CASTRO V.
SAGALES the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to
Facts: Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952
conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear and
decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme
Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for
compensation had to be submitted to the regular
courts. The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in
January 1952 and action having been commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952
.1 For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the
accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should
be considered because the right to compensation of the
laborer or employees or his dependents, like the
obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins from
the very moment of the accident.
Issue: the resultant issue is the proper forum: either the
courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission
Whether or not the matter falls within the jurisdiction of
the Workmen’sCompensation Commission
Held: It is true that the right arises from the moment of
the accident, but such right must be declared or
confirmed by the government agency empowered by
law to make the declaration. Republic Act No. 772 is
very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for
compensation shall be decided exclusively by the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having been
formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no
jurisdiction, at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional
objection may be interposed to the application of the
law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission,
because the statute does not thereby operate
retroactively; it is made to operate upon
claims formulated after the law's approval.
CITY OF BAGUIO V. MARCOS
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI
of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral
proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was
RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio
Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25,
1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case
on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors
have been in continuous possession and cultivation of
the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim.
On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and
Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the
following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside
reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of
the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was
filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931,
which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of
cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize
the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of
Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have
been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next
Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the
Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account
of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to
be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years
next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to
be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which
should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening
of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the
institution of reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a
statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the
text may be supplied or remedied by its title.
EBARLE V. SUCALDITO
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial
governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for re-election
in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against
the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions for
prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were
dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and
alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed
to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which
outlined the procedure how complainants charging the
government officials and employees with the
commission of irregularities should be guided.
Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable
to administrative charges and not to criminal complaints
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of
Irregularities”. It speaks of commission of irregularities
and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to
make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to
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the more specific terms like “accused,” “convicted,” and
the like.
LIDASAN V. COMELEC
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later,
Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that
certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in
Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato
voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which
includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato
– to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of
the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part
of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill
that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it
only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his
own province. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
LIDASAN V. COMELEC
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the
municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the
President, recommended to Comelec that the operation
of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute
should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in
the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes
barrios located in another province — Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to
be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is
the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text
of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the
bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not
it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
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of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects
the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del
Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of
Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part
of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill.
PEOPLE V. ECHAVEZ
Facts: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against
16 persons charging them with squatting, as penalized in
Presidential Decree 772. Respondent Echavez dismissed
the case on the grounds that 1) the accused entered the
land through stealth and strategy and not with the use of
force, intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the
absence of the owner (as described in the Presidential
Decree); and 2) under the rule of ejusdem genernis, the
decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing
land.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes
squatting and similar acts also apply to agricultural
lands
Held: No.
Ratio: The preamble shows that it was intended to
apply to squatting in urban communities or particularly
to illegal constructions in squatter areas. The
complainant involves pasture lands in rural areas. The
rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) does not
apply to this case.
StatCon maxim: A preamble may restrict what
otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.
PEOPLE V. PURISIMA
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII
and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the
abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the
respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the
said informations on common ground that the
informations did not allege facts constituting ang
offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an
essential element of the crime, which is, that the
carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or
public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in
the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law
and order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege that
the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended
for the purposes of abetting the conditions of
criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The
petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is
basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct
that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal
also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is
immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in
form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal
possession of deadly weapon” penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 9?
3
Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a
complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9
states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the
acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to
suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the
like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble
and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the
stiff sanctions provided.
Aboitiz Shipping of Corp v. Cebu
G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965
Facts: Ordinance No.207 was passed by Municipal
Board of Cebu, which required ships whose vessels
dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said
city, but owned by the national government. The
petitioner paid the wharfage charges under protest.
Aboitiz questioned the validity of the ordinance
contending that the said ordinance could not have been
enacted because the right to collect wharfage belongs to
the national government. As a result of this ordinance,
they will be paying twice. The petitioner attacked Sec.
17(w) of the ordinance which states that “charges to be
paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public
wharves, docks, levees, or landing places,” questioning
the application of the word “public” whether it refers to
the ownership of the national government, provincial, or
municipality, because the local legislators did not make
distinction between those owned by the national
government and those owned by the city of Cebu.
Issue: Whether or not the city of Cebu may provide an
ordinance charging vessels dock at public wharves of
piers located in the said city but owned by the national
government
Held: No.
Ratio: Because Sec 17(w) of the Charter of Cebu would
refer only to those public wharves or landing places
owned by the City of Cebu and not those owned by the
national government, under the exclusive supervision of
Bureau of Customs, Sec. 1142 of Revised
Administrative Code.
StatCon maxim: Legislative intent should accordingly
be ascertained from a consideration if the whole context
of the statute and not from an isolated part or particular
provision.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there
shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
4
informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have
not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of
general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car
within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for
overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided
that from the action initiated by Primicias, the
Municipal Order was null and void and had been
repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null
and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in
its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an
explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the
later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict
between a municipal order and a national law must be
ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous
and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and
no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses,
etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
Bagatsing v Ramirez
GR No L-41631, December 17, 1976
FACTS:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted
5
Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public
markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and
providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation
of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of
the ordinance, alleging among others the noncompliance
to the publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the
ordinance void. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. What law should govern the publication of a
tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which
requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its
approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only
demands publication after
approval?
2. Is the ordinance valid?
RULING:
1. The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no
question that the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is a special act since it relates only to
the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax
Code is a general law because it applies
universally to all local governments. The fact
that one is special and the other general creates
a presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the
general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case. However,
the rule readily yields to a situation where the
special statute refers to a subject in general,
which the general statute treats in particular.
The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a
rule for the publication of “ordinance” in
general, while the Local Tax Code establishes
a rule for the publication of “ordinance levying
or imposing taxes fees or other charges” in
particular.
2. The ordinance is valid.
COMMISSIONER V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
FACTS:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. had zero taxable income
for 2000 but would have been liable for Minimum
Corporate Income Tax based on its gross income.
However, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. did not pay
the Minimum Corporate Income Tax using as basis its
franchise which exempts it from “all other taxes” upon
payment of whichever is lower of either (a) the basic
corporate income tax based on the net taxable income or
(b) a franchise tax of 2%.
ISSUE:
Is PAL liable for Minimum Corporate Income Tax?
HELD:
NO. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.’s franchise clearly
refers to "basic corporate income tax" which refers to
the general rate of 35% (now 30%). In addition, there is
an apparent distinction under the Tax Code between
taxable income, which is the basis for basic corporate
income tax under Sec. 27 (A) and gross income, which
is the basis for the Minimum Corporate Income Tax
under Section 27 (E). The two terms have their
respective technical meanings and cannot be used
interchangeably. Not being covered by the Charter
which makes PAL liable only for basic corporate
income tax, then Minimum Corporate Income Tax is
included in "all other taxes" from which PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. is exempted.
The CIR also can not point to the “Substitution Theory”
which states that Respondent may not invoke the “in
lieu of all other taxes” provision if it did not pay
anything at all as basic corporate income tax or
franchise tax. The Court ruled that it is not the fact tax
payment that exempts Respondent but the exercise of its
option. The Court even pointed out the fallacy of the
argument in that a measly sum of one peso would
suffice to exempt PAL from other taxes while a zero
liability would not and said that there is really no
substantial distinction between a zero tax and a one-peso
tax liability. Lastly, the Revenue Memorandum Circular
stating the applicability of the MCIT to PAL does more
than just clarify a previous regulation and goes beyond
mere internal administration and thus cannot be given
effect without previous notice or publication to those
who will be affected thereby.