ARTICLE 201 Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows

US v. KOTTINGER 45 Phil 352, G.R. No. L-20569, October 29, 1923

FACTS: On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110
Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J.
Kottinger, the manager of the company. The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being
obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the
legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from
the Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the
legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A-5 has the legend
"Moros Philippines." The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it
thought the post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures
represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J.
Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in
the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277.

ISSUE:

Whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in
the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.

HELD:

Pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in
which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. The Philippine statute does not
attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are
themselves descriptive. They are words in common use and every person of average intelligence understand their
meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing
on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances
of the case.

RATIO: The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastity,
decency, or delicacy. "Indecency" is an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts
in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of
obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.

ARTICLE 211 Indirect Bribery

FORMILLEZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN 159 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 75160, March 18, 1988 FACTS:

Petitioner Leonor Formilleza, convicted in the Sandiganbayan for indirect bribery, has been with the government service
for around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the NIA in Tacloban City, Leyte. Her
duties include the processing of the appointment papers of employees. She then filed a petition for review of her case.

Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, 1985. Her appointment was
coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her appointment was terminated. This notwithstanding,
she continued working for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration.
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that when
she approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to see the petitioner who was to determine the
employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless
the latter were given some money. Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary authorities in the
province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner. The entrapment equipment
consisted of marked paper money bills. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks at the
canteen, she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the
same with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the
money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner
was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was brought to the PC crime laboratory in
the locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. In the presence of the corporate counsel of the
petitioner, she denied accepting any bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused accepted the supposed bribe money

HELD:

The Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. She is, therefore,
entitled to an acquittal. Against the evidence of the respondents that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs.
Mutia under the table is the assertion of petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed
something in her hand which she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. An
examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that
the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This corroborates petitioner's story. There was no
picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her
under the table, which should be the case according to the version of the prosecution. None of the photographs show
the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. As the petitioner was
admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultra-violet powder. It is possible that she intended
to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but we are
not certain.

RATIO: The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of
the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting
away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect
bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.

ARTICLE 212 Corruption of Public Officials R.A. No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

PEOPLE v. ALBANO 163 SCRA 511, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988 FACTS: General Santos

City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon was charged for violation of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. He was charged with the grant of license or permit to operate cockpits in the said City as he
denied the application for renewal of Emilio Evangelista for license or permit to operate his cockpit, and issuing instead a
license and permit to operate to Luis Acharon, his uncle (relative within the third civil degree) to operate a new cockpit
about 250 meters away from the cockpit of Emilio Evangelista and in spite of the order of the CFI in Civil Case No. 840,
entitled "MANDAMUS" in which Emilio Evangelista is the Petitioner, directing the Mayor to accept and give due course
to the application of petitioner Emilio Evangelista for a license or permit to operate his cockpit; the said accused failed
and refused to do so, thereby causing injury to said applicant and gave his uncle, Luis Acharon, an unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions thru his manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. These acts are contrary to paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 3, Republic Act No. 3019. He was
also, on separate information, charged of taking advantage of their positions as City Mayor and City Vice Mayor, by using
the names of 327 employees of the city government of General Santos City, fraudulently procured and purchased 1,635
sacks of rice in bulk with the Regional Office of the Rice & Corn Administration by using their own money and after
obtaining such rice at a price very much lower than the prevailing price in the open market for the same quality of rice,
dispose the same illegally to persons other than the said 327 employees of the city government in violation of paragraph
(a), (e), (h) and (j) of Section 3, in relation to Section 1 of Republic Act 3019. The prosecution then filed an Urgent Motion
for the issuance of an order suspending the accused from office. The accused submitted the question of the validity or
invalidity of the informations on the basis of the records of each case. The trial court subsequently decided the cases on
the merits by making findings of fact based on its assessment of the records of the antecedent proceedings had in the
cases, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused, resolving that the informations in both cases are
"invalid ab initio" and consequently dismissing said cases. Thus, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the order of the lower court. They contend that the trial court erred in finding that the acts charged
do not constitute violations of RA No. 3019 by taking matters not alleged in the informations and that the same court
erred in deciding the case on the merit without trial consequently rendering the orders of dismissal null and void for
want of due process.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not a court may consider matters not alleged in the information under consideration in a pre-suspension
proceeding to determine the validity or invalidity of an information filed under RA No. 3019

2.Whether or not a court may, without a trial proper, decide a case on the merits by making findings of fact after an
assessment of the evidence on the record, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused, and, on the basis
thereof, dismiss the same

HELD:

The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer is mandatory. However,
suspension cannot be automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the validity of the information appears
conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an
elective public official even before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues
involved in (the) cases." Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the
information must first be had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding
which impairs its validity. No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

RATIO: Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 provides that: Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall
be suspended. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
ARTICLE 212 Corruption of Public Officials R.A. No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

DELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN 173 SCRA 409, G.R. No. 86899-903, May 15, 1989 FACTS:

On or about February 3, 1978 in Botolan, Zambales, accused Amor Deloso, a public officer being then the Municipal
Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, issued Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan
thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer, giving the latter unwarranted benefits,
thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. Petitioner was then suspended pendente lite from his
position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019. He thereafter filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution
and implementation of the suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition.
The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan since they have a heavy case load and that other cases have been set earlier.
Petitioner then questioned the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of RA No. 3019.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preventive suspension of the accused is justified

HELD:

Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections. The regular
term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the
Constitution. (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII, Constitution). He was, however, ordered suspended from
performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the
criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct
possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the
ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority. Under these circumstances the
preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question. The
injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective
officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interests of the sovereign electorate
and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court. It
would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending
beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of
public funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court
prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.

RATIO: A preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to
the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The injunction against preventive suspensions for an
unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is
a relatively short one.