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JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 187317 April 11, 2013


CARLITO C. ENCINAS vs. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG

FACTS: Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March
2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless
they gave him five thousand pesos (₱5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred
to far-flung areas. Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station
(Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they
decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up short and managed
to give only two thousand pesos (₱2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week.
When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-
complaint (BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990.
On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion
activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.

HELD: No. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute
res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment."
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to
the exercise of administrative powers.83 Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature,84 as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon
the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions
involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate
the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory
functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances
presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of
judicial discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely
administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge
for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the purpose of the BFP proceedings was to
determine whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense against
petitioner.
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the
purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public
prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
The Ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals91 is analogously applicable to the case at bar. In that
case, we ruled that the preliminary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was
definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-making."
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 178347 February 25, 2013


SALVA CION VILLANUEVA et, al. vs. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT et, al.

FACTS: The controversy in the instant case arose when PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to Patricia Louise Mining and
Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed small-scale nickel mining project to be conducted in a controlled use
area in Barangay Calategas in the Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan.
The petitioners, who are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas, sought the recall of the said clearance in their
letter to PCSD Chairman, Abraham Kahlil Mitra. The PCSD, through its Executive Director, Romeo B. Dorado, denied
their request for lack of basis.
On August 7, 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against PCSD and PLMDC with the
RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. They prayed for the nullification of the said SEP Clearance for violating various
provisions of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. They alleged that these provisions prohibit small-scale nickel
mining for profit in the proposed site,18 which, they maintain, is not even a controlled use zone, but actually a core zone.
PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal of the Petition on various grounds, including the impropriety of the remedy of
certiorari. PCSD argued that it did not perform a quasi-judicial function.
The trial court denied the said motions in its Order dated September 20, 2006. It ruled, among others, that
certiorari is proper to assail PCSD’s action. PCSD Administrative Order (AO) No. 6 series of 2000 or the Guidelines in the
Implementation of SEP Clearance System states that the PCSD must conduct a public hearing, and study the supporting
documents for sufficiency and accuracy, before it decides whether to issue the clearance to the project proponent. The
trial court concluded that this procedure is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power.
The trial court denied reconsideration of the above Order.
PLMDC and PCSD again filed Motions to Dismiss but this time on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued
that, under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, only the Court of Appeals [CA] can take cognizance of a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus filed against a quasi-judicial body.
Petitioners argue that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over PCSD because the latter is a quasi-judicial body
functioning only within the RTC’s territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the RTC is the proper court following the principle of
judicial hierarchy.
On the other hand, respondents argue that, under Section 4 of Rule 65, only the CA can take cognizance of
certiorari petitions against quasi-judicial bodies.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCSD is exercising a quasi-judicial function in its issuance of the SEP.

HELD: No. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative
body.32 RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does not confer quasi-judicial powers on the said body:
SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. – In order to successfully implement the provisions of this Act, the Council
is hereby vested with the following powers and functions:
(1) Formulate plans and policies as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
(2) Coordinate with the local governments to ensure that the latter’s plans, programs and projects are aligned with the plans, programs and policies of the
SEP.
(3) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government, and on private entities and organizations for cooperation and
assistance in the performance of its functions.
(4) Arrange, negotiate for, accept donations, grants, gifts, loans, and other fundings from domestic and foreign sources to carry out the activities and
purposes of the SEP.
(5) Recommend to the Congress of the Philippines such matters that may require legislation in support of the objectives of the SEP.
(6) Delegate any or all of its powers and functions to its support staff, as hereinafter provided, except those which by provisions of law cannot be delegated;
(7) Establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence and moral character and prescribe a compensation and
staffing pattern;
(8) Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor for the effective implementation of the SEP and the other provisions
of this Act.
(9) Enforce the provisions of this Act and other existing laws, rules and regulations similar to or complementary with this Act;
(10) Perform related functions which shall promote the development, conservation, management, protection, and utilization of the natural resources of
Palawan; and
(11) Perform such other powers and functions as may be necessary in carrying out its functions, powers, and the provisions of this Act.
Save possibly for the power to impose penalties33 under Section 19(8) (which is not involved in PCSD’s issuance of
an SEP Clearance), the rest of the conferred powers, and the powers necessarily implied from them, do not include
adjudication or a quasi-judicial function.
PCSD AO 6, cited by the trial court and the parties, cannot confer a quasi-judicial power on PCSD that its enabling
statute clearly withheld. An agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper discharge of its functions is always
circumscribed by the enabling statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with rule-making power, may circumvent
legislative intent by creating new powers for itself through an administrative order.
In issuing an SEP Clearance, the PCSD does not decide the rights and obligations of adverse parties with finality. The SEP
Clearance is not even a license or permit. All it does is to allow the project proponent to proceed with its application for permits, licenses,
patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant government agencies. The SEP Clearance allows the project proponent to prove the
viability of their project, their capacity to prevent environmental damage, and other legal requirements, to the other concerned
government agencies. The SEP Clearance in favor of PLMDC does not declare that the project proponent has an enforceable mining right
within the Municipality of Narra; neither does it adjudicate that the concerned citizens of the said municipality have an obligation to
respect PLMDC’s right to mining. In fact, as seen in Section 5 of AO 6, the PCSD bases its actions, not on the legal rights and obligations
of the parties (which is necessary in adjudication), but on policy considerations, such as social acceptability, ecological sustainability,
and economic viability of the project.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

A.M. No. P-08-2531 April 11, 2013


CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA

FACTS: In March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter4 informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service eligibility
of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pita’s taking of the Career Service Sub-
Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.
The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of
Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As the
pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed that another person
took the civil service examination on her behalf.
Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred that she took
the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the
pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might have deteriorated in quality
over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for the difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment
leading to her non-development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.
The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City, was
the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in the
Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear in the Personal Data Sheet dated
October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda.
In view of the foregoing, considering that the evidence presented is substantial, it is recommended that respondent
Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of the charges and meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessories.
Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January 26, 2001 finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of dishonesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court has Jurisdiction on the instant Administrative case.

HELD: YES. In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never even questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC, fully
participated in the proceedings before the CSC. Although she was not yet a Supreme Court employee when the CSC
instituted the case against her, she had already become a member of the judiciary when Resolution No. 01-0263 dated
January 26, 2001 finding her guilty and meting her the penalty of dismissal was issued - having been appointed by the
Court to her present position on July 24, 2000. Her motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution was denied. The
respondent then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same Resolution. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the Supreme Court which in its Resolution dated August 24, 2004 found
no reversible error in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals to warrant the exercise by the Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case. Taking into consideration the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we
believe that with all the more reason the doctrine of estoppel should thus be considered applicable in the instant case as
the respondent went all the way to the Supreme Court to question the CSC Resolution. In addition, the Court itself has
even ruled on the case, effectively upholding CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 when it explicitly stated that in any event, the
petition would still be denied for failure thereof to sufficiently show that the public respondent committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this
case.
xxxx
There lies the question as to how should respondent then be proceeded against with respect to her employment in
the Judiciary. We deem that we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and dismiss the respondent outright.
The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over the respondent and should therefore have the final
determination of her administrative liability.
Considering, however, that the CSC had already conducted both fact-finding and formal investigations, we find no
reason why the Court should replicate what the CSC had done more ably.
In support of its conclusion, the OCA cited Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 1118 among
others. Said the OCA:
The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Supreme Court
through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions in certain cases. In the very recent
case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it had administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless
upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. In the said case, petitioner Ampong, a court interpreter at
the time the CSC instituted administrative proceedings against her, questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC after it found
her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously taking the CSC-supervised Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET)
in 1991 in place of another person and dismissed her from the service. The Court denied the petition on the ground that
the previous actions of petitioner estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC which had accorded her due
process.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

A.M. No. P-13-3105 September 11, 2013


OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR.

FACTS: Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 429-06, entitled Ms. Criselda M. Paligan v.
Spouses Cornelio and Lermila Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of money with damages, before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City, Kalinga. In A letter dated July 23, 2009,1 addressed to the Presiding Judge,
MTCC,2 Tahuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status of the writ of execution issued on September 10, 2008 by
the MTCC in Civil Case No. 4'29-06, since she had not received any report or information whether the said writ had
already been served. Paligan also furnished the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Tabuk City,
Kalinga, a copy of her letter.
In a 2nd Indorsement dated August 17, 2009,4 the OCA referred Judge Dalanao’s 1st Indorsement dated July 29,
2009 and Paligan’s letter dated July 23, 2009 to Atty. Mary Jane A. Andomang (Andomang), Clerk of Court, RTC, Tabuk
City, Kalinga, for comment and appropriate action.
In his letter dated November 16, 2009,8 Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr. (Macusi), Sheriff IV, RTC-Branch 25, Tabuk City,
Kalinga, defended himself by calling attention to the fact that he was appointed as Sheriff only in 2006, while some of the
writs of execution in Judge Dalanao’s inventory of cases were issued as early as 1997. While admitting that in some
cases, there were late reports or no reports at all on the writs of execution, Macusi argued that "(t)he rule states that the
Sheriff must act with celerity and promptness when they are handed the Writs of Execution; yet, the rule also states that
when party litigants, in whose favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate the efforts of the Sheriffs to implement those
Writs, the latter are relieved from such duty and incur no administrative liability therefor."9 Macusi additionally wrote
that he did not report regularly despite the presence of the rules since he "relied on the dictates of practicality so as not to
waste supplies. Rules, accordingly are there to guide but they are not absolute, what matters is what one accomplishes."
Macusi then informed the OCA that he had been, in fact, sued before the courts because of his accomplishments as a
Sheriff. As for his failure to submit his estimate of expenses for Judge Dalanao’s approval, Macusi explicated that he
dispensed with the same for the winning parties were already willing to assist him and pay for his expenses.
The OCA, finding that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule141, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, sent the
latter a letter dated December 2, 2009 directing him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him.
Macusi submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30,2013, informing the Court that he was deemed
resigned from government service by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of City
Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010 Local Elections. He prayed that the Court dismiss the administrative case
against him for being moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not cessation from office renders the administrative case moot and academic.

HELD: No. Macusi’s prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusi’s constructive resignation
from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Local Elections does not render the case against
him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative
sanction. As the Court held in Baquerfo v. Sanchez:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case
moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not
lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent’s
resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Macusi had been careless and imprudent in discharging his
duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the expeditious disposition of cases. As such, he is indeed
guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task. Simple
neglect of duty signifies "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 195395 September 10, 2013


ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS: Petitioner Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District in Talisay City, Negros Occidental. The Water
District was formed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973."
The Commission on Audit disallowed a total amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Eight Pesos
(P3 80,208.00) which Mendoza received as part of his salary as the Water District's general manager from 2005 to 2006.4
The Commission found that petitioner Mendoza's salary as general manager "was not in consonance with the rate
prescribed under [Republic Act No.] 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and the approved Plantilla
of Position of the district." The Commission also found that petitioner Mendoza's claim of salary was "not supported with
an Appointment duly attested by the Civil Service Commission." Payment to petitioner Mendoza was, therefore, "illegal."
On July 6, 2009, the Commission on Audit issued the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision" informing petitioner
Mendoza of the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s. The Commission then instructed the Talisay Water District
cashier to withhold petitioner Mendoza's salaries corresponding to the amount disallowed and apply them in settlement of
the audit disallowance in accordance with Rule XII, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Audit.
Petitioner Mendoza filed his Motion for Reconsideration10 of the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision." He assailed
the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally received a copy of this. This deprived him
of the opportunity to answer the Notice immediately. He also argued that Section 23 of the Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973 gives Talisay Water District board of directors the right to fix and increase his salary as general manager and is an
exception to the Salary Standardization Law. Finally, he argued that he had relied on Section 23 in good faith. As such,
he cannot be ordered to refund the salaries he had received.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner was afforded due process even if he did not personally received the notice of Disallowance.

HELD: Yes. The Commission on Audit issued the Notice of Disallowance/s on May 28, 2007. The 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Audit governed pleading and practice in the Commission during this period. Sections 5
and 6 of Rule IV state:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 5. Number of Copies and Distribution. - The report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of
disallowances and charges, and order or decision of the Auditor shall be prepared in such number of copies as may be
necessary for distribution to the following: (1) original to the head of agency being audited; (2) one copy to the Auditor for
his record; (3) one copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of the government under audit; (4) other
copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings.
Sec. 6. Finality of the Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, Order or Decision. - Unless a request
for reconsideration in filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision of
the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the parties concerned.
In this case, copies of the Notice of Disallowance/s were received on May 29, 2007 by "the Agency Head,"
"Accountant," and "Persons Liable" with their signatures appearing beside the three designations. Petitioner Mendoza
never disputed this fact. After his receipt of the Notice of Finality of COA Decision on August 27, 2009, petitioner Mendoza
filed the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 10, 2009. The Commission on Audit gave due course to the Motion
for Reconsideration and issued the assailed Decision two (2) years after the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance/s. It
ruled that petitioner Mendoza's salary is covered by the Salary Standardization Law.
These circumstances show that the Notice of Disallowance/s was served on the necessary officers in accordance
with the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Moreover, this Court En Banc in Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission ruled that:
Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as. applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Petitioner Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the
Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the
Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side
and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due process."
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013


MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)

FACTS: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008, he committed an
error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s
Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009,
he was issued a memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension
was imposed. He filed MR seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents
relative to the case. Both were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a
30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the penalty
imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly
dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking recourse from the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA was correct in out rightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD: No. CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
is bereft of any legal standing
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there
is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative
review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and
penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal
and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot
file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse
of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 197299 February 13, 2013


OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. RODRIGO V. MAPOY and DON EMMANUEL R. REGALARIO

FACTS: Mapoy and Regalario (respondents) are Special Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
assigned at the Criminal Intelligence Division (CRID).4 On August 26, 2003, they implemented a search warrant against
Pocholo Matias (Matias), owner of Pocholo Matias Grain Center, at his warehouses located in Valenzuela City and were
able to seize 250,000 sacks of imported rice. Matias was then charged with technical smuggling or violation of Section
3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela. The search warrant, however,
was subsequently quashed for "lack of deputization by the Bureau of Customs."
On October 8, 2003, respondents were arrested by the elements of the Counter Intelligence Special Unit of the
National Capital Regional Police Office (CISU-NCRPO) during an entrapment operation conducted at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila based on the complaint6 of Matias that the respondents extorted money from him in exchange for not filing
any other criminal charges against him. The arresting officers recovered the P300,000.00 marked money from Regalario.
In their position paper,9 respondents denied the charges against them and claimed that Matias sent them death
threats and offered money for the settlement of his case. This led them to seek authority from the Chief of the CRID-
Intelligence Services to conduct further investigation on the matter.10 Thus, when Matias called them up in the morning
of October 8, 2003 reiterating his offered consideration, they formed a team to conduct a legitimate entrapment operation
against him for corruption of public officials at the agreed place or the Century Park Hotel, Manila whereat Matias
dropped a white envelope on their table and hurriedly left. They then followed him to effect his arrest but were prevented
from doing so by the CISU-NCRPO operatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the decision of the Ombudsman supported by substantial evidence.

HELD: Yes. It is well-entrenched that in an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of
guilt is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings.
In this case, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the charges against respondents for grave misconduct
and dishonesty. Records show that Matias sought the help of the police to entrap respondents who were illegally soliciting
money from him. Hence, the CISU-NCRPO planned an entrapment operation which took place at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila on October 8, 2003. Prior to the entrapment, Matias withdrew P300,000.00 from his bank, which, in turn,
recorded the serial numbers of the bills released. During the entrapment, Mapoy received the white envelope containing
P300,000.00 marked money from Matias and handed it over to Regalario from whom it was subsequently recovered. After
their arrest, respondents were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequently charged of the crime of
robbery/extortion. To a reasonable mind, the foregoing circumstances are more than adequate to support the conclusion
that respondents extorted money from Matias which complained act amounts to grave misconduct or such corrupt
conduct inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constituting flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules.26
Similarly, respondents have been dishonest in accepting money from Matias. Dishonesty has been held to include the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud, untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle, lack of fairness and straightforwardness, among others. Hence, their dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties was in order.
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory of respondents that they were at the Century Park Hotel, Manila on that
fateful day to entrap Matias for the crime of corruption of public officers. As correctly found by the Ombudsman, nothing
was mentioned in the Disposition Form relied upon by respondents with respect to their planned entrapment of Matias. It
was only a request to conduct further investigation which was not even shown to have been approved. Moreover, the
respondents' act of letting Matias leave the table after handing the money to them is inconsistent with their purported
intent to arrest him for the crime of corruption of public officers. No law ot1icer would let an offender walk away from
him. Furthermore, as aptly observed by the Ombudsman, the presence of respondents' witnesses, Ramirez and Maure, at
the hotel was not sufficiently established, and no justification was offered to explain their failure to come to the aid of
respondents when the latter were being arrested.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 201643 March 12, 2014


OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. JOSE T. CAPULONG

FACTS: These charges were based on two particular acts: first, for failure to file the required Statements of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for calendar years 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1998; and second, for failure to disclose
in his SALNs for calendar years 1999 to 2004 his wife’s business interest in two corporations, namely, SYJ Realty
Corporation and Radsy Production, Inc. Accordingly, the Ombudsman issued an Order dated December 7, 2009 directing
Capulong to file a counter-affidavit.
In his Counter-Affidavit9 filed on February 24, 2010, Capulong denied all the allegations against him, asserting
that he had been diligently filing his SALNs since his assumption of office. He claimed that since he had never received
any order from their head office requiring him to submit his SALNs for the aforesaid periods as stated under Section 310
of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 060231, a presumption exists that he had faithfully complied with the
annual filing of the SALN. He further asserted that he was not informed by his wife that she was made an incorporator of
the aforementioned corporations; hence there was no willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on his part. Besides, the
registration of both corporations had already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as of
March 15, 2004.
On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order issued by the Ombudsman placing him under preventive
suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not exceed six months effective from
receipt of the Order.
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the Ombudsman’s order,
Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 119071, with urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the
petition and issued a TRO dated April 26, 2011, enjoining and prohibiting the Ombudsman and any person representing
them or acting under their authority from implementing the preventive suspension order of the Ombudsman until further
orders from the court.
On May 18, 2011, Capulong filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File and Admit Memorandum asking the
CA to rule on the merits of the petition. On the other hand, the Ombudsman filed a manifestation on June 9, 2011
declaring that the lifting of Capulong’s preventive suspension had rendered the case moot and academic; hence the
petition should be dismissed.
On July 29, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, which granted Capulong’s petition and dismissed
the criminal charge docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0560-J (LSC). According to the CA, the petition is not rendered moot and
academic by the subsequent lifting of Capulong’s preventive suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether primary or
incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive suspension.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise
of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the context of this well-
entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman.
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of
said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence
in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing
that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical
manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.26 These exceptions exist in this case and
compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 195390 December 10, 2014


GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. vs. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO

FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local
government units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The
examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance
and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Thus, on December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216, enumerating the policies
and guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of
the strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20% development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for
the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended."
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005, pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation and
utilization of the 20% of the IRA for development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the LGUs in
undertaking development projects. The said memorandum circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for
development projects should be utilized for social development, economic development and environmental management.
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83,
entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.

ISSUE: Whether or not MC No. 2010-83 was issued pursuant to quasi-legislative powers of DILG.

HELD: Yes. The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication that the assailed issuances of the
respondent are already in the full course of implementation. The audit memorandum specifically mentioned of
Villafuerte’s alleged non-compliance with MC No. 2010-83 regarding the posting requirements stated in the circular and
reiterated the sanctions that may be imposed for the omission. The fact that Villafuerte is being required to comment on
the contents of AOM No. 2011-009 signifies that the process of investigation for his alleged violation has already begun.
Ultimately, the investigation is expected to end in a resolution on whether a violation has indeed been committed,
together with the appropriate sanctions that come with it. Clearly, Villafuerte’s apprehension is real and well-founded as
he stands to be sanctioned for non-compliance with the issuances.
There is likewise no merit in the respondent’s claim that the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies
warrants the dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-
making or quasi-legislative power of the DILG. This pertains to "the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute." Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or
rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In challenging the validity of an
administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing of a case in court. This was made clear
by the Court in Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), where it was
ruled, thus:
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. x x x.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No.172551 January 15, 2014


AND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES

FACTS: Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of
agricultural land (property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49465.
On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405, the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find this
valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation.
The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as
shown in the tax declaration11 that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP
did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s
valuation.
The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation.
The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at
this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C, which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba
City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively, civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give
weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the
prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).

ISSUE: Whether or not LBP has jurisdiction in determining land valuation and compensation for agrarian reform cases.

HELD: Yes. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we again affirmed the
need to apply Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 in just compensation cases. There, we considered the CA and
the RTC in grave error when they opted to come up with their own basis for valuation and completely disregarded the
DAR formula. The need to apply the parameters required by the law cannot be doubted; the DAR’s administrative
issuances, on the other hand, partake of the nature of statutes and have in their favor a presumption of legality. Unless
administrative orders are declared invalid or unless the cases before them involve situations these administrative
issuances do not cover, the courts must apply them.
As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is primarily charged with determining land
valuation and compensation for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only
preliminary. The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication. Thus, we
clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the
factors laid down by law and the pertinent DAR regulations.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 190837 March 5, 2014


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC.

FACTS: The FDA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720, otherwise known as the "Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," primarily in order "to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for foods, drugs and
devices, and cosmetic product[s]." On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health (DOH), thru then-Secretary Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. (AO) 67, s. 1989, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical Products." Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products
with the FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However,
the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local facility capable of
conducting the same. The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8,
s. 1997 which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.
Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource pharmaceutical product" with the generic name of rifampicin –
branded as "Refam 200mg/5mL Suspension" (Refam) – for the treatment of adults and children suffering from pulmonary
and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis. On November 15, 1996, respondents applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug,
valid for five (5) years, or until November 15, 2001. At the time of the CPR’s issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE
testing since there was still no facility capable of conducting BA/BE testing. Sometime in 2001, respondents applied for
and were granted numerous yearly renewals of their CPR for Refam, which lasted until November 15, 2006, albeit with
the condition that they submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for said drug.
Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and
annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was
granted the authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720. As such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars
and the manner of their promulgation contravened the law and the Constitution. They further averred that that the non-
renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect Refam, but their other
products as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.

HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which
delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute
and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an
adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule.
Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing
the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to
authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and
obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations
under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being
administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and
refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by
the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain
facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order No.
292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to
be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an administrative
rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175, s. 1987 prohibits, inter
alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products without obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA. In this
regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after
due course, grant or reject such applications. To this end, the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon
the recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical
products.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014


OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated
that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in
contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set
out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.
Instead of attending the hearing,Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December
2012. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory
hearing no longer pushed through.
In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director Amora-Ladra) of the
Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec Resolution No. 9551, Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if
no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted.
In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec adopted the recommendation of
Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly’s COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the
cancellation of Kimberly’s COC.
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendation of Director
Esmeralda-AmoraLadra, Law Department, as follows:
1. To cancelthe Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica without prejudice to any civil,
criminal or administrative liability that she may have incurred pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution 9518; and
2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica as an effect of the cancellation
of the COC of Kimberly.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed in the cancellation Kimberly’s COC. (Quasi-Judicial Powers of
COMELEC)

HELD: No. In simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the
latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the
Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminds the Comelec that, inthe exercise of it adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the En Banc.
Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.28
As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should
have first decided this case.
In Bautista v. Comelec, et al. where the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of a candidate’s
COC for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the
Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate. The Court held:
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if
there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted
without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy without first referring the case
to a division for summary hearing.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It isthus clear that cancellation proceedings involve
the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in divisionshould first decide. More so
in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en bane cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact
where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. We thus caution the Comelec against
its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law
Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation of certificate of candidacy is a
quasi-judicial process, and accordingly is heard by the Commission on Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we
DISMISS the present petition for being moot and academic.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014


RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA

FACTS: On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J
ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioner’s
abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that
she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s financial support.
In his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied respondent’s allegations
and alleged, among others, that he had been maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it
was respondent who verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children's stay with him was extended; that
respondent had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuñiga despite the impropriety and moral implications of such set-
up; that despite their written agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, the latter violated
the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said
Zuñiga; and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her
custody. Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO, considering that the provision
authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter raised herein was the RTC’s alleged
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality
of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota
of the case was absent.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is proper delegation of power.

HELD:Yes. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness
and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance
of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.
If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte
determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be
present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the
affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO
have been committed.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

GR No. 211362 Feb 24, 2015


FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY vs. SUPERINTENDENT OF
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY

FACTS: Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On
November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of
which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked
Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher
reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical
officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO,
Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to
write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm
while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the
teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at
3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from
said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a
lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was
dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher
to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his
query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of
them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed
a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly,
Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next
class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof
may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an
investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC
reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under
PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of
chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of
the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the
dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-
investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such
pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s
“sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the
CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter
of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was failure to observe exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Whether or not there was violation of due process.
3. Whether or not PMA has the right to dismiss Cadua in the gist of academic freedom.

HELD: 1. No. Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino's
resolution of Cadet 1CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative
process. While Cadet 1CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level the
determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the
assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of
the PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate review
proceedings before the CRAB he still appealed to the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting
the military. It is contended that the President's power over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is
recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Sengaand in Section 31 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST
"The National Defense Act"). As such, the President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view, the
filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal
affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of
Cadet 1CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC
recommendation from the AFP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after
the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet 1CL Cudia's family the
night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist
that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor] and Verceles v.
BLR-DOLE rulings.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of,
have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum." In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States, which was cited by respondents, it was specifically
held that in a typical case involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the
military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military and
civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial remedies if
any of the following is present:
when there is a violation of due process;
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may
be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant
is the fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued
its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event
bars any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

2. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the
institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded
due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing
practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to
explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo.
The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The
HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a
new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge
against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against
him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have
violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
(AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had
issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.

3. Yes. The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." As a
Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so
does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has
always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on
students who violate disciplinary rules. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court elucidated:
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be
taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution
no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties
of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical
and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help
its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to
study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of
graduation privileges.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student
prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, We upheld the university's withdrawal of a
doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed
out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the
right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate
upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student
that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she
was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before
the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of
academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 185544 January 13, 2015


THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS: Sometime in 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
approached the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo for its possible assistance in handling the
corporation’s labor cases.
Clark Development Corporation, through its legal officers and after the law firm’s acquiescence, "sought from the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel [‘OGCC’] its approval for the engagement of [Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and
Gastardo] as external counsel.
On December 4, 2001, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel denied the request.8 Clark Development
Corporation then filed a request for reconsideration.
On May 20, 2002, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, through Government Corporate Counsel Amado
D. Valdez (Government Corporate Counsel Valdez), reconsidered the request and approved the engagement of Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo.10 It also furnished Clark Development Corporation a copy of a pro-forma retainership
contract containing the suggested terms and conditions of the retainership. It instructed Clark Development Corporation
to submit a copy of the contract to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel after all the parties concerned have
signed it.
On July 13, 2005, Clark Development Corporation requested the Commission on Audit for concurrence of the
retainership contract it executed with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. According to the law firm, it was only
at this pointvwhen Clark Development Corporation informed them that the Commission on Audit required the clearance
and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel before it could approve the release of Clark Development
Corporation’s funds to settle the legal fees due to the law firm.
On November 9, 2006, the Commission on Audit’s Office of the General Counsel, Legal and Adjudication Sector
issued a "Third Indorsement"24 denying Clark Development Corporation’s request for clearance, citing its failure to
secure a prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit and the approval with finality of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel. It also stated that its request for concurrence was made three (3) years after engaging the
legal services of the law firm.
Clark Development Corporation and Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo separately filed motions for
reconsideration, which the Commission on Audit denied in the assailed resolution dated November 5, 2008. The
resolution also disallowed the payment of legal fees to the law firm on the basis of quantum meruit since the Commission
on Audit Circular No. 86-255 mandates that the engagement of private counsel without prior approval "shall be a
personal liability of the officials concerned."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing the payment of the legal fees to Laguesma Magsalin
Consulta and Gastardo as Clark Development Corporation’s private counsel.

HELD:No. In this case, Clark Development Corporation had failed to secure the final approval of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel and the written concurrence of respondent before it engaged the services of petitioner.
When Government Corporate Counsel Valdez granted Clark Development Corporation’s request for reconsideration, the
approval was merely conditional and subject to its submission of the signed pro-forma retainership contract provided for
by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. In the letter dated May 20, 2002, Government Corporate Counsel
Valdez added:
For the better protection of the interests of CDC, we hereby furnish you with a Pro-Forma Retainership Agreement
containing the suggested terms and conditions of the retainership, which you may adopt for this purpose.
After the subject Retainership Agreement shall have been executed between your corporation and the retained counsel,
please submit a copy thereof to our Office for our information and file.
Upon Clark Development Corporation’s failure to submit the retainership contract, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel denied Clark Development Corporation’s request for final approval of its legal services contracts,
including that of petitioner. In the letter dated December 22, 2005, Government Corporate Counsel Devanadera informed
Clark Development Corporation that:
[i]t appears, though, that our Pro-Forma Retainership Agreement was not followed and CDC merely adopted the proposal
of aforesaid retainers/consultants. Also, this Office was never informed that CDC agreed on payment of retainer’s fee on a
per case basis.
In view of Clark Development Corporation’s failure to secure the final conformity and acquiescence of the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel, its retainership contract with petitioner could not have been considered as
authorized.
The concurrence of respondents was also not secured by Clark Development Corporation priorto hiring petitioner’s
services. The corporation only wrote a letter-request to respondents three (3) years after it had engaged the services of
petitioner as private legal counsel.
The cases that the private counsel was asked to manage are not beyond the range of reasonable competence expected from the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. Certainly, the issues do not appear to be complex or of substantial national interest to
merit additional counsel. Even so, there was no showing that the delays in the approval also were due to circumstances not attributable
to petitioner nor was there a clear showing that there was unreasonable delay in any action of the approving authorities. Rather, it
appears that the procurement of the proper authorizations was mere afterthought.
Respondents, therefore, correctly denied Clark Development Corporation’s request for clearance in the
disbursement of funds to pay petitioner its standing legal fees.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

GR No. 185812 January 13, 2015


MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY v. COA

FACTS: The Resident Auditor issued notices of disallowance on the allowances and incentives received by the officers and
employees of Maritime Industry Authority. The Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit upheld the
notices of disallowance issued. The Commission on Audit affirmed the notices of disallowance. Thus, this petition for
certiorari was filed by Maritime Industry Authority.
Maritime Industry Authority is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication and
created under Presidential Decree No. 474.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes" took effect. The law standardizes the salary
rates of government officials and employees.
On September 30, 1989, the Department of Budget and Management issued National Compensation Circular Nos.
56[6] and 59 implementing Republic Act No. 6758.
Maritime Industry Authority discontinued the grant of several allowances and incentives to its officials and
employees allegedly due to the issuance of National Compensation Circular Nos. 56 and 59.
In the memorandum dated February 10, 2000, the Administrator of Maritime Industry Authority recommended to
then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada the approval and/or restoration of financial incentives, benefits, or allowances to
the officers and employees of Maritime Industry Authority.
The Resident Auditor disallowed the grant of the allowances on the ground that it constituted double compensation
to public officers and employees proscribed by Article IX(b) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Section 229 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual or GAAM Volume 1. Further, the President's approval of the memorandum
was not the law contemplated by the Constitution as an exception to the prohibition on double compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees of Maritime Industry Authority
have legal basis.

HELD:No. Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:


Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Petitioner Maritime Industry Authority argues that the rule against double compensation does not apply because
National Compensation Circular No. 59 is ineffectual due to its non-publication.
Respondent Commission on Audit counters that the disallowed allowances is tantamount to additional
compensation proscribed by Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. This is because these allowances are not
authorized by law.
Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by government officials and employees as
incorporated in the standardized salary, unless excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and
Management. The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction.
The disallowed benefits and allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority's officials and employees were not
excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were deemed already given to
the officials and employees when they received their basic salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances
was tantamount to double compensation.
JED SALVIO PARACHA – ADMIN LAW REVIEW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 208261 December 8, 2014


PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION vs. LORENIA P. DE GUZMAN

FACTS: On December 7, 2001, PAGCOR hired De Guzman as an Evaluation Specialist and assigned her to the Property
and Procurement Department. At the time of her employment, De Guzman accomplished a Personal History Statement
(PHS), which requires an attestation8 from the employee that the information stated therein are true and correct to the
best of her knowledge and belief, and agreed that any misdeclaration or omission would be sufficient ground for denial of
her application, clearance, or cause for separation. In her PHS, De Guzman indicated that she had no relatives currently
employed with PAGCOR and did not disclose that she has a sister named Adelina P. See (Adelina). In 2008, De Guzman
updated her PHS, reiterating her statement that she had no relatives working with PAGCOR, but this time, listed Adelina
as one of her siblings.
It was later found out, however, that De Guzman had a nephew named Gerwin P. See, her sister Adelina’s son, who
worked in PAGCOR from July 26, 2001 until his resignation on September 22, 2005.
Upon discovery of De Guzman’s alleged deceit, Atty. Albert R. Sordan (Atty. Sordan) of PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation
Unit sent De Guzman a Notice of Charges dated August 12, 2010 (Formal Charge) charging her of "Deception or Fraud in
Securing Employee’s Appointment or Promotion" and directed her to show cause why she should not be subjected to any
disciplinary action. In her reply-letter dated August 16, 2010, De Guzman, among other things, maintained that she
updated her PHS with all honesty and to the best of her knowledge. In a Memorandum dated November 5, 2010 (Assailed
Memorandum) signed by Michael J. Bailey, Officer-In-Charge of PAGCOR’s Human Resource and Development
Department (HRDD-OIC Bailey), De Guzman was found administratively liable for the charges filed against her and was,
thus, dismissed.
De Guzman received a copy of the Assailed Memorandum on November 6, 2010 and appealed her dismissal before
the CSC on December 10, 2010. PAGCOR opposed the appeal for having been belatedly filed.
The CSC found that the Formal Charge and the Assailed Memorandum were not issued by the proper disciplinary
authority – PAGCOR in this case – but merely by its employees, namely Atty. Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey, respectively.
As such, no Formal Charge was validly filed against De Guzman, resulting in the violation of her right to due process.
Consequently, the CSC ordered PAGCOR to reinstate De Guzman to her position and to pay her back salaries from date of
dismissal to actual reinstatement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative disciplinary case against De
Guzman on the ground that she was deprived of her right to due process.

HELD: Yes. In light of the foregoing jurisprudence and after a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no error on
the part of the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling giving due course to De Guzman’s appeal despite its belated filing for
being meritorious, as will be discussed hereunder.
Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in administrative
disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the employee concerned a formal charge specifying the
latter’s acts and/or omissions complained of, and directing him to answer the charges stated therein, viz.:
Section 16. Formal Charge. – After a finding of a prima faciecase, the disciplining authority shall formally
charge the person complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge(s), a brief statement of materialor
relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the
testimony of witnesses, a directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his answer whether or not he elects a formal investigation of the
charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to be assisted by a counsel of his choice.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman to her position. Adhering
to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power
to appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has the power to discipline or remove De Guzman for any transgressions she may have
committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR may only act through its Board of Directors as a collective body, which is
vested with the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate powers under the law. Simply put, PAGCOR is the
proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees, and as such, formal charges against its employees in administrative
disciplinary proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors, as in this case.
However, in this instance, the Formal Charge, as well as the Assailed Memorandum, did not come from PAGCOR
through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty. Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey, respectively. Records are bereft of
any showing that the latter were authorized by the PAGCOR Board of Directors to issue the aforesaid documents. As
such, the Formal Charge and the Assailed Memorandum are null and void. Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from
PAGCOR without a valid formal charge was done in violation of her right to due process, warranting the dismissal of the
instant administrative disciplinary case against her, without prejudice to its re-filing, pursuant to Section 48 of the
URACCS, to wit:
Section 48. When to Remand an Appealed Case to Agency of Origin. - If on appeal, the Commission finds that the
disciplining authority violated respondent-appellant's right to due process such as the failure to issue a formal charge,
the Commission shall dismiss the appealed case and order the immediate reinstatement of the respondent with payment
of back salaries and other benefits. However, the dismissal of the case shall be without prejudice on the part of the
disciplining authority to re-file it in accordance with law.