People vs Crisologo

Facts:

Accused-appellant Crisologo alias “Amang,” a deaf-mute, was charged of robbery with homicide. He was allegedly
informed of the charge against him through sign language by Special Policeman Munoz a childhood acquaintance.
Mr. Munoz subsequently entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused. Upon objection of counsel, however, this
plea was disregarded and arraignment was rescheduled until the Court could avail of the services of an expert in the
sign language from the school of the deaf and dumb. Apparently no sign language expert or representative ever
arrived, the accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial
proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign
language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was violated.

Held:

Yes. The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full
facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused’s own version of
the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently
unjust circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to
inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at
stake.

In Terry v. State, where a deaf-mute accused of manslaughter was not provided with an interpreter despite repeated
requests from counsel, it was held:

… The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel,
also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; against him, and, further to be confronted by the witnesses,
who are to testify against him. In constructing this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all
this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is
called upon to answer, and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused
must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know
and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make his
plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is based. This the
fundamental law accords, and for this the law must provide. These humane provisions must not, and cannot, be
dependent upon the ability, financial or otherwise, of the accused … [This] constitutional right … would be
meaningless and a vain and useless provision unless the testimony of the witnesses against him could be understood
by the accused. Mere confrontation of the witnesses would be useless, bordering upon the farcical, if the accused
could not hear or understand their testimony. So, also, as to the nature and cause of the accusation. In the absence
of an interpreter it would be a physical impossibility for the accused, a deaf-mute, to know or to understand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, and, as here, he could only stand by helplessly, take his medicine, or
whatever may be coming to him, without knowing or understanding, and all this in the teeth of the mandatory
constitutional rights which apply to an unfortunate afflicted deafmute, just as it does to every person accused of a
violation of the criminal law. In other words the physical infirmity of this appellant can in no sense lessen his rights
under the Constitution, and, in the proper administration of its laws, this great and sovereign state must and will
accord the means by which its citizens, humble and afflicted though they may be, shall receive all the rights, benefits
and privileges which the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules of practice provide.
Scheneckerburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1943)

FACTS: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in
CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this

saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his
objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively

upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et. al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.

No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt
from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force
and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.”

2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred
exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines

“The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by
themSupreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution.” According to
Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFI’s. As a result, the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the
Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The original
jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez

Criminal Case Digest:

Digested Cases

Facts:

The defendant is the editor of “Miau,” a periodical published and circulated in Manila, and that an
article containing the alleged injurious matter was published in the issue of that periodical of September
15, 1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly abusive language, and in terms not capable of
being misunderstood; charges the private prosecutor, who had been then recently appointed a member
of the United States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of the murder
of his mother and sister and with having subsequently entered into intimate political relations with the
assassin. The article contains other statements and imputations of a derogatory character.

Issue: W/N the offense is injuries grave and punishable under Article 458 of the RPC.

Held: It is urged by counsel that the official position of the private prosecutor should be considered as
an aggravating circumstance under Penal Code, article 10, No. 20.

The result, then, is that the penalty prescribed by article 458, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code should be
applied in its medium grade, and in view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as four
years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day’s banishment for every
12 pesetas not paid, and the costs of both instances
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS
T. PASTOR, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947

Nature of the Action: An appeal from the decision of the trial court

Facts: Defendants were charged of violating Sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code,
having deliberately evaded paying the percentage tax while being owners of ‘Magazine Center’, an
establishment devoted to selling newspapers from 1936 to 1938. However, defendant Sindiong
countered that the law accused of him were repealed by CA Nos. 466 and 503, which were in force in
1939, and which excluded Sindiong’s business from the requirement of paying taxes.

Issue: Can defendants be charged against a law that has been repealed?

Ruling: Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed from be, as it is hereby,
affirmed with costs de officio.

Ratio: No. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code (CA
466 and 503), the defendants ceased to be bound in paying taxes. The prevailing doctrine is that where
the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in
the repealed law, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.
People vs. Julmain

May 30, 1949 (83 Phil 293)

PARTIES:

Plaintiff and appellant: People of the Philippines

Defendants and appellees: Salip Julmain, Alimponos Hadja, Insan In Hadja

FACTS:

On January 19, 1947, on the way to Jolo, while in between the seas of Zamboanga and Basilan, Salip
Monsola killed Moro Aye and threw him overboard, off the unregistered vinta. Because of the crime,
Moro’s wife Ulka Aye and his children landed at Pangasaan, Basilan Island riding the same vinta,
although they were supposed to land in Kambing, Luuk, Sulu.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Sec. 14 par 3, Rule 106 shall apply in the aforementioned case.

2. WON the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga was the court appropriate to handle the case.

HELD:

1. No. Sec 14 par 3 Rule 106 states that “where an offense is committed on board a vessel registered or
licensed in accordance with the laws of teh Philippines, in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
may be instituted or tried int eh proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or province
through which the vessel passed during its voyage” This will not apply because the vinta is unregistered
or unlicensed, therefore, the scene f the crime must be considered as an ordinary place.

2. Yes. The crime happened in the waters within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. Even if the vinta is registered, CFI of Zamboanga is still the rightful court because it handles
the first port of entry, Pangasaan, Basilan.