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ABSTRACT
intelligence and policymaking communities. This entry will define human intelligence
and provide an understanding of how it is collected, the types of sources that provide it,
decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
value provided by a human source for use in the analysis of an intelligence issue or
intelligence jargon, is not only the intelligence derived from human sources but also
reflects a specific type of collection activity whereby information is passed from one
individual to another either directly or indirectly. The various forms this process takes
will be determined by what type of intelligence is being provided by the human source,
who is collecting it, under what circumstances and for what particular use.
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! This article will first identify the principal agencies in the U.S. government
requirements. HUMINT will then be categorized by type reflecting the broad range of
by a brief overview of the human intelligence collection process. The focus will then
shift to the human sources who provide the intelligence looking at the classical agent
recruitment process and the types of agents that are recruited. This entry concludes
with a look at some of the tradecraft employed by intelligence officers to securely run
the Executive Branch. Their job is to gather intelligence to collectively support the
President and other intelligence consumers in the policymaking, law enforcement and
military communities to carry out foreign relations and other national security activities.
The premier collector of HUMINT in the U.S. government is the National Clandestine
Service (NCS) within the Central Intelligence Agency. (1) It is made up of case
officers, staff officers, linguists, analysts, specialists and support personnel that deploy
collection organization within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), also makes
operational requirements. The DX was activated in August 2008 and was formed from
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the combination of DoDʼs Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and DIAʼs CI and
system and is the primary focal for contact with the NCS. In addition, the individual
military services maintain their own intelligence collection activities to support their
! The FBI is extremely active in recruiting foreign diplomats and other officials in
support of their counterintelligence responsibilities inside the U.S. The FBI has also had
a successful track in recruiting foreign intelligence officers residing in the U.S. (4) In
greatly expand its human intelligence collection capabilities, particularly in the area of
criminal investigations, FBI Special Agents also recruit informants to track foreign spies
capabilities, the FBI has adapted recruitment techniques from CIA training courses for
worldwide to gather drug enforcement intelligence in its efforts to combat domestic and
human sources plays an important and often a critical role are positive intelligence,
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what are Country Yʼs intentions in the Middle East? When will Country Z have a fully
sources who would be able to provide valuable insight into the plans and intentions of
other means. Human sources also provide operational intelligence to support ongoing
operational activities such as the spotting and assessing of new recruitment targets. (6)
fall into two general categories. Covert collection of human intelligence, which
countryʼs plans and intentions. An asset might also be a penetration of the country Xʼs
or her case officer in the form of assessment data on a potential recruitment target.
These are all clandestine relationships which if revealed would result in dire
consequences for the asset and potentially the handling officer. (8)
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information from human sources in a generally open but discreet manner. The
collection activities “are openly acknowledged by or are readily attributable to the U.S.
Government, and include activities designed to acquire information through legal and
open means without concealment.” A broad range of collection activities fall into this
category and reflect varying degrees of sensitivity with regard to to source protection
and disclosure. Diplomats and military attaches may elicit information of intelligence
value during the normal course of their duties in dealing with their foreign counterparts
or other contacts of intelligence interest who know that their information may be shared
with other officials in the U.S. Government. Overt intelligence collection may be in the
may be obtained from programmatic debriefings of emigrants who may have worked at
another important stream of HUMINT that is collected overtly. Interrogations are used
environment, the subject of the interrogation may not be fully cooperating and the ability
context of military operations is the work of the Human Terrain Teams which collect
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cultural intelligence for tactical use in engaging the local population during stability
businessmen and academicians who voluntarily share information that address a wide
range of intelligence requirements. The U.S. business community has a broad array of
information of intelligence interest. The U.S. academic community also has relies on
professors from various disciplines into contact with foreign colleagues who may be
working in areas of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. Particularly with regard
technical breakthroughs may offer valuable insight that will provide intelligence analysts
advances. (11)
! The National Resources Division (NRD) within the National Clandestine Service
(NCS) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the primary group within the
corporate world, and among universities and scientific institutions. Although the fact
considered an overt domestic collection activity, the actual contacts are handled
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discreetly with contact approvals obtained at the highest level of each organization. As
part of the contact approval process, the ground rules for contact and level of
Meanwhile, the domestic collection activities are monitored by in-house CIA lawyers
and congressional overseers to ensure legal compliance with all laws governing contact
between intelligence organizations with the public and private sectors. (12)
! Any contact with foreign nationals within the U.S. by any intelligence community
agency must be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has
primacy regarding intelligence activities involving foreign nationals present in the U.S.
The FBI has traditionally been active in collecting human intelligence from informants in
aftermath of 9/11, reorganization within the FBI led to the creation of the Directorate of
divisions to form the National Security Branch. In this organizational restructuring, the
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known as requirements that are sent to the appropriate intelligence collection groups to
implement collection. In the case of HUMINT collection, requirements are tailored for
use with selected human sources who are well-positioned because of their access to
the information to provide answers to the questions on the requirements list. Whether
the collection is overt or covert, the collector must accurately debrief the human source
being careful to separate the factual information provided by the source from the
sourceʼs opinion about the information. A sourceʼs opinion is useful to the extent that it
places the factual information within a specific context. For example, a nuclear
scientist in a hostile country working in a top secret program to develop the capability to
enrich uranium reports factual information on the arrival of new technology for the
program. The nuclear scientist might also be positioned to provide an opinion on how
with what is known or is new information, which may then generate a new set of
requirements. Over time the reliability of the sourceʼs reporting can be established and
a determination can be made regarding whether the reporting relationship with the
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! There is a constant need to recruit new sources to provide raw intelligence for
New agents are needed to address new sets of requirements in emerging areas of
interest to intelligence analysts. For example, hostile County X may have recently
established a biological weapons program about which little is known. There is also a
need to replenish and maintain established agent networks that provide intelligence on
programs. Whatever the reason, the general procedure used by most intelligence
recruitment cycle.
! The recruitment of new agents is the primary function of a case officer. The
first step in the process generally begins with “spotting” a source of potential interest.
A case officer might begin the spotting process by researching openly available
information on the Internet or other open sources to identify individuals with potential
access to information of intelligence value. The case officer would also be active in
frequenting locations where potential recruitment targets may appear. The venues
could range anywhere from the host country diplomatic circuit to the local skydiving
club. The goal is to engineer a direct contact to a target of potential interest in a way
! The next step is the initial “assessment” phase where the officer tries to gain
insight into the potential recruitment target by obtaining biographic information to verify
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intelligence interest. Through direct contact with the target, the case officer working
undercover seeks to elicit information that provides insight into the targetʼs interest,
attitudes and beliefs, relationships, and any hints of potential vulnerabilities. In addition
to direct assessment, the officer may be able to acquire indirect assessment information
from recruited “access agents” who have knowledge of the target. The case officer may
also be able to obtain further assessment data on the target through surveillance,
! If the initial assessment of the target appears positive, the officer will seek to
move the target into the “development” phase in which ongoing contact is established to
further build the relationship and gather more detailed assessment information. The
aim is to develop a close, personal relationship that allows the potential recruitment
target to more fully trust the officer. As mutual trust builds, the officer gains greater
insight into the target mindset and susceptibility to recruitment. It is during this phase
that the relationship between the case officer and the target becomes firmly established
information to a case officer may range from simple venality to an urgent need for
medical attention for a family member that the case officer could arrange. Generally it
surface during the development phase, the case officer will drop the target from active
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! The “pitch” is the most critical phase in the recruitment cycle. It constitutes the
exchange for some form of renumeration or benefit. This stage is critical because it
involves serious consequences for both the case officer and target. It is during the
pitch phase that the case officer “breaks cover” and reveals his or her true intelligence
affiliation. If the target accepts the pitch and agrees to provide protected information,
the target has, in effect, agreed to violate the laws of his or her country and must rely on
the skill of the case officer to securely protect their relationship against being revealed
to authorities. If the target refuses the pitch and reports it to the authorities, the case
officer may come under close scrutiny by the host countryʼs counterintelligence
persona non grata. If the case officer is under official cover, the officer would generally
not face civil or criminal charges; however, not all countries will necessarily respect an
officialʼs status, which increases the risk of pitching targets in countries that have a
history of not respecting established international law. For case officers who are
reported pitch could subsequently lead to their arrest and potential exposure of
developing a solid assessment and a strong personal relationship with the recruitment
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leads to what is known as a “warm” pitch. Another type of approach known as a “cold”
pitch is sometimes used against high priority targets in certain circumstances when
of the target is not possible. In this instance a case officer operating in alias may enter
a country to make a quick pitch to the target with plans to immediately depart the
! If the recruitment target accepts a pitch, the operation moves into the “handling”
phase. In this stage, the case officer formalizes the recruitment usually by having the
newly acquired agent sign a secrecy agreement. The terms of the arrangement are
introduced to ensure that the case officer and the agent can meet securely to avoid
detection. The agentʼs access to protected information will be more clearly defined
and requirements tailored to the agentʼs access will be provided as a guide to collection.
Although a recruitment target accepts a pitch and becomes an agent, the case officer
continues the assessment process to gain insight into the agentʼs ability to discreetly
perform the agent role and handle the stresses associated with living a new clandestine
life. Over time the case officer will be able to assess the accuracy of the agentʼs
reporting as well as identify any potential signs that the agent may have been detected
and has been doubled back against the case officer by the counterintelligence unit of
officer and an agent ends. This phase is known as “termination” and, despite the
sinister popular connotation, termination simply means that the secret “agreement” to
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provide protected information has been terminated. The termination may center
around the agentʼs access to information. The agent may have changed jobs and has
requirements may have changed and the information provided by the the agent is no
longer needed or of intelligence interest. The termination may also be made on the
basis of operational security. Information may surface that indicates that the agent has
come to the attention of local counterintelligence. It may also be the case that the agent
simply wanted to end the clandestine relationship because of the stress of leading a
factors that lead the agent to a decision not to provide protected information anymore.
both agree that the relationship has run its course. Any commitments that formed part
most common category is the recruited asset, which is an agent that has gone through
the agent acquisition cycle and is productively working in-place to provide protected
! Defectors in the most general sense are indiviudals who change sides. Within
information of interest who renounces allegiance to the country he or she is serving and
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seeks refuge and support in another country. Defectors, also known as walk-ins or
volunteers, represent a potential treasure trove of intelligence if the defector was a well-
placed official who has had broad access to protected information. Defectors are
distinguished from refugees in that refugees refer to individuals seeking to leave their
native country for personal or poltical reasons but do not have access to information of
intelligence interest. (16) After the defectorʼs identity is verified and any intellligence
procedure for the intelligence officer handling the case to explore whether the defector
a decision is made to encourage a defector to return to their official position and work
work as a penetration of his or her government. For example, does anyone in the
defectorʼs government know that he or she has defected? Did the defector leave
because of some incident that put the individual in jeopardy, i.e. did the person “burn
of serving as a clandestine agent? In highly sensitive cases where the intelligence and
a resettlement package may be offered in which the defector would return to work in
place for a period of time in exchange for resettlement in the U.S. or a third
country. (17)
commodity and will use false defectors to walk in to the opposing service to hopefully
penetrate that service as part of their counterespionage (CE) program. This is a type
of “double agent” operation is known as a “dangle” in which an agent under the control
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them. The individual subsequently reports the “pitch” to the appropriate authorities and
under the guidance and control of his countryʼs CI service will pretend to act as an
agent of the hostile service in order to gain access to that serviceʼs protected
recruited asset working for hostile service and then “turned” that individual to work for
them as a channel into the hostile service. (18) In the most general sense, a double
agent operation essentially refers to an agent who is ostensibly working for one
intelligence service but is actually secretly working for another intelligence agency. (19)
TRADECRAFT
refers to the procedures to securely conduct HUMINT collection operations. The use of
good operational tradecraft is vital in allowing a case officer to meet and communicate
with human sources without the opposition counterintelligence service becoming aware
meetings, techniques for securely making contact with an agent, use of disguise and
officer will often use a “safe house” to meet and debrief recruited assets. A safe house
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drawing any undue attention. The operational environment may also allow a case
officer to use the common tradecraft practice known as car pickups to securely meet an
agent. At a pre-arranged time, the case officer picks up the agent by driving by a
designated location that minimizes direct observation of the car pickup contact. The
meeting is generally conducted while the case officer drives. The optimal time for a car
pickup meeting is after nightfall when it is difficult to discern identities of the occupants.
The case officer and the agent have pre-arranged a cover story to explain their reason
for being together if they are stopped by local authorities. In addition, the case officer
has already devised and discussed a contingency plan with the agent in the event they
get into an car accident or other situation that could threaten the clandestinity of the
meeting. (20)
when regular direct contact with the agent is not possible to due the potential detection
agent contact in both directions without any traceable or discernible link between the
the meet the case officer at a a particular pick-up site. It may also be used to transmit
information. The “dead drop” has been the classical form of impersonal
which either the case officer or the agent hides information or other material of
preselected location for retrieval by the other party. (21) The revolution in modern
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the medium to embed messages inside a document or image file, program or protocol.
In 2010, the FBI charged that the Russian intelligence service was using specialized
steganography software to embed encrypted messages in image files which were then
necessary clandestine skills that a case officer needs to communicate and handle
and is assumed to have living spaces and communications devices bugged. Because
and spouses are carefully screened to ensure that they have the ability to make good
operational decisions while working under constant stress. Those who pass
psychological screening will go through denied area operations training after having
successfully completed the basic operational training course. (23) Most of the case
officer training for the CIA is done at a facility colloquially known as “The Farm”. (24)
! Intelligence officers posted overseas conceal the true nature of their activities by
working under “cover” to minimize the probability of detection by the local CI service and
other groups such as terrorists or drug traffickers seeking to target intelligence officers
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for kidnap or assassination in retaliation for operations against their groups. Without the
proper cover, intelligence officers would be unable to securely recruit and handle
! There are basically two types of cover used by intelligence officers. One type is
known as “official cover” and refers to intelligence officers assuming the role of a
diplomat or some other type government official while posted overseas. Diplomatic
cover has several advantages. It provides the intelligence officer with natural access to
host country targets that are potentially of operational interest. Diplomatic cover also
provides the officer with a degree of protection if the officerʼs intelligence activities are
facing criminal espionage charges, the intelligence officer would be declared persona
non grata by the host government and expelled from the country, that is, if the host
where the U.S. has an otherwise good relationship with the host country, the host
country may simply quietly suggest that the officer be sent home promptly to avoid
being declared persona non grata and facing the public fanfare that goes with an offical
expulsion. Another advantage of diplomatic cover is that it provides the embassy with a
trained intelligence professional who can handle defectors with sensitive intelligence
information and other volunteers who may want to share threat information.
! The other type of cover is known as non-official cover (NOC) and refers to
the U.S. government which offers the advantage of being able to gain access to
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potential targets outside the normal range of contacts within diplomatic circles. In
addition, when diplomatic relations breakdown or are seriously impaired, a NOC may
still be positioned to conduct operations in the host country given the officerʼs low CI
profile due to his or her lack of affiliation with the U.S. government. There are,
activity and arrests the officer, the NOC cannot make any claim of diplomatic immunity
since the officer does not have diplomatic status. In addition, to establish a NOC
identity entails large costs and requires complicated administrative support to maintain
CONCLUSION
assessments used by U.S. policymakers to guide the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
It often constitutes the only stream of intelligence on issues where intelligence collection
by other means is not possble. To maintain this key collection capability, HUMINT
programs require highly skilled intelligence officers to securely and effectively recruit
and manage the cadre of human sources who work with the U.S. often at great personal
! The increasing global challenges and potential threats facing the U.S. and its
allies in the years ahead more than ever underscore the urgent need for the U.S. to
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intelligence that provides the “ground truth” analysts need to produce more accurate
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June 10, 2011.
(4) Olson, James M. Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying; Potomac Books:
Washington, D.C., 2006, 248n14.
(5) FBI Proposes Building Network of U.S. Informants. ABC News: The Blotter. July
25, 2007. http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/07/fbi-proposes-bu.html
Accessed on June 16, 2011.
(6) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/
html/ v02i4a08p_0001.htm
(9) Intelligence Community Directive Number 304: Human Intelligence. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, July 9, 2009, 6-7.
(10) Lucas, G.R. Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology; AltaMira
Press: Lanham, MD, 2009, 139.
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52-60.
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(14) Pechan, B. L. The Collectorʼs Role in Evaluation. In Inside CIAʼs Private World:
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H. Bradford, Ed.; Yale University Press: New Haven, 1995, 100-107.
(22) Criminal Complaint by Special Agent Ricci Against Alleged Russian Agents,
United States Department of Justice. http.//www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
062810complaint2.pdf. Accessed on June 16, 2011.
(25) Shulsky, Abram N.; Scmitt Gary J. Human Intelligence Collection. In Silent
Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3rd Ed.; Brasseyʼs Inc.: Dulles,
VA, 2002; http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/readings/
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