CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.
DEPARTMENT OF fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service
Commission, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy,
should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may
be imposed.
FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations
Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was
P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30.
CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM
on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC
filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same
time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is
constitutional
HELD: DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC
due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed,
such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy
automatically and regularly released.
The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic
release‖ in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as
―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.
Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required
to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them
from the national coffers.
By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is
vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This
conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which
effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖
policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal
autonomy by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the
CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the
event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and
the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION CANNOT
PROMULGATE RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE. Section 1, Rule 13, Part
III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply
only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2,
Rule 1, Part I provides: "SEC. 2. Applicability. — These rules,
except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought
before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests
and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction." It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests
or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]). Private respondent received a
copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion
for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b),
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days
to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for
a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August
11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with
Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11,
1992 was filed timely.
Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003
Suffrage, Overseas Absentee Voting
JANUARY 27, 2018
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject
matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites
the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his
claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise
by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of
suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends
or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be
granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid &
constitutional?
RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide
a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically
present in the country.
The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of
R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;”
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only
upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit:
“The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to
wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the
same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such
as COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions
of said law continues to be in full force and effect.
Orocio v COA
213 SCRA 109 G.R. No. 75959 August 31, 1992
FACTS:
An accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) onMay 25, 1982 where two individuals
suffered injury
– or uses of funds and property pertaining to theGovernment or any
Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, andDomingo Abodizo, a
casual employee
O.P. Landrito’s General Services (
OPLGS), the janitorialcontractor of the NPC. The two injured
personnel were brought to the hospital. NPC initiallyadvanced the
amount for hospitalization expenses for the treatment of Abodizo,
and set up thisas an account receivable from OPLGS deducted on
a staggered basis from the latter's billingagainst the NPC until the
same was fully satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund
ofthe total amount deducted from their billings representing
payment of the advances made bythe NPC. The amount of
hospitalization expenses was refunded to the contractor OPLGS.
TheUnit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the
refund of the hospitalization expensesof Abodizo contending that
under the contract, there is no employee-employer
relationbetween the NPC and the OPLGS employees. Hence,NPC
is not answerable for such expenses.General Counsel asked for is
consideration of the said disallowance denied. The COA
RegionalDirector, herein respondent, confirmed the disallowance.
NPC General Counsel submitted asecond request for
reconsideration and justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec
15-A of
RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which provides that “... all legal matter
s shall be handled by the General
Counsel of the Corporation...”
ISSUE:
Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion of the
legal counsel of the NPC iswithin the scope of the auditing power
of the COA?
HELD:
The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle allaccounts pertaining to the expenditures
of itssubdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The matter
of allowing in audit a disbursement account isnot a ministerial
function, but one which necessitates the exercise of discretion.
Besides, theOPLGS, Abodizo's employer, admitted that the
incident was purely accidental and that there isno showing
whatsoever in the incident report of any negligence on the part of
NPC or itsemployees.Wherefore, the instant petition is
GRANTED. In so far as it holds petitioner personally liable forthe
disallowed disbursement and the Debit Memo, dated July 22, 1986,
of the Manager of theAccounting Department of the National
Power Corporation, are herby set aside for being nulland void.So
ordered
ISSUES:
1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for
the disbursement in question, preclude or bar the COA from
disallowing in post-audit such disbursement?
2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a
motion to reconsider the disallowance in question?
3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the disallowance on the
theory that the disbursement was made on the basis thereof?
HELD:
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the
COA’s audit power. In determining whether an expenditure of a
Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable,
the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel
of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis
for the questioned disbursement. The COA, both under the 1973
and 1987 Constitution, is a collegial body. Its General Counsel
cannot act for the Commission for he is not even a Commissioner
thereof. He can only offer legal advice or render an opinion in
order to aid the COA in the resolution of a case or a legal question.
Thus, Nepomuceno’s endorsement cannot be considered as a
“decision” of the COA. Even if the disallowance was proper, there
would still be no basis for directly holding petitioner liable therefor;
moreover, there would be no reason to debit immediately his
account with the NPC. It was never claimed that petitioner was
personally liable for the disallowed disbursement; only the
approving authority, the management examiners and the Chief
Accountant of the NPC were deemed liable therefor.
ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
et al. 429 SCRA 789 (2004)
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in
May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed
before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which
consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared
Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of
execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second
Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner
Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However,
Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and
designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second
Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC
decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion
participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the
COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may
not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the
case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the comelec shall decide a case or matter by a
majority vote of all its members
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the
majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought Quo Warranto
to be attained.5 Since the above-quoted constitutional provision and
states "all of its members," without any qualification, it should be Mandamus
interpreted as such. with Preliminary Injunction
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution,
counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from the questioned before the RTCof Rizal challenging his dismissal by
COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just three (3) votes petitioners.Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two
out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC. (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, actions ofgovernment employees which is vested exclusively in the
questions the Cua ruling in light of Section 7, which says "majority Civil Service Commission; and (2)
of all the Members." He thus concludes that "[t]hree is not the quo warranto
majority of seven."6 was not the properremedy.
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the
members who participated or deliberated, it would have clearly Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied the Motion to Dismiss
phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme Court in and the Motion for Recon.Petitioners then elevated the matter to
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution: this Court through a petition for
SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the Rules of certiorari
Court are required to be heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with under Rule 65 which was referred torespondent CA for
the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took adjudication. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and in its
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted Resolution, denied the Motion forRecon.
thereon.
Issue:
Mateo v. Court of Appeals WON the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over the case involving
– dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation.
247 SCRA 284 Ruling:
Facts: It has no jurisdiction.MOWAD is a
Petitioners, all Board Members of Morong Water District quasi
(MOWAD), conducted an investigation on private respondent -public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198, known as the
EdgarSta. Maria, then General Manager. provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973,as amended.

He was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San In

Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He Davao City Water District v
was later dismissed on January 7, 1993.Private respondent filed a .
Special Civil Action for Civil Service Commissions
,
the Court
en banc
ruled that employees ofgovernment-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission(CSC).The established rule is that the
hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and controlled
corporations are governed bythe provisions of the Civil Service
Law and Rules and Regulations.PD No. 807, Executive Order No.
292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series
of 1990 of the CivilService Commission spell out the initial remedy
of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically
provide thatthe party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or
action of an agency of the government involving
termination of services
may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter,
private respondent could go on
certiorari
underRule 65 of the ROC if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of
the CSC.Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling ofeach Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari
by the party within thirty daysfrom receipt of a copy thereof.The
CSC under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are
unappealable and subject only to this Court's
certiorari
judgment.Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain
cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the
CivilService Law.Petition is GRANTED and the decision of
respondent CA is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE