is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00.
The court further awarded compounded
EVIDENCE:
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVEd
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422
hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares
(5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, 1 as
amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land Bank of the
Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:
Acquired property Area in hectares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as
respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation
of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount
of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the
provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR. 5
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which
interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente
Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of
SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in
bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established
in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using
the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) =
Net Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 38448 )
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
(using the formula under Executive Order No. 2289 )
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant
to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
trial court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
"primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands
1
suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition
arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and
compensation by the Landbank.12
Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. 13 If
the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after
he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government.14 In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR are in
accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which
provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court 19 and, on its own
initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to
examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of
properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x."20 In determining just compensation, the RTC
is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
thus:
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation."
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as
amended.21
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements
in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and
merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly
erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following
factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even
authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00,
merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the
knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very
recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil
Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at
Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are
situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut
land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70.
In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per
hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest
every forty-five days. We cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and
in this case there is a great variance in average production per year when in the two
cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines
Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year
as average gross production. In the Rodriguezcase, the defendants fixed the average
gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also
constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at
bar.
xxx xxx xxx
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land
taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
2
 production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both
cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to
adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the coconut land in this
case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that
Landbank fixed for this case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net
income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore,
the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an
area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross
production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this
case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans
x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted
interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest
on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of
the compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the
knowledge of the opposing party,"25 which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is
explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative
or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case." (emphasis
added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in
granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. 28 It
must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes
the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the
person who personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and
does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the
formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11
discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under
Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents
have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion,
however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC
wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the
subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,
shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance
of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED
to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial
judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper
valuation of the subject property. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON
KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi,"
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM
TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and
several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060,
10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan
de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
3
Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The
Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names
of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with
threats to kill the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No.
10060] 4 and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario
or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer
of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron
vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein
accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and
brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga
City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and
deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released
only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the
damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats
and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public officer of
the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk
Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on
the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration,
this Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered,
unless detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as
principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom
and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on
them shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and
pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
four accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two
(2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065 and 10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three
charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five
(5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the
three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these
three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced
to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
4
 Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders
"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by
them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on
December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their
liability being solidary.
Costs against the accused convicted. SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
"amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of
Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution

To Jessica Calunod: The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
One Bracelet P 2,400.00 agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect
government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00 Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the
Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government:
Cash P 200.00 Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod
and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver
To Armado C. Bacarro: from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00 On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School
to check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they
One Necklace P 300.00 proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the
place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who
One Calculator P 295.00 pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

Eyeglasses P 500.00
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of
their personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain
One Steel Tape P 250.00
by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander
Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).
To Edilberto S. Perez:

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00 While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00 regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others.
(pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
Cash P 300.00
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest.
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara: During their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who
were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed
the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)
One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom
notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall
be extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon
Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John
Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were
informed that they would be released. They started walking until around
7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received
the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was
P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between

5
 Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
. . . 12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto
Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
13
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel
were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants
spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion
station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8)
accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the
same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped
and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with
Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with
Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes,
fetch water and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was
assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-
treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about
two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives
were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her
chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992,
pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who
was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of
the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for
less than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her
escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military
troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a
"bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an
army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali,
then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the
other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of
Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm,
soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being
arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them were just
made to board a six by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck.
The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside
the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians
present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya
Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga
City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where
they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused
were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp.
6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore
narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm
on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in
the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the
present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for
the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3,
1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution
witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and
convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
[p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify,
[p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only
of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988,
to February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven
of the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais;
(5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid",
and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as
accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to
which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed
6
 band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut
themselves off from established communities, lived in the mountains and
forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The
wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to
their needs, giving them material and moral support. These wives also
attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or
comforting them.
xxx xxx xxx
II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and
Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the
8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male
accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages
by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from
place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and
Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men who
had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions
and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a
common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to
commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).) 14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-
appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their
right to cross-examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al.,
with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the
kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth
offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the commission
of the offense. 15
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no
longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence,
and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty
imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice
of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team
leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was
allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant
Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been
heard and are actually pending before the same judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal
cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based
mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica
Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous
cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome
of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons
who were with the group?
7
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said
for fifty-four days. Tangkong and his wife are here?
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know A Yes, ma'am.
them? Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he
Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those who were identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.
assigned to give us some food. Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will name?
take care of you? A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
A Yes. xxx xxx xxx
Q And to whom were you assigned? ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
A To Ila Abdurasa. Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one
assigned to, who else did you come to know? who took us.
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated
of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another brother that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took you
in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira. to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
xxx xxx xxx A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and xxx xxx xxx
you really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if
these persons if you will see the[m] again? he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you
A Yes, ma'am. would not recognize him?
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my
those you mentioned are here? shoes.
A Yes, they are here. COURT:
Q Some of them are here? Q Who?
A Some of them are here. A Tangkong, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 20
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing? Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of FISCAL CAJAYON:
those nine armed men who took us from the highway. xxx xxx xxx
RTC INTERPRETER: Q Who else?
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his A The last man.
name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS. Q Did you come to know his name?
CP CAJAYON D MS: A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
captivity? A The same, guarding us.
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
Nana. Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed
COURT: men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge.
Q Who? [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A Tangkong. A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
xxx xxx xxx 19 Q They did not fire any shots?
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing A But they were pointing their guns at us.
to appellant as one of the culprits: Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the]
FISCAL CAJAYON: Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander
xxx xxx xxx Falcasantos?
Q And what happened then? A Yes.
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us. A Yes.
Q [To] whom were you assigned? Q Will you please identify?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana. A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court
xxx xxx xxx who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o xxx xxx xxx
you remember how he looks like? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.
A Yes. Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:

8
 Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used A Yes, there is the other signature.
the word Tangkong. Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan
ATTY. FABIAN Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean? are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their signed this one?
time two hours another will be on duty guarding us. A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong? [sic].
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us. Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan,
xxx xxx xxx 21 and there is the signature above the same. Did you come to know
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or who signed it?
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member xxx xxx xxx
of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to
guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to us the portion here which says the terms? . . .
the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator. A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang
kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms
Kidnapping for Ransom sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday,
narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters. February 3, 1989.
CP CAJAYON D MS: xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated
were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City January 21, 1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us why it is
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or
supposed to negotiate? January 31, 1989?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
terms. 22 Q January 21, 1989?
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms? A Yes.
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by xxx xxx xxx
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter. Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you Please go over this.
asked to write for your ransom? A (Going over the letter)
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them. Yes, ma'am.
Q Why will you able to identify the same? Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A Because I was the one who wrote it. A (Witness reading)
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship? Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga
A Yes. completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25
by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there xxx xxx xxx
are five letters all handwritten. INTERPRETER:
COURT: They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete
Original? uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half
CP CAJAYON D MS: medium, one half large.
Original, your Honor. xxx xxx xxx
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after
these were the ones you were asked to write. [they were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you
A (Witness going over [letters]) know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more. A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as
letters, what else will make you remember that these are really P500,000.00, and when we were already — I was asked again to
the ones you wrote while there? write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that
A The signature is there. all of us are alive. 26 [sic]
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature. Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto
Q That is your signature? Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and
A Yes, ma'am.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

9
the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City
Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, 31 having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been
clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of
appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Kidnapping of Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of
the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as
one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were
with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter.
In People vs. Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even
before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be
held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was
committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art.
267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was
deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the
conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but
also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs.
Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267,
paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst
for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a
barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished,
therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the
trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed
was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in
that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His
plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl
from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not
indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
victims.
Third Issue: Denial and Alibi
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and
their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to
the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against
him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life
imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a
definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised
Penal Code. 41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping
for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of
his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one
each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the
personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is
ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the
kidnappers. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well
as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to
plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted
10
the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex
"B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to
five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex
"C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of
a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few
days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion
training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having
successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April
7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as
captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia.
(Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to
take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible
promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November
1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice
(Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short
notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all
possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2)
months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion
was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a
quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that
the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in
the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or
documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items
demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an
obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if
the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner
of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of
the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-
84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon
in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver,
and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp.
102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano
and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant .SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
11
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291]
complaint is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.3 is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied. More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries: written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN
FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY
HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE
THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under
the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the
burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied.4
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to
"money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims
arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator,
238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261
SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable
to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily
prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more
than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already
prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity
date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has
already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below
from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on.
1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1,
In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement
1982, was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should
of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or
prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate
voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action
court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate
had been commenced at all."12
court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on
June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial
Court, had already prescribed. Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions
xxx xxx xxx
set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear
Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of
and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general
xxx xxx xxx

12
 Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the
Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that
when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with
the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning
the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline
industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional
operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt
cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of
flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6,
1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice
and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion,
therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections
has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of
office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never
qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still
able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public
documents2 of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication
thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States
"providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation
will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation." 4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from
running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public
office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires
Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition of a
foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen
of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued
it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship.
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S.
passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his
American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be
13
made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation
to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport
because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues
the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a
country".1âwphi1 On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one.
Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision
merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by
the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 8 They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. 9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his
U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked
by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and
which agreed with Arnado’s claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions
because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that
Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following
dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived
in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his
nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon
departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and
upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use." 10 This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on
18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s travel records show that he presented his
U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts
were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the
use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport.
Arnado’s continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to
what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively
Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public
office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports,
we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the
prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.
Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu
Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE
DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June
2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case
Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three
accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act
No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas
bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA
southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted
on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other – one sat two
seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When
he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two
passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at
the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that
the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if
the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out
and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the
man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the
suspicious characters to the police.
14
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men 9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of
designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to these charges.
alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, 10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of
Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus the Abu Sayyaf.1
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus
passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident. Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an
apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman –
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former
read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against
interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day
the government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise
Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He
then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
kilos of TNT – that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
confirm that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
other "John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused
remain at-large.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad,
Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly
and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing,
received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
the parties stipulated the following:
mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro
ko sayo."
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing
Assignment of Errors
one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG
bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency
taught him how to make explosive devices.
of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
said plea.
bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes
persons injured. charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24
each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their
First Assignment of Error
participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes,
because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching
that they had entered. inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of

15
stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial
Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed
upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will
recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not
guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering
the stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall,
they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people
and injury of about forty other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Peña, have you
discussed this matter with your clients?
………
Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t conferred with
them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
………
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused because if they
are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas,
your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated
multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder
case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt.
They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
………
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn
their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder.
Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I
will terminate pretrial and accommodate…5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges … must
refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure
under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In
People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty,"
the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to
"guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving
the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to
the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still
an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation
of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the
duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not
been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple
murder – based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made
two other confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission
(pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule
on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of
great significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged." 13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the
Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis
of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
16
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-
state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men
who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the
bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan
and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of
guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-
turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the
state prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he
train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two
weeks.
………
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr.
Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
………
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro
Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2
kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
………
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you
by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
………
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date,
December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
………
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb
………
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
………
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the
bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me
until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after
I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
………
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
………
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which
were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
………
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me
not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo
Trinidad exploded.
………
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he
took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at
Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the
bombing in General Santos.
………
A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was
sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing
exploded in Makati, any other call?
………
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.
………
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
………
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky
called you up the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the
success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the
relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission,
which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf
should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to
sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians." 18 It can
17
also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal
Valentine’s Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and design would be realized.
Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of
manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first mission." 19 They made two
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually
separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentine’s
demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25
On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf
Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from
Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." 20 In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at
the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat.
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments." 26
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as
not have been accomplished
the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
both conspirators.27 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
"principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in
Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of … [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
their mission – prove the finding that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as
commission of the crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible
crime would not have materialized."22lawphi1 against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act
cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
would not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his
he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.28
Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the
act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. 24 The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as
affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011
accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime." As correctly declared
by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R.
to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive
explosive devices.
BRION, J.:
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by
accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter’s Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the
the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane) (3rd motion).

18
 THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009)
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves
and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of
the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.
0009.5
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No.
0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board
of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special
stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets
of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG.
These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting
rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12,
1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from
participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’
the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10especially in the election of the members of the board of
directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual
stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed
guidelines."11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held
on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room,
Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The
stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through
Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final
judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a
proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 10778913(PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for
holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our
November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed
resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case
and the former merely an incident.15
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a
"Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose
of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996
Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and
immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No.
0130.17
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former
director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving
notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of
deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of
the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to
depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their
answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify
on the facts set forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the
petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class
A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use
the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the
scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to
the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole
purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered
Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously
scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was
"unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition
for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition).
We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:
This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend
the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the
two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the
stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court
with no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper determination.
xxxx
19
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to
entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors
and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized
capital stock of ETPI.
The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.
II. Civil Case No. 0009
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and
March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
witnesses:
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –
1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on
oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner]
are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents].
(emphasis added)
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case,
insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O.
Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx,
subject to the following conditions :
1. xxx
2. xxx
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be
cross-examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx
[by the respondents].

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
time ETPI was organized. Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included
xxxx as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x prayer that:
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x
1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x
trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts
1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048,
established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended
0050, 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:
thereto. [emphasis ours]
a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
b. Maurice Bane
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying
c. Evelyn Singson
the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
d. Leonorio Martinez
e. Ricardo Castro; and
f. Rolando Gapud Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently,
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty
the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the
[Civil Case No. 0009]. Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-
examine them. On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer
of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds
provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed
a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their
respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3,
petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:
2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).

20
IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of
the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers
to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the
petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its
case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the
non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to
qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any
need to dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which
already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become
final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the
15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant
plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of
procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of
2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to
take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted
when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff
having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though
purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998
ruling. [emphases ours]
The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME
FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS
ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL
CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND
TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory
order; thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a
character of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending. 42 On this basis, the petitioner
concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice
of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case
No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence)
is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence
offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the
"parent" case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it
would be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served
on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their
right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its
allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to
the government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence
was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the
case was filed and the voluminous records that the present case has generated. 43
THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ),
they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary
period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This assertion proceeds from
the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by
the petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line,
they posit that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the
assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to
contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a
character of "finality."
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a
supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial
court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case
since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and
available to [it] before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of
the petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right
to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution
and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the
Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence
because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party
may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely
because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane
deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion
21
for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice
should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he
formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to
substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence. 50
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is
not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign
residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule
23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as
explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their
comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition
submitted for decision.
THE ISSUES
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:
1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion
for reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane
deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision
he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution
is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final
if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of
the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order
or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment
or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties,
reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against
each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a
time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the
denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to
achieve this end.
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is
finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s
1998 resolution – which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision
or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its
reconsideration or to appeal.56
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third
(actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section
5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash"
of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the
ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.57
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment
or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court
declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order,
the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of
the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the
60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of
the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered
by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt
to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
22
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an
interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the
respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the
petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on
the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party.
As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an
available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the
aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. 59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet
concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this
stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the
admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy
available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its
position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the
Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably
did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the
denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a
petition.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous
but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a
question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. 62Without this showing, the
Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best,
an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the
unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing
of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed
with public interest and has become a matter of public concern. 63 In other words, we opt to
resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in
the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has
inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the
order of presentation of a
party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of
discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure
depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of
evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to
oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the
presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist
on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the
resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally
offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this
present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence
and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the
petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which
prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to
the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action.
The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane
deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been
rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and
without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of
evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its
case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000
resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of
Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition
as evidence (considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt
to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be
cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s
motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should
have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its
attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration
of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day
reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and
proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested
its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the
petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayan’s
resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions,
ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review
on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally
aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion
to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does
not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after
it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission
of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the
prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for
23
the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We
can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the
case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a
relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the
exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony
should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously."

The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
the Rules of Court, which reads:
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change
the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to
Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are
order and shall proceed as follows: involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not
xxxx always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent
delay in the administration of justice.76 However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity,
for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; 78 or
where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87
party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved
party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action
the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant."
as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances
properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law.
lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has
defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the
jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition,
refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law. 81 Grave abuse
which was concededly omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of
of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or
course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly. 89
arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment 82 or mere abuse
of discretion.83
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied
84 Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the
In Lopez v. Liboro, we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
submission of the Bane deposition.

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
state of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in
Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties
the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence
have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil
is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence
Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete
or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The
resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on remand and
omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It
would surely stare us in the face after remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve
was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)
the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

24
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense
with the usual requisites of admissibility
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in
evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No.
0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no
longer exists.
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130
were consolidated – provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases.95
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31
is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and
the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases.
Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to
order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used
generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title
"consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically
a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the
nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the court’s
capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other things)
what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and
convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the
dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to
determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in
this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses: 97
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case
the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a
situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims
which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one
action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at
all provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the
court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the
voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that
would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action,
parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt
(which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually
resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take
judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a
consolidation for trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to
the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground
that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not
available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses
again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of
consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main
case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had
(at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without objection. 104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and
the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a
special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the
conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together with the
parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable
from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in
another action – must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a
case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the
respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions
of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the
petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought
to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon
oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific
provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993
(that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the
Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to
Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner
even made a representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
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IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under
Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit
incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against
the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the admissibility of
testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues
that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over
Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the
incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to
the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-
face two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to
treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene
esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the
Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence."
Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule
23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47,
Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot
be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered.
This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply
refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule
130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. 114 Since depositions are
principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant
facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the
trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded
under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine
the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination
was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for
cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court,
the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. 117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former
testimony or depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification
of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. 118 A
fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter
alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an
adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-
examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite
identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former
testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be
substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or
would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.120 (The
requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should
be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility
of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned. 122)
26
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot
simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130,
for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the
circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes
further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words,
the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with
Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for
its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner
complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for
the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding
are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former
testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now
examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify."
On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action,
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with
the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of
the deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. 127 Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s excuse
for the non-presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the
same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability
will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence. 129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding
between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in
evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de
novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a
witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No.
0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of
the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to
presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the
use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition
in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court.
Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity, 131 the
burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence.
This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or
conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of
parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made
on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an
essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of
cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness
may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the
examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of
hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported
testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential
safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been
satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the
admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however,
is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent
proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in
law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the
same rights of property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or
privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While
Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible
only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case
No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While
Africa and the respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all
any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former
respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not
result in the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and
personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver
27
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices
previously sent to them.140
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996, 141 the
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition, the petitioner sent a Second
Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it
likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended
deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent
Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143to the petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely
raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the
Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s motion for protective orders, 144 it strikes us that no ruling was
ever handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral
examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound
thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be
taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to
it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection
against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to
discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs —
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to
be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is
intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the
deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s
Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the
bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that
these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the
petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the
lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents
in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition
was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party
status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of consolidation being merely for
trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot
be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right
of cross-examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence,
cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since
such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the
Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was
premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5
which provides:
Effect of substitution of parties. — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action
involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the
former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring
ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their
right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition.
Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent
speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every
other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and
the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs.
On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge
or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the
individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the
then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to
the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously
absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure
to appear at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination,
without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate
time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a
party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of
the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by the
mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the
respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil
Case No. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still
here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the
Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No.
0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is
for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane
had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have
been taken - without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine a witness against
them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery.
These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the
present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No.
0009.
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling
28
thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the
respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to
appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be
stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise
have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only
express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on.
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against
the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an
incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the
petitioner to do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced
and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice
of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them. 152 Put differently, it is the
assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on
matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will
dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes
that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule
129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x
judicial departments of the Philippines,"155or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice
of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 156 On the other
hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may
allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In
the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice,
the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 160
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial
notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously
pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical
perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case
0130 – as evidence in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of
cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which,
in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s
argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission
of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case,
simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-
litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks,
instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our
prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the
Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of
the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is
up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to
the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should
take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion –
the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a
legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to
reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane
deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence.165
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His
covering note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the
public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
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First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at
issue in this case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with
the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent
quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the
Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital
witness") is not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a
competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of
the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion
on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which we will
restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions
consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions
involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is
vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate
actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,
which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent
proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris
Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are
combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is
tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure,
which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which
has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107,
pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477
(Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out
of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled
matter that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on consolidation. 167
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of
consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases"
and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if the
repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in
keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation
would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become
relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would
suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents)
had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a
trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only
resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition
considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to
one of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the
rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence –
especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for
the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the
reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the
Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter
of right and, thus, failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the
apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane deposition in
Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the parties). 169 There is
simply the absence of "due" in due process.
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the
Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the
deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these
consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the
most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by
respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission and
failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty
of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary
to the petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure
involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the
resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding
discussions show. They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents,
particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of
the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They
involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot
disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking
the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their evolution.
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a
conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote
resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
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