1.

IN RE LANUEVO

Facts:

Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant, Victorio Lanuevo and a 1971 bar
candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary action against five bar examiners for acts and omissions
committed in the 1971 bar examinations.

Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme Court checked the records of the 1971
bar examinations. As a result thereof, the grades in five subjects of an examinee (Ramon Galang) were
found to be charged, which, however, were the properly initialed and authenticated by each of the
examiner concerned. Upon investigation, the Bar Confidant admitted in his sworn statement having
brought back the five examination notebooks to the examiners for re-evaluation. In turn, the five
examiners admitted, in their individual sworn statements, having re-evaluated and re-checked the
notebooks involved (all of which had failing marks) upon the representation made to each of them
separately and individually by the Bar Confidant that examiners were authorized to do so and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his (examiner concerned) particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. On the other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the actuation's of the
Bar Confidant.

The Supreme Court, holding that the Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do with the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or
after the notebooks are submitted by the examiners and, that, therefore, the deception made by the Bar
Confidant was in violation of the trust and confidence reposed in him, disbarred the Bar Confidant and
ordered his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

With respect to respondent Ramon Galang, the Supreme Court likewise disbarred him because of the
highly irregular manner of his passing the bar which was effected through an authorized re-evaluation of
his examination notebooks, and on the ground that he fraudulently concealed and withheld his pending
criminal case for slight physical injuries in all his seven applications to take the bar examinations which
indicates his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor.

Respondent Bar Examiners were reminded to exercise the greatest or utmost care and vigilance in the
performance of their duties as such.

2. First Lepanto vs CA

Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., was registered as a “non-pioneer enterprise” with public
respondent BOI having been so issued a Certificate of Registration under Executive Order NO. 226, also
known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of glazed floor tiles. Among the
specific terms and conditions imposed on First Lepanto’s registration were that: (1) The enterprise shall
export at least 50% of its production; and (2) The enterprise shall produce only glazed floor tile. In a
letter addressed to the BOI, First Lepanto requested for an amendment of its registered product to
“ceramic tiles” in order to likewise enable it to manufacture ceramic wall tiles; however, before the BOI
could act on First Lepanto’s request for amendment, Mariwasa and Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc., already
had on file their separate complaints with the BOI against First Lepanto for violating the terms and
conditions of its registration by the use of its tax and duty-free equipment in the production of ceramic
wall tiles.

The BOI rendered a decision finding First Lepanto guilty and imposing on the latter a fine of P797,950.40
without prejudice, however, 1) to an imposition of additional penalty should First Lepanto continue to
commit the same violation; and 2) to the Board’s authority to consider/ evaluate First Lepanto’s request
for an amendment of its certificate of registration, including, among other things, a change in its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”

After paying the imposed fine, First Lepanto formally filed its application with the BOI to amend its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”

On 06 August 1992, another verified complaint was filed by Mariwasa with the BOI which asseverated
that, despite BOI’s finding that First Lepanto had violated the terms and conditions of its registration, the
latter still continued with its unauthorized production and sale of ceramic wall tiles. Respondent BOI
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, Mariwasa
appealed the case to the Office of the President.

In the meantime, First Lepanto caused the publicationin the Manila Bulletin of a notice on the official
filing with the BOI of the aforementioned application for amendment of Certificate of Registration No. EP
89-452. Mariwasa opposed the application. On 10 December 1992, respondent BOI handed down its
decision approving First Lepanto’s application.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision of the Board of
Investments

Held: The BOI is the agency tasked with evaluating the feasibility of an investment project and to decide
which investment might be compatible with its development plans. The exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government agency
concerned and not by the courts. BOI has allowed the amendment of First Lepanto’s product line
because that agency believes that allowing First Lepanto to manufacture wall tiles as well will give it the
needed technical and market flexibility, a key factor, to enable the firm to eventually penetrate the world
market and meet its export requirements.

It is basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

3. In re cunanan

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down
for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation. As to the portion declared in
force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

4. Kuroda vs jalandoni
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes.
He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of
crimes not based on law, national and international.

II. THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No.
68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is
not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule
and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

5. Omico Mining vs Vallejos

While petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint filed by then CFI Judge Catolico was pending
resolution by the trial court, the latter filed a petition to declare petitioners in default alleging that seven
months had lapsed since summons was served on petitioners. The court granted the petition. Petitioners
filed their notice of appeal to the Supreme Court after their motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: WON judges can engage in private practice of law.

RULING: No. The inhibitory rule embodied in Section 25 of Rule 138 makes it obligatory upon the judicial
officers to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties. These objectives are dictated by a
sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.

6. People vs villanueva

On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of
Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in
this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practiceof law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

7. Dia anonuevo vs bercasio ss

8. De guzman vs visayan rapid transit

Respondent engaged the professional services of the petitioner for the purpose of obtaining the
suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the
respondent transportation company. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been
benefited with an economy of PhP 78,448.00 for every eighteen months.

ISSUE:WON respondent is entitled to reasonable compensation.

RULING: Yes. Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and
did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these services
were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results of his client.

9. Cayetano vs monsod

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

10. In re edillon

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of
Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.

11. Tajan vs cusi

In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo Tajan, he was required by respondent
Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law
for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which
petitioner knew were false.

ISSUE: WON courts of first instance has jurisdiction to hear and determine the disbarment or suspension
of attorneys.

RULING: Yes. Section 38 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court states that, “Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension, such attorney shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises.”
12. Alcala vs vera

13. Catimbuhan vs cruz

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.assistance
to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila
filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent
Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an
Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4,
1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.Thus, a non-
member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his
own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney.
However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of
petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining
order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

14. Hydro resources vs pagalilauan

Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant” and received basic
monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to
P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he
would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his
duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was
illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation
and Aban.
Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or a
similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without
qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the
petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three
years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of
the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an
employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement
of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of
dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the
four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor.

In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner, dealt only
with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted the Personnel
Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his
profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee
and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which
met the four standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.

15. Ramos vs rada

Moises Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II. Without prior
permission therefor, he accepted the appointment and discharged the duties as administrator of the real
properties of a private corporation. He is now charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule
XVIII.

ISSUE:WON respondent violated said provision.

RULING: Yes but only a technical violation. He may, however, apply, if he so desires, for permission to
resume his business connection with the corporation, in the manner above indicated.

16. Beltran vs abad

FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted to the
Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA
COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as
a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he
made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for
Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with
the respondent.

Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein,
denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in
the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in
Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in
the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme
Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis
of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense,
sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the
aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court,
which latter signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial
evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still
practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.

ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.

Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.

HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust,
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply
by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one
who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without license.
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of
Court.) The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court
within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing.
A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he
must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been
disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an
unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty.
Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined
for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of
the bar.

17. Bacaro vs pinatacan

This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and immorality. Complainant
gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of respondent's betrayal,
her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent
render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even
admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other,
does not justify him for disqualification to the practice of law.

Issue: WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case involving his good
moral character

Holding:Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has legally
recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has
undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of
his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. But he must be admonished that his
admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance
with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ratio: One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must
be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and
the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of
this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a model
citizen" He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean
living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar
examinations.

18. Diao vs Martinez

DIAO was admitted to the Bar.

2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered
the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to
him) is equivalent to a high school diploma

Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school.

No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University
in April, 1949

1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
records.

ISSUE:WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law
requirements? NO.

HELD:STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S
DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.

Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

19. Collantes vs renomeron

Facts: As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register
some 163 deeds of sale with assignment of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There
was no action from the respondent. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements,
respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with
a certain “special arrangement” between them. Fed up with the respondent’s extortionate tactics, the
complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied
registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of
absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 27, 1987,
respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, Land Registration Authority [LRA].
Exasperated by respondent’s conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges against respondent Register of Deeds. LRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on
February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be
found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented
to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct, recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in
the government service, effective immediately. Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against
Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment
complaint against said respondent.

Issue: Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for
his malfeasances as a public official.

Held: Yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his lawyer’s oath. An oath
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source
of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires
public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and
[d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7,
subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 103).

20. Jk mercado vs de vera ss