I.1.1.

Introduction
NATO’s Purpose

NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through
political and military means.
I.2.1.1. Historical background

Introduction

NATO - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - is a military alliance established by the
North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) of April 4, 1949, which sought to
create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in central and Eastern Europe after World
War II and to deter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) expansion on the
European Continent. From 1945 to 1949, to widen the Communist sphere of influence, the
USSR had annexed Czechoslovakia, East Prussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, and sections of Finland, and had penetrated into the governments of Albania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary. The original members of the alliance were Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Joining the original signatories were Greece and
Turkey (1952); West Germany (1955; from 1990 as Germany); Spain (1982); the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); and Albania and Croatia (2009). France withdrew from the
integrated military command of NATO in 1966 but remained a member of the organization;
in 2009, however, French President. Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the country would
resume its position in NATO's military command.
The heart of NATO is expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the
signatory members agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Article 6 defines the geographic scope of the treaty as covering “an armed attack on the
territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America.” Other articles commit the allies to
strengthening their democratic institutions, to building their collective military capability, to
consulting each other, and to remaining open to inviting other European states to join.
Article 6 defines the geographic scope of the treaty as covering “an armed attack on the
territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America.” Other articles commit the allies to
strengthening their democratic institutions, to building their collective military capability, to
consulting each other, and to remaining open to inviting other European states to join.
Historical background
After World War II in 1945, western Europe was economically exhausted and militarily weak
(the western Allies had rapidly and drastically reduced their armies at the end of the war), and
newly powerful communist parties had arisen in France and Italy. By contrast, the Soviet
Union had emerged from the war with its armies dominating all the states of central and
eastern Europe, and by 1948 communists under Moscow's sponsorship had consolidated their
control of the governments of those countries and suppressed all noncommunist political
activity. What became known as the Iron Curtain, a term popularized by Winston Churchill,

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 had descended over central and eastern Europe. Further, wartime cooperation between the
western Allies and the Soviets had completely broken down. Each side was organizing its
own sector of occupied Germany, so that two German states would emerge, a democratic one
in the west and a communist one in the east.
In 1948 the United States launched the Marshall Plan, which infused massive amounts of
economic aid to the countries of western and southern Europe on the condition that they
cooperate with each other and engage in joint planning to hasten their mutual recovery. As for
military recovery, under the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the United Kingdom, France, and the
Low Countries—Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg—concluded a collective-
defense agreement called the Western European Union. It was soon recognized, however, that
a more formidable alliance would be required to provide an adequate military counterweight
to the Soviets.
By this time Britain, Canada, and the United States had already engaged in secret exploratory
talks on security arrangements that would serve as an alternative to the United Nations (UN),
which was becoming paralyzed by the rapidly emerging Cold War. In March 1948, following
a virtual communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February, the three governments began
discussions on a multilateral collective-defense scheme that would enhance Western security
and promote democratic values. These discussions were eventually joined by France, the Low
Countries, and Norway and in April 1949 resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty. The
foundation for NATO had been set in Brussels, Belgium, in March 1948, when
representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
met to forge a mutual assistance treaty to provide a common defense system. The Brussels
Treaty stipulated that should any of the five signatories be the target of “armed aggression in
Europe,” the other treaty parties would provide the party attacked “all the military aid and
assistance in their power.” In June 1948, after a losing battle by isolationists, the U.S.
Congress adopted a resolution recommending that the United States join in a defensive pact
for the North Atlantic area. President Harry S. Truman urged U.S. participation in NATO as a
critical part of his policy of containment of Soviet expansion. Containment had begun with
the Truman Doctrine of 1947 with military assistance to Greece and Turkey to resist
Communist subversion. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 in
Washington, D.C. It formally committed the European signatories and the United States and
Canada to the defense of Western Europe. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, 82 to 13. This
treaty marked a fundamental departure with tradition of the United States because it was
Washington's first peacetime military alliance since the Franco-American Alliance of 1778. In
October 1949, in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, Congress authorized $1.3 billion in
military aid for NATO. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. The Federal Republic of
Germany joined in 1955 following an agreement on the termination of the Allies' postwar
occupation of West Germany and an understanding that the country would maintain foreign
forces on its soil. A rearmed Germany became a major component of NATO.
The USSR strongly opposed the NATO alliance. The Berlin Blockade in 1947–48 and the
threat of war had in fact given impetus to the creation of NATO. Following the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950, fearing the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe
as a result of a miscalculation by Moscow, NATO countries expanded their military forces in
Europe. Allied forces in Western Europe numbered twelve divisions to deter a Soviet threat of
eighty divisions. The sending of several U.S. divisions to Europe was strongly debated in the
U.S. Congress. Proponents of isolationism, including former President Herbert Hoover and
Senator Robert Taft, opposed the assignment of ground troops to Europe. Others, including
retired Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, supported an increase in the U.S. commitment to the
Cold War and urged expansion of NATO forces. The isolationists lost, and Truman in 1951
added four more to the two divisions already in Germany to bring the Seventh U.S. Army to

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 six divisions. Truman also brought Eisenhower out of retirement to become Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe (SACEUR), following the creation of Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 1951. NATO ministers, in the Lisbon Agreement on NATO
Force Levels of February 1952, set new force goals for 1954 consisting of 10,000 aircraft and
89 divisions, half of them combat‐ready. These were unrealistic; but by 1953, NATO had
fielded 25 active divisions, 15 in Central Europe, and 5,200 aircraft, making it at least equal to
Soviet forces in East Germany. In 1955, Moscow created the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance
composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
East-West relations were further strained by Nikita Khrushchev, who emerged as the Soviet
leader after Josef Stalin's death in 1953. Although he had criticized Stalin's dictatorship and
had accused his predecessor of escalating international tensions, Khrushchev ordered a Soviet
force into Hungary to suppress a rebellion and maintain Communist rule in 1956. In 1957, the
USSR's launching of Sputnik, the first of the space satellites, indicated that the Soviet Union
was developing long-range nuclear missiles. NATO had planned in 1954 to use nuclear
weapons in case of a massive Soviet invasion. In 1957, it planned to make the thirty NATO
divisions and its tactical aircraft nuclear‐capable. By 1960, NATO's commander, SACEUR,
probably had some 7,000 nuclear weapons; but two SACEURs, Gen. Alfred Gruenther and
Gen. Lauris Norstad, warned of NATO's declining conventional capabilities as a result of
reductions or redeployments in British and French forces.
During the 1960s, French president Charles de Gaulle rejected the lead of the United States
and Britain in Europe and pushed for a larger diplomatic role for France. The French
developed their own nuclear capacity; then, in 1966, while still remaining a part of the NATO
community, France withdrew its troops from the alliance and requested that NATO's
headquarters and all allied units and installations not under the control of French authorities
be removed from French soil. NATO headquarters officially opened in October 1967, in
Brussels, where it has remained. East and West efforts to achieve peaceful coexistence
decreased a year later when the Soviet Union and four of its satellite nations invaded
Czechoslovakia.
In an effort to reach an era of detente, a relaxation of tensions reached through reciprocal
beneficial relations between East and West, the Nixon administration took the lead with the
Leonid Brezhnev government in Moscow, and NATO members and Warsaw Pact members
opened the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969. In May 1972, the
first series of SALT Treaties was signed. The following year a SALT II agreement was
reached, although it was never ratified by the United States. Further efforts during the 1970s
for East-West balanced force reductions proved unsuccessful. The Arab‐Israeli War did little
to ease world tensions when it erupted on 6 October 1973, after which the Soviets implied that
they might intervene in the crisis due to the strategic importance of oil reserves in that part of
the world. A year later, Brezhnev accused NATO of creating a multinational nuclear force
and called for cancellation of the alliance as a first step toward world peace. In 1979, the
USSR invaded Afghanistan and that ongoing conflict caused the suspension of negotiations
between the United States and the USSR on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) that had opened in 1981. Talks resumed in 1984 primarily to prevent the militarization
of outer space and then led to negotiations on arms control and disarmament. Reformer
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in March 1985, and that October he met
President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland, to discuss ceilings of 100 nuclear missile
warheads for each side (none of which would remain in Europe) and 100 residual warheads to
remain in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territories in the Pacific. Verification arrangements were
also agreed upon for the first time.
By the end of the 1980s, dramatic changes had occurred in the Warsaw Pact countries. In

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 November 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened, which led the way to a unified Germany ten
months later. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania took steps toward breaking from Soviet
domination. When Russian troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe in 1990, the Warsaw
Pact was dissolved. In response to these events, NATO members at a summit conference in
London in July 1990 declared that they no longer considered the Soviets to be an adversary
and laid plans for a new strategic concept that was adopted in 1991 in Rome. The concept
reaffirmed the significance of collective defense to meet evolving security threats—
particularly from civil wars and massive refugee problems—and established the basis for
peacekeeping operations, as well as coalition crisis management both inside and outside the
NATO area. It also stressed cooperation and partnership with the emerging democracies of
the former Warsaw Pact.

Organization

Spurred by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the United States took
steps to demonstrate that it would resist any Soviet military expansion or pressures in Europe.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the leader of the Allied forces in western Europe in World
War II, was named Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) by the North Atlantic
Council (NATO's governing body) in December 1950. He was followed as SACEUR by a
succession of American generals.
The North Atlantic Council (NAC), which was established soon after the treaty came into
effect, is composed of ministerial representatives of the member states, who meet at least
twice a year. At other times the council, chaired by the NATO secretary-general, remains in
permanent session at the ambassadorial level. Just as the position of SACEUR has always
been held by an American, the secretary-generalship has always been held by a European.
NATO's military organization encompasses a complete system of commands for possible
wartime use. The Military Committee, consisting of representatives of the military chiefs of
staff of the member states, subsumes two major commands: the European Command, headed
by the SACEUR and located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons, Belgium; and the Atlantic Command, headed by
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and headquartered in Norfolk,
Virginia, U.S. A third major command, the Channel Command (for the English Channel), was
headed by the Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN) until it was disbanded in 1994.
During the alliance's first 20 years, more than $3 billion worth of “infrastructure” for NATO
forces—bases, airfields, pipelines, communications networks, depots—was jointly planned,
financed, and built, with about one-third of the funding from the United States. NATO
funding generally is not used for the procurement of military equipment, which is provided by
the member states—though the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, a fleet of radar-bearing
aircraft designed to protect against a surprise low-flying attack, was funded jointly.

The role of Germany

A serious issue confronting NATO in the early and mid-1950s was the negotiation of West
Germany's participation in the alliance. The prospect of a rearmed Germany was
understandably greeted with widespread unease and hesitancy in western Europe, but the
country's strength had long been recognized as necessary to protect western Europe from a
possible Soviet invasion. Accordingly, arrangements for West Germany's “safe” participation
in the alliance were worked out as part of the Paris Agreements of October 1954, which ended
the occupation of West German territory by the western Allies and provided for both the
limitation of West German armaments and the country's accession to the Brussels Treaty. In

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 May 1955 West Germany joined NATO, which prompted the Soviet Union to form the
Warsaw Pact alliance in central and eastern Europe the same year. The West Germans
subsequently contributed many divisions and substantial air forces to the NATO alliance. By
the time the Cold War ended, some 900,000 troops—nearly half of them from six countries
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Canada, and The Netherlands)—were
stationed in West Germany.

The role of France

France's relationship with NATO became strained after 1958, as President Charles de Gaulle
increasingly criticized the organization's domination by the United States and the intrusion
upon French sovereignty by NATO's many international staffs and activities. He argued that
such “integration” subjected France to “automatic” war at the decision of foreigners. In July
1966 France formally withdrew from the military command structure of NATO and required
NATO forces and headquarters to leave French soil; nevertheless, de Gaulle proclaimed
continued French adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty in case of “unprovoked aggression.”
After NATO moved its headquarters from Paris to Brussels, France maintained a liaison
relationship with NATO's integrated military staffs, continued to sit in the council, and
continued to maintain and deploy ground forces in West Germany, though it did so under new
bilateral agreements with the West Germans rather than under NATO jurisdiction.
I.2.1.2. NATO during the Cold War

From its founding, NATO's primary purpose was to unify and strengthen the Western Allies'
military response to a possible invasion of western Europe by the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies. In the early 1950s NATO relied partly on the threat of massive nuclear
retaliation from the United States to counter the Warsaw Pact's much larger ground forces.
Beginning in 1957, this policy was supplemented by the deployment of American nuclear
weapons in western European bases. NATO later adopted a “flexible response” strategy,
which the United States interpreted to mean that a war in Europe did not have to escalate to an
all-out nuclear exchange. Under this strategy, many Allied forces were equipped with
American battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons under a dual-control (or “dual-key”)
system, which allowed both the country hosting the weapons and the United States to veto
their use. Britain retained control of its strategic nuclear arsenal but brought it within NATO's
planning structures; France's nuclear forces remained completely autonomous.
A conventional and nuclear stalemate between the two sides continued through the
construction of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s, détente in the 1970s, and the resurgence of
Cold War tensions in the 1980s after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and
the election of U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1980. After 1985, however, far-reaching
economic and political reforms introduced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
fundamentally altered the status quo. In July 1989 Gorbachev announced that Moscow would
no longer prop up communist governments in central and eastern Europe and thereby signaled
his tacit acceptance of their replacement by freely elected (and noncommunist)
administrations. Moscow's abandonment of control over central and eastern Europe meant the
dissipation of much of the military threat that the Warsaw Pact had formerly posed to western
Europe, a fact that led some to question the need to retain NATO as a military organization—
especially after the Warsaw Pact's dissolution in 1991. The reunification of Germany in
October 1990 and its retention of NATO membership created both a need and an opportunity
for NATO to be transformed into a more “political” alliance devoted to maintaining
international stability in Europe.

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I.2.1.3. NATO in the post - Cold War era

After the Cold War, NATO was reconceived as a “cooperative-security” organization whose
mandate was to include two main objectives: to foster dialogue and cooperation with former
adversaries in the Warsaw Pact and to “manage” conflicts in areas on the European periphery,
such as the Balkans. In keeping with the first objective, NATO established the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (1991; later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) to
provide a forum for the exchange of views on political and security issues, as well as the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (1994) to enhance European security and stability
through joint military training exercises with NATO and non-NATO states, including the
former Soviet republics and allies. Special cooperative links were also set up with two PfP
countries: Russia and Ukraine. They established diplomatic links with NATO and joined the
NACC on a foreign ministerial level.
In 1992, due to the escalation of the Bosnian Crisis, and Serbia's armed support of the
Bosnian Serbs against Muslims and Croats, NATO's mission was expanded to include
peacekeeping operations in support of United Nations (UN) efforts to restrain the fighting and
find a solution to the conflict. In July 1992, NATO ships and aircraft commenced monitoring
operations in support of the UN arms embargoes on Serbia and Bosnia from the former
Yugoslavia. In April 1993, NATO aircraft began patrolling the skies over Bosnia to monitor
and enforce the UN ban on Serbian military aircraft.
The second objective entailed NATO's first use of military force, when it entered the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 by staging air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions around
the capital city of Sarajevo. The subsequent Dayton Accords, which were initialed by
representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, committed each state to respecting the others' sovereignty and to settling
disputes peacefully; it also laid the groundwork for stationing NATO peacekeeping troops in
the region. A 60,000-strong Implementation Force (IFOR) was initially deployed, though a
smaller contingent remained in Bosnia under a different name, the Stabilization Force
(SFOR). In March 1999 NATO launched massive air strikes against Serbia in an attempt to
force the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Miloševic to accede to diplomatic provisions
designed to protect the predominantly Muslim Albanian population in the province of
Kosovo. Under the terms of a negotiated settlement to the fighting, NATO deployed a
peacekeeping force called the Kosovo Force (KFOR).
The crisis over Kosovo and the ensuing war gave renewed impetus to efforts by the European
Union (EU) to construct a new crisis-intervention force, which would make the EU less
dependent on NATO and U.S. military resources for conflict management. These efforts
prompted significant debates about whether enhancing the EU's defensive capabilities would
strengthen or weaken NATO. Simultaneously there was much discussion of the future of
NATO in the post-Cold War era. Some observers argued that the alliance should be dissolved,
noting that it was created to confront an enemy that no longer existed; others called for a
broad expansion of NATO membership to include Russia. Most suggested alternative roles,
including peacekeeping.
During 1996, fourteen non-NATO countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, and
Ukraine) were invited to contribute to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). All the
NATO countries with armed forces (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
the United States) pledged to contribute military forces to the operation, and Iceland provided
medical personnel. With 60,000 troops, 20,000 of them from the U.S. forces, IFOR was the
largest military operation ever undertaken by NATO. It was the first ground force operation,

6
the first deployment “out of area,” and the first joint operation with NATO's PFP partners and
other non-NATO countries. NATO's IFOR halted the pitched battles and urban sieges that
ravaged Bosnia during the four-year war. National elections were held in September 1996,
and plans were made for a reduced IFOR force.
During the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993–2001), the United States led an initiative to
enlarge NATO membership gradually to include some of the former Soviet allies. In the
concurrent debate over enlargement, supporters of the initiative argued that NATO
membership was the best way to begin the long process of integrating these states into
regional political and economic institutions such as the EU. Some also feared future Russian
aggression and suggested that NATO membership would guarantee freedom and security for
the newly democratic regimes. Opponents pointed to the enormous cost of modernizing the
military forces of new members; they also argued that enlargement, which Russia would
regard as a provocation, would hinder democracy in that country and enhance the influence of
hard-liners. Despite these disagreements, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined
NATO in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were
admitted in 2004; Albania and Croatia joined on 1 April 2009, prior to the 2009 Strasbourg–
Kehl summit. The most recent member state to be added to NATO is Montenegro on 5 June
2017.

Meanwhile, by the beginning of the 21st century, Russia and NATO had formed a strategic
relationship; no longer considered NATO's chief enemy, Russia cemented a new cooperative
bond with NATO in 2001 to address such common concerns as international terrorism,
nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control.
The collapse of Communism in Europe led NATO to search for new roles beyond that of a
mutual defense pact. One was to bolster democracy and national security in former Warsaw
bloc nations; consequently in March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were
made members of NATO. The other new role for NATO was as a regional policeman seeking
to restrict ethnic wars, terrorism, and the generation of massive flows of refugees through
genocidal violence. Consequently, as a result of military and paramilitary actions by Serbian
president Slobodan Milosevic against hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in the
Serbian province of Kosovo, NATO in late March 1999 began a military offensive against
Serbian forces and installations By April 1999, when the 50th anniversary of the
establishment of NATO was observed, NATO forces in the Kosovo Crisis were engaged in
the largest military assault in Europe since World War II. The NATO air offensive ended
successfully with the Serbian forces withdrawal from Kosovo in June and the establishment of
a UN administered and NATO implemented peacekeeping force there. With the end of the
Cold War (and NATO's first war), a new era for NATO had clearly emerged.
I.2.1.4. Policy and decision making

The key word in NATO is “consensus”, but this makes things very complicated and time
consuming for several reasons:
• Different executive, legislative relations.
• Complex issues.
• 29 nations with different historic backgrounds and perspectives.
• Interaction with other organisations.
• Different information and intelligence — different perceptions.
• Above all different national interests
Ways to Accelerate the Process
• Distribute all available information and intelligence to all nations.

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• Distribute national views to all other nations.
• Table proposals.
• Effective chairmanship.
• Willingness to compromise.
Why keep consensus?
• Political and consultation rights.
• No exclusion.
• Ensure individual interest.
• Main characteristic: Willingness to forge consensus.

The Alliance must and will continue fulfilling three essential core tasks:

• Collective Defense
• Crisis Management
• Cooperative Security

NATO’s Level of Ambition

Strategic Concept: “…We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary
to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations.
Therefore, we will …. maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and
several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic
distance…“
(C-M(2011)0022, Political Guidance, 14 MAR 2011 and MC 400/3 (Guidance for the
Military Implementation of NATO’s Stetegic Concept), 23 FEB 2012):

 2 Major Joint Operations (MJO)

L: Corps size M: Task Force size A: 1000 sorties/day

 6 Small Joint Operations (SJO)

L: Division size M: Task Group size A: 350 sorties/day

NATO Flagship Projects

 Missile Defence (MD)

 Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JISR)
 Cyber Defence
 Command and Control (C2)
 Deployment and Sustainment (D&S)

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 I.2.1.5. The civil-military structure of NATO
 Main bodies and responsibilities

NATO is composed of numerous bodies and committees, the most important as well
as their responsibilities and characteristics will be presented in the following
paragraphs:

North Atlantic Council (NAC)

• Derives its effective political authority directly from the North Atlantic Treaty.
• The most important decision-making body in NATO.
• Political and Political — Military Security Matters.
• A unique forum for wide-ranging consultation.
• Equal Rights for all Members.
• Each government is represented on the council by a permanent representative.
• Permanent Council-Ministerial- Summit.

Defense Planning Committee (DPC)

• It was established in the early 60s.

• Deals with most defense matters and subjects.
1. Integrated Command Structure.
2. Defense Planning.
• Has the same functions and authority as the Council.
• In ministerial sessions Defense Ministers or Secretary of Defense.
• France does not regularly participate.

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

• It was established in 1966.

• Forum for consultation on all matters relating to the Alliance nuclear policy (Same
meetings as NAC and DPC).
• France does not attend and Iceland -Observer status.

Civil-Military Structure of NATO

The Secretary General

• Senior international statesman nominated by the member governments. (Protocol

wise, Equivalent to PM)
• Permanent Chairman of the NAC, DPC, NPG, EAPC, NRC, NUC, MED DIAL
(PRIMUS INTER PARES)
• Promotes and directs the process of consultation and decision making throughout the
Alliance.
• The principal spokesman for the Alliance.
At the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl (4 Apr 09), the 29 NATO Heads of state and
Government agreed to appoint Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as
NATO’s next Secretary General. He formally took up his duties on August 1, 2009.
 International Staff

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 The Military Committee

 NATO’s highest military authority is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of all 29

member nations. On a day-to-day basis, their work is carried out by military,
representatives, mainly of three-star rank, stationed at NATO HQ in Brussels. Their
work, supported by the International Military Staff, covers a vast range of issues
around which consensus views are built.
• The highest military authority within the alliance.
• It is not a command.
• Consists of the CHOD of Member Countries/ Representatives.
• Provides military advice to the NAC (The Chairman is the primary military advisor
of the SG).
• Translates NAC decisions in Guidance.
• Develops military plans at the request of NAC.
• Axis between the political bodies and the command structure.
In practice, the Chairman of the Military Committee presides over the Military
Committee where each member country has a military representative (or Milrep) for
his/her Chief of Defence. This committee, NATO’s most senior military authority,
provides the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group with consensus-
based military advice– that is, advice agreed to by all of NATO’s Chiefs of Defence.
The Military Committee works closely with NATO’s two Strategic Commanders –
SACEUR, responsible for operations and SACT, responsible for transformation. They
are both responsible to the Military Committee for the overall conduct of all Alliance
military matters within their areas of responsibility.
On the one side, the Military Committee provides the Strategic Commanders with
guidance on military matters; and on the other side, it works closely with the Strategic
Commanders to bring forward for political consideration by the North Atlantic
Council, military assessments, plans, issues and recommendations, together with an
analysis that puts this information into a wider context and takes into account the
concerns of each member country. The Military Committee is supported in this role by
the International Military Staff.
In sum, the Military Committee serves, inter alia, as a link between the political
leaders of the HQ and the two Strategic Commanders.
On 14 Nov 07 the NATO’s 26 Chiefs of Defence voted in private session for a new
Chairman of the Military Committee. Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chief of the
Italian Defence Staff, a Naval Officer, received the majority of votes. He assumed
responsibilities on 27th June 2008.

 International Military Staff

 The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of the Military
Committee, NATO’s senior military authority.
It is responsible for preparing assessments, studies and other papers on NATO military
matters. It also ensures that decisions and policies on military matters are implemented
by the appropriate NATO military bodies.
The IMS comprises some 320 military personnel supported by approximately 90
civilian personnel. It is headed by a Director and divided into five functional divisions
and several branches and support offices. It is able to move swiftly and smoothly into
a 24 hours a day, seven days a week crisis mode without additional personnel.

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 NATO is a political Alliance with a hard military core. It is not a military Alliance.
Our politicians like to say that after the cold war the political importance of NATO has
increased and that while the alliance used to be a military alliance it has now become
more of a political alliance. It is, however, still true that it is the military command and
force structures, deployable and static, that makes NATO different to other
organisations. The integrated military command structure is the unique asset of
NATO, not shared by EU, WEU, OSCE or the UN.

Role of NATO's Military Structure

• To defend the territory of Member Countries (Article 5).

• Plus many other tasks (Non article 5).
• Democratic Control

Levels of Command (Former Structure)

• Strategic Commands (SC)

• Regional Commands (RC)
• Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) and Component Commands (CC)

and now
Three tiers command

• Strategic level changed from the geographical to the functional division of

responsibilities;
• Operational level;
• Tactical level.

 I.2.1.6. Nato strategic commands

 Allied Command Transformation
ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION

ACT leads continuous NATO Military Transformation in order to enhance

effectiveness in current and future operations through the innovative development and
delivery of training, education, capabilities, doctrine and concepts.”

ACT was created as part of a reorganization of the NATO Command Structure in 2002. This
was the first time in NATO’s history that a strategic command was solely dedicated to
“transformation”, demonstrating the importance placed by Allies on the roles of
transformation and development as continuous and essential drivers for change that will
ensure the relevance of the Alliance in a rapidly evolving global security environment.

ACT is organized around four principal functions:

 strategic thinking;
 the development of capabilities;
 education, training and exercises; and

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  cooperation and engagement.

ACT Trident

These functions are reflected in the composition of ACT, which is comprised of the Norfolk
Headquarters and three subordinate entities: one in Norway (Joint Warfare Centre), one in
Poland (Joint Force Training Centre) and one in Portugal (Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned
Centre). ACT also includes a SACT representative at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at
the Pentagon outside Washington D.C., an ACT Staff Element at the ACO Headquarters -
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE - and a shared Military Partnership
Directorate (MPD) with ACO, also located at SHAPE.
Additionally, NATO’s other education and training facilities and nationally-run entities,
which are not part of the NCS, also coordinate with ACT. This includes the NATO Defense
College in Rome, Italy, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the NATO
Communications and Information Systems School, Portugal (from 2016 or 2017 – currently
located in Italy), the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre, Greece, and
the nationally-run Centres of Excellence. NATO Agencies also interact with ACT on matters
of common concern.

Strategic Plans and Policy

The main responsibility of Strategic Plans and Policy is threefold: to develop and promote
issues of strategic importance to transformation; articulate policies to direct Alliance
transformation efforts; and support the development of NATO strategic-level concepts which
clarify how transformation may be achieved.

Capability Development
This is a broad area which covers the entire capability development process, i.e., from the
moment a need is identified to the production phase when a new capability is actually
developed for the Alliance. Moreover, Capability Development provides a major contribution
to the NATO Defence Planning Process improving interoperability, deployability and
sustainability of Alliance forces. The Directorate focuses on science and technology, and
maintains collaboration with industry to infuse innovative ideas and transformative principles
into NATO capability development processes and products. In addition, it establishes and
maintains a transformation network and constitutes a hub within the NATO organisation and
between member countries to promote continuous reform of NATO forces, structures and
processes.

Joint Force Training

Joint Force Training (JFT) directs and co-ordinates all ACT activities that are related to the
conduct of individual and collective training and exercises. The aim is to continually provide
the Alliance with improved capabilities and enable its forces to undertake the full spectrum of
Alliance missions.

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SACT Representative in Europe
The SACT Representative in Europe (SACTREPEUR) is located at NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium. As the name indicates, the SACTREPEUR represents SACT at NATO
Headquarters, acting as SACT’s representative to the Military Committee and attending all
relevant meetings – committee, working group or other. SACTREPEUR has the coordinating
authority for all ACT engagements with NATO Headquarters and maintains strong links with
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) through his counterpart - the SACEUR
Representative (SACEUREP) - also based at NATO Headquarters.

ACT Staff Element Europe

The ACT Staff Element Europe (SEE) is co-located with ACO in Mons, Belgium. It deals
primarily with defence and resource planning issues, as well as implementation. In doing so, it
interacts with different NATO entities: the International Military Staff and the International
Staff at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, with ACO, other NATO bodies and agencies and
individual Allies.

ACT Liaison Office to the Pentagon

To help enhance NATO transformation, this office promotes effective links and direct
coordination between ACT and the US Joint Staff and other departments in the US military
headquarters (Pentagon), located outside Washington D.C. Through strong links with US
military entities, the office establishes and maintains working relations with other
governmental and non-governmental bodies in and around Washington D.C.

Military Partnership Directorate

The Military Partnership Directorate (MPD) provides direction, control, co-ordination,
support and assessment of military cooperation activities across the Alliance. It directs and
oversees all non-NATO country involvement in military partnership programmes, events and
activities and coordinates and implements NATO plans and programmes in the area of
partnership. The MPD is shared with ACO and is located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium with a
Staff Element at HQ SACT in Norfolk, Virginia.

Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway

The Joint Warfare Centre’s (JWC) main task is to train NATO forces at the operational level
to ensure they remain interoperable and fully integrated. Its principal mission is the training of
the NATO Response Force (NRF) Headquarters’ elements and NRF Component
Headquarters’ elements.
The JWC also seeks to improve NATO’s capabilities and interoperability by promoting and
conducting NATO’s joint and combined experimentation, analysis and doctrine development
processes.3
The JWC assists ACT’s work with new technologies, modelling and simulation. It also
conducts training on and works at developing new concepts and doctrine for joint and
combined staffs. In addition, it performs collective staff training for partner countries and new
NATO members.
JWC assists ACO in evaluating joint force training and has formal links to both NATO

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agencies and national and multinational training centres.

Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland

The Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) focuses on joint and combined training of NATO
forces at the tactical level. It focuses, in particular, on the conduct of tactical training to
achieve joint interoperability at key interfaces - a critically important area identified during
military combat in Afghanistan.
The Centre provides support and expertise in the training of Alliance and partner forces, runs
courses, conducts training and provides advice to a variety of audiences. It cooperates with
national training centres, including Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Centres and Centres
of Excellence to ensure the application of NATO standards and doctrine in combined and
joint fields.
As a priority, JFTC provides expertise to help NRF joint and component commanders ensure
that each NRF rotation achieves a high level of interoperability, flexibility and extensive
training so as to be combat-ready at the beginning of a cycle of duty.

Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal

The main role of the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) is to reinforce the
process of continuous improvement of concepts, doctrine and capabilities within NATO
through the transformation process, based on lessons learned from operations, training,
exercises and experimentation.
As such, JALLC conducts the analysis of real-world military operations, training, exercises
and NATO Concept Development and Experimentation collective experiments, and is
responsible for establishing and maintaining a lessons learned database. It ensures that key
factors and lessons identified are characterized and appropriate action is proposed. The
JALLC therefore contributes directly to improving operations through the identification of
shortfalls in capabilities by delivering relevant, timely and useable lessons learned products.

Political direction, military guidance

Strategic Direction:
• Comprehensive Political Guidance
• Ministerial Guidance
• NATO Military Authorities Strategic Priorities and Objectives
• NATO Summit Declarations

Strategic Goals:
• Provide Appropriate Support to Operations
• Lead NATO Military Transformation
• Improve Relationships, Interaction and Practical Co-operation with Partners, Nations and
International Organisations

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Objectives →Priorities →Outputs

Key functions

• Alliance Force Transformation

Driving the Process
Leading National Efforts
• Capability Development
Leverage of Best Practice
Shaping Interoperability
Guiding New Development
• Support to NATO Missions and Operations
Preparation of Deploying Staffs
Specialised, Tailored Training for Force Elements
• Collation and Adaption of Lessons Learned
Capturing Specific Lessons
Transition from Cause to Solution
• Strategic Engagement
Comprehensive Approach
EU / JFCOM Relationship
Multiple Futures Project
Partnerships

ACT is the motor for transformation

Transformation through: Policy & Doctrine Alignment Interoperability Development

Addressing Capability Shortfalls Training and Preparation etc

Defence planning reform

• More comprehensive & coherent across Defence and Ops Planning

– Changes consistent with latest guidance
– All planning disciplines & stakeholders on equal footing
– Military Judgement applied at higher level by Strategic Commands
– Increased Transparency, Traceability and Clarity
– More formalised management process
– Quality checking and cost-effectiveness given explicit consideration
• Appropriate account of views of nations regarding need to improve
– Adopt ‘tailored’ approach toward nations, as appropriate
• Enhanced analysis through improved methodology:
– Capability-Based approach
– More selective use of Planning Situations
• Adopt NATO-wide common and interoperable databases
– NATO Capability Database, CDSS, NDPASS (Defense Planning Automated Support

15
System), Operational Planning
• Better integration of Lessons Learned and CURs

ACT / USJFCOM RELATIONSHIP

• A complementary approach delivered through the co-location and close liaison between
SACT and USJFCOM staffs.
• Providing NATO with exposure to US Joint expertise at little additional cost.
• Ability to capitalise on USJFCOM force training, integration and experimentation.
• Access to extensive peacekeeping and CIMIC operational experience.
• Greater efficiency in training, planning and execution of NATO operations.

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)

General André Lanata (French Air Force) , was confirmed by the North Atlantic Council
as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation on 7 June 2018.He joined the French Air
Force academy in 1981 and qualified as a fighter pilot in 1984. Throughout his career, he has
acquired an extensive experience both as a fighter pilot and as an operational commander.
Starting his career in a reconnaissance fighter squadron in Strasbourg Air Force Base, he
became a flight commander in 1990 and chief of operations in 1992.
Responsible for reconnaissance programs at the Air Staff between 1993 and 1995, he then
joined the Joint War College in Paris. He served as the commanding officer of the 2/3 Fighter
Squadron “Champagne”, at Nancy Air Force Base.
As a staff officer, he has served in both plans and policy, at air and joint levels. Assigned in
2000 at the FAF headquarters in the Plans-Programs division, he joined the Joint Staff in 2002
as the Operational Coherence officer in charge of the preparation of joint forces and force
protection.
Commander of the Air Force Base 188 in Djibouti between 2004 and 2006, he was at the
same time the commander of all French Air Forces in Djibouti.
He joined the Air Staff in 2006 as deputy and then chief of Plans. Assigned at the Secretariat
for the National Defence and Security, he worked as the deputy director for international and
strategic affairs from 2008 to 2011.
Deputy chief of Operations at the Joint Staff in 2011, he particularly worked on the financing
of French operations, bilateral or multilateral agreements such as the Combined Joint
Expeditionary Force (CJEF) concept, while directing at the same time the transformation of
the organization.
He was the chief of Plans at the Joint Staff since 2013, more specifically in charge of all
military programs, financial planning and arms control.
General André LANATA was awarded the rank of commander in the French Legion of
Honour order and in the National Merit Order. He has flown 146 combat missions in six
different theatres of operations and more than 3300 flying hours, mostly on Mirage F1CR and
Mirage 2000D. He earned two war crosses –one with palm - and the Cross of Military Valour.
ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS (ACO)
To prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to meet Alliance political
objectives.
2010 Strategic Plan 3 essential core tasks: Collective defence, Environmental issues,
Terrorism, Crisis management, Conventional, Cyber, attacks against energy lines, Technology
Related trends, Cooperative security.

16
Allied Command Operations, NATO's headquarters for all military plans and operations, is
the successor to two historic strategic commands for NATO – Allied Command Europe and
Allied Command Atlantic. Two years after NATO was founded in 1949, the members of the
Alliance realized that a military command structure was necessary to ensure greater
integration of NATO forces and proper lines of command in the event of a crisis or war. As a
result, in 1951 the first strategic command, Allied Command Europe (ACE), came into
existence under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, US Army, who had the title
of Supreme Allied Commander Europe or SACEUR. His headquarters – the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE – was located in the Parisian suburb of
Rocquencourt, France. One year later the second major strategic command for NATO was
activated. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) had its headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia,
USA, and was commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic or SACLANT. The
first SACLANT was Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, US Navy.

In 1967 SHAPE moved from Rocquencourt, France, to Casteau, Belgium, as a result of

French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to withdraw his country from NATO's
integrated military command structure. Headquarters ACLANT remained in its original
location throughout its history.

NATO Command Structure

 A strategic level headquarters.

 Prepare, plan, conduct and execute NATO military operations, missions and tasks to
meet political objectives.
 ACO headed by SACEUR who is dual-hatted:
o ACO commander
o Commander of the US European Command.

Allied Command Operations (ACO) - Reformed

Strategic level command: SHAPE

SHAPE is a strategic headquarters. Its role is to prepare, plan, conduct and execute NATO
military operations, missions and tasks in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the
Alliance. As such it contributes to the deterrence of aggression and the preservation of peace,
security and the territorial integrity of Alliance.
ACO is headed by SACEUR, who exercises his responsibilities from SHAPE. Traditionally,
he is a United States Flag or General officer. SACEUR is dual-hatted as the commander of the
US European Command, which shares many of the same geographical responsibilities.
SACEUR is responsible to the Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in
NATO under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The Military Committee is the primary source of military
advice to the NAC and NPG.

Operational level commands: Brunssum and Naples

The operational level consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs): one in
Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy. Both have to be prepared to plan,

17
conduct and sustain NATO operations of different size and scope. Effectively, they need to be
able to manage a major joint operation either from their static location in Brunssum or Naples,
or from a deployed headquarters when operating directly in a theatre of operation. In the latter
case, the deployed headquarter is referred to as a Joint Task Force HQ or JTFHQ and should
be able to operate for a period of up to one year.
When deployed, a Joint Force Command is only charged to command one operation at a time.
However, the elements of the Joint Force Command which have not deployed can provide
support to other operations and missions. When a Joint Force Command is not deployed, it
can assist ACO in dealing with other headquarters which are deployed in theatre for day-to-
day matters and assist, for instance, with the training and preparation for future rotations.
The two commands at this level are also responsible for engaging with key partners and
regional organisations in order to support regional NATO HQ tasks and responsibilities, as
directed by SACEUR. Additionally, they support the reinforcement of cooperation with
partners participating in NATO operations and help to prepare partner countries for NATO
membership.

Joint Force Command Brunssum

 Operational level standing Joint Force Command.

 Prepared to plan, conduct and sustain NATO operations.
 Able to manage effectively a MJO from the static location, or from a deployed HQ for
a period of up to one year.

Tasks

 NATO Response Force (NRF): Joint Task Force HQ

 Resolute Support Mission
 MultiNational Corps NorthEast (MNC NE)
 NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs)
 (EST, LVA, LTU, POL, HUN, SVK) not BGR, ROM

Joint Force Command Naples

Operational level standing Joint Force

 Activated on 15 March 2004

 Mission: prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to preserve the
peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states and freedom of the
seas and economic lifelines throughout SACEUR's Area of Responsibility (AOR) and
beyond
 No permanently designated AOR
 Kosovo FORce
 NATO Support to African Union
 NATO Response Force (Annual Base)
 NATO HQ Sarajevo
 NATO Liaison Office Skopje
 NATO military liaison Office Belgrade
 NATO Multinational Division – South East (MND-SE)

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  NFIUs BGR, ROM

Land, maritime and air commands

The tactical (or component) level consists of what is called Single Service Commands (SSCs):
land, maritime and air commands. These service-specific commands provide expertise and
support to the Joint Force Commands at the operational level in Brunssum or Naples. They
report directly to SHAPE and come under the command of SACEUR.

 Land command , Headquarters Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM), Izmir,

Turkey: this command’s role is to provide a deployable land command and control
capability in support of a Joint Force Command running an operation larger than a
major joint operation. It can also provide the core land capability for a joint operation
(major or not) or a deployable command and control capability for a land operation.
Izmir is also the principal land advisor for the Alliance and contributes to development
and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise.

LANDCOM

Provides expertise in support of Alliance land forces readiness, competency and

standardization including their evaluation and certification.

 Delivers a planning capability in support of Higher headquarters and the NATO Force
Structure (NFS)
 Provides the core of the headquarters element responsible for the conduct of land
operations and the synchronization of land forces command and control (C2) in
accordance with the Allied Level of Ambition (LOA)
 Tactical level commands: Izmir, Northwood and Ramstein

Tasks

 Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)

 NATO Response Force (NRF). Coherent, Joint, trained, certified, at high readiness

 Maritime command, Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (HQ MARCOM),

Northwood, the United Kingdom: this command’s role is to provide command and
control for the full spectrum of joint maritime operations and tasks. From its location
in Northwood, it plans, conducts and supports joint maritime operations. It is also the
Alliance’s principal maritime advisor and contributes to development and
transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise. Northwood is
ready to command a small maritime joint operation or act as the maritime component
in support of an operation larger than a major joint operation.

Mission:

 Central command of all NATO maritime forces

 Primary maritime advisor to the Alliance. Operations: Sea Guardian. Maritime
Groups:
 2 Standing NATO Maritime Groups. (4 Frigates, 1 AD Frigate, 1 patrol ship ,1 refuel
ship)

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  2 Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups. (2 command ships, 2
countermeasures ships, 3 minehunters)

 Air command,Headquarters Allied Air Command (HQ AIRCOM), Ramstein,

Germany:

 This command’s role is to plan and direct the air component of Alliance operations
and missions, and the execution of Alliance air and missile defence operations and
missions. Ramstein is also the Alliance’s principal air advisor and contributes to
development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of
expertise. Ramstein, with adequate support from within and outside the NATO
Command Structure can provide command and control for a small joint air operation
from its static location, i.e., from Ramstein or can act as Air Component Command to
support an operation which is as big or bigger than a major joint operation.

To reinforce its capability, Ramstein has additional air command and control elements
available: two Combined Air Operations Centres and a Deployable Air Command and
Control Centre. The air elements are also structured in a more flexible way to take account of
the experience gained in NATO-led operations.

Additional air support

To carry out its missions and tasks, HQ AIRCOM (Ramstein) is supported by Combined Air
Operations Centres (CAOC) in Torrejon, Spain and in Uedem, Germany, as well as one
Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACCC) in Poggio Renatico, Italy.

 CAOCs: both the CAOC in Spain and in Germany are composed of two parts. One
part is a Static Air Defence Centre (SADC) responsible for air policing and the other,
a Deployable Air Operations Centre (D-AOC), which supports operations. The D-
AOC is an element focused on the production of combat plans and the conduct of
combat operations. It has no territorial responsibilities assigned during peacetime, but
supplements the HQ AIRCOM when required.

 DACCC: this entity based in Italy consists of three elements. Firstly, a DARS or
Deployable Air Control Centre + Recognized Air Picture Production Centre + Sensor
Fusion Post. The DARS is responsible for the control of air missions including
surface-to-air missiles, air traffic management and control, area air surveillance and
production of a recognised air picture and other tactical control functions; secondly, a
D-AOC, which has the same role as a CAOC; and thirdly, a Deployable Sensors
Section, which provides both air defence radar and passive electronic support
measures tracker capabilities that are deployable.

Communication and information systems

Communication and information systems (CIS) have been split into two: the deployable CIS
capabilities and the static CIS capabilities.
The NATO (CIS) Group based in Mons, Belgium will provide deployable communications
and information systems support for ACO. The NATO CIS Group is responsible for the
provision of all deployable CIS capabilities, as well as CIS operations and exercises planning
and control. It acts as the coordinating authority for command and control services support to

20
operations. The provision of the static and central CIS capabilities is the responsibility of the
NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), which is not part of the NATO
Command Structure.
The NATO Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Group will be supported by three
NATO Signals Battalions located at Wesel, Germany, Grazzanise, Italy, and Bydgoszcz,
Poland. These three will be complemented by various smaller elements (Deployable CIS
modules) elsewhere.

STRIKFORNATO, AWACS and AGS

Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), NATO Airborne Early
Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) and Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) are part
of the NATO Immediate Response Capability. They are multinational structures that are not
part of the Command Structure, but are available for the Alliance and organized under
Memorandums of Understanding and Technical Agreements (MOU/ TA) signed by the
respective contributing countries.
STRIKFORNATO is a rapidly deployable maritime headquarters that provides scalable
command and control across the full spectrum of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks. It
focuses on maritime operations and, as part of NATO reforms, has moved from Italy to
Portugal. It comprises 11 participating countries and serves as a link for integrating US
maritime forces into NATO operations.
Final agreement is awaited on the NATO NAEW&C Force. The Force Commander is
conducting a comprehensive Force Review that will determine the size and shape of the
Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) capability for the future and is adapting the
capability to match the new manpower ceilings decided in the context of the new Command
Structure. The NAEW&C Force comprises three elements: a multinational HQ (Mons) and
two operational components, the multinational E-3A and the E-3D. NATO Air Base (NAB)
Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to 17 Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' AWACS aircrafts. NATO
operates this fleet, which provides the Alliance with an immediately available airborne
command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battle-space management
capability. The fleet of six Boeing E-3D aircraft based in Waddington, Lincolnshire, United
Kingdom, is manned by RAF personnel only. The United Kingdom exercises limited
participation, but her fleet of E-3D aircraft is an integral part of the NAEW&C Force.
NATO is acquiring an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will provide
SACEUR with the capabilities for near real-time, continuous information and situational
awareness concerning friendly, neutral and opposing ground and surface entities. The AGS
system will consist of five Global Hawk Unmanned Airborne Vehicles and the associated
command and control base stations, as well as support facilities provided by the AGS’ main
operating base at Sigonella, Italy. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems will
continuously detect and track moving objects and will provide radar imagery of areas of
interest and stationary objects. The system will be fully trained and equipped to participate in
NATO approved operations worldwide and available at graduated levels of readiness. It is
expected to be available to the Alliance in the 2015-2017 timeframe.

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ACO Capabilities
NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)
NATO Standing Naval Forces
NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion
Strategic Airlift Capability
https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-capabilities2

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti (US),

is one of the two strategic commanders for NATO and the commanding officer of Allied
Command Operations (ACO). He took over this post 04 May 2016.

He is responsible to NATO's Military Committee, the highest military authority in NATO, for
the overall direction and conduct of military operations for NATO.

SACEUR, a United States Flag or General officer, leads all NATO military operations and is
dual-hatted as Commander US European Command.

His command is exercised from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at
Casteau, Mons, Belgium.

SACEUR is responsible for the overall command of NATO military operations. He conducts
the necessary military planning for operations, including the identification of forces required
for the mission and requests these forces from NATO countries, as authorised by the North
Atlantic Council and as directed by NATO's Military Committee. SACEUR analyses these
operational needs in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.
SACEUR makes recommendations to NATO's political and military authorities on any
military matter that may affect his ability to carry out his responsibilities. For day-to-day
business, he reports to the Military Committee, composed of Military Representatives for
Chiefs of Defence of NATO member countries. He also has direct access to the Chiefs of
Defence and may communicate with appropriate national authorities, as necessary, to
facilitate the accomplishment of his tasks.
In the case of an aggression against a NATO member state, SACEUR, as Supreme
Commander, is responsible for executing all military measures within his capability and
authority to preserve or restore the security of Alliance territory.
SACEUR also has an important public profile and is the senior military spokesman for Allied
Command Operations. Through his own activities and those of his public information staff he
maintains regular contacts with the press and media. He also undertakes official visits to
NATO countries and countries where NATO is conducting operations, or with which NATO
is developing dialogue, cooperation and partnership.Other tasks that come under the
responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe include:

 contributing to stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by developing and

participating in military-to-military contacts and other cooperation activities and
exercises undertaken in the framework of the Partnership for Peace and NATO’s
relationships with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries;

22
  conducting analysis at the strategic level designed to identify capability shortfalls and
to assign priorities to them;
 managing the resources allocated by NATO for operations and exercises;
 in conjunction with Allied Command Transformation, developing and conducting
training programmes and exercises in combined and joint procedures for the military
headquarters and forces of NATO and Partner countries.

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti graduated from the United States Military Academy, West
Point, in 1978 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.
A career infantry officer, General Scaparrotti served as Commander, United States Command
/ Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea. Prior to his service in Korea,
General Scaparrotti served as the Director of the Joint Staff, Commander International
Security Assistance Force and Deputy Commander U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, Commanding
General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd
Airborne Division.
General Scaparrotti has also served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational and
strategic level of the United States military to include Director of Operations, United States
Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military
Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING
FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia).

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

NATO’s highest military authority is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of all 29 member
nations. On a day-to-day basis, their work is carried out by military representatives, mainly of
three-star.

 The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military authority in NATO.

 It is the primary source of military advice to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the
Nuclear Planning Group, and assists in developing strategic policy and concepts.
 It also provides guidance to the two Strategic Commanders – Allied Command
Operations and Allied Command Transformation.
 The Military Committee, chaired by the Chairman of the Military Committee,
provides an essential link between the political decision-making process and the
military structure of NATO.
 It meets at the level of Military Representatives shortly after meetings of the NAC to
follow up on Council decisions, and at the level of Chiefs of Defence Staff three times
a year.

Its advice is sought prior to any authorization for military action and, consequently represents
an essential link between the political decision-making process and the military structure of
NATO.
It also provides military guidance to the Alliance’s two Strategic Commanders and assists in
developing overall strategic policy and concepts for the Alliance. In this context, it prepares
an annual long-term assessment of the strength and capabilities of countries and areas posing

23
a risk to NATO's interests.
It meets frequently at the level of Military Representatives (MILREPs) and three times a year
at the level of Chiefs of Defence (CHODs). It is chaired by the Chairman of the Military
Committee, who is nominated for a three-year term.
The Military Committee also plays a key role in the development of NATO’s military policy
and doctrine within the framework of discussions in the Council, the Nuclear Planning Group
and other senior bodies. It is responsible for translating political decision and guidance into
military direction to NATO’s two Strategic Commanders – Supreme Allied Commander
Operations and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.
In this context, the Committee assists in developing overall strategic concepts for the Alliance
and prepares an annual long-term assessment of the strength and capabilities of countries and
areas posing a risk to NATO's interests.
In times of crises, tension or war, and in relation to military operations undertaken by the
Alliance such as its role in Afghanistan and Kosovo, its advises the Council of the military
situation and its implications, and makes recommendations on the use of military force, the
implementation of contingency plans and the development of appropriate rules of
engagement.

REVIEW

NATO is:

 A political Alliance of 29 sovereign countries with a hard military core.

 Each nation exercises control politically through NAC, DPC and NPG.
 Decisions are taken “by consensus”.
 More deployable, flexible and responsive.
 Significant reduction in HQs and CAOCs.
 Two Strategic Commands, ACO (single AOR) and ACT.
 ACO: Operation level, JFC-JHQ.
 Tactical level: Land, Air and Maritime Component Commands.
 Co-operation, Partnership and Dialogue.
 Mutually reinforcing institutions.
 Transatlantic forum for security consultations among the Allies
 NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear
and conventional disarmament
 NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of
the Alliance.
 Dealing effectively with the global threats
 Reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost effective organization
 Continuation of helping Afghanistan for stability ( key prior)

NATO Command Structure Review

 Command HQs and two CAOCs and one DCAOC each.

24
 New NATO Command Structure

The operational side of our house is facing fundamental changes - not only NATO's greatest
functional re-alignment including a major migration of functionality across the Atlantic and
within Europe rather than a metamorphosis from ACE to ACO, which means the adoption of
the J-structure while digesting manpower cuts by approx. 30% (from 950 to 680).
A command structure that is faster, more agile and adaptable to emerging threats, able to
move quickly, deploy to wherever the threats are located and can conduct rapid decisive
operations. The new structure of ACO HQs is designed to do just that. To understand the
cultural change inherent to this restructuring it is unavoidable to look at some impacts for the
future JFC HQs.

Allied Command Transformation ACT

 Supreme Allied Commander Transformation has responsibility for bringing about the
Transformation of the Alliance, and he is dual-hated as COM US JFCOM. SACT is
responsible amongst other things for Capabilities, Doctrine and Defence planning
which will no longer be carried out at SHAPE per se, although a forward Staff element
from HQ SACT will be co-located in order to lead in those areas.
 Transformation from the military strategic perspective is all about improving military
capability. From a NATO perspective, the emphasis is therefore on collaborative
efforts to improve joint and combined capabilities.
 Forward element in SHAPE, Europe X-working.
 As USJFCOM ACT will be well placed to tap into the agencies and national centres of
excellence at the heart of US technology.

Division of Responsibilities

 Defence Planning
 Strategic Concepts, Policy, and Doctrine
 Resources
 Joint Training and Education for individuals
 Experimentation
 Research & Development

Allied Command Operations ACO

 C2 of Forces
 Provide Intelligence Support
 CIS operational planning and execution
 Joint Exercises and Evaluation

25
NATO

 Political Alliance of 26 sovereign countries with a hard military core.

 NATO HQ does not lead NATO.
 Each nation exercises control politically through the NAC, DPC and NPG.
 Decisions by CONSENSUS.
 Significant role of the Secretary General.

Military Committee

 The axis between the political bodies and the integrated Military Structure.
 It gives guidance to the NATO Commanders.

New Command Structure:

 New threats, new risks, saves MONEY?

 More deployable, flexible and responsive - More functional.
 Significant reduction in HQs and CAOCs.
 2 Strategic Commands, ACO (single AOR) and ACT.
 ACO: Operational level: JFC-JHQ
 Tactical level: Land, Air and Navy Component Commands
 Co-operation, Partnership and Dialogue.
 Mutually Reinforcing Institutions (Interlocking).

 I.2.1.7. References
 NATO Information Service , NATO Today, 1987.
NATO Information Service , The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and
Figures, 11th ed., 1989.
Lawrence S. Kaplan , NATO & the US: The Enduring Alliance, 1994.
NATO Office of Information and Press , NATO Handbook, 1995.
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs , U.S. Security for
Europe and NATO (June 1995).
S. Nelson Drew , NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans‐Atlantic Security in Transition,
1995.
William Thomas Johnsen , NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend
or the Whirlwind?, 1995.

26
I.2.4.1. NATO Secretary General

The Secretary General is the Alliance’s top international civil servant. This person is
responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the
Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented.

 The Secretary General is NATO’s top international civil servant and has three
principal roles.
 He/she chairs all major committees and is responsible for steering
discussions, facilitating the decision-making process and ensuring that
decisions are implemented.
 He/she is the Organization’s chief spokesperson.
 He/she is at the head of the International Staff, whose role it is to support the
Secretary General directly and indirectly.
 The person is nominated by member governments for an initial period of four
years, which can be extended by mutual consent.

The Secretary General is also NATO’s chief spokesperson and the head of the
Organization’s International Staff.

The post is currently held by Jens Stoltenberg, former Prime Minister of Norway, who
took up his responsibilities on 1 October 2014.

The function of Secretary General is filled by a senior statesman with high-level

political experience in the government of one of the member countries. The person is
nominated by member governments for an initial period of four years, which can be
extended by mutual consent.

THREE MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES

 Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and other key bodies

First and foremost, the Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic Council -
the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - as well as other senior
decision-making committees. These include the Nuclear Planning Group, the
NATO-Russia Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Additionally,
together with a Ukrainian representative, he is the chairman of the NATO-
Ukraine Commission, as well as the chairman of the NATO-Georgia
Commission.

Above and beyond the role of chairman, the Secretary General has the
authority to propose items for discussion and use his good offices in case of
disputes between member states. He acts as a decision facilitator, leading and
guiding the process of consensus-building and decision-making throughout the
Alliance.

He maintains direct contact with heads of state and government, foreign and
defence ministers in NATO and partner countries, in order to facilitate this
process. This entails regular visits to NATO and partner countries, as well as
bilateral meetings with senior national officials when they visit NATO
Headquarters.

27
 Effectively, his role allows him to exert some influence on the decision-making
process while respecting the fundamental principle that the authority for
taking decisions is invested only in the member governments themselves.

 Principal spokesperson

The Secretary General is also the principal spokesman of the Alliance and
represents the Alliance in public on behalf of the member countries, reflecting
their common positions on political issues.

He also represents NATO vis-à-vis other international organisations as well as

to the media and the public at large. To this end the Secretary General
regularly holds press briefings and conferences as well as public lectures and
speeches.

 Head of the International Staff

Third and lastly, the Secretary General is the senior executive officer of the
NATO International Staff, responsible for making staff appointments and
overseeing its work.

Support to the Secretary General

The entire International Staff at NATO Headquarters supports the Secretary General,
either directly or indirectly.

The selection process

The Secretary General is a senior statesman from a NATO member country,

appointed by member states for a four-year term. The selection is carried through
informal diplomatic consultations among member countries, which put forward
candidates for the post.

No decision is confirmed until consensus is reached on one candidate. At the end of

his term, the incumbent might be offered to stay on for a fifth year.

The position has traditionally been held by a European statesman.

Jens Stoltenberg (since October 1st 2014)

Jens Stoltenberg was born in Oslo on 16 March 1959. He spent his childhood years
abroad, with his diplomat father, mother and two sisters

Mr Stoltenberg holds a postgraduate degree in Economics from the University of

Oslo. After graduating in 1987, he started work in Statistics Norway.

 1990-1991: State Secretary at the Ministry of the Environment

 Since 1991: Member of Parliament
 1993-1996: Minister of Industry and Energy
 1996-1997: Minister of Finance
 2000-2001: Prime Minister of Norway
 Since 2002: Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party
 2005-2013: Prime Minister of Norway

28
While Mr Stoltenberg was Prime Minister, Norway’s defence spending increased
steadily, with the result that Norway is today one of the Allies with the highest per
capita defence expenditure. Mr Stoltenberg has also been instrumental in
transforming the Norwegian armed forces, through a strong focus on deployable
high-end capabilities. Under his leadership, the Norwegian Government has
contributed Norwegian forces to various NATO operations.

During his tenure as Prime Minister, Mr Stoltenberg frequently called for NATO to
focus on security challenges close to Allied territory.

Mr Stoltenberg is a strong supporter of enhanced transatlantic cooperation, including

better burden-sharing across the Atlantic. He sees NATO and the EU as
complementary organizations in terms of securing peace and development in Europe
and beyond.

Mr Stoltenberg has had a number of international assignments. These include

chairing the UN High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence and the High-level
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing. He was until recently UN Special Envoy
on Climate Change.

References: http://www.nato.int/

I.2.5.1. The North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty

29
Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They
seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace
and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all
of them.

Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security .

Article 6 (1)
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack:

30
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian
Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of
the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or
any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on
the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security.

Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and
any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and
undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary
bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee
which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area
to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing
its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The
Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of
each such instrument of accession.

Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as
soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all
the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States
which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including
the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect
to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)

Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if
any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having
regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including
the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

31
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one
year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of
America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice
of denunciation.

Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in
the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be
transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22
October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian
Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become
inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of
all signatory states.

Official Texts
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Albania01 Apr.
2009
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia01 Apr.
2009
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Republic of Slovenia26 Mar.
2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Slovak Republic26 Mar. 2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Romania26 Mar. 2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Republic of Lithuania26 Mar.
2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Republic of Latvia26 Mar.
2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia26 Mar.
2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria26 Mar.
2003
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland16 Dec.
1997
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary16 Dec.
1997
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic16 Dec. 1997
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain10 Dec. 1981
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of
Germany23 Oct. 1954
• Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey22 Oct. 1951

32
I.2.6.1. Strategic concept 2010

“Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation”

Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO
will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and
security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it
continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and
new partners:
• It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including
against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
• It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize
post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners,
most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
• It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the
Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
• It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons
– but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear
weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
• It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all
European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement
contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
• It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible
Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the
money they invest in defence.
The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust
military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common
security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential
mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community
of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all
its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source
of stability in an unpredictable world.
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of
individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly
committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the
Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in
NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as

33
important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of
NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it
together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.
4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the
security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance
must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute
to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:
a. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in
accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and
binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging
security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the
Alliance as a whole.
b. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities
to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively
employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing
crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to
stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in
post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro- Atlantic security.
c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security
developments beyond its borders. The
Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security,
through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by
contributing actively to arms control, non-membership in the Alliance open to all European
democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters
that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set
out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be
brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate,
forge common approaches.
6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as
possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and
transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against
NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-
Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a
century.
8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around
the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with
consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict.
This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to
the Euro-Atlantic area.
9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their
means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity.
During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile
regions.
10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to
international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to,
and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the

34
threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire
nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.
11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security,
including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as
trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.
12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage
that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also
transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold
that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries
and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be
the source of such attacks.
13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit
routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require
greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some
NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases,
on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share
of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly
exposed to disruption.
14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser
weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to
have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.
15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water
scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in
areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and
operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our
populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does
not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve
if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.
17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains
a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear
weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons
exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own,
contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend
against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:
• maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
• maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller
operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
• develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both
our Article 5 responsibilities and the
Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO
Response Force;
• carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange
for assuring our defence against the full

35
range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and
provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all
Allies;
• ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear
forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
• develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile
attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security
of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other
Euro-Atlantic partners;
• further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons of mass
destruction;
• develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks,
including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-
defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better
integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
• enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through
enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of
appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism
themselves;
• develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy
infrastructure and transit areas and
lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on
the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
• ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging
technologies, and that military planning
takes the potential threats into account;
• sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently
resourced;
• continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range
of threats to the Alliance, taking
into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of
Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when
necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support
reconstruction.
21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western
Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is
necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other
international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis,
planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and
effectiveness of the overall international effort.
22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will
continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where
appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.
23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to
manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the

36
unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led
operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to
international conflict management efforts.
24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide
continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and
capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation
wherever possible with other relevant international actors.
25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
• enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and
how they can best be prevented;
• further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including
counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
• form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more
effectively with civilian partners, building
on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability
may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for
the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
• enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
• develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis
zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without
international assistance;
• identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid
deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and
civilian specialists
from partner countries and institutions;
• broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a
regular basis and in dealing with all stages
of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure
undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in
reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:
• We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a
way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished
security for all.
• With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have
dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on
nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further
reductions in the future.
• In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase
transparency on its nuclear weapons in
Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of disparity with the greater
Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.
• We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides

37
predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for
stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the
basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
• We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to
international efforts to fight proliferation.
• National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the
security of all Alliance members. We are
committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on
these issues.

Open Door
27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect
of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe
more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be
best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-
Atlantic structures.
• The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which
share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and
obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and
stability.

Partnerships
28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner
relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a
concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.
29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing
international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s
operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships
will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.
30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexibile formats that bring NATO and partners
together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
• We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and
relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international
relations.
• We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common
concern.
• We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on
NATO-led missions to which they
contribute.
• We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.
31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial
contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political
dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration
signed in 2008, including through:
• enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
• more regular political consultation; and
• enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.
32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-
Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two
organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share

38
common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European
defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework
for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies
make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO
and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and
should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace
and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable
circumstances through which we will:
• fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness,
transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both
organisations;
• enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from
coordinated planning to mutual support in the
field;
• broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to
share assessments and perspectives;
• cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-
effectiveness.
33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a
common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the
contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will
act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of
the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect
of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all
states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain
convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and
constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best
serve our security. We are determined to:
• enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared
interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and
the promotion of wider international security;
• use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and
joint action with Russia.
35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision
of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly
and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further
develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to
peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:
• enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council;
• continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine
and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based
on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-
Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of
the countries;
• facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure
lasting peace and stability based on democratic
values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;

39
• deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to
the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
• develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome
new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate
together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated
military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could
afford individually.
37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its
missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those
resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
• maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to
sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s
usability targets;
• ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce
unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
• develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost- effectiveness and as a
manifestation of solidarity;
• preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind
us together;
• engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods
and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so
that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly
committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military
Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a
source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to
safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal
and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and
resolve.

I.3.1 NATO Defense Planning Overview

I.3.1.1. Evolution of defense planning within NATO

40
Evolution of defence planning within NATO

Defence planning existed during the Cold War but “operational planning”, in the
currently accepted sense did not. This was because it was the task of force (and
nuclear) planning to identify all the forces required to implement the collective
defence war plans and members were expected to assign and employ the requested
forces virtually without question. These war plans were, in effect, the only
“operational plans” of the era.
When, after the Cold War, the Alliance started to get involved in non-Article 5
operations, the situation had to change. Since these missions are, by agreement,
case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary, the automaticity of
availability associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This
led to the requirement for “force generation conferences” to solicit the necessary
forces and “operational planning” to develop the plans.
Existing processes were adjusted so that “defence planning” disciplines no longer
focused exclusively on meeting collective defence requirements and the needs of
static warfare. Forces, assets, capabilities and facilities had to be capable of facing
threats posed by failed states, ethnic rivalry, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism. In fact, acknowledging the ever-changing situation and
recognizing the benefits of harmonization and coordination, the existing procedures
were reviewed on a regular basis and adjusted as appropriate.
In practical terms, there was no standard defence planning process or defence
planning cycle per se. Each one of the seven principal disciplines was managed by a
different NATO body and applied special procedures. They also contributed differently
to the overall aim of providing the Alliance with the forces and capabilities to
undertake the full range of its missions.
With the differences between the various components of the defence planning
process and interrelated disciplines, the need for harmonization and coordination is
essential.
While force planning had provided, to a certain extent, a basis for this harmonization
and coordination, at the Istanbul Summit NATO leaders concluded that more was
required. They directed the Council in Permanent Session to produce comprehensive
political guidance in support of the Strategic Concept for all Alliance capabilities
issues, planning disciplines and intelligence, responsive to the Alliance's
requirements. They also directed that the interfaces between the respective Alliance
planning disciplines, including operational planning, should be further analysed.
With the adoption of a new Strategic Concept in November 2010 at the Lisbon
Summit, Alliance leaders committed to ensure that NATO has the full range of
capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and
security of Allies populations[ ] .
Furthermore the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept sets out NATO’s strategic
priorities and defines the Organization’s vision of Euro-Atlantic security for the next
decade. It provides an analysis of the strategic environment and a framework for all
Alliance capability development planning disciplines and intelligence, identifying the
kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform and setting the context for
in which capability development takes place.
Defence planning, on the other hand, takes a more systematic approach and has a
medium and longer-term perspective, including with respect to identifying
requirements, the development and delivery of capabilities, the adjustment of
military and civilian structures, personnel issues, equipment procurement and the
development of new technologies.
A package of capabilities representing the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs
was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit. The package goes hand in hand with and
underpins the new Strategic Concept. It was developed to help the Alliance meet the

41
demands of on-going operations, face emerging challenges and acquire key enabling
capabilities. The package is based largely on existing plans and programmes and a
realistic projection of resources. It therefore provides a renewed focus and mandate
to ensure that in the competition for resources, these, the most urgent capabilities,
are delivered.

Implementation of the new NATO Defence Planning Process

In April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the Outline Model of the new NATO Defence
Planning Process (NDPP) and in June 2009, defence ministers endorsed the
Implementation and Transition Plan of the NDPP. The NDPP introduces the concept of
a more coherent and comprehensive defence planning process and it aims to
improve the harmonization of the planning domains, including their related
committee structure and staffs, and encourage member countries to harmonize and
integrate their national defence planning activities so as to complement NATO
efforts. It applies a specific approach and mechanism through which NATO is
bringing its civilian and military side, including the Strategic Commands, closer
together engaging them in a common, functionally integrated approach to the issue
of defence planning.
In the meantime, defence ministers endorsed the Implementation and Transition
Plan of the NDPP. The NDPP introduces the concept of a more coherent and
comprehensive defence planning process. It applies a specific approach and
mechanism through which NATO is bringing its civilian and military side, closer
together engaging them in a common, functionally integrated approach to the issue
of defence planning.
This has two major implications. Firstly, work will have to be done in a functionally
integrated manner while at the same time ensuring that products are fully
coordinated, coherent, persuasive, clear, and result-oriented and delivered on a
timely basis. This has required a cultural shift in the way in which the HQs and staffs
conduct business, particularly between the civilian and military experts and the
various staffs supporting the committees responsible for the planning domains.
Consequently, the demand for communication, consultation, coordination and for
finding feasible and realistic solutions which are supported by all stakeholders is
increasing.
Secondly, Allies themselves, in the delegations at NATO HQ and in capitals, have to
exploit the full potential of the NDPP and coordinate and consolidate expert
community views prior to presenting them in the various NATO fora. It is crucial that
individual members speak with one voice in the various NATO committees.
The NDPP therefore provides a framework within which national and Alliance
processes can be harmonized to meet Alliance objectives. It establishes in detail how
to meet the mandates of the political guidance and sets targets for nations and the
Alliance collectively, thereby guiding national and collective capability development.
Implemented in a four-year cycle, the NDPP seeks forces and capabilities that are
deployable, sustainable and can contribute to the full range of Alliance missions,
allocating the totality of the Alliance’s requirements to nations on the principles of
fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge. The forces provided by Allies have to
be able to operate together in a multinational context, prepared, trained, equipped
and supported to contribute to the full range of missions, including in distant and
remote areas.

I.3.1.2. NATO Defense planning - definition

NATO Defense planning – definition

42
Defence planning in the Alliance is a multi-disciplinary process by which the alliance
identifies its military requirements and a crucial tool which enables member countries
to benefit from the political, military and resource advantages of working together.
The aim of NATO defence planning is to provide a framework within which national
and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in
the most effective way. It aims to facilitate the timely identification, development
and delivery of the necessary range of forces - forces that are interoperable and
adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported - as well as the associated
military and non-military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of
missions. Its ultimate goal is to ensure operational commanders have access to
forces and capabilities required to initiate, sustain and successfully conclude NATO
operations.

I.3.1.3. Defense planning domains and related committees

Defense planning domains and related committees

Defence planning encompasses several planning domains: force, resource,

armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil
emergency planning, air defence, air traffic management, standardization,
intelligence, medical support and research and technology. The NDPP has introduced
a new approach to defence planning and operates within the new NATO committee
structure. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) is the central
body that oversees the work of NATO bodies and committees responsible for the
planning domains.

FORCE PLANNING
Force planning aims to promote the availability of national forces and capabilities for
the full range of Alliance missions. In practical terms, it seeks to ensure that Allies
develop modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities,
which can undertake demanding operations wherever required, including being able
to operate abroad with limited or no support from the country of destination.
However, force planning should not be understood to refer primarily to “forces”; the
focus is on “capabilities” and, how best nations should organise their priorities to
optimise these. Therefore force planning also addresses capability areas that are also
covered by single-area specific planning domains.
The term “force planning” has often been used interchangeably with “defence
planning” and “operational planning”. Defence planning is a much broader term than
force planning and operational planning is conducted for specific, NATO-agreed
operations.

THE DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING COMMITTEE

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) oversees the force planning
process. It is the senior decision-making body on matters relating to the integrated
military structure of the Alliance. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) and it is the senior advisory body to the NAC on defence matters concerning
all member countries, provides guidance to NATO's military authorities and, in its
reinforced format, oversees the defence planning process, of which force planning is
a constituent activity. It also has the lead on defence aspects of Partnership.
It is a key committee bringing together defence counsellors from all national
delegations. It deals with a broad range of issues such as transformation, defence
capabilities, agency reform, common-funded acquisition and missile defence, and in
Reinforced format (DPPC(R)) it manages the NATO Defence Planning Process.
Chairmanship is flexible depending on the topics being discussed, but the DPPC’s

43
permanent Chairman is the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and
Planning; in Reinforced format it is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General of
NATO. The deputy chairman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary General of the
Defence Policy and Planning Division.
This committee has been called the DPPC since the June 2010 committee reform. It
replaced both the Executive Working Group and the Defence Review Committee. It
has no subordinate committees under its remit.

RESOURCE PLANNING
The large majority of NATO resources are national. NATO resource planning aims to
provide the Alliance with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that
are jointly or commonly funded, that is to say where members pool resources within
a NATO framework. In this regard, resource planning is closely linked to operational
planning, which aims to ensure that the Alliance can fulfill its present and future
operational commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction.
There is a distinction to be made between joint funding and common funding: joint
funding covers activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) and NATO pipelines; common funding
involves three different budgets: the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO
Security Investment Programme.
Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are
key for the cohesion of the Alliance and the integration of capabilities.

THE RESOURCE POLICY AND PLANNING BOARD

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the
North Atlantic Council on the management of all NATO resources. It has
responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as
well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower.
The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB. The
Budget Committee reviews and recommends civil and military budgets, while the
Investment Committee is responsible for the implementation of the NSIP, which
finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of
the two strategic commands that exceed national defence requirements of individual
member countries.
Main roles and functions
The RPPB is responsible for resource policy, including eligibility and affordability, and
is tasked with planning and performance assessment. The RPPB receives strategic
guidance from the NAC and provides coherence and guidance to the work of resource
committees. It advises Council on the resource implications of new initiatives,
operations and missions, as it does the Military Committee on the cost and
investment implications of any of the committee’s decisions.
The RPPB was set up in July 2010 as the only financial committee reporting directly
to the North Atlantic Council. It succeeded the Senior Resource Board, which was
one of four financial committees (Senior Resource Board, Civil Budget Committee,
Military Budget Committee and the Infrastructure Committee) reporting to the NAC.
The Senior Resource Board itself was created in the 1990s in an effort to optimize
the allocation of military common-funded resources and reinforce management
structures. At the same time, capability packages were established to identify the
assets available to and required by NATO military commanders.
These capability packages are a means to assess identified Alliance capabilities in
terms of both capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs as
well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task.
The Board reviews these capability packages and endorses them from the point of

44
view of their resource implications and eligibility for common funding prior to their
approval by the North Atlantic Council.
Each year, the RPPB also recommends for approval by the Council a comprehensive
Medium Term Resource Plan, which sets financial ceilings for the following year and
planning figures for the four subsequent years. This five-year Medium Term Resource
Plan sets the parameters within which the Budget and the Investment Committees
oversee the preparation and execution of their respective budgets and plans.
The Board also produces an Annual Report, which allows the Council to monitor the
adequacy of resource allocations in relation to requirements.

Working mechanisms
All NATO member countries are represented on this board, which is chaired by a
national chairman selected on a rotational basis.
Besides national representatives, representatives of the International Military Staff,
NATO Strategic Commanders, and Chairmen of the Budget Committee and
Investment Committee also attend the Board's meetings.
The Board is supported by the NATO Office of Resources.

ARMAMENTS PLANNING
Armaments planning focuses on the development of multinational (but not common-
funded) armaments programmes. It promotes cost-effective acquisition, co-operative
development and the production of armaments. It also encourages interoperability,
and technological and industrial co-operation among Allies and Partners.
THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS (CNAD)
The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO
committee responsible for Alliance armaments cooperation, material standardization
and defence procurement. It brings together the top officials responsible for defence
procurement in NATO member and Partner countries to consider the political,
economic and technical aspects of the development and procurement of equipment
for NATO forces, with the aim of arriving at common solutions.
Authority, tasks and responsibilities
The CNAD reports directly to the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s principal decision
making body. It is tasked with identifying collaborative opportunities for research,
development and production of military equipment and weapons systems. The CNAD
is responsible for a number of co-operative armaments projects that aim to equip
NATO forces with cutting-edge capabilities . Ongoing projects include a Programme
of Work for Defence against Terrorism, the Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme,
and the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme.
All NATO member states are represented at the meetings of the CNAD, and some
session are also open to Partner countries.
The CNAD meets twice a year at the level of National Armaments Directors, under
the chairmanship of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment,
to oversee and guide the work of the CNAD subordinate structure.
In addition to that, it meets regularly at the level of representatives of the National
Armaments Directors (NADREPs), which come from the permanent delegation of
member countries to NATO.

LOGISTICS PLANNING
Logistics planning in NATO aims at ensuring responsive and usable logistics support
to NATO operations. This is achieved by promoting the development of military and
civil logistics capabilities and multinational cooperation in logistics.
THE LOGISTICS COMMITTEE
The Logistics Committee (LC) is the senior advisory body on logistics in NATO.
Its overall mandate is two-fold: to address consumer logistics matters with a view to

45
enhancing the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of
Alliance forces; and to exercise, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, an
overarching coordinating authority across the whole spectrum of logistics functions
within NATO.
It carries out its work through subordinate bodies: the Logistic Staff Meeting, the
Movement and Transportation Group, and the Petroleum Committee. The LC reports
jointly to both the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council, reflecting the
dependence of logistics on both civil and military factors.
The LC is responsible for harmonizing and coordinating the development of policy
recommendations and coordinated advice on civil and military logistic matters,
Alliance logistic interoperability, and cooperation in logistics.
As new Alliance concepts, visions and technologies emerge, the LC ensures that the
necessary logistic support concepts are in place and in line with the NATO vision for
logistics.
A key document is “NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics” (MC 319/2), which
establishes the principle of “collective responsibility” for logistic support between
national and NATO authorities. It is based on the idea that both NATO and
participating countries are responsible for the logistic support of NATO’s multinational
operations and is characterized by close coordination and cooperation between
national and NATO authorities during logistics planning and execution.
The LC is a joint civil/ military body where all member countries are represented.
Membership is drawn from senior national civil and military representatives of
ministries of defence or equivalent bodies with responsibility for consumer aspects of
logistics in member countries. Representatives of the Strategic Commands, the NATO
Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO Standardization Agency, the Committee
of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO and other sectors of the NATO
Headquarters Staff also participate in the work of the LC.
Working mechanisms
The LC meets under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General twice a year, in
joint civil and military sessions. It has two permanent co-chairmen: the Assistant
Secretary General of the division responsible for defence policy and planning issues
and the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee.
Support staff and subordinate bodies
The LC is supported jointly by dedicated staff in the International Secretariat (IS)
and the International Military Staff (IMS). It carries out its work through six
subordinate bodies, of which the first two play the principal role:
• the Logistic Staff Meeting;
• the Movement and Transportation Group;
• the Standing Group of Partner Logistic Experts;
• the Logistic Information Management Group;
• the Petroleum committee; and
• the Ammunition transport safety group.
The Logistic Staff Meeting
This is the principal subordinate body, which advises the LC on general logistic
matters. It monitors and coordinates the implementation of logistic policies,
programmes and initiatives through consultation among countries, the strategic
commanders and other NATO logistic and logistic-related bodies. It also provides a
forum for addressing logistic concerns and coordinates with the Movement and
Transportation Group and other subordinate bodies, and harmonizes their work with
the LC’s overall policies and programmes.
Furthermore, the Logistic Staff Meeting develops logistic policies, programmes and
initiatives for the LC’s consideration.
It meets twice a year in the same format as the LC and is co-chaired by a civil co-
chairman, the Head, IS Logistics, and by a military co-chairman, the Deputy

46
Assistant Director, IMS Logistics, Armaments and Resources Division.

The Movement and Transportation Group

As its name indicates, this group is specialized in the area of movement and
transport. It advises the LC on movement and transportation matters and monitors
and coordinates the implementation of related policies, programmes and initiatives
through consultation and cooperation among countries, the strategic commanders
and other NATO transportation and transportation-related groups and agencies.
It is co-chaired by the same people who co-chair the Logistic Staff Meeting - the
Head, IS Logistics, and the Deputy Assistant Director, IMS Logistics, Armaments and
Resources Division – and also meets twice a year, in March and September in the
same format as the LC. In addition, the three Transport Planning Boards and
Committees of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee are represented on the
Movement and Transportation Group.
Both the Logistic Staff Meeting and the Movement and Transportation Group can
form ad hoc working groups to carry out specific tasks that require a certain
expertise.

The Standing Group of Partner Logistic Experts

This group identifies, develops and promotes the employment of Partner logistic
forces and capabilities volunteered by Partners for NATO-led operations. It does this
under the guidance of the Logistic Staff Meeting with Partners and the Movement and
Transportation Group with Partners. It also makes recommendations concerning
logistics pre-arrangements to the strategic commanders and, more generally,
provides a forum for addressing logistic topics related to the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) programme that any member or PfP country may want to raise.
This group meets twice a year under the chairmanship of a Partner country; the
chair is assumed for a two-year term. Membership comprises the strategic
commanders and senior staff officers from NATO and Partner countries, the IS, the
IMS, and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

The Logistic Information Management Group

This is NATO’s overarching logistics information management body. It reviews,
assesses and recommends NATO logistic information management requirements and
develops logistic information management policy and guidance for consideration by
the Logistics Staff Meeting.
The Logistic Information Management Group is chaired by a country representative
and comprises experts from NATO and Partner countries. It meets as often as
necessary.

The Petroleum Committee

This Committee is the senior advisory body in NATO for logistic support to Alliance
forces on all matters concerning petroleum, including the NATO Pipeline System
(NPS), other petroleum installations and handling equipment.
The Petroleum Committee deals with questions related to NATO petroleum
requirements and how they are met in times of peace, crisis and conflict, including
expeditionary operations.

The Ammunition Transport Safety Group

This group provides guidance for NATO forces on procedures for planning, organising
and conducting the logistic transportation of munitions and explosives and danferous
goods using the different modes of transportations available.
The LC works in close cooperation with the Civil Emergency Planning Committee
(CEPC). The CEPC is responsible for coordinating the use of civil resources to support

47
the Alliance’s overall defence effort. The responsibilities of these two committees are
interrelated, bringing them and their related sub-committees to work closely
together.
The LC also works with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, NATO
Standardization Agency and the Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services
in NATO.
Evolution
Logistic conferences were, for a long time, a feature of planning within NATO’s
military command structure. In 1964, the ACE Logistics Coordination Centre (LCC)
was formed to meet the requirements of Allied Command Europe. This centre had
detailed emergency and wartime roles, which were rehearsed and tested during
exercises. The Atlantic Command (SACLANT) also had a Logistics Coordination
Board.
However, as Alliance preparedness including logistics readiness and sustainability
became a priority, there was an increased need for cooperation and coordination in
consumer logistics. What was then called the Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference
(SNLC) was therefore established in 1979 and has since developed and introduced
logistic support concepts to meet the logistic challenges of the future. It was
renamed the Logistics Committee in June 2010 after a thorough review of NATO
committees aimed at introducing more flexibility and efficiency into working
procedures.

NUCLEAR PLANNING

The aim of nuclear policy and planning is to promote the maintenance of a credible
nuclear deterrent and force posture, which meets the requirements of the current
and foreseeable security environment.
NATO has developed an adaptive nuclear planning capability. Accordingly, nuclear
forces are not directed towards a specific threat nor do they target or hold at risk
any country. In addition, the formulation of the Alliance’s nuclear policy involves all
NATO countries (except France), including non-nuclear Allies.

THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

The Nuclear Planning Group is the ultimate authority within NATO with regard to
nuclear policy issues, as are the North Atlantic Council or the Defence Planning
Committee on matters within their competence. Its discussions cover a broad range
of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security and survivability of nuclear
weapons, communications and information systems, as well as deployment issues. It
also covers wider questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and
nuclear proliferation.
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) takes decisions on the Alliance's nuclear policy,
which is kept under constant review and modified or adapted in the light of new
developments. Since the end of the Cold War the Alliance has been able to greatly
reduce its reliance on nuclear forces. While they are maintained as part of the
Alliance's policy of deterrence, their role is fundamentally political and they are no
longer directed towards a specific threat.
The role of the Nuclear Planning Group is to review the Alliance's nuclear policy in
the light of the ever-changing security challenges of the international environment
and to adapt it if necessary. It provides a forum in which member countries of the
Alliance can participate in the development of the Alliance's nuclear policy and in
decisions on NATO's nuclear posture, irrespective of whether or not they themselves
maintain nuclear weapons. The policies that are agreed upon therefore represent the
common position of all the participating countries. Decisions are taken by consensus
within the NPG, as is the case for all NATO committees.

48
Members participating in NATO's integrated military structure (all member countries
except France) are part of the NPG. It is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO.
The work of the Nuclear Planning Group is prepared by an NPG Staff Group
composed of members of the national delegations of all participating member
countries. The Staff Group prepares meetings of the NPG Permanent Representatives
and carries out detailed work on their behalf. It meets once a week and at other
times as necessary.

C3 PLANNING

The effective performance of NATO's political and military functions requires the
widespread utilization of both NATO and national Consultation, Command and
Control (C3) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and
NATO-agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures.
C3 systems include communications, information, navigation and identification
systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated
in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of NATO. Individual C3
systems may be provided by NATO via common funded programmes or by members
via national, multi-national or joint-funded co-operative programmes.
C3 planning is responsive to requirements, as and when they appear, so there is no
established C3 planning cycle. However, activities are harmonized with the cycles of
the other associated planning disciplines where they exist.

THE CONSULTATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL (C3) BOARD

The Consultation, Command and Control Board is a senior multinational body acting
on behalf of and responsible to the NAC on all matters relating to C3 issues
throughout the Organization. This includes interoperability of NATO and national C3
systems, as well as advising the CNAD on C3 cooperative programmes. All NATO
members are also members of this body.

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

Civil emergency planning in NATO aims to collect, analyse and share information on
national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use
during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies
and Partners to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences
of crisis, disaster or conflict.

THE CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top NATO advisory body for the
protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO's
objectives. The CEPC coordinates planning in several areas, to ensure – when
necessary - civil support for the Alliance ’s military operations or support for national
authorities in civil emergencies.
Civil Emergency Planning provides NATO with essential civilian expertise and
capabilities in the fields of terrorism preparedness and consequence management,
humanitarian and disaster response and protecting critical infrastructure.
The committee has for example developed a plan for improving the civil
preparedness of NATO and Partner countries against terrorist attacks. In August
2008, the CEPC dispatched a team of CEP civil experts to help the Georgian
Government in assessing damage to critical infrastructure. In November 2008, teams
of civil experts visited Azerbaijan to advise on preparedness issues.
The CEPC reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-
making body. It coordinates and provides direction and guidance for four specialised

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groups.
These bring together national government, industry experts and military
representatives to coordinate emergency planning in areas such as: civil protection;
transport; industrial resources and communications; public health, food and water.
Their primary purpose is to develop procedures for use in crisis situations.
Together, NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning structures provide an interface to many
different ministries across a broad range of sectors, thus providing a vast civil
network going beyond NATO’s more traditional interlocutors in Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defence.
The CEPC also oversees the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters, which acts as the focal point
for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO and partner countries, and in
countries where NATO is engaged with military operations.
All NATO member countries are represented on the CEPC, and regular meetings are
held with NATO's Partner countries.
The CEPC meets twice a year in plenary session, at the level of the heads of the
national civil emergency planning organisations from NATO and partner countries.
In addition, it meets on a weekly basis in permanent session, where countries are
represented by their national delegations to NATO. Meetings alternate between those
of NATO member countries only, and those open to Partner countries.
The Secretary General is Chairman of plenary sessions, but in practice these are
chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, while permanent
sessions are chaired by the NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Planning,
Civil Emergency Planning and Exercises.

AIR DEFENCE PLANNING

Air defence planning enables members to harmonize national efforts with

international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons.
NATO integrated air defence (NATINAD) is a network of interconnected systems and
measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. A NATO
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme has been
initiated to enhance the existing NATINAD system, particularly against theatre
ballistic missiles.
THE NATO AIR DEFENCE COMMITTEE (NADC)
The Air Defence Committee advises the North Atlantic Council and the relevant Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council bodies on all elements of air defence, including missile
defence and relevant air power aspects. It promotes harmonization of national
efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air
defence weapons.
The NADC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and meets twice a year. It has
two subordinate panels:
Panel on Air Defense Philosophy (PADP); and
Panel on Air Defense Weapons (PADW).

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

NATO's role in civil-military air traffic management is to ensure, in cooperation with

other international organizations, safe access to airspace, effective delivery of
services and civil-military interoperability for air operations conducted in support of
the Alliance's security tasks and missions while minimizing disruption to civil
aviation, already constrained by the limited capacity of systems and airports, and
mitigating the cost implications of new civil technologies on defence budgets.

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THE NATO AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (NATMC)
The ATMC is the senior civil-military advisory body to the NAC for airspace use and
air traffic management. The committee’s mission is to develop, represent and
promote NATO’s view on matters related to safe and expeditious air operations in the
airspace of NATO areas of responsibility and interest. All NATO members are
members of this body.

STANDARDIZATION

At NATO, standardization is the process of developing shared concepts, doctrines,

procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of
“compatibility, interchangeability and commonality” in operations, procedures,
materials, technology and administration. The primary products of this process are
Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between member countries.

THE NATO COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION (NCS)

The NATO Committee for Standardization (NCS) is the senior authority of the Alliance
responsible for providing coordinated advice to the NAC on overall standardization
issues. It is supported by NCS Representatives (NCSREPs), who provide
harmonisation and guidance at delegate level under the overall direction and
management of the Committee. The focus of the work undertaken by the NCSREPs is
the harmonisation of standardisation between NATO and national bodies and
promoting interaction between them in the standardisation field.
The NCS is chaired by the Secretary General, normally represented by two
permanent co-chairmen, namely the Assistant Secretary General for Defence
Investment and the Director of the International Military Staff. Since September
2000, NATO’s Partner countries have been actively involved in NCS activities. All
NATO members are members of this body.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning process, in particular

with the emergence of multidirectional and multidimensional security challenges such
as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic warning
and assessment capacity for NATO are essential to ensure maximum warning and
preparation time to counter military and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the
requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of all-source
political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the
intelligence producers within the Alliance.

THE INTELLIGENCE STEERING BOARD

The Intelligence Steering Board acts as an inter-service coordination body
responsible for steering intelligence activities involving the International Staff and
the International Military Staff and for providing effective support to the decision-
making process at NATO Headquarters. It is tasked, among others, with developing
the Strategic Intelligence Requirements from which any capability requirements are
derived.

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

It is responsible for developing a work plan in particular in the areas of NATO
Intelligence Support to Operations and oversight of policy guidance on military
intelligence.

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MEDICAL SUPPORT

Medical support is normally a national responsibility, however planning needs to be

flexible to consider multinational approaches. The degree of multinationality varies
according to the circumstances of the mission and the willingness of countries to
participate.

THE COMMITTEE OF THE CHIEFS OF MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICES IN NATO

(COMEDS)
COMEDS is composed of the senior military medical authorities of member countries.
It acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military medical
matters and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

NATO promotes and conducts cooperative research and information exchange to

support the effective use of national defence research and technology and further the
military needs of the Alliance.

THE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD (RTB)

The RTB is an integrated NATO body responsible for defence research and
technological development. It provides advice and assistance to the CNAD, as well as
to the Military Committee. It coordinates research and technology policy in different
NATO bodies and is supported by a specialized NATO Research and Technology
Agency.

I.3.1.4. The NATO Defense Planning Process - NDPP

The NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP

The NDPP consists of five steps: establish political guidance, determine

requirements, apportion requirements and set targets, facilitate implementation, and
review results. Although the process is sequential and cyclical in nature (four year
cycle with bi-annual elements), some elements occur at different frequencies and
implementation is a continuous activity.
Step 1 - Establish political guidance

The intent is to develop a single, unified political guidance for defence planning which
sets out the overall aims and objectives to be met by the Alliance. It translates
guidance from higher strategic policy documents (i.e., the Strategic Concept and
subsequent political guidance) in sufficient detail to direct the defence planning
efforts of the various planning domains, both in member countries and in NATO,
towards the determination of the required capabilities. This will obviate the
requirement for other political guidance documents for defence planning.
Political guidance should reflect the political, military, economic, legal, civil and
technological factors which could impact on the development of the required
capabilities. It will, inter alia, aim at defining the number, scale and nature of the
operations the Alliance should be able to conduct in the future (commonly referred to
as NATO’s Level of Ambition). It will also define the requisite qualitative capability
requirements to support this overall ambition. By doing so, it will steer the capability
development efforts of Allies and within NATO. Furthermore, it will clearly define

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associated priorities and timelines, as appropriate, for use by the various planning
domains.
Any political guidance needs to be written against the background that the majority
of capabilities sought by the Alliance are and will be provided by individual member
countries.
Political guidance will be reviewed at least every four years.

Step 2 - Determine requirements

There is one single consolidated list of Minimum Capability Requirements, including

eventual shortfalls. These requirements are identified by the Defence Planning Staff
Team, with the Strategic Commands, notably Allied Command Transformation in the
lead. The team take into account all NDPP-related guidance and ensure that all
requirements considered necessary to meet quantitative and qualitative ambitions
set out in the political guidance are covered. The process is structured,
comprehensive, transparent and traceable and uses analytical supporting tools
coupled with relevant NATO expert analysis.
Planning domains are fully engaged throughout the analysis, assisting the Strategic
Commands in providing a sound framework for further work which, ultimately, needs
to be usable by each planning domain.
Strategic Commands must be transparent, while ensuring that political
considerations do not prematurely qualify the process during which requirements are
identified. This is achieved by seeking expert advice and feedback from member
countries, inviting the latter to observe key milestones and decision points, together
with regular briefings to Allies.

Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets

Target setting initially apportions the overall set of Minimum Capability Requirements
to individual countries and NATO entities in the form of target packages, respecting
the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.
Initially led by the Strategic Commands, the Defence Planning Staff Team will
develop targets for existing and planned capabilities against the Minimum Capability
Requirements and cover them in the draft target packages, together with their
associated priorities and timelines. Targets should be expressed in capability terms
and be flexible enough to allow national, multinational as well as collective
implementation.
Each individual Ally has the opportunity to seek clarification on the content of targets
and present its national views on their acceptance during a meeting between the
relevant national authorities and representatives from the Defence Planning Staff
Team. Subsequently, the Defence Planning Staff Team will consider the member
country’s perspective and priorities with the aim of refining the NATO target
packages and providing advice on what constitutes a reasonable challenge.
Following discussions with member countries, leadership of the Defence Planning
Staff Team will transition from the Strategic Commands to the International Staff. At
this point, the Defence Planning Staff Team will continue to refine and tailor
individual draft target packages in line with the principle of reasonable challenge. To
ensure transparency and promote Alliance cohesion, packages will be forwarded to
Allies with a recommendation of which targets should be retained or removed to
respect this principle. Allies will review these packages during a series of multilateral
examinations.
Agreed packages are accompanied by a summary report, which is prepared by the
Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced), on the targets as a whole. This
will subsequently be forwarded to permanent representatives for submission to

53
defence ministers for adoption. The summary will include an assessment of the
potential risk and possible impact caused by the removal of planning targets from
packages on the delivery of the Alliance’s Level of Ambition.

Step 4 - Facilitate Implementation

This step assists national efforts and facilitates multinational and collective efforts to
satisfy agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner.
The aim is to focus on addressing the most important capability shortfalls. This is
done by encouraging national implementation, facilitating and supporting
multinational implementation and proceeding with the collective (multinational, joint
or common-funded) acquisition of the capabilities required by the Alliance. This step
also facilitates national implementation of standardization products (STANAGs/Allied
Publications) developed to improve interoperability.
The detailed work needed to develop and implement a capability improvement or
action plan is carried out by multidisciplinary task forces. These task forces are
composed of representatives from all stakeholders, under the lead of a dedicated
entity. Each task force is supported by a “Capability Monitor” who keep themselves
abreast of progress in the implementation phase and report to all relevant bodies
and committees, providing feedback and additional guidance to the task force
leader.
Unlike other steps in the process, this step – or function - is continuous in nature.

Step 5 - Review results

This step seeks to examine the degree to which NATO’s political objectives,
ambitions and associated targets have been met and to offer feedback and direction
for the next cycle of the defence planning process.
The Defence Planning Capability Review (DPCR) scrutinises and assesses Allies’
defence and financial plans as well as collective efforts so as to provide an overall
assessment of the degree to which the combined Alliance forces and capabilities are
able to meet the political guidance, including the NATO Level of Ambition. The DPCR
provides a key mechanism for generating feedback and input for the next cycle.
Capability reviews will be carried out every two years.
The review process begins with the development of the Defence Planning Capability
Survey. It seeks data on national plans and policies, including Allies’ efforts
(national, multinational and collective) to address their planning targets. It also
seeks information on the national inventory of military forces and associated
capabilities, any relevant non-military capabilities potentially available for Alliance
operations and national financial plans.
The Defence Planning Staff Team conduct a preliminary analysis and produces draft
assessments for each Ally. These assessments constitute a comprehensive analysis
of national plans and capabilities, including on force structures, specific
circumstances and priorities. The assessments also include a statement by the
Strategic Commands regarding the impact each country’s plans have on the ability of
Allied Command Operations to conduct missions. They may also include
recommendations including, as appropriate, on the redirection of resources from
surplus areas to the identified Alliance deficiencies areas.
Once a draft assessment has been developed, it will be circulated to the country
concerned for discussion between the national authorities and the Defence Planning
Staff Team to ensure information in the draft assessment is correct. The draft
assessments are then revised accordingly and submitted to the Defence Policy and
Planning Committee (Reinforced) for review and approval during a series of
multilateral examinations. During these examinations, the working practice of
consensus-minus-one will be continued.
In parallel with the examination of country assessments, the Military Committee,

54
based on the Strategic Commands’ Suitability and Risk Assessment, will develop a
risk assessment on the military suitability of the plans and the degree of military risk
associated with them in relation to political guidance for defence planning, including
the Level of Ambition.
On the basis of the individual country assessments and Military Committee Suitability
and Risk Assessment, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced)
prepares a NATO Capabilities Report, highlighting individual and collective progress
on capability development as it relates to NATO’s Level of Ambition.
The Report will also provide an assessment of any associated risks, including a brief
summary of the Military Committee’s Suitability and Risk Assessment. It will also
include an indication of whether the risks identified could be mitigated by capabilities
developed by member countries outside the NATO defence planning process or by
contracting civil assets. This would not relieve Allies from the obligation of trying to
meet NATO’s Level of Ambition from within Alliance inventories, nor would it diminish
the need to develop the capabilities sought. However, it will assist defence planners
in prioritising their efforts to overcome the most critical shortfalls first.
The report will also contain further direction to steer capability development.
The Outline Model For the NATO Defence Planning Process
Defense planning processes

Furthermore the NDPP consist of several processes that allow the development
and/or improvement, allocation and implementation of the capability.

First one is Capability Requirement Review, former Defence Requirement Review,

which is the analytical process and the associated support tool set used by the SCs
having in support all related planning domains, to determine the Minimum Capability
Requirement needed by the Alliance to meet its Level of Ambition and other agreed
objectives set out in political guidance. Its construct has to logically and convincingly
lead to the apportionment of identified requirements and their translation into
capability targets which support nations harmonising their plans with NATO targets
and priorities.
In order to be credible, reliable and transparent with respect to nations, the CRR
adopt a capability-based approach by describing first the way NATO would conduct
its operations in the future, and deriving from this description the functions that
would have to be performed and the capabilities needed to support these functions.
The second one is Set Targets, the former Force Planning. Initially the process
include the apportionment of the overall set of Minimum Capability Requirements to
nations in the form of target packages for the delivery of required capabilities and
mitigation of shortfalls while respecting the principles of fair burden sharing and
reasonable challenge. It will also include the development of targets to be
implemented by using common funding. This step in the process is a quadrennial
effort, although the possibility for the introduction of out-of-cycle targets will be
retained to remain responsive to the needs of the Alliance and individual Allies.
Similarly, the option of a full revision or an update at the mid-term point will be
retained to react to a change in the security environment or a change in political
guidance.
Last but not least, the NATO Capability Review, former Defence Review, scrutinises
and assesses Allies’ defence and financial plans as well as collective efforts with a
view to providing an overall assessment of the degree to which the combined

55
Alliance forces and capabilities are able to meet the political guidance, including the
NATO Level of Ambition. In addition, the NCR provides a key mechanism for
generating feedback, any associated recommendations, and input to the next cycle.
Current support structures

Although a more integrated and comprehensive process has been agreed comprising
a coordinating framework with more flexible working arrangements, the committee
and staff structures to support the process remain unchanged.

THE SENIOR COMMITTEE FOR DEFENCE PLANNING

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior
committee for defence planning. It is responsible for the development of defence
planning-related policy and the overall coordination and direction of NDPP activities.
It also provides integrated advice to the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear
Planning Group. Effectively, the DPPC (R) is the central body that oversees the work
of the NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains. It can
provide feedback and, as required, defence planning process-related direction to
them.

DEFENCE PLANNING STAFF TEAM

The work of the DPPC (R) is supported by the NATO Defence Planning Staff Team.
Conceptually, the Defence Planning Staff Team is a virtual pool of all civil and
military expertise resident within the various NATO HQ staffs and Strategic
Commands. This entity supports the entire defence planning process throughout the
five steps. In practice, the Defence Planning Staff Team provides the staff officers
required to undertake the majority of the staff work to support the NDPP; a standing
Core Element facilitates the day-to-day coordination and an Internal Coordination
Mechanism that oversees all aspects of the work.

CORE ELEMENT
It is a standing inter-departmental group, co-located within the International Staff at
NATO HQ, responsible for coordinating the implementation of the NDPP at staff level.
The Core Element facilitates the day-to-day management of the associated defence
planning efforts conducted by the various task forces and is therefore equipped with
the necessary coordination authority. It supports the DPPC (R), the Internal
Coordination Mechanism and line managers of the designated lead entities. The Core
Element assumes a consultative role on request and as appropriate.
So far the integrated team consists of four staff officers representing their parent
entities acting in a collaborative manner: from the International Staff (Defence
Planning and Policy and Defence Investment), from the International Military Staff
and Allied Command Transformation.

TASK FORCES
Much of the NDPP work is carried out by inter-disciplinary task forces, established
from the Defence Planning Staff Team pool of experts, with representatives of
stakeholder communities for the duration of a particular task. A number of task
forces may be in existence at any one time, possibly under the leadership of different

56
staff entities. They are functionally integrated teams, reinforced, as necessary, by
experts from member countries or external bodies. Regardless of their parent
organization, all task force members support the appointed task force leadership by
contributing to the satisfactory conduct of a particular task.

INTERNAL COORDINATION MECHANISM

The Internal Coordination Mechanism was set up to align and de-conflict staff efforts
related to defence capability development activities across the various planning
domains and within the various NATO staffs, including established task forces. It
coordinates the establishment, composition, manning and work programmes of the
task forces.
As a general rule, the Internal Coordination Mechanism is composed of senior level
officers from the International Staff (Defence Planning and Policy, Defence
Investment and Operations), the International Military Staff and from Allied
Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations, including representatives
of the directors/heads of the planning domains. When required, the Internal
Coordination Mechanism meets at the level of the Assistant Secretary General / Flag
Officer (three star) level.

I.3.2.1. NDPP defining qualities

DEFINING CAPABILITIES

Defining requisite NATO capabilities through the maturing Defence Planning Process
will provide a viable path to delivering attribute-based military and non-military
requirements across multiple time horizons.

INTRODUCTION
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) has five steps:
• Establish political guidance
• Determine requirements
• Apportion requirements & set targets
• Facilitate implementation
• Review results
The Defining Capabilities breakout focused on the second step (requirements
determination) with the two primary outputs of Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs) and
Minimum Capability Requirements (MCRs).
The PSAs provide the Alliance with a single compilation of capability shortfalls,
identifying those that the Strategic Commands believe offer the greatest potential to
improve Alliance mission effectiveness and interoperability in the near-, mid- and
long-terms. The collective capability shortfalls of the 2009 Bi-Strategic Command
(Bi-SC) PSAs were derived from the 2007 Defence Requirements Review and other
sources such as Lessons Learned, Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements,
and the findings of the Multiple Futures Project. The Bi-SC 2009 PSAs conclude that
the greatest potential exists in the High Level Capability Requirements (HLCRs) areas
of Command and Control, Education and Training, and Awareness and Understanding
for the following prioritised mission sets:

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• Countering Hybrid Threats
• WMD detection and consequence management
• Adaptable command structures and Expeditionary C2
• StratCom

DISCUSSION
An overview of the NDPP and the development method for the 2009 PSAs was
followed by a significant discussion on the need to transition from a Cold War-based
quantitative approach to capabilities to a more flexible qualitative or attribute-based
approach. Participants concluded with a discussion on the development of planning
situations, clarifying planning time horizons, and accounting for non-military
capabilities.

NATO Defence Planning Process Overview

Breakout session participants stated that there has always been a Defence Planning
Process (DPP), but the new NDPP will be more capability-based and inclusive.
The NDPP should facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the
necessary range of forces, both military and non-military capabilities, that are
interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported to
undertake the Alliance‟s full spectrum of missions. These planning activities should
be „harmonised‟ across the domain working groups to meet agreed targets in the
most effective way.
Session leaders emphasised that Step 1 of the NDPP is the analysis of political
guidance. National guidance enters the process from multiple sources, such as
Executive Working Group (EWG) multilateral meetings and the drafting process of
the new Strategic Concept. ACT addresses the MC at various stages of the NDPP,
providing the nations other opportunities to comment and engage with the process.

2009 Priority Shortfall Areas (PSAs) Overview – Key Insights Brief

Breakout session leaders presented an overview of the 2009 list. The 2009 PSAs are
organised in three different levels to meet the needs of different audiences:
• High Level Capability Requirements (HLCRs) indicate in broad terms a Capability
Areas and are aimed at senior policy level
• Each HLCR contains several Tier 2 Capability Areas, aimed at senior expert level,
such as the Military Committee
• Tier 1 Capability Areas are broken down into a number of Tier 2 Capabilities, which
together with supporting summaries are aimed at technical and subject-matter
experts
The PSA list provides the context and necessary details, which should be used as a
reference document. It does not presume political decisions that will determine which
capabilities NATO and nations will develop. That will remain a national decision.
NATO and national efforts in alleviating capability shortfalls need to be harmonised in
order to avoid duplication and to enable interoperability. In theory, there should be
no unfulfilled requirements.
After deriving Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR), the Strategic Commands,
with ACT in the lead, conduct a comparison between the MCR and existing and
planned national, multinational and NATO-owned capabilities available for Alliance
operations, and then identifies unfilled requirements that prevent the Alliance from
meeting its Level of Ambition.
This set of unfilled requirements will be used by the Strategic Commands to derive
the PSAs, taking into account the risks associated with each shortfall and identifying
surpluses against the Minimum Capability Requirement. A synopsis of the Minimum
Capability Requirement will be presented and discussed at the EWG (Reinforced) and
used subsequently to assist in the mutual development of action items.

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Based on this portion of the Implementation and Transition Plan, four capability
areas have been agreed upon by the nations:
• Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
• Military Medical
• Network Enabled Capability
• Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

Shift in Capability Focus from Quantity to Quality

Participants stated that NATO must provide transparency to the nations by describing
better both requirements and the associated capabilities to the nations. Many felt
that the Alliance must move from the old Cold War quantity-based to a post-Cold
War attribute-based approach
There was general agreement that the NDPP should contain mechanisms to identify
surpluses. A suggestion made was that some capabilities could be met by
Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations instead of Alliance members. Another
recommended approach was to outsource some capabilities via periodic contracts
instead of purchasing rapidly obsolete equipment.
Session leaders stated that the new planning emphasis on capability can be summed
up as “what do we need to fix,” versus the old system of “how many artillery pieces
do I need?” The primary emphasis is now on fixing interoperability and mission
effectiveness, versus providing physical equipment in specified numbers.
In conclusion, the three questions to answer through the planning process are:
• What are you learning today?
• What will be different in the future?
• How do you build them?
Answers must be attribute (characteristics) based. The future force structure will not
have more „stuff,‟ just a different way to organise and use what is available.

Future Security Environment – Generic Planning Solutions

The entire capability requirement process stems from generic planning scenarios,
which lead to task decomposition, and then to capability requirements. Participants
expressed that the key to get planning scenarios correct is to establish a common,
understandable baseline, and that transparency is critical to enable tracing how
capability requirements are derived.
The nations must find the MCR credible if they are to buy in. Various participants
expressed a desire for a better balance between current state and future aspirations,
more detailed knowledge of scenarios, applicability to „generic‟ situations, and
improved traceability and transparency. Some recommended execution of a test case
that would be compared to the results from the Multiple Futures Project, and
predicting that if they align, there will be acceptance. To ensure compatibility both
the NATO and national planning processes will work towards integrating themselves
in order to have the nations‟ force structure already compatible with NATO
requirements.

Multiple Planning Horizons

There was general agreement that multiple planning horizons are important. Short-
term capabilities are more tangible, but longer-term time horizons provide more
flexibility in determining which types of forces are optimal to deliver that capability.
A more exhaustive and quality-oriented planning process is necessary to meet
national expectations. The linkage between planning horizons and planning situations
is dependent on the lead time required to adjust the efforts.

Non-Military Capabilities (NMC)

Participants felt that the Comprehensive Approach to meeting mission goals must

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address both military and non-military requirements across the full spectrum of
Alliance nations. Minimum Capabilities Requirements will be arrived at by all defence
planning entities and by drawing upon all available military and non-military planning
expertise.
Participants expressed a desire to develop active engagement communities in order
to support the interaction and interface between military and non-military actors.
The political guidance factor that occurs in Step 1 of the NDPP will help with this
process and incorporate possible legal considerations.
Some members opined that when it comes to developing capability, the real value is
in the targets expressed in five to fifteen year timeframe. This is the window in which
NATO can affect the targets within its planning ability; targets should therefore be
specific in that period. This focus could also produce short-term results useful to
force generators within NATO.
Participants noted that NATO‟s support to a Comprehensive Approach may require
providing capabilities in new areas that have traditionally not been its concern.
Examples included police functions, prison management, and the provision of
essential civil services.
It was noted that civilian entities may be better able to provide training and support
in such areas as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) and Cyber
defence. It was generally agreed that when NATO sends out its capability
requirement list, nations should have the ability to answer requirements with non-
military as well as military assets.
One example of national ownership of the NMC issue presented was the UK‟s Joint
Operational Planning Group, which was primarily staffed by civilians. The UK uses its
Cabinet Office to act as a clearing house when decisions need to be made regarding
the transfer of national assets between government ministries and the MoD.

CONCLUSIONS

• The NDPP supports a shift from a cold-war era quantity based to a more agile
attribute-based approach to capability definition
• Opportunities for engagement in the development of the planning situations would
be appropriate for nations with a desire to participate to a greater degree.
• Multiple Planning Horizons are generally acceptable as proposed.
• Nations‟ ability and subject matter expertise to manage non-military capability
requirements will affect their
ability to contribute to this aspect of capability definition.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Organise a workshop that gives nations the opportunity to be engaged in the

development of the NATO Defence Planning Process‟s (NDPP) generic planning
situations.
• Support Alliance nations in addressing emerging needs to account for non-military
capability requirements.
• Track and fully leverage results of Military Capabilities Surveys going to nations in
the spring of 2010, to be returned to NATO in the summer of 2010.

I.4.1.1. Paying for NATO

Paying for NATO

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Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running
NATO and implementing its policies and activities.
The greater part of these contributions comes through participation in NATO-led
operations and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with
those of other member countries. Member countries incur the deployment costs
involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With
a few exceptions, they also cover the procurement of military forces and military
assets such as ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks, artillery or weapons systems.
Several NATO activities, however, are coordinated and conducted by the alliance’s
headquarters in Brussels. Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are
made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on
relative Gross National Income. These contributions represent a very small
percentage of each member’s overall defense budget and, generally, finance the
expenditures of NATO’s integrated structures.
Direct contributions generally follow the principle of common funding, that is to say,
member countries pool resources within a NATO framework.. The funds are
maintained by direct contributions from NATO’s member states. Individual shares of
the civil and military budgets remained unchanged for decades, while NSIP shares
were adjusted every few years based upon gross relative domestic product (GDP),
per capita GDP, and several other factors. There are three budgets that come under
the common funding arrangements:
• the civil budget;
• the military budget; and
• the NATO Security Investment Program
Member countries make direct contributions to NATO in accordance with an agreed
cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income. The largest direct contributors
to NATO in absolute terms are the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and
France.
Common funding covers collective requirements such as the NATO command
structure, NATO-wide air defence, command and control systems or Alliance-wide
communications systems, which are not the responsibility of one single member.
Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can
identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO
provides political and financial oversight.
As mentioned above, direct contributions to NATO come principally in two different
forms: common funding and joint funding. They can also come in the form of trust
funds, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and donations.
There are no fixed, pre-set rules on whether national, multinational, joint or common
funding should be used to address a given problem. In general, however, the
following factors will influence the choices made by countries: the required level of
integration or interoperability, the affordability at the national level, the complexity
of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Often, a
combination of funding sources is used.
NATO crisis response operations and missions are resourced along the same lines as
capability projects.
Financial management of these different types of contributions is structured to
ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries
supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them.
The main body involved in these financial matters is the Resource Policy and
Planning Board, to which the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee
report.
Twice a year, ministers of NATO member countries provide guidance on general use
of NATO resources. But the actual management of the accounts is conducted by

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various separate committees. As their names imply, the three funds are responsible
for separate but often complementary activities.

I.4.1.2. Principle and practices of common funding at NATO

Principle and practices of common funding at NATO

Common funding
When a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the Resource Policy
and Planning Board discuss whether the principle of common funding should be
applied – in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the
contributing countries and therefore should be borne collectively.
The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be
introduced as a result of new contingencies, for instance the need to support critical
requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions.
Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military
budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). These are the
only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in
line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities.
Where military common funding is concerned - the military budget and the NATO
Security Investment Program – the guiding principle for eligibility is the “over and
above” rule: “common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are
over and above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from
national resources.”

Joint funding
Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the
terms of an agreed NATO Charter. The participating countries still identify the
requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility
and provides political and financial oversight.
Joint funding arrangements typically lead to the setting-up of a management
organization and an implementation agency. There are currently 14 NATO Agencies
with activities ranging from the development and production of fighter aircraft or
helicopters to the provision of logistic support or air defence communication and
information systems. Other agencies coordinate Research and Development activities
or are active in the fields of standardization and intelligence-sharing.
Jointly funded Agencies vary in the number of participating countries, cost-share
arrangements and management structures. Work is underway, however, to
streamline their activities around procurement, logistic support and air defence and
communication capabilities. The introduction of shared service arrangements, also
with the NATO Command Structure, in areas such as human resources, financial
management and IT services should allow for more efficient operations at lower
cost.

Other forms of funding

In addition to common funding and joint funding, some projects can take the form of
trust fund arrangements, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and
donations.
NATO member nations agree upon a five-year plan, called the Medium Term
Resource Plan (MTRP). It is reviewed and revised annually and retains an out-year
perspective over five years. Through this agreed plan, nations commit to their annual
NATO budget contribution levels. The amounts of the contributions are expressed as
national percentage shares. The actual amounts are in euros--NATO's standard
monetary pricing unit.

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The NATO multinational headquarters budgets are for NATO-recognized entities
composed of voluntary participating nations that operate under an agreed charter or
Memorandum of Understanding. Beyond the preceding categories, there are other
O&M budgets (either small and/or specialized) to which the U.S. contributes. These
include those for NATO civilian pensions, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, and
the Central European Pipeline.

NCS = NATO Communications System

DCM = Deployable Communications Module
DCAOC = Deployable Combined Air Operations Center
PE = Peacetime Establishment
NFS = NATO Force Structure
CAOC = Combined Air Operations Center
TCSOR = theater Capability Statement of Requirements
CJSOR = Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CRO = Crisis Response Operations
MB = Military Budget
O&M = Operating and Maintenance
CIS = Communications and Information Systems

Financial management within NATO is structured to ensure that the ultimate control
of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined
activity, and is subject to consensus among them. No single body exercises direct
managerial control over all four of the principal elements of the Organization’s
financial structure:
o the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;
o the international military structure, financed by the military budget;
o the Security Investment Program; and
o specialized Production and Logistics Organizations.
When cooperative activities do not involve all member countries, they are, for the
most part, managed by NATO Production and Logistics Organizations. The Production
and Logistics Organizations fall into two groups: those which are financed under
arrangements applying to the international military structure and are subject to the
general financial and audit regulations of NATO; and those which operate under
charters granted by the NAC. These have their own Boards of Directors and finance
committees and distinct sources of financing within national treasuries, which means
that they operate in virtual autonomy.
Financial regulations applied at NATO provide basic unifying principles around which
the overall financial structure is articulated. They are approved by the NAC and are
complemented by rules and procedures adapting them to specific NATO bodies and
programs.

Financial management of the civil and military budgets

The civil and military budgets are annual, coinciding with the calendar year. Each one
is prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body, reviewed
and recommended for approval on the basis of consensus by the Budget Committee
composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for
execution by the NAC.
Failure to achieve consensus before the start of the financial year entails non-
approval of the budget and the financing of operations, under the supervision of the
Budget Committee, through provisional allocations limited to the level of the budget
approved for the preceding year. This regime may last for six months, after which
the Council is required to decide either to approve the budget or to authorize

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continuation of interim financing.
When the budget has been approved, the head of the NATO body has discretion to
execute it through the commitment and expenditure of funds for the purposes
authorized. This discretion is limited by different levels of constraint prescribed by
the Financial Regulations regarding such matters as recourse to competitive bidding
for contracts for the supply of goods and services, or transfers of credits to correct
over or under-estimates of the funding required. Discretionary authority to execute a
budget may be further limited by particular obligations to seek prior approval for
commitments and expenditure. These may occasionally be imposed by the Budget
Committee in the interests of ensuring strict application of new policies or of
monitoring the implementation of complex initiatives such as organizational
restructuring.

Financial control
With respect to the military and civil budgets, the head of the NATO body is
ultimately responsible for the correct preparation and execution of the budget, the
administrative support for this task is largely entrusted to his Financial Controller.
The appointment of this official is the prerogative of the NAC, although the latter
may delegate this task to the Budget Committee.
Each Financial Controller has final recourse to the Budget Committee in the case of
persistent disagreement with the head of the respective NATO body regarding an
intended transaction. The Financial Controller is charged with ensuring that all
aspects of execution of the budget conform to expenditure authorizations, to any
special controls imposed by the Budget Committee and to the Financial Regulations
and their associated implementing rules and procedures. He may also, in response to
internal auditing, install such additional controls and procedures as he deems
necessary for maintaining accountability.

The International Board of Auditors

An independent International Board of Auditors for NATO is responsible for auditing
the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC
and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are
properly used for the settlement of authorized expenditure and that expenditure is
within the physical and financial authorizations granted.
The Board’s mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits,
therefore extending its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of
management practices in general. It is composed of officials normally drawn from
the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and
responsible to the NAC.

Bodies involved
The civil budget and the military budget are supervised by the Budget Committee
and the NATO Security Investment Program by the Investment Committee. Overall
military resource policy issues are handled in the Resource Policy and Planning Board
(RPPB).

The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the
NAC on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall
management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security
Investment Program (NSIP) and manpower. Both the Budget Committee and the
Investment Committee report to the RPPB.

The Budget Committee

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The Budget Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for
NATO’s civil and military budgets. The civil budget covers all costs related to NATO’s
International Staff at NATO HQ in Brussels; the military budget covers all costs
related to the International Military Staff at NATO HQ, the strategic commands and
the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force.

The Investment Committee

The Investment Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board
for the implementation of the NATO Security and Investment Programme (NSIP).
The NATO Security and Investment Programme finances the provision of the
installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands
– Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command Transformation - recognized as
exceeding the national defence requirements of individual member countries.

I.4.1.3. NATO Civil Budget

NATO Civil Budget

The civil budget provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital
and program expenditure of the International Staff at NATO HQ. It supports the
alliance’s Brussels headquarters and its international civilian staff, which is
responsible for policy planning of operations and capabilities, liaison with non-
alliance partner countries, and public diplomacy. It is financed from national foreign
ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Budget Committee and
implemented by the International Staff.
NATO’s international staff is headed by the Secretary General’s office, and consists of
civilian employees of member countries, often provided to NATO on 3-4 year details.
Among other activities, this staff supports the work of the North Atlantic Council (the
governing body of the alliance) and its more than two-dozen committees.
The civil budget covers standard administrative tasks, such as personnel, travel,
communications, utilities, supplies and furniture, and security. In addition, this
budget is used for several program activities, including public information, civil
emergency planning, and the work of the science committee.
The civil budget also has funded the non-military aspects of structures related to
enlargement, including the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC).3 The civilian side of these bodies sponsors activities
intended to strengthen European security through creating stronger political and
economic systems in former-communist countries. In addition, the civil budget funds
activities related to the Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the
NATO-Ukraine Charter, as well as relations with the European Union.
NATO’s civil budget is financed by all member states, usually through their ministries
of foreign affairs. The U.S. contribution is provided through the State Department’s
budget (Contributions to International Organizations). The U.S. assessment was
21.81; for FY2008, the Administration requested a total of $59.0 million (U.S.
Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification. Fiscal Year 2008
(Contributions to International Organizations). Washington, D.C. p. 739.)
The civil budget is formulated on an objective-based framework, which establishes
clear links between NATO’s strategic objectives and the resources required to
achieve them. There are four front-line objectives and three support objectives.

The four frontline objectives

 Support to operations: Provide effective policy, planning and resourcing in support
of NATO operations and for civil emergency planning activities;
 Alliance capabilities: Conduct necessary policy and planning work to promote and

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support improved Alliance capabilities;
 Consultation and cooperation with partners: Support consultation and cooperative
activities with partners to strengthen security and respond to new security
challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic region;
 Public relations: Build awareness of, and support for, NATO, its operations and its
role in promoting security through public diplomacy.

The three support objectives

 NATO and International Staff support: Provide professional and support services to
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), subordinate committees and the International
Staff;
 HQ operating and maintenance: Operate and maintain the NATO HQ facility and
site by providing buildings and facilities, and management services to the NATO HQ
site in Brussels (facilities occupied by the International Military Staff are funded from
the military budget);
 HQ security: Ensure NATO-wide security policy and provide a safe and secure
environment for all HQ staff and operations. This includes the physical security of HQ
premises and the overall coordination of NATO security among member and partner
countries.

I.4.1.4.NATO International Military Budget

NATO International Military Budget

The International Military Budget provides for the operating and maintenance costs
(including personnel and operating costs, mission operating expenses and capital
expenditures) of the network of NATO international military headquarters,
programmers and agencies. It is composed of over 50 separate budgets, which are
financed from national defence budgets (in most countries). It is supervised by the
Military Budget Committee, within the guidance and direction on resource issues
provided by the Resource Board Resource Policy and Planning Board, and
implemented by the individual budget holders. In all cases, the provision of military
staff remains a nationally funded responsibility.
NATO’s military budget is, in most years, the largest of the three accounts. More
than half of this fund is used to pay for operational and maintenance costs of the
international military staff, its headquarters in Mons, Belgium and subordinate
commands in different NATO geographical areas.
The military budget effectively provides funds for the International Military Staff, the
strategic commanders and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C)
Force and, more specifically for:
 The Military Committee, the International Military Staff and military agencies;
 Allied Command Operations, including its network of subsidiary Commands,
Programmers and Agencies such as NATO Centralized Communications Budget
 Allied Command Transformation, including its network of subsidiary Commands,
Programmers and Agencies;
 Theatre headquarters for deployed operations and support of critical theatre-level
enabling capabilities such as theatre medical capabilities or theatre engineering
capabilities;
 the International Military Staff Groups, which also includes the budgets such as
those for the NATO Defense College, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development (AGARD) and the NATO Air, Command and Control System
Management Agency (NACMA);
 The NATO Standardization Agency, the NATO Air Command and Control System

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Management Agency NAMCA, the NATO Command and Control Agency (NC3A).and
the NATO CIS Services Agency;
 The NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS
and radar systems, and deployable HQ communication systems;
 The Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre (Poland), the
Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal), the NATO Defense College
(Italy), the Communications and Information Systems School (Italy), the NATO
Programming Centre (Belgium), the Multi-Service Electronic Warfare Support Group
(United Kingdom);
 The Scientific Program of Work of the NC3A, Allied Command Transformation
experimentation funds, the Research and Technology Agency (France) and the
Undersea Research Centre (Italy);
 Some limited partnership support activities and part of the Military Liaison Offices
in Moscow and Kyev.
The level of the military budget is reviewed and approved annually by the North
Atlantic Council. Individual member state contributions to the budget are based on a
cost-sharing formula. Expenses for the various activities funded by the Military
Budget may be split among 25 or 26 members, because France does not participate
in all military activities. The U.S. contribution to NATO’s military budget is provided
through the Department of the Army’s Operations and Maintenance account (Support
for Other Nations). The U.S. share ranges from 22.5% (with all 26 members
participating) to 26.7%; U.S. contributions to the AWACS program is 40.0%. The
Administration requested $362 million in its FY2008 budget. (U.S. Department of
Defense. Department of the Army. Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget Estimates.
Operations and Maintenance, Army. Justification Book. Vol. I. February, 2007.)
Comparing the role of NSIP and Military Budget, in accordance to BI-SC 85-1 Article
1.8.6, the Resource Policy and Planning Board has agreed the following division of
responsibility between the Military Budget and NSIP:
•The up-front provision of new capabilities and major renovations, upgrades and
modifications of existing capabilities are an NSIP responsibility, with the extent of
NSIP funding remaining in line with NSIP rules;
•The running, maintenance, upkeep and repair of existing capabilities, when declared
eligible for common funding, is the responsibility of the Military Budget;
As a reminder, the allocation and use of NATO common funded resources must be
conducted according to NATO objectives and priorities. in the current environment
NATO highest priority is operations and missions. Continued support to ongoing and
planned NATO operations and missions is one of the major areas of interest of NATO
common funding. In the same vein, resourcing capabilities to support the actual
deployability of NATO forces is another priority area.
In this context, the issue of „Unfunded Requirements” needs to be analyzed.
Unfunded Requirements refers the technique of identifying requirements that are not
funded and no credits are allocated to fulfill the requirement. These requirements are
either lower in priority than funded requirements or have not yet been prioritized for
funding. During the budget execution these might be funded through reprioritization
of planned credits and use of credits once these become available. The purpose of
identifying these unfunded requirements is to identify these requirements in the
planning phase and include them in the budget estimates in order for the MBC to
endorse these requirements. If and when funds will become available, execution
could commence immediately. Emerging, unfunded requirements will be prioritized
within the total requirements.

Military Committee Strategic Priorities and Objectives:

Operations
•Conduct and sustain Alliance operations

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•Prepare forces for operations
•Deter threats to NATO through the Alliance territorial defence posture
•Detect, address and effectively manage nuclear threats
Transformation
•Improve identification of military capability shortfalls
•Improve the development of military capability solutions
•Deliver the capabilities required to eliminate the military shortfalls
•Integrate the Armed Forces of new member states in the NCS and NFS
Cooperation
•Increase international stability through co-operative engagement with non-member
states and their forces
•Broaden participation of non-NATO member states in Alliance operations
•Maximise the success of NATO military operations through engagement and
cooperation with external organizations and agencies
•Support aspirant nations within the Membership Action Plan

I.4.1.5. Some basic issues about budgets

Some basic issues about budgets

Up to 2004, the Military Budget requirements for the Military Budget have been
budgeted using the input based (or line item based) way of budgeting.
Line-item budgeting has been used extensively in the past in NATO budgeting
because of its simplicity and its control orientation. It is referred to as the "historical"
approach because expenditure requests are based on historical expenditure and
revenue data. One important aspect of line-item budgeting is that it offers flexibility
in the amount of control established over the use of resources, depending on the
level of expenditure detail (e.g., fund, function, object) incorporated into the
document.
The line-item budget approach has several advantages that account for its wide use.
It offers simplicity and ease of preparation. It is a familiar approach to those involved
in the budget development process. This method budgets by organizational unit and
object and is consistent with the lines of authority and responsibility in organizational
units. As a result, this approach enhances organizational control and allows the
accumulation of expenditure data at each functional level. Finally, line-item
budgeting allows the accumulation of expenditure data by organizational unit for use
in trend or historical analysis.
Although this approach offers substantial advantages, critics have identified several
shortcomings that may make it inappropriate for certain organizational
environments. The most severe criticism is that it presents little useful information to
decisionmakers on the functions and activities of organizational units. Since this
budget presents proposed expenditure amounts only by category, the justifications
for such expenditures are not explicit and are often unintuitive. In addition, it may
invite micro-management by administrators and governing boards as they attempt
to manage operations with little or no performance information. However, to
overcome its limitations, the line-item budget can be augmented with supplemental
program and performance information.
An example to the traditional way of budgeting (line item budgeting) is provided
below, illustrating the development of a budget based on the Nature of Expenses:
_ Chapter 71000 - Personnel
o Employment of (Civilian) Personnel (salaries, allowances), recruitment, separation,
post employment benefits; etc.)
_ Chapter 72000 - Contractual Supplies and Services
o Administration, utilities, facilities (rent, maintenance, fuel), Communications and

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Information Systems (CIS), Automated Data Processing (ADP) , etc.
_ Chapter 73000 - Capital and Investment
o Communications and Information Systems,
o furniture, mission equipment, transport equipment, machinery, etc.
More recently, the North Atlantic Council has endorsed Output/Objective Based
Budgeting (allocating funds according to predetermined objectives, instead of
arbitrarily or according to past practices) as a more appropriate budgeting approach.
The advantages of this budgeting approach refer to:
o Relating resources to identifiable outputs/objectives
o Providing possibility of prioritisation of Resource Planning
o Stakeholders (Nations, Committees, Management boards) know what the
resources are used for

A new and exciting injection into NATO financial management is the recent rollout of
the NATO Automated Financial System (NAFS), an Oracle-based software application.
It is an enterprise resource planning system that provides a complete automated and
integrated financial solution for the whole organization. NATO is implementing NAFS
to bring its accounting structure in line with the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards to include accrual accounting. The end result is expected to be
a better strategic overview on NATOs financial position. Advertised advantages of
working with NAFS include heightened financial controls, data collection, online
information access, and financial reporting. Current challenges mainly involve
incorporating NAFS into daily Component life, working interface issues with the
existing logistics procurement system, and getting users trained and their comfort
levels increased.

I.4.2. NATO guide to common funding

I.4.2.1. NATO guide to common funding

NATO needs resources to run its own civil and military headquarters, to sustain its
own activities and programmes, to run crisis response operations and, more broadly,
to have the necessary capabilities to meet its objectives and priorities. Almost all
these capabilities are national capabilities, funded and maintained by the member
countries of the Alliance.

NATO is an alliance of sovereign states responsible for the defence of their own
populations and infrastructure. National planning and defence spending are, of
course, influenced by Alliance policy and planning activities, which set the overall
framework, the level of ambition, the force goals to be achieved and the priorities to
be considered. Standardisation and interoperability requirements also play an
important role. Notwithstanding these factors, however, member countries remain
responsible for their own capability development and for the use of those
capabilities.

In some circumstances, countries choose to cooperate in pursuit of capabilities. In

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fact, multinational cooperation both within and outside the NATO framework is
increasing. This cooperation is often f ocused on the development of capabilities
beyond the means of individual countries, especially smaller ones, deriving benefits
from economies of scale, and the
conduct of crisis response operations.

Cooperation outside NATO

Multinational cooperation outside the f ormal NATO framework takes many forms. It
ranges from the exchange of students at military academies, to logistic support
arrangements, combined procurement of equipment, and development of complex
weapon systems. Financial activities range from barter agreements, military sales,
payments for services rendered, to combined buys and cost-shared development
programmes. NATO as an organisation has neither direct influence nor organised
visibility over these cooperative activities. No precise estimates of the amounts
involved exist, but approximately 5 to
10% of the combined defence budgets would appear a reasonable guess.

Cooperation inside NATO

Multinational cooperation within the NATO framework has two well-established

components: joint funding and common funding.
• Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the
terms of an agreed NATO Charter. The participating countries still identify the
requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility
and provides political and financial oversight. Joint funding arrangements typically
lead to the setting-up of a management organisation and an implementation agency.
The list below provides an overview of the existing jointly funded agencies. They can
principally be found in the areas of aircraft and helicopter production, air defence and
logistics. Combined yearly turnover amounts to some €6 billion, the equivalent of
approximately 1% of the combined defence budgets of NATO Allies.
The following agencies are mainly commonly funded: the NATO ACCS Management
Agency (NACMA), the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), the
NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA), the NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA), the
Research and Technology Agency (RTA) and the NATO Defense
College (NDC).

• Common funding arrangements include the NATO Civil and Military Budget and the
NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO
authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching
Alliance objectives and priorities. All 26 member countries participate. For those
elements directly related to the Alliance’s integrated military command structure,
participation is
limited to 25 members.

The Civ il Budget is formulated on an objective based framework. It provides the

funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programme
expenditure required to achieve four frontline and three support objectives.

The four frontline objectives are:

Support to operations

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Provide effective policy, planning and resourcing in support of NATO operations in
the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, for instance in Afghanistan, and for civil
emergency planning activities.

Alliance capabilities
Conduct necessary policy and planning work to promote and support improved
Alliance capabilities such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group Studies and the
Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work, implementation of the NATO
Response Force, expertise in armaments, air defence, airspace management, etc.

Consultation and cooperation with partners Support consult ation and cooperative
activities with partners to strengthen security and respond to new security
challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic region, for instance through the Security
through Science Programme, the NATO-Russia Coundl Work Programme, the NATO-
Ukraine Action Plan, cooperation with countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue and
the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO-EU cooperation, and NATO HQ Partnership
for Peace support activities.

Public relations
Build awareness of, and support for, NATO, its operations, and its role in promoting
security through public diplomacy, inparticular through the implementation of the
NATO HQ Public Diplomacy Programme and related activities.

The three support objectives are:

NATO and International Staff support Provide professional and support services to
the North Atlantic Council, subordinate committees
and the International Staff (IS). This covers for instance IT operations, interpretation
and translation services and other conference support for the consultation process.
This objective also includes activities of the Int ernational Board of Auditors for NATO
(IBAN).

HQ operating and maintenance

Operate and maintain the NATO HQ facility and site by providing buildings and
facilities, and management services to the NATO HQ site in Brussels (facilities
occupied by the International Military Staff are funded from the Military Budget).

HQ security
Ensure NATO-wide security policy and provide a safe and secure environment for all
HQ staff and operations. This includes the physical security of HQ premises and the
overall coordination of NATO security among member and partner countries.

Size
The 2006 Civil Budget was approved at €181.06 million (including pensions for over
€17.72 million and IBAN for €3.22 million). It is financed from national Foreign
Ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Civil Budget Committee, and
implemented by the NATO International Staff.

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For military common funding, i.e., the Military Budget and the NATO Security
Investment Programme, the guiding principle for eligibility is the “over and above”
rule:
“common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and
above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national
resources”.
Common funding amounts to some €1.75 billion per year. For 2006, this means
€181.06 million for the Civil Budget, €934 million for the Military Budget, and
€640.5 million for the NSIP. The following table shows how these costs are shared
among Allies.
For military common funding, i.e., the Military Budget and the NATO Security
Investment Programme, the guiding principle for eligibility is the “over and above”
rule:
“common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and
above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national
resources”.
Common funding amounts to some €1.75 billion per year. For 2006, this means
€181.06 million for the Civil Budget, €934 million for the Military Budget, and
€640.5 million for the NSIP. The following table shows how these costs are shared
among Allies.
The €1.75 billion amounts to some 0.3% of the combined defence budgets of NATO
Allies. Although a relatively small amount of money, NATO common funding has a
disproportionately large impact given that it concentrates entirely on Alliance
integration and on NATO-wide systems.
Each of these activities is supervised by a NATO Committee – the Civil Budget
Committee, the Military Budget Committee or the Infrastructure Committee. Overall
military resource policy issues are handled in the Senior Resource Board (SRB). The
SRB submits a Medium Term Resource Plan each year covering requirements for
military common funding for the coming five years.

NATO Military Budget

The Military Budget funds the operation and maintenance costs of:
• NATO’s integrated command structure;
• the International Militar y Staf f and the NATO Standardisation Agency;
• the overarching elements of the NATO -wide communications and information
systems;
• deployed theatre HQ and critical theatre-level enabling capabilities for NATO-led
operations and missions;
• the NATO Airborne Early Warning capability (the AWACS fleet) and the Active
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme Office;
• the NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS
and radar systems, and deployable HQ com in support of the Combined Joint NATO
Response Forces;
• the Joint Warfare Centre (St Norway), the Joint Force Training (Bydgoszcz,
Poland), the Joint Ana
& Lessons Learned Centre (Lisb Portugal), the NATO Defense Colle (Rome, Italy), the
Communicatio
and Information Systems Sch (Latina, Italy); the NATO Programmi Centre (Glons,

72
Belgium); the M Service Electronic Warfare Sup Group (Yeovilton, United Kingdom);
• the Scientific Programme of Wor NC3A, Allied Command Tran (ACT)
experimentation funds, the Technology Agency (Neuilly, Franc Research Centre (La
Spezia, Italy);
• some limited Partnership for Peac Dialogue support activities, and Liaison Offices in
Moscow and Kyiv;
In all cases the provision of military personnel remains a nationally funded
responsibility.

Size
The NATO Military Budget is in fact composed of over
50 separate budgets. The overall total for 2006 was agreed at €934 million.
Financed from national defence budgets (in most countries), supervised by the
Military Budget Committee, implemented by the individual budget holders.

NATO Security Investment Programme

The NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) funds the investment aspects of:
• NATO’s integrated command structure;
• t h e ove r a rc h i n g e l e m e n t s of t h e N ATO -w i d e communications and
information systems;
• deployed theatre HQ and critical theatre-level enabling capabilities for NATO-led
operations and missions;
• the airfield infrastructure for the NATO Airborne Early
Warning capability (the AWACS fleet);
• the core Air Command & Control Software (the ACCS system); the Active Layered
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) adaptations, and a number of critical
backbone radar systems;
• the NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations C e ntre s, d e p l oya b l
e A RS a nd rad a r systems, and deployable HQ communication systems in support
of the Combined Joint Task Forces and NATO Response Forces;
• the Joint Warfare Centre (Stavanger, Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre
(Bydgoszcz, Poland), the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centr
the NATO Programming Centre (Gl
Multi-Service Electronic Warfare S (Yeovilton, United Kingdom);
• Critical strategic airfield, naval ba storage infrastructure considered and above”
what could reasonabl expected to be funded from natio budgets (including Aviano a
Ramstein airbases, Kabul Internatio Airport, NATO pipeline systems Central and
Northern Europe, It Greece and Turkey).

Operation and maintenance costs of such facilities are a national responsibility.

Size
The NSIP has yearly expenditure levels of around
€640 million. Identified requirements remaining to be implemented are estimated at
some €8.7 billion.
Financed from national defence budgets, supervised by the Infrastructure
Committee, and projects implemented by individual host nations and NATO Agencies.

73
C3 Support: Command, Communications and Control Support
CRO: Crisis Response Operations
Air C2: Air Command and Control

Ad hoc arrangements

In addition to joint and common funding, NATO member countries cooperate within
the Organisation on an ad hoc basis for a variety of other, more limited, activities
that do not fit the established framework for operational, political, programmatic or
organisational reasons. In such cases, cooperation takes the form of trust funds,
contributions in kind, ad hoc cost-sharing arrangements, donations, etc.
Recent examples include support for the training of Iraqi security forces at NATO
institutions; the transportation of equipment donated to Iraq; the transportation of
supplies and the financing of reconstruction projects in the framework of the
Pakistan earthquake relief operation; and also cooperation in the framework of the
NATO-Russia Council as illustrated by the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, or the
start-up costs of future joint/common funded activities such as the Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) Programme Management Office.
There are no fixed, pre-set rules on whether national, multinational, joint or common
funding should be used to address a given problem. In general, however, the
following factors will influence the choices made by countries: the required level of
integration or interoperability, the affordability at the national level, the complexity
of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Finding the right
balance, while also taking into account political imperatives, is often the key issue.
The diagram below describes the logic often applied to decisions on funding.
Application of this logic to individual issues often leads to a combination of funding
sources. The funding of the NATO Airborne Early Warning capability (the AWACS
aircraft) is a typical example.

Funding crisis response operations

NATO crisis response operations and missions are resourced along the same lines as
capability projects. In principle, the NATO and Partner countries providing the forces
are responsible for all costs involved (“costs lie where they fall”). This includes the
provision of equipment and manpower, salaries and pensions, transportation and
installation costs, communication requirements, as well as the sustainment and
logistic support of the forces in theatre and their re-deployment.
In practice, countries choose to cooperate at many levels: combining transportation,
relying on joint logistics, and using shared outsourcing arrangements. Whether such
services are invoiced or not is a matter that is dealt with bilaterally between the
countries which have “teamed up”. So far, the introduction of multinational forces
such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) has not fundamentally changed this
approach. The NRF is multinationally funded with the specific arrangements left to
participants in the individual forces.

Expanded eligibility
Experience from previous and ongoing operations indicates that special
arrangements are needed to help countries providing a number of critical theatre-
level enabling capabilities under the operational control of the theatre commander.

74
In consequence, and in line with the “over and above” principle, NATO military
common funding now not only supports the theatre HQ elements of a NATO-led
operation, but also such critical theatre-level enabling capabilities as airports,
seaports and railports of disembarkation; role 2 and 3 medical facilities; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance and air-to-ground surveillance; engineering support;
and fuel storage and supply.
Still under discussion is the possibility that military common funding would also
support the strategic lift of short notice deployments. It is being argued that this
should be considered “over and above” what the country that happens to be on short
notice to deploy should be expected to support from national resources.

Summary
Multinational cooperation is increasing. Network enabled capabilities, interoperability
and deployability, multinational forces, and integrated logistics all call for a greater
degree of cooperation. While most of this cooperation will remain at the multinational
level – with NATO providing much of the planning framework – NATO common
funding will also have its role to play. Deployable command, control and
communication systems and the recently agreed expansion of the funding
arrangements for crisis response operations are but two examples of this trend.

I.5.1.1. The Principles of Common Funding

The Principles of Common Funding

NATO is an intergovernmental organisation to which member nations allocate the

resources needed to enable it to function on a day-to-day basis and to provide the
facilities required for consultation, decision-making and the subsequent
implementation of agreed policies and activities. It serves a political Alliance
supported by an essential military structure which provides for the common defence
of the member countries, cooperation with NATO's Partner countries and
implementation of Alliance policies in peacekeeping and other fields.
The idea of an investment program funded jointly took shape in the years that
followed the Second World War when many Western European countries that
intended to repair the damaged military infrastructure found out they did not own
enough financial resources. During that time, the joint international project funding
was a new idea difficult to accept.
Common funding is a powerful concept and tool having major implications at
international level. The issue of cost sharing is complex, including diverse planning
and influence factors, such as the different NATO member states capacity to pay, the
use of the national and joint facilities, benefits, as well as the costs to the host
nations and others.
In the military context, apart from a limited number of permanent headquarters and
small standing forces, the vast majority of military forces and assets belonging to
NATO member countries remain under national command and control until such time
as some or all of these, depending on the country, may be assigned to NATO for the

75
purposes of undertaking specific military tasks. The forces of NATO countries
contributing to the Stabilisation Force led by NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(SFOR) and to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) are thus assigned to NATO temporarily in
order to fulfill the Alliance's mandates but are trained, equipped, maintained and
financed by the individual defence budgets of member nations.
In order to facilitate consultation and joint decision-making in the framework of their
Alliance, each member country maintains a diplomatic and military presence at NATO
headquarters as well as civil and/or military representation at the headquarters of
the various NATO agencies and military commands. The costs of maintaining and
staffing their national delegations and military missions are also a national
responsibility, financed in accordance with the different accounting principles and
practices of each country.
The two examples given above - the costs of maintaining military forces and the
costs of civil and military representation in Alliance forums - illustrate expenditures
which would have to be taken into account in any analysis of the total cost to each
nation of its NATO membership. Such expenditures would have to be offset by a
similar analysis of the economic benefits obtained by each member country as a
result of its participation in the Alliance.
However. the rationale for NATO membership extends far beyond the confines of a
financial balance sheet drawn up on the above basis and embraces political.
economic. scientific. technological. cultural and other factors which do not lend
themselves readily to translation into financial terms. Moreover, to arrive at a
meaningful conclusion each member country would have to factor into the calculation
the costs which it would have incurred, over time, in making provision for its national
security independently or through alternative forms of international cooperation.

Who pays for NATO

NATO funds are devoted essentially to those expenditures which reflect the interests
of all member countries. The common funding structure is diverse and decentralised.
Certain multinational cooperative activities relating to research, development,
production and logistic support do not involve all and, in some instances,. may only
involve a small number of member countries. These activities, most of which are
managed by NATO Production and Logistics Organisations, are subject to the general
financial and audit regulations of NATO but otherwise operate in virtual autonomy
under charters granted by the North Atlantic Council. Reference is made to them
below (see Financial Management).
With few exceptions, NATO funding does not therefore cover the procurement of
military forces or of physical military assets such as ships, submarines, aircraft,
tanks, artillery or weapon systems. Military manpower and materiel are assigned to
the Alliance by member countries, which remain financially responsible for their
provision. An important exception is the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control
Force, a fleet of radar-bearing aircraft jointly procured, owned, maintained and
operated by member countries and placed under the operational command and
control of a NATO Force Commander responsible to the NATO Strategic
Commanders. NATO also finances investments directed towards collective
requirements, such as air defence, command and control systems or Alliance-wide
communications systems which cannot be designated as being within the
responsibility of any single nation to provide. Such investments are subject to
maintenance, renewal and ultimately replacement in accordance with changing
requirements and technological developments and the expenditures this requires

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also represent a significant portion of NATO funding.
The starting point for the process of seeking and obtaining approval for common
funding of a given project is the identification and recognition of the required
capability and a determination that the responsibility for providing this capability
cannot reasonably be made the financial responsibility of a single country and that it
will serve the interests of all contributing countries. The requirement must be duly
generated, stated and authenticated and this in itself calls for a complex interaction
of national and international administrative processes. Once recognised, the
requirement for expenditure must be judged eligible for common funding by member
countries on a defined scale. The determination of whether the requirement is
eligible for common funding is made by consensus of the member countries which
would be liable to support the cost.
Over the years since the establishment of the Alliance, the application of these
principles has given rise to the elaboration of complex rules involving scales of
integral or partial funding support and the exclusion of various cost elements, for
example, national or local taxes. Another major and perhaps surprising exclusion
dating from the time of NATO's establishment is the remuneration of military
personnel serving at NATO Headquarters or at any of the international headquarters
forming part of the military structure of the Alliance. This remains a charge to the
assigning nation. Some 16 000 military personnel are routinely posted to
international headquarters, all of whom are paid for by their nations. Remuneration
of the international civilian staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at NATO
military headquarters is financed respectively by NATO's common-funded civil and
military budgets. Significant areas of NATO-related funding are subject to
conventions of this nature accepted by all the member countries.

The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be
introduced as a result of new contingencies - for example, the need to develop clear
definitions of those parts of NATO's peacekeeping costs which should be imputed to
international budgets and those which should be financed by national budgets. Other
changes in existing conventions relating to common funding may result from
organisational or technological developments or simply from the need to control
costs in order to meet requirements within specific funding limitations. Despite these
challenges, the principle of common funding on the basis of consensus remains
fundamental to the workings of the Alliance. It continues to be upheld by all the
member countries and can be seen as a reflection of their political commitment to
NATO and of the political solidarity which is the hallmark of the implementation of
agreed NATO policies.

NATO funding principles

The „Over and Above” principle means “Over” the existing available assets & also
“Above” reasonable expectations of provision from national resources. This definition
was originally accepted by the nations and established for a one-year trial period
beginning 1 October 1996.
This means that the basic principle of eligibility for common-funding under the NSIP
is that requirements should be over and above those that could reasonably be
expected to be made available from national resources. Naturally, this consideration

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is dependent on the strategic situation and importance of a region. This does not
preclude, therefore, the possibility of common-funding, on a case-by-case basis, of
limited critical additional facilities required by NATO to deal with exceptional regional
risk factors or geostrategic conditions within the Alliance. At the same time, eligibility
for common funding within the new guidelines does not consititute automatic
„entitlement”. NATO common funding permits funding, on a case-by-case basis, of
limited critical additional infrastructure for exceptional regional risk factors or geo-
strategic conditions (as identified by the NMA and approved by the North Atlantic
Council / Defence Planning Committee). (C-M(93)38(Final))
Currently NATO funding is organized on the basis that "costs lie where they fall" -
meaning that the costs related to a country’s participation to a NATO operation are
supported by that particular nation, or in other words member NATO nation
contributing troops or equipment pay for their own expenses. For example a country
which offers troops for Afghanistan has to pay to send and keep them there. This
means that bulk of funding lies with the nations who contribute the forces.

I.5.1.2. The NATO Security Investment Program

The NATO Security Investment Program

The NATO Security and Investment Programme (NSIP) is a key mechanism to deliver
capability via NATO Common Funding, while directly contributing to improving
NATO's defence capabilities and promoting interoperability between the 28 Allies.
NSIP finances the provision of key military capabilities in support of Article 5
requirements, NATO Crisis Response Operations such as ISAF and KFOR, the NATO
Command Structure, NATO-wide Command, Control, Communications and
Information Systems (C3I), Air Command & Control (Air C2), as well as for
reinforcement and logistics (e.g Airports of debarkation, storage depots).
The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defence of each member country and is
supervised by the Investment Committee. Projects are implemented either by
individual host countries or by different NATO agencies and strategic commands,
according to their area of expertise.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Security Investment Program (NSIP)
was established in 1950 as the NATO Infrastructure Program. NSIP finances the
construction and restoration needed to support NATO minimum military
requirements. Facilities built and restored with NSIP funds include airfields,
communications and information systems, pipelines and storage facilities for fuel,
harbors, military headquarters, radar systems, and navigational aids. NATO member
countries share the cost of NSIP projects. NATO has authorized NSIP projects
totaling $23.5 billion since program inception.

Managing NSIP

At NATO, the NATO Resource Policy and Planning Board has overall responsibility for
military resources that are commonly funded by NATO member countries and
provides guidance on matters dealing with major resource policy. The NATO
Infrastructure Committee manages NSIP, within an annual contribution ceiling
approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), including screening and managing the
technical and financial aspects of all projects, authorizing host nations to obligate

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funds for projects, and deciding on procurement methods.
The agreed ceiling for 2010 is €875m. The IC screens and authorises projects
designed to meet those operational requirements of the NATO Strategic Commands
(Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) which
exceed the national defence requirements of individual member nations.

This type of common funded activity is unique: similar programmes do not exist
within either the UN or EU. The IC also approves the procurement strategy for
individual NSIP projects. Procurement can follow a number of routes, but the most
common are:
• International Competitive Bidding (ICB) governed by a NATO document known as:
AC/4-D/2261 (1996 EDITION)
• National Competitive Bidding (NCB) governed by the rules of the Host Nation
responsible for the project;
• Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) for those projects where the IC has agreed the
NC3A can run a limited competition, based on firms that have registered with them.
To compete for this work, firms must first register with the NC3A; and
• Sole Source

The starting point of the implementation of the NATO Security Investment

Programme is represented by the capability packages. These packages identify the
assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfill specified
tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and
recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military
manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the Resource
Policy and Planning Board then approved by the NAC.
Once the capability packages are approved, authorization for individual projects can
move forward under the responsibility of the Investment Committee. The Host
Nation which is either the country on whose territory the project is to be
implemented, a NATO agency or a strategic command prepares an authorization
request. Once the Committee has agreed to the project, the Host Nation can proceed
with its final design, contract award and implementation. Unless otherwise agreed by
the Investment Committee, the bidding process is conducted among firms from
those countries contributing to the project.

Authorizing NSIP Projects

Generally, new NSIP projects must be authorized by a unanimous vote by NATO
member countries through the NATO Infrastructure Committee. However, when a
member country believes a project requires faster completion than can be realized
using NATO procedures, the country may prefinance the project. To be eligible for
possible future reimbursement under NSIP, the country submits a prefinancing
statement, which must be noted by the NATO Infrastructure Committee.

Administering NSIP Projects.

For each NSIP project, one NATO member country or a NATO agency performs the
administrative functions for all member countries. Usually, the administrator country
is the country on whose land the NSIP project is being built, also called the host
nation. However, the host nation may allow another country to administer an NSIP

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project. That requires that the two countries execute a memorandum of agreement.
Administering NSIP projects includes designing and preparing specifications,
obtaining bids, awarding contracts, monitoring contractor performance, requesting
NATO to perform a Joint Formal Acceptance Inspection (JFAI) of an NSIP project, and
completing an audit with the NATO International Board of Auditors.

NSIP evolution

Formerly known as the NATO Infrastructure Fund, this program in the past was
responsible chiefly for funding military installations and construction projects. In May
1993, the functions of the program were changed significantly to reflect the alliance’s
new security policy. Known since December 1994 as the NATO Security Investment
Program (NSIP), the fund’s activities have been steered away from a static defense
posture, appropriate during the Cold War, toward crisis control, antiterrorism and
other tasks, which require more rapid force mobility and flexibility.
Accordingly, the NSIP budget now involves the collective financing of a wide variety
of NATO support functions, including, for example: command, control,
communications and information hardware and software; logistics activities; harbors
and airfields; training installations; transportation; and storage facilities for
equipment, fuel, and munitions. Its work is managed by the NATO Infrastructure
Committee, and individual projects are implemented by host countries or NATO
agencies or commands.
Because NSIP projects may be located in any of the member countries, this program
has tended to be somewhat more politically sensitive than the other two.
Infrastructure and other NSIP projects are decided upon through a priority planning
process. Specific projects are generally awarded on the basis of competitive bidding,
and, once completed, undergo NATO-controlled inspection and auditing.
In NATO view, infrastructure refers to static buildings and permanent installations,
pavements, piers, and other fixed facilities or structures needed to support military
forces or the static items of capital expenditure which are needed to support
operational plans and to enable higher command and forces to operate efficiently
and effectively. It has been expanded to include certain mobile projects (e.g., radars
and mobile operational war headquarters) and equipment essential to NATO
operations and war plans (e.g., communications and information technology
systems).
Categories and types of projects that the NATO allies have agreed shall be funded
through the NSIP. Currently, the following 16 categories of infrastructure are eligible
for NATO funding:
• Airfields –AF
• Ammunition Storage – AS
• Anti- Submarine and Surface Vessels Warning Installations - SW
• Communications - CM
• Forward Storage Sites - FS
• Information Systems - IS
• Naval Bases - NB
• Navigation Aids - NA
• Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Installations - PL

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• Reinforcement Support - RS
• Surface-to-Air Missiles Installations - SA
• Surface-to-Surface Missiles Installations - SS
• Training Installations - TI
• War Headquarters - HQ
• Warning Installations - WI
• Miscellaneous (Various) - VA
NATO’s basic rule for providing resources is the minimum capability requirement,
replacing the previous minimum military requirement (the most austere facility
required to meet a NATO military need as determined by the NATO military
authorities.) The Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) are „the complete set of
capabilities”, which will also cover areas such as short term requirements, long term
capability requirements and interoperability requirements. Criteria & Standards
(C&S) form the basis for the Minimum Capability Requirements and they consist of 2
parts: military guidelines and technical standards. The MCR are not static, they can
change based on timeframe required and location.
Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contribute to the
activities of the alliance in several ways, the chief of which is through the
deployment of their own armed forces, funded by their national budgets. Certain
commonly conducted activities, however, are paid for out of three NATO-run
budgets. These three accounts—the civil budget, the military budget, and the
security investment program—are funded by individual contributions from the
member states. The countries' percentage shares of the common funds are
negotiated among the members, and are based upon per capita gross national
income and several other factors. The U.S. shares for the three funds, which have
fallen over the past three decades, currently range from about 22%-25%. Twelve
central and eastern European nations were admitted into the alliance in 1999, 2004,
and 2009. As NATO has expanded, it has incurred certain additional costs to
accommodate the new members. These costs are being shared by all, including the
new countries. In 2005, members of the alliance adopted new burden sharing
arrangements; the U.S. level, however, was limited to its current share. Additional
changes in the cost share formulas are under review. Congress will likely examine
U.S. contributions to the NATO budgets in the context of the Defense and State
Departments' appropriations.
How big is the share of each member country to the NSIP budget? It is important to
note that NSIP is not a budget but a fund that is established within the limits of an
annual ceiling approved by the North Atlantic Council – NAC. In general, no nation
pays more than 1% of its defense budget, thus ensuring the financial support for
NSIP projects to be implemented, which brings mutual benefits for the entire NATO
member states community. For example to be much more specific the ceiling agreed
for 2001 was approximately equivalent to USD 624 million and for 2008 was € 640
million.
The NSIP financial management system is based on a mutual financial compensation
system. When the expenditures on implementing the allocated projects are under
the level of the own contribution to NSIP fund, they are deducted from the national
contribution. Funding over this limit is achieved through the mutual funds transfer
between states.

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The allocation and use of NATO common funded resources must be conducted
according to NATO objectives and priorities. in the current environment NATO
highest priority is operations and missions. Continued support to ongoing and
planned NATO operations and missions is one of the major areas of interest of NATO
common funding. In the same vein, resourcing capabilities to support the actual
deployability of NATO forces is another priority area.
In this context, the issue of Unfunded Requirements needs to be analyzed. Unfunded
Requirements refers the technique of identifying requirements that are not funded
and no credits are allocated to fulfil the requirement. These requirements are either
lower in priority than funded requirements or have not yet been prioritised for
funding. During the budget execution these might be funded through reprioritisation
of planned credits and use of credits once these become available.

Categories Of Eligible Facilities

Before 1994, a project was considered basically eligible for NATO common funding
when it was in a category of projects already unconditionally agreed to by the NATO
countries for implementation at NATO expense. Once this consideration was met, the
project also had to:
(a) Represent a NATO Minimum Military Requirement MMR, be of the most austere
standard, and conform to existing NATO criteria.
(b) Support forces either assigned to or under the command of NATO, or (except for
the airfield category) forces earmarked for NATO. In the case of "Other Forces for
NATO," such other forces will be identified in national responses to the Defense
Planning Questionnaire (DPQ).
(c) Support an approved NATO mission or the training of NATO forces.
(d) Comply with special restoration policy and procedures (if appropriate).
Under the Fundamental Review of Infrastructure in 1994, basic eligibility
requirements for NATO common-funded infrastructure were redefined in the context
of CPs and the "over and above" criteria. NATO countries must show that the
requirement exceeds that which the country would need to provide for its defense.
Project originators should ensure that they answer the following questions when
preparing their project requests (including requests for minor works and urgent
requirements):
(a) Which countries use the infrastructure in addition to the host nation, and is it
used continuously, periodically, or as a planned contingency only?
(b) If there are only one or two user nations, and their use also supports their
national requirements, why is the infrastructure not cost-shared with the host
nation?
(c) If the infrastructure is also used by the host nation (whether permanently or for
contingencies), why is the NATO-funded portion considered to be an item not
normally needed by the host nation; or what portion of the infrastructure does the
host nation consider to be in excess of its national needs?
(d) In the case of restoration or replacement of NATO or shared-use infrastructure,
what is the operational or technical priority of the work and why can the work not be
delayed? The operational consequence of nonapproval should be stated, and a
technical estimate of such factors as rate of deterioration, predicted timeframe of

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failure, and cost of minor interim repairs should be included.
(e) Where new infrastructure is proposed, why is existing national or NATO
infrastructure insufficient to meet the requirement?

Qualification Requirements

To qualify for common funding, a project generally must fall in one of the established
categories that NATO has agreed to fund ((1) through (3) below). The main areas
where USAREUR forces use NATO funds are surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) (which
currently includes the Patriot Air Defense System) and reinforcement support (RS)
(which involves storage sites for prepositioned materiel such as APS-2 and
conventional ammunition). There are indications that eligibility of the airfield
category may be expanded to include all rotary wing aircraft that are assigned to an
aviation task force structure (for example, attack helicopter, cargo helicopter,
observation helicopter, utility helicopter). NATO does not rule out an expansion of
traditional eligibility as long as it supports a required military capability.
Infrastructure:
(1) Must have a high degree of common interest
(2) Must conform to NATO-approved criteria and standards.
(3) Requires approval by unanimous consent.

Eligibility

Funding eligibility is established when forces are assigned to NATO. The assigned
forces are reported by countries in the annual DPQ. NATO forces will support the
NATO contingency operation plan for Article V operations, and concepts of operation
for non-Article 5 operations.

Criteria

Criteria for NSIP infrastructure projects have been developed to define the scope of
works that may be authorized to meet the NATO Minimum Capability Requirements.
The scope of work is prepared for facilities to ensure they will meet wartime
requirements. Often the MCR seems small when compared to peacetime
requirements and military construction (MILCON)-funded facilities of the same type.
Defined criteria provide qualitative and quantitative measures for determining the
limits and scope of projects that can be funded. Criteria documents are individually
developed by the SC and approved by NATO. Traditionally, the SC attempts to deal
with all requirements equally and apply criteria equally in all nations, regardless of
where the construction is to be performed.

Financial Management of The NSIP

Funding NSIP Costs.

Each year NATO establishes a contribution ceiling for NSIP. The U.S. share of the
contribution ceiling, generally about 25 percent, is funded through direct
appropriations in the annual DoD Appropriations Acts for military construction. For FY

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1999, FY 2000, and FY 2001, appropriated funds were $154 million, $172 million,
and $172 million, respectively. In addition, National Defense Authorization Acts allow
DoD to use funds recouped from prefinanced projects, which originated from military
construction money, to fund NSIP. In preparing NSIP budgets, DoD reduces its
budget request by the amount it expects to recoup that year from prefinanced
projects.
The financial management system which applies to the NSIP is based on an
international financial process. Host nations report on the expenditure foreseen on
authorized projects within their responsibility. Following agreement of the forecasts
by the Investment Committee, the International Staff calculates the amounts to be
paid by each country and to be received by each host nation. Further calculations
determine the payment amounts, currencies and which country or NATO agency will
receive the funds.
Once a project has been completed, it is subject to a Joint Final Acceptance
Inspection to ensure that the work undertaken is in accordance with the scope of
work authorized. As soon as this report is accepted by the Investment Committee, it
is added to the NATO inventory.

Reimbursing NSIP Project Costs.

Three methods are used to reimburse the administrator country for eligible NSIP
costs. For authorized projects, all NATO member countries provide partial funding up
front to the administrator country for the planning and design of the project and for
the anticipated payments to the construction contractor for the first year. Afterward,
NATO member countries reimburse the administrator country for additional contract
costs. Those payments, based on a pay sheet calculated and provided by NATO, are
made each quarter. For prefinanced projects, the administrator country initially
finances the project and is later reimbursed by the other member countries for
eligible costs. Procedures to collect funds from the other member countries differ
depending on whether the administrator country is the host nation or user nation.
When the host nation is the administrator country, it recoups eligible costs by
requesting reimbursement directly from the NATO Infrastructure Committee. When
the user nation is the administrator country, it bills the host nation for
reimbursement. The host nation then requests payment from the NATO
Infrastructure Committee. After the host nation is paid, it forwards the payment to
the administrator country.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Document AC/4-M/206, “NATO Infrastructure
Manual” states that for projects where the full amount of funds are not needed within
the first year, the NATO Infrastructure Committee will note the total cost, but will
include only a sufficient funding level to cover the first year.s requirement. The
purpose is to avoid tying up funds for longer than necessary, thus permitting more
projects to be started and completed sooner. The NATO Infrastructure Committee
guarantees to host nations that NATO will provide funds for the total project or pay
reasonable termination costs should a decision be taken to terminate the design or
construction.

I.5.1.3. Current Resources Challenges

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Current Resource Challenges

The NSIP is driven by budget levels; by capability shortfalls identified through the
Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations capability
assessment processes; and, heavily, by foreign currency rates.
Normalized for inflation, foreign currency, and special operations, the annual NATO
O&M military budgets have been relatively flat over many years. The same can be
said of the NSIP budget. This is true since member nation contribution percentages
have not changed substantially even as new member nations have joined over time.
The difference lies with the piece parts of the budgets, particularly as NATO
transformation has been implemented and NATO peace support operations were
born.
NATO is involved in a number of operations, and its operating tempo is high: Peace
support operations are on-going in the Afghanistan; assistance to Iraq is being
provided to help train military and police forces; potential humanitarian support
missions are being analyzed; and exercises to test and hone NATO capabilities like
the NATO Response Force are frequent. NATO policy directs the nations to provide
and pay for the logistics support of its own members. These costs must be
underwritten within existing obligation authority at the expense of other programs
or, in the case of related U.S. unilateral contingencies, must be compensated when
possible with emergency supplemental appropriations.
Foreign currency rates have been volatile and, to some extent, are unpredictable.
Like the proverbial jumping bean, they can go up, down, or sideways-seemingly at
will and much faster than can be accommodated within the regular decision cycles of
PPBES.
Nations' contribution shares to NATO common-funded budgets may change. This also
could affect multinational budgets in terms of those nations participating and
respective budget shares, or it even could lead to NATO operationally-specific
budgets developed and funded by a coalition of nations.

MANPOWER POLICY, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

NATO MANPOWER OVERVIEW

• Manpower Overview
• Manpower Management

Overview
• Terminology & Types of Establishments
• Legal Basis
• Types of Human Resources
• Manpower Policy and Principles

Basic Definitions
• MANPOWER (Requirements)
• MANNING (People)
• CEILING (Authorised posts)
• STRENGTH (Current level of Manning)

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Basic Definitions (cont)
• PEACETIME ESTABLISHMENTS (PEs)
• OPEs
• EMERGENCY ESTABLISHMENT (EEs)
• CRISIS ESTABLISHMENTS (CEs)

Basic Definitions (cont)

• OFFSET POST
• 180 DAY RULE

Legal Basis
• The North Atlantic Treaty
• The Ottawa Agreement
• The Paris Protocol

Mix of Manpower Resources

Military Personnel
• NATO International Military Personnel (± 12,500 Posts)
• Employed by National Authorities
• Costs Borne by the Nations

Post Categories Within the International Manpower Ceiling

• Quota post
• Nationality Undetermined Posts (NU)
• Rotational Post (ROT)
• Non-Quota Post (NQ)

International Civilian Personnel

• NATO International Civilian Personnel (± 6,000)
• Direct Employment Contracts with NATO
• Costs Borne by NATO Budgets
• Customer Funded Civilian Posts

Military Post Categories Outside the International Manpower Ceiling

• Dual Hatted Post (DH)
• Twinned Post (TP)
• Host Nation Posts
•International Military Partnership Posts
• Interim Posts: Voluntary National Contribution, National Overages

Local Wage Rate

• Local Wage Rate Personnel (± 1,000)
• Direct Employment Contracts with NATO
• No International Representation
• Not part of Peacetime Establishments

• Consultants and Contractors

• Morale Welfare Activities
• Crisis Response Operations

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Mix of Manpower Resources

Manpower Responsibilities
• Nations
• North Atlantic Council (NAC)
• Military Committee (MC)
• NATO Defence Manpower Committee (NDMC)
• NATO Defence Manpower Audit Authority (NDMAA)
• Peacetime Establishment Authority (PEA)
• HQ NATO IMS / Manpower Staff

NATO Manpower Policy and Procedures (AAP 16(D)) Apply To

• All international posts within the SCs and their subordinate
headquarters, as well as the NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA)
• All international posts in the MC Agencies and NATO Defense
College
• All international posts in the IMS and the Partnership
Coordination Cell (PCC)
• The Military Posts of the NC3A
• National Units and HQ support posts that come within the international PE ceiling

NATO Manpower Guidelines do NOT apply to:

• Host Nation (HN) posts and National (NAT) posts
• Nations’ delegations and national representatives/liaison teams to NATO
• Posts in specific Military Committee Agencies

Manpower Management The Military Imperative

Military organisations must be:

• Effective, efficient and transformable in time of crisis
• Capable of operating on Article 5 operations and Crisis
Response Operations (CRO)

The evolving security environment requires:

• the Alliance to generate rapidly deployable forces at short notice
•the ability to facilitate contingency operations not related to collective defence

NATO Organisational Objectives

• Standardised organisations and procedures
• Clear and Accountable Responsibility
• Peacetime organisation easily transformable in time of conflict
• Minimum levels of command
• Simple vertical organisation
• Clear lines of communication
• Adaptable to new technologies, missions and CONOPS

Manpower Policy Objectives

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Policy Objective One: To provide manpower for a structure which carries out NATO’s
assigned roles and missions, and to ensure that there is a streamlined decision-
making process thereby avoiding or eliminating levels of review or duplication. The
structure should maintain the simplest vertical organisation with clear lines of
communication, and be able to transform from peace to conflict with minimum
organisational change.
Policy Objective Two: To maintain standard organisations and procedures, consistent
with effective and efficient mission accomplishment at each Command level and,
where different functions are envisaged, within each HQ.
Policy Objective Three: To maintain the minimum manpower establishment to
discharge assigned roles and missions.
Policy Objective Four: To adapt manpower establishments in line with technological
advances, legislation, and different missions and evolving concepts of operation from
peace to conflict.

Manpower Policy Principles

Highlights:
• Adherence to “Zero Growth”
• Multi-nationality to preserve Alliance solidarity and cohesion.
• All posts to be militarily justifiable
• Appropriate span of control to be set
• Substitution of Military Personnel by Civilian Staff
• Pursuance of “Spend-to-Save” Measures

I.7.1.1. MC roles and responsabilities

MC roles and responsibilities

The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military authority in NATO and the oldest
permanent body in NATO after the North Atlantic Council, both having been formed
months after the Alliance came into being. It is the primary source of military advice
to NATO’s civilian decision-making bodies – the North Atlantic Council and the
Nuclear Planning Group.
Its advice is sought prior to any authorization for military action and, consequently
represents an essential link between the political decision-making process and the
military structure of NATO.
It also provides military guidance to the Alliance’s two Strategic Commanders and
assists in developing overall strategic policy and concepts for the Alliance. In this
context, it prepares an annual long-term assessment of the strength and capabilities
of countries and areas posing a risk to NATO's interests.
It meets frequently at the level of Military Representatives (MILREPs) and three
times a year at the level of Chiefs of Defence (CHODs). It is chaired by the Chairman
of the Military Committee, who is nominated for a three-year term.

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Roles and responsibilities
Consensus advice on military mattersThe Committee’s principal role is to provide
consensus-based advice on military policy and strategy to the North Atlantic Council
and direction to NATO’s Strategic Commanders. It is responsible for recommending
to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common
defence of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO’s
operations and missions.
The Military Committee’s advice is sought as a matter of course prior to authorization
by the North Atlantic Council of NATO military activities or operations.
It therefore represents an essential link between the political decision-making
process and the military command structure of NATO and is an integral part of the
decision-making process of the Alliance.

Strategic direction
The Military Committee also plays a key role in the development of NATO’s military
policy and doctrine within the framework of discussions in the Council, the Nuclear
Planning Group and other senior bodies. It is responsible for translating political
decision and guidance into military direction to NATO’s two Strategic Commanders –
Supreme Allied Commander Operations and Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation.
In this context, the Committee assists in developing overall strategic concepts for the
Alliance and prepares an annual long-term assessment of the strength and
capabilities of countries and areas posing a risk to NATO's interests.
In times of crises, tension or war, and in relation to military operations undertaken
by the Alliance such as its role in Afghanistan and Kosovo, its advises the Council of
the military situation and its implications, and makes recommendations on the use of
military force, the implementation of contingency plans and the development of
appropriate rules of engagement.
It is also responsible for the efficient operation of agencies subordinate to the Military
Committee.

Committee representatives
The Military Committee is made up of senior military officers (usually three-star)
from NATO member countries who serve as their country’s Military Representatives
(MILREPs) to NATO, representing their Chief of Defence. It represents a tremendous
amount of specialised knowledge and experience that helps shape Alliance-wide
military policies, strategies and plans.
The MILREPs work in a national capacity, representing the interests of their countries
while remaining open to negotiation and discussion so that a NATO consensus can be
reached.
A civilian official represents Iceland, which has no military forces.
The Committee is chaired by the Chairman of the Military Committee, who is NATO’s
senior military official. He directs the day-to-day business of the Military Committee
and acts on its behalf. He is also the Committee’s spokesman and representative,
making him the senior military spokesman for the Alliance on all military matters.

I.7.1.2. Working mechanisms of the Committee

Working mechanisms of the Committee

The Committee meets at least once a week in formal or informal sessions to discuss,
deliberate and act on matters of military importance. These meetings follow closely

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those of the North Atlantic Council, so that the Committee may follow up promptly
on Council decisions.
In practice, meetings are convened whenever necessary and both the Council and
the Military Committee normally meet much more frequently than once a week. As a
result of the Alliance's role for instance in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean
and off the Horn of Africa, as well as its supporting role in relation to Iraq, the need
for the Council and Military Committee to meet more frequently to discuss
operational matters has greatly increased.
The work of the Military Committee is supported by the International Military Staff
(IMS), which effectively acts as its executive body. The IMS is responsible for
preparing assessments, studies and other papers on NATO military matters and
ensures that decisions and policies on military matters are implemented by the
appropriate NATO military bodies.

High-level meetings
Like the political decision-making bodies, it also meets regularly at its highest level,
namely at the level of Chiefs of Defence (CHODs). Meetings at this level are normally
held three times a year. Two of these meetings occur in Brussels and one in the form
of an informal Military Committee Conference is hosted by a NATO member country,
on a rotational basis.

Cooperation with partners

In the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace
programme, the Military Committee meets regularly with partner countries at the
level of national Military Representatives (once a month) and at the level of Chiefs of
Defence (twice a year) to deal with military cooperation issues. The Military
Committee also meets in different formats in the framework of the NATO- Russia
Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Georgia Commission, and with
the CHODs of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

MC/IMS in the NATO Structure NATO HQ

REPRESENTATION:

• Chairman of the Military Committee - CMC (4 Star);

• Nations Military Representatives (majority 3 Star);
• Strategic Commands (2 Star);
• Director International Military Staff (DIMS) (3 Star);

The international Military Staff (structure, task and

responsabilities, selection process and mandate)

The International Military Staff

The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive agency of the Military
Committee. It provides staff support to the Military Committee and is responsible for
the preparation of assessments, studies and other papers on NATO military matters.
The IMS also ensures that decisions and policies on military matters are
implemented by the appropriate NATO military bodies. The IMS provides the
essential link between the political decision-making bodies of the Alliance and the

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NATO Strategic Military Commanders (SACEUR and SACT) and their staffs.
The IMS comprises approximately 380 military personnel. They are coming from all
member nations, with the exception of Iceland, which has no military establishment.
They are all qualified experts in different fields of expertise and they work in an
international capacity for the common interest of the Alliance. They co-operate on
the basis of a common understanding of military doctrine and NATO procedures, ably
supported by a nucleus of 85 civilian personnel well versed in NATO administration.

Structure
The IMS is organised into five functional divisions (plans and policy, operations,
intelligence, co-operation and regional security, and logistic, armaments and
resources) as well as a number of branches and support offices. It is a well balanced
organisation that is able to move swiftly and smoothly into a 24 hour, 7 days a week
crisis mode without additional personnel. The IMS is headed by a Director, at the
level of a three star general or flag officer, at present Lieutenant General P.J.M.
Godderij, a Dutch Air Force officer. He is assisted in his tasks by 12 flag officers who
head the divisions.
It is responsible for preparing assessments, studies and other papers on NATO
military matters. It also ensures that decisions and policies on military matters are
implemented by the appropriate NATO military bodies.
The IMS comprises some 320 military personnel supported by approximately 90
civilian personnel. It is headed by a Director and divided into five functional divisions
and several branches and support offices. It is able to move swiftly and smoothly
into a 24 hours a day, seven days a week crisis mode without additional personnel.
• The IMS is headed by a Director, at the level of a three star general or flag officer,
assisted by 12 flag officers who head the divisions and administrative support offices
within the IMS.
Several key positions are located within the Office of the Director of the IMS:
o the Executive Coordinator: he manages staff activities and controls the flow of
information and communication, both within the IMS and between the IMS and other
parts of the NATO Headquarters;
o the Public Affairs Adviser: he advises the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the
Military Committee, and the Director of the IMS on strategic communications and
public affairs matters, and acts as military spokesman for the Chairman of NATO’s
Military Committee;
o The Financial Controller: he advises key officials on all IMS financial and fiscal
matters;
o The Legal Officer: he advises on international and national legal implications of all
aspects of NATO’s military missions and of the Military Committee’s advice to the
North Atlantic Council.

The five divisions

The IMS’ key role is to support the Military Committee, and to do this it is organized
into five functional divisions responsible for the following.
o Plans and policy
The IMS develops and coordinates the Military Committee’s contribution to NATO
policy and planning matters, defence policy, strategic planning, special weapons
policy planning, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defence and force
planning, the NATO Response Force and capabilities in general.

o Operations
The IMS supports the Military Committee in developing operational plans and
addressing questions about the NATO force posture and other military management
issues regarding NATO’s role in international crises. It promotes and develops

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multinational training and exercises for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP)
countries.

o Intelligence
The IMS provides day-to-day strategic intelligence support to the NATO Secretary
General, the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, and other NATO bodies.
It collates and assesses intelligence received from NATO member countries and
commands, and coordinates its dissemination to NATO commands, agencies,
organizations and countries.

o Co-operation and regional security

The IMS liaises with military contacts and cooperates within the framework of the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP programme, the NATO-Russia Council, the
NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Dialogue. Military advice on NATO
involvement in different aspects of disarmament, arms control and cooperative
security issues is also developed.

o Logistic, armaments and resources

The IMS manages Alliance resources in support of NATO military bodies, and it
develops and updates military policy and procedures for the management of Alliance
resources. It provides staff support to and appropriate representation of the Military
Committee in a variety of areas.

Additional functions and offices

o Consultation, command and control (C3)

The NATO HQ Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S), which comprises
civilians from NATO’s International Staff and officers and civilians from the
International Military Staff, serves the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee
and the C3 Board. It is located administratively within the IMS structure and advises
the Military Committee on C3/communication and information system policy
standards, products, analysis and capability packages.

o The NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN)

The SITCEN is positioned between the International Staff and the International
Military Staff and consists of both civilian and military personnel. As NATO
Headquarters’ central agency for providing situational awareness, it is responsible for
receiving, exchanging and disseminating political, economic and military intelligence
and information throughout the headquarters, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

o NATO Office on Gender Perspectives

This office is the permanent focal point for collecting, providing and sharing
information regarding national programmes, policies and procedures on gender-
related issues, including the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on
women, peace and security (UNSCRs 1325 and 1820).

Admiral GiampaoloDi Paola (ITA)

The Chairman of the Military Committee is NATO’s senior military officer, by virtue of
being the principal military advisor to the Secretary General and the conduit through
which consensus-based advice from NATO’s 28 Chiefs of Defence is brought forward
to the political decision-making bodies of NATO.
He directs the day-to-day business of the Military Committee, NATO's highest
military authority, and acts on its behalf.
The Chairman is also the Committee’s spokesman and representative, making him

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the senior military spokesman for the Alliance on all military matters.
The current Chairman is Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola of Italy. He took up his
functions on 27 June 2008.

Tasks and responsibilities

The Chairman’s authority stems from the Military Committee, to which he is
responsible in the performance of his duties.
He chairs all meetings of the Military Committee and, in his absence, the Deputy
Chairman of the Military Committee takes the chair.
The Chairman of the Military Committee is both its spokesman and representative.
He directs its day-to-day business and acts on behalf of the Committee in issuing the
necessary directives and guidance both to the Director of the International Military
Staff and to NATO’s Strategic Commanders. He represents the Military Committee at
the North Atlantic Council, and other high-level political meetings such as the
Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, providing consensus
advice on military matters when required.
By virtue of his appointment, the Chairman of the Committee also has an important
public role and is the senior military spokesman for the Alliance in contacts with the
press and media. He undertakes official visits and representational duties on behalf
of the Committee, meeting with government officials and senior military officers in
both NATO countries and in countries with which NATO is developing closer contacts
in the framework of formal partnerships, for instance, the Partnership for Peace
programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the
NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Dialogue, and with Non-NATO
Troop Contributing Countries to NATO operations.
He is also the Chairman of the Academic Advisory Board of the NATO Defense
College.

Selection process and mandate

The Chairman of the Military Committee is elected from among the NATO Chiefs of
Defence and appointed for a three-year term of office. The CMC-elect has served
preferably as Chief of defence or an equivalent capacity in his own country, and is a
non-US officer of four-star rank or national equivalent.

IMS NATO Logistics & Resources Division

Resources Related Bodies and Committees

Resource Related Bodies and Committees

ENDORSING BODIES
Military Committee
• Operational aspects;
• Military necessity (MCR- Minimum capability requirements);
• Military manpower Resource Policy and Planning Board;
• Affordability;
• Resource allocation;
• Eligibility;

IMPLEMENTING
COMMITTEES
Infrastructure Committee
• NSIP Implementation (Scope and Financial authorizations);
• Urgent Requirements;

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• Minor Works Military Budget Committee;
• Mil Budget Implementation;
• O&M (operation and maintenance);

NATO Defence Manpower Committee

• CP Manpower Requirements;
• NATO Annual Manpower Plan;
• Changes to PEs (Peacetime establishments);

I.7.1.6. The Capability Package Process at NATO

The capability Package Process at NATO

Screening Endorsement Approval

NOR - NATO Office of Resources
RPPB - Resource Policy and Planning Board
JSSR – Joint Staff Screening Report

As part of the transition to a more integrated approach to military common resources

management, the Council has adopted the CP process of identifying and validating
military common resource requirements as a means to link these requirements with
the Alliance defence planning process. Progressively, military requirements are being
met on the basis of CPs. There are four distinct phases in the CP process: CP
definition, CP submission, CP approval and CP implementation.

CP Definition
CP definition is aimed at providing the link between the military common resources
and the Defence Planning Process. On the basis of the Ministerial Guidance, the Force
Goal Process produces specific planning targets for individual countries to meet in
order to provide the Alliance with the overall level of forces and capabilities to
implement NATO strategy. The Force Goals should strike a balance between military
requirements, technical feasibility, available resources and political considerations.
MC Guidance for Defence Planning amplifies the Principal Capability Requirements
(PCR) outlined in MC 400/1 and identifies the required Military Functions (MF). This
forms the basis for the development by the NMAs of their required capabilities. The
Major NATO Commands (MNCs) issue annual guidance for the preparation of new
CPs. The Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), in consultation with their Principal
Subordinate Commands (PSCs), Host Nations, and user nations, develop the CPs
that support the required capabilities within their area of responsibility. There are no
fixed guidelines as to what constitutes a properly sized CP. However, it is clear that a
CP must be manageable in terms of scope, cost and implementability. The cost and
complexity must be such as to allow package execution within a reasonable
timeframe, normally five to seven years from the time of approval.

CP Submission
At this stage, the NMAs identify additional requirements by comparing required
assets to available assets. It is accomplished primarily by the MSC under
responsibility of the MNC and with assistance of the PSCs. It is important that CP

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definition is closely coordinated with host/user nations, to make sure that nations
can fully support the CPs during the CP approval process. The following steps can be
identified:
a. The identification of those minimum resources (forces, armaments, logistics, and
infrastructure assets) that must be available to accomplish the required capability.
The infrastructure assets should be identified by type and number of installations
(communications facilities, air defence facilities, naval bases, airfields, headquarters,
pipelines, etc.) that must be available to meet the required capability.
b. The determination of those installations which currently exist to satisfy the
required capability identified in the step described above. This analysis will include all
NATO and potentially available national military and civil assets that could satisfy the
requirement.
c. The selection of those installations available to support the required capability
together with the related common-funded Operation and Maintenance costs and
NATO Manpower. If existing NATO or national infrastructure assets are not adequate
to support the required capability, this step must identify either common-funded or
nationally funded additional investment requirements either for new installation(s) or
to satisfy shortfalls in existing installations, including the relation to common-funded
Operation and Maintenance costs and NATO Manpower.

CP Approval
CPs are submitted to NATO Headquarters for approval upon their completion. The
International Staff (IS), together with the International Military Staff (IMS), will
prepare a joint screening report to be considered by both the RPPB and the MC. This
report will address the feasibility, implementability, eligibility for common-funding
and affordability within the agreed planning framework, the MTRP of the submitted
CP.
The RPPB's primary focus is on affordability. Its responsibilities, however, include
determining the feasibility and eligibility for common-funding, addressing both
national and international resource implications and political aspects. The MC
considers CPs from a military requirement point of view, assigning the military
priority on which basis CPs will compete for funding.
Approval of the CP constitutes a commitment that the necessary resources, including
international manpower, will be made available. Concerning the nationally funded
portion, approval of the CP constitutes a commitment to make the identified national
facilities available to NATO and to implement any additional requirements. By the
same token, Council/DPC approval of a CP constitutes the tasker to the
implementation committees to start implementation.

Implementation
As was mentioned, implementation of CPs is the responsibility of the implementation
committees, within the broad policy guidance provided by the SRB on matters of
resource allocation. Concerning those CPs for which no requirements exists for
common-funded or nationally funded additional investment either for new
installations or to satisfy shortcomings on existing installations, the implementation
committees will make sure that the necessary resources are available. For those CPs
for which additional investment is necessary, the IC is responsible for managing the

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implementation of the common-funded investments. Both the MBC and the NDMC
are involved in managing the provision of sufficient operation and maintenance
support and international manpower.
1817. In cases where a total reassessment of the requirement forms the basis for a
new CP, a CP will be subject to the full review and approval process as outlined
above. Normally, such major reassessments would take place every six to eight
years. In case major changes to approved CPs are necessary, either changing the
military requirement as endorsed by the MC or impacting on the resource allocation
ceilings endorsed by the SRB in the framework of the MTRP, submission to the MC
and/or the SRB and approval by the Council/DPC are required. Adaptations occurring
during the normal implementation of CPs fall within the responsibility of the
implementing committees.

Key issues
General
• Increased MC involvement in resource and capability management (MC Intelligent
Customer Approach)
• PE Review of the NCS
Manpower
• Future manpower challenges
• Nations’ Manpower Commitments
Military Budget
• 2010

MC Involvement in Resource and Capability Management

MC Involvement in Resource and Capability Management

MTRP - medium-term resource plan

In order to be more efficient in its work the MC wants to become an INTELLIGENT

CUSTOMER.

1. ISSUE
MC lacks resource related information and wants to become an “intelligent customer”

2. INITIATIVE / WAY AHEAD

1. Review the MCR concept

• Increase MC visibility on resource issues by
• SCs provide resource information in any request to the MC
• MC insert resource dimension into any advice to the NAC
• Move to Cost – effectiveness
• Risk analysis

2. Programmatic approach
• MC insight in CRO requirements

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3. CP Master Plan
• Achieve overview on CPs
• Interrelations
• Synchronise implementation
• Inform decision maker on critical developments

4. Consolidate NMA (NATO military authorities) involvement in MTRP

Process
• Consolidated resource proposals (MC overview)
• Consolidated NMA impact statements (MC impact on the development of the MTRP)

5. CP Process Review
• Faster
• More responsive

I.7.1.8. PE Review

PE (peace establishments) Review – Background

• CPG (comprehensive political guidance) – more but smaller demanding Ops

• MG 06 – new LoA
• Political Guidance – need for NCS PE Review, not a follow-on audit only
• MC Guidelines – how to execute the PE Review
•
The PE Review is to result in a Command Structure that is more effective and more
affordable.

PE Review – Conduct
Phase 1 – Review of the missions, roles and tasks, and PEs to be reviewed (MC
Agreed the Report on Phase 1, 11 Sep 07)
Phase 2 – Review of manpower requirements and development of
ISPEs (RPPB Affordabiilliity Assessment, 19 Feb 09)

Key Issues: Resource Estimates

• Military Budget Increase due to outsourcing and contractorization with no
substantial offset.
• NSIP strongly affected by Deployability (DCIS and HQ support for DJSEs ..); =>
more related to LoAthan PE Review
• Positive cooperation between bodies involved (NOR; IMS; SCs; NCSA) - Joint
report from IS/IMS on cost impact;
• RPPB had the leading role for financial assessment, eligibility and affordability
issue.

Future Manpower Challenges

After 2010, CPs will come up with additional manpower requirements (approx.
1400); this will raise the question of the afordability of Military Manpower bill since
the National manpower resources are stretched out;

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What could be the solution? Outsourcing? Civilianisation? Termination of some
capabilities’ implementation?

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