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Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only
occurrences of the employment relationship
Brief Fact Summary. and not with any specific contractual
Carroll (Plaintiff) worked as a railroad obligations. Reversed and remanded.
brakeman, and was injured in Mississippi due to
the failure of other employees’ to inspect the Dissent.
brakes in Alabama. Under the First Restatement, where a tort is
involved the choice of law focuses on the situs
Synopsis of Rule of Law. of the wrong””that is, where the last incidence
Where a negligent act is committed in one required to make the defendant liable took
state, but causes injury in a different state, an place. This will usually be the place of plaintiff’s
action seeking damages for injuries resulting injury.
from the act may be brought only in the state
where the result occurred, and not where the Auten v Auten (1922) – Fuld, J.
act was committed. Plaintiff: Margarite Auten
Defendant: Harold Auten
Facts. Concept:
Carroll (Plaintiff), a resident of Alabama, was
injured in Mississippi due to a break in a Brief facts: Margarite Auten sues Harold Auten
defective railroad car link. The Railroad’s in New York to recover support for her and her
(Defendant) employees had been negligent in children that Harold owed by virtue of a
their duty to inspect the links in Alabama. separation agreement. The Autens were
Plaintiff sued the Defendant in Alabama under a married in England. Harold deserted her, went
state statute that authorized recovery. to America, obtained a Mexican divorce, then
Mississippi would have denied recovery as it married another woman. Margarite went to
had no similar statute. New York, where she and Harold came to a
separation agreement which provided that
Issue. Harold was to pay to a trustee, for Margarite’s
May recovery be obtained for a tortious act in account, 50 pounds sterling (British currency) a
the state where the breach of duty occurred, month for her support and that of their 2
but not the injury? children. The agreement also provided that they
were not to sue each other in any action
Held. relating to their separation, and Margarite
(McClellan, J.) No. The general rule is that would not cause any complaint against Harold
recovery cannot be made in one state for the in any jurisdiction because of his alleged divorce
injuries to the person sustained in a different and remarriage. Harold made a few payments
state unless the infliction of the injuries is only, so Margarite filed a petition for separation
actionable under the law of the state where the in England, charging Harold with adultery.
injuries were received. In this case, up to the Harold was served in New York with process in
time the train passed from Alabama, no injury that suit and he was ordered to pay alimony
had resulted. The Alabama statute has no pendent lite. This English case never proceeded
efficiency beyond state lines. Only Mississippi to trial. Margarite instituted the instant suit to
could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim. recover support due under the agreement.
There may have been a different result if Carroll Doctrine: Center of Gravity/Grouping of
had been injured in Alabama but suffered in Contacts Theory: The courts, instead of
Mississippi. As for an argument that the regarding as conclusive the parties’ intention or
Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual the place of making or performance, lay
duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in emphasis rather upon the law of the place

which has the most significant contacts with the constituted a rescission and repudiation of the
matter in dispute. separation agreement? English

1. 1917: Harold and Margarite Auten were Based on the “center of gravity” or “grouping of
married in England, living there with their 2 contacts” theory of the conflict of laws, English
children until 1931. law governs.
2. 1931: According to Margarite, Harold The decisions in New York jurisprudence as to
deserted her, came to America, obtained a which law applies to contracts with elements in
Mexican divorce, then married another woman. different jurisdictions show several approaches.
3. 1933: They came to a separation o Most of the cases rely on these general
agreement, which provided that: rules, which were thought to be conclusive:
o Harold was to pay to a trustee, for the • "All matters bearing upon the
account of Margarite, £50 (50 pounds sterling) a execution, the interpretation and the validity of
month for the support of Margarite and her 2 contracts are determined by the law of the
children. place where the contract is made"
o They were to live separate and apart. • "All matters connected with
o They were not to sue each other in any performance are regulated by the law of the
action relating to their separation. place where the contract, by its terms, is to be
o Margarite would not cause any performed."
complaint to be lodged against Harold in any • What constitutes a breach of the
jurisdiction because of the alleged divorce or contract and what circumstances excuse a
remarriage. breach are considered matters of performance,
4. Harold made a few payments only, governable, within this rule, by the law of the
leaving Margarite and her children destitute. place of performance.
5. August 1934: Margarite filed a petition o However, recent decisions have
for separation in an English court, charging innovated by employing a method that
Harold with adultery rationalizes the choice of law. This method has
6. December 4, 1936: Harold was served been called the “center of gravity” or “grouping
in New York with process in that suit. of contracts” theory.
7. July 1938: Harold was ordered to pay • “The courts, instead of regarding as
alimony pendente lite. conclusive the parties’ intention or the place of
8. This English case never proceeded to making or performance, lay emphasis rather
trial. upon the law of the place which has the most
9. 1947: Margarite brought the instant significant contacts with the matter in dispute.”
suit to recover $26,564 representing support • This method may seem less predictable
due under the agreement, from January 1, 1935 but it gives to the jurisdiction having the most
to September 1, 1947. interest in the problem, control over the legal
issues arising from a specific set of
CFI dismissed the complaint. circumstances, allowing the forum to apply the
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower rules of the jurisdiction most intimately
court’s decision connected with the outcome of the particular
ISSUES: • This has been thought to effect the
Which law applied as to the issue of whether probable intention of the parties when making
Margarite’s commencement of the English case their contract.
(petition for separation with charge of adultery) In the instant case:

o England has the most significant Emergency Recitation: Haag met Barnes in New
contacts with the case. York while Barnes was in a business trip. They
• The agreement was between British became friends since Barnes hired Haag as a
subjects. law secretary. Eventually, Haag became
• They were married in England. pregnant. As a result, they had an agreement
• They lived there as a family for 14 executed in Illinois, since Illinois was the
years. principal place of work of Barnes, wherein it
• Harold abandoned his family and was in provided the terms of support, that Haag
the US on a temporary visa. releases Barnes from any action, and that their
• Margarite’s sole purpose was to get agreement will be govern by the laws of Illinois.
Harold to agree to support their family. Eventually, Haag instituted a complaint in New
• The money was to be paid to a trustee York for the alleged violation of Sec. 64 of the
in New York but those who stood to benefit live New York City Criminal Courts Act. In dismissing
in England. the complaint and ruling in favor of Barnes, the
• The agreement refers to British court said that the Illinois laws would apply
currency (pounds sterling.) since it has the most significant contacts with
o New York’s only connection to the case the matter in dispute because: (1) both parties
is where the agreement was made , and where are designated as being “of Chicago, Illinois”; (2)
the trustee to whom the money was to be paid the child was born in Illinois; (3) the agents to
held office. act in behalf of the parties are all Illinois
o It is unlikely that Margarite intended to residents; and (4) support were always made
subject herself to the law of another state from Chicago, Illinois.
which she was not familiar with.
• English law must be applied. FACTS:
o It is for the courts of that state to • The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges
determine whether Margarite’s institution of a that in 1947 she moved from Minnesota and
case constituted a breach of their agreement. took up residence in New York City and that
o The Court noted that based on English since then she has been a resident of New York.
law, there was no breach of the agreement by • The defendant Norman Barnes, on the
Margarite. other hand, is a resident of Illinois.
• According to the statements contained
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Appellate in the complainant's affidavits:
Division and that of Special Term insofar as they o She met Barnes in the spring of 1954 in
dismiss the complaint should be reversed, with New York.
costs in all courts, and the matter remitted for o She was a law secretary and had been
further proceedings in accordance with this hired by Barnes to work for him while he was in
opinion. New York.
o The relationship between them
Haag v. Barnes "ripened into friendship" and, on the basis of
representations that he loved her and planned
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The more modern view to divorce his wife and marry her, she was
is that "the courts, instead of regarding as "importuned" into having sexual relations with
conclusive the parties' intention or the place of him.
making or performance, lay emphasis rather o That she became pregnant and that,
upon the law of the place `which has the most upon being informed of this, Barnes asked her
significant contacts with the matter in dispute'". to move to Illinois to be near him.
o She refused and, instead, went to live in
California with her sister to await the birth of

her child. Fearing that Barnes was losing • In opposition, Haag contended:
interest in her, she returned to Chicago before o That New York, not Illinois, law applies;
the child was born and, upon attempting to o That the agreement in question is not a
communicate with Barnes, she was referred to sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under
his attorney. The attorney told Haag to choose a either section 63 of the New York City Criminal
hospital in Chicago, which she did, and the baby Courts Act or section 121 of the Domestic
was born there with Barnes paying the Relations Law, since both of these provisions
expenses. provide that "An agreement or compromise
• Shortly after the birth of the child, Haag made by the mother * * * shall be binding only
attempts to see Barnes in New York failed and when the court shall have determined that
she was advised by Barnes’ attorney to return adequate provision has been made"; and
to Chicago in order that an agreement might be o That, even were the Illinois law to
made for the support of her and her child. apply, it does not bar the present proceeding.
• Returning to that city, Haag procured an
attorney and signed an agreement which ISSUE(S): Whether the law of New York or of
provides: Illinois applies
o For the child’s support;
o That Haag releases Barnes from all HELD: The law of Illinois applies. The motion to
manner of actions; and dismiss was properly granted.
o That their agreement "shall in all
respects be interpreted, construed and RATIO:
governed by the laws of the State of Illinois". • Haag may not upset a support
• Shortly after the agreement was signed, agreement which is itself perfectly consistent
Haag lived in California for 2 years. She then with the public policy of New York, which was
returned to New York where she and her child entered into in Illinois with the understanding
have ever since been supported by Barnes in that it would be governed by the laws of Illinois
full compliance with the terms of the and which constitutes a bar to a suit for further
agreement. In fact, Barnes has provided sums in support under Illinois law.
excess of their agreement. • The traditional view was that the law
• The present proceeding was instituted governing a contract is to be determined by the
in 1959 and Barnes was thereafter arrested intention of the parties. However, The more
pursuant to section 64 of the New York City modern view is that "the courts, instead of
Criminal Courts Act. regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or
• A motion, made by Barnes, to dismiss the place of making or performance, lay
the proceeding was granted by the Court of emphasis rather upon the law of the place
Special Sessions and the resulting order was `which has the most significant contacts with
affirmed by the Appellate Division. the matter in dispute'". Whichever of these
o The ground urged for dismissal was that views one applies in this case, however, the
the parties had entered into an agreement answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law
providing for the support of the child which has applies.
been fully performed; • The agreement, in so many words,
o That in this agreement the Haag recites that it "shall in all respects be
relinquished the right to bring any action for the interpreted, construed and governed by the
support of the child; and laws of the State of Illinois" and, since it was
o That, in any event, the action is also drawn and signed by Haag in Illinois, the
precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt,
which, the parties expressly agreed, would treat these factors as conclusive and result in
govern their rights under the agreement. applying Illinois law.

• But, even if the parties' intention and The court rejected a traditional fixed method of
the place of the making of the contract are not determining which law should apply, and
given decisive effect, they are nevertheless to instead, a process of weighing factors such as
be given heavy weight in determining which relationship between the party, decision to take
jurisdiction "`has the most significant contacts the trip, connections to the locality. Thus, the
with the matter in dispute'". Court held that the parties did not have
• And, when these important factors are substantial connection with Ontario and so it
taken together with other of the "significant would be unfair to apply the law as the location
contacts" in the case, they likewise point to was largely fortuitous. The Court found that the
Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts jurisdiction with the most connections was New
are the following: York and so New York law should apply.
o both parties are designated in the
agreement as being "of Chicago, Illinois", and GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Barnes’ place of business is and always has G.R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933
been in Illinois;
o the child was born in Illinois; FACTS:Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson
o the persons designated to act as agents Gibbs are both citizens ofCalifornia and
for the principals (except for a third alternate) domiciled therein since their marriage in July
are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for 1906. There was no antenuptial marriage
both parties who drew the agreement; and contract between the parties and during
o all contributions for support always theexistence their marriage the spouses
have been, and still are being, made from acquired lands in the Philippine Islands,as
Chicago. conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law
York contacts are of far less weight and of California, the community property of
significance. Chief among these is the fact that spouses who are citizens of California, upon the
child and mother presently live in New York and death of the wife previous to that ofthe
that part of the "liaison" took place in New husband, belongs absolutely to the
York. surviving husband without administration. In
intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on
Bobcock v. Jackson September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition.
The court granted said petition and entered a
A husband and wife from New York went on a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to
car trip with a friend Babcock to Ontario. While be the sole and absolute owner of said lands,
in Ontario they had a motor vehicle accident. applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of
Babcock sued Jackson, the driver, claiming his California.When this decree presented to
negligence caused the car crash. the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer
This case brought up a question of ‘choice of Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as
law’; if the law of the place of residence of the binding said decree of court and refused to
accident victims (New York) be applied, or, register the transfer oftitle of the said conjugal
should the law of the place of the tort (Ontario) property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that
be applied. Under the old conflict rules, the law thecorresponding inheritance tax had not been
of the place of the accident should apply. paid. Thereupon, Allison filed inthe said court a
However, Ontario had a law that prohibited petition for an order requiring the said register
passengers from suing the driver. of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to
the petitioner without requiring
previouspayment of any inheritance tax.

Gibbs in the lands aforesaidwas transmitted to

ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this
time of her death is theowner of a descendible transmissionplainly falls within the language of
interest in the Philippine lands. section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 ofthe
Administrative Code which levies a tax on
RULING: Thesecond paragraph Article 10 of the inheritances. It is unnecessaryin this proceeding
Civil Code provides:Nevertheless, legal and to determine the "order of succession" or the
testamentary successions, in respect to "extent ofthe successional rights" (article
theorder of succession as well as to the amount 10, Civil Code,supra) which would
of the successional rights and the intrinsic beregulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by California which was in effectat the time of the
thenational law of the person whose succession death of Mrs. Gibbs.
is in question, whatevermay be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may Grant v. Mcauliffe
besituated.The second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal ortestamentary Brief Fact Summary
succession has taken place in the Two California residents driving separate cars in
Philippines and inaccordance with the law of Arizona crashed into one another and one died
the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is as a result. Under Arizona law, a tort action did
consulted only in regard to the order of not survive the death of the plaintiff, while
succession or the extent of the successional under California law it did.
rights; in other words, the second paragraphof
article 10 can be invoked only when the Synopsis of Rule of Law
deceased was vested with a descendible Statutes providing for the survival of a tort
interest inproperty within the jurisdiction action if the plaintiff dies are procedural, not
of the PhilippineIslands. This fundamental substantive, and may be applied to a suit that
principle is stated in the first paragraph of arises from an injury sustained in a different
article 10of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal jurisdiction.
property is subject to the laws of thenation of
the owner thereof; real property to the laws of Facts: Pullen was a resident of California and
the country in whichit is situated.”Under this the driver of an automobile who died as result
broad principle, the nature and extent of the of an auto accident in which he was allegedly
title whichvested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the negligent party. The accident took place in
the acquisition of the community landshere in Arizona. Grant (Plaintiff), also a resident of
question must be determined in accordance California, was injured in the accident and
with thelex rei sitae. Itis admitted that the sought damages from McAuliffe (Defendant),
Philippine lands here in question were acquired Pullen’s administrator. Under California law,
ascommunity property of the conjugal tort actions survive the tortfeasor’s death,
partnership of the appellee and his wife.Under however, under Arizona law they do not. The
the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested California trial court found that Arizona law
of a title equal to thatof her husband. It results applied sine it was a substantive rather than
that the wife of the appellee was, by the lawof procedural nature and, therefore, granted
the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible McAuliffe’s (Defendant) motion to abate
interest, equal tothat of her husband, in the Plaintiff’s suit. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that
Philippine lands covered by certificatesof title the law was in fact procedural and therefore
Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the the law of the forum, California, should apply.
date of theiracquisition to the date of her
death.The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Issue

Is a survival statute as to tort actions in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

substantive law that would govern litigation The case arose when their overseas
over injuries sustained wherever the case is employment contracts were terminated even
tried? before their expiration. Under Bahrain law,
where some of the complainants were
Held deployed, the prescriptive period for claims
(Traynor, J.) No. A survival statute as to tort arising out of a contract of employment is one
actions is not substantive law that would govern year.
litigation over injuries sustained wherever the
case is tried. This court recognizes the doctrine ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on
that the substantive law of the place of the prescription of action based on the Amiri
wrong must govern litigation wherever it is Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
tried. However, the forum state may always prescription that shall be the governing law
follow its own procedural rules of law. Since
the authorities are split on whether a survival HELD: As a general rule, a foreign procedural
statute is procedural or substantive, this court law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
will determine which argument has the most matters, such as service of process, joinder of
merit. Because a survival statute does not actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so
create a new cause of action but simply allows forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum.
the continuation of an existing action, it is This is true even if the action is based upon a
procedural. All the relevant contacts are with foreign substantive law.
California and the survival statute does not
relate to liability but is a procedural rule to A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
enforce claims for damages. Since a court may Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
always follow its own procedural rules, this case viewed either as procedural or substantive,
may properly be tried under California law. depending on the characterization given such a
Reversed and remanded. law.

Cadalin v. POEA However, the characterization of a statute into

G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994 a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a
GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the
not be applied in the forum. practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing
EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has statute” directs the state of the forum to apply
a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
will apply the foreign statute of limitations. claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of provides that an action barred by the laws of
the forum will not enforce any foreign claim the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
obnoxious to the forum's public policy. in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil
FACTS: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC
for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & “If by the laws of the state or country where the
Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
such, they were all deployed at various projects also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
in several countries in the Middle East as well as

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however,

Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore Held
insofar as it ordains the application in this (Currie, J.) Yes. Where the place of the wrong
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree prohibits husbands and wives from suing each
No. 23 of 1976. other for negligence, the court of the spouses’
domicile may apply its own law that would
The courts of the forum will not enforce any allow such suits. This case presents the issue of
foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public capacity to sue due to marital status. This
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive relates to substantive family law and not to
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as substantive tort law. While the majority of the
regards the claims in question would states recognize the place of the wrong as
contravene the public policy on the protection governing capacity, we feel that the state of the
to labor. domicile has a greater interest in such cases
than the state where the wrong took place.
Haumschild v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d While California’s conflict of laws rule would
130, 95 N.W.2d 814, 1959 Wisc. LEXIS 402 (Wis. refer to our law to determine the wife’s
1959) capacity, we do not feel it proper to resort to
the awkward principles of renvoi to accomplish
Brief Fact Summary what we feel to be the desired result. The law
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) was injured as a of the place of the wrong will govern as to
result of her husband’s negligence while they substantive tort law, but the law of the domicile
were traveling in California. She brought suit in will govern as to capacity to sue. Mrs.
Wisconsin where they lived. Haumschild (Plaintiff) should be allowed to
recover. Reversed and remanded.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
Interspousal immunity for tort actions is a rule Discussion
of family law and not tort law and the law of the If the state of domicile will govern on the issue
spouses’ domicile governs, not the law of the of interspousal immunity, then a California wife
place where the wrong occurred. injured by her husband would be denied
recovery in a Wisconsin court. But if the state
Facts of domicile views the immunity question as
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) and her husband procedural tort law, the court’s decision would
(Defendant) were residents of Wisconsin appear unsatisfactory. Wisconsin would then
travelling in California. While in California, be imposing its substantive family law in
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident substitution for the other state’s procedural
as a result of her husband’s negligence. tort law. However, on balance, the Wisconsin
California law prohibited a husband or wife court’s approach would appear to be well-
from bringing suit against a spouse for reasoned, since the marital partners’
negligence, however, the law of Wisconsin did expectations (one could suppose) would appear
not. Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) sued her to be grounded in their domicile’s family law.
husband (Defendant) in Wisconsin.
Aznar v. Garcia
Issue 7 SCRA 95 – Civil Law – Application of Laws –
Where the place of the wrong prohibits Foreign Law – Nationality Principle – Internal
husbands and wives from suing each other for and Conflict Rule
negligence, may the court of the spouses’
domicile apply its own law which would allow Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
such suits?

Edward Christensen was born in New York but domiciliary of France, but by British law,
he migrated to California where he resided for a Annesley is a domiciliary of France. By the laws
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the of France, the estate of Annesley is governed by
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the laws of her nationality, but by the laws of
his death. In his will, he instituted an Britain, the estate of Annesley is governed by
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy the laws of the domicile. French law only allows
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but the testator to freely dispose of one-third of her
left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen estate.
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar
was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Issue
Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 Whether or not the succession is governed by
of the Civil Code, California law should be French law.
applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile. On the Held
other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the Yes. French law governs.
national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to Ratio
anything under California law. Notwithstanding the lack of a formal French
domicile, Annesley is a French domiciliary by
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the British law given the concurrence of actual
deceased should be applied in determining the residence in a foreign jurisdiction coupled with
successional rights of his heirs. the intent to remain there. Thus, French law
refers the matter to English law which, in turn,
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant will refer the matter back to French law.
more successional rights to Helen said in effect Consequently, in these circumstances, French
that there are two rules in California on the law dictates that French courts will apply the
matter; the internal law which applies to domestic law. Hence, French law governs the
Californians domiciled in California and the succession and Annesley may only dispose of
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside one-third of her estate.
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the
Philippines, the law of his domicile must be UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO V. DATER
followed. The case was remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings – the -GEORGE Dater (and his wife, Nellie Dater) and
determination of the successional rights under JOHN Price (and his wife, CLARA Price) obtained
Philippine law only. a loan for $75k in CHICAGO
-the loan is secured by a property in CHICAGO
Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley owned by George and John Price.
-the checks for the loan were payable and was
Facts: Sybil Annesley ("Annesley"), a British cashed in Chicago
subject, was married to a British domiciliary. -the debtor couples signed the trust mortgage
The spouses resided in France until the death of and notes in Michigan (they were residents of
the husband. Annesley remained in France Michigan), then delivered the documents back
without taking the steps set forth under French at Illinois, Chicago
law for the formal acquisition of domicile in that -upon death of Mr. Price, Mrs. Clara Price
country and seldom returned to Britain until her became the actual and record owner of at least
death. She left a will executed in France but in 1/2 of the mortgaged property.
British form bequeathing her estate to her
daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a

-Loan was not paid. So property was sought to -Student of Iowa (Parsons College, Iowa)
be foreclosed by University of Chicago? In Trent
Chicago… -domiciled in NJ
-George Dater was held liable while Clara Price -also a student of Iowa (Parsons College)
(the widow) was absolved, no COA -Trent agreed to drive Pfau to Missouri using a
-UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO appeals car registered in NJ, insured in NJ, and insured
by a carrier in NJ
ISSUE: WON Mrs. Price has the capacity to enter -car collision (NJ registered car driven by Trent
into an obligation in the state of Michigan (so as collided with Joseph Davis car when Trent failed
to make her liable)? to negotiate a curve) occurred in IOWA. Pfau
incurred injuries.
RATIO : NO. -Pfau sues before an NJ court
-dispute does not involve
construction/force/effect of instruments BUT IOWA Guest Statute
OF MRS. PRICE'S CAPACITY. A host-driver is not liable to his passenger-guest
-(not sure): apply law of the place of for ordinary negligence
performance (here it's Michigan) TRENT'S DEFENSE: he would not be liable
Michigan law
Illinois law
Mrs. Price has no personal liability on the note,
recoverable from her separate estate NJ and Connecticut Guest Statute
The case is governed by Michigan law…Burr guest-passengers can recover from their host-
Case divers for ordinary negligence
Burr v. Beckler: the wife, who was in Florida, PFAU's argument: Trent is liable
executed a note and trust deed in Florida to her
husband who was in Chicago. As the note was >as Pfau is a domiciliary of Connecticut, it
complete when delivered from Florida (thus, appears that Connecticut would have a
already completed in Florida), Florida law would significant interest in applying it's substantive
apply, and since Florida law holds that she is not law
competent to enter into a contract, her note >TRENT RAISES IOWA LAW AS A DEFENSE: Iowa
and trust deed were void. law should apply. If apply Connecticut law,
-Burr case and this case: should apply conflict of law rules. As
*manual delivery complete: already signed Connecticut adheres to LEX LOCI DELICTI, the
when delivered to the mortgagee law of the place where the incident happened
*no engagement to make the loan prior to should govern, i.e. Iowa law.
delivery (money cashed after execution of
mortgage) HELD: For PFAU!
*no advance payment of money Not definite that Pfau would be unable to
recover in either Connecticut or Iowa
HELD: MICHIGAN LAW applies. MRS. PRiCE NOT No reason for applying Connecticut's choice of
LIABLE. A married woman cannot bind her law, as Connecticut's choice-of-law does not
separate estate through personal engagement identify Connecticut's interest in the matter;
for the benefit of others. does not relate to a state's interest in having its
law applied to given issues in a tort case.
PFAU v. TRENT ALUMINUM CO. "since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and
since the substantive laws of Connecticut and
Pfau NJ are the same, this case presents a false
-domiciled in Connecticut conflict and the Connecticut plaintiff should

have the right to maintain an action for ordinary >>>but no proof that Texas has conflict-of-law
negligence. situs theory
-defense 1 of oppositors: Art17, Par3 (which
BELLIS V. BELLIS provides that Prohibitive laws in the Philippines
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
Amos Bellis judgments of foreign countries) is an exception
-born in Texas to Art 16, par2 and A1039, which on the other
-citizen of Texas hand provides that the national law of the
-executed a will in RP: all his property... decedent applies with regard 4 items:
-had 2 marriages and some illegitimate children (1) order of succession
Mary Mallen (1st wife) (2) amount of successional rights (thus,
-5 legit children in 1st marriage, 1 pre-deceased legitimes)
dad (3) intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
Violet Kennedy (2nd wife) (4) capacity to suceed
-3 legit children >SC: Congress deleted in what supposedly is
3 illegit children Art17 the phrase "notwithstanding the
-Oppositors-appellants provisions of this and the next preceding
-Amos executed a will in the Philippines: estate article" which means that their purpose was to
to be divided as follows: make the 2nd paragraph of Article 16 a specific
$40k to 1st wife provision in itself to be applied to testate and
$120 to 3 illegit children ($40k each) intestate successions
Remainder goes to 7 surviving children (it must *whatever public policy or good customs may
be big!) be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
-will admitted for Probate in MANILA has no intention to extend the same to the
-illegitimate children opposed project of succession of FOREIGN NATIONALS. Specific
partition: deprived of legitime as compulsory provisions should prevail over general ones
heirs -defense 2 of oppositors: decedent made 2
CFI: applied law of the nationality of the person wills, supposedly 1 would govern Texas
whose succession is in question - Texas law property and the other Philippine property.
Thus, he intended Philippine law to apply to his
Texas law Philippine estate
Did not provide for legitimes >SC: as was held in Miciano v. Brimo, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
Philippine law his properties shall be distributed in accordance
Provided for legitimes with Philippine law (and not the law of his
nationality) is illegal and void, for his national
ISSUE: WON Texas law should apply? YES law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Art10 and Art16 provides.

HELD: -No renvoi in this case: same nationality, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
same domicile (both in Texas); besides, the BANK (PCIB) V. ESCOLIN
opponents do not even rely on renvoi
-assuming there's a conflict-of-law rule in Texas *this is a case discussed in Succession under
providing that Fideicommisary Substitution (which Sir Danicon
...the law of the domicile should apply, still said to have been ruled correctly, i.e. no
apply Texas law fideicommisary substitution)
…situs theory: properties are in RP so apply RP Facts:

-Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (husband and

wife) provided mutually in their respective will a HELD: Texas law applies, but because of
provision wherein they would give all their estoppel (?) and it is yet to be proven…
estate to the surviving spouse, and upon the *note: in Succession, it was held in this case
death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of that there was no fideicommissary substitution
what has been inherited by the surviving spouse so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no
from the earlier deceased spouse would be obligation to preserve the properties inherited
bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other
later deceased. heirs (the siblings)
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was *no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB
appointed special administrator and later allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas
executor of the will. No liquidation was made. (although it was arguing that RP laws apply),
-Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal
appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate estate
and was initially also Mr. Hodges' estate but >>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the
PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for both estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as
estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of
and Magno) differed in the alleged share of the estate), for admissions by a party related to
Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal partnership the effects of foreign laws, which have to be
property that she could have bequeathed to her proven in our courts like any other controverted
heirs. fact, create estoppel.
PCIB Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr.
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her Hodges did renounce his share, it is clear from
share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges himself
law), notwithstanding Art16 of our Civil code as executor of his wife's estate that there are
which mandates the application of Texas law, properties which constitute the estate of Mrs.
Mr.Hodges being a citizen of Texas Hodges which should be distributed among her
heirs pursuant to her will
Magno It is now beyond controversy that whatever be
Texas law applicable, wherein no system of the provisions of Texas Law applicable, the
legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE
could not be less than her share or (?) >1/2 CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
-Existence and effects of foreign laws being
-there was also an allegation on the part of questions of fact, and it being the position now
Magno (for the brothers and sisters of Mrs. of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
Hodges) that Mr. Hodges made a renunciation pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3
of the inheritance in a manifestation to the US of the conjugal estate, such contention
inheritance tax authorities (probably to escape constitutes and admission of fact, and
inheritance tax liabilities), which was allegedly consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
ratified by the heirs in the Philippines. further proceedings in these cases to claim that
(court, though, did not rule on alleged said estate could be less, irrespective of what
renunciation. For purposes of the discussion, might be proven later to be the actual
Court assumed that renunciation was not provisions of Texas law...
upheld) Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate
estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should
ISSUE: WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, proceed, there having no proper and legal
should be applied and not Texas law? adjudication or distribution yet of the estate

Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs. decedent was not a resident of the state of
Hodges's estate Illinois
WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share ISSUE: WON Decedent a national of Illinois (to
WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of warrant the application of Illinois law)
the conjugal property
>>>case is remanded to trial court to allow the HELD: YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he
parties to present evidence in relation to these was indeed a national of Illinois. Petition merely
issues contests the residence of the decedent to be in
RULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT the Philippines, but not the nationality
THAT NO EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS LAWS? Court ISSUE: WON will executed in conformity with
said that evidence should still be presented re: the State of Illinois
what Texas law contains but PCIB now cannot
allege that the estate is less than 1/4… HELD: NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE PETITIONER
*Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may -Courts cannot take JN of Foreign laws: TC
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be merely relied on the presentation of Section
proven like any other fact in dispute between 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois as
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exhibited in a volume of an annotation and
exceptional n instances when the said laws are assumed that he could take JN of the laws of
already within the actual knowledge of the Illinois. But it was WRONG!!!
court, such as when they are well and generally -proper rule is to require proof of the statutes
known, or they have been actually ruled upon in of the States of the American Union whenever
other cases before it and none of the parties their provisions are determinative of the issues
concerned claim otherwise. in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON (1) petition does not state any fact from which
it would appear that the law of Illinois is
Emil Johnson (decedent) different from what the court found
-native of Sweden (2)petition did not raise any assignment of error
-Citizen of US (Illinois) to question the supposed taking of JN of the
-resident of RP at time of death court
-made a WILL ***
>signed and written by him FOREIGN LAW
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform 3 alternatives to the forum courts:
with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure Dismiss the case for inability to establish a COA
of the Philippines, which required 3 witnesses) Assume that the foreign law is the same as the
-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will law of the forum
was executed in accordance with the laws of Apply the law of the forum
Illinois (he was a citizen of Illinois) DISMISS THE CASE FOR INABILITY TO ESTABLISH
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it COA
to probate -court rests on the party relying on the foreign
--after will probated, her alleged daugher, Ebba law the burden of introducing proof of the
Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the contents of such law.
decree, saying that the will was not executed in -forum court would, upon proof of law, enforce
accordance with Illinois law, and that the a right existing under that foreign law. Hence,

failure to prove its content results in failure to proving that "law", has in some way adequately
establish a prima face case. assisted the court in judicially learning it
WALTON V. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO. where the common law does not prevail, our
doctrines relative to negligence, and to a
Walton master's liability for his servant's acts, may will
-citizen and resident of Arkansas not exist or be vastly different. So Walton can't
-seriously injured while temporarily in Saudi argue that the rudimentary tort principles
Arabia by a truck owned by Saudi ARAMCO should have been presumed to be recognized in
Saudi ARAMCO Saudi Arabia.
-incorporated in Delaware May hugas kamay paragraph from the court:
-licensed to do business in NY though it deemed unjust, as this involves both
-engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi US citizens, the court said it should strictly
Arabia enforce its laws
-Walton sued Saudi Aramco in NY.
-no evidence of Saudi Arabian law alleged by APPLY FORUM LAW
plaintiff, nor did the defendant offered to prove -parties who fail to introduce proof as to the
it. content of a foreign law acquiesce to the
NY TC: no JN of Saudi Arabian law, directed application of the forum law
verdict in favor of defendant -theory: basic law is forum law; when foreign
(so labo, di ba NY law ang basis nya or law not proved, then apply forum law.
something? Is Walton claiming under Saudi
Arabian law???) LEARY V. GLEDHILL

HELD: Affirm. Absolve defendant Saudi Aramco -both parties were acquainted in the military
Apply NY Conflict of law rules service
-substantive law applicable to alleged tort is the -in the past, they had corresponded, resulting
LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGED TORT to Leary purchasing $1,000 worth of stock
OCCURRED - so should apply Saudi Arabian -Gledhill invited Leary to France, wherein
law… BUT Saudi Arabian law was not proved. Gledhill told him that he needed $4,000 and he
-A federal court must receive evidence if it is could already raise $2,000, but needed Leary's
admissible according to the rules of evidence of help to raise the $4,000. No mention of selling
the state in which the court sits. plaintiff shares of stock
-Siegelman v. Cunard White Star: in this case, -Leary returned to Germany. From there, he
Court took JN of foreign law but this is an sent Gledhill $1,500 w/o indicating on the check
exception because US Court can easily or in the accompanying letter what the money
comprehend of ENGLISH decisions, which are was for.
like those of any state in US -Later, Leary sued Gledhill for recovery of the
$1,500 before NJ courts, which was allegedly a
-IN THIS CASE HOWEVER, it involved Saudi loan to Gledhill
Arabian Law: Comprehension of foreign "law" -Gledhill's defense: he didn't borrow money
is, to say the least, not easy, then, according to from Leary
the somewhat narrow interpretation of the NY >Moved to dismiss:
Statute by NY courts, a court "abuses" its (1) no promise to repay
discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes (2) no demand for repayment
judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not (3) no pleading or proof of the law of France
pleaded, and surely does so unless the party, where the transaction occured
who would otherwise have had the burden of

HELD: Apply NJ law board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their
-transaction occurred in France daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to
-France is not a common law jurisdiction (Court Manila from other airlines
took JN): so inappropriate to presume that the -Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based
principles of common law prevail there. on breach of contract of carriage before RTC
*BUT HERE (cf. Walton v. Saudi Aramco): even if Makati
did not present French law, not deemed to have -RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD +
lost COA and the court could presume any the Atty's fees
ff: -CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking
(1) French law same as law of forum being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no
(2) French law recognizes certain fundamental fraud nor bad faith on the part of TransWorld
principles, e.g. that the taking of a loan creates Airlines
an obligation upon the borrower to make Issue: WON MD should have been awarded for
repayment BF on part of TransWorld Airlines?
(3) parties by failing to prove the law of France Held: YES. Overbooking = BF
have acquiesced in having their dispute US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just
determined by the law of the forum presented statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather
-so TC presumed that the law of France in (customer service agent) in her deposition
common with that of other civilized countries wherein she said that OVERBOOKING WAS
recognizes a liability to make repayment under ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal
the facts here present, and its decision is not Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board.
w/o substantial merit -what is required to be able to prove foreign
-CON: difficult to determine WON the question law:
presented was of such a fundamental nature as *official publication
reasonably to warrant the assumption that it *copy of the written law attested by the officers
would be similarly treated by the laws of all having the legal custody of the record, or his
civilized countries deputy + certificate that such officer has
-here: the presumption # 2 (that forum law custody + seal of the office of the officer who
applies when parties fail to prove foreign law) is made the certification
universally applied regardless of the nature of >who can make the certification:
controversy …secretary of an embassy or legation
*** …consul general
ZALAMEA V. CA. Court rigorously applied the …consul
rule requiring proof of foreign law, held that …vice consul
since foreign law pleaded but not proven, …consular agent
private respondent's conduct was excused. …any officer in the foreign service of the
ZALAMEA V. CA -here, none presented to prove contents of the
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is Code of Federal Regulations for the Civil
allowed in US) Aeronautics Board
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased -so CA erred in finding that overbooking is
3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans allowed under US laws
World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount, and one Even if there is such US law existing allowing
full-fare. All tickets confirmed in Manila and re- overbooking, it's irrelevant!
confirmed in NY -lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold, issued
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their in RP so RP law applicable
seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was Overbooking = BF
holding the full-fare ticket, he was allowed to

-where an airline had deliberately overbooked,

it took the risk of having to deprive some HELD: Turkish law should be applied so
passengers of their seats in case all of them provision in the will void. Brimo would not be
would show up for check in. For the indignity disinherited, because of the impossibility of the
and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed condition imposed upon him.
seat on the last minute, said passenger is 1. Court presumed that Turkish laws were
entitled to an award of moral damages the same as RP laws (processual
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty presumption)
for not informing its passengers beforehand 2. Since under our law, the project
*** partition was valid, it should be upheld.
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION/ PRESUMED- 3. However, provision of the will with
IDENTITY APPROACH regards application of RP law instead of
-forum presumes that the foreign law is the Turkish laws is void (but still used RP
same as forum law. laws in distributing the estate of the
decedent, but with the excuse that the
MICIANO V. BRIMO Court was just presuming Turkish laws
to be the same as RP laws…)
*this is also a case in succession where Xxx
decedent wants RP law, instead of Turkish law, *use of most significant relationship
to apply, and one of brothers was threatened to theory/disingenuous characterization: same
be disinherited conclusion w/o flouting testator's intention (to
Joseph Brimo use RP law)
-Turkish National
-but had properties in the Philippines COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER
-and executed will in the Philippines, which
contained a provision which provided that the WATLTER STEVENSON
disposition of his properties should be done in -born in RP
accordance with Philippine laws, and that an -but parents both Brit
heir who opposes such will would be deprived -married to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson (also
of his share. British) in 1909
-Andre Brimo, his brother, opposed the scheme -instituted his wife as sole heiress
of partition submitted by the judicial -initially field inheritance and estate tax returns
administrator of Joseph's estate on the ground covering the whole estate but later filed an
that the will was not in accordance with the amended return (made it smaller)
laws of Turkey, thus void for violating Art. 10, -CIR: assessed taxable net deduction: used
NCC: Article 124, NCC: property relation of spouses
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, determined by national law (law of England)
in respect to the order of succession as well as And English law does not recognize legal
to the amount of the successional rights and the partnerships between husband and wife, all
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be properties acquired during marriage belong to
regulated by the national law of the person husband exclusively
whose succession is in question, whatever may BOTTOMLINE: assess estate tax based on the
be the nature of the property or the country in whole property of Walter (which would have
which it may be situated." been just 1/2 if based on RP law)
-no proof presented CTA: apply RP Law - no proof of English law, no
…that the will was not executed in accordance prenuptual agreement: so applying laws of RP,
with Turkish laws contracting parties presumed to have adopted
…of the Turkish laws applicable

the system f conjugal partnership as to >denied: loss of will before hearing

properties acquired during the marriage >appealed: further proceedings, deposition of
WON RP law should be applied? Presume that witnesses to a will taken : still dismissed
English law is the same as RP laws = only asses -Pacific war ensued
estate and inheritance tax on 1/2 of the estate. -after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino)
1.When stevensons married during 1909, old presented the alleged will of his father in
civil code still applies. Chinese Characters executed and signed by him
in 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
Old civil code and probated in Amoy, China
Nationality theory of determining property -presented petition for probate of either the
relation of spouses where one is a foreigner, no 1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will -
prenuptual agreement: follow husband's both DISALLOWED
Limited to marriages contracted in a foreign PROBATED?
New civil code AS TO THE 1929 PHILIPPINE WILL: not proved by
Same Credible witnesses
-Silvino failed to present 2 credible witnesses to
Includes marriages celebrated in RP and aborad prove the provisions of the lost 1929 will
-CREDIBLE Witnesses: competent witnesses, not
…but both only applies to mixed marriages. rely on hearsay
Here, both spouses are Brits! AS TO THE ALLEGED PROBATED 1931 WILL: was
Manresa said English law (the law of the not established
husband's nationality) should be used. -Rule 78.1: if will probated in another country, if
But no proof of English law presented by CIR. So could be allowed, filed and recorded by proper
apply processual presumption, presume English CFI
law = RP laws -Rule 78.2: copy of will + allowance is filed
before CFI, court shall fix time and place for
SUNTAY V. SUNTAY hearing, and cause notice to be given as in case
of original will
*again, a succession case…but I cannot find the -Rule 78.3: if will allowed in RP, court shall issue
digest…maybe it's under another certificate of allowance, signed by Judge,
subject…hmmm… attested by the seal of the court, filed and
Jose Suntay recorded by clerk, and will would have same
-Filipino Citizen effect as if originally proved and allowed in such
-resident of the Philippines court
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China -in this case: failed to prove…
-left properties in RP, and a house in China …Municipal district court of Amoy, China is a
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd probate court
wife and child of 2nd marriage …law of China on procedure in probate or
-2 proceedings: allowance of wills in 1931
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of …here, just presented the unverified answers of
the 1st marriage appointed as administrator of Consul General of RC (depositions) which are
the estate INADMISSIBLE:
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a
will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP

>Consul General does not qualify and make the particular subject are presumed to be the same
person who holds the Chinese law an expert of as RP laws
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters -here, no proof of Chinese laws applicable, so
>if admitted, adverse party would be deprived use RP laws
of his right to confront and cross-examine Why no evidence presented:
witnesses *granddad's marriage certificate was allegedly
-plus: proceeding in Amoy, China court were destroyed or lost during the Japanese
not probate proceedings, but was conducted occupation, and Citizenship Investigation
for the taking of the testimony of 2 attesting Bureau just listened to his testimony.
witnesses to the will *Francisco was also just required to give
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of testimonies before Philippine consular and
proof that the municipal district court of Amoy immigration authorities regarding their
is a probate court, it may be presumed that the marriages, birth, and relationship to each other
proceedings in the probating or allowing a will -the said testimonies are ADMISSIBLE as
in the Chinese courts are the same as those in statements or declarations regarding family
RP Courts tradition or reputation in matters of pedigree
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices (in accordance with the NCC, FC and ROC)
through personal service or service by Philippine law: Lex loci celebrationis
publication -all marriages performed outside RP in
-so since no notice of the proceedings before accordance with the laws in force in the country
Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it were performed and valid there shall also be
cannot be deemed as a probate proceeding and valid in this country
is deemed as merely a deposition or -all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
perpetuation of testimony family
-he who asserts that the marriage is not valid
BOARD OF COMMISIONERS (CID) V. DELA under our laws bear the burden of proof to
ROSA present the foreign law
-deportation proceedings where initiated failed to prove that it was invalid in accordance
against WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, with CID alleging with Chinese laws
that he failed to prove the legality of the -since the rule is that a legitimate child follows
marriages of his Filipino grandfather (Santiago) the citizenship of is father, his father is a Filipino
to his grandma as well as the marriage of his citizen as the marriage of his grandpa with
Father (Francisco) to his mom, both of which grandma is valid. As his father's marriage to his
were celebrated in China (his grandma and mother is also valid, William Gatchalian is also a
mom were Chinese citizens). legitimate child, thus would follow citizenship of
-no evidence to prove that under Chinese law dad, thus Filipino
(which was not also proved), the marriages ****
were valid. (note: at first, it was Gatchalian who was
-as no evidence that William Gatchalian was required to prove the existence of Chinese law
born in a valid marriage(ie born outside to prove that the marriages of his grandpa and
marriage), he is deemed to have followed the papa were valid. But with the presumption in
citizenship of his mom (CHINESE) - same thing favor of the solidarity of families, the burden of
with his dad! proving that the marriages were not valid, thus,
WON William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen? of proving the Chinese law which says so, was
NO. transferred to CID)
Apply processual presumption: in the absence FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING EITHER TO
of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on APPLY DOMESTIC LAW OR TO DECIDE CASE


Degree of public interest involved in the dispute PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
Accessibility of foreign law materials to the Public policy:
parties -principle of law
Possibility that plaintiff is merely forum ...which holds that no subject or citizen
shopping ...can lawfully commit any act
Similarities between forum laws and foreign law ...which has a tendency to be
on the issue in point >injurious to the public or
(usually forum law only applied when issue >against public good.
involves marriage and family relations) Public Policy Technique
EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN -situation in which the court declines to give
LAW due course to a claim existing under a foreign
GR: look into application of foreign law and law
apply it ..because it considers the nature of the claim
Basis: comity and reciprocity unconscionable
X: 3 MAIN CATEGORIES (look at previous notes) or its enforcement would "violate a
(1) local law expressly provides >fundamental principle of justice,
Civil Code >some prevalent concept of good morals,
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty >some deep-rooted tradition of the
subject to the law of the country where they commonwealth.
are situated -dismissal through this method is technically not
Intestate and testamentary succession: dismissal on the merits BUT in reality, plaintiff
governed by lex nationale of the person whose cannot get jurisdiction in any other court
succession is under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
Philippines valid according to the law of the CORPORATION (PIA) V. OPLE
place where the will was made or lex domicilli PIA
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint
wills even if valid in the country where they -foreign corporation licensed to do business in
were executed RP
(2) failure to plead and prove foreign law or -hired IN THE PHILIPPINES 2 FILIPINAs as
judgments stewardess, the contract containing provisions
-as seen above ...that they have a right to terminate the
(3) case falls under exceptions to rule of comity services of the Filipinas upon notice and
-Art17, Par3: PROHIBITIVE LAWS concerning ...that the agreements shall be construed under
*persons and by laws of Pakistan and ONLY THE COURT
*their acts OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN shall have jurisdiction to
*or property0 consider any matter arising out of or under the
*and those which have for their object agreement
…public order -instead of the 3year contract, the 2 stewardess
…public policy were terminated 1y4m before the expiration of
…and good customs their contract
…shall not be rendered inefffective by laws or -2 Filipina employees filed a COMPLAINT FOR
or by determinations or conventions agreed COMPANY BENEFITS AND BONUSES vs. PIA
upon before Ministry of Labor and Employment
In a foreign country

-as defense, PIA invoked the provisions of its IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE FOREIGN
contract (that Pakistani law should apply, and LAW IS
that the case should have been filed before *BARBAROIUS IN ITS PROVISIONS OR
WON the contract provisions should be CASE
followed (i.e. WON Pakistani law should apply XXX
and the case brought before Pakistani Courts)? THE FOREIGN LAW IS PROCEDURAL IN NATURE
NO Why: Judicial convenience
PIA cannot invoke Par10 (venue and applicable -impractical for the court of the forum to adopt
law) of its contract to prevent application of the procedural machinery of another state
labor laws and regulations of the Philippines Problems: characterization of the foreign law
because into procedural or substantive
*the EER is a relationship affected w/ public e.g. Statute of Frauds and Statute of
interest Limitaitions
*In accordance with Art17.3: RP Labor laws ISSUES ARE RELATED TO PROPERTY (LEX SITUS)
cannot be rendered illusory by parties agreeing *IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ARE GOVERNED BY
upon some other law to govern their THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE IT IS LOCATED
relationship -in the NCC: we included Personal property in
PIA cannot invoke that Karachi court is the sole the Lex Situs rule (Art17)
venue for the dispute: court used place of When Lex situs applicable:
significant contacts approach *sale
*contract executed in RP *exchange
*contract was between Philippine citizens and a *barter
corporation licensed to do business in the *mortgage
Philippines (therefore a Resident Company) *any form of alienation of property (SEBMA)
*though the Filipina stewardesses were 3 reasons why lex situs governs property:
assigned in the Middle East and Europe, they Land and everything attached to it are w/n the
were based in the Philippines in between exclusive control of the state: only State officials
assignments can lawfully deal with them physically - their
-Par10 cannot be given effect so as to oust consent necessary
Philippine agencies and courts of the Immovables are of greatest concern to state
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law Demands of certainty and convenience
PIA did not invoke the Pakistani law applicable: Exceptions to lex situs rule: to follow
so presume as same as Philippine law (applied THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE ENFORCEMENT
Processual Presumption) OF FOREIGN CLAIM IS FISCAL OR
CRITIQUES TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION GR: state is not obliged to enforce the revenue
*ulitimate escape device: Court can disregard law of another
the applicable law to arrive at its desired result e.g. BANCO DE BRAZIL V. AC ISRAEL
without having to provide the rigorous level of COMMUNITY CO: court deny enforcement of
analysis required to explain the shift tax claims by foreign countries on local
*intolerable affectation of superior virtue residents
*court of the forum sits in judgment over the View that Fiscal laws = Penal laws (JUDGE
wisdom and soundness of the applicable foreign LEARNED HAND)
law MOORE V. MITCHELL: Revenue laws fall within
Test when the public policy exception is the same reasoning (as penal laws); they affect
properly invoked: WHEN THE FOREIGN COURT a state in matters as vital to its existence as its
criminal laws. No court ought to undertake an

inquiry which it cannot prosecute w/o What is a penalty? Restatement of Conflicts of

determining whether these laws are consonant laws: a sum of money exacted as punishment
w/ its own notions of what is proper for a civil wrong (there's a claim or right)
View that Fiscal law ≠ Penal laws: (PROFESSOR Vs. compensation: for loss suffered by injured
LEFLAR) party
Tax laws are not passed to punish people. Its an Penal laws and Revenue laws: deemed as
obligation of the citizen who enjoys the different, but there are views holding Revenue
protection of government to share the expense laws as penal in character
of maintaining the government. EXTRADITION
FOREIGN LAW OR JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO Basis: jurisdictional cooperation + assistance
GOOD MORALS (CONTRA BONOS MORES) among States in the enforcement of their
-the determination of what is contrary to good criminal laws
morals is left to the forum court trying a Scope: all offenses except Political or religious
particular case What happens: when a person indicted for a
Contra Bonos Mores (American definition): acts penal offense or a convict serving sentence
*having mischievous or pernicious ESCAPES to another country, the receiving
consequences country has legal obligation to surrender
*against true principles of morality escapee to the State from which he escaped
>bribery of public officers
>marriage between ascendants and
descendants (incest!)
CRITIQUE: inherent subjectivity
Chief Justice Marshall: Courts of no country
execute penal laws of another.
whether it appears to the tribunal which is
called upon to enforece it to be, in its essential
character and effect, a pubishment of an
offense against the public
LOZADA V. POSADAS: when it imposes
punishment for an offense committed against
the state which under the Constitution, the
Executive has the power to pardon
>>>this definition however was broadened in
common use as penal statutes were understood
to include
>"all statutes which command or prohibit
certain acts, and establish penalties for their
> impose a penalty for their commission