1. BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP (BDC) vs Diaz G.R. No.

213233, August 05,

2015
Facts

Petitioner executed a Deed of Sale over its property in favor of Sps. Melgazo, both of
whom are now deceased. After sometime, Nacua sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps.
Melgazo transferred to him their rights over the property and expressed willingness to
pay their outstanding obligations. Before the property was fully paid, however, Diaz, by
virtue of the several deeds of transfer of rights to Tapay, paid BDC the amortizations due
on the property. BDC thereafter issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz.
Diaz then introduced improvements on the property. Later on, BDC executed a Contract
to Sell in favor of Diaz. However, BDC informed Diaz that respondent Arreza was
claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the property. BDC
then placed Diaz’s account in “inactive status” and filed a complaint for Interpleader
against them, RTC ruled that the signatures of Sps. Melgazo transferring their rights to
Nacua were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that Arreza had a better right over the property.
Diaz filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC and argued that BDC
and Tapay’s representations led him to believe that he had a good title over the property,
but due to the court’s ruling in the interpleader case, he was constrained to transfer the
property to Arreza. RTC dismissed the complaint but was reversed by CA and anchored
its ruling on its finding that Diaz is both a buyer in good faith and a builder in good faith.

Issue:
1. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING BDC IN BAD FAITH
2. Whether or Not Respondent is a purchaser for value and in good faith
3. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS UNJUST
ENRICHMENT ON THE PART OF BDC
4. WHETHER DIAZ CAN STILL CLAIM REIMBURSEMENT for the improvements
introduced by him

HELD:
1. No, Petitioner BDC acted in bad faith in dealing with respondent Diaz. As the CA
correctly noted, it is undisputed that Bliss knew about Arreza’s claim in 1991. It even
received amortization payments from Arreza. Yet, Bliss acknowledged the transfer to
Diaz and received the monthly amortizations paid by Diaz. Also, Bliss is aware that
should Arreza pursue his claim in court, Diaz may be evicted from the property. This
uncontroverted sequence of events led the CA to correctly rule that BDC, indeed, acted
in bad faith. When Diaz came forward and presented the deeds of transfer, including the
deed of transfer executed by Tapay in his favor, BDC was already well aware of a
conflicting claim by Arreza. Instead of waiting for the resolution on the matter, BDC
immediately accepted the deed of transfer presented by Diaz, as well as the
amortizations he paid over the property. It was only in 1994 that BDC filed the
Interpleader case to resolve the conflicting case. This is nothing short of evident bad
faith.
2. No. For one to be considered a purchaser in good faith, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays
a full and fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has
notice of the claim of another. We find that in the case at bar, the first element is lacking.
While it is true that the subject lot is registered lot, the doctrine of not going beyond the
face of the title does not apply in the case here, because what was subjected to a series
of sales was not the lot itself but the right to purchase the lot from BDC. The title remained
in [BDC’s] name when Tapay offered to transfer his rights over the property to Diaz.
Notably, the several transfers themselves did not purport to be Deeds of Absolute Sale,
but merely deeds of assignment of rights. The subject of those deeds of assignment was
never the real right over the subject property, but merely the personal right to purchase
it, if it were, the sale would have been void because Tapay never had ownership over
the subject property. Diaz failed to diligently inquire into the title of his predecessor before
entering into the contract of sale. As such, he cannot be considered a buyer in good
faith. Had he discharged this duty diligently, he would have found out that Nacua’s right
was without basis, because it was founded on a forged deed. For his failure to inquire
diligently and trace the source of the right to purchase the property, Diaz cannot claim
to be a purchaser in good faith and for value.

3. No. Petitioner BDC is liable to return the amortizations paid by respondent Diaz, under
the doctrine of unjust enrichment, Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code,21 there is unjust
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. Allowing BDC to keep the amortizations paid by
Diaz is tantamount to unjust enrichment. It would result in BDC receiving amortizations
twice the amount it should have received, that is, the amortizations paid by Diaz and
Arreza. As a direct result of the final and executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful buyer
of the subject property, the buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and BDC is rendered
null and void. Consequently, there remains no valid consideration whatsoever for the
payments made by Diaz to BDC.

4. Yes, both parties being in bad faith, BDC is liable to Diaz for the value of the
improvements he introduced on the subject property. Art. 453 of the Civil Code
commands that the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had
acted in good faith. Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of
indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly Article 546 provides
that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred. In this case, however, the option of selling the land to the
builder in good faith is no longer viable in light of the ruling in the interpleader case.
Hence, there is only one thing left for [BDC] to do: indemnify Diaz for the improvements
introduced on the property.
2. Rep. of the Philippines vs Santos, G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

FACTS: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent applied for the registration of the property in the RTC which he later amended
to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been
in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than
30 years. City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of
the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had
not resulted from accretion. RTC granted the application for land registration, Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.

ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN

ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER
IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

Held: No. Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof
to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
opposition to it. They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply
for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the
property was an accretion to their land. Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters." Accretion is the process
whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of
rivers. Respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river
had formed the lot they claim. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the
dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River. It seems to be highly improbable that the
large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square
meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the
river in the span of about 20 to 30 years. The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.
Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the
property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an
orchard. That land was definitely not an accretion. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership over the lot. Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents. Even if respondents possessed the lot for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the
land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion. Since property of public
dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to
be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. It
was cited in a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question
has been declared alienable.

3. SPS PERALTA vs HEIRS OF ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014

FACTS:
The subject parcel of land was registered in the name of Abalon. By virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a TCT was issued in the name of Rellama. It was then subdivided into 3
portions. Lot 1679-A was sold to Sps Peralta, and a TCT was issued in their names. Lot
1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Lotivio who thereafter transferred his
ownership and a TCT was issued in the name of the Andals, the latter likewise acquired
Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of a TCT. Claiming that the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming
further that they acquired the subject property by succession, they being the nephew
and niece of Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff-appellees filed the case below
against herein defendants-appellants. They averred that the owner’s duplicate had
always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise,
they alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property through
her tenant. On the other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he
was claiming. They further alleged that after the ownership over the subject property was
transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof and retained
Godofredo as their own tenant. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not
buyers in good faith as they were aware that the subject land was in the possession of
the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the purchase. They thus claim that the
titles issued to the defendants-appellants are null and void. RTC ruled in favor of the
Abalons and CA declared the Andals to be buyers in good faith of the subject property
and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor was valid while Sps Peralta acted in bad
faith, for relying merely on a photocopy of the certificate of title.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in declaring the Andals as buyers in good faith and Sps. Peralta
buyers in bad faith.
Held: No. Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before
receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers
in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from whom they receive the
thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are
acting in good faith. After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under
fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his name and selling
a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent
circumstances involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of
the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or proof that would rebut the presumption
in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered them
as buyers in good faith and upheld their title. The records of the RTC and the CA have
a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his name;
and there was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was
no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being sold to them, and that he had
transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus, they had every right to
rely on the face of his title alone. As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA
that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a factual finding that
in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title
provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title should have
made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama,
because he was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was
supported by evidence.

4. VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES BRANOCO, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase from Vere
who, in turn, bought such from Rodrigo. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for
tax purposes soon after acquiring it. Respondents similarly claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase from Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the Property. The
trial court ruled for petitioner, however set aside by CA where it upheld the sale between
Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’

HELD: No. It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under
a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by
the heirs of Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s
estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the
moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which was
reflected in the Deed. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as
a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have
easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell,
or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to
that effect.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property. Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim
of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s combined possession of the
Property for more than ten years. Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded
legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through
possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession
coupled with just title and good faith. There is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right. Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership. Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having
successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As
Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the
Property "in the concept of an owner" nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation and
seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. When Vere bought the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that
prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith. Lacking good faith possession,
petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to
show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.
Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.

5. ARAMBULO vs. NOLASCO, G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners of 2 parcels of land. When Iraida passed away, she
was succeeded by her husband, respondent and their children. Petitioners filed a petition
for relief alleging that all of the co-owners, except for respondents, have authorized
petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject properties; that only respondents
are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares and that the sale of subject
properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or
more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
common, the courts may afford adequate relief. Respondents sought dismissal of the
petition for being premature and that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners
to sell the properties they co-owned because they were not called to participate in any
negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. Trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners and that respondents’ withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares
is prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners, hence, ordered respondents to
give their consent to the sale. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the
full ownership of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be
compelled to sell their undivided shares in the properties.

ISSUE: W/N respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give their
consent to the sale of their shares in the co-owned properties.

HELD: No. Article 493 of the Civil Code dictates that each one of the parties herein as
co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by
the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the
part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may
be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With
the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their
parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners,
their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents. Since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co- owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. To
be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of
the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions
of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free
disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for
partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co- ownership. Article 494 of the
Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and
that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree
that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property, it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners,
and (b) the co- owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. This is the
result obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be
done while the co-ownership exists.

6. BORROMEO vs DESCALLAR, G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009

FACTS: Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent lived together and transferred to their
own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision. When the Deed of Absolute Sale, under
their name, was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, it was refused
on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was deleted in the Deed because of
legal constraints. Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were issued in
respondent’s name alone. However, they broke up, after sometime, and Jambrich met
petitioner. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business. Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted
to the latter and to pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to petitioner but when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property contending
that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner
acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which
Jambrich executed in his favor. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner which was reversed
by the CA, ruling that Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title
thereto.

ISSUE: W/N Jambrich, an alien, has right to transfer the property purchased but named
in favor of another.

HELD: Yes. It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only
a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the
titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply
to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as
when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She
had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. Respondent argued
that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. The capacity to acquire private
land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private
land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino
citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. As the property in dispute is already in
the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy
to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.

7. Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation v. Chung, G.R. No.

173252, July 17, 2009

FACTS: Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner

of a parcel of which contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
carried over from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico declaring that Francisco Hidalgo
has the right to open doors in the course of his lot and to pass through the land of
Encarnacion Sandico, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and
towards the right of a Callejon. The annotation does not expressly provide that it will be
binding to the heirs and assigns of the parties. Furthermore, the property of Hidalgo was
already subdivided.
The memorandum of encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of every title
covering Sandico’s property until it was acquired by the petitioner. Hidalgo’s property,
on the other hand was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph, Kia and Cleto all
surnamed Chung.
Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of
Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road
which is Matienza Street which was granted but the trial court but eventually reversed
by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES
• WON the can be cancelled by the petitioners who owns the servient estate on the
ground that that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road
• WON the easement is binding only between Hidalgo and Sandico since the
annotation did not expressly provides the intention to bind their heirs and assigns.

RULING: An easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable,

whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do
or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
These are established either by law (legal easement) or by the will of the owner
(voluntary easement).

(1) Petitioner itself admitted that the existing easement is voluntary. The opening of an
adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may
have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency
as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. This easement of
right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or
by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art. 631,NCC)
(2) A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract that is generally
effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.

8. FUENTES vs ROCA, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

FACTS: Tarroza sold her titled land to her son, Roca. Six years later, the latter, without
registering the land to his name, offered to sell the lot to petitioners. When they executed
the Deed of Sale, they expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months and
required the petitioners to pay downpayment for the transfer of the lots to Roca, and the
latter to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure consent of his wife. And if
complied by Roca, the Fuentes’ shall take possession and pay the balance and if not,
the latter will become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. Upon
compliance, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately
constructed a building on the lot. Eight years later, the children of Roca, the respondents,
filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes
spouses claiming that the sale was void since Roca’s wife, did not give her consent to it,
that her signature had been forged. The petitioners presented Atty. Plagata who testified
that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence and admitted, however,
that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the
Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she
alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on
ground of fraud had already lapsed. Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented
handwriting experts at the trial, who testified in favor of each other’s parties. RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that the action had already prescribed and mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery and Atty.
Plagatas defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. CA
reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give
credence to Atty. Plagatas testimony. Also, upon comparing the questioned signature
with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance between them. That
they had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion
that her signature had been forged. Since they were married in 1950, the CA concluded
that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife
during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that
the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the 1989 sale.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the wife’s signature was forged;
2. Whether or not the Roca’s action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed
3. Whether or not only the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.

HELD:
1. The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature strokes on the
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other
hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R and s
were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained
eye. Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she
signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for
comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from
any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed
the affidavit of consent. While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of
its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.

2. Second. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses in 1989, a few months after
the Family Code took effect which was in 1988. Here, the Rocas filed an action against
the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real
property that their father sold without his wife’s written consent. The passage of time did
not erode the right to bring such an action. Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil
Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife
may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. It did not yet prescribe.

3. No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Roca’s despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership
of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the
right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
disposal. In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among
other things, to recover from the heirs, the Rocas, what they paid him, with legal interest
until fully paid, chargeable against his estate. Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to
have acted in good faith in entering the land and building improvements on it, for they
had not known that the signature of the wife was indeed forged. As possessor in good
faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property
prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are
entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the
property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made.
9. ALOLINO vs SPS. FLORES, G.R. 198774, April 04, 2016

FACTS: Alolino extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his registered 2
contiguous land. There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on
the perimeter wall. In 1994, the respondents constructed their house/sari sari store on
the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of
Alolino's house. The structure is only about 2-3 inches away from the back of Alolino's
house, depriving Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his
house. Acting on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal
Construction against the respondents directing them to immediately stop further
construction. Sometime in 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second
floor to their structure, again without securing a building permit. This floor was to serve
as residence for their daughter. The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal
Construction directing the respondents to desist from their illegal construction. The Office
of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that no settlement was
reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint. In 2003, Alolino filed a
complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal of the
encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and
(3) the payment of damages. The respodents alleged that they had occupied their lot
where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in
the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he
constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing the required
setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not
violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window. And
they claimed that in 2004, the Sanggunian reclassified the property as a residential lot
from its prior classification as a barrio/municipal road. RTC rendered a judgment ordering
the respondents to remove their illegal structure obstructing Alolino's right to light and
view. It held that the respondents' illegal construction was a private nuisance with respect
to Alolino because it prevented him from using the back portion of his property and
obstructed his free passage to the barrio/municipal road and was a public nuisance,
having been illegally constructed on a barrio road - a government property - without a
building permit. CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has a right to easement to light and view

HELD: No. An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community,
or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. Continuous
and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
years. Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones can
only be acquired by virtue of a title. Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification
for the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract.
We must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land
itself is public property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and
cannot be burdened with voluntary easements. On the other hand, the respondents'
house is private property, albeit illegally constructed on public property. It can be the
object of prescription and can be burdened with voluntary easements. Nevertheless, it
is indisputable that the respondents have not voluntarily burdened their property with an
easement in favor of Alolino. An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot
be acquired through prescription. On the other hand, an easement of light and view can
be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the dominant
estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window
located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have
made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction in 1994;
Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription.
Thus, only easements created by law can burden the respondents' property. Alolino does
not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not mean, however, that
the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking the rear
of Alolino's house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the
proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance. Under Article 694 of the Civil Code,
the respondents' house is evidently a nuisance. A barrio road is designated for the use
of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon.
Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed
house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The occupation and use of
private individuals of public places devoted to public use constitute public and private
nuisances and nuisance per se. Evidently, the respondents have no right to maintain
their occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road. The interests of the few
do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and
general welfare.

10. RANA vs LEE WONG, G.R. No. 192861, June 30, 2014

FACTS: Wong and Sps. Ong are co-owners of a registered residential land. On the
opposite side of the subject road are the adjacent lots of Sps. Uy and Sps. Rana which
follows a rolling terrain with the Rana property standing 2 meters higher than and
overlooking the Uy property, while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the
subject road. In 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road
that runs between the Rana and Wong-Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level
the said portion with their gate. Sps. Rana likewise backfilled a portion (subject
backfilling) of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy properties without
erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials. The
matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Lahug as well as the Office
of the Building Official of Cebu City (OBO), but to no avail. Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps.
Uy filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana before
the RTC claiming that both the elevated and cemented subject portion and the subject
backfilling are "nuisances" caused/created by the latter which curtailed their use and
enjoyment of their properties. Sps. Rana countered that prior to the construction of their
residence, there was no existing road and they merely developed the subject portion
which abuts their gate in view of the rolling terrain. They claimed that Wong and Sps.
Ong do not have any need for the subject portion because their property is facing an
existing road. They likewise denied having undertaken any backfilling along the
boundary of the Uy property considering the natural elevation of their own property,
which renders backfilling unnecessary. Wong, et al., in turn, filed a Motion for Leave to
be Allowed to Bring in Heavy Equipment for the intermediate development of the Wong-
Ong property with a view to the use of the subject road as access to their lot.
Notwithstanding Sps. Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted Wong,et al.’s motion. Despite
the limited tenor of the Order, Wong, et al., proceeded to level the subject portion, which,
in the process, hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their residence, resulting
too to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage. Feeling aggrieved, Sps. Rana,
filed a Supplemental Answer, praying for restoration and indemnity. Meanwhile, Sps.
Rana filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Damages against Sps. Uy, due to
encroached portion upon an 11 sq. m. portion along the common boundary of their
properties, which was counteracted by Sps. Rana. RTC ordered a resurvey of the
properties to show cause of the actions and declared thereafter that the parties all acted
in bad faith, and, therefore, no relief can be granted to them against each other and
found that the backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property exerted pressure on the
perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a nuisance. As such, the former
were directed to construct a retaining wall at their own expense. RTC decision was
affirmed by CA.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Wong et.al. can be granted for Abatement of Nuisance and Damages.
2. W/N there was an encroachment.

HELD:
1. A nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which "affects a community
or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or (b) a private
nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition". Jurisprudence further
classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that
is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance may
either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which "affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity"); or
(b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which "depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.") It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a
nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated. With respect to the elevated and
cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. By its
nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily
to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly
located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong
properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se(but actually a nuisance per
accidensas will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily abated.
As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the
unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject
portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the
aforesaid rights. Thus, for the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights, Sps.
Rana should be similarly held liable for nominal damages.
2. Yes. Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may
prosper, the party prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his
ownership thereof. In the present cases, the Report of the court-appointed
commissioner, Atty. Pintor, who conducted a relocation survey of the Rana and Uy
properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the two properties and showed
that Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of the Rana property. Both the RTC
and the CA relied upon the said report; thus, absent any competent showing that the
said finding was erroneous, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the conclusions
reached by the courts a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are,
therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq.m. encroached portion.

11. Planters Development Bank vs Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619, September
5, 2012

Facts: BF Homes and Julie Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land.
Later, BF Homes sold to PDB all its rights over the contract. Chandumal paid her monthly
amortizations until she defaulted in her payments. So, PDB sent a notice to Chandumal
with a demand to vacate the land within 30 days, otherwise all of her rights will be
extinguished and the contract will be terminated and deemed rescinded. In spite of the
demand, Chandumal failed to settle her account. PDB filed an action for judicial
confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession but still Chandumal refused
to do so. Summons were then issued and served by deputy sheriff Galing but its was
unavailing as she was always out of her house on the dates the summons were served.
RTC then issued an order granting the motion of PDB. Chandumal filed an urgent motion
to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer. Chandumal said that she did
not receive the summons and was not notified of the same and her failure to file an
answer within the reglementary period was due to fraud. RTC denied Chandumal's
motion to set aside the order of default. Chandumal appealed to the CA. CA nullified the
RTC's decision. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons?
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC?
(3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the contract to sell?
Held:
(1) Correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service
of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically show
or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer
or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant.

(2) The Court notes that aside from the allegation that she did not receive any summons,
Chandumal’s motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed to
positively assert the trial court lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was
the substantial claim that PDB failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552
on payment of cash surrender value, which already delves into the merits of PDB’s cause
of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision to the CA, an act
which demonstrates her recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render said
judgment.

(3) R.A. No. 6552 recognizes the right of the seller to cancel the contract but any such
cancellation must be done in conformity with the requirements therein prescribed. In
addition to the notarial act of rescission, the seller is required to refund to the buyer the
cash surrender value of the payments on the property. The actual cancellation of the
contract can only be deemed to take place upon the expiry of a thirty (30)-day period
following the receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission
by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash surrender value.

12. Rotairo vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 173632 , September 29, 2014

Facts: A parcel of land in was mortgage by Victor Alcantara and Alfred Ignacio to
Pilipinas Bank and Thrust Comp. in 1968. Two years after, the property was parceled
out by Alcantara and Ignacio and separately sold to different buyers, one of whom is
Ambrosio Rotairo. Rotairo constructed his house on the property and after completing
payments, A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 25, 1979 in his favor
by Ignacio and Co. In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan
obligations causing Pilipinas Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property.
Alcantara and Ignacio failed to redeem the property thus title was consolidated in the
name of Pilipinas Bank. The bank sold the property to Rovira Alcantara who is the
daughter of Victor Alcantara. Rovira filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages before the RTC which dismissed the same. The CA on appeal set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the turnover of possession of the property to Rovira. Hence
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Rovira can claim a better right to the property.

Held. No. The Court finds that Rovira cannot claim a better right to the property because
she is not a buyer in good faith. "The vendor’s heirs are his privies.” Based on such
privity, Rovira is charged with constructive knowledge of prior dispositions or
encumbrances affecting the subject property made by her father. The fact that the
contract to sell was unregistered became immaterial and she is, therefore, bound by the
provisions of the contract to sell and eventually, the contract of sale, executed by her
father in favor of Rotairo.
Further, more than the charge of constructive knowledge, the surrounding circumstances
of this case show Rovira’s actual knowledge of the disposition of the subject property
and Rotairo’s possession thereof. It is undisputed that after the contract to sell was
executed in April 1970, Rotairo immediately secured a mayor’s permit in September 28,
1970 for the construction of his residential house on the property. Rotairo, and
subsequently, his heirs, has been residing on the property since then. Rovira, who lives
only fifty (50) meters away from the subject property, in fact, knew that there were
"structures built on the property." Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother to
inquire as to the legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by
the bank of its title to the property." But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and
assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and
make necessary inquiries because the bank was not in possession of the property.
"Where the vendor is not in possession of the property, the prospective vendees are
obligated to investigate the rights of one in possession." A purchaser cannot simply close
his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard, and thereafter claim that
he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.

13. G.R. 182133, June 23, 2015

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS-HLURB, J.O.S. MANAGING BUILDERS, INC., AND EDUPLAN
PHILS., INC.

Facts: J.O.S Managing Builders registered owner and developer of the

condominium project Aurora Milestone Tower sold a condominium unit to EDUPLAN by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said unit. JOS Managing Builders failed to
issue Condominium Certificate of Title in the name of EDUPLAN. Later, EDUPLAN
learned that several lots owned by JOS, including the land where Aurora Milestone
Tower was erected, were mortgage to Union Overseas Bank of the Philippines without
prior approval from the HLURB. EDUPLAN filed a complaint before the HLURB arbiter
for specific performance 1) declare the mortgage between Union Bank and JOS, null
and void 2) the release of Condominium Certificate of Title and 3) to provide emergency
power facilities to EDUPLAN including monthly telephone carrier charges. In its defense,
Union Bank stated that the lands owned by JOS were already foreclosed and that they
are the highest bidder on the foreclosure sale. The arbiter ruled that the mortgage was
null and void contrary to Section 18 of PD 957 or the Condominium Act which requires
prior approval of HLURB to encumber a condominium to a contract of mortgage. HLURB
Board of Commissioners affirmed the decision. Union Bank filed a Petition for Review
before the CA but was dismissed due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
proper action is to Petition for Review to the Office of the President.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the case
Whether or not the mortgage is null and void.

Ruling: CA erred in dismissing the petition. The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic vs. Lacap, the
court enumerated the numerous exceptions, one of the exceptions is when the question
involve is purely legal and will ultimately to be decided by the courts of justice. This case
falls under this exception.
The mortgage is only null and void with regards to EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc’s
unit. In this case, the only subject of litigation is one unit condominium unit and not all
the properties under mortgage. Therefore, EDUPLAN has no personality or standing to
bring suit on the whole property, as he has actionable interest over the subject lot only.
EDUPLAN has already paid in full the entire unit, so he is entitled to the transfer of
ownership and the issuance of Certificate of Title as provided for under Section 25 of PD
957. With respect to the mortgage of the other properties, it is still valid and binding
between Union Bank and JOS Builders. Failure to secure the HLURB'S prior written
approval as required by P.D. No. 957 will not annul the entire mortgage between the
condominium developer and the creditor bank, otherwise the protection intended for
condominium buyers will inadvertently be extended to the condominium developer even
though, by failing to secure the government's prior approval, it is the party at fault.

14. G.R. No. 176791 November 14, 2012

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC. vs. SPOUSES ARSENIO (Deceased) and
ANGELES NANOL AND ANYBODY CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM

Facts: Respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to Sell
with petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc a house and Lots 17 and 19. Respondent-
spouses, however did not avail petitioners in house financing instead from Capitol
Development Bank. A simulated sale over the property was executed in favor of the
spouses. Accordingly, titles were transferred in the name of respondents and submitted
to Capital Development Bank for loan processing. Unfortunately, the bank collapsed.
Thus, the respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner over
the same property this time, they availed the in-house financing. Sometime in 200,
respondent demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house allegedly
valued at P 3.5 Million, more or less. On Sept. 10, 20013, petitioner sent a notarized
notice of Deliquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due to the latter’s failure to pay
the monthly installments. Respondent did not vacate the premises. Petitioner filed a
Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of Possession, Conveyance and Damages.
The RTC declared the deed of absolute sale as void and directed the respondents to
turn-over the house and lot and for Communities Cagayan Inc. to pay their total monthly
installments and the value of the new house less the cost of the original house.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition.
Issue: Whether or not RTC erred in requiring Communities Cagayan Inc. to pay the total
monthly installments and the value of the new house less the cost of the original house.

Ruling: Yes. CCI is not required to pay the total monthly installments of the respondents
rather an amount of 50% of the cash surrender value of the payments made on the
property. Under the Maceda Law, if the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to
the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to 50%
of the total payments made. With respect to the payment of the value of the house, this
case is remanded to the RTC for further proceedings with the proper application of Arts.
448, 546 and 548 of the NCC. Art. 448 provides two options for the owner 1) he may
appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbu8sing the buyer(builder in good
faith), the necessary and useful expenses or; 2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless
its value is considerable more than that of the improvement, in which case, the buyer
shall pay reasonable rent.

15. Philippine National Bank vs. Spouses Marañon, GR No. 189316, July 01, 2013

Facts:
A 152 square meter lot in downtown Bacolod with a building leased to various tenants
was subjected to a loan and mortgage by Spouses Montealegre with Philippine National
Bank. The property was under the name of EmolieMontalegre under TCT 156512. The
Spouses Montealegre failed to pay the loan and PNB foreclosed on said lot and building.
During auction sale PNB was the highest bidder on August 16, 1991, then was issued a
Certificate of Sale on December 17, 1991 and registered on February 4, 1992.
Spouses Marañon filed on July 29, 1992 before the RTC a complaint for Annulment
of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the Montealegres, PNB, the Register of
Deeds and Provincial Sherriff. The civil case alleged that the Marañons are rightful
owners of the lot and the Montealegres forged their names in a Deed of Sale to transfer
the property to the Montealegres. PNB averred it is a mortgagee in good faith and the
mortgage is binding and valid. During the trial PaterioTolete deposited with the Clerk of
Court of Bacolod P144,000 and P30,000 with PNB of rental payments. RTC found in
favor of the Marañon after it was determined that their signatures were in deed forged
and the conveyance to the Montealegres was null and void. PNB was also adjudged as
a mortgagee in good faith and to respect the lien on the property. Neither parties
dissented.
Current controversy is the rental monies deposited. Marañons filed an Urgent Motions
for Withdrawal of Deposited Rental for the P144,000 and P30,000 deposited by Tolete.
The RTC granted the motion for both rental payments because the Spouses are the
rightful owners and they are entitled to the civil fruits of their property. The RTC issued
Orders to return the P30,000 to the Spouses.
PNB dissented saying the mortgage lien was decided to be respected and they are
entitled to both the P144,000 and the P30,000 rental payments and filed petitions for
certiorari and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals denied the petition rationalizing that the mortgage transaction was not
between the current petitioners and respondents and that PNB was not a mortgagee in
good faith because as a financial institution should have looked beyond the title
presented by the Montealegres. Motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues:
#1 Whether or not that the mortgage the RTC decided should be respected should also
include the fruits deposited to answer for the debt.
#2 Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision that PNB was a
mortgagee in good faith.

Held:
#1 No. Rent as an accessory follows the principal is the general rule. Normally when
the principal property is mortgaged and there is failure of the mortgagor to pay, the fruits
pass on to the mortgagee as accorded by the Article 2127 of the Civil Code. But this is
subject to qualfications. This rule is under the presumption that the mortgagor was the
rightful owner to encumber such property. There was no juridical tie made between PNB
and the Marañons because of the fraudulent acts of the Montealegres. The building and
fruits are not subjected to the lien, only the lot. Thus the rents paid are not subjected to
be passed upon to PNB.

#2 Yes. The RTC has already determined that PNB was a mortgagor in good faith and
was given finality because it was not disputed by the parties at present. This is called
the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgements.

The doctrine espouses two purposes:

(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business; and
(2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist.
The Supreme Court though agreed in toto the resolutions given the CA although
the High Court opined that PNB is in good faith, for the sake of reiterating that the
Marañons are the rightful owners. The standing as purchaser of PNB has not been yet
decided and cannot be entertained yet by the SC.

16. Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013

FACTS: Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Velazco, filed an
application for land registration claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, as evidenced by a certification by the CENRO,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration. The OSG appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the CA then
reversed the RTC decision and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March
15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.

ISSUE: Whether Malabanan’s possession of the land had already ripened to ownership

HELD: No. There are two ways how Malabanan can acquire the property: (A) Under
SEC 14(1) of PD1529, which states that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupaton of alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisiton of ownership since June 12, 1945. Under this, the land
need not to be alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. One can
secure judicial confirmaton as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable. (B) Under
SEC 14(2) of PD1529, which pertains to prescripton as a mode of acquiring ownership
over “PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY” of the states that there must be an express
declaration that such property is already patrimonial. The prescriptve period is 10 years
if with just title and 30 years if no just title. Petition was denied because Malabanan is
not qualifed under the two circumstances. In the first, there is no evidence of possession
since June 12, 1945 since his tax declaraton is only since 1948. While under the second
circumstance, the property becomes patrimonial only since 1982 and the 30-year period
of prescripton is not yet met.

17. GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION, vs CYPRESS GARDENS

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171072, April 7, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress
Gardens, a ten-storey building. Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and
incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to
manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the
land on which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress but Goldcrest
retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the
condominium Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the
management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium
to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas
pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in
1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the
common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon.
Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between
the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and
the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that
Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said areas and for its refusal to remove
the questioned structures.
Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. On review, the HLURB Special
Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the award for actual
damages after finding that the encroached areas were not actually measured and that
there was no evidentiary basis for the rate of compensation fixed by Arbiter San Vicente.
It likewise held that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the use of the roof decks
limited common area because only Goldcrest has the right to use the same.
Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It questioned the
deletion of the award for actual damages and argued that the HLURB Special Division
in effect ruled that Goldcrest could erect structures on the roof decks limited common
area and lease the same to third persons. The Office of the President dismissed the
appeal. Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which partly
granted its appeal. The parties separately moved for partial reconsideration but both
motions were denied. Hence this petition

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK
DESIGNATED AS A LIMITED COMMON AREA.

RULING:
No. The SC find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office
of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office
structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same.
Goldcrests did not only act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium
plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.The owne r of the
dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights
on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than
that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary
for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement
more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make
necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient
time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner
of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the
office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks
limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the
condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium
unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.

18. Calanasan vs Sps. Dolorito, G.R. No. 171937, November 25, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner took care of her orphan niece, the respondent since childhood. In
1982, when Evelyn was already married to respondent Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner
donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been mortgaged. The donation was
conditional: Evelyn must redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and
enjoy the property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation
and its terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property, had the
title of the land transferred to her name, and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights
over the donated land. In, 2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J.
Calanasan, complained with the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude
against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be revoked; in their
answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of ingratitude. The petitioner
died while the case was pending with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores J.
Calanasan, substituted for her. After the petitioner had rested her case, the respondents
filed a demurrer to evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may dissolve the donation

HELD: No. Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules
on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed." The SC agree with
the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the
property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable
consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of
contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with
respect to the onerous portion of the donation. Insofar as the value of the land exceeds
the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions
on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation
to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation.

19. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, vs. LEGASPI TOWERS 300,

INC., G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009

FACTS: Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land along the
stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a
loan from PNB to finance the construction of a 21-storey condominium along Roxas Blvd.
The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land where Caruff
planned to erect the condominium.
— In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the mortgaged parcels
of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the building constructed by Caruff, it built
a powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps in the adjacent lot.
— After the completion of the condominium project, it was constituted pursuant to the
Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
— However, for Caruff’s failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the
mortgage. Thereafter, Proclamation no. 50 was issued which provided for the creation
of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
— By virtue of A.O. No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer executed by PNB, the National
Government became the assignee and transferee of all its rights and titles to and
interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from the
foreclosure of Caruff’s mortgage.
— Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC, whereby Caruff sought
the nullification of PNB’s foreclosure of its properties.
— A Compromise Agreement was later entered into by Caruff, PNB, and the National
Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other things, that Caruff would
transfer and convey in favor of the National Government the lot where it built the
generating set and sump pumps. The RTC rendered a Decision approving the
Compromise Agreement.
— On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence of an
easement before the RTC. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of constructing the
powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted a voluntary easement in favor
of the respondent.
— APT alleged that it acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the Compromise
Agreement free from any liens and/or encumbrances. It was not a privy to any
transaction or agreement entered into by and between Caruff, respondent, and the bank.
It further alleged that the continued use of the subject property by respondent and the
condominium owners without its consent was an encroachment upon its rights as
absolute owner and for which it should be properly compensated.
— The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence of an easement over the portion
of the land occupied at present [by the] powerhouse and sump pumps nos. 1 and 2 only,
of Legaspi Towers 300, in favor of Legaspi Towers 300, Incorporated.
— Aggrieved, APT sought recourse before the CA. The petitioner, Privatization and
Management Office (PMO) substituted APT in its appeal. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump pumps constitutes
as easement of the property.

HELD: NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from
doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of
another thing or person."
— Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable
for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
— There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners. Article 619
of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former
are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
— In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the subject
property.
— In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary easement
when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the disputed portion of the
subject property for its benefit. However, it should be noted that when the appurtenances
were constructed on the subject property, the lands where the condominium was being
erected and the subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were
constructed belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply,
since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both properties were owned
by Caruff.

20. Quintos vs Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

FACTS: The parties in this case are siblings and their parents, were the owners of the
subject property. When the couple passed away, they left the ownership over the
property to their ten children. In 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition
against petitioners. Due to non-appearance of parties as well as their counsels, the case
was dismissed. As they were unable to secure a favorable decision, respondents
resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication bequeathing ownership to the ten siblings.
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property to
spouses Candelario. Petitioner siblings filed for Quieting of Title against the respondents
alleging that their parents had in their lifetime transferred ownership of the property in
favor of the siblings. They further averred that they have adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled
to equitable title thereto. They also did not have any participation in executing the Deed
of Adjudication. Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already
barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10
undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on
the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial
constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf.
Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from
their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents
sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property

HELD: NO. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt,
or uncertainty affecting title to real property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
efficacy. In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action
must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite. Petitioners failed
in proving their claim over the property. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent
siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co.
over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer
evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the
ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.
On the contrary, on May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale covering
half of the subject property in favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners alone.
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence.Regrettably,
petitioners, as such plaintiff, in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed
upon them in proving legal or equitable title over the parcel of land in issue. As such,
there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the
subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent
siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent
spouses became co-owners of the same.

21. LOCSIN vs HIZON, G.R. No. 204369, September 17, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner as the registered owner of the lot, filed an ejectment case against one
Aceron before the MTC to recover possession over the land in issue. Eventually, the two
entered into a compromise agreement, which the MTC approved. Locsin later went to
the United States without knowing whether Aceron has complied with his part of the
bargain under the compromise agreement. In spite of her absence, however, she
continued to pay the real property taxes on the subject lot. When Locsin discovered that
her copy of the TCT was missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction
to secure a new one. Sometime in early 2002, she discovered through her counsel that
Bolos was able to secure a new TCT by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
her and later titled to Carlos. She then sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the
property since her signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery.
Carlos claimed that he was unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos’ title and he is, thus,
an innocent purchaser for value and good faith. Bernardo, father of Carlos’ and who
bought the property, met with Locsin’s counsel and discussed a compromise, which
turned out to be deceitful, for Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property
for to his sister and her husband, herein respondents Sps Guevara, who had a new
certificate of title issued in their names. The sps Guevara then immediately mortgaged
the said property. It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that Locsin filed an
action for reconveyance, annulment of the TCT, cancellation of the mortgage lien
annotated thereon, and damages. RTC dismissed the complaint which was affirmed by
CA wherein
it was ruled that respondents are innocent purchasers for value and Locsin can no longer
recover the subject lot.

Issue:Whether or not respondents are innocent purchasers for value.

Held: No. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full
and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another
person’s claim. Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule
that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. The recognized exception to this rule is that
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of
a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. One who
falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value
nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
In the case at bar, Bolos’ certificate of title was concededly free from liens and
encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of Carlos and the spouses Guevara to
exercise the necessary level of caution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the
sequence of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the application of the mirror
doctrine and inspires the Court’s concurrence with petitioner’s proposition. Bernardo
knew that Bolos, from whom he purchased the subject property, never acquired
possession over the lot. Bolos’ purported Deed of Sale was executed in 1979 but the
ejectment case commenced by Locsin against Aceron was in 1992, or thirteen (13)years
after the property was supposedly transferred to Bolos. Having knowledge of the
foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos, to our mind, should have been impelled to
investigate the reason behind the arrangement. They should have been pressed to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation in order to protect Carlos’
interest. Entering into a compromise agreement is an act of strict dominion. If Bolos
already acquired ownership of the property as early as 1979, it should have been her
who entered into a compromise agreement with Aceron in 1993, not her predecessor-
in-interest, Locsin, who, theoretically, had already divested herself of ownership thereof.
The spouses Guevara are not innocent purchasers for value, the transfer from Carlos to
the spouses Guevara was effected only 15 days after Locsin demanded the surrender
of the property from Carlos. The fact that Lourdes Guevara and Carlos are siblings, and
that Carlos’ agent in his dealings concerning the property is his own father, renders
incredible the argument that Lourdes had no knowledge whatsoever of Locsin’s claim of
ownership at the time of the purported sale. There is also strong reason to believe that
even the mortgage in favor of DCC was a mere ploy to make it appear that the Sps.
Guevara exercised acts of dominion over the subject property. This is so considering the
proximity between the property’s registration in their names and its being subjected to
the mortgage. These circumstances, taken altogether, strongly indicate that Carlos and
the spouses Guevara failed to exercise the necessary level of caution expected of a
bona fide buyer and even performed acts that are highly suspect. Consequently, this
Court could not give respondents the protection accorded to innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value.

22. LIMSON vs Wack Wack Condominium Corp., G.R. No. 188802, February 14,
2011

FACTS: Petitioner purchased from Benitez an apartment unit at Wack Wack Apartments.
Upon moving in, she noticed defects in the electrical main panel hence, reported by
writing to respondent. Gonzalez, a Member of respondents Board of Directors, replied
by letter that, it is the duty of the unit owner to maintain the electrical and plumbing
systems at her expense under House Rules and Regulations. Thereafter, Petitioner
informed respondent that the switch board is such that No. 12 wire is protected by 30
ampere fuse and that five appliances are connected to only one fuse and later sought
professional assistance from a private electrical consultant, who concluded that the
wirings are unsafe, hazardous and did not comply with the Philippine Electrical Code.
City Building Office conducted an inspection and recommended replacement of fusible
load center with panel board and circuit breaker components and to submit a built
electrical plan signed by a Professional Electrical Engineer. Respondent wrote Revelina
to demand that repairs be undertaken within 10 days and imposed a daily fine. Petitioner
refused to undertake the repairs and to pay the fine and claimed that the electrical main
panel forms part of the common areas, citing RA 4726, An Act to Define Condominium,
Establish Requirements for Its Creation and Government of Its Incidents, arguing that
an electrical main panel is in the nature of a utility installation. Respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against the petitioner to compel Sps
Limson to undertake the necessary repairs of the defective and hazardous condition of
the electrical wiring of their Unit and seek payment of liquidated damages. Assessments
and penalties were charged against the spouses and respondent filed a Notice of
Assessment with the Register of Deeds with application for foreclosure and public
auction of the Unit, which was then purchased by the respondent. RTC dismissed
respondent’s complaint for and ruled that the questioned electrical installations are to be
considered as part of the common area and not of Unit 703, though the same are
necessarily found inside the said unit. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, holding
in the main that for the electrical main panel to be considered as part of the common
areas, it should have been intended for communal use and benefit. The subject electrical
main panel being located inside the unit and its principal function being to control the
flow of electricity into the unit, the appellate court concluded that charges for its repair
cannot be for respondents account.

ISSUE: W/N unit owner has the duty to maintain electrical and plumbing system.

Held: No. In a multi-occupancy dwelling such as Apartments, limitations are imposed

under R.A. 4726 in accordance with the common interest and safety of the occupants
therein which at times may curtail the exercise of ownership. Upon acquisition of a unit,
the owner not only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also binds himself to a contract
with other unit owners. Unquestionably, the fuse box controls the supply of electricity
into the unit. Power is sourced through jumper cables attached to the main switch which
connects the units electrical line to the Apartments common electrical line. It is an
integral component of a power utility installation. Respondent cannot disclaim
responsibility for the maintenance of the Apartments electrical supply system solely
because a component thereof is placed inside a unit. Utility installations forms part of the
common areas, which reference is justified by practical considerations. Repairs to
correct any defects in the electrical wiring should be under the control and supervision
of respondent to ensure safety and compliance with the Philippine Electrical Code, not
to mention security and peace of mind of the unit owners.