Constructivism

Description

See learning as an active process of constructing knowledge rather than acquiring it,
and view instruction as a process of supporting the construction of knowledge rather
than providing it. Hold two assumptions: 1) there are different perspectives not a
common meaning, and 2) the learner will not reach an expert's knowledge, so instead of
teaching the learner what an expert knows, the instructor attempts to change and
challenge the learner's thinking.

Two Approaches to Constructivism:

1) Cognitive Approach - Based on Piagetian Theory. The learner constructs knowledge

due to a conflict between what was expected and what occurred. This conflict is known
as disequilibrium (Piagetian term) or pertubation (Dewey's term). In this approach
cognition occurs in the head of the individual within the group, and in examining
learning, the focus is on how culture affects an individual's psychological processes.

2) Sociocultural Approach - learning occurs as people interact with others, with each
playing an active but unequal role. Importance is placed on how one changes the way
he or she his/her participates within the community - not an individual constructs
knowledge of that activity.

Assumptions

All knowledge is constructed and all learning is a process of that construction

(semiosis).

Individuals construct knowledge as part of a community but each has his/her own
invisible world view (umwelt) that he/she believes is the same as everyone else's. This
view remains invisible until it is challenged or confronted by another world view.

Knowledge is content dependent so it is important to situate learning in an authentic,

relevant and realistic contexts.

All human learning is constructed in a context where some type of mediational means,
tools and/or signs, are used. Members of a culture may create a tool or sign to solve a
problem, but the development of this tool or sign changes their participation within the
culture. Members of a culture create a tool for some goal, but then the use of this tool
changes the culture - examples include the computer, automobile, etc. Language is also
used as a mediation means, and this causes learning (or knowledge construction) to
become a social process
What is Social Constructivism? Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of culture and
context in understanding what occurs in society and constructing knowledge based on this
understanding (Derry, 1999; McMahon, 1997). This perspective is closely associated with many
contemporary theories, most notably the developmental theories of Vygotsky and Bruner, and
Bandura's social cognitive theory (Shunk, 2000).

Assumptions of Social Constructivism

Social constructivism is based on specific assumptions about reality, knowledge, and learning.
To understand and apply models of instruction that are rooted in the perspectives of social
constructivists, it is important to know the premises that underlie them.

Reality: Social constructivists believe that reality is constructed through human activity.
Members of a society together invent the properties of the world (Kukla, 2000). For the social
constructivist, reality cannot be discovered: it does not exist prior to its social invention.

Knowledge: To social constructivists, knowledge is also a human product, and is socially and
culturally constructed (Ernest, 1999; Gredler, 1997; Prat & Floden, 1994). Individuals create
meaning through their interactions with each other and with the environment they live in.

Learning: Social constructivists view learning as a social process. It does not take place only
within an individual, nor is it a passive development of behaviors that are shaped by external
forces (McMahon, 1997). Meaningful learning occurs when individuals are engaged in social
activities.

Social Context for Learning

Some social constructivists discuss two aspects of social context that largely affect the nature and
extent of the learning (Gredler, 1997; Wertch, 1991):

Historical developments inherited by the learner as a member of a particular culture. Symbol

systems, such as language, logic, and mathematical systems, are learned throughout the learner's
life. These symbol systems dictate how and what is learned. The nature of the learner's social
interaction with knowledgeable members of the society is important. Without the social
interaction with more knowledgeable others, it is impossible to acquire social meaning of
important symbol systems and learn how to use them. Young children develop their thinking
abilities by interacting with adults.

General Perspectives of Social Constructivism on Learning Social constructivists see as crucial

both the context in which learning occurs and the social contexts that learners bring to their
learning environment. There are four general perspectives that inform how we could facilitate the
learning within a framework of social constructivism (Gredler, 1997):
Cognitive tools perspective: Cognitive tools perspective focuses on the learning of cognitive
skills and strategies. Students engage in those social learning activities that involve hands-on
project-based methods and utilization of discipline-based cognitive tools (Gredler, 1997; Prawat
& Folden, 1994). Together they produce a product and, as a group, impose meaning on it through
the social learning process.

Idea-based social constructivism:

Idea-based social constructivism sets education's priority on important concepts in the various
disciplines (e.g. part-whole relations in mathematics, photosynthesis in science, and point of
view in literature, Gredler, 1997, p.59; Prawat, 1995; Prawat & Folden, 1994). These "big ideas"
expand learner vision and become important foundations for learners' thinking and on
construction of social meaning (Gredler, 1997). Pragmatic or emergent approach: Social
constructivists with this perspective assert that the implementation of social constructivism in
class should be emergent as the need arises (Gredler, 1997). Its proponents hold that knowledge,
meaning, and understanding of the world can be addressed in the classroom from both the view
of individual learner and the collective view of the entire class (Cobb, 1995; Gredler, 1997).
Transactional or situated cognitive perspectives: This perspective focuses on the relationship
between the people and their environment. Humans are a part of the constructed environment
(including social relationships); the environment is in turn one of the characteristics that
constitutes the individual (Bredo, 1994; Gredler, 1997). When a mind operates, its owner is
interacting with the environment. Therefore, if the environment and social relationships among
group members change, the tasks of each individual also change (Bredo, 1994; Gredler, 1997).
Learning thus should not take place in isolation from the environment.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS The social

constructivist thesis is that mathematics is a social construction, a cultural product, fallible like
any other branch of knowledge. This view entails two claims. First of all, the origins of
mathematics are social or cultural. This is not controversial, and is convincingly documented by
many authors such as Bishop (1988) and Wilder (1981). Secondly, the justification of
mathematical knowledge rests on its quasi-empirical basis. This is the controversial view put
forward by a growing number of philosophers representing the new wave in the philosophy of
mathematics, such as Lakatos (1976, 1978), Davis and Hersh (1980), Kitcher (1983), Tymoczko
(1986) and Wittgenstein (1956).

For the social constructivist account of mathematics to be minimally adequate it must it

must offer satisfactory solutions to the two problems described above. In order to address these
issues two assumptions of social constructivism need to be made explicit. First of all, the
assumption of realism - there is an enduring physical world, as our common-sense tells us.
Secondly, the assumption of social reality - any discussion, including this one, presupposes the
existence of the human race and language (the denial of this is potentially inconsistent). Thus I
assume the existence of social and physical reality, without presupposing any certain knowledge
of either. These assumptions allow a social constructivist epistemology to be developed from the
two principles of radical constructivism, which are a. " knowledge is not passively received but
actively built up by the cognizing subject; b. the function of cognition is adaptive and serves the
organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality."von Glasersfeld
(1989, page 182) With the added assumptions of the existence of social and physical reality I can
extend these principles to elaborate the epistemological basis of social constructivism. c. the
personal theories which result from the organization of the experiential world must 'fit' the
constraints imposed by physical and social reality; d. they achieve this by a cycle of theory-
prediction-test-failure-accommodation-new theory; e. this gives rise to socially agreed theories
of the world and social patterns and rules of language use; f. mathematics is the theory of form
and structure that arises within language. This provides the basis for a social constructivist
philosophy of mathematics. Its elaboration draws on Wittgenstein's (1956) account of
mathematical certainty as based on linguistic rules of use and 'forms of life', and Lakatos' (1976)
account of the social negotiation of mathematical concepts, results and theories. The result is a
philosophical analogue of Restivo's (1988) sociological account of mathematics as a social
construction. There is no space to give a full account of social constructivism (which I do
elsewhere, in Ernest, forthcoming). However, if the theory is accepted tentatively, it is possible
to indicate how it addresses the two problems described above. One problem is to account for
'the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics' in describing the world via the theories of
science. First of all, the concepts of mathematics are derived by abstraction from direct
experience of the physical world, from the generalisation and reflective abstraction of previously
constructed concepts, by negotiating meanings with others during discourse, or by some
combination of these means. Thus mathematics is a branch of knowledge which is indissolubly
connected with other knowledge, through the web of language. Language enables the
formulation of theories about social situations and physical reality. Dialogue with other persons
and interactions with the physical world play a key role in refining these theories, which
consequently are continually being revised to improve their 'fit'. As a part of the web of
language, mathematics thus maintains contact with the theories describing social and physical
reality, and hence indirectly, with the physical world. The 'fit' of mathematical structures in areas
beyond mathematics is continuously being tested, and mathematics is evolving to provide the
patterns and solve the tensions that arise from this modelling enterprise. Thus, 'the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics' is no miracle of coincidence. It is built in. It derives from the
empirical and linguistic origins and functions of mathematics. To account for the apparent
certainty and objectivity of mathematical knowledge I claim first that mathematics rests on
natural language, and that mathematical symbolism is a refinement and extension of written
language. The rules of logic and consistency which permeate the use of natural language provide
the bedrock upon which the objectivity of mathematics rests. Mathematical truths arise from the
definitional truths of natural language, acquired by social interaction. For example, we normally
agree that nothing is both Red and not-Red, and that P & not-P is false. Likewise, The truths of
mathematics are defined by implicit social agreement - shared patterns of behaviour - on what
constitute acceptable mathematical concepts, relationships between them, and methods of
deriving new truths from old. Mathematical certainty rests on socially accepted rules of discourse
embedded in our 'forms of life' (Wittgenstein, 1956)

. RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM REHABILITATED?

Evidently social constructivism offers the possibility of a philosophy of mathematics which

accounts for the objectivity and utility of mathematics, as well as its fallibility and culture-
boundedness. The cost is that 'objectivity' is reinterpreted as 'social', and although it still refers to
something external to the individual it is no longer external to humankind. Clearly this is
controversial. But what this account also offers is an answer to the main criticism directed at
radical constructivism, namely that it is a solipsistic (Goldin, 1989) "epistemology that makes all
knowing active and all knowledge subjective" (Kilpatrick, 1987, page 10). I have argued that the
principles of radical constructivism are consistent with, and can be supplemented by assumptions
of the existence of physical and social reality. Thus the denial of the existence of the external
world is not entailed. In fact, radical constructivism is ontologically neutral, for no claim is made
as to the substratum of experience, only that it is unknowable. The case I have argued is that the
subjectivity of mathematical knowledge which seems to follow from the principles of radical
constructivism does not (just as Intuitionism is not entailed by them, as Lerman, 1989, shows).
On the contrary, additional assumptions can safeguard the objectivity of mathematics, when it is
viewed as a social construction. Finally, a further criticism often directed at radical
constructivism is that it does not entail a theory of teaching, let alone being the theory of
discovery, problem solving and investigational teaching (Goldin, 1989; Kilpatrick, 1987). Here I
must agree. To lay the foundation for a philosophy of mathematics, I have had to add further
assumptions to those of constructivism. To derive a theory of teaching I must add yet more, not
least of which is a set of values. For education depends on the assumption as to what is valuable
in our culture to pass on. No such values are assumed in the two principles of radical
constructivism.