Asian Terminals vs Malayan Insurance

GR 171406 / April 4, 2011

Facts:

1. Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV “Jinlian” 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash
dense. The shipment was insured with Malayan Insurance.
2. Upon arrival of the vessel, the stevedores of Asian Terminals unloaded the bags from the vessel and brought
them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping pending clearance from the
Bureau of Customs and delivery to consignee. After all the bags were unloaded, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad
condition.
3. Malayan Insurance, as insurer, paid the value of the lost cargoes to the consignee.
4. Malayan Insurance, as subrogee of the consignee, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Asian
Terminals.
5. RTC found Asian Terminals liable for the damage sustained by the shipment. The proximate cause was the
negligence of Asian Terminals’ stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. This was
caused by their usage of the steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags by the stevedores, despite the
admonitions of the Marine Cargo Surveyors.
6. RTC orders Asian Terminals to pay P643K to Malayan Insurance. CA agrees with the decision of the RTC
7. Asian Terminals argues claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000, pursuant to its
Management Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA). Petitioner contends
that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of an executive
department subject to judicial cognizance.

Issue:

Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the PPA in
determining petitioner’s liability.

Held:

1. Judicial notice does not apply

2. Section 1, Rule 129
a. Judicial notice when mandatory – a court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the laws of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
3. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the
court can take judicial notice of.
a. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department.
b. The PPA is a GOCC in charge of administering the ports in the country.
c. the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner.

People v. Tomas Tundag (October 2000)

Facts:

Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas Tundag, raped her twice. First was on September 5, 1997 and the
other on November 18, 1997. 2 separate criminal cases were filed against her father. Mary Ann Tundag also alleged
that she was 13 years old when she was raped by her father. (However, the prosecution in the case at bar was not
able to show any documents pertaining to Mary Ann’s age at the time of the commission of the rape. The
prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial notice that Mary Ann was under 18 years of age which was
subsequently granted without conducting a hearing.) She narrated that her father used a knife to threaten her not to
shout while he was raping her on both occasions. While raping her, he was even asking her if it felt good. He was
even laughing. (What a bastard!) After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann went to her neighbor (by the
name of Bebie Cabahug) and told her what happened to her. They reported this to the police and was later
examined by a doctor who concluded that she was not a virgin anymore. The Trial Court convicted Tomas Tundag on
both counts of rape and was sentenced to the penalty of death. On appeal to the CA, Tomas flatly denied that the
incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that
evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to
have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being
exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.

Issue: WON Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape

Held: Yes!

Tomas Tundag’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty
ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who
testified on affirmative matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense,
which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of
her honor. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death
penalty if found guilty by the court.

Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a
history of sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an
erect male organ into complainants genitals. Bu this does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was
sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things, nonetheless, the
presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.

Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with him
after he had castigated her for misbehavior. But such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the
charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken
seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her
family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.

Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him
considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent
and immaterial since he was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him.

Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any
way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice.
We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father – her
father’s death.

Issue 2: WON the penalty of death imposed on him is correct. WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial
notice of Mary Ann’s age without a hearing.

Held: No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was incorrect for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary
Ann’s age without a proper hearing.
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 penalizes rape of a minor
daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. The elements are as follows: (1) sexual congress; (2)
with woman; (3) by force or without her consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the
additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years old at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent
of the victim.

In this case, Mary Ann’s age was not properly and sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that
she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she
was born because her mother did not tell her.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section
1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

Catungal v. Hao (Short title)

GR # 134972 | March 22, 2001

Petitioner: Sps. Ernesto and Mina Catungal

Respondent: Doris Hao

(Rule 129, Section 2)

DOCTRINE

Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.

FACTS

- Galang, leased a three-storey building situated at Baclaran to BPI for a period of15 years and during the existence of the
lease, BPI subleased the ground floor to Hao.
- Galang and Hao executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors of the building. and spouses Catungal
subsequently bought the property from Galang.
- Invoking her right of first refusal purportedly based on the lease, Hao filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with RTC
Makati.
- Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired. so Spouses Catungal sent demand letters to Hao to
vacate.
- The demand letters were unheeded causing the spouses to file two complaints for ejectment, with MeTC Paranaque.
o Hao then filed an action for injunction with RTC of Makati, to stop the MeTC of Paranaque from proceeding.
- The cases were consolidated with RTC of Makati which rendered a decision granting the injunction and annulling the contract
of sale.
- On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and the complaints were accordingly dismissed.
 - Hao elevated the case before the SC which denied the same.
- The MeTC Paranaque, after the reversal of the decision for injunction, proceeded with the trial of the ejectment cases and
rendered a Decision ordering Hao to vacate.
- Spouses Catungal filed a motion for clarificatory judgment on the ground that MeTC only awarded rent for the ground floor.
MeTC clarified that the payment was only for the use of the first floor.
- Spouses sought reconsideration, praying that Hao be ordered to pay the use all floors and Hao.
- Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration, the MeTC of issued an Order, elevating the case to the RTC.
- RTC of Paranaque ordered that the rentals should covers all floors.
- CA reduced the amount of rentals for the second and third floors.
ISSUE/S

1. W/N CA erred in reversing the findings of the RTC by using as basis for reducing the rental only the evidence submitted by the
parties and ignoring circumstances of which the RTC properly took judicial notice.

PROVISIONS

Rule 129, Section 2

Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)

RULING & RATIO

1. Yes
- In ruling that the increased rental should be awarded, RTC based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice.
- The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the vicinity and indeed
committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals.
- According to jurisprudence, the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy
of leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
contract of lease.
- The RTC correctly applied the legal concept of judicial notice
- Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure or
otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to him, or is assumed to have, by
virtue of his office.
- Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
- Matters of judicial notice have three requisites: (1) matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain (3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court.
- The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location
and the commercial viability.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners by reinstating the decision of the RTC, with
modifications.

 Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice

Landbank vs. Wycoco

Facts:

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva
Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his land to the DAR for P14.9 million. The
evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No.
NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP
and DAR. However, the offered price of the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He then
filed a case before the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled
that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public
knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from
P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the
compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00.

Issue:

WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid and within its jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court
should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation
without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same
cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market
value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location,
as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for
determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by
courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action.

Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384 (April 29, 2005) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available to Owner >
Recovery of Real Property > Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvindicatoria

Facts:

Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co-owners of the parcel of land
where Salvador constructed his house without their knowledge and refused to vacate despite their demands.

Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the
complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which determines the jurisdiction of the court.

Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion reinvindicatoria, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their opposition to Salvador's motion to dismiss, they mentioned the
increase in the assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, they maintained that their
action was also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion reinvindicatoria.

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.

Held:

The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed that Salvador vacate
the property and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of
possession of the real property. It was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria or a suit for the recovery of possession over
the real property as owner.

The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is
filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property. Absent any allegation in
the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC,
were null and void.

SASAN vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for
illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-
PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial
and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by
HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-
PCIBank.

For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of
providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients.

On the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a
Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required
substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and
responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer
of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to
the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into
consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof,
declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged
in "labor-only contracting."

Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a
legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases.

RULING:

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure.
After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The
NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial
justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional
evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.

The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

People v Jalandoni G.R. No. L-57555 August

28, 1984
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT

To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.
Facts: Teresa Jalandoni was accused of estafa. The information alleged that she issued several checks drawn
against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI); that the
checks were dishonored for lack of funds, a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof the
BPI suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to Modify
Judgment. BPI invoked a Court of Appeals decision People vs. De Castillo, where the court acquitted the appellant
who was accused of malversation of public funds on the ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her
to pay the amount of her civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid
multiplicity of suits, a second paragraph be added to Our judgment,

Issue: Whether or not Jalandoni was denied due process by not affording to her a separate hearing.

Held: There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused
was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and
defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
Jalandoni’s claim that “[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires necessarily the
introduction of proof (Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of merit. As shown above the appellant has formally admitted
that BPI suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil liability, if any, is
unsettled is an insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a party to state a fact only to disown it afterwards
because of convenience.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Kenrick

Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149576
PARTS OF A PLEADING – SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration

Authority, Petitioner, vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not
delegate it to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he
has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under Rule 45 as an appeal to the ruling of
the CA against the Republic and lifting the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick for
failure to file an answer to the Republic’s complaint.

FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation
Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) claiming ownership over those lands.
Its encroachment resulted to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime
land. Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly
originated from a TCT registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has no record of them and
that their ascendant title, allegedly in the name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office.
Thus, the OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which
was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be
located and be served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by
publication against him.

While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and
Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty.
Garlitos was summoned and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature appearing above
Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not
know who finally signed it.
Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion in default for failure to
file a valid answer because the person who signed it was not the counsel for the respondents.
Thus, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the ROC, an
unsigned pleading is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be a sham and false and
intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also ordered that the answer be stricken from the
records, declared Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.

Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for certiorari.

CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for certiorari and lifted the trial
court’s order of default against Kenrick Then, it ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with
dispatch. It ruled so because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be
unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’
acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by
somebody in his stead.

Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that its pleading was
unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.

HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the party or counsel
representing him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and authority to sign a pleading is
personal to him and may not be delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is
not.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons,

something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was
void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could
have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos
consented to the signing of the answer by another “as long as it conformed to his draft.” We give
no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign
the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal
effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the
Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true
that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that
could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities
have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush
them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice[1].

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure[2]. In this case,
respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly
abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in
violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his
possible misconduct.

PETITION GRANTED