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Dabalos v. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City, G.R. No.

193960, 07 January 2013)

FACTS: Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the complainant
whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling of hair, punching the
complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have demeaning and degrading effects on the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic
Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the relationship had already ceased at the time of the
alleged incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate cause
of the violence?

RULING: Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he
has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of violence should be a
consequence of such relationship.

Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010)

Facts: After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.)
9262.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present
for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. 15 January 2004)

Facts: Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why
Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing
of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held: For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated
partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based
on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

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