Civ Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTBaguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry
P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of
Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar;
Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of
Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of
Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur;
Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao
Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte;
Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis
Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis-à-
vis the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011.
To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration
of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws — Republic Acts Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 —
constitutional.
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial
ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit
that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the
assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE

RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL
CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.
II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.
III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF

THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF
FINAL JUDGMENTS.
IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD
BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST
SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.
Ruling
Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of
merit.
I.
Procedural Issues
With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the
petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution,
claiming that the decision herein had long become final and executory. They state that the Court
thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of res judicata and immutability of final
judgments.
The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009
Resolution denying the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the November 18,
2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment
on May 21, 2009.
The Court disagrees with the petitioners.
In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for
lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of
31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a
prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20
April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas,
et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. No further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, Renato C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P.
Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part.
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.1
Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To
Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents’ "Motion for
Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit
Attached ‘Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a determination of
the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for reconsideration by an
equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate opinion of
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.2
Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009
Resolution, viz:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule
52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final
and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted
by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a
case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the
required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.3
As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several
pleadings and documents, including respondents’ Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009
etc.
The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009,
asseverating that their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion
for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009
Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondents’ Second Motion For Reconsideration.
They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14,
2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus,
the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to a
tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.
As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.
The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners’
‘Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge’", together with the Reply.
On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam With
Motion to Expunge, to grant the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents’ Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge.
On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.
and voting anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a
majority, promulgated its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional,5 disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to
Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the
March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws,
namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the
December 21, 2009 Decision.6 On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul
Decision of 21 December 2009.7
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the
petitioners.8
On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed
their separate Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.9 Similar
manifestations with supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-
intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on February 15, 2010;10 City of Batangas on February 17,
2010;11 and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010.12 The Court required the adverse parties to
comment on the motions.13 As directed, the respondents complied.
On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.14
On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010.15 They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion
to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.16 On
November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010"].17 On November 30, 2010,18 the Court noted, among others, the
petitioners’ Opposition.
On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents’ Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration
of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.
Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents’
Second Motion For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Court’s voting and
acting on it having the effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the
respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the
expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within
the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution), the Court opted to act on the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse parties through its
September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court,
by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.
Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court:
(a) rendered ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn;
(b), re-opened the Decision of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c)
lifted the directive that no further pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and
acted on the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter,
the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents’ Second Motion for Reconsideration and
ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws
valid and constitutional).
It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the
November 18, 2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To
be sure, the Reflections were the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations
of the Court. The reference in the December 21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that
there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within
15 days from its receipt,20pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the
Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the
issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional
infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the
November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011
Resolution, reversing and setting aside the August 24, 2010 Resolution.
It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in
accordance with the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity
attending or tainting the proceedings.
It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary
circumstances from the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.23
On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it
to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the
16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of
immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the
doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this
case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.
II.
Substantive Issues
The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of
Article X of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just
share in the national taxes.
The Court differs.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with
respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of ₱20 million under the Local
Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the ₱100 million under the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel
during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the
fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills
during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,24 including
the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in
session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator
Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending
deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.
R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during
the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution
to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29.
Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the
Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to
Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:
MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities
from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated
revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central government as
required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate
to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they
want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the
Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local
Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of municipalities into cities
unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore wants to
shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate
rather than do it itself.
That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution
that would qualify the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income
alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into
cities. However, income is not only the requirement for municipalities to become cities. There are
also the requirements on population and land area.
In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want
converted into cities piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the
other requirements when the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this
is a most unusual manner of creating cities.
My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do
regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of
the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the
requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them do their thing.
Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the reasons why the
municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed
what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills
creating cities.
In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the
matter of converting municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do
under the joint resolution.
In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being
undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am
saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let
them do that. But they should do it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if
they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate
as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.
Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had
they followed the recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be
covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would, by now – if not all, at least some – have been
converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the delay in the
approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned.
Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for
the Senate to request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code
which has been respected all through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law
and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into
cities.26
Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of
Representatives, and were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives.27 The bills, when forwarded
to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate.28 The acts of both Chambers of
Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were
amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.
The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of ₱100 million from locally
generated sources is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several
municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into
cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A.
No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmariñas in Cavite (R.A. No. 9723), and Biñan in Laguna (R.A. No.
9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of ₱100 million
from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in
Cavite.
The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.
As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of
2006 to post an average annual income of ₱100 million based on the figures contained in the
certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of
existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the ₱100 million threshold income
five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the
petitioners to claim that the ₱100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.
In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:
Senator Osmeña III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be
converted into a city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that
once converted into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it
would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a
municipality. So more or less three times or more.
Senator Osmeña III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share
from the internal revenue allocations?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic
Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a
municipality—what a municipality would earn—and a city? Because essentially, to a person’s mind,
even with this new requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million
and has a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it
would not qualify as a city.
Senator Pimentel. Yes.
Senator Osmeña III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?
Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that
we can very well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should,
as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial
requirement.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentleman’s "and", but perhaps
we should bring down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less
than 10,000 hectares—100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000
hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already earning
P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000 would not be
qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San
Juan is a specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100
square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000.
But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?
Senator Osmeña III. Because of the income.
Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger
here, if we become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have
more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city
compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever.
Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the
word "or" so that if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in
terms of population and income, that would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the
distinguished gentleman is considering several amendments to the Local Government Code.
Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a later time, with his permission.
So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.29
The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated
the threshold income of ₱100 million from local sources, including those already converted into
cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the
Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from
Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to
prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung
areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in
the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have
nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result
should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local
government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger
share in the national coffers than other local government units.
There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws
belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other
natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the Senate to
sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,30 viz:
It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in
terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class
municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005.
Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial
capitals.
The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this
time, indicate their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.
Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces.
Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among
all the municipalities in their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and
Lamitan are number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they
pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also among the frontrunners in their regions –
Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions VIII, XIII, and CAR,
respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo,
number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII,
respectively. This simply shows that these municipalities are viable.
Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its
member cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion
at the time of their creation.
The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income
requirement of ₱20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government
facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population of a component city. We also
stressed that the increased income requirement of ₱100 million was not the only conclusive indicator
for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. These observations were
unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League of Cities
that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the ₱100
million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources under R.A.
No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of ₱100 million, no
research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into
account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the
passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While the Constitution
mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the
LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to
the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national
growth.
Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are
espousing, we may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities
cited by the petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for
being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively
converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading
of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the requirements imposed by the
LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income
requirement of ₱50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of ₱100
million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set
forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.—It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San
Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite
by the qualified voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not
qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the
required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a
component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No.
2157.
The petitioners’ contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national
taxes is not acceptable.
In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage
under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%,
determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share
is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases,
then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation
by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every
newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received
may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section
285 and Section 286 of the LGC.
As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not
violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in
the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their
respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to
share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will
have to share with only around 120 cities.
Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA
to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great
potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their
potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from
the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near
Metro Manila.
III.
Conclusion
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only
had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably
gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should
do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February
2011) is denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
G.R. No. 182403 March 9, 2010
ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT, ERLINDA P. CUDIAMAT1 and CORAZON D.

CUDIAMAT,Petitioners,
vs.
BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, NASUGBU,
BATANGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-owners of a 320
square meter parcel of land (the property) in Balayan, Batangas, covered by TCT No. T-37889 of the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas. Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his wife,
entrusted the custody of the title to who was residing in Balayan.
In 1979, Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto, obtained a loan from respondent
Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto
mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
purportedly executed by Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife-herein co-petitioner Erlinda
Cudiamat.
On June 19, 1991, Restituto was informed, via letter2 dated June 7, 1991 from the bank, that the
property was foreclosed. He thus, by letter3dated June 25, 1991, informed the bank that he had no
participation in the execution of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the purpose.
In the meantime, Perfecto died in 1990. In 1998, as Perfecto’s widow petitioner Corazon was being
evicted from the property, she and her co-petitioner-spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed on August 9,
1999 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a complaint4 "for quieting of title with
damages" against the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, docketed as Civil Case No.
3618, assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of
the property.
In its Answer to the complaint, the bank, maintaining the validity of the mortgage, alleged that it had
in fact secured a title in its name, TCT No. T-48405, after Perfecto failed to redeem the mortgage;
that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been placed under
receivership and under liquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC); that
PDIC filed before the RTC of Nasugbu a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the bank which
was docketed as SP No. 576; and that jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it is lodged
with the liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu.
By Decision of January 17, 2006,5 Branch 9 of the Balayan RTC rendered judgment, in the complaint
for quieting of title, in favor of the plaintiffs-herein petitioners. It ordered respondent Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu to cancel the encumbrance annotated on TCT No. T-37889, and to cancel TCT
No. T-48405 issued in the name of the bank and reinstate the former title. It also directed the bank to
return the property to petitioner spouses Restituto and Erlinda and to pay ₱20,000 to all the
petitioners to defray the costs of suit.
The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending, inter alia, that the Balayan RTC had no
jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint for quieting of title.
By the assailed Decision of December 21, 2007,6the appellate court, ruling in favor of the bank,
dismissed petitioners’ complaint for quieting of title, without prejudice to the right of petitioners to
take up their claims with the Nasugbu RTC sitting as a liquidation court.
To the appellate court, the Balayan RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, should have deferred to
the Nasugbu RTC which sits as a liquidation court, given that the bank was already under
receivership when petitioners filed the complaint for quieting of title.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of
March 27, 2008, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari. 1avv phi1
Assailing the appellate court’s ruling that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over their complaint,
petitioners argue that their complaint was filed earlier than PDIC’s petition for assistance in the
liquidation; and that the bank is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC
because it actively participated in the proceedings thereat.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC.
In Lozon v. NLRC,7 the Court came up with a clear rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and
when it does not:
The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower
court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of
the parties or by estoppel." However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position –
that the lower court had jurisdiction… (underscoring supplied)
The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin.8
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over
the complaint for quieting of title filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a
liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May 25, 2000, when
PDIC’s petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course.
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is
not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and
relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which
had, in fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (about two years before the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.
The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,9held that as a general rule, if there is a judicial
liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation
proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela, however, after considering the circumstances attendant to the
case, held that the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to refile or
relitigate its case before the litigation court would be "an exercise in futility." Among the
circumstances the Court considered in that case is the fact that the claimants were poor and the
disputed parcel of land was their only property, and the parties’ claims and defenses were properly
ventilated in and considered by the judicial court.
In the present case, the Court finds that analogous considerations exist to warrant the application of
Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in this Court, and
his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died10 during the pendency of the case. And, except for co-petitioner
Corazon, Restituto is a resident of Ozamis City. To compel him to appear and relitigate the case in
the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC when the issues to be raised before it are the same as those
already exhaustively passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC would be superfluous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated
March 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 17, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated
jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which
affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas2 in LRC Case No. N-
98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation’s
(Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have
been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision
before filing this Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the
entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an
area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997.4On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the
MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.7
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default8 and commenced with the reception of
evidence.9 Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,11 and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable
zone.12 Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.13
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge
therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on
appeal.15 The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s
registrable title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest
even before the outbreak of World War II.16
Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE

APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.17
The Court’s Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.19 It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.20Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised
for the first time on appeal.21
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional]
question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting
to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
him"22 is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated
by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.23 In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after
receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question
the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by
laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on
appeal. In Figueroa v. People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the
general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in
the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here,
petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still
with the RTC.25 At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the
MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the
MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal,
petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.26 Clearly, the exceptional doctrine
of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."27In this case, petitioner
Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that
it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a)
the period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be
registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because
the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the
Property Registration Decree.28
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a
day after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial
hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was
beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,31petitioner Republic therein contended that there was
failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125
days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled
that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the
date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a
land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of
his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish
an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.32
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997,33 within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the
jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the
filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration
Decree.34
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days
from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did
not affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the
subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only
by the Constitution or the law.35 It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot
assume that the law deliberately meant the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a
dead letter."36 However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In
fact, the RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration,37 except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set
beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondent’s application for original registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the
MTC’s delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value
of which should not exceed ₱100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth
in the Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporation’s application for registration on 8 January 1998.41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this
case does not exceed ₱100,000.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to
its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third,
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.42
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the
records are bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the
property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From
the records, we find that the assessed value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident
that the total value of the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may
exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the
lower court erred in granting respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the
absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.44 The applicant
for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by
establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government.45 We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered.46 The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.47
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.49
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application.50 Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.
1âwphi1
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be
granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable
based on a positive act of the government, the application should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove
that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160604 March 28, 2008
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, ISAGANI YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, PERGENITO

B. BANDAYREL, JR., GOBLETH C. MOULIC, ESTANISLAO CALDEZ, and ZENAIDA
CALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, BRANCH 5, and LUZ CORTEZ
BABARAN,Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the review, setting aside, and annulment of the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79702 dated October 22, 2003
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners.
The antecedents are as follows:
The Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), in its August 1, 2000 issue, published an article with the heading
"After Bong, who’s next?"2 The article narrates the death of Expedito "Bong" Caldez, a photo
correspondent of the PDI in Cagayan. In said article, the family of the deceased correspondent
laments the death of their loved one due to the alleged erroneous diagnosis of Dr. Luz Babaran.3
Later, in its September 29, 2000 issue, the PDI published another article with the heading "DOH
orders probe of fotog’s death."4 In said article, it was reported that the regional Department of Health
(DOH) in Tuguegarao City has started investigating the death of Expedito Caldez following an order
from the DOH’s Bureau of Licensing and Regulation.
On July 25, 2001, based on the two PDI column articles, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for
Damages,5 Civil Case No. 5850, against herein petitioners. In said complaint Dr. Babaran alleged,
among other things, that: after learning about the article published in the August 1, 2000 issue of the
PDI, she wrote a letter to the editor of the PDI but she never received any response from the latter;
to aggravate the matter, another article appeared in the September 29, 2000 issue of the PDI and
she was again singled out as having erroneously diagnosed the illness of Expedito Caldez; the
Report6 of the DOH Fact-Finding Committee concluding that her diagnosis cannot be considered
erroneous, was suppressed and was never published by the PDI; the articles portrayed her as
incompetent and one whose alleged erroneous diagnosis caused the death of Expedito Caldez; and,
in causing the articles to be published, petitioners acted in bad faith.
On September 13, 2001, petitioners filed their Answer7 with counterclaims. In said answer,
petitioners raised, among others, the following defenses: that the complaint states no cause of action
against them; that the complaint fails and omits to state the factual premises to support a conclusion
that there was malice on the part of the PDI in publishing the questioned news report; that private
respondent failed to allege "actual malice" on the part of the petitioners; that a case for actionable
libel with claims for damages has not been adequately stated in the complaint; and, that the
complaint fails to establish the basis of petitioners’ liability.8
Pre-trial was held and terminated, and petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for a Preliminary Hearing
on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer (which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss).9 In
said motion, it was alleged that at the pre-trial on February 19, 2003, the court noted that one of the
defenses raised by petitioners was that private respondent has not delineated the participation of
each of petitioners in the publication of the alleged libelous articles.10 Thereupon, private
respondent’s counsel asked for a few days to determine whether the complaint should be amended
to cure its defects. However, private respondent had not moved to amend the complaint, hence,
petitioners filed the motion.11
In support thereof, petitioners contend that: in libel charges, the participation of each defendant must
be specifically alleged in the complaint, which private respondent failed to do; and the allegations of
the complaint are mere conclusions of law and opinions of the private respondent.12 Petitioners
ultimately prayed that a preliminary hearing be conducted on their affirmative defense that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action; and that, thereafter, the complaint be dismissed.13
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Based on

Affirmative Defense.14 In said comment/opposition, private respondent averred that at the February
19, 2003 pre-trial, the issue of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action was not raised.
As such, it is no longer an issue to be litigated in the case. Private respondent prayed that the court
deny petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
On May 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order15 denying petitioners’ motion in
this wise:
With this finding and conclusion, the Court finds no further necessity in dwelling at length on the
other issues raised by the defendants. Consequently, the motion for a Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer (which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss) is hereby
DENIED. The initial presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set on July 3, 2003, at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.16
The RTC opined that private respondent’s allegations in her complaint, as well as her documentary
evidence, show that there is sufficient cause of action. It added that the documentary evidence
discloses facts which are sufficient to enable the court to go beyond the disclosures in the complaint.
Considering that the facts alleged in the complaint which make out the principal cause of action and
relief are sufficient, the case should not be dismissed.17
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18but it was denied in the Order19 dated July 29, 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)20 with the CA, relying on the ground that:
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE ITS FAILURE TO VALIDLY AND
SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL AGAINST THE PETITIONERS
BECAUSE:
A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING,

EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF THE NEWS ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS
NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT;
B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND NOT STATEMENTS
OF ULTIMATE FACTS.21
Petitioners prayed among others: that the Orders of the RTC dated May 30, 2003 and July 29, 2003
be annulled and set aside for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of
jurisdiction; and that Civil Case No. 5850 be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.22
On October 22, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution23 dismissing the petition for being insufficient in
form and substance and for presenting no justiciable issue needing serious consideration by the
court. Also, the CA noted that the Order dated May 30, 2003 shows that the RTC had already ruled
against petitioners’ affirmative defense that the complaint states no cause of action.
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT WHICH FAILS TO VALIDLY AND SUFFICIENTLY STATE A

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL BECAUSE:
A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING,

EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF THE NEWS ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS
NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT;
B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY LEGAL

CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND NOT STATEMENTS
OF ULTIMATE FACTS; AND
C) THE COMPLAINT IS VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO

FREE PRESS AND TO FREE SPEECH.
SHOULD BE DISMISSED UPON MOTION BY THE DEFENDANTS (PETITIONERS HEREIN). 24
Petitioners argue that private respondent’s complaint failed to comply with the requirement in libel
cases that the participation of each defendant must be specifically alleged in the complaint.
Petitioners maintain that their divergent personal circumstances and different legal existence, not to
mention the absence of any professional relationship of two of petitioners with the rest of them,
should have prompted private respondent to specify the participation of each petitioner in the news
gathering, reporting, editing, publication, and circulation of the subject articles. As such it cannot be
determined with certainty from the allegations in the complaint whose acts and omissions are
actually complained of.25
Also, petitioners added that the material allegations of the complaint are not statements of ultimate
facts but were mere conclusions of law and were merely private respondent’s opinions.26
Finally, petitioners contend that the complaint violates their constitutionally protected freedom of
speech and of the press.27
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. In relation to a complaint, it is a formal statement of the
operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a
cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus,
it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. As such, the failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint
warrants its dismissal.28 Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Of the three, the most important is the last element since it is only upon the occurrence of the last
element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.29 In determining whether an initiatory pleading
states a cause of action, "the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the
material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde
are not considered. The court may however consider, in addition to the complaint, the appended
annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.30
When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss, the sufficiency
of the motion should be tested on the strength of the allegations of facts contained in the complaint
and on no other basis.31 The issue of whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action,
warranting its dismissal, must be passed upon on the basis of the allegations stated therein
assuming them to be true and the court cannot inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare
them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the
plaintiff.32
This Court finds that petitioners raised the threshold question of whether the complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action. 1avv phi 1
Hence, the trial court should have granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses raised in the answer based on failure to state a cause of action. This procedure
is designed to prevent a tedious, if not traumatic, trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently
alleging a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 22,
2003 is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, Branch 5, for the trial court to hear and resolve petitioners’ Affirmative Defenses Raised in
the Answer.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for
review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a
relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s
certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August
1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support
and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September
3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the
Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his
opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be
furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the
State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by
publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject
matter.4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is
adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.5Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because
petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s
father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued an
Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there
are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these
four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court
observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she
had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent;
and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was
treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The
dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing
to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the
RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the court’s
previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing
on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the
petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum
shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The
court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioner’s personal
knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is
no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing,
whether at the court’s instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter
in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of
Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was
named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case,
which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The
assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondent’s special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking
a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that
a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case,
thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant
to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to
legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case
if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition
cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of
corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote
harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an
absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish
prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed
order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do
members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or
even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass
them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-
just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute
and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities
for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of
merit.16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE

ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY

RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS
CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE

DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED

THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES
PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED

RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE ‘FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A

TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.’17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the court’s lack
of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because
issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative
relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex
Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition.
Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to
summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does
not state respondent’s name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known
address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of
the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt
as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.18 Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of
filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four
significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner
avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because they
are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CA’s ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in
relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he
waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He avers
that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent’s
motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that
the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is
a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of
a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the
denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether
the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right
to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
question depends on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person
as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem.22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested parties are
deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but proper
in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that
the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the
due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has
participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we
further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead
respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petition—classified as an action in rem—the notice
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition
and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to
respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
they were not of petitioner’s personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has
just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative
proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we find that there
is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA
testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite
elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public."35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or
a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a
prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding
of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained —
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.37
1avv phi 1
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 143188 February 14, 2007
FLORENTINO PINEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA, represented by ERNESTO E. GUEVARA and ISAGANI S.
GUEVARA, namely: ELISEO GUEVARA, JR., ZENAIDA G. SAPALICIO, DANTE G. GUEVARA,
DANILO C. GUEVARA, and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the
Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074. The Decision reversed
the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 273, Marikina, and directed the
court a quo to conduct trial on the merits, while the Resolution denied petitioner Pineda’s motion for
reconsideration.
As borne out by the records, the following are the factual antecedents.
On 7 September 1995, respondents Eliseo Guevara, Jr., Zenaida G. Sapalicio, Dante G. Guevara
and Isagani S. Guevara, collectively referred hereinafter as the Guevara heirs, filed an action for the
nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of land measuring approximately 2,304 hectares
situated in Marikina.
Named defendants were the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez, Jose
Perez, Roy Guadalupe, Lino Bucad and Florentino Pineda. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-171-MK, was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina.
The Guevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the co-owners of a property originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 386 issued on 7 December 1910 in favor of the
spouses Emiliano Guevara and Matilde Crimen. The couple’s son, and the Guevara heirs’
predecessor-in-interest, Eliseo Guevara, allegedly purchased the property on 1 January 1932 and
had exercised ownership over the property since then by selling and donating portions thereof to
third persons. The Guevara heirs averred that the sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was
annotated at the back of OCT No. 386.
According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a
certain portion of the property, particularly that area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 223361 issued to the estate of Pedro C. Gonzales. TCT No. 223361 was derived from OCT No.
629, which the Guevara heirs described as fake, having been issued only on 26 January 1912 or
subsequent to the issuance of OCT No. 386. Hence, the Guevara heirs prayed that OCT No. 629
and its derivative titles, to wit, TCT Nos. 223361, 244447, 244448, 244449 be cancelled, that the
Guevara heirs be declared owners of the property and that a new certificate of title be issued in their
names.
Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action,
prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in
actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. He
registered the property in his name and was issued TCT No. 257272.
Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos Perez, purchased the property from the late
Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perez’s name for taxation purposes. According to them, they
had been in actual possession of a lot measuring 375 square meters before 1958 and had been
regularly paying the property taxes thereon.
The rest of the defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answer with
counterclaim, raising the same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. They claimed
that OCT No. 629 was issued to the Municipality of Marikina in 1912 and that the late Pedro
Gonzales and his family started occupying the property as early as 1950 as lessees thereon. The
late Pedro Gonzales allegedly bought the property from the Municipality of Marikina in a public
bidding on 25 April 1966 and had allowed defendants to occupy the property. They asserted that the
Guevara heirs never actually occupied the property.
On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
During the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were directed to file their memoranda.
After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action
on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal, claiming the denial of
their right to due process.
On 23 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, which set aside the
RTC’s order of dismissal and directed the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 95-171-MK. The appellate
court ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule
16, Section 12 of the Rules of Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds
enumerated under said provision. Although the RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other
affirmative defenses raised by petitioners in the answer, such as lack of cause of action, prescription
and res judicata, the Court of Appeals discussed them and ruled that none of these affirmative
defenses raised were present to warrant the dismissal of the action.
Only Pineda sought reconsideration. In its 3 May 2000 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Pineda’s motion. Hence, the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL

OF RESPONDENTS WHICH RAISED ONLY PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW; AND,
THEREFORE, IT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN HEARING AND DECIDING
THE SAID APPEALED CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE

DEFENSE OF LACHES AS ANALOGOUS TO PRESCRIPTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S

DISMISSAL OF THE RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT IS ERRONEOUS FOR THE
REASON THAT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES IS NOT AMONG THE
GROUNDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THE RULES, WHICH MAY BE
ALLEGED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BE PROVED DURING THE TRIAL.
AS A COROLLARY TO THE THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR ABOVE, THE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF
RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, TO AVOID PROTRACTED LITIGATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT WHILE
PRESCRIPTION IN DEROGATION OF THE TITLE TO REGISTERED OWNERS
WILL NOT LIE, LACHES WILL.3
Counsel for the estate of Pedro Gonzales filed a Comment/Manifestation,4 stating that her clients
have adopted and joined Pineda’s petition praying for the reinstatement of the trial court’s order of
dismissal.
At bottom, the petition raises two main issues, to wit: (1) whether or not the appeal of the heirs of
Guevara was improperly elevated to the Court of Appeals since, according to them, it raised a pure
question of law; and (2) whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of
laches without conducting trial on the merits.
Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of Appeals the objection on the
improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs of Guevara. This, he failed to do. The issue of improper
appeal was raised only in Pineda’s motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this issue. For an issue cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.5 In any case, the appeal by the heirs of Guevara also raised
the issue regarding the existence of laches on the part of petitioners as defendants, which is factual
in nature as discussed below.
Now, did the trial court correctly order the dismissal of the complaint based on laches without
conducting trial on the merits? The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that under Rule 16, Section
16 of the Rules of Court, laches is not enumerated under said provision, hence, it must be proved
during trial. On the other hand, petitioner Pineda asserts that laches is analogous to prescription
and, therefore, can be a ground of dismissing a complaint as though a motion to dismiss is filed.
Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary
in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of laches is premature.7 Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein
both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.8
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred.9
Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by
the trial court. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.10 Laches is not concerned with
the mere lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim
in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.11 Without prejudging the instant case, an
apparent delay in the enforcement of one’s claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party
charged with negligence or omission in invoking his right must be afforded the opportunity to raise
his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a contentious proceeding.
In reversing the RTC’s order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches could not be a
ground to dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1."12 This is not
entirely correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in
a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words "abandoned"
and "otherwise extinguished" to the phrase "claim or demand deemed set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading" is broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches. However, when a
party moves for the dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial court must set a hearing on
the motion where the parties shall submit not only their arguments on the questions of law but
also their evidence on the questions of fact involved.13 Thus, being factual in nature, the elements of
laches must be proved or disproved through the presentation of evidence by the parties. As
discussed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as shown in a pleading does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches.
In the case at bar, while the trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to
dismiss had been filed, the records do not reveal that it extended to the parties the opportunity to
present evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevara filed and served written
interrogatories14 on one of the defendants but the trial court held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion to order the defendant to submit answers to the written interrogatories.15 The trial court
likewise denied the Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs of Guevara.16These were the
instances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence on which to anchor its factual
findings. Although the trial court heard oral arguments and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda, the presentation of evidence on the defenses which are grounds for a
motion to dismiss was not held at all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted by
the parties would have enabled this Court to review the trial court’s factual finding of laches instead
of remanding the case for trial on the merits. A perusal of the records precludes this Court from
making a categorical declaration on whether the heirs of Guevara were guilty of laches.
Neither does the affirmative defense of prescription alleged in an answer automatically warrant the
dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a
motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed.17Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.18Pineda’s theory
that the defense of laches should be treated as an affirmative defense of prescription warranting the
dismissal of the complaint is erroneous. 1awphi1.net
There is also no basis in procedural law to treat the RTC’s order of dismissal as a summary
judgment. The trial court cannot motu propriodecide that summary judgment on an action is in order.
Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be,
must invoke the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion.19 The adverse party must be notified
of the motion for summary judgment20 and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions before hearing is conducted.21 More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.22
Based on the parties’ allegations in the complaint and answer, the issues in the case at bar are far
from settled. For instance, both petitioner and respondents claim their ownership rights over the
same property based on two different original certificates of title. Respondents charge petitioner of
illegal occupation while the latter invokes good faith in the acquisition of the property. Clearly, these
are factual matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court,
especially when what are involved appear to be sizeable parcels of land covered by two certificates
of title.
Except for Pineda, the other defendants did not elevate the Court of Appeals’ Decision to this Court.
With respect to them, the appellate court’s Decision has already become final and conclusive,
notwithstanding their adoption23 of Pineda’s petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54074 are AFFIRMED. Let the records of the
case be remanded for further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, which is
hereby ORDERED to try and decide the case with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161030 September 14, 2011
JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO

FERNANDO TANGKENCGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS FERNANDO, represented by ALFREDO V.
FERNANDO, HEIRS OF GUILLERMO FERNANDO, represented by Ronnie H. Fernando, HEIRS
OF ILUMINADA FERNANDO, represented by Benjamin Estrella and HEIRS OF GERMOGENA
FERNANDO, Petitioners,
vs.
LEON ACUNA, HERMOGENES FERNANDO, HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANTONIO FERNANDO AND
FELISA CAMACHO, represented by HERMOGENES FERNANDO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75773, entitled "Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.," which
reversed and set aside the Decision2 dated May 16, 2002 of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 256-M-97.
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
RO-487 (997)3 registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A.
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died
intestate, the property remained undivided. Petitioners herein – namely, Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo
Fernando, Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, the heirs of Tomas Fernando,
the heirs of Guillermo Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada Fernando and the heirs of Germogena
Fernando – are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However,
petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after
compulsory conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.
Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint4 for partition on
April 17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among
others, that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late
spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe
Galvez. They further claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without
instructions as to the disposition of the property left by them covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997).
There being no settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish
to build up their homes or set up their business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them.
In sum, they prayed that the subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding to
the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.
In their Answer5 filed on May 20, 1997, defendants essentially admitted all of the allegations in the
complaint. They alleged further that they are not opposing the partition and even offered to share in
the expenses that will be incurred in the course of the proceedings.
In his Complaint in Intervention6 filed on January 12, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred
that in the Decision7 dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the
portion of the property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando,
married to Felisa Camacho; (b) spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses Ignacio de
la Cruz and Salud Wisco; and (d) Jose Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest. He likewise claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the
portion identified as Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.
Respondent Acuna further alleged that Salud Wisco, through her authorized attorney-in-fact,
Amador W. Cruz, sold her lawful share denominated as Lot 1303-D with an area of 3,818 square
meters to Simeon P. Cunanan,8who in turn sold the same piece of land to him as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale.9 He also belied petitioners’ assertion that the subject property has not been settled by
the parties after the death of the original owners in view of the Decision10 dated July 30, 1980 of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baliuag, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 80-389 which ordered the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificates of title to the claimants of the
portion of the subject property designated as Lot 1302.11 Norma Fernando, one of the petitioners in
the instant case, even testified in LRC Case No. 80-389. According to respondent Acuna, this
circumstance betrayed bad faith on the part of petitioners in filing the present case for partition.
Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot prosper since the heirs of the
original owners of the subject property, namely Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo,
Leopoldo, Hermogena, Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly
had already sold their respective one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject property to Ruperta Sto.
Domingo Villasenor for the amount of ₱35,000.00 on January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a
"Kasulatan sa Bilihang Patuluyan."12 He added that he was in possession of the original copy of OCT
No. RO-487 (997) and that he had not commenced the issuance of new titles to the subdivided lots
because he was waiting for the owners of the other portions of the subject property to bear their
respective shares in the cost of titling.
Subsequently, a Motion for Intervention13 was filed on June 23, 1998 by respondent Hermogenes
Fernando (Hermogenes), for himself and on behalf of the heirs of the late spouses, Antonio A.
Fernando and Felisa Camacho. According to him, in the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of
Bulacan, their predecessors-in-interest had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A, 1302-F,
1302-G,14 1302-H and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and any adverse distribution of the
properties would cause respondents damage and prejudice. He would also later claim, in his
Answer-in-Intervention,15 that the instant case is already barred by res judicata and, should be
dismissed.
In the interest of substantial justice, the trial court allowed the respondents to intervene in the case.
The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted for judgment on the
pleadings on May 7, 1999.16 However, the trial court denied said motion in a Resolution17 dated
August 23, 1999 primarily due to the question regarding the ownership of the property to be
partitioned, in light of the intervention of respondents Acuna and Hermogenes who were claiming
legal right thereto.
In their Manifestation18 filed on April 12, 2000, petitioners affirmed their execution of a Deed of Sale
in favor of Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor in 1978, wherein they sold to her 1,000 square meters
from Lot 1303 for the sum of ₱ 35,000.00.
After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon
testified that they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997)
but only the area referred to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also admitted that Lot 1302 had
already been divided into ten (10) sublots and allocated to various owners pursuant to the July 30,
1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan and these owners already have their own titles. She
likewise claimed that the entire area consisting of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan is based on the
subdivision plan of Lot 1303. She admitted that plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest was only allocated
a portion of Lot 1303 based on the said plan. However, she claimed that the November 29, 1929
Decision subdividing Lot 1303 was never implemented nor executed by the parties.19
Petitioner Norma Fernando testified on October 3, 2000 that she is one of the children of Jose A.
Fernando and Lucila Tinio. She affirmed that plaintiffs were only claiming Lot 1303 and Sapang
Bayan. She also testified that Sapang Bayan was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was
previously a river until it dried up. Unlike Lot 1302, the rest of the property was purportedly not
distributed. She likewise averred that she is aware of a November 29, 1929 Decision concerning the
distribution of Lot 1303 issued by the cadastral court but insisted that the basis of the claims of the
petitioners over Lot 1303 is the title in the name of her ascendants and not said Decision.20
On November 16, 2000, as previously directed by the trial court and agreed to by the parties,
counsel for respondent Hermogenes prepared and submitted an English translation of the November
29, 1929 Decision. The same was admitted and marked in evidence as Exhibit "X"21 as a common
exhibit of the parties. The petitioners also presented Alfredo Borja, the Geodetic Engineer who
conducted a relocation survey of the subject property.
After plaintiffs rested their case, respondent Hermogenes testified on December 7, 2000. In his
testimony, he claimed to know the plaintiffs and defendants as they were allegedly his relatives and
neighbors. He confirmed that according to the November 29, 1929 Decision, portions of Lot 1303
was designated as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C and 1303-D which were adjudicated to certain
persons, including Jose Fernando, while the rest of Lot 1303 was adjudicated to his parents, Antonio
A. Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. According to respondent Hermogenes, his family’s tenant
and the latter’s children occupied the portion of Lot 1303 allotted to his (Hermogenes) parents while
the rest of Lot 1303 was occupied by the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision.
He admitted, however, that nobody among the purported possessors of Lot 1303 registered the lots
assigned to them in the Decision.22
On January 18, 2001, respondent Hermogenes presented a witness, Engineer Camilo Vergara who
testified that the subject land is divided into Lots 1302 and 1303 with a creek dividing the two lots
known as Sapang Bayan. He also identified a Sketch Plan numbered as PSD-45657 and approved
on November 11, 1955.23During the hearing on January 30, 2001, respondent Hermogenes made an
oral offer of his evidence and rested his case. On the same date, respondent Acuna, in lieu of his
testimony, offered for the parties to simply stipulate on the due execution and authenticity of the
Deeds of Sale dated April 6, 1979 and December 28, 1980, showing the transfer of Lot 1303-D from
Salud Wisco to Simeon Cunanan and subsequently to respondent Acuna. When counsel for
plaintiffs and defendants agreed to the stipulation, albeit objecting to the purpose for which the
deeds of sale were offered, the trial court admitted Acuna’s exhibits and Acuna rested his case.24
On February 15, 2001, plaintiffs recalled Norma Fernando as a rebuttal witness. In her rebuttal
testimony, she identified the tax declaration25over the said property in the name of Jose A. Fernando;
an official receipt26 dated October 3, 1997 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of
Baliuag, Bulacan for payment of real property taxes from 1991 to 1997; and a real property tax
clearance27 dated October 6, 1997, to show that plaintiffs have allegedly been paying the real
property taxes on the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). However, she further
testified that they were now willing to pay taxes only over the portion with an area of 44,234 square
meters, which is included in their claim.28
In a Decision dated May 16, 2002, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs and defendants (petitioners
herein) were indeed the descendants and successors-in-interest of the registered owners, Jose A.
Fernando (married to Lucila Tinio) and Antonia Fernando (married to Felipe Galvez), of the property
covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). After finding that the parties admitted that Lot 1302 was already
distributed and titled in the names of third persons per the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of
Baliuag, Bulacan the trial court proceeded to rule on the allocation of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.
With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral
Court, adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando’s share to Lot 1303-C,
was never implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said
decision has already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered the reversion
of Lot 1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A.
Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303
among petitioners as successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition,
however, were the portions of the property which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to
Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor and respondent Acuna.
As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the same had not been alleged in
the pleadings nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court,
the parties failed to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot
1302 or Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or
that it was an accretion which the adjoining lots gradually received from the effects of the current of
water. It was likewise not established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The
trial court concluded that none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently established their claims over
Sapang Bayan.
The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the reversion of
Lot 1303, except the portions allotted to Acuna and Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor, to the
ownership of Jose Fernando and Lucia Tinio and Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT
No. 997 and thereafter allowing the partition of said Lot 1303 among the plaintiffs and the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Jose and Lucia as well as Antonia and Felipe after the
settlement of any inheritance tax, fees, dues and/or obligation chargeable against their estate.29
All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this case to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed November 24, 2003 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 16, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 256-M-97, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint dated April 17, 1997 filed by plaintiffs-appellants is
dismissed. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.30
Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our review through the
instant petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:
1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan portion of the piece of
land covered by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the
descendants and heirs of the late spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez;
2. Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original
certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.31
The petition is without merit.
Petitioners based their claims to the disputed areas designated as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan on
their ascendants’ title, OCT No. RO-487 (997), which was issued on February 26, 1927 in the name
of Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio and Antonia A. Fernando married to Felipe Galvez. The
Court now rules on these claims in seriatim.
Petitioners’ claim with respect to Lot 1303
As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan
(in Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was written in Spanish, Lot 1303
had already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses
Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho;
spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from
whom respondent Acuna derived his title. The English translation of the said November 29, 1929
Decision was provided by respondent Hermogenes and was adopted by all the parties as a common
exhibit designated as Exhibit "X." The agreed English translation of said Decision reads:
Lot No. 1303 – This lot is decreed in record No. 448, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25414 and actually with
Original Certificate No. 997 (exhibited today) in the name of Jose A. Fernando and Antonia A.
Fernando, who now pray that said lot be subdivided in accordance with the answers recorded in the
instant cadastral record, and the sketch, Exh. "A", which is attached to the records.
A part or portion of the lot has been claimed by Antonio A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felisa
Camacho; another portion by the spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; another portion by
Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felipe Galvez; another portion by Jose A. Fernando, of
legal age, married to Lucila Tinio; and another portion by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud
Wisco, both of legal age. The part claimed by the spouses Jose A. Martinez and Gregoria Sison is
Lot 1303-A of Exh. A; the part claimed by Antonia A. Fernando is Lot 1303-B of said exhibit; the part
claimed by Jose A. Fernando is Lot 1303-C of said exhibit, and the part claimed by the spouses
Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco is Lot 1303-D of the aforementioned Exhibit.
The subdivision of said lot is hereby ordered, separating from the same the portions that correspond
to each of the claimants, which portions are known as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C, and 1303-D in
the sketch, Exh. "A", and once subdivided, are adjudicated in favor of the spouses, Jose Martinez
and Gregoria Sison, of legal age, Lot No. 1303-A, in favor of Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age,
married to Felipe Galvez, Lot No. 1303-B; in favor of Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to
Lucila Tinio, Lot 1303-C; in favor of the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, of legal age,
Lot 1303-D; and the rest of Lot 1303 is adjudged in favor of Antonio A. Fernando married to Felisa
Camacho. It is likewise ordered that once the subdivision plan is approved, the same be forwarded
by the Director of Lands to this Court for its final decision.
It is ordered that the expense for mentioned subdivision, shall be for the account of the spouses
Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison, Antonia A. Fernando, Jose A. Fernando, the spouses Ignacio de
la Cruz and Salud Wisco, and Antonio A. Fernando.32
From the foregoing, it would appear that petitioners’ ascendants themselves petitioned for the
cadastral court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were only allocated
Lots 1303-B and 1303-C. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never
fully implemented in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots
assigned to them without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral court which
would have led to the titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the
persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently, their heirs and assigns
have since been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their respective lots for more than
seventy (70) years until the filing of the suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by petitioners which is the
subject matter of this case. Respondent Hermogenes, who testified that petitioners were his relatives
and neighbors, further affirmed before the trial court that the persons named in the November 29,
1929 Decision took possession of their respective lots:
ATTY. VENERACION:
Q – This Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio, you testified earlier are the parents of the
plaintiffs. Did they take possession of lot 1303-C?
A – Yes, sir. They took possession.
Q – Did they take possession of the other lots?
A – No. Yes, the portion…
Q – The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they take possession of that?
A – Yes, they took took possession of the other… No, sir.
Q – I am asking you whether they took possession, the children…
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
The questions are already answered, your Honor.
ATTY. VENERACION:
What is the answer?
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
It’s in the record.
COURT:
The persons named in the Decision already took possession of the lots allotted to them as per that
Decision. So that was already answered. Anything else?
ATTY. VENERACION;
No more question, Your Honor.33
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not dispute that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the cadastral
court already adjudicated the ownership of Lot 1303 to persons other than the registered owners
thereof. Petitioners would, nonetheless, claim that respondents’ purported failure to execute the
November 29, 1929 Decision over Lot 1303 (i.e., their failure to secure their own titles) meant that
the entire Lot 1303 being still registered in the name of their ascendants rightfully belongs to them.
This is on the theory that respondents’ right to have the said property titled in their names have long
prescribed.
On this point, we agree with the appellate court.
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
states that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover
possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.34
However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,35 the Court had
recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is
true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his
right to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,36 the Court had held that while a person may
not acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of
the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover
back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.
In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion,37 we similarly held that while
jurisprudence is settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally
an abundance of cases where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to
recover possession of property through the equitable principle of laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in
equity.38 The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting
complainant’s rights after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he has had the opportunity
to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is
accorded to the complainant.39
In view of respondents’ decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue
of a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners’ inaction and neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right
to recover the same, it is clear that respondents’ possession may no longer be disturbed. The right
of the registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property
is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.
In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners’
ascendants wrongfully included lots belonging to third persons.40 Indeed, petitioners’ ascendants
appeared to have acknowledged this fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral
court to subdivide Lot 1303 as evident in the November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur with the Court
of Appeals that petitioners’ ascendants held the property erroneously titled in their names under an
implied trust for the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their
title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.41 As we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42 the essence of an action for reconveyance
is that the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It is settled in jurisprudence that
mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that
the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title.43
We cannot subscribe to petitioners’ argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have
under the November 29, 1929 Decision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully execute the
same. We again concur with the Court of Appeals in this regard. An action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
However, this Court has ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title
to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the
land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right.44
Petitioners’ claim with respect to Sapang Bayan
As for the issue of the ownership of Sapang Bayan, we sustain the appellate court insofar as it ruled
that petitioners failed to substantiate their ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. The said principle is embodied
in Article 457 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
We have held that for Article 457 to apply the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.45 The character of the
Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred to in the provision
which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to support this
assertion.
In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how Sapang Bayan came
about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed
connected to the main river could not be ascertained.
Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 146and
Article 502, paragraph 147 of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public
dominion. In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some
other person, it must continue to belong to the State.
We ruled on this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals,48 to wit:

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph
1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration
act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.491avv phi 1
Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of
public dominion:
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.51
Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be
adjudged to any of the parties in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175799 November 28, 2011
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner,

vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
September 8, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94382 and its Resolution2 dated December 12, 2006, denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
On August 30, 2005, respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City a Complaint3 against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited
praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being
contrary to Article 20184 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-782, and was raffled to Branch 150. Upon respondent’s (plaintiff’s)
motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect
service of summons on petitioner (defendant).
On October 20, 2005, petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss5 praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint
failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action
is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
On November 29, 2005, petitioner filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take the deposition of
Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner) before the Philippine Consul General; and
(2) a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on respondent.
On December 9, 2005, the trial court issued an Order6 denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to
the trial court, there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in
the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of
Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served.
The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations
in the Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated
during the trial.
On December 27, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.7 On March 6, 2006, the trial
court issued an Order denying the December 27, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration and disallowed
the twin Motions for Leave to take deposition and serve written interrogatories.8
On April 3, 2006, petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari9 with the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss. The
Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94382.
On September 8, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an
interlocutory order, it cannot be the subject of a Petition for Certiorari, and may only be reviewed in
the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. On December 12, 2006, the
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 2006, the trial court issued an Order directing respondent to answer
some of the questions in petitioner’s Interrogatories to Plaintiff dated September 7, 2006.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the September 8, 2006
Decision and the December 12, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Arguing against the ruling
of the appellate court, petitioner insists that (a) an order denying a motion to dismiss may be the
proper subject of a petition for certiorari; and (b) the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in not finding that it had not validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and that the plaintiff had no
cause of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, posits that: (a) the present Petition should be dismissed for not
being filed by a real party in interest and for lack of a proper verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping; (b) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari was not the proper remedy; and (c)
the trial court correctly denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Our discussion of the issues raised by the parties follows:
Whether petitioner is a real party in interest
Respondent argues that the present Petition should be dismissed on the ground that petitioner no
longer existed as a corporation at the time said Petition was filed on February 1, 2007. Respondent
points out that as of the date of the filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the
name NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Thus, according to respondent, the present
Petition was not filed by a real party in interest, citing our ruling in Philips Export B.V. v. Court of
Appeals,10 wherein we held:
A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the very existence of a corporation (American Steel
Foundries vs. Robertson, 269 US 372, 70 L ed 317, 46 S Ct 160; Lauman vs. Lebanon Valley R.
Co., 30 Pa 42; First National Bank vs. Huntington Distilling Co., 40 W Va 530, 23 SE 792). Its name
is one of its attributes, an element of its existence, and essential to its identity (6 Fletcher [Perm Ed],
pp. 3-4). The general rule as to corporations is that each corporation must have a name by which it
is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts. The name of a corporation in this respect designates the
corporation in the same manner as the name of an individual designates the person (Cincinnati
Cooperage Co. vs. Bate, 96 Ky 356, 26 SW 538; Newport Mechanics Mfg. Co. vs. Starbird, 10 NH
123); and the right to use its corporate name is as much a part of the corporate franchise as any
other privilege granted (Federal Secur. Co. vs. Federal Secur. Corp., 129 Or 375, 276 P 1100, 66
ALR 934; Paulino vs. Portuguese Beneficial Association, 18 RI 165, 26 A 36).11
In its Memorandum12 before this Court, petitioner started to refer to itself as Investec Australia
Limited (formerly "NM Rothschild & Sons [Australia] Limited") and captioned said Memorandum
accordingly. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a
corporation under the laws of Australia under said new name. It presented before us documents
evidencing the process in the Australian Securities & Investment Commission on the change of
petitioner’s company name from NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited to Investec Australia
Limited.13
We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve
not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the name
of the real party in interest. While we stand by our pronouncement in Philips Export on the
importance of the corporate name to the very existence of corporations and the significance thereof
in the corporation’s right to sue, we shall not go so far as to dismiss a case filed by the proper party
using its former name when adequate identification is presented. A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.14There is no doubt in our minds that the party who filed the present Petition, having
presented sufficient evidence of its identity and being represented by the same counsel as that of
the defendant in the case sought to be dismissed, is the entity that will be benefited if this Court
grants the dismissal prayed for.
Since the main objection of respondent to the verification and certification against forum shopping
likewise depends on the supposed inexistence of the corporation named therein, we give no credit to
said objection in light of the foregoing discussion.
Propriety of the Resort to a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
We have held time and again that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order
which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of
a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for Certiorari which is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.15 However, we have likewise
held that when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant
of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be justified. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant:
[S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in
contemplation of law.16
The resolution of the present Petition therefore entails an inquiry into whether the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its denial of petitioner’s
Motion to Dismiss. A mere error in judgment on the part of the trial court would undeniably be
inadequate for us to reverse the disposition by the Court of Appeals.
Issues more properly ventilated during the trial of the case
As previously stated, petitioner seeks the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-782 on the following
grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper
service of summons; (b) failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action and absence of a cause
of action; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean
hands.
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the alleged absence of a cause of
action (as opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of
petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged
contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 1617 of the Rules
of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or
existence of respondent’s alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the
trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as
a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without
going into the very merits of the main case.
It is basic that "[a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another."18 Its elements are the following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the
part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of such right.19 We have held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.20
The trial court held that the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three elements of a cause of
action, i.e., it alleges that: (1) plaintiff has the right to ask for the declaration of nullity of the Hedging
Contracts for being null and void and contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; (2)
defendant has the corresponding obligation not to enforce the Hedging Contracts because they are
in the nature of wagering or gambling agreements and therefore the transactions implementing
those contracts are null and void under Philippine laws; and (3) defendant ignored the advice and
intends to enforce the Hedging Contracts by demanding financial payments due therefrom.21
The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint.22However, this principle of
hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Thus, in Tan v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held:
The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the
complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the
failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to
such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud;
nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or
conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of
which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor
scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to
facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred
to; and, nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments. A more judicious
resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the
consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts
may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and
jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to
examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in
ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.24 (Emphases supplied.)
In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being
contrary to Article 201825 of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts,
despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely
to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated
in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.
Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore
cannot be hypothetically admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to be
nullified, as well as a copy of the contract itself, are incorporated in the Complaint. The determination
of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into
whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very
issue to be determined in Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioner’s defense against the charge of
nullity of the Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties that actual deliveries of gold be
made pursuant thereto. Such a defense requires the presentation of evidence on the merits of the
case. An issue that "requires the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full
ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere
Motion to Dismiss."26 The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that allegations of estoppel and bad faith require proof. Thus, in
Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 we ruled:
Having come to the conclusion that the complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of the
right of first refusal and that the trial court should thus not have dismissed the complaint, we find no
more need to pass upon the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action for damages
or whether the complaint is barred by estoppel or laches. As these matters require presentation
and/or determination of facts, they can be best resolved after trial on the merits.28 (Emphases
supplied.)
On the proposition in the Motion to Dismiss that respondent has come to court with unclean hands,
suffice it to state that the determination of whether one acted in bad faith and whether damages may
be awarded is evidentiary in nature. Thus, we have previously held that "[a]s a matter of defense, it
can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."29
Jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on account of the
improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner through the DFA, with
respondent’s counsel personally bringing the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate
General in Sydney, Australia.
In the pleadings filed by the parties before this Court, the parties entered into a lengthy debate as to
whether or not petitioner is doing business in the Philippines. However, such discussion is
completely irrelevant in the case at bar, for two reasons. Firstly, since the Complaint was filed on
August 30, 2005, the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure govern the service of
summons. Section 12, Rule 14 of said rules provides:
Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on
the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is a significant amendment of the former Section 14 of said rule which previously provided:
Sec. 14. Service upon private foreign corporations. — If the defendant is a foreign corporation, or a
nonresident joint stock company or association, doing business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such
agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents
within the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
The coverage of the present rule is thus broader.30 Secondly, the service of summons to petitioner
through the DFA by the conveyance of the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney,
Australia was clearly made not through the above-quoted Section 12, but pursuant to Section 15 of
the same rule which provides:
Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. – When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Respondent argues31 that extraterritorial service of summons upon foreign private juridical entities is
not proscribed under the Rules of Court, and is in fact within the authority of the trial court to adopt,
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 135:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. – When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears comformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with the service of summons
on a defendant which does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, while Rule 135 (which is in
Part V of the Rules of Court entitled Legal Ethics) concerns the general powers and duties of courts
and judicial officers.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four instances wherein a
defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2)
when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such
action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in
the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of
the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.32
Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading
Corporation33 that:
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or
quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons
can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest
if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.34 (Emphases supplied.)
In Domagas v. Jensen,35 we held that:
[T]he aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these
only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to,
or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.36
It is likewise settled that "[a]n action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action
quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation."37
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts
between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be
freed from its obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily
liable to the plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and
until the plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case
the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the defendant, petitioner
Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot
try any case against it because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it
voluntarily appears in court.38
In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held to have voluntarily
appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was actually afforded, specific reliefs from the
trial court.39 Respondent points out that while petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was still pending,
petitioner prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against respondent, such as written
interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of documents.40
Petitioner counters that under this Court’s ruling in the leading case of La Naval Drug Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,41 a party may file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its
person, and at the same time raise affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, without
waiving its objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.42
It appears, however, that petitioner misunderstood our ruling in La Naval. A close reading of La
Naval reveals that the Court intended a distinction between the raising of affirmative defenses in an
Answer (which would not amount to acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court) and the prayer for
affirmative reliefs (which would be considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court):
In the same manner that a plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a court suit, a
defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, to put
up his own defenses alternatively or even hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the
Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer,
except for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to mean that a
defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his objection to the court's jurisdiction over
his person, all other possible defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such
defenses, but the failure to so raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of
course, we refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be
asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer.
Mindful of the foregoing, in Signetics Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Freuhauf
Electronics Phils., Inc. (225 SCRA 737, 738), we lately ruled:
"This is not to say, however, that the petitioner's right to question the jurisdiction of the court
over its person is now to be deemed a foreclosed matter. If it is true, as Signetics claims, that its
only involvement in the Philippines was through a passive investment in Sigfil, which it even later
disposed of, and that TEAM Pacific is not its agent, then it cannot really be said to be doing business
in the Philippines. It is a defense, however, that requires the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as a full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, which should not thus
be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss. So, also, the issue posed by the petitioner as to
whether a foreign corporation which has done business in the country, but which has ceased to do
business at the time of the filing of a complaint, can still be made to answer for a cause of action
which accrued while it was doing business, is another matter that would yet have to await the
reception and admission of evidence. Since these points have seasonably been raised by the
petitioner, there should be no real cause for what may understandably be its apprehension,
i.e., that by its participation during the trial on the merits, it may, absent an invocation of
separate or independent reliefs of its own, be considered to have voluntarily submitted itself
to the court's jurisdiction."43 (Emphases supplied.)
In order to conform to the ruling in La Naval, which was decided by this Court in 1994, the former
Section 23, Rule 1444 concerning voluntary appearance was amended to include a second sentence
in its equivalent provision in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Emphasis supplied.)
The new second sentence, it can be observed, merely mentions other grounds in a Motion to
Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This clearly refers to
affirmative defenses, rather than affirmative reliefs.
Thus, while mindful of our ruling in La Naval and the new Section 20, Rule 20, this Court, in several
cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in a court is tantamount to voluntary appearance
therein.45 Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,46wherein defendants filed
a "Motion for Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court"
subsequent to their filing of a "Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction)," we held:
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the respondents'
motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon
Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than
dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount
to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case,
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.47 (Emphasis supplied.) 1âwphi1
In view of the above, we therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial
court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.48 Consequently, the trial
court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 8, 2006 and its Resolution dated December 12, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No.
94382 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTBaguio City

G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011

G.R. No. 177499

G.R. No. 178056

I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE

III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF

In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:

The Court differs.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes.

Senator Osmeña III. Because of the income.

ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT, ERLINDA P. CUDIAMAT1 and CORAZON D.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin.8

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE

The Court’s Ruling

The Property Registration Decree provides:

We are not persuaded.

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, ISAGANI YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, PERGENITO

The antecedents are as follows:

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Based on

A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING,

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT WHICH FAILS TO VALIDLY AND SUFFICIENTLY STATE A

A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING,

B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY LEGAL

C) THE COMPLAINT IS VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO

SHOULD BE DISMISSED UPON MOTION BY THE DEFENDANTS (PETITIONERS HEREIN). 24

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

The antecedents of the case are, as follows:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED

ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE ‘FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A

The petition is meritorious.

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

FLORENTINO PINEDA, Petitioner,

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S

AS A COROLLARY TO THE THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR ABOVE, THE COURT OF

JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:

Petitioners’ claim with respect to Lot 1303

A – Yes, sir. They took possession.

Q – Did they take possession of the other lots?

A – No. Yes, the portion…

A – Yes, they took took possession of the other… No, sir.

Q – I am asking you whether they took possession, the children…

The questions are already answered, your Honor.