Mike Fawcett

Department for Transport

3/26A Great Minster House
76 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 4DR

16th April 2010

Dear Mike

HEATHROW HIGH SPEED RAIL ACCESS REVIEW

Thank you for your recent letter inviting the Northern Way to submit summary
evidence to Lord Mawhinney‟s review of Heathrow-related high speed rail options.
Attached is the Northern Way‟s submission.

If you or Lord Mawhinney would find it helpful, David Begg as Chairman of the
Northern Transport Compact and/or myself would be more than pleased to meet and
discuss the Northern Way‟s submission further. The first page summarises the key
issues that we are raising.

Yours sincerely

John Jarvis

John Jarvis
Northern Way Transport Director
Yorkshire Forward
Victoria House
2 Victoria Place
Leeds
LS11 5AE
Tel: 0113 394 9590
Fax: 0113 394 9880
E: john.jarvis@yorkshire-forward.com
W: www.thenorthernway.co.uk
HEATHROW HIGH SPEED RAIL ACCESS REVIEW

SUBMISSION TO LORD MAWHINNEY

Summary

International connectivity is vital for the North‟s businesses to trade

internationally, to attract inward investment and to support inbound
tourism.
The international connectivity that is currently provided by Heathrow is a
national asset. This would be reinforced by the planned expansion of
Heathrow.
While growing route networks from the North‟s airports will improve
international connectivity, inevitably there will also remain a need for
access to hub airports.
From Northern airports, journeys via overseas hubs typically offer longer
and more expensive journeys than connections via Heathrow.
Access to Heathrow‟s international connectivity is therefore of vital
economic importance to the North. As well as complementing the
connectivity provided by direct services from the Northern airports, it
offers typically shorter duration journeys at lower cost than international
alternatives.
Domestic air services from the North to Heathrow have declined and
now only Manchester and Newcastle offer services to Heathrow.
Continuing capacity pressures in advance of Heathrow‟s planned
expansion are anticipated to reduce further the North‟s air links to
Heathrow.

High speed rail links between the North and Heathrow offer the

opportunity to restore the North‟s connectivity to Heathrow and hence

enhance the North‟s connectivity to international markets. High speed
links allow for the economic benefits of Heathrow and its planned
expansion to be shared with the North.
High speed rail links to Heathrow have the added benefit of providing a
lower carbon alternative to those domestic flights that will operate
between the North and London, and Scotland and London, as well as
providing a lower carbon alternative to transfer internationally.
The evidence that the demand (and hence benefits and revenue) for rail
services to airports is maximised by removing the need for interchange
is compelling.

 The Northern Way

1.1 The Northern Way is a unique initiative, bringing together the cities and
regions of the North of England to work together to improve the sustainable
economic development of the North towards the level of more prosperous
regions. Formed as a partnership between the three Regional Development
Agencies (North West Development Agency, One North East and Yorkshire
Forward), we also work with local authorities, universities, the private sector
and other partners to secure a strong coalition in support of this goal. We
aim to influence policy and delivery at a local, city region, regional and
national level, to join up thinking and encourage collaboration.

The Northern Way Growth Strategy

1.2 Published in 2004, the Northern Way Growth Strategy Moving Forward: The
Northern Way1 sets out how the Northern Way seeks to bridge the output
gap. The Growth Strategy was developed to build on the North‟s three
Regional Economic Strategies and Regional Spatial Strategies. The Growth
Strategy highlights transport as a priority area for transformational change.
The importance of transport to the North‟s economic future was reaffirmed in
the stock-take of the Northern Way‟s activity undertaken in 2007 and it is
now one of three key areas that are a focus of Northern Way activity.

1.3 The Northern Way Growth Strategy pre-dated the Eddington Transport
Study. Nonetheless, both reached the same conclusion on the importance of
access to international gateways to economic growth.

The Strategic Direction for Transport

1.4 To underpin the Growth Strategy, the Northern Way has developed a
Strategic Direction for Transport2. The Strategic Direction is an evidence-
based assessment of the most appropriate transport interventions that will
promote productivity gain, while at the same time seeking to protect and
enhance the North‟s natural and built environment and contributing to
meeting the nation‟s commitments regarding climate change. Looking over a
20 to 30 year time horizon, it sits below the high-level transport goals of the
Growth Strategy and above the level of individual schemes and projects.
The Strategic Direction sets out the types of interventions which will have
greatest productivity impact.

1.5 The Strategic Direction identifies connections from the North to London and
to Heathrow as a critical issue for businesses in the North, as well as for
inbound tourism. These links are of vital importance to the North‟s future
economic prospects and the Strategic Direction identifies the need for their
improvement.

1
http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/page.asp?id=479
2
http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/page.asp?id=433

 The Northern Way’s Short, Medium and Long Term Transport

Priorities

1.6 As part of the Strategic Direction, the Northern Way undertook to develop
Short, Medium and Long Term Transport Priorities3 for investment in the
North‟s transport system. The Northern Way‟s prioritisation work shows that
while the transport proposals being pursued by stakeholders across the
North will make worthwhile contributions to productivity growth, taken
together they do not allow the Strategic Direction to be met. Consequently, if
the North‟s productivity growth is to be maximised these strategic delivery
“gaps” (between what is currently being promoted and what the Strategic
Direction suggests will be required) need to be addressed.

1.7 The identified gaps include the absence of firm proposals on how to keep
the motorway and trunk road networks moving in a no road user charging
scenario, as well as the absence of a north-south strategy for rail. Both of
these issues are pertinent to how in the future air passengers and freight will
access Heathrow from the North.

North South Links

1.8 The Northern Way went on to undertake work which demonstrates the
importance of north-south rail connections to the Northern economy. This
work was published in September 20074. The report highlights the
importance of providing enhanced additional capacity for north-south links to
London and key international gateways such as Heathrow (for passengers
and for freight) and argues that a high speed rail solution should be
developed to meet both these needs.

1.9 As well as the substantial conventional benefits (predominantly from faster

journey times and less crowding) that a high speed rail network will bring,
our September 2007 work identifies the additional productivity benefits that
quicker north-south and trans-Pennine journeys will bring to the North and
which hitherto had not been considered by Government. These benefits
have now been explicitly recognised in the work undertaken by HS2 and
submitted to the Department for Transport at the end of last year. They also
form part of the economic case for high speed rail identified by
Greengauge21.

Heathrow Expansion

1.10 In February 2008, the Northern Way responded to the Department for
Transport‟s consultation on Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport. In the
Northern Way‟s submission we identified:

3
http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/page.asp?id=447
4
http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/page.asp?id=451

 Heathrow‟s route network means it is a key international gateway for

the North of England.
Of Heathrow passengers with ultimate origin or destination in the
North of England, around two-thirds use domestic air services to
Northern airports before completing their journey by car or surface
public transport. The other third access Heathrow by surface
transport.
Domestic air links from the North to Heathrow are therefore of
significant economic importance.
However, short-term financial considerations by the airlines are
placing these services under threat as scarce capacity at Heathrow is
leading airlines to pursue better financial returns by reallocating their
assets (slots, aircraft etc.) from domestic routes to international
services. While from the airlines‟ perspective such decisions are
understandable, they have a significant adverse economic
consequence to the North. The submission noted that the routes from
Durham Tees Valley and Leeds Bradford appeared most at risk. Since
responding to the Heathrow consultation in February 2008, both these
results have been curtailed.
The Government‟s proposals for expansion at Heathrow offered no
assurance that capacity would be available for domestic services.
Furthermore, the continuing pressures on Heathrow capacity in the
period to new capacity coming on stream would result in further
reductions in air connectivity with the North.

1.11 Consequently, the Northern Way expressed concern that the Government‟s
consultation document on Heathrow expansion included no meaningful
discussion of access to Heathrow from the North, by either air or surface
transport. This means that it is unclear how the North will share the
economic benefits from Heathrow‟s expansion.

1.12 In our Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport consultation response, the

Northern Way therefore called for the Government to investigate how in the
longer term as part of a new national high speed rail network, the desired
levels of service from the North to Heathrow can be provided by direct rail
links on corridors both east and west of the Pennines. In the light of this, the
Northern Way subsequently welcomed that HS2‟s terms of reference
included consideration of how Heathrow could be served by high speed rail.

1.13 A copy of the Northern Way‟s response to the Adding Capacity at Heathrow
Airport consultation accompanies this submission for reference purposes.

Air Links between Heathrow and the North

1.14 On 19th February 2009, BMI announced its withdrawal of two key routes to
Heathrow from Leeds Bradford and Durham Tees Valley. BMI‟s decision
was a result of airline consolidation and strategic decisions on BMI‟s route
network favouring long haul routes, combined with lack of capacity. The

 landing charges regime at Heathrow, as well as Air Passenger Duty, were

further considerations.

1.15 Fast, direct and reliable links to Heathrow are important to the economies of
the North. Over time, growing networks from the North‟s airports will
enhance the North‟s international connectivity. Nonetheless, given that
Heathrow serves the nation‟s capital and has international hub status, it will
always remain the case that, freed from capacity constraints, Heathrow will
offer a more extensive route network than can be offered from any Northern
airport.

1.16 International connectivity from the North is of course also available via other
European and inter-continental hub airports and will continue to be so in the
future. However, current experience (as illustrated by Tables 1 to 3 below for
a European, North American and Pacific Rim destination) is that for a typical
business trip (one booked at short notice for a short duration) these links
take longer and are more often than not more expensive than direct flights
from Heathrow. Typical experience is that flying from a Northern airport via
Heathrow offers a shorter aggregate journey time, although airlines offering
services via competing international hubs seek to compensate by offering
lower prices than the Heathrow option.

Table 1: Time and Cost to Madrid

Origin via Outbound Return Average Economy Fare

Airport Time Time Time
Newcastle Paris 04:35 04:30 04:32 £358.40
Manchester Amsterdam
(out)
Paris (rtn) 05:00 04:25 04:42 £246.20
Leeds
Bradford Amsterdam 04:30 04:35 04:32 £244.60
Durham
Tees Valley Amsterdam 04:25 04:40 04:32 £327.90
London
Heathrow Direct 02:20 02:15 02:17 £234.80

 Table 2: Time and Cost to New York

Origin Via Outbound Return Average Economy Fare

Airport Time Time Time
Newcastle London
Heathrow 11:10 09:10 10:10 £432.81
Manchester Direct (to 07:50 06:50 07:20 £426.42
Newark)
Leeds 10:35 10:20 10:27 £387.07
Bradford Amsterdam
Durham 10:30 10:25 10:27 £355.45
Tees Valley Amsterdam
London 07:30 06:55 07:12 £365.65
Heathrow Direct

Table 3: Time and Cost to Hong Kong

Origin Via Outbound Return Average Economy Fare

Airport Time Time Time
Newcastle London
Heathrow 14:30 15:40 15:05 £1,253.30
Manchester London
Heathrow 13:40 14:40 14:10 £1,255.50
Leeds
Bradford Amsterdam 14:45 17:45 16:15 £1,609.90
Durham
Tees Valley Amsterdam 14:25 17:30 15:57 £1,587.30
London
Heathrow Direct 11:40 12:40 12:10 £1,158.10

Notes to Tables 1 to 3:
th nd
Flights are for 15 April 2010 returning seven days later on 22 April 2010
Selected flights are shortest aggregate duration of outbound and return journey times,
except where the cost is 50% greater than the direct Heathrow flight in which
circumstances the next shortest trip is chosen
th th
Data is from Expedia.co.uk and was accessed on 9 and 12 April 2010.

1.17 In summary, insufficient capacity and the constraints on growth at Heathrow

have left the North in a position today of inadequate aviation links to
Heathrow. This, in turn, reduces the North‟s international connectivity. In
particular, the loss of the direct links from Yorkshire and the North East has
impacted detrimentally on the North‟s competitive position. Across the North,
BMI‟s decision leaves only Manchester and Newcastle Airports with
Heathrow services. British Airways reduced its Newcastle Heathrow service
from seven to six flights a day in 2006, and to five flights in the Winter

6
 season 2008/09. For those destination not served directly from Northern
airports, the trend will be for greater reliance on international hubs and the
longer journey times that these connections offer will worsen the North‟s
connectivity for time-sensitive business travellers. It will make the North less
attractive for overseas investment. It will also make the North less attractive
for inbound tourism and incur economic costs to outbound leisure travellers.

Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed

Rail for the North: The Northern Way’s High Speed Rail Position
Statement

1.18 In September 2009, the Northern Way submitted its High Speed Rail
Position Statement to HS2 Ltd and to Lord Adonis. The Position Statement
was also published on the Northern Way‟s website.

1.19 Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the
North is the Northern Way‟s assessment of available evidence on high
speed rail and how it can help accelerate the North‟s economic growth.
Before publication it was endorsed as a position statement by the Northern
Way Transport Compact and the Northern Way Steering Group. In
developing the Position Statement we took into account the evidence
developed by Network Rail and Greengauge21. We also took into account
the Northern Way‟s own evidence, evidence commissioned by our regional
and city regional partners, as well as international experience of high speed
rail.

1.20 The Position Statement identifies a compelling economic case for the North
to be linked to London and the South East and to Scotland by a two line
north-south high speed rail network that serves the east and west side of the
country. Furthermore, the Position Statement identifies that the benefits of a
high speed rail network will be maximised by linking the North directly to
Heathrow Airport. As we have set out above, the Northern Way has reached
this position principally because of the significant economic benefits that will
come from the North‟s enhanced international connectivity. The Northern
Way also notes the significant and worthwhile reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions that would come from substituting the remaining domestic air links
from the North (and Scotland) with high speed rail services.

1.21 In developing its position, the Northern Way was mindful of the forceful
evidence that as well as by minimising journey times, the attraction of rail
services to airports (and hence their demand, revenue and benefits) is
maximised by removing the need to interchange (and conversely, that
demand, revenue and benefits is reduced if there is no option but to
interchange).

1.22 A copy of Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed
Rail for the North is attached to this submission.

 High Speed Rail to Heathrow

1.23 Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt and Amsterdam Schiphol, Heathrow‟s

principal competitor airports in continental Europe, are each served by high
speed rail (or in the case of Schiphol, soon will be). High speed services at
these airports are integrated into national and European high speed
networks. They provide access to air passengers as an alternative to
domestic or international short-haul air services and the airports operate as
surface transport hubs in their own right. As well as delivering economic
benefits to the North, serving Heathrow by high speed rail will help
strengthen that Heathrow‟s competitive position, as well as create the
opportunity for a West London transport hub, which in turn will return further
benefits.

1.24 The Northern Way is aware of the proposal developed by Arup for the
provision of a high speed rail station adjacent to the Great Western Main
Line, with Heathrow served by a network of „people mover‟ fixed links. Arup
canvassed the Northern Way‟s support for their proposition. In response, we
agreed with the thrust of Arup‟s public statement that Heathrow would work
best when directly connected to a high speed rail network. We also agreed
high speed rail offers businesses better access to global gateways and
would encourage people to access Heathrow by train, not car or air, and so
benefit the environment.

1.25 However, we did not agree with the implication of the Arup proposal that
HS2 must run directly through Heathrow. Diversion of HS2 to Heathrow
would add to journey times between London and the North, thereby reducing
its attractiveness and the overall benefits that high speed rail will bring to the
North. We noted that the Northern Way would like to see other alternatives
to Arup‟s Heathrow Hub proposals fully investigated for linking Heathrow to
a high speed rail network and delivering high speed rail connectivity into the
heart of Heathrow. In this respect, Lord Mawhinney‟s review is very timely
and welcome.

1.26 A copy of the Northern Way‟s response to Arup is attached to this

submission.

1.27 The Northern Way is a member of the Greengauge21 Public Interest Group
and the evidence developed by Greengauge21 was one of the sources
considered when developing our Position Statement. Since the publication
of the Position Statement in September 2009, the Northern Way has
continued to be an active member of the Public Interest Group.

1.28 In February 2010, Greengauge21 published The Heathrow Opportunity. This

sets out evidence why direct high speed rail links to Heathrow would be
more beneficial than links from the North that required interchange. The
Heathrow Opportunity also sets out a number of high speed rail alignment
options that would allow direct high speed rail services to the North.

1.29 We would encourage Lord Mawhinney‟s review to give consideration to this

further evidence from Greengauge21 on the importance of direct rail links to
Heathrow, and the alignment and network options that Greengauge21 has
put forward, alongside the HS2 and Arup evidence.