HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay,
covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become
the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that
of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the
Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes
and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or
just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan
or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Raul Manglapus, as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the
Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by
real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or
not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife died and left a will where
she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after,
Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which
he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal
properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court
in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated

Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first wife is a
foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made
the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines, however
the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator.

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in
the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a
valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation
or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be
used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the
state.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper
permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the
Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the
issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of
the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents
filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and
bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners
tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at
the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is
not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the
petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way
justify their act of ―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of
his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help,
which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are
threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who
has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses
the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly
stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing
must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.‖

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and issued an original
certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered
within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had
encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a
complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an
encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the
property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea
moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of
the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration
decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity.
The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC., vs. SPOUSES ARSENIO (Deceased) and ANGELES NANOL AND ANYBODY
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM
COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC.,
vs.
SPOUSES ARSENIO (Deceased) and ANGELES NANOL AND ANYBODY CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM
Facts:
Sometime in 1994, respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner
Communities Cagayan, Inc., (CCI) whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and Lots 17 and
19 located at Block 16, Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro City, for the price of P368,000.00 (P368T). They
obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank (CDB), using the property as collateral. To facilitate the loan, a simulated
sale over the property was executed by petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles (TCT Nos. 105202
and 105203) were transferred in the names of respondent-spouses and submitted to CDB for loan processing. The bank
collapsed and closed before it could release the loan.
On November 30, 1997, respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same
property for the same price. This time, they availed of petitioner’s in-house financing thus, undertaking to pay the loan
over four years, from 1997 to 2001.
Respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house allegedly valued at P3.5
million, more or less. (Respondent Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein respondent Angeles, to pay for the monthly
amortizations.)
On September 10, 2003, petitioner sent respondent-spouses a notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of
Contract to Sell due to the latter’s failure to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, an action for unlawful detainer against respondent-spouses.
In her Answer, respondent Angeles averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.
Issues
1) Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all the monthly installments paid; and
2) Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses the value of the new house minus the cost of the
original house.
Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments
on the property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made under the Maceda Law.
Respondent-spouses are entitled to reimbursement of the improvements
made on the property.
In view of the special circumstances obtaining in this case, we are constrained to rely on the presumption of good
faith on the part of the respondent-spouses which the petitioner failed to rebut. Thus, respondent-spouses being
presumed builders in good faith, we now rule on the applicability of Article 448 of the Civil Code. Article 448 on builders in
good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties, such as in the instant case. We went
over the records of this case and we note that the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contract to Sell. As such, we are
constrained to apply Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides viz:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies
with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option
and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d’etre for this provision has been
enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
In conformity with the foregoing pronouncement, we hold that petitioner, as landowner, has two options. It may
appropriate the new house by reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market value thereof minus the cost of the old
house. Under this option, respondent Angeles would have "a right of retention which negates the obligation to pay rent." In
the alternative, petitioner may sell the lots to respondent Angeles at a price equivalent to the current fair value thereof.
However, if the value of the lots is considerably more than the value of the improvement, respondent Angeles cannot be
compelled to purchase the lots. She can only be obliged to pay petitioner reasonable rent.

Heirs of Durano Sr. vs Spouses Uy

344 SCRA 238 [GR No. 136456 October 24, 2000]
Facts: As far back as August 1970, a 128 hectare of land located in the barrios of Dunga and Cahumayhumayan, Danao
City. On December 27, 1973, the late Congressman Ramon Durano Sr. together with his son Ramon Durano III, and the
latter’s wide Elizabeth Hotchkins-Durano, instituted an action for damages against spouses Angeles Sepulveda Uy and
Emigdio Beng Sing Uy, Spouses Faustino Alatan and Valeriana Garro, Spouses Rufino Lavador and Aurelia Mata,
Silvestre Ramos, Hermogenes Tito, Teotimo Gonzales, Primitiva Garro, Julian Garro, Ismael Garro, Bienvido Castro,
Glicerio Alcala, Felemon Lavador, Candelario Lumantao, Garino Quimbo, Justino Tito, Marcelino Gonzales, Salvador
Duyday, Venancia Repaso, Leodegracia Gonzales, Jose dela Calzada, Restituta Gonzales, and Cosme Ramos before
branch XVII of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Danao City.. Herein respondents are the possessors of the
subject parcel of land which they are cultivating, it was used to be owned by CEPCO who later sold the same to Durano &
Co. On September 15, 1990, Durano & Co sold the disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who procured the
registration of these lands in his name under TCT no. T-103 and T-104. The different parts of the entire land was
bulldozed by the petitioner’s company resulting to the destruction of plants and other products that were placed by the
respondents. Hence, a claim for damages was lodged against herein petitioner. The respondents presented tax
declaration covering the different areas of the parcel of land that is titled in each of them as proof that they are entitled for
the said damages.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity can be applied in order to make Durano & Co
liable for damages.
Held: Yes. The court of appeals applied the well-recognized principle of piercing the corporate veil, i.e. the law will regard
the act of the corporation as the ac of its individual stockholders, when it is shown that the corporation was used merely
as an alter ego by those persons in the commission of fraud or other illegal acts.
That the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:
Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time
no separate mind, will or existence of its own.
Such control must, have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of statutory or
other positive legal duty, on dishonest and unjust acts in contravention of plaintiff’s legal right; and
The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents the piercing the corporate veil. In applying the instrumentality or alter
ego doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality not form, with how the corporation operated and the individual
defendants relationship to that operation.

BINALAY VS. MANALO

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation of
the soil deposits must be slow and hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership thereof. Also,
the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latter’s daughter and
from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside
the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land underwater during the rainy season
(September to December). On sunny days, however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry season (January to
August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was then
underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two braches (western
and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed
of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the “island”/elongated strip of land
formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth.
The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite
Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the river’s fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other
edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products)
and also cultivate the western strip during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of title,
possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and
Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when the land dries up for the
most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in Gov’t of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de
San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the subject matter in this case was a lake so that the definition of a
“bed” was different.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level of waters
of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property of
public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The dried
up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical and very
prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was called “Rio Muerte de Cagayan.”
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the civil code states that rivers are property
of public dominion. The word “river” includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually owned
that part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a
sizable area could have been brought about by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil
or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion should’ve
been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not
adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it – across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep
may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the
river in a slow and gradual manner.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL

G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

FACTS
Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of Manila were formerly a part of a large parcel
of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when
the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state. On 1912, the
Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken
from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the
Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of
the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of land belonging to
their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in interest having taken possession thereof,
said lots belong to them.

ISSUE

To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

RULING

The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting
it remained submerged, the claimants-appellees may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the
sea or seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as
public dominion remained unchanged. As provided by Article 5 of the Law of Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTOS

[G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012]

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest by John Paul C. Ladiao (21 Sept 2015)

Topic: Survey of the Land – Form & Contents Sections 15-19

FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque
City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-
A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-
OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on
Jan. 3, 1968.

On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land property survey inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3,
1968 is classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.

HELD:
NO. The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; DISMISSES the application for
registration.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that
the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that
dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law
that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.