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*
G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000.

ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Courts; Judgments; Memorandum Decisions; Although a

memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it
cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court—the court must make a full findings of fact
and conclusion of law of its own.—The Constitution requires that
“[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.” The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides that “[T]he judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement
of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon
which the judgment is based.” Although a memorandum decision
is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to
the findings of fact and the conclusions, of law of the lower court.
The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusion of law
of its own.
Same; Same; Judges; Judges disposed to pay lip service to
their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously
take refresher courses on decision writing.—The decision of the
regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a
similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said: “[I]t is
starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in
its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even
at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its
inadequacy speaks for itself.” Judges similarly disposed to pay lip
service

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals

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to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously

take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff
sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Criminal Law; Unjust Vexation; Where the accused admitted
having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone
lines of the complainant’s business, without any necessary permits
or authorization to relocate the lines, and timing the interruption
of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the
operation of business of the complainant, he is liable for unjust
vexation.—Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the
electric, water and telephone lines of complainant’s business
establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He
failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary
permits or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the
interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak
hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus,
petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.
Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust
vexation.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Roberto C. Leong and Juanito S. Amihan, Jr. for
petitioner.
     William Su for private respondent.

PARDO, J.:

What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of

the Court of Appeals affirming the 1 conviction of accused
Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust vexation.
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres
M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court,
Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with
unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes
and telephone lines of “Crazy

_______________

1 In CA-G.R. CR No. 14209, promulgated on August 16, 1993,

TayaoJaguros, J., ponente, de Pano, Jr. and Isnani, JJ., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 47-51.

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Feet,” a business
2
establishment owned and operated by
Mildred Ong.
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong
Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to “relocate” the
telephone, electric and water lines of3 “Crazy Feet,” because
said lines posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu
Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate
authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water 4
pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal
Trial Court
5
found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust
vexation,
6
and sentenced him to “imprisonment for twenty
days.” The court also ordered him to pay moral damages,
finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the
electric, water pipe and telephone lines of “Crazy Feet”
caused the interruption of its business operations during
peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong.
The trial court also awarded exemplary damages to
complainant “as a deterrent to the accused not to follow7
similar act in the future and to pay attorney’s fees.” The
trial court disposed of the case as follows:

“IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of unjust vexation provided under
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days and to pay
private complainant the following:
P 10,000.00—moral damages
P 5,000.00—exemplary damages
P 5,000.00—attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of this suit.”

_______________

2 Information, Rollo, p. 113.

3 Motion for Reconsideration etc., Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 119-128, at p. 122.
4 Ibid., at p. 127.
5 In Crim. Case No. 48294, Decision, dated September 1, 1992, Judge Rafael O.
Penuela, presiding, Comment, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 171-178.
6 The term “imprisonment for twenty days” is wrong. The court must use the
terminology of the Revised Penal Code, namely, twenty days of arresto menor.
(People v. Palomar, 278 SCRA 114, 151-152 [1997]).
7 Comment, Annex “B,” Rollo, at p. 178.

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Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals

SO ORDERED.
Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.
(SGD.) RAFAEL O. PENUELA8
Judge”      
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On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the

latter court in a decision dated December 8, 1992,
simplistically adopted the decision of the lower
9
court in
toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong 10Chiu
Kwan elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On
August 16, 1993, the Court of11 Appeals promulgated its
decision dismissing the appeal, agreeing with the lower
court’s finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of unjust vexation. 12
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional
Trial Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed
peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional
Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:

“This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to

submit their corresponding memorandum or brief. The
prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.
“After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating
the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no
ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated 13 decision and
hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto.”

The Constitution requires that “[N]o decision shall be

rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the

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8 Ibid.
9 Manifestation, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 119-128; also Comment, Annex
“C,” Rollo, pp. 179-190. Judge Emma C. Labayen, presiding.
10 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14209.
11 Petition, Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 47-51.
12 Petition filed on January 14, 1994, Rollo, pp. 8-40. On March 1, 2000,
we gave due course to the petition. Rollo, pp. 392-393.
13 Rollo, p. 128.

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Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals

14
facts and the law on which it is based.” The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that “[T]he
judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed
by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement
of the facts proved or admitted by the
15
accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.”
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Although a memorandum decision is permitted under

certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of
fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court
must make
16
a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of
its own.
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a
nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded
decision of a regional trial court, we said:

“[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and

trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing,
not even at a simple summation of facts 17
which could easily be
done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.”

Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work

must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take
refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff
sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower
court for compliance with the constitutional requirement of
contents of a decision. However, considering that this case
has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be
fully served if we review the evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the
electric, water and telephone lines of complainant’s
business establishment because these lines crossed his
property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he
had the necessary permits or authorization

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14 Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution,

15 Rule 120, Sec. 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.
16 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344
SCRA 202; Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, 335 (1989).
17 Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 16.

591

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Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals

to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of

electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of
the operation of business of the complainant. Thus,
petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.
Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for
unjust vexation.
Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to be without basis.
Moral damages may be recovered if they were the 18
proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
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An award of exemplary damages is justified if the crime

was committed 19
with one or more aggravating
circumstances. There is no evidence to support such
award. Hence, we delete the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong
Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00,
and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and

YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—Court decisions are based on facts and

reasoned arguments, not on surveys of popular sentiments.
(People vs. Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471 [1999])
The elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the
crime of rape as defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. (People vs. Contreras, 338 SCRA 622 [2000])

——o0o——

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18 Article 2217, Civil Code.

19 Article 2230, Civil Code.

592

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Llorente vs. Court of Appeals

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