Ishmael Himagan vs People
Quisumbing
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of
Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act
No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The
law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed
by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall
be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety
(90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed
by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense
where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination
of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial
must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify
or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The
first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from
within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should
the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall”
before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in
RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be
lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge
who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may
be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed
without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy
trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case.
Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its
dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by
habeas corpus
ISAE vs DOLE Secretary Leonardo A.
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of
private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That
the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of
course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal
pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction.
That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the
principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant
to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to
International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-
hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave
travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on
“significant economic disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School
is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
hires constitutes racial discrimination.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties
to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to
justify its claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays
one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to
injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
compensation to female employees as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in an labor organization.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is
that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic
and human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an
employee, it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against
private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair
with a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the
household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their
quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably
beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to
attempt suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking
her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she
was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she
was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial
support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a
single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her
to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger
of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things,
to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to
wives/women and not to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means
violence by men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against
children and other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb
and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and
an abused wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human
rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many
United Nations human rights treaties such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration.
Among the standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
· enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children
by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner,
or father of the victim.
· The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional
mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and
freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore
as the Philippines’ compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake,
without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against
women in all forms both in law and in practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central
and most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of
women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence
of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a
violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
2. Philippine’s obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and
advancement for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well
as de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of
discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on
discrimination against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered
and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of
their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women,
as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have
made in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are
victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by
strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has
or had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to
the Achievement of Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
· A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on,
the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
· Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common
Law Legal Code: all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination
stemming from the view of male superiority."
· 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological
assumption that: husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus "they
were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband," a
concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior
to the enactment of the Family Code.
· Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men
are expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the
family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women
– power, which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence
against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such power.
· In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife,
were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
· The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or
even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
· Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal
family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
· English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
· However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat
their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous
cases involving violence committed against women in the Philippines.
· In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or
11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving violence against women were filed under
RA 9262.
· From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the
different categories of violence committed against women. The number of
reported cases showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
· The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that
women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore
need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis
to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence
perpetuated by women.
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and
cultural differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between
women and men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular
conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special
protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee:
· The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that
they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results.
It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men.
Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences
between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in
order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality
also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under representation
of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and
women.
· Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive
equality. These results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is,
women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men,
enjoying the same income levels, equality in decision-making and political
influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.
The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all
spheres of her life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and
implementation of ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the
woman is guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs
will not be ignored by the government, which is committed to uplift her to her
rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive
equality nor be empowered.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and
inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision
provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such
discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities
and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is “THE” ameliorative action
· In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that
would address the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that
is deeply embedded in the society’s subconscious, on Filipino women and
children and elevate their status as human beings on the same level as the
father or the husband.
· R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of
discrimination against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of
"reverse discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to
equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the genuine
and substantive equality which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a
goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary as a
redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive
equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and
that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of
results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that
of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed
differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under
certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be
required in order to address such differences.
Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the
same. But this model does not take into account biological and socially
constructed differences between women and men. By failing to take into
account these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact perpetuate
discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model – this recognizes differences between women and men
but considers women’s weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This
approach reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the
issue of discrimination of women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model – this assumes that women are "not vulnerable
by nature, but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed
disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further need for protection."
Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime importance to women’s
contexts, realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and
measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the
disadvantages they experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause (application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an
absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of
women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and
to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children,
who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the
special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of
the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal
protection simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the
same way. It does not connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it
require that every person is treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as
a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among persons are based
on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a proper governmental
purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when
shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate government
objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress
found that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children
contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding
the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s total development.
Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are more
susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the
pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles
within the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On
this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction
within the family between men, on the one hand, and women and children, on
the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the
laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in
various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of the
family.
Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate
relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is
a power issue.
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative
constitutional requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can
become descriptive reality. The socially constructed distinctions between
women and men that have afflicted us and spawned discrimination and
violence should be eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-exist.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens
from the helter skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the
safety of the special other who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If
that is not possible, then for such time as will be sufficient to create cherished
memories enough to last for eternity.
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full
course.
Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle
to be freed from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or
minded, to hit their wives or partners and their children. This law
institutionalizes prompt community response to this violent behavior through
barangay officials who can command the man to immediately desist from
harming his home partner and their children. It also establishes domestic
violence as a crime, not only against its victims but against society as well. No
longer is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute that
law enforcers ought not to get into.
Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can
no longer be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of
substantive equality. "It ought to be construed in consonance with social
justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution—a transformative
covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical
equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian
democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men,
can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause,
anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the
indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society,
each person may be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with
equal moral status."
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which
he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously
against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class
legislation.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which
are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and
who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously
against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the
following statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,
which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including
acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes,
shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this
Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
Provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing
of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such
fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held
on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed
by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the
Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979
and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr.
also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it
is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of
harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken
up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232)
where the issue has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be
declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does
it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52
is hereby declared valid.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal
protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to
proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and
hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The
questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its
application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office
of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be
similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant
conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or
partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and
discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII,
sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates
for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
PJA vs Prado
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:
(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be
as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been
held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or
the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.
No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service
system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O.
207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate
Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of
the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and
the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered
in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by
such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection
of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose
of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily
for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for
the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among
the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain
offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of
their own public functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal
protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is
vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the
judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending
that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut
expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they
should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other
departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege,
the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it
for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it
at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved
by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the
laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster
withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but
still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing
of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection,
as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty
of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege
has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to
which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the
part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
League of Cities vs COMELEC
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion
of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that
the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
The Issues
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article
X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never
written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the
criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the
equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a
valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is
contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─
The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where
the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed
date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same
business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may
be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments.
The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of,
the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in
a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry
after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any
relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will
discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law,
in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The
classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal
protection of the law.
Amelia Aquino vs PPA
On 26 July 2000, petitioners, who are second category PPA officials filed a
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition before the RTC of Manila, raffled to
Branch 55. They claim anew that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not
exceeding 40% of their respective basic salaries. They anchor their petition on
recent developments allegedly brought about by the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al. which was
decided almost six (6) years after the Court’s decision in PPA v. COA, et
al.They further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, extended the
cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits.
PPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata under paragraph
(f), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It argued that a case involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action had already been resolved by this
Court in PPA v. COA, et al.
Finding merit in PPA’s motion, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition
in an Order dated 8 November 2000. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
GRANTED, and the Petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED on the ground
that it is already barred by the principle of res judicata.
Petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court by way of appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court, however, in a
Resolution dated 28 March 2001 referred the case to the CA for appropriate
action. The case was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 64702.
On 31 July 2002, a decision was rendered by the CA on the referred case. It
declared that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the case. The
appellate court explained that the existence of DBM and COA issuances which
entitle herein petitioners to the grant of RATA is the pertinent fact and condition
which is material to the instant case taking it away from the domain of the
principle of res judicata. When new facts or conditions intervene before the
second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the party,
the issues are no longer the same; hence, the former judgment cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the subsequent action. At the time judgment was rendered
in the previous case, the fact and condition now in existence, which consist of
the DBM and COA issuances, has not yet come about. In view of the
issuances, petitioners are faced with an entirely separate facts and conditions,
which make the principle of res judicata inapplicable. The decision ordered the
remand of the case to the court of origin for continuation of proceedings.
After due proceedings in the trial court, a decision in favor of petitioners was
rendered on 10 August 2005. The dispositive portion of the decision
commanded respondent PPA to pay the claim for RATA equivalent to 40% of
petitioners’ standardized basic salaries authorized under LOI No. 97,
commencing from their respective dates of appointments or on 23 October
2001 when the case of Irene V. Cruz, et al. v. COA was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, whichever is later.
The trial court ratiocinated that "when the Supreme Court En Banc ruled on 23
October 2001 in the IRENE CRUZ case that ‘The date of hiring of an employee
cannot be considered as a substantial distinction,’ the so-called first (sic)
category managers and supervisors whose appointments thereto were made
after 01 July 1989 and who were effectively deprived of the 40% RATA on
account of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the PPA v. COA, et al. case have
established a clear legal right to claim the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97
commencing on 23 October 2001, and the correlative legal duty of respondent
PPA to pay the same; thus, entitling petitioners who are qualified to avail of
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus."
PPA raised the matter before the CA which docketed the case as CA G.R. SP
No. 91743. In a decision dated 29 August 2007, the appellate court reversed
the decision of the trial court and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 10, 2005 Decision and the
September 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, National
Capital Judicial Region, Manila, are hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the
Amended Petition in Civil Case No. 00-98161 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the
appellate court in a resolution dated 29 February 2008.
Hence, this petition assailing the 29 August 2007 decision of the CA and its
29 February 2008 resolution.
Issues
I. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable in the instant case
taking into consideration the final decision of the court of appeals in ca. G.r.
sp no. 64702.
II. Whether or not ppa in denying the claim of petitioners for 40% rata has
committed a violation of their constitutional right to equal protection; and
III. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to 40% rata and should not be made
to refund the rata they had already received.
Petitioners likewise raised as their cause of action the violation of their
constitutional right to equal protection of the law. They contend that this alone
would constitute sufficient justification for the filing anew of the instant petition.
Contrary to the statement in the assailed decision of the CA to the effect that
they failed to plead or raise such issue in the trial court, they submit that a
perusal of their amended petition would show that paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and
33 thereof were devoted to that issue.
Court Ruling: The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. x x x. A law is not invalid simply because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.39
As explained earlier, the different treatment accorded the second sentence
(first paragraph) of Section 12 of RA 6758 to the incumbents as of 1 July 1989,
on one hand, and those employees hired on or after the said date, on the
other, with respect to the grant of non-integrated benefits lies in the fact that
the legislature intended to gradually phase out the said benefits without,
however, upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay and benefits.40
The consequential outcome under Sections 12 and 17 is that if the incumbent
resigns or is promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled
to his predecessor’s RATA privilege or to the transition allowance. After 1 July
1989, the additional financial incentives such as RATA may no longer be given
by the GOCCs with the exemption of those which were authorized to be
continued under Section 12 of RA 6758.41
Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not infringe the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as it is based on reasonable classification intended
to protect the rights of the incumbents against diminution of their pay and
benefits.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Ce11iorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated 29 August 2007 and Resolution dated 29 February 2008 of the
Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, ET AL vs
Executive Secretary
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 10014 and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration
of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct
contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo
was declared as the first National Artist.
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 11445 was issued. It amended
Proclamation No. 1001 "by creating a National Artists Awards Committee" that
would "administer the conferment of the category of National Artist" upon
deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of members of the Board
of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations
in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body
of work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be
so recognized."
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the
conferment of the National Artist Award was again reiterated in Presidential
Decree No. 2086 issued on June 7, 1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It
established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and
gave it an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and
preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural
heritage.
The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up
and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three
deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final
list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos,
Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to
respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued
declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents,
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National
Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of
the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists
and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of
discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was
disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at
that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second
shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when
they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and
the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that
would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures,
and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal
protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this
case.
Constitutional law; Equal protection. There was a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP
as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National
Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines
and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The
conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore
made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-
graft court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No.
3019,[5] as amended. The Information reads:
That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan],
said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of
the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third
civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad
faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others,
intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled
corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO),
a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all
equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,
houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the
Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its
equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed
by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of
P5,000,000.00.
Contrary to law.
On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first MOTION TO DISMISS AND
TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT claiming that no valid preliminary investigation
was conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation
could be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having
been undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued
an order giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation
with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On
January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show
that [the Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed order.
On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio
U. Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the
reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case.
Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the
recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and
directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second MOTION TO
QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT.
On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION TO DISMISS. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the
motion and admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner,
except the third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its
previous Resolutions.[7] In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court
pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in
1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention
had been committed on or about 1975, the amended provision was
inapplicable to him.[8]
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his
right to a preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had been
granted a reinvestigation.[9] It further held that his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch
as the Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act
3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether
there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is
immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the
1973 Constitution.
Court Ruling:
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second
motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or
different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there
would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial would never commence.
A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly
burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in
the first motion to quash are generally deemed waived.[19] Petitioners Motion
to Dismiss violates this rule.
To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity.[23] While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-
for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague.
Adiong v. Comelec[25] decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a
statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec[26] held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not
because of vagueness.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass
acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual
case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was
aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,
is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in
a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes,
described as a manifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only
as a last resort. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.[28]
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be
examined only as applied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not
be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
Facts:
The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) filed an information before the anti-graft court on
July 12, 1989 charging Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No.
3019 as amended.
The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16
to July 29, 1975, Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos, former
president of the Philippines, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and
with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interest and/or
that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned
and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority of stocks of which is
owned by former Pres. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all
equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,
houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the
Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some
equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed
by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P 5,
000, 000.00.
Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he
allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-
de-camp – of former President Marcos. He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, which states that:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by other pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure.”
Issue:
Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution,
Romualdez is immune from criminal prosecution.
Ruling:
No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art
Vii of 1973 Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez because the immunity
amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened
in 1975.
In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a
non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while
sitting in office. Romualdez’s reasoning fails since he derives his immunity
from one who is no longer sitting as president. Verily, the felonious acts of
public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing
as any other trespasser.”
Romualdez vs COMELEC
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of
the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false
information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen,
Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by
the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we
articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack
of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature
of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of
the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot
claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against
the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded
due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in
opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They
similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process
was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree
with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were
reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them.
It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted
whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners
actively participated.

Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since
1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5
years the house of Renomeron.

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be

conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.

First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC

is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support
the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189.

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that
the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by
private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2)
and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,