labels, and categories are imputedly knowable.

Phenomena Imputedly Knowable on a Basis Are Not Actively Imputed by the Cognition
of Them

Phenomena that are imputedly knowable on a basis include:

• nonstatic noncongruent affecting variables such as the conventional “me” imputed

on a network of aggregates
• certain static phenomena, for instance voidnesses imputed on validly knowable
phenomena and space imputed on material objects,
• such things as wholes imputed on parts or sequences and commonsense objects,
such as a table, imputed on the sense data of one of the senses (the colored
shapes of the sight of one).

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Although such phenomena may be cognized either conceptually or non-conceptually,
the cognition of them does not actively impute them on their basis for imputation.
According to the Gelug assertions, they naturally occur imputed on a basis, whether or
not anyone actively cognizes them. Thus, a person naturally is imputedly existent on
the basis of five aggregates, and can only be cognized, either conceptually or non-
conceptually, with one or more of the aggregates simultaneously also appearing in the
cognition. This fact is like the fact that a whole is imputedly existent on the basis of
parts, and can only be cognized, either conceptually or non-conceptually, with one or
more of its parts simultaneously also appearing in the cognition.

The Components Comprising Cognition of Imputedly Knowable Phenomena

In the case of the imputation of names and labels imputed on categories and on
members of the categories, and in the case of categories labeled on individual
members belonging to the categories, three components are involved:

• the name or category,

• the basis for imputation (gdags-gzhi),
• the referent object of the imputation (btags-chos, imputed object).

In the case of the name or category “me,” the basis for imputation is the network of
aggregates. The referent object of the imputation (the imputed object) – in other
words, what the name, label and category “me” refer to – is the conventional “me.”

In the case of the imputation of the conventional “me” on the network of aggregates,
there are only two components:

• the imputed object,

• the basis for imputation.

Here, the imputed object is the conventional “me” and the basis for imputation is the
network of aggregates.

To differentiate these distinctions more clearly, we may adopt the terminology that
names are designations on a basis for designation, categories are mental labels on a
basis for mental labeling, and noncongruent affecting variables, such as the
conventional “me,” are imputations on a basis for imputation.

Two Varieties of the Lack of a Subtle Impossible Soul of Persons

The lack of a subtle impossible soul of a person, as asserted by Gelug Prasangika, also
has doctrinally-based and automatically-arising varieties, as is the case with the Gelug
Prasangika assertion of the coarse variety. The doctrinally-based one is based on the
non-Prasangika assertion (Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika) of the mechanism

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for how the self, as an imputation on the aggregates, is only knowable simultaneously
with the aggregates as its basis for imputation also appearing.

Grasping for a Subtle Impossible Soul of a Person

Let us look more closely at this subtle impossible soul of a person, “me.” Suppose we
have realized that the conventional “me,” our “self,” is nonstatic, non-monolithic,
cannot exist independently and unimputedly separate from the aggregates (a body
and a mind) and can only be cognized simultaneously with the aggregates that it is an
imputation on also appearing. Nevertheless, either doctrinally based or automatically
arising, we might still grasp for our conventionally existent “me” – an imputed object
that is the referent object ( bdags-chos) of a conceptual cognition of one – to exist as
an actual findable referent “thing” (bdags-don), (the real “me”). A referent “thing” is an
entity that is self-established by the power of its uncommon defining characteristic
mark (what makes me “me,” what makes “me” a unique individual) being findable in its
basis for imputation (in the aggregates). It is like grasping for a “me” that is findable
within the aggregates that are its basis for imputation, imputed there and knowable
only with that basis for imputation containing it also simultaneously appearing.

To understand this, we need to look at imputation itself more closely than before. As a
noncongruent affecting variable, our conventional “me” occurs naturally as an
imputation on a network of aggregates and is imputedly knowable, both conceptually
and non-conceptually, simultaneously with one or more of those aggregates. But what
establishes that there is such a thing as a person, that there is such a thing as “me”?
Can we point to something on the side of some object of cognition, for instance a
body, that, by its own power or in conjunction with something else, establishes that
this is a person?

The Chittamatra tenet system asserted that dependent phenomena ( gzhan-dbang),

equivalent to nonstatic phenomena such as a body and a person, when cognized non-
conceptually and when cognized conceptually are different. Both Madhyamaka
systems, Svatantrika and Prasangika, refute that and assert that they are the same.
Thus, according to them, (1) the conventional “me” cognized non-conceptually as an
imputed object naturally imputed on a network of aggregates is the same as (2) the
conventional “me” cognized conceptually as the referent object of both the name “me”
and meaning/object category “me” imputed on a network of aggregates.
But the non-conceptual sensory cognition of a body, for instance seeing one, does not
establish that there is such a thing as a person, “me,” as a natural imputation on it as
its basis.

Upon analysis, there is nothing findable on the side of the body that, by its own power,
or in conjunction with sensory cognition, makes it a person, “me.” When the name
(word) “me” is designated through a meaning/object category on a body, there is still,

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upon analysis, nothing findable on the side of the body that by its own power or, in
conjunction with conceptual cognition, makes it “me.”

What establishes that there is such a thing as person, then? All that anyone can say is
that a person, “me,” is merely what the name (word) “me” refers to on the basis of
aggregate factors such as a body on which it is designated. The existence of such a
thing as “me,” then, is established merely by the fact that it is the referent object of the
name “me,” designated by conceptual cognition through a meaning category on
aggregates such as a body.

If, upon analysis, we could point to something findable on the side of a body, for
instance, that makes me “me,” then I, as a person, would be truly established (truly
existent). This means that the “me” would be self-established (inherently existent),
established by the power of a self-establishing nature ( rang-bzhin) on its own side. It
would be findable as a referent “thing” ( bdag-don) that corresponds to the referent
object (imputed object) “me.” But, although the word “me” refers to someone, namely
the conventional “me” as its referent object (what it refers to), yet it does not
correspond to some findable referent “thing” that we can pinpoint on the side of its
basis, in this case a body.

If a category (the category of persons in a population) is like a box, a referent “thing”

would be something that exists as if it were in a box (a person as a statistic),
independent of everything else. Nothing exists like that. Nobody exists just as a
statistic. So it is important to differentiate between a referent object (the conventional
“me”) and a referent “thing” (a truly established “me,” the “me” to be refuted), which
would be like a solidly existent prop holding up the appearance of a conventional “me”
from behind.

The technical term is a “focal support” (dmigs-rten), as some findable “thing” at which
the cognition is aimed and focused. We feel that what supports or substantiates my
being an individual person is that I am a concrete number in a population chart. It’s as
if being in the population record makes “me” a real person. Or to use a more modern
example, what substantiates that I am a person is that I am a person in Facebook.

In short, there is nothing findable on the side of the referent object (the conventional
“me”) or its basis for imputation (the body or mind) that by its own power or in
conjunction with designation with words establishes the existence of “me” and makes
“me” a person. The only thing that we can say establishes the existence of my self is
merely designation itself – I am what the name (word) “me” refers to, based on a basis
for designation (a body and a mind). There is no findable referent “thing” (me) inside a
body and mind that from its own side establishes that the referent object of the label
“me” exists.

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Two Varieties of Grasping for a Subtle Impossible Soul of a Person

This grasping for the referent object, the conventional “me,” to exist as a referent
“thing,” a false “me,” arises automatically or it can be doctrinally based. It arises
automatically because the constant habits of grasping for truly established existence
cause our mental activity to make the mental holograms, through which we cognize
objects, appear to exist that way.

But this grasping could also be doctrinally based from having been taught and having
accepted the assertions of the Sautrantika, Chittamatra or Svatantrika tenet systems.
All three tenet systems accept the fact that we cannot cognize an imputed
phenomenon without also cognizing simultaneously its basis for imputation. So it is
impossible that anyone could cognize a person by itself. Yet, because each of these
tenet systems asserts that the defining characteristic mark ( mtshan-ma) of a person is
found as a self-defining characteristic mark (rang-mtshan) in the basis for imputation
of the person, belief in this reinforces the automatically-arising grasping for a person
to be their basis for imputation – their body, for instance.

A defining characteristic mark is what distinguishes something from everything else. In

any cognition, the mental factor of distinguishing (‘du-shes) cognizes such a mark,
otherwise we would be unable to distinguish anything from anything else. However,
although defining characteristic marks are conventionally existent, they cannot be
found on the side of what is characterized by them ( mtshon-bya) or on the side of the
mind that cognizes them. If they were findable, then the object characterized by them
would have existence established by the power of its individual self-defining
characteristic marks (rang-mtshan-gyis grub-pa). Prasangika asserts that such
existence is equivalent to truly established existence and self-established existence.

Suppose that there were findable characteristic marks that had the power to establish
that persons exist. Such a mark would be like a bar code or an individual genome; it
would be what makes us an individual.

• Sautrantika asserts that the characteristic mark of a person is in mental

consciousness. In technical jargon, mental consciousness is the common locus
(gzhi-mthun) for the characteristic marks of both mental consciousness and a
person.
• Chittamatra asserts that foundation consciousness ( kun-gzhi rnam-shes,
Skt. alayavijnana) is the basis having the defining characteristic mark ( mtshan-gzhi)
of a person. When we cognize a person non-conceptually, as when seeing
someone, all the components of the cognition – the object, the consciousness of it
and the accompanying mental factors – arise simultaneously from the same natal
source (rdzas), a karmic “seed” (sa-bon). When we see a person as an imputation
on a body, then, there is also present in the cognition the characteristic mark of a

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 person and the basis that contains it – the foundation consciousness underlying
the five aggregates.

When we cognize a person conceptually, although the body and person that appear
and the categories mentally labeled on them lack any defining characteristic marks on
their own, nevertheless they have them on their own sides merely when the categories
are mentally labeled on the body and person that simultaneously appear with them in
the conceptual cognition. The self-defining characteristic mark of the body is findable
on the side of the body and the self-defining characteristic mark of the person is
findable on the side of the foundation consciousness underlying the mental
consciousness of the conceptual cognition.

• Svatantrika asserts that the self-defining characteristic mark of a person is findable

on the side of “mental consciousnesss as a basis having the defining characteristic
mark” (mtshan-gzhi yid-kyi rnam-shes) that also makes it an individual person. So
even in combination with imputation, the basis for labeling must also appear since
that is the locus of the characteristic mark. The mental consciousness pervades the
other aggregates, so when we see a body, we also cognize the mental
consciousness. So we cannot cognize the person by itself.
• a truly established “me” as identical with its basis for imputation, for instance “I am
mental consciousness,”
• or a truly established “me, the possessor” as being totally different and separate
from the aggregates, which are things that it inhabits, possesses and controls.

Thus, each of these non-Prasangika systems explains that the self, a person, has a
findable self-defining characteristic mark on the side of its basis for imputation and
that this mark has the power on its own (or Svatantrika asserts in conjunction with
imputation) to establish the existence of that person.

Self-Defining Characteristic Marks

What are these self-defining characteristic marks? Perhaps we can understand this
from the example of a Facebook page as a basis for imputation of a person. The self-
defining characteristic mark that would establish the existence of a person would be
the findable presence of them on their own Facebook page. It is almost like, “I have a
Facebook page; therefore I exist.” If we’re not on Facebook, we don’t exist as a person.

Then we add other self-defining characteristic makes, namely the profile, for instance a
name, gender, age, work, education, and other qualities. Readers of our Facebook page
then take our “self” to exist as an imputed person on the basis of this Facebook page,
and even further on the basis of the profile we put of ourselves on the Facebook page.
In fact, however, we do not exist simply as a person on a Facebook page; we are an
actual person with many more qualities and aspects as the ones we chose to put on
our page.

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Although the Facebook page refers to us, and not to someone else; nevertheless, there
is no such person as one that corresponds to the Facebook page profile. But on the
basis of identifying with that made-up person as “me” – casting the net of a truly
established “me” onto that Facebook person – we experience the disturbing emotions
of longing desire for “Likes” and anger when we do not have “Likes.” Others just relate
to that imaginary Facebook person as if that were the real us, but in fact it isn’t “me” at
all.

A Facebook page, astrology chart or numerology chart are not appropriate bases for
the imputation a person. However, if we understand this presentation in terms of
Facebook, then we can extend that to understanding the presentation in terms of
mental consciousness or foundation consciousness as the locus of self-defining
characteristic marks supposedly establishing the existence of a person.

Subtle Disturbing Emotions and Attitudes

Even if we have rid ourselves of the doctrinally-based and automatically-arising

disturbing emotions and attitudes as defined by the non-Prasangika Buddhist tenet
systems (what Prasangika calls the “coarse disturbing emotions and attitudes”),
Prasangika asserts that we are still left with subtle disturbing emotions and attitudes.
These are based only on grasping for a person to be truly established as a findable
referent “thing,” self-established by the power of its own self-nature and by the power
of self-defining characteristic marks findable on its basis for imputation. These subtle
disturbing emotions are not aimed at persons or objects. They are aimed at this
impossible way of existing. We grasp for this impossible way of existing despite
realizing that the self, a person, is nonstatic, non-monolithic, an imputation on the
aggregates, cannot exist separately from a network of aggregates as its basis for
imputation and knowable only simultaneously with the aggregates.

Because of this grasping, we still have thirsting and obtainers like a deluded outlook
toward a transitory network, which casts onto the conventional “me” the net of either

Again, the same analysis of neither one nor many applies here for gaining the
understanding of the voidness of such an impossible soul of a person.

Summary

In short, we need non-conceptual cognition of the lack of all three types of impossible
soul of a person in order to rid ourselves of the three levels of unawareness of how
persons exist that constitute the first of the twelve links of dependent arising, and thus
stop forever the tainted aggregates of uncontrollably recurring rebirth.

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