CONSTI II Cases 1 To 70 Compiled

Cases in Constitutional Law II – Cases 1 to 70
Table of Contents:
Police Power………………………………………………… 2
Eminent Domain …………………………………………… 3
Due Process………………………………………………… 8
Equal Protection Clause…………………………………… 11
Search and Seizure………………………………………… 13
Writ of Amparo………………………………………………. 21
Right to Privacy……………………………………………… 22
Privacy of Communication…………………………………. 23
Freedom of Expression…………………………………….. 27
Freedom of Assembly………………………………………. 33
Freedom of Religion………………………………………… 39
Right to Information…………………………………………. 42
Right to Form Association………………………………….. 44
Non-Impairment Clause…………………………………….. 46
Free Access to Courts………………………………………. 48
“She loves you, yeah, yeah, yeah!”

- The Beatles (1963)
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POLICE POWER
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1.) WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people.
FACTS:
The City of Manila (City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim) issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of
motels as well as offering quick-time rates and prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission
Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels. White Light as well as various other motels challenged
the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being
unconstitutional.
The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.
RULING:
No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
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2.) MMDA VS TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING
FACTS:
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered into a contract for advertising with the Metro
Rail Transit Corp. andthereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and otheradvertising media in d
ifferent parts of the MRT 3 premises. MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle said billboards and
signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009wherein the MMDA prohibits the posting, installation,
and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk,
center-island, posts, trees, parks and openspaces.
Trackworks refused the said request and then MMDAproceeded to dismantle the billboards and si
milar forms of advertisement. Trackworks filed a civil case before the Pasig RTC, a TRO was issued
against MMDA. The MMDA filed a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied said petition and affirmed
the order of the RTC. Petition was then filed with the SC which denied the same and eventually this
resolution after a petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of respondents’
advertisement materials.
RULING:
By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

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No, the Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle, remove or destroy the
billboards and other advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. TheMMDA’s
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 granted MMDA
police power let alone legislative power.
Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages andother advertising media in the
MRT 3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the
MRT3structure or to obtain advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, MRTC
owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of theMRT3
to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time
material to this case, anduntil this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertisingservices
with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership.
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3.) ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. VS. CA
FACTS
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued
Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions:
(1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store;
(2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are
functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having
first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell
directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot
advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It
is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.(SOPI) lodged a
complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business
permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit.
ISSUE:
Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of
police power, in the grant of business permits
RULING:
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The
issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. A
business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession,
in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
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EMINENT DOMAIN
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4.) ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR
FACTS:

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These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844)
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects
of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were
declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against

Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with
initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
RULING:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of
Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favour of the farmer.
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5.) PPI VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772stating that the Commission shall have free print
space of not less than one-half page in at least one newspaper in every province or city as Comelec
Space. This ad space will be used by candidates for their campaign and platforms of government, and for
the Commissions dissemination of vital information. Moreover, COMELEC released a letter-directive
ordering the different newspapers to comply with the said resolution. The petitioner Philippine Press
Institute(PPI) filed a petition contending that COMELEC violated the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution against the taking of properties without just compensation due to Sec 2. Moreover,the
directive of COMELEC amounts to involuntary servitude and violation of the freedom of expression and of
the press due to Sec 8. On the other hand, COMELEC asserts their directive is not mandatory and
compelling. They only ask for a donation. They aver that even if the order is mandatory, it would still be
valid through the use of police power.
ISSUE:

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Is COMELEC’s action constitutional through the exercise of police power?
RULING:
No. Looking at Sec 2, it seems that respondent is correct that the order to give a frees pace to
COMELEC is not mandatory as there is no compelling language or any criminal or administrative charges
for violation. The respondent’s reason for creating the resolution was due to the voluntary offers given by
the newspaper company in the 1992 elections to help them advertise important election matters.
However, the court will have to disagree that even if the order is mandatory, it would not still be valid as
an exercise of police power. First, only the legislature can exercise police power except if it is delegated
to some other body. The COMELEC did not give any effort to specify evidences that they were given
police power. According to the Constitution, when a property is taken, it must be given a just
compensation.
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6.) FORFORM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. P N R
FACTS:
The San Pedro - Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of
railroad facilities and appurtenances to serve the squatters’ resettlement areas. The properties of Forform
were traversed as right-of-way and the PNR occupied the Forform properties without previous
condemnation proceedings and payment of just compensation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Forform can recover possession of its property because PNR failed to file any expropriation
case and just compensation.
2. Whether leasing out of portion of the property to third person is beyond the scope of public use.
RULING:
1. NO. The owner of the land, who stands by, without objection, and sees as public railroad constructed
over it, cannot, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith
of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company.
In such a case, there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.
2. NO. The public use requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. At present, it may be amiss to state that whatever is
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term “public
use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and
“public convenience.” Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
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7.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES CANCIO
The payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different
from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property.
While the provisional value is based on the current zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the
prevailing fair market value of the property.
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115 which reserved certain parcels of land of the
public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA)
for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by
the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land.

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Petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot P52,294,000 which respondents rejected. Petitioner
commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It sought a writ of possession for the
property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with LBP in accordance with A.O.
No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, specifically
Sec 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner 100% of the current zonal value for the purpose of issuance of
writ of possession.
ISSUE:
WON RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of issuance of writ of possession.
RULING:
RA 8974 governs this case, not AO. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to instances
when the national government reapropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. The
economic zone is a national government project. Also, the complaint for appropriation was filed only on
August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law was approved on Nov. 2000. Therefore it is applicable in
this case. It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation
will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may present evidence
relative to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.
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8.) LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ
FACTS:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of
which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and
confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for the
preliminary determination of the just compensation. PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures
and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just
compensation. LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just
compensation has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP
instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when
it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the RTC. CA, finding
LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his
discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just
compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
RULING:
The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal
counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the
petition. On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its
ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the
lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation
should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period.
Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality
because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.
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9.) HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO VS. JOVITO M. LUIS
FACTS:

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The City of Pasig had taken the parcel of land of Luis and used the same as municipal road now
known as Sandoval Avenue. After 16 years, Mayor Eusebio informed Luis that Pasig City cannot pay him
more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Thereafter, Luis filed an action for reconveyance.
Mayor Eusebio contended that Luis’ action for just compensation for the property taken for public use is
already barred by prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether Luis’ action to claim just compensation for the property taken for public use is already
barred by prescription.
RULING:
NO. Where private property is taken by the government for public use without first acquiring title
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof
does not prescribe.
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10.) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right of way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the
land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”
FACTS:
KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, they expropriated several parcels of land which will be
traversed by their transmission towers and lines in Carmen and City of Danao, Cebu. Among these
lots were those owned by the respondent Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and -Spouses Quimco. NAPOCOR
obtained from them a “Permission to Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project in exchange for
their promise to pay just compensation. Petitioner began the construction in 1996. Upon its completion,
NAPOCOR imposed restrictions on the use of respondents’ land like planting or building anything higher
than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission lines. They were also prohibited from
continuing their quarry business near petitioner’s transmission towers. The paid measly sums by
NAPOCOR compared to the other landowners who resisted the expropriation. NAPOCOR claims that
they are not required to pay for the full value of the property traversed as its Charter provides that they
are only obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as
just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NAPOCOR should pay for the full value of the land or the simple easement fees
asprovided in its charter.
RULING:
Petitioners contention that respondents’ complaint is actually for “reversed eminent domain”which
requires the appointment of commissioners for the determination of just compensation has no merit. The
case filed by the respondents was an ordinary civil action for failure of petitioner to comply with its
obligation to pay just compensation f or the respondents’ properties. Expropriation is not limited to the
acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also
falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” Having established that petitioner’s acquisition of right of-
way easement over the portions of respondents’ lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain, petitioner then is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee
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11.) MCIAA V. BERNARDO L. LOZADA
FACTS:

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Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters,
more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City.Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was
subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of thePhilippines (Republic), represented
by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1881.During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square
meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947--the...
time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting
to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general
aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and,
upon such transfer, the... closure of the Lahug Airport.
Issues:
(1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise
settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute
and unconditional
RULING:
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is apparent that the
acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport
would continue its operation. The condition not having... materialized because the airport had been
abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property. With respect
to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such... a case, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
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DUE PROCESS
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12.) ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS HON. APOLONIO EXEVEA
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region. He was dismissed by President Fidel Ramos pursuant to AO 52 dated
May 12, 1993 which was an aftermath of 3 complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier. Zamudio
charged Lumiqued with Malversation through falsification of public documents. He allegedly padded
gasoline receipts amounting to Php 44,172.46 and made unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php
116,000.00. Zamudio also charged him with oppression and harassment after being relieved without just
cause after filing the 2 cases against Lumiqued. Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145, creating a committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued who
submitted his affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed against him was to extort money from
him. He also admitted that his average daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate

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consumption of the 5 service vehicle issued to him and that the receipts were turned over to him by
drivers for reimbursement.
July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and Lumiqued was not
assisted by a counsel since he was confident that he can defend himself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative hearing.
RULING:
The right to counsel is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is
not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and in an
administrative inquiry.
Lumiqued was not accused of any crime in the proceedings. The investigation that was
conducted was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for
the complaints filed against him.
A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of charges and the respondent’s capacity to represent himself and no duty rest on such a body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. A respondent has the option of engaging the services
of the counsel or not.
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13.) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to
the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and
to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties
under a treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international
law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.“In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal

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law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason
that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.In states
where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
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14.) GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
(Petitioner represented by the Philippine Department of Justice)
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
FACTS:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the (RTC) of Manila. The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government
requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for
his provisional liberty.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the
due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He
already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
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15. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC. v COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC delisted PGBI under the party-list system for the upcoming May 2010 elections,
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI came to this Court in its petition for certiorari, however, the Court initially dismissed the
petition in light of ruling in MINERO v. Commission on Elections “Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the
Court disqualified MINERO:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate
at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the
two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it. PGBI subsequently moved
for reconsideration”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated
RULING:

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No. PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No.
8679.
In administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or

organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
NOTE: MINERO ruling was abandoned for erroneous application of the law.
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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
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16. TELEBAP v COMELEC
FACTS:
TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. Its

operation was affected by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other
political purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is violation of equal protection of law
RULING:
No. There are important differences between broadcast and print media. Broadcast companies do
not own airwaves and frequencies thru which they transmit broadcast signals and images. Their franchises
are mere privilege which may reasonably be burdened with performance of some public service.
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17. PEOPLE v JALOSJOS
FACTS:
Re-elected Congressman Romeo G. Jalosjos was confined at the national penitentiary for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, if allowed to exercise his functions as member of HR, will constitute a
violation of equal protection of law
RULING:
Yes. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The Court, therefore, finds that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.
******************************************************************************

12
18. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing PTC, an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
******************************************************************************
19. COMELEC v CONRADO CRUZ
FACTS:
We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge against the highlighted portion of Section
2 of RA No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years. No barangay elective official shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position:
Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of Section 2(2) of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law
RULING:
No. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials.
The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for
a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application
of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not
only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the
Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment.
******************************************************************************
20-A. JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO v DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec, on the 2004 and
2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against
Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

13
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause
RULING:
No. Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials of the
Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of investigating alleged graft and corruption
during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 177 specifically referred to the "previous
administration"; while the Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary
investigation of election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected
to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
******************************************************************************
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
******************************************************************************
20. LIM v HON. FELIX
FACTS:
At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, Congressman Moises Espinosa,
Sr. and his security escorts, except Dante Siblante, were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Four
separate information of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. Petition
filed by petitioners to transfer the venue from RTC of Masbate to RTC of Makati was granted by the SC.
Respondent court issued warrants of arrest against the accused, relying solely on the certification
and recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
Yes. Judge Nemesio S. Felix commits a grave abuse of discretion, because he relies solely on the
certification of the prosecutor, as in this case, where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he
has not personally determined the probable cause.
Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records
which sustain it.
******************************************************************************
21. MANALILI v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:

14
Policemen from the Anti- Narcotics Unit chanced upon a male person who appeared high on drugs,
because of his reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner. The policemen asked the male person what
he was holding but the male person tried to resist. But later on the latter gave a wallet, Pat. Espiritu took it
and found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unreasonable search and seizure in admission of the marijuana leaves
found in the possession of the petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and- frisk.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according
to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason
to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs.
Furthermore, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. Issues not raised below cannot be
pleaded for the first time on appeal.
******************************************************************************
22. PEOPLE v EDISON SUCRO
FACTS:
Sucro was arrested for selling marijuana sticks and tea bags of dried marijuana leaves. The same
were recovered from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Police Macabante, who bought
the same from Sucro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search was incidental to a lawful arrest
RULING:
Yes. Police Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He
saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. The
act of Police Macabante of throwing the marijuana stick clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the
marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers
had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
In People vs. Bati – police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities.
There is nothing unlawful in the arrest hence the fruits obtained are admissible in evidence.
******************************************************************************
23. PEOPLE v ABE VALDEZ
FACTS:
The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area
where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants,
the latter admitted that they were his.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants are lawful

15
RULING:
No. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Noting the
testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora.
In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The
"plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
******************************************************************************
24. PEOPLE v CHUA HO SAN
FACTS:
Policemen while monitoring, in response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, intercepted a radio call requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat, that
looked different from boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao
shores.
When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted carrying a multicolored strawbag. The
man suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the officers. Speaking in English,
Tagalog, then Ilocano requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. CID then
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man acceded to the request. The bag
contained shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted constitute a valid exemption
from the warrant requirement
RULING:
No. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly
indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
No facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs participation in an ongoing

criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was
not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process
of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
******************************************************************************
25. PEOPLE v TANGLIBEN
FACTS:
Police were conducting surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound against persons
engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. They noticed
a person carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They requested to open the red traveling
bag but the person refused. They found marijuana leaves in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo inside
the bag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search was incidental to a lawful arrest
RULING:

16
Yes. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
The case before us presented urgency. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers
had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
It may be pointed out, however, although that the marijuana approximately one kilo, the forensic
chemist testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams, is not a considerable quantity to confer upon
the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves. Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is
clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which
is not his residence.
******************************************************************************
26. PEOPLE v JOHNSON
FACTS:
Lady frisker frisked Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the US. She felt something
hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Mrs. Johnson was
taken to the women’s room for inspection. She brought out three plastic packs, containing a total of 580.2
grams of shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against
unreasonable search and seizure
RULING:
No. The search during the routine frisk at the airport was valid pursuant to airport security
procedures. Corollary, her subsequent arrest was justified, since it was effected upon discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket,
luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the
girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon.
******************************************************************************
27. PEOPLE v MALMSTEDT
FACTS:
The bus where accused was riding was stopped. During the inspection, a police officer noticed a
bulge on Malmstedt’s waist. Suspecting the bulge to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt’s passport
and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever that was bulging on his waist, which turned out to be a pouch bag containing four (4) suspicious-
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Malmstedt had two (2) travelling bags which contained one teddy bear in each, which later was found to
contain hashish.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
RULING:
Yes. It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of
the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially

17
made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of
the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity.
Accused was searched and arrested in flagrante delicto while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
******************************************************************************
28. VALMONTE v DE VILLA
FACTS:
The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace
and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not military and police checkpoints violate the constitutional mandate against
unreasonable search and seizures
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that, in the case at bar, there are no sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden.

18
******************************************************************************
29. PEOPLE V DE GRACIA
SUMMARY:
In the event of a coup or some other situation of lawlessness and violence, the prohibition against
warrantless searches can be dispensed with where:
a. military operatives have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being committed; and
b. there is no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts
FACTS:
1. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup
d’état against the Government in December, 1989.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in Quezon City on December 1, 1989. The establishment was
suspected to be an occupied communications post by the RAM-SFP.
3. A group of 5 men approached the surveillance team. Soria ordered the driver of their car to leave.
However, as they left, the 5 men fired at them.
4. On December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated weapons,
explosives, and ammunition.
5. No search warrant was secured because there was so much disorder considering that Camp
Aguinaldo (which was nearby) was being attacked by rebel forces and there were firefights within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office. The courts were also closed.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure.
RULING: YES.
1. There was general chaos and disorder at that time because of the coup. Nearby, Camp Aguinaldo was
also under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were closed therefor.
2. Considering the facts of the case, the military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. Furthermore, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. Under the urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully
be dispensed with.
******************************************************************************
30. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
SUMMARY:
Mandatory drug testing (MDT) is constitutional if done on students and employees. It is unconstitutional if
done on electoral candidates and persons accused of crimes.
As to candidates - MDT adds a qualification not provided for in the Constitution. Thus, MDT amends the
Constitution without going through the proper channels, rendering it unconstitutional.
As to persons accused of crimes - MDT violates the right to privacy and self-incrimination
As to students and employees - MDT does not violate the right to:
a. equal protection and due process - no one is singled out. An institution has the prerogative to
impose reasonable rules and regulations in admitting students or imposing qualifications for
employment.
b. privacy and unreasonable search - the right to privacy is not absolute and yields to the interest
of the public, provided such intrusion is reasonable.

19
FACTS:
1. When Republic Act No. 9165 was passed, Section 36 thereof required mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. In line
thereof, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules on mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office.
2. Section 36(g) and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486:
Pimentel, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He sought to nullify the same for being
unconstitutional because they imposed a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided in the Constitution.
He further alleged that, by requiring a candidate to undergo a mandatory drug test, it creates an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free.
He also added that no provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
3. As to Section 36 (c), (d), (f), and (g) - several petitions under Rule 65 were filed on the grounds that
said sections are unconstitutional because:
a. the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
b. the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable.
c. a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said

provisions.
d. it infringes on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure
e. it violates the right against self-incrimination
f. it is contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 36 (c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 are constitutional.
RULING:
Pars (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL.
Pars (f) and (g) are UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1. Sec 36 (g) and Comelec Resolution 6486 - these laws, in effect, amend the Constitution. In its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
The powers of each of the departments are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution.
Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.
In the same vein, COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
2. Sec 36 (c) - random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. It is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable rules and regulations. The right to enroll is not absolute and is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.

20
3. As to right to privacy - the petition failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search.
The right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from
intrusion into one’s private activities. However, the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of
the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
4. As to unreasonable search and equal protection - while every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug
test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing.
5. As to Sec 36 (f) - there is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In
the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
******************************************************************************
31. POLLO V CONSTANTINO-DAVID
SUMMARY:
Two-fold requirement in the existence of privacy:
1. an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
2. that the expectation be one that society recognizes as reasonable (objective).
A government official who uses a government-issued computer cannot expect absolute privacy as to the
files contained in said computer, as such computer is within the regulation and control of the government.
FACTS:
1. Respondent CSC Chairman David received an anonymous letter-complaint alleging anomalies in the
Regional Office of the CSC. In response thereof, David formed a team and ordered them “to back up all
the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
2. It was found that most of the files contained copied files from the computer assigned to and being used
by the petitioner. The files obtained were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals. Thus, David issued a Show-Cause Order, requiring petitioner to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit.
3. In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files from his computer.
4. Petitioner was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713. In response thereof, petitioner alleged that the
complaint was without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the
CSC Chairman, such power belonging solely to the courts.
ISSUE:
W/N the search conducted by the CSC constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
constitutional right to privacy.
RULING:
NO. The search was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
1. The existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement:

21
first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
2. “Special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons.
There is thus a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the
warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
3. The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the
CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its
inception and scope.
The case at bar involves a government-issued computerfrom which the personal files of the petitioner
were retrieved from, the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
******************************************************************************
WRIT OF AMPARO
******************************************************************************
32. SEC OF DND V MANALO
SUMMARY:
The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and
by private individuals or entities.
FACTS:
1. Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, two farmers from Bulacan, were suspected of being
members of the New People’s Army.
2. They were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and
military units.
3. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as
members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being
held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents.
4. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able
to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a legal basis for the writ of amparo, i.e. is the right to freedom from fear protected
by existing laws.
RULING:
YES.
1. The right to the security of person, at its core, is the immunity of one’s person against government
intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security. The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and
liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights.
2. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials
or employees and by private individuals or entities.
3. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats
thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity.

22
******************************************************************************
33. ROBERT REYES V SEC. GONZALES
SUMMARY:
A writ of amparo does not cover and does not remedy the impairment of one's right to travel.
FACTS:
1. Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of
November, 2007 and they were temporarily held at Camp Crame.
2. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon
the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
3. After the investigation, Petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge
against him but the HDO was still in effect.
4. Petitioner requested that the HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case.
5. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued against the respondents, violating the whole
breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
RULING:
1. No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
2. The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in
the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security.
3. A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.
******************************************************************************
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
******************************************************************************
34. GOMBOA V CHAN
SUMMARY:
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. To avail of this privilege, there must be an
actual connection between one's right to privacy and one's right to life, liberty or security.
FACTS:
1. Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her
and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG).
2. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs.
3. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials
of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

23
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.
RULING:
NO.
1. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It protects a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in cases in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
2. For the write to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
3. Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate.
******************************************************************************
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
******************************************************************************
35. NAVARRO V CA
SUMMARY:
RA 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) only prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications, not public ones.
FACTS:
1. Reporters Jalbuena, Lingan and Ilagan went to the police station to report an incident in Entertainment
City where they were threatened by one Dante Liquin and the security guard.
2. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between Lingan and accused policeman Navarro, who
was then having drinks outside the headquarters.
3. The accused was challenged by Lingan to a fisticuffs and the former thereafter hit the victim with the
handle of his gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow on Lingan’s head. Lingan died under
treatment.
4. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro
after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping.
RULING:
1. The tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248
SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
******************************************************************************
36. RAMIREZ V CA
SUMMARY:

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The nature of the conversation unlawfully recorded is immaterial in applying the Anti-Wire Tapping law. It
is sufficient for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication, to violate the
Anti-Wire Tapping law by secretly recording such communications.
FACTS:
1. A case for damages was filed by Ramirez alleging that respondent Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality.”
2. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by petitioner.
3. As a result of the recording, and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, respondent filed a criminal case against petitioner for violation of Republic Act 4200.
ISSUE:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
RULING:
YES.
1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication.
2. The provision clearly makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
3. The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein.
4. The term "Communication" is broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.
******************************************************************************
37. ZULUETA V CA
SUMMARY:
A person who contracts marriage does not shed his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is still available to him.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
2. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issues:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
NO.

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1. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be

inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity). The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
3. Freedom of communication and compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other are
two separate things. This has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
******************************************************************************
38. WATEROUS DRUGS CORP V NLRC
SUMMARY:
The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals.
FACTS:
1. Catolico was a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
2. YSP Inc. sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However,
previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to
YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
3. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of
ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an
envelope addressed to Catolico.
4. Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed
that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Issues:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
RULING:
1. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. However, such invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
******************************************************************************
39. MARQUEZ V DESIERTO
SUMMARY:
Requisites for an in-camera inspection of a bank account:
1. there must be an actual pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
2. the account must be clearly identified
3. the inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case.
4. the bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman Desierto to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera related to various accounts maintained at the bank
where petitioner is the branch manager.

26
2. The accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman.
3. Petitioner, after meeting with the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) Panel, to ensure the
veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera inspection.
4. Petitioner being unable to readily identify the accounts in question, the Ombudsman issued an order
directing petitioner to produce the bank documents.
5. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict between RA
6770 and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in contempt before the Ombudsman.
Issues:
Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the accounts is an allowable
exception of R.A. No. 1405.
RULING:
NO.
1. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction.
2. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the
pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
3. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
4. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence.
******************************************************************************
40. OPLE V TORRES
SUMMARY:
The intrusion to one's right to privacy must be justified by some compelling state interest.
FACTS:
1. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January.
2. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:
a. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
b. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
Issues:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
RULING:
YES. Said act is thus unconstitutional.
1. The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty.
2. It is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest.
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
a. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and ;

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b. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The
broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which, if implemented, will put our people’s right
to privacy in clear and present danger.
******************************************************************************
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
******************************************************************************
41. TELEBAP V COMELEC
SUMMARY:
Broadcasting is a franchise and thus a privilege, and the grantee may be reasonably burdened with the
performance of public service in the exercise thereof.
FACTS:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the
fact that the provisions:
1. have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation;
2. denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and
3. are in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or
information during election period.
Issues:
Whether or not Comelec Time is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO.
1. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. As a

franchise, broadcasting is a privilege and subject to, among other things, be amended by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
2. COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast
stations for the common good; so that not only candidates are benefitted, but the voters as well, who will
be fully informed of the issues in an election.
3. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
******************************************************************************
42. ABS-CBN V COMELEC (Granada)
SUMMARY:
Holding exit polls and disseminating their results are constitutional because they are essential to the
freedom of speech and the press. The clear and present danger that they will disrupt the elections must
be duly established and the ban on them must not be too broad.
FACTS:
1. COMELEC issued a Resolution stopping ABS CBN, or any other groups, their agents or
representatives, from conducting exit surveys.

28
2. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
3. Two days before the elections, the Court issued a TRO in favor of ABS-CBN. The Comelec was
directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution.
4. Exit polls were conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
Issues:
Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of Speech and of the
Press.
RULING:
1. The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an
essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, COMELEC cannot ban them totally in
the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
2. The assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to
interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
3. When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the
freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free
elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom.
******************************************************************************
42. ABSC-BN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC (Panes)
FACTS:
A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said
Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcasted] immediately ."The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections
(Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed resolution is valid.
RULING:
No. The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a
preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least, free
speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without prior restraint. In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed.
Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may
also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed
by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.

29
43. SWS vs Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period
of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint.
ISSUE:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
******************************************************************************
44. RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.
FACTS:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letterrequesting

this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other
than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public
concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public
concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.
RULING:
The petition is denied.

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The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he
is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised.
******************************************************************************
45. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING

SYSTEM,INC., Petitioners, -versus- HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS
MAXIMO,RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.G.R. Nos.
170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing
so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official
capacities impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have
ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations. Petitioner were
required to submit requirements for the reclassification of the land wherein the said stations are operating.
Such requirements then as required were never listed in the list of requirements in the renewal/application
of any permit issued by Cauayan City. And notably, petitioners had never been required to submit such
papers before.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to free expression of the petitioners was violated by respondents by the
closure of the station.
RULING:
Yes. The right to free expression of the petitioner was violated by the respondents. That the acts
imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who
happen to be members of the press is clear enough. The circumstances of this case dictate that
respondents ‘closure of petitioners’ radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. It must be pointed out
that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyowas aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities
in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.
Bombo Radyo is a rival station of DWDY who is also owned by the family DY. Also, in an article found in
the Philippine Daily inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will
“disenfranchise the radio station." Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents ‘denial of
petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and
that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice.
Therefore the right to free expression of the petitioners’ constitutional right to press freedom was blatantly
violated by the respondents
******************************************************************************
46. HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992
elections.
On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the
COMELEC.
Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing
Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:

31
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais
City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment
in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayors office of Bais City.
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI)
also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for

mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority
and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the city.
In the same month, Francisco G. Villanueva was appointed OIC Mayor to replace Hector
Villanueva who had been removed from office.
The poll body also stated that insofar as the penalty of the removal is concerned, this cannot be
reversed anymore, and consequently cannot be the subject matter of an appeal.
The indefinite term as OIC to which respondent was appointed in 1986 already lapsed, with the
holding of the 1988 local elections and the assumption of office of those elected therein. On May 11,
1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that
petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-
quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and
editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the article is privilege in nature.
RULING:
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious. The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the
following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty;
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true
reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive
list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The rule on privileged
communication had its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete, this Court
ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech.
In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public
interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the
very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public
attention not only to the election itself.
******************************************************************************
47. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) AND WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS GSIS PRESIDENT & GENERAL MANAGER, PETITIONERS,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.

32
FACTS:
Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be
charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel
Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees
resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative
charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the
petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other
formal charges arising from the same facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities
available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as
GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization, petitioner
Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and
demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.
ISSUE:
WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
RULING:
NO.
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in
“peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the
backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court
of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free
expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the
purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in
accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this
right, or even deny certain sectors such right.
******************************************************************************
48. ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
(MTRCB)
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program
against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristo’s minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan):
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]

Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] [‘]Yung putang babae[,] ang

33
gumagana lang doon[,] [‘]yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol
pa sa putang babae [‘]yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a
“G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference.
Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension
from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.
RULING:
The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from
the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of
the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to
children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child
literally rather than in the context that they were used.”
The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an
order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its
charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that
the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang
Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent
contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”
******************************************************************************
49. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al. v. ANTI-

TERRORISMCOUNCIL, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007.They assailed
the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered
that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since
these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
ISSUE:
Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute
.RULING:
Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. In
this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only “as
applied” to a particular defendant. This means that in determining the constitutionality of a statute, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged. Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the
petitioners have not been charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not
applicable.
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FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

34
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50. Bayan, Et Al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, Et Al.,
FACTS:
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,”
“protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
ISSUE:
Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
RULING:
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. However, it must be remembered that the
right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable”
and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to
the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part.
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51. IBP Vs Atienza
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with
the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the
Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled
rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was
only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression
and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.

35
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating
the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in
the rally permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without
consulting with the IBP.
RULING:
No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place
different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity.
This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse
(and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not
consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason
therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.
******************************************************************************
52. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO
ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State.
To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others
to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of
mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or
expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state
of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious
purposes shall be governed by local ordinances:
Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully
observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by
workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are
allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

36
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly,
rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar
changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person
or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required
if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in
private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction
the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days
from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any
reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

37
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which
is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no
serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers
of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public
assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include
but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the
lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public
assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering
with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed
in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and
order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes
with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the
public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of
property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly
as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call
the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are
thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance
persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or
abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the

38
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless
he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be
governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not
constitute a group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a
permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having
first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such
permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit:
Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or
attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by
the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by
the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to
disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the
public assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the
immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six
months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to
six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one
day to thirty days.

39
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the
effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom
parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or
modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION
******************************************************************************
53. Estrada Vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las
Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio
Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with
another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still
legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident
of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained
the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor
and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.

40
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it
should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s
position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free
exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.
******************************************************************************
54. Soriano Vs. La Guardia
FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for
three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication.
******************************************************************************
55. Austria V. NLRC
FACTS:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner
was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications
form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for
the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same
to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor
Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be
able to do the collecting.

41
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as
such, involves the separation of church and state.
RULING:
No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here
is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely
secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds
invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.
******************************************************************************
56.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) Vs. Office Of The Executive
Secretary, Et Al (2003)
FACTS:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization

that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. On October 26,
2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is
a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion
RULING:
The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns
of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in
mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does
not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise
of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable

42
57. VELARDE VS. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
FACTS:
Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a petition for Declaratory Relief against Mariano Mike Z. Velarde,
together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva
and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. The petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act
of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective
office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of a religious leader in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office
or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate is violative of the letter or spirit of the
constitution.
RULING:
SJS has failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely
sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and
jurisdiction. It is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving
a constitutional principle. The constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection
of the rights of the parties concerned.
The assailed decision of the trial court was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it
made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.
******************************************************************************
58. TARUC VS. BISHOP DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the
town fiesta of Socorro, Surigao Del Norte. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop
tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of
the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. The Bishop also appealed to
petitioner Taruc to refrain from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC.
Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans and the latter proceeded to
hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant. As a result, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners
(Taruc, et. al.) expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Taruc, et.al. filed a
complaint contending that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of
members of a religious institution.
RULING:
NO jurisdiction. The case at bar is purely ecclasiastical matters which is considered to be outside the
providence of the court due to the form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly
in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those who unite to an ecclasiastical body
do so with implied consent to submit to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.
******************************************************************************
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
******************************************************************************

43
59. CHAVEZ VS PCGG
FACTS:
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and
all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount
public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the country’s economy that would be greatly prejudicial
to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
RULING:
It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the exploratory stage. There is a need to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information
in general such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.
******************************************************************************
60. CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
FACTS:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA tasked "to reclaim
land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands." PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition claiming that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article
III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going negotiations before a
final agreement.
RULING:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's
right to information on matters of public concern. The right to information contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right
if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
******************************************************************************
61. NERI VS SENATEE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
FACTS:

44
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege.
RULING:
YES. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege.
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
NOTE:
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
******************************************************************************
62. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) wrote to COMELEC, requesting a copy of
the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and
congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC
programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities pursuant to Section 12 or RA 9369. COMELEC
replied that the source code was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the
review had to be done, apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. CenPEG filed a
petition for mandamus against COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC may be compelled by mandamus to issue CenPEG with a copy of the
source code.
RULING:
YES. Under Section 12 of RA 9369, once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the
Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested
political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. COMELEC’S reason that the source
code was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment, has no merit since the elections had passed
and that reason is already stale.
******************************************************************************
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

45
******************************************************************************
63. IN RE: EDILLON
FACTS:
The Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fees to the IBP.
RULING:
YES. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of. The Rules
of Court only compels a lawyer to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom
to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone, attend the meeting of
his Integrated Bar Chapter, or vote in its election. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. The Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
******************************************************************************
64. MALABANAN VS RAMENTO
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.
They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting. At such gathering,
however, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of
the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the university authorities
and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non
academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. As a result, the
students were suspended for one academic year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the constitutional
rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
RULING:
Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is
not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of such conditions, penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
******************************************************************************
65. UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS LAGUESMA
FACTS:

46
Petitioner (UPCSU) is a union of supervisory employees. UPCSU filed a petition for certification on behalf
of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the
med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under Art. 245 of the
Labor Code. UPCSU claimed that Art. 245 of the Labor Code contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting
labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
RULING:
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. There is rational basis for prohibiting
managerial employees from forming or joining labor organization. If these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership.
******************************************************************************
66. ACOSTA VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in September
and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public
school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their
grievances. Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and absence without official leave.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
RULING:
These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ sworn duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association.
In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages
for any purpose.
******************************************************************************
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
******************************************************************************
67. PACIFIC WIDE REALTY AND DEV’T CORP VS PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC.
FACTS:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in
Ternate, Cavite. PALI obtained loans but was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both
current and those that were about to fall due. As a result, PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments
and rehabilitation. The Rehabilitation plan included terms which reduced the principal obligation (50%) of
PALI from secured and unsecured creditors. It likewise provided for the period within which PALI should
pay.
ISSUE:
Whether the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause.

47
RULING:
NO. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of
contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the
modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the
non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not
absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State for the common good of the general public.
******************************************************************************
68. HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to
have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA). In the middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR
Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the
DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. In seeking a writ of mandamus to compel
the issuance of an IFMA in its favor, PICOP relied on a 29 July 1969 Document, the so-called Presidential
Warranty approved by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in favor of PICOPs predecessor-in-interest,
Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc. (BBLCI).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional right against
non-impairment of contracts.
RULING:
The 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, much less a
contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. Even if we assume that the 1969
Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, and the same is a contract specifically
enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue an IFMA, PICOPs Petition for Mandamus must still fail. The 1969
Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions. Thus,
PICOP still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its
TLA into an IFMA.
******************************************************************************
69. DIAZ VS SEC. OF FINANCE AND COMM. OF BIR
FACTS:
Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing
the validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
on the collections of tollway operators. Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll
fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action. They likewise invoked
the non-impairment of contract clause. The government, on the other hand, argued that petitioners have
no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in
existing toll operating agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway operators. At any rate, the
non-impairment clause cannot limit the States sovereign taxing power which is generally read into contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, as tollway users, may invoke non-impairment of contract clause.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners have no personality to invoke the non-impairment of contract clause on behalf of
private investors in the tollway projects. They will neither be prejudiced by nor be affected by the alleged
diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT imposition. They have no interest at all in
the profits to be earned under the TOA’s because such interest solely belongs to the private tollway

48
investors. Besides, her allegation that the private investors rate of recovery will be adversely affected by
imposing VAT on tollway operations is purely speculative. The Court cannot rule on matters that are
manifestly conjectural. Neither can it prohibit the State from exercising its sovereign taxing power based on
uncertain, prophetic grounds.
******************************************************************************
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
******************************************************************************
70. RE: REQUEST OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT CLIENTS
FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES, AUGUST 28, 2009
FACTS:
Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No.
24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for
the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the
various IBP chapters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the clients of the legal aid offices may be given exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees.
RULING:
YES. Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is
essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the
most important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our society. Indigent litigants are
permitted under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma
pauperis. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide
addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees
assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court.
Note:
Under the IBPs Guidelines on Legal Aid, the combined means and merit tests shall be used to determine
the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid:
SEC. 19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass
upon the request for legal aid by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the
consideration of other factors adverted to in the following sections.
SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining whether the applicant has no visible means of
support or his income is otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to engage
competent private counsel owing to the demands for subsistence of his family, considering the number of
his dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality.
The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the Developmental Legal Aid Program
such as Overseas Filipino Workers, fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged
groups.
SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the applicants cause of action or his
defense is valid and chances of establishing the same appear reasonable.
SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the failure to render the same upon the
Rule of Law, the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases and the practice
of law in the locality shall likewise be considered.
SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the
private practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone for personal ends.

49
SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already receiving adequate assistance from any
source other than the Integrated Bar.
“And in the end the love you take

Is equal to the love you make”
- The Beatles (1969)

CONSTI II Cases 1 To 70 Compiled

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CONSTI II Cases 1 To 70 Compiled

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Cases in Constitutional Law II – Cases 1 to 70

Eminent Domain …………………………………………… 3

Equal Protection Clause…………………………………… 11

Search and Seizure………………………………………… 13

Right to Form Association………………………………….. 44

Free Access to Courts………………………………………. 48

“She loves you, yeah, yeah, yeah!”

1.) WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA

Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.

2.) MMDA VS TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

3.) ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. VS. CA

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to

4.) ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against

Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

5.) PPI VS. COMELEC

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

Is COMELEC’s action constitutional through the exercise of police power?

6.) FORFORM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. P N R

7.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES CANCIO

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

8.) LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ

9.) HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO VS. JOVITO M. LUIS

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

10.) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN

11.) MCIAA V. BERNARDO L. LOZADA

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

12.) ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS HON. APOLONIO EXEVEA

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

13.) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

14.) GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN

(Petitioner represented by the Philippine Department of Justice)

15. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC. v COMELEC

Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

16. TELEBAP v COMELEC

TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. Its

Whether or not there is violation of equal protection of law

17. PEOPLE v JALOSJOS

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

18. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

19. COMELEC v CONRADO CRUZ

20-A. JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO v DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

20. LIM v HON. FELIX

Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion

Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:

21. MANALILI v COURT OF APPEALS

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

22. PEOPLE v EDISON SUCRO

Whether or not the search was incidental to a lawful arrest

23. PEOPLE v ABE VALDEZ

By: Fernandez, Gonzales, Granada, Panes, Soldevilla

24. PEOPLE v CHUA HO SAN

No facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs participation in an ongoing

25. PEOPLE v TANGLIBEN