60 / THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES $10. The origin of dualism in the prevailing exemplary role of natural science. The rationality of the world more geometrico. Ovs masic xixscenr of the novel conception of nature has yet to be brought to the fore. In his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective of what appears to the senses and is mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life; he abstracts from all that 1s in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this ab- straction is the things purely as bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up 2 world which becomes the subject matter of research, One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism, which appears immedi- ately afterward in Descartes. In general we must realize that the conception of the new idea of “nature” as an encapsuled, really and theoretically self- enclosed world of bodies soon brings about 2 complete transfor- ‘mation of the idea of the world in general. The world splits, 0 to speak, into two worlds: nature and the psychic world, although the latter, because of the way in which it is related to nature, does not achieve the status of an independent world. The an: clents had individual investigations and theories about bodies, but not a closed world of bodies as subject matter of a universal science of nature. They also had investigations of the human and the animal soul, but they could not have a psychology in the modern sense, a psychology which, because it had universal nature and a science of nature before it [as a model], could strive for a corresponding universality, i.c., within a similarly self enclosed field of its own. The splitting of the world and the transformation of ts meaning were the understandable consequences of the exem- plary role of naturalscientific method—or, to put it another Partll / 61 way, natural-sclentific rationality—a role which was indeed quite unavoidable at the beginning of the modern period. Im- plled in the mathematization of nature, as the idea and the task were understood, was the supposition of the coexistence of the infinite totality of its bodies in space-time as mathematically rational; though natural science, as inductive, could have only inductive access to interconnections which, in themselves, are mathematical. In any case, natural science possessed the highest rationality because it was guided by pute mathematics and achieved, through inductions, mathematical results, Should this not become the mode! of all genuine knowledge? Should know]- edge, if itis to attain the status of 2 genuine science which goes beyond nature, not follow the example of natural science or, even better, that of pure mathematics, insofar as we have, per- haps, in other spheres of knowledge, the “innate” faculty of apodictic self-evidence through axioms and deductions? It is no wonder that we already find the idea of a universal mathematics {in Descartes. Of course the weight of the theoretical and pract- cal successes [of science], beginning immediately with Galfleo, had its effect. Thus the world and, correlatively, philosophy, take on a completely new appearance. The world must, in itself, be a rational world, in the new sense of rationality taken from mathe- matics, or mathematized nature; correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the world, must be built up as a unified rational theory more geometric, $11. Dualism as the reason for the ineomprehensibility of the problems of reason; as presupposition for the specialization of the sciences; as the foundation of naturalistic psychology. OF counss, if sclentifcally rational mature fs a world of bodies existing in itself—which was taken for granted in the siven historical situation—then the worldinitself must, in a senso unknown before, be a peculiarly split world, split into nature in-tself and a mode of being which is different from this: that which exists psychlcally. At fit this was to introduce con-62 / THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES siderable difficulties, even in respect to the idea of God coming from religion, an idea which had by no means been given up. Was God not unavoidable as the principle of rationality? Does not rational being, even [merely] a8 nature, in order to be thinka- ble at all, presuppose rational theory and a subjectivity which ‘accomplishes it? Does not nature, then, indeed the world.in-t- self, presuppose God as reason existing absolutely? Does this not ‘mean that, within belng-in-tself, psychic being takes precedence as subjectivity existing purely for itself? It is, after all, subjectiv. ity, whether divine or human. In general, the separating.off of the psychic caused greater and greater dificulder wbencver problems of reason made them selves felt. Of course it was only later that these difficulties became so pressing that they became the central theme of philos- ophy, in the great investigations on human understanding, in “eritiques of reason,” But the power of rationalistic motives was ‘a8 yet unbroken; everywhere men proceeded, full of confidence, to carry through the rationalistic philosophy on all fronts. And they were not without success in acquiring undoubtedly valuable knowledge: even if this knowledge did “not yet" correspond to the ideal, it could be interpreted as a preliminary stage. Every establishment of a special science was now eo ipso guided by the {dea of a rational theory, or of a rational domain, corresponding to it, The specialization of philosophy into particular sciences accordingly has a deeper meaning, one exclusively related to the modem attitude. The specializations of ancient scientists could not result in particular sciences in our sense. Galileo's natural science did not arise through a specialization. It was only the subsequent new sciences which by contrast specialized the idea of a rational philosophy motivated by the new natural science; it ‘was from this idea that they received the momentum to make progress and conquer new domains, rationally closed special regions within the rational totality of the universe. ‘Naturally, as soon as Descartes had proclaimed the idea of a rational philosophy and the division of nature and spirit, a new psychology was an immediate requirement, and it already made its appearance in Descartes's contemporary, Hobbes. It was, as we have already indicated, a psychology of a sort completely unknown to earlier times, designed concretely as a psychophysi- cal anthropoiogy inthe atonal ould not be misled by the usual contrast between ‘empiricism and rationalism, The naturalism of a Hobbes wants Part / 63 tobe physicalism, and like all physicalism it follows the model of physical rationality." ‘This is also true of the other sciences of the modern period, the biological, etc. The dualistic split, the consequence of the physicalistic conception of nature, brings about in them a devel- opment in the form of split disciplines. The biophysical sciences, those which at first concentrate, in a one-sided fashion, purely ‘on what pertains to the physical body, still find it necessary to begin by grasping the concrete entities deseriptively, analyzing and classifying them intuitively; but the phystealistic view of nature makes ft obvious that a further developed physics would fn the end “explain” all these concrete entities in a physicalisti- cally rational way. Thus the flourishing of the biophysical. descriptive sciences, especially in view of their occasional use of Imowledge taken from physics, is considered a success of the scientific method, always interpreted in the sense of physics. In regard to the soul, on the other hand, which is left over after the animal and the human bodies have been separated off as belonging inside the closed region of nature: here the exem- plary role of physics’ conception of nature, and of the scientific method, has the understandable effeet—this since the time of Hobbes—that a type of being is ascribed to the soul which is similar In principle to that of nature; and to psychology is as- cribed a progression from description to ultimate theoretical “explanation” similar to that of biophysics. ‘This notwithstanding the Cartesian doctrine that bodily and psychic “substance” are separated by radically different attributes. This naturalization of the psychic comes down through John Locke to the whole mod- em period up to the present day. Locke's image of the white paper is characteristic—the tabula rasa on which psychic data ‘come and go, somehow ordered like the events of bodies in na- ture, This novel, physicalistically oriented naturalism is, in Locke, not yet consistently worked out, not thought through to the cend as positivistic sensationalism. But it spreads rapidly, and in a way which is fateful for the historical development of all * When T use the erm “physicalism.” bere and elsewhere, use st cxclusively in the general sense which is understood throughout the ‘Course of our own investigations, fe. o stand for philosophical errors ‘eating from minnerettins ot the tue meaning of modern Dhysies. Thus the word dees not reer here specifically to the "physi Ealistic movement” (Vienna Cirle,” Togleal empizilera 3 Hiusserl uses the English term.64 / THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES philosophy. In any case, the new naturalistic psychology was from the beginning more than an empty promise; it enters the stage impressively, in great writings, claiming to give the lasting formulation of a universal science. Borne by the same spirit, all the new sciences seem to suc ceed, even the highest. metaphysics. Where physicalistic ration- alfsm could not be carried through in earnest, as precisely in the ‘case of metaphysics, aid was sought in unclear qualifications, through the use of variations of Scholastic concepts. For the ‘most part, in fact, the guiding sense of the new rationality was not precisely thought out, even though it was the driving force behind the movements. Its explication in more precise terms was itself a part of philosophy’s intellectual labor up to the time of Liebniz and Christian Wolff. In Spinoza’s Ethica we have a Classical example of how the new naturalistic rationalism thought itself capable of creating ordine geometrico a systematic philosophy—metaphysics, a science of the ultimate and highest ‘questions, questions of reason, but also questions of fact. ‘One must, of course, correctly understand Spinoza’s histori- cal meaning, It is a complete misunderstanding to interpret Spinoza according to what is visible on the surface of his “geo- metrical” method of demonstration. Beginning as a Cartesian, he 4s at first, of course, completely convinced that not only nature ‘bat the totality of being as such must be @ coherent rational system. That was taken for granted in advance. The mathemati- cal system of nature must be enclosed in the total system—but, as part of a system, the former cannot be self-sufficient. One ccannnot leave physics to the physicists as if it were truly a com- plete system and then entrust to psychological spectalists the task of developing a rational system proper to the psychological arm of the dualism. God, the absolute substance, would also have to belong within the unity of the rational total system as a subject for theory. Spinoza is confronted with the task of discov- ering the postulated rational total system of what is—discover- {ng first of all the conditions of its betng thought in coherent fashion—and then of systematically realizing it through actual construction. It is only thus, through the deed, that the actual conceivability of a rational totality of being is established. Prior to this, in spite of the self-evidence this attitude found in the exemplary character of natural science, it was only a postulate; for the dualism of radically different “substances,” with the one absolute and most real substance above them, the possibility of {ts boing thought through was not at all clear. Of course, Spinoza Part / 65 was interested only in what was systematically general—his Ethicas the first universal ontology. Through it, he believed, the actual systematic meaning of existing natural science could be obtained, together with that of the psychology which was to be similarly constructed as a parallel to it. Without this meaning both remain incomprehensible, $12. Over-all characterization of modern physicalistic rationalism. PumosoPay 1 315 ancient origins wanted to be “sclence,” universal knowledge of the universe of what is; it wanted to be not vague and relative everyday knowledge— ssia— but rational knowledge—trierhun. But the true idea of rationality, and in connection with that the true idea of universal science, ‘was not yet attained in ancient philosophy—such was the con- viction of the founders of the modern age. The new ideal was possible only according to the model of the newly formed mathe- ‘matics and natural science. It proved its possibility in the inspir- {ing pace of its realization. What is the universal science of this new idea but—thought of as ideally completed—ommiscience? This, then, is for philosophy truly a realizable, though infinitely istant, goal—not for the individual or a given community of ro- searchers but certainly for the infinite progression of the gener- ations and their systematic researches. The world is in {tself 2 rational systematic unity—this is thought to be a matter of apo- ictic insight—in which each and every singular detail must be rationally determined. Its systematic form (the universal struc- ture of Its essence) can be attained, is indeed known and ready for us in advance, at least insofar as it is purely mathematical. Only its particularity remains to be determined; and unfortu- nately this is possible only through induction. This is the path— infinite, to be sure—to omniscience, Thus one lives in the happy certainty of a path leading forth from the near to the distant, from the more or less known into the unknown, as an infallible method of broadening knowledge, through which truly all of the totality of what is will be known a5 itis “inttself”—in an infinite progression. To this always belongs another progression: that of approximating what is given sensibly and intultively in the