In relation to part B (CURB Act and EAEA)

Argument: The contention of the Resthelian Prime Minister Yuzof-Al-Fez (par 32 of the compromis) that

they allowed free trade and free movement of Arrepyan nationals into Resthel before was just in recognition

and respect of the shared history of our two peoples is erroneous.

There was a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Federal Republic of Arrepy and

the Principality of Resthel. In the case of Portugal vs. India, the practice of free passage having continued

over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in respect of

the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the Court is, in view of all the

circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise

to a right and a correlative obligation. Around the late 1700s, Arrepyans became devotees of the Lathan

faith and it was also during this time that it became customary for adherents of the Lathan faith to make the

Sacred Pilgrimages of Cleansing (par 5 compromis). Arrepyans, being citizens of the empire, freely crossed

the bridges built over the El Caiman River to perform their personal pilgrimage (par 6 comrpmis).

Side note:

Concordat became customary law.

Additional note for argument #3: In Danube Dam Case, it was held that as to state of necessity, even if a

state of necessity is found to exist, it is not a ground for the termination of a treaty. It may only be invoked

to exonerate from its responsibility a State which has failed to implement a treaty. As to impossibility of

performance, if the joint exploitation of the investment was no longer possible, this was originally because

Hungary did not carry out most of the works for which it was responsible; Article 61, paragraph 2, of the

Vienna Convention expressly provides that impossibility of performance may not be invoked for the

termination of a treaty by a party to that treaty when it results from that party’s own breach of an obligation

flowing from that treaty.

As to fundamental change of circumstances/rebus sic stantibus, the changed circumstances advanced by

Hungary (i.e., changes of political nature, the reduced economic viability of the Project, and the progress

of environmental knowledge and international environmental law) are, in the Court’s view, not of such a

nature’ that their effect would radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed in order

to accomplish the Project. A fundamental change of circumstances must have been unforeseen; the

existence of the circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be

bound by the treaty. Accordingly, the contention of Resthel is erroneous.

De facto government; when is an act imputable to the State (check Sarmiento)

UNCLOS provisions on rivers; right of free passage