[G.R. No. 122156.

February 3, 1997]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing
but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.[3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner
in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then
set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a
proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to
release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must
be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.[9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2,
Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate
of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
 Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares
and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in
a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what
it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws
and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. [15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions
on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective
laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications
on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are
basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply
not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity
of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights [27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and
the promotion of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon
which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. [36]

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the
hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila
the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the
hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and
reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. [38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting
the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino
citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a
question.

MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.

 MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given
preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. [42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo[43] -

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x
x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common
good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens
or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the
common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it
has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of
the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We
cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation.In fine,
the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there
are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted
by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a
separate and distinct personality.This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction
of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide
that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by
the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to
accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners
matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
 Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling
the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as
any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than
let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline
for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun,
under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that
it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages
and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the
wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of the
Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as
the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are
not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of
the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense
of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign
investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting
that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less
than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for
- is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other
hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino?This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity
of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
5 U.S. 137

Marbury v. Madison ()

Argued:

Decided:

___

 Syllabus

 Opinion, Marshall

Syllabus

The clerks of the Department of State of the United States may be called upon to give evidence of transactions in the Department which are not of
a confidential character.

The Secretary of State cannot be called upon as a witness to state transactions of a confidential nature which may have occurred in his
Department. But he may be called upon to give testimony of circumstances which were not of that character.

Clerks in the Department of State were directed to be sworn, subject to objections to questions upon confidential matters.

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must
be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And the power has been exercised when the last act required from the
person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.

If the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission of an officer, it has been delivered when executed, and given to the Secretary
of State for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.

In cases of commissions to public officers, the law orders the Secretary of State to record them. When, therefore, they are signed and sealed, the
order for their being recorded is given, and, whether inserted inserted into the book or not, they are recorded.

When the heads of the departments of the Government are the political or confidential officers of the Executive, merely to execute the will of the
President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than
that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

The President of the United States, by signing the commission, appointed Mr. Marbury a justice of the peace for the County of Washington, in the
District of Columbia, and the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the
signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for
which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

To render a mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is directed must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ must be directed,
and the person applying for it must be without any other specific remedy.

Where a commission to a public officer has been made out, signed, and sealed, and is withheld from the person entitled to it, an action of detinue
for the commission against the Secretary of State who refuses to deliver it is not the proper remedy, as the judgment in detinue is for the thing
itself, or its value. The value of a public office, not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained. It is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver
the commission or a copy of it from the record.

To enable the Court to issue a mandamus to compel the delivery of the commission of a public office by the Secretary of State, it must be shown
that it is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or that it be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create the
cause.

The authority given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial system of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to public
officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity,
expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each.

If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

At the December Term, 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel,[p138] severally
moved the court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue
commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. This
motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late
President of the United States, nominated the applicants to the Senate for their advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the
District of Columbia; that the Senate advised and consented to the appointments; that commissions in due form were signed by the said President
appointing them justices, &c., and that the seal of the United States was in due form affixed to the said commissions by the Secretary of State;
that the applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not complied with that request; and that their
said commissions are withheld from them; that the applicants have made application to Mr. Madison as Secretary of State of the United States at
his office, for information whether the commissions were signed and sealed as aforesaid; that explicit and satisfactory information has not been
given in answer to that inquiry, either by the Secretary of State or any officer in the Department of State; that application has been made to the
secretary of the Senate for a certificate of the nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and consent of the Senate, who has declined giving
such a certificate; whereupon a rule was made to show cause on the fourth day of this term. This rule having been duly served,[p139]

Mr. Jacob Wagner and Mr. Daniel Brent, who had been summoned to attend the court, and were required to give evidence, objected to be sworn,
alleging that they were clerks in the Department of State, and not bound to disclose any facts relating to the business or transactions of the office.

The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers taken in writing, but informed them that, when the questions were asked, they
might state their objections to answering each particular question, if they had any.

Mr. Lincoln, who had been the acting Secretary of State, when the circumstances stated in the affidavits occurred, was called upon to give
testimony. He objected to answering. The questions were put in writing.
The court said there was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been, he was not obliged to answer it, and if he thought
anything was communicated to him confidentially, he was not bound to disclose, nor was he obliged to state anything which would criminate
himself.

The questions argued by the counsel for the relators were, 1. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in any case. 2.
Whether it will lie to a Secretary of State, in any case whatever. 3. Whether, in the present case, the Court may award a mandamus to James
Madison, Secretary of State.

TOP

Opinion

MARSHALL, C.J., Opinion of the Court

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case requiring the Secretary of State to show cause
why a mandamus[p154] should not issue directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of
Washington, in the District of Columbia.

No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances,
and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by
the Court is founded.

These principles have been, on the side of the applicant, very ably argued at the bar. In rendering the opinion of the Court, there will be some
departure in form, though not in substance, from the points stated in that argument.

In the order in which the Court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?

The first object of inquiry is:

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

His right originates in an act of Congress passed in February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia.

After dividing the district into two counties, the eleventh section of this law enacts,

that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the President of the
United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years.[p155]

It appears from the affidavits that, in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the County of
Washington was signed by John Adams, then President of the United States, after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it, but the
commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out.

In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For
if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which,
being completed, became his property.

The second section of the second article of the Constitution declares,

The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.

The third section declares, that "He shall commission all the officers of the United States."

An act of Congress directs the Secretary of State to keep the seal of the United States,

to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States to be appointed by the President, by and
with the consent of the Senate, or by the President alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall
have been signed by the President of the United States.

These are the clauses of the Constitution and laws of the United States which affect this part of the case. They seem to contemplate three distinct
operations:

1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary.

2. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.[p156]

3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed might perhaps be deemed a duty enjoined by the Constitution. "He shall," says
that instrument, "commission all the officers of the United States."

The acts of appointing to office and commissioning the person appointed can scarcely be considered as one and the same, since the power to
perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the Constitution. The distinction between the appointment and the commission will
be rendered more apparent by adverting to that provision in the second section of the second article of the Constitution which authorises Congress

to vest by law the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of
departments;

thus contemplating cases where the law may direct the President to commission an officer appointed by the Courts or by the heads of
departments. In such a case, to issue a commission would be apparently a duty distinct from the appointment, the performance of which perhaps
could not legally be refused.

Although that clause of the Constitution which requires the President to commission all the officers of the United States may never have been
applied to officers appointed otherwise than by himself, yet it would be difficult to deny the legislative power to apply it to such cases. Of
consequence, the constitutional distinction between the appointment to an office and the commission of an officer who has been appointed
remains the same as if in practice the President had commissioned officers appointed by an authority other than his own.

It follows too from the existence of this distinction that, if an appointment was to be evidenced by any public act other than the commission, the
performance of such public act would create the officer, and if he was not removable at the will of the President, would either give him a right to
his commission or enable him to perform the duties without it.

These observations are premised solely for the purpose of rendering more intelligible those which apply more directly to the particular case under
consideration.[p157]

This is an appointment made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is evidenced by no act but the commission
itself. In such a case, therefore, the commission and the appointment seem inseparable, it being almost impossible to show an appointment
otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission; still, the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of
it.

But at what stage does it amount to this conclusive evidence?

The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment, being the sole act of the President, must be completely evidenced when it is
shown that he has done everything to be performed by him.

Should the commission, instead of being evidence of an appointment, even be considered as constituting the appointment itself, still it would be
made when the last act to be done by the President was performed, or, at furthest, when the commission was complete.

The last act to be done by the President is the signature of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the Senate to his own
nomination. The time for deliberation has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the Senate concurring with his
nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is evidenced by an open, unequivocal act, and, being the last act
required from the person making it, necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as it respects the appointment, an inchoate and incomplete
transaction.

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must
be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act required from the
person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission. This idea seems to have prevailed with the
Legislature when the act passed converting the Department[p158] of Foreign Affairs into the Department of State. By that act, it is enacted that
the Secretary of State shall keep the seal of the United States,

and shall make out and record, and shall affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the
President: . . . provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the President of the
United States, nor to any other instrument or act without the special warrant of the President therefor.

The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission, and the great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is
complete. It attests, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the verity of the Presidential signature.

It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive
evidence that the appointment is made.

The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the Secretary of State is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the
President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.

This is not a proceeding which may be varied if the judgment of the Executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately
marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the
United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by
the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.

If it should be supposed that the solemnity of affixing the seal is necessary not only to the validity of the commission, but even to the completion
of an appointment, still, when the seal is affixed, the appointment is made, and[p159] the commission is valid. No other solemnity is required by
law; no other act is to be performed on the part of government. All that the Executive can do to invest the person with his office is done, and
unless the appointment be then made, the Executive cannot make one without the cooperation of others.

After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary opinion may be supported, none has been found which appear of sufficient force
to maintain the opposite doctrine.

Such as the imagination of the Court could suggest have been very deliberately examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it appears
possible to give them, they do not shake the opinion which has been formed.

In considering this question, it has been conjectured that the commission may have been assimilated to a deed to the validity of which delivery is
essential.

This idea is founded on the supposition that the commission is not merely evidence of an appointment, but is itself the actual appointment -- a
supposition by no means unquestionable. But, for the purpose of examining this objection fairly, let it be conceded that the principle claimed for
its support is established.

The appointment being, under the Constitution, to be made by the President personally, the delivery of the deed of appointment, if necessary to its
completion, must be made by the President also. It is not necessary that the livery should be made personally to the grantee of the office; it never
is so made. The law would seem to contemplate that it should be made to the Secretary of State, since it directs the secretary to affix the seal to
the commission after it shall have been signed by the President. If then the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission, it has
been delivered when executed and given to the Secretary for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.

But in all cases of letters patent, certain solemnities are required by law, which solemnities are the evidences[p160] of the validity of the
instrument. A formal delivery to the person is not among them. In cases of commissions, the sign manual of the President and the seal of the
United States are those solemnities. This objection therefore does not touch the case.

It has also occurred as possible, and barely possible, that the transmission of the commission and the acceptance thereof might be deemed
necessary to complete the right of the plaintiff.

The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, but not by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the
appointment, which must precede it and which is the mere act of the President. If the Executive required that every person appointed to an office
should himself take means to procure his commission, the appointment would not be the less valid on that account. The appointment is the sole
act of the President; the transmission of the commission is the sole act of the officer to whom that duty is assigned, and may be accelerated or
retarded by circumstances which can have no influence on the appointment. A commission is transmitted to a person already appointed, not to a
person to be appointed or not, as the letter enclosing the commission should happen to get into the post office and reach him in safety, or to
miscarry.
It may have some tendency to elucidate this point to inquire whether the possession of the original commission be indispensably necessary to
authorize a person appointed to any office to perform the duties of that office. If it was necessary, then a loss of the commission would lose the
office. Not only negligence, but accident or fraud, fire or theft might deprive an individual of his office. In such a case, I presume it could not be
doubted but that a copy from the record of the Office of the Secretary of State would be, to every intent and purpose, equal to the original. The act
of Congress has expressly made it so. To give that copy validity, it would not be necessary to prove that the original had been transmitted and
afterwards lost. The copy would be complete evidence that the original had existed, and that the appointment had been made, but not that the
original had been transmitted. If indeed it should appear that[p161] the original had been mislaid in the Office of State, that circumstance would
not affect the operation of the copy. When all the requisites have been performed which authorize a recording officer to record any instrument
whatever, and the order for that purpose has been given, the instrument is in law considered as recorded, although the manual labour of inserting
it in a book kept for that purpose may not have been performed.

In the case of commissions, the law orders the Secretary of State to record them. When, therefore, they are signed and sealed, the order for their
being recorded is given, and, whether inserted in the book or not, they are in law recorded.

A copy of this record is declared equal to the original, and the fees to be paid by a person requiring a copy are ascertained by law. Can a keeper of
a public record erase therefrom a commission which has been recorded? Or can he refuse a copy thereof to a person demanding it on the terms
prescribed by law?

Such a copy would, equally with the original, authorize the justice of peace to proceed in the performance of his duty, because it would, equally
with the original, attest his appointment.

If the transmission of a commission be not considered as necessary to give validity to an appointment, still less is its acceptance. The appointment
is the sole act of the President; the acceptance is the sole act of the officer, and is, in plain common sense, posterior to the appointment. As he
may resign, so may he refuse to accept; but neither the one nor the other is capable of rendering the appointment a nonentity.

That this is the understanding of the government is apparent from the whole tenor of its conduct.

A commission bears date, and the salary of the officer commences from his appointment, not from the transmission or acceptance of his
commission. When a person appointed to any office refuses to accept that office, the successor is nominated in the place of the person
who[p162] has declined to accept, and not in the place of the person who had been previously in office and had created the original vacancy.

It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the Court that, when a commission has been signed by the President, the appointment is made, and that the
commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the Secretary of State.

Where an officer is removable at the will of the Executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern, because the act is
at any time revocable, and the commission may be arrested if still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the Executive,
the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.

The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over
the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and
he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.

Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed, and as the law creating
the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the Executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer
legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.

To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.

This brings us to the second inquiry, which is:

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?[p163]

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain, the King himself is sued in the respectful form of a
petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.

In the third volume of his Commentaries, page 23, Blackstone states two cases in which a remedy is afforded by mere operation of law.

"In all other cases," he says,

it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is
invaded.

And afterwards, page 109 of the same volume, he says,

I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the Courts of common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark that all possible
injuries whatsoever that did not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals are, for that very
reason, within the cognizance of the common law courts of justice, for it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England that every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.

The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case.

It behooves us, then, to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation or exclude the
injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this inquiry, the first question which presents itself is whether this can be arranged[p164] with that
class of cases which come under the description of damnum absque injuria -- a loss without an injury.

This description of cases never has been considered, and, it is believed, never can be considered, as comprehending offices of trust, of honour or
of profit. The office of justice of peace in the District of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of the attention and guardianship of the
laws. It has received that attention and guardianship. It has been created by special act of Congress, and has been secured, so far as the laws can
give security to the person appointed to fill it, for five years. It is not then on account of the worthlessness of the thing pursued that the injured
party can be alleged to be without remedy.

Is it in the nature of the transaction? Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be considered as a mere political act belonging to the
Executive department alone, for the performance of which entire confidence is placed by our Constitution in the Supreme Executive, and for any
misconduct respecting which the injured individual has no remedy?

That there may be such cases is not to be questioned. but that every act of duty to be performed in any of the great departments of government
constitutes such a case is not to be admitted.
By the act concerning invalids, passed in June, 1794, the Secretary at War is ordered to place on the pension list all persons whose names are
contained in a report previously made by him to Congress. If he should refuse to do so, would the wounded veteran be without remedy? Is it to be
contended that where the law, in precise terms, directs the performance of an act in which an individual is interested, the law is incapable of
securing obedience to its mandate? Is it on account of the character of the person against whom the complaint is made? Is it to be contended that
the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of their country?

Whatever the practice on particular occasions may be, the theory of this principle will certainly never be maintained.[p165] No act of the
Legislature confers so extraordinary a privilege, nor can it derive countenance from the doctrines of the common law. After stating that personal
injury from the King to a subject is presumed to be impossible, Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255, says,

but injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the Crown without the intervention of its officers, for whom, the law, in
matters of right, entertains no respect or delicacy, but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors and misconduct of those agents by whom
the King has been deceived and induced to do a temporary injustice.

By the act passed in 1796, authorizing the sale of the lands above the mouth of Kentucky river, the purchaser, on paying his purchase money,
becomes completely entitled to the property purchased, and, on producing to the Secretary of State the receipt of the treasurer upon a certificate
required by the law, the President of the United States is authorized to grant him a patent. It is further enacted that all patents shall be
countersigned by the Secretary of State, and recorded in his office. If the Secretary of State should choose to withhold this patent, or, the patent
being lost, should refuse a copy of it, can it be imagined that the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy?

It is not believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain such a proposition.

It follows, then, that the question whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not must always
depend on the nature of that act.

If some acts be examinable and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

In some instances, there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying
down the rule.

By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the[p166] exercise of which he is to
use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance
of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.

In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there
exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and, being
entrusted to the Executive, the decision of the Executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of
Congress for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the
will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be
examinable by the Courts.

But when the Legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the
rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law, is amenable to the laws for his conduct,
and cannot at his discretion, sport away the vested rights of others.

The conclusion from this reasoning is that, where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the Executive, merely to
execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws
of his country for a remedy.

If this be the rule, let us inquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the Court.[p167]

The power of nominating to the Senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the President
according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely
applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the
rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated,
and consequently, if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President, the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are
not resumable by the President. They cannot be extinguished by Executive authority, and he has the privilege of asserting them in like manner as
if they had been derived from any other source.

The question whether a right has vested or not is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury
had taken the oaths of a magistrate and proceeded to act as one, in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him in which his
defence had depended on his being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.

So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right either to the commission which has been made out for him or to a copy
of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the Court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of
his appointment.

That question has been discussed, and the opinion is that the latest point of time which can be taken as that at which the appointment was
complete and evidenced was when, after the signature of the President, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.

It is then the opinion of the Court:

1. That, by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United States appointed him a justice[p168] of peace for the County of
Washington in the District of Columbia, and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of
the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment, and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the
space of five years.

2. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that
right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

It remains to be inquired whether,

3. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on:

1. The nature of the writ applied for, and

2. The power of this court.

1. The nature of the writ.

Blackstone, in the third volume of his Commentaries, page 110, defines a mandamus to be

a command issuing in the King's name from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature
within the King's dominions requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which the
Court of King's Bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice.

Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burrows, 1266, in the case of The King v. Baker et al., states with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this
writ may be used.

"Whenever," says that very able judge,

there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise (more especially if it be in a matter of public concern or attended
with profit), and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and[p169] has no other specific legal remedy, this court ought
to assist by mandamus, upon reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to preserve peace, order and good
government.

In the same case, he says,

this writ ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there
ought to be one.

In addition to the authorities now particularly cited, many others were relied on at the bar which show how far the practice has conformed to the
general doctrines that have been just quoted.

This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its mandate to him would be, to use the words of Blackstone,

to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty and which the Court has previously determined or at least
supposes to be consonant to right and justice.

Or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, the applicant, in this case, has a right to execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of possession of
that right.

These circumstances certainly concur in this case.

Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be directed must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may
be directed, and the person applying for it must be without any other specific and legal remedy.

1. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The intimate political relation, subsisting between the President of the United States
and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly irksome, as well as
delicate, and excites some hesitation with respect to the propriety of entering into such investigation. Impressions are often received without
much reflection or examination, and it is not wonderful that, in such a case as this, the assertion by an individual of his legal claims in a court of
justice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should, at first view, be considered[p170] by some as an attempt to intrude into the
cabinet and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the Executive.

It is scarcely necessary for the Court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. An extravagance so absurd and excessive could not have
been entertained for a moment. The province of the Court is solely to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the Executive or
Executive officers perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political or which are, by the Constitution and laws,
submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court.

But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of the cabinet, it respects a paper which, according to law, is
upon record, and to a copy of which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no intermeddling with a subject over which the
Executive can be considered as having exercised any control; what is there in the exalted station of the officer which shall bar a citizen from
asserting in a court of justice his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim or to issue a mandamus directing the performance of a
duty not depending on Executive discretion, but on particular acts of Congress and the general principles of law?

If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act under colour of his office by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of
the law. How then can his office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct if the case be such a case as
would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?

It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing
a mandamus is to be determined. Where the head of a department acts in a case in which Executive discretion is to be exercised, in which he is
the mere organ of Executive will, it is[p171] again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be
rejected without hesitation.

But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under
the particular direction of the President, and the performance of which the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to
have forbidden -- as for example, to record a commission, or a patent for land, which has received all the legal solemnities; or to give a copy of
such record -- in such cases, it is not perceived on what ground the Courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment
that right to be done to an injured individual than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department.

This opinion seems not now for the first time to be taken up in this country.

It must be well recollected that, in 1792, an act passed, directing the secretary at war to place on the pension list such disabled officers and
soldiers as should be reported to him by the Circuit Courts, which act, so far as the duty was imposed on the Courts, was deemed
unconstitutional; but some of the judges, thinking that the law might be executed by them in the character of commissioners, proceeded to act and
to report in that character.

This law being deemed unconstitutional at the circuits, was repealed, and a different system was established; but the question whether those
persons who had been reported by the judges, as commissioners, were entitled, in consequence of that report, to be placed on the pension list was
a legal question, properly determinable in the Courts, although the act of placing such persons on the list was to be performed by the head of a
department.

That this question might be properly settled, Congress passed an act in February, 1793, making it the duty of the Secretary of War, in conjunction
with the Attorney General, to take such measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of the Supreme Court of the
United[p172] States on the validity of any such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid.

After the passage of this act, a mandamus was moved for, to be directed to the Secretary of War, commanding him to place on the pension list a
person stating himself to be on the report of the judges.
There is, therefore, much reason to believe that this mode of trying the legal right of the complainant was deemed by the head of a department,
and by the highest law officer of the United States, the most proper which could be selected for the purpose.

When the subject was brought before the Court, the decision was not that a mandamus would not lie to the head of a department directing him to
perform an act enjoined by law, in the performance of which an individual had a vested interest, but that a mandamus ought not to issue in that
case -- the decision necessarily to be made if the report of the commissioners did not confer on the applicant a legal right.

The judgment in that case is understood to have decided the merits of all claims of that description, and the persons, on the report of the
commissioners, found it necessary to pursue the mode prescribed by the law subsequent to that which had been deemed unconstitutional in order
to place themselves on the pension list.

The doctrine, therefore, now advanced is by no means a novel one.

It is true that the mandamus now moved for is not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute.

It is to deliver a commission, on which subjects the acts of Congress are silent. This difference is not considered as affecting the case. It has
already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right of which the Executive cannot deprive him. He has been
appointed to an office from which he is not removable at the will of the Executive, and, being so[p173] appointed, he has a right to the
commission which the Secretary has received from the President for his use. The act of Congress does not, indeed, order the Secretary of State to
send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to it, and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him than by another person.

It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specific legal remedy for the commission which has been withheld from Mr.
Marbury, in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the
thing itself, or its value. The value of a public office not to be sold is incapable of being ascertained, and the applicant has a right to the office
itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission or a copy of it from the record.

This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission or a copy of it from the record, and it only remains to be inquired:

Whether it can issue from this Court.

The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court

to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.

The Secretary of State, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description,
and if this Court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore
absolutely incapable of conferring the authority and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.

The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time
to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some
form, may be exercised over the present[p174] case, because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.

In the distribution of this power. it is declared that

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.

It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause assigning
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the Legislature to assign original
jurisdiction to that Court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited, provided those cases belong to the judicial
power of the United States.

If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power and the
tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if such is to be the
construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be
original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.

Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed, and, in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must
be given to them or they have no operation at all.

It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore such construction is inadmissible unless
the words require it.[p175]

If the solicitude of the Convention respecting our peace with foreign powers induced a provision that the Supreme Court should take original
jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them, yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases if no
further restriction on the powers of Congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such
exceptions as Congress might make, is no restriction unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.

When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system divides it into one Supreme and so many inferior courts as the Legislature may
ordain and establish, then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them as to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words
seems to be that, in one class of cases, its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other, it is appellate, and not original. ,If any other
construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the obvious
meaning.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that, if it be the will of the Legislature that a
mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect,
the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to[p176] appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither
is it necessary in such a case as this to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to
public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution, and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be
exercised.

The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States,
but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long
and well established, to decide it.

That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it
nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.

This original and supreme will organizes the government and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here or
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.

The Government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and
unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited[p177] and acts allowed
are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it, or that the
Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.

Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it
is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written
Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.

This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.

If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it
effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what
was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive
consideration.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.[p178]

So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written Constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that, if the Legislature shall do what is
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the Legislature a practical and
real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
those limits may be passed at pleasure.

That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions -- a written Constitution, would of itself
be sufficient, in America where written Constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar
expressions of the Constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution.[p179]

Could it be the intention of those who gave this power to say that, in using it, the Constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising
under the Constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?

This is too extravagant to be maintained.

In some cases then, the Constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or
to obey?

There are many other parts of the Constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.

It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour,
and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the Constitution, and only
see the law?

The Constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."

If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it, must the Court condemn to death those victims whom the
Constitution endeavours to preserve?

"No person," says the Constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession
in open court."

Here. the language of the Constitution is addressed especially to the Courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed
from. If the Legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?
From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent that the framers of the Constitution[p180] contemplated that
instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.

Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner to their conduct in their
official character. How immoral to impose it on them if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what
they swear to support!

The oath of office, too, imposed by the Legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words:

I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no rule for his
government? if it is closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him?

If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe or to take this oath becomes equally a crime.

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first
mentioned, and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.

The rule must be discharged.

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,
against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO

PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de
la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal
or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein
petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been
reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding
the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the
following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the
rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme
Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his
special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period
within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly
conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6
of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction
of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such
confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over
protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision
are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII)
of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case
at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary
writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts,
and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been
presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to
overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel
were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far
made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill
may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established
a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said
body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made
by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the
one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the
American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to
follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret
the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound
to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-
123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In
our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall
be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the
United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in
order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant
of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the
sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but
also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of
three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members
to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member
in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on
September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators
to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties
in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be
designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection
5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest
number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of
the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of
December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft,
reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to
indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and
there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not
contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its
members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a
member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the
municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of
the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person
tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is
in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the
returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to
the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I
want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate
from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion
does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a
member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas
speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera
clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision
Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que
los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of
Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su
Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de
la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran
del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and
the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention
rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the
original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the
elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative
body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One
of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose
functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their
opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their
witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were
considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court
was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and
elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open
one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the
house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so
that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of
election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence
the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of
controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of
both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial
capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very
business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and
received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr.
Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of
the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day,
and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of
the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important
rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of
its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with
rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22];
Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee
of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests,
the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and
the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in
the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United
States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the
Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is
not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a
member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the
Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical
interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To
be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be
said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings
of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power
of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would
then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting
the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to
avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the
National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting
protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the
possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place,
if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through
the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe,
however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular
sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they
were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is
inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases
over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not be
overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15,
1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new
National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on
December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to
the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater
of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case
upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral
Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-
protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result
would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already
barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be
followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and
should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at
the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there
might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power
to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by
the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as
such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary
in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such
return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21,
pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to
the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and
to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the
particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against
the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole
judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of
such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record
— First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the
reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election
of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate
rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering
each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying
the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against
the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and
extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an
inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however, constrained to withhold my assent to
certain conclusions therein advanced.

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the
power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312;
10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of the separation of powers into
legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear
constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed to
be included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice
of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:

Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of the United States, he shall, within thirty
days after the result of such election shall have been determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same,
give notice, in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specify
particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect that the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this
provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and manner of filing contest in the election of
members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and
expenses of contest which may be paid from their respective funds.

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would be above the law, but to raise
legislative elections contests from the category of political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond
the reach of the law, but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of which provides that —

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws
shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of government, and to prevent any hiatus in its
operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain
operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in
such laws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the government and
corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold that
section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the
power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime. It is
important to observe in this connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and manner in which
notice of a contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other
words, the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the Philippine Legislature was by statute
lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National
Assembly, as required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time and
manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body
clothed with power to decide such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have the effect of barring the right of
the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt
its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed with the commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO,

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP.
CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209135

AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND
HON. FRANKLIN MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209136

MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT; AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209155

ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209164

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN,

BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209260

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209442

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ,Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA; AND THE BUREAU OF TREASURY,
REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V. DE LEON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209517

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN CEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA NARTATES, FOR HERSELF
AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
(CUENHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE
(SWEAP-DSWD CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION (EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR
HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA
(KKKMMDA), Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209569

VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC), REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,Petitioner,

vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges
posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money
pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority
under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive
Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices
outside of the Executive.

Antecedents

What has precipitated the controversy?

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part
of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of
request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in
2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained
that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; 2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3)
carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per
zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, 6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use
Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a)
use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.

As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in
the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time,
and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district"7 – excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), 8 on October 16, 2013;
G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17,
2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on
November 8, 2013.

In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure –
Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for
continuing and current allotments.

In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.
 Issues

Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to wit:

Procedural Issue:

A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

Substantive Issues:

B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution insofar as:

(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings"
as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;

(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and

(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.

E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed funds in order to support its argument regarding the President’s power
to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing unprogrammed funds to support projects under the DAP was considerably
discussed. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their respective
memoranda. Hence, an additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:

F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.

During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec. Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that had
been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or abandoned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certified
copy of the President’s directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to the DAP.9

In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:

(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and their Realignment);10

(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the DAP, namely:

a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2011);

b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2012);

c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated
Allotments as of June 30, 2012);

d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2013);

e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Treatment of Commitments/Obligations of the
National Government);

f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Guidelines on the Submission of Quarterly
Accountability Reports on Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);

g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund Release System in the Government).

(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from discontinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation
from 2011 to 2013

On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents not
yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Members, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understanding
the factual bases of the DAP, to wit:

(1) First Evidence Packet11 – containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in
detail the 116 DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as follows:

a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration Program
(Projects and Sources of Funds);
 b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized
Balances and its Realignment);

c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances
and their Realignment);

d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of funds for other priority projects and expenditures of
the Government);

e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures of the
Government);

f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances
and their Realignment to Fund the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration Program); and

g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).

(2) Second Evidence Packet12 – consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs) and appropriation covers;

(3) Third Evidence Packet13 – containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects under the DAP;

(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 – identifying the DAP-related portions of the Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on
Audit for 2011 and 2012;

(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 – containing a letter of Department of Transportation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya
addressed to Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from his agency, inclusive of annexes; and

(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 – a print-out of the Solicitor General’s visual presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.

On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence Packet,18 which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses of
such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal bases thereof.

On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in further compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:

(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to the effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue
targets for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising from sources not considered in the original revenue targets, which
certifications were required for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI, and
Article XLV of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive Department for the use of the
Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).

RULING

I.

Procedural Issue:

a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies

All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:

G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition
G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorariand Prohibition
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari
G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the parties;19 that
the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the
adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing
to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or
spending power of Congress;20 and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA) or in the
trial courts.21

The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the DAP. 22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or
any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and
NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render. 23

The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the
COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts
by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court.24

The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court,
Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one
of the repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its
exercise of the legislative power.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.

The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the
proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:–

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable
and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and
that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity." This
is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable…

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also, another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold emphasis supplied)26

Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:–

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x

The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies…" The term "actual
controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse to
decide those political questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases which are not actual
yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory relief.

May I ask the Commissioner’s opinion about that?

MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments.

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other
lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a
difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had
authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the
court has the duty to decide.27

Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in
maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great branches of Government. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,28 Justice Jose P. Laurel intoned:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several department and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

xxxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x 29

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company:30

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment
was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner
to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law.
The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to
essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction,
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of
Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact
that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the
lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:33

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration
of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts
of legislative and executive officials.34

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with
both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment
is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. 35

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty.
We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the
Chief Executive’s spending power.

b) Requisites for the exercise of the

power of judicial review were
complied with

The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable controversy
before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case. 36

The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. 37 An actual case or controversy, in
the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38

x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."

An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein
meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments
by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP
entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.

It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Honors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully
served its purpose, the Administration’s economic managers have recommended its termination to the President. x x x." 39

The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the
challenges to the DAP’s constitutionality, viz:

DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge
should no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under
the now defunct policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full details
we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the constitutional authority of the President and the
Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our elected
representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles. 40

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41

The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases.
Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening
events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar
and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.42

Assuming that the petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely
come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review.

Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."43 The
concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 44 where the Court said:

In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-
present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action
had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila
Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise
of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental
importance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in
Araneta v. Dinglasan.

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far
reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has
been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests
on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication of a public right.

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue
may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:

Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in
Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is
at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." 45

The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."

Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the
issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in
preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their
right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government.47

On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed
duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association
of all lawyers in this country."49

Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer
locus standi on each of them.

In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Court’s exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 50

II.
Substantive Issues

1.
Overview of the Budget System

An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.

a) Origin of the Budget System

The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse). 51

In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government
for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be
effective based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under Republic Act No. 992
(Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the public together
with the estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or benefit. 52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the
financial plan of the Government,53 or "the master plan of government."54

The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed
from the creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions that
required public expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for war activities, preservation of peace and order,
security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services. 56 In order to finance those expenditures, the State raised
revenues through taxes and impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues for specific government functions. 58 The
State’s budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its government and changes in its market
economy.

The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public financial institutions. This is because of the country’s past as a
colony successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time. Many aspects of the country’s public fiscal administration, including
its Budget System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of the western public financial institutions. At any rate, the
Philippine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the development of a progressive democratic
government, namely: (1) to carry on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed, authorized and executed in
accordance with the Constitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for the periodic review
and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons entrusted by law with the responsibility as well as the
enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true financial position of the
Government.59
b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System

The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A
Budget Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones Law to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the
responsibility to assist in the preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine Legislature. 60

As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by President Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to
serve as the agency that carried out the President’s responsibility of preparing the budget. 62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect on
January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided a line-item budget as the framework of the Government’s
budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing revenues.

CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced
performance-budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in terms of expected results. 64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the role
of the Budget Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government.65

The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177
that President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission
into the Ministry of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.

The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM
pursuant to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.

c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66

Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4)
Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.

c.1.Budget Preparation67

The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters
earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies
in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is
addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned
and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).

Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM.
To boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society
organizations and other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which proposals are then presented before a
technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend their
budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review
Board, comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover the prioritization
of programs and their corresponding support vis-à-vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their implementation.

The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP),
and is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs
in the NEP, especially those in line with the National Government’s development plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement
of each department and agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.

The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for further refinements or
reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for
submission to Congress. The budget documents consist of: (1) the President’s Budget Message, through which the President explains the policy
framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, 68 which contains the macroeconomic
assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the
NEP.

Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the
Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. 69 Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal year. 70 The
two components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating expenses(MOOE).

Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts); 71 (2)
social services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and
others);72 (3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the
administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities); 73 (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security expenditures
and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); 74 and (5) public debt.75

Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund.76

On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or receipts of the government treasury used to support
government expenditures.77

Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defray…the
necessary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and
which is independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of the people." 78 Adam Smith’s classification relied on the two
aspects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or entity
possessing supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold property and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi
private income or revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the second aspect, the State could collect by imposing
charges on the revenues of its subjects in the form of taxes.79
In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to
finance government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and
gains on such sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3)
grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific purposes in the form of money and/or materials,
and do not require any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient); 82 (4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made
by government corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other
receipts);83 and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of the
Government in general, including the National Government and its political subdivisions). 84

More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows:85

General Income Specific Income

1. Subsidy Income from National 1. Income Taxes
Government 2. Property Taxes
2. Subsidy from Central Office 3. Taxes on Goods and Services
3. Subsidy from Regional 4. Taxes on International Trade and
Office/Staff Bureaus Transactions
4. Income from Government 5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue
Services
7. Other Specific Income
5. Income from Government
Business Operations
6. Sales Revenue
7. Rent Income
8. Insurance Income
9. Dividend Income
10. Interest Income
11. Sale of Confiscated Goods and
Properties
12. Foreign Exchange (FOREX)
Gains
13. Miscellaneous Operating and
Service Income
14. Fines and Penalties-Government
Services and Business Operations
15. Income from Grants and
Donations

c.2. Budget Legislation86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the
NEPand the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the
significant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.

Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations
Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies.
Thereafter, the House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB). 87

The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary
session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the House of Representatives’ version is transmitted to the Senate.88

After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committee
hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives’ deliberations. The Senate’s Finance Committee and its Sub-Committees may submit
the proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives has formally transmitted its version to
the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading. 89

The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of
discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to
the President for approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct veto, 91 or
are identified for conditional implementation.

If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress. 92

c.3. Budget Execution93

With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of
funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.

The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are required
to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the
monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of obligations that are not yet due and demandable.

Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments
issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels.
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in
that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released in two forms – through a comprehensive Agency
Budget Matrix (ABM),94 or, individually, by SARO.95

Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations 96 on behalf of the Government in order to implement
their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services,
and using utilities.

In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of
the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which issuance
is based upon an agency’s submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum amount of
cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash
Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas
operations to allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.

Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the Modified
Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.

c.4. Accountability98

Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently
utilized to achieve the State’s socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the
purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.

An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)
review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).

2.

Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan

a. DAP was a program designed to

promote economic growth

Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. 99 The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress represents the Administration’s "blueprint for public policy" and reflects the Government’s goals and strategies. 100 As such, the national
budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for
which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.101 Embodied in every national budget is government spending.102

When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus of
his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to
July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and payment schedules. 103 The World Bank observed that the
Philippines’ economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the Government continue with its
underspending and fail to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved
the way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track public spending and to push economic
growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed
funds.105 In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of accelerated
spending.106The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the implementation process through the
clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),and
(2) front loading PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108

Did the stimulus package work?

The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially
successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011. 110 The continued
implementation of the DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a
34% growth as of September 2013.111

The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies
towards growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring
profitability for prospective investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the
economy and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into disbursements.114

b. History of the implementation of

the DAP, and sources of funds
under the DAP

How the Administration’s economic managers conceptualized and developed the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains unknown
because the relevant documents appear to be scarce.

The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the
approval of the President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum, which contained a list of the funding sources for ₱72.11 billion
and of the proposed priority projects to be funded,115 reads:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx

SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS)

DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011

Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Acceleration Program totaling ₱72.11 billion. We are already
working with all the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the projects therein.

A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program

Amount
Action
Fund Sources (In million Description
Requested
Php)

FY 2011 30,000 Unreleased Personnel Declare as

Unreleased Services (PS) savings and
Personal appropriations which approve/
Services (PS) will lapse at the end of authorize its use
Appropriations FY 2011 but may be for the 2011
pooled as savings and Disbursement
realigned for priority Acceleration
programs that require Program
immediate funding

FY 2011 482 Unreleased

Unreleased appropriations (slow
Appropriations moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance)

FY 2010 12,336 Supported by the GFI Approve and

Unprogrammed Dividends authorize its use
Fund for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2010 21,544 Unreleased With prior

Carryover appropriations (slow approval from
Appropriation moving projects and the President in
programs for November 2010
discontinuance) and to declare as
savings from Zero-based Budgeting savings and with
Initiative authority to use
for priority
projects

FY 2011 Budget 7,748 FY 2011 Agency For information

items for Budget items that can
realignment be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
disbursing projects
DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA – 2.497 Billion
DOT – 1.000 Billion
DepEd – 270 Million

TOTAL 72.110

B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program

(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)

GOCCs and GFIs

Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO and NCA Release) (in Million Php)
1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2 1,868
2. NHA: 11,050

a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents to 450

Camarin A7
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP 500
c. On-site development for families living 10,000
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers 100
along Iloilo River and its tributaries
3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of 357
ageing physical plant and medical equipment
4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of 75
centralized credit information system
5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the PIDS 100
office and building construction
6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance 400
and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC
7. PHIC: Obligations incurred (premium 1,496
subsidy for indigent families) in January-June
2010, booked for payment in Jul[y] – Dec
2010. The delay in payment is due to the
delay in the certification of the LGU
counterpart. Without it, the NG is obliged to
pay the full amount.
8. Philpost: Purchase of foreclosed property. 644
Payment of Mandatory Obligations, (GSIS,
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking Privilege
9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B 10,000
capitalization under the BSP Law
10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment Renovation 280
11. LCOP: 105
a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program 35
(Stem-Cell Research – subject to legal 70
review and presentation)
12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion 570
TOTAL 26,945

NGAs/LGUs
Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO) Cash
(In Million Requirement
Php) (NCA)
13. DOF-BIR: NPSTAR
centralization of data
processing and others (To be
synchronized with GFMIS
activities) 758 758
14. COA: IT infrastructure
program and hiring of
additional litigational experts 144 144
15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing
Facilities and Communication
Equipment 30 30
16. DA: 2,959 2,223
a. Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated Community Based Multi-Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
Farming 1,629 1,629
b. Mindanao Rural
Development Project 919 183
c. NIA Agno River Integrated
Irrigation Project 411 411
17. DAR: 1,293 1,293
a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2 1,293 132
b. Landowners Compensation 5,432
18. DBM: Conduct of National
Survey of
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips 625 625
19. DOJ: Operating requirements
of 50 investigation agents and
15 state attorneys 11 11
20. DOT: Preservation of the Cine
Corregidor Complex 25 25
21. OPAPP: Activities for Peace
Process (PAMANA- Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B) 1,819 1,819
22. DOST 425 425
a. Establishment of National
Meterological and Climate
Center 275 275
b. Enhancement of Doppler
Radar Network for National
Weather Watch, Accurate
Forecasting and Flood Early
Warning 190 190
23. DOF-BOC: To settle the
principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS 2,800 2,800
24. OEO-FDCP: Establishment of
the National Film Archive and
local cinematheques, and other
local activities 20 20
 25. DPWH: Various infrastructure
projects 5,500 5,500
26. DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin
Client Cloud Computing
Project 270 270
27. DOH: Hiring of nurses and
midwives 294 294
28. TESDA: Training Program in
partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors 1,100 1,100
29. DILG: Performance Challenge
Fund (People Empowered
Community Driven
Development with DSWD and
NAPC) 250 50
30. ARMM: Comprehensive Peace
and Development Intervention 8,592 8,592
31. DOTC-MRT: Purchase of
additional MRT cars 4,500 -
32. LGU Support Fund 6,500 6,500
33. Various Other Local Projects 6,500 6,500
34. Development Assistance to the
Province of Quezon 750 750
TOTAL 45,165 44,000

C. Summary

Fund Sources
Identified for Allotments Cash
Approval for Release Requirements for
(In Million Release in FY
Php) 2011
Total 72,110 72,110 70,895
GOCCs 26,895 26,895
NGAs/LGUs 45,165 44,000

For His Excellency’s Consideration

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

OCT 12, 2011

The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 116 requesting omnibus
authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December 12, 2011
read:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx

SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment

DATE: December 12, 2011

This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to consolidate savings/unutilized balances in FY 2011 corresponding to
completed or discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional projects or expenditures.

In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects even if their implementation carries over to 2012 without necessarily
impacting on our budget deficit cap next year.

BACKGROUND

1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies’ operations, particularly on the
implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have identified savings
out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act. Said savings correspond to completed or discontinued projects under certain
departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the following:
 1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during preparation of the budget;

1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going priority projects; and

1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund

1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as a result of on-going priority
projects and implementation of new activities

2.0 x x x x

2.1 x x x

2.2 x x x

ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS

3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus authority to pool savings/unutilized balances in
FY 2010 last November 25, 2010.

4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM shall secure the corresponding
approval/confirmation of the President. Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be within the
authorized Expenditure level.

5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be sourced from the said pooled appropriations in
FY 2010 that will expire on December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may be declared as savings to fund
additional expenditures.

5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that we have
identified to be immediate actual disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire on December
31, 2011.

5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased Appropriations,
most of these are the same projects for which the DBM is directed by the Office of the President, thru the
Executive Secretary, to source funds.

6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that have been chosen given their multiplier impact
on economy and infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and their translation into disbursements.
Please note that we have classified the list of proposed projects as follows:

7.0 x x x

FOR THE PRESIDENT’S APPROVAL

8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the President’s approval for the following:

8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; and

8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding.

For His Excellency’s consideration and approval.

(Sgd.)

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

DEC 21, 2011

Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund proposed projects were contained in various other memoranda from Sec.
Abad dated June 25, 2012,117 September 4, 2012,118 December 19, 2012,119 May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President apparently
approved all the requests, withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum, as borne out by his
marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to further discussions." 122

In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure –
Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), 123 reproduced herein as follows:

NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541

July 18, 2012

TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and other Offices of the National Government, Budget and Planning
Officers; Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned

SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012
1.0 Rationale

The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the
departments/agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent
with the government priorities.

In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend or
stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of
unutilized allotment releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5,
Book VI of EO 292.

For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal
targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources.

Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012
performance. To enhance agencies’ performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting
them to identify slow-moving programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both pertaining to internal systems and those
which are outside the agencies’ spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and improvement plans for the rest of 2012.

Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued to post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus
resulting to substantial unobligated allotments.

In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels
of obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments. This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available
allotments to fund and undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.

2.0 Purpose

2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as of June 30, 2012
to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects of the national government;

2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated allotments; and

2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn allotments.

3.0 Coverage

3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government
agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current
Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and

3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
concerned based on their updated/validated list of pensioners.

3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified programs, projects and activities of the
departments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects as may be identified
by the agencies.

4.0 Exemption

These guidelines shall not apply to the following:

4.1 NGAs

4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine
Constitution; and

4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution of a
predetermined budget ceiling.

4.2 Fund Sources

4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;

4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment conditions per General Provisions
of the GAA:

• Confidential and Intelligence Fund;

• Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery, Repair and Maintenance,
Supplies and Materials and Utility which shall be used for the grant of Collective Negotiation
Agreement incentive benefit;
 • Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the last quarter after taking
into consideration the agency’s full year requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water,
Illumination, Power Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent.

4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart);

4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA,
Priority Development Assistance Fund, Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to LGUs,
among others;

4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and

4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the General
Fund.

5.0 Guidelines

5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement activities notwithstanding the implementation
of the policy of withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter, FY 2012. Even without the
allotments, the agency shall proceed in undertaking the procurement processes (i.e., procurement planning up to the
conduct of bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to GPPB Circular Nos. 02-2008 and 01-2009 and DBM
Circular Letter No. 2010-9.

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all
departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget
accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

• Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);

• Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

• Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agency’s latest report available
shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agency’s obligation
level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects
actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level shall approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e., ₱800 M x 2 quarters).

5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012
shall be immediately considered for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following considerations:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-
ready and doable during the given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-
programmed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

5.5. Consistent with the President’s directive, the DBM shall, based on evaluation of the reports cited above and results of
consultations with the departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 through issuance of
negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs).

5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the magnitude of withdrawn allotments. The report shall
highlight the agencies which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this Circular.

5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:

5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments
were withdrawn;

5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or

5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and projects
not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current year.

5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to DBM a Special Budget Request (SBR),
supported with the following:

5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);

5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and

5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or
Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.

5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories shall be until the end of the third quarter i.e.,
September 30, 2012. After said cut-off date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled and form part of the overall savings
of the national government.

5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority programs and projects as cited under item 5.7.3
of this Circular, shall be subject to approval of the President. Based on the approval of the President, DBM shall issue the
 SARO to cover the approved priority expenditures subject to submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and
supported with PFP and MCP.

5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012 unobligated
allotments) shall be within the approved Expenditure Program level of the national government for the current year. The
SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the appropriation source of the release to determine the extent of allotment
validity, as follows:

• For charges under R.A. 10147 – allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2012; and

• For charges under R.A. 10155 – allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2013.

5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other reportorial requirements is reiterated for
monitoring purposes.

6.0 Effectivity

This circular shall take effect immediately.

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

Secretary

As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged
against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance
of negative SAROs, but such allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies from which they were
withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs
of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in 2012. Financing the
other priority PAPs was made subject to the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like "realignment" and
"augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated allotments.

Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and funded, that is — (1) by declaring "savings" coming from the
various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing
unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.

c. DAP was not an appropriation

measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it

Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize the
disbursement and release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas, PHILCONSA, IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the
appropriations funded under the DAP were not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE, the
DAP, being actually an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its validity. VACC maintains
that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were separate and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs
without congressional authorization and control.

The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority
of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.

We agree with the OSG’s position.

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s
adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which
Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied
to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense." 124 As pointed out in Gonzales v.
Raquiza:125 ‘"In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’ while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’"126

On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation.127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool
the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to
be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury
by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and
utilization of the public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executive’s implementation of the DAP was consistent
with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.
a. Although executive discretion
and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution

We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its
execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget
implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable
them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions. 128 In particular, the power to transfer
funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by
Congress in the GAA.

Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs,129particularly when the funds are
grouped to form lump sum accounts.130 It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader
appropriation items.131 This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase. The DAP –
as a strategy to improve the country’s economic position – was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate
under the GAAs.

Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power, 132 Prof. Louis
Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the
Executive thusly:

[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by
administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of
expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing change.
New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable
for Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control expenditures by
confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The
realities and complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound management of public funds.

xxxx

x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be
discretion, but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.

In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the
fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government. The
Court has recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon,133 viz:

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based.

In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of
established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act
authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and
to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine Legislature,135 was
the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any limitation, for the Act
explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office to another, and to
spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.

From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of funds that could be transferred, thereby limiting the power to transfer
funds. Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or miscellaneous expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the
transferred funds were to be used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.

In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under miscellaneous expenses to any other item of a certain bureau or
office was removed.

During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds continued to be governed by the GAAs despite the enactment of
the Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did not include a provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in
the extent of the President’s power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with the President being given more flexibility in
implementing the budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the appropriations in the Executive Department could
be made in the "interest of the public, as the President may determine."136

In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the President’s seemingly unbounded discretion in transferring funds.137 Its
Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit the transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and the
independent constitutional bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in their respective
budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention was to further restrict, not to liberalize, the power to transfer
appropriations.139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to
augment, and suggested that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the original item of
appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than five percent if the original item of appropriation to be
augmented exceeds one million pesos."140 But two members of the Committee objected to the ₱1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount
was arbitrary and might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate the ₱1,000,000.00 threshold, and settled on the ten
percent limitation.141

In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the Convention, which adopted the following final version under Section
16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a law
authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional omissions
to transfer funds for the purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective offices. The leeway was
limited to augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be transferred should come from savings from another
item in the appropriation of the office.142

On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44 that:

Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project, or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act,
from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of
Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution,
ruling:

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.143

It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of
Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

Section 25. x x x

xxxx

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

xxxx

The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of
the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court
stated in Nazareth v. Villar:144

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the
appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is
found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to
augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of
the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority
to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in
Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise
within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute
shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the
general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the
exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations during
the Budget Execution Phase.

b. Requisites for the valid transfer of

appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
b.1. First Requisite–GAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional

Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.

Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?

In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:

Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:

Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP.145

A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not
carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to
authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within the
Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the
Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used
to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.

Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be met,
namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for
the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.

b.2. Second Requisite – There were

no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?

The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP — the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments — were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood
to refer to the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to
the budget.146 The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs for which the funds had been appropriated were actually
implemented and completed, or finally discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be realized with certainty in the middle of
the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because such PAPs had not actually been
abandoned or discontinued yet.147 They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original program or
project from which it was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not been completed, abandoned
or discontinued.148

The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress and
the actual amount allotted for the appropriation; that the definition of "savings" in the GAAs set only the parameters for determining when
savings occurred; that it was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution with the authority to augment) who
ultimately determined when savings actually existed because savings could be determined only during the stage of budget execution; that the
President must be given a wide discretion to accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were savings inasmuch as they
were clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation…free from any obligation or encumbrances which are (i) still available after
the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized…"

We partially find for the petitioners.

In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second
principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to
spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA.149 The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which
Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment operative under the
GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as to
let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is real
or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.150

The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that
the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing
Congress’ power of the purse.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:

Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus
enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of
the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.

The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was at
that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the
enumeration of the three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency level. It could not
be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which
the appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.

The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel
Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per
Zero-Based Budgeting findings."

The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.

The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They
have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has
already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued either an ABM
(for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be.
Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or
simply because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were allocated under the
GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with allotments but
without disbursement authority.

For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs
for which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for
such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further
qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated
allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.

Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly
allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the
Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend such funds as
MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot be transferred.

The DBM’s Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:

ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS

5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies’ operations, particularly on the implementation of
their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have been continuously calling the attention of all
National Government agencies (NGAs) with low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of
their programs and projects in the second quarter.

6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the concerned agencies and with call-up letters sent.

7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the department’s disposal, the level of financial performance of some
departments registered below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements for the first semester still not being met.

8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and
current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the
agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slow-
moving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:

3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 ofall national government agencies
(NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No. 10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155),
pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well
as capitalized MOOE; and
 3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based
on their undated/validated list of pensioners.

A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations"151 "to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects."152 But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the
original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn" 153 supported the conclusion that the
PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet
fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.

Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during
the given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed
implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for continuing and current appropriations as of
June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65,
General Provisions of the 2011 GAA, viz:

Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after
the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No. 9970
shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to
the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations.

and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after
the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic document.154

Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.

Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations.— All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the
purposes specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these
releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form
or by way of electronic document.

Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized
balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:

7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even with the availability of funds at their
disposal, the targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at
the end of the fiscal year if these remain unobligated.

8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter, both for continuing and
current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the
agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes pan of one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year
under the DBM’s memorandum dated May 20, 2013.

The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with
existing appropriations under the GAAs.155

The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing
agencies based on their own assessment that they could not obligate those allotments pursuant to the President’s directive for them to spend their
appropriations as quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy. 156

We agree with the petitioners.

Contrary to the respondents’ insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to
wit:

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units (OUs)
shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

• Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);

• Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

 • Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agency’s latest report available shall be used by DBM as
basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agency’s obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated
allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level
shall approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e., ₱800 M x 2 quarters).

The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the
impoundment of appropriations that could be allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the
GAAs,157 thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments. 158

In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push
agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred
to the decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of allotments under NBC No.
541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which the President was granted the authority to
suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so required.

The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations
were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds
cannot be considered as impoundment.

According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:159 "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend
funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood
to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable National
Government budget deficit, to wit:

Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded through
retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds appropriated
for the purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be
released pursuant to Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected
only in cases where there is an unmanageable national government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual national government
budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of

Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.

The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds,
not the retention or deduction of appropriations.

Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012 and 2013 GAAs) be applicable. They uniformly stated:

Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund releases from appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted
intact or in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by law,
or upon direction of the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this provision to the extent that sub-allotments by
agencies to their subordinate offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by the DBM.

The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments upon their release from the DBM, which was a different matter
altogether. The Court should not expand the meaning of the provision by applying it to the withdrawal of allotments.

The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his
judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal
services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to other
PAPs.

It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be
reverted to the General Fund.1âwphi1 This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.- Unexpended balances of appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall
not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays shall
remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for current operating expenditures may be specifically
recommended and approved as such in support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments:
provided, finally, that the President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-recurring expenditures
in a subsequent year.

The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation process and the preparation process and the
President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded
by said continuing appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end
of the fiscal year.

b.3. Third Requisite – No funds from

savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA

The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations law
for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree.160

The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit: –

x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded
by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.

In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken of
the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

As of 2013, a total of ₱144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP. 161

Of this amount ₱82.5 billion were released in 2011 and ₱54.8 billion in 2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of the total DAP releases were
applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.163

The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the following PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the
respective GAAs, namely:

(i) ₱1.5 billion for the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army;

(ii) ₱1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;

(iii) ₱700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164

(iv) ₱50 million to ₱100 (million) each to certain senators;165

(v) ₱10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones under the National Housing Authority;

(vi) ₱10 billion and ₱20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;

(vii) ₱5.4 billion landowners’ compensation under the Department of Agrarian Reform;

(viii) ₱8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development program;

(ix) ₱6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments

(x) ₱5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the Department of Tourism and the Department of Public
Works and Highways;

(xi) ₱1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;

(xii) ₱1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health units; and

(xiii) ₱4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects.166

In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were implemented, had appropriation covers, and could properly be
accounted for because the funds were released following and pursuant to the standard practices adopted by the DBM. 167 In support of its
argument, the OSG has submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other pertinent documents relative to the
implementation and fund transfers under the DAP.168

Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were
allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.

For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM)
project under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount of ₱1.6 Billion, 169 broken down as follows:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED
A.03.a.01.a Generation of new knowledge and
technologies and research capability building
in priority areas identified as strategic to
National Development
 Personnel Services P 43,504,024
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses 1,164,517,589
Capital Outlays 391,978,387
P 1,600,000,000

the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that Congress had appropriated only ₱537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing
for personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

Personnel Maintenance Capital TOTAL

Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenditures
III. Operations
a. Funding Assistance to Science 177,406,000 1,887,365,000 49,090,000 2,113,861,000
and Technology Activities
1. Central Office 1,554,238,000 1,554,238,000
a. Generation of new
knowledge and
technologies and research
capability building in
priority areas identified as
strategic to National
Development 537,910,000 537,910,000

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program
Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority areas identified as strategic to National Development,
the Executive allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of Congress. Worse, the
Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.170

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that
Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President
himself did not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any
appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in
enacting the GAAs. That happened in some instances under the DAP.

In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and
Development (DOST-PCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis Laboratory, which reads:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED
Development, integration and coordination of the
National Research System for Industry, Energy
A.02.a
and Emerging Technology and Related Fields
Capital Outlays P 300,000,000

the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the program specified in the GAA, whose particulars
were Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following activities: (1) Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry, Energy
and Utilities; (2) Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of PCIERD Information System for Industry,
Energy and Utilities. Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination of the National Research System for Industry, Energy and
Emerging Technology and Related Fields– the particulars stated in the SARO – could fall under the broad program description of Research and
Management Services– as appearing in the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not being specifically stated in the
GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative authorization, could not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.

In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion in implementing the budget given the
generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified under the GAAs; 172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to
spend the initial appropriations under his authority to declare and utilize savings, 173 and in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws.

Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. 174 Moreover, leaving the
spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. 175

Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget
proposal submitted by the Executive.176 Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength,177 and underpins "all
other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government."178 Such
enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the
money.179 Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should
be spent.

It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. 180For this purpose, appropriation
involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any
part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without
legislative authorization."181To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an
expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds.182 Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an
increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations
will thereby be violated.

b.4 Third Requisite – Cross-border

augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section
25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.

To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate,
with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice;
the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?

During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border augmentations, to wit:

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect any
part of savings of the National Government under your control cross border to another department?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Can you tell me two instances? I don’t recall having read your material.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a
budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its 250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit
observation informed the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments therein
may suffer from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of Representatives was not enough to complete 250
Million, they wrote to the President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was granted, Your Honor. The second instance
in the Memos is a request from the Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good governance programs of the
government and therefore, part of that is a requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many agencies. And in the
performance of that function, the Commission on Audit needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and litigators to
help them with their audit work and for that they requested funds from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations…

SECRETARY ABAD:

They were, we were augmenting existing items within their… (interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am
concerned. It says here, "The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
offices." Did you not feel constricted by this provision?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to
transfer savings which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an existing item in both the Commission as well as in the House
of Representatives; that’s how we saw…(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?

SECRETARY ABAD:

In an extreme instances because…(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, that’s your feeling.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to
respond because we felt…(interrupted).183
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to ₱143,700,000.00 and ₱250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respecti vely to the
COA184 and the House of Representatives.185 Those transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the
Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows:186

AMOUNT
DATE (In thousand pesos)
OFFICE PURPOSE
RELEASED Reserve Releases
Imposed
Commission on IT Infrastructure Program and 11/11/11 143,700
Audit hiring of additional litigation
experts
Congress – Completion of the construction 07/23/12 207,034 250,000
House of of the Legislative Library and (Savings of HOR)
Representatives Archives
Building/Congressional e-
library

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made available" to the "Commission on Elections the savings of his
department upon [its] request for funds…"187 This was another instance of a cross-border augmentation.

The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:

99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another department upon the latter’s request,
provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other
department access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the
Constitution.188

In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, representing Congress, announced a different characterization of
the cross-border transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation," viz:

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the DAP. What were these cross-border transfers? They are transfers of
savings as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So, that makes it similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a cross-border
which appears to be in violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border was crossed. But never has it been claimed
that the purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the government or agency of the government. The cross-border
transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the nature of [aid] rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity separate and independent
from the Executive Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. He’s in charge of the whole
operation although six or seven heads of government offices are given the power to augment. Only the President stationed there and in effect in-
charge and has the responsibility for the failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one reason or another, the money is not
enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an aid to a department like COA. The
President is responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well allow this, if Your Honor
please.189

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position now, I think, of government is that some transfers of savings is
now considered to be, if I’m not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of your argument?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

That’s our submission, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution? Where do we actually derive the concepts that transfers of
appropriation from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be considered a said? What particular text in the Constitution can we
situate this?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the
executive in-charge of the success of the government.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis for this theory of the government?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to Congress. That there are opportunities and there have been
opportunities of the President to actually go to Congress and ask for supplemental budgets?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:
If there is time to do that, I would say yes.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary situation?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Very extra-ordinary situations.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor please.190

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross border
transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.

4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid

Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently, the
release and use of unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra.

The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as separate sources of
funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified
the instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for which they could be used.

The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections must exceed revenue targets;
and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition was not met. 191

The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances
occur, to wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the President to Congress; (2)
new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for foreign assisted
projects were secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted
projects.192 This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment.193

The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations that provided standby authority to
incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are
generated.194 Contrary to the DBM’s averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM – the collection of new revenues from sources not originally considered in the
BESFs – was not included. This meant that the collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the
unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the revenue
collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.

The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released was bolstered by the following texts of the Special
Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:

2011 GAA

1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including savings generated
from programmed appropriations for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue
targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for
foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering
the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations for the first two
quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of the President, release the pertinent appropriations under the Unprogrammed Fund
corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the release of the balance of
the total savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject to fiscal programming and approval of the President.

2012 GAA

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That collections
arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the
purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.

As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund" gave the authority to use such additional revenues for
appropriations funded from the unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic requirement that revenue collections
must still exceed the original revenue targets.

In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues generated from newly-approved foreign loans were clear to the effect that
the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis" for the issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of the
amount of the loan. In such instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan proceeds, and
the mere perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs the additional revenues from sources not considered in the BESFs
must be taken into account in determining if the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the 2013
GAA, which was substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made this explicit, thus:

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections arising
from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans
for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO
covering the loan proceeds.

Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not considered in the revenue target would not be enough. The total revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-approved
foreign loans).

The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections should exceed the
original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target stated in
the BESF, but the respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue as enumerated in the BESF, with
the condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a particular source already exceeded the stated target.

The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the corresponding revenue target stated for each source of revenue, to wit:

TAX REVENUES

Taxes on Net Income and Profits

Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services

General Sales, Turnover or VAT

Selected Excises on Goods

Selected Taxes on Services

Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions

NON-TAX REVENUES

Fees and Charges

BTR Income

Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
Income from Investments

Interest on Bond Holdings

Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
NG Income Collected by BTr

Dividends on Stocks
NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit

Privatization
Foreign Grants

Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to the effect that the revenue
collections had exceeded the original revenue targets,195 they complied by submitting certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance
(DOF) pertaining to only one identified source of revenue – the dividends from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-owned
and controlled corporations.

To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented the certification dated March 4, 2011 issued by DOF
Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:

This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of Financing for 2011, the programmed income from dividends from shares
of stock in government-owned and controlled corporations is 5.5 billion.

This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury, the National Government has recorded dividend income amounting
to ₱23.8 billion as of 31 January 2011.196

For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by National Treasurer Roberto B. Tan, viz:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to March 2012 amounted to
₱19.419 billion compared to the full year program of ₱5.5 billion for 2012.197
And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013 issued by National Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to May 2013 amounted to
₱12.438 billion compared to the full year program of ₱10.0198 billion for 2013.

Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build and operate the NAIA expressway amounting to ₱11.0 billion in
June 2013.199

The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to ₱23.8 billion in 2011, ₱19.419 billion in 2012, and ₱12.438 billion in 2013
the BTr had exceeded only the ₱5.5 billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the ₱10
billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.

However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to be construed in light of the purpose for which the
unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs
should the revenue collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were realized.
The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should new or
additional revenue sources be realized during the year.200 Given the tenor of the certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not yet
supported by the corresponding resources.201

The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In
contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the
programmed appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be
dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to mean that
the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds simply
because there was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it would disregard the
budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Government’s surplus budget policy.202

We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents’ view.

5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges

The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and balances, and the principle of public
accountability.

With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause, 203 Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP was "unfair
as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail
themselves of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue favoritism" in favor of
select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.

Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable classification was used in distributing
the funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts they
respectively received.

Anent the petitioners’ theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP to
some legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing
the legislators to identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the GAAs, a function that exclusively
belonged to the Executive; that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative encroachment in the functions of the Executive; and
that the President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of the funds
under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.

Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of public accountability enshrined in the Constitution,204 because the
legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive, and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.

The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the
affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the
constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to the
proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.

The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators,
lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP,
and about some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive
discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who
supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and
how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the
inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for
whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.

The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from conducting congressional inquiries into
the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency eliminated any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is
fundamental that speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue simply because nothing concrete can thereby be
gained. In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic burden
of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually existed.205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed executive act.

We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM transgressed
the system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances
infringing the doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.

Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption
by the Executive of Congress’ power of appropriation, we have already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts
that the Executive could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp up or
accelerate the economy of the country.

6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable

After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must now deal with the consequences of the declaration.

Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation.206 However, the generality
of the rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule may at times be impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the need to
except from the rigid application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible result?

The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely not a novel one, has been exhaustively explained in De Agbayani
v. Philippine National Bank:207

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil
Code puts it: ‘When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.’
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as
until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.’"

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act
but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.208 But its use must be
subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to
only as a matter of equity and fair play.209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.

We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.

To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include
any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council:210

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase ‘executive act’ used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank refers only to acts,
orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Enrique Fernando in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to
executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what ‘executive act’ mean. Moreover,
while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code
and jurisprudence, the phrase ‘executive act’ does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited
by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term ‘executive act’ is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term ‘executive act’ is broad
enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the
agency in question or nullified by the Court.

A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma. In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without
a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good
faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.

In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant
thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that ‘military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government
and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.’

Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the
same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations,
said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This
doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In
keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not
only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later
nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.

Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law,
springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may
have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,211 the Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to
apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative
fact doctrine did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:

Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its
reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There
must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice,
not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied.
An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with
informal contacts with the government agency.

It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The
DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing
various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase
of the budget cycle – the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary
responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could
and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.

As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not
covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation
is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the
recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like
public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of
operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable
wastefulness.

Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always the
consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what
used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; 212but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law
is totally ineffective should apply.

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless
there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices
under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory
definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER,
AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the
southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area
of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow
costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by
the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2
did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining
with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries
of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar
circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General
in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant
merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that
the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat
the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and
to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time
serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way
around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The
same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City
of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the
City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually
win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a
law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter
provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by
the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6cannot made by a special law,
(2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may
be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create
an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of
any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly
stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of
the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should
exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.

I.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted
should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati)
to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution
does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with
the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion
of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. — A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code
shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

II.

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified
by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution
proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.

I.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted
should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati)
to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution
does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with
the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion
of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. — A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code
shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

II.

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified
by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution
proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

Footnotes

1 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored by Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No. 1244 sponsored by
Senator Vicente Sotto III.

2 Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Land Area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet
the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

3 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp. 23-28.

4 Ibid, citing as example the City of Mandaluyong.

5 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (19180); Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 24.

6 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.

7 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

8 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.

9 Section 5(1), Article VI.

10 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986 up to this time, Congress has yet to pass a general reapportionment law.

11 Section 1, Article II provides that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority from them."

12 Sec. 5. . . .

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

xxx xxx xxx

13 As per the certificate issued by Administration Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994
stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city), p. 15.

14 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred, and twenty days before the election."
ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA
DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE
VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The
petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The
petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly
situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on
May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths
at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.

Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the
membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not
more than 21 years old will be summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated
and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.[1]

Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction -

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents issuances, orders and actions
and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.

b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set by the present law and in accordance with Comelec Resolutions
No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK elections.

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said elections, for example, July
15, 2002, and the present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any
SK elective position even if they are more than 21 years old.

d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their post after the
barangay elections.[2]

The Facts

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB for brevity). The KB was
composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to provide its
members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.[3]

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years
of age.[4] The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs to enhance the social, political, economic,
cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth.[5] The SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and seven
members, all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing
in the barangay for at least six months and who meet the membership age requirement.

The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every three
years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec shall
promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections on May 6,
2002.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (Montesclaros for brevity) sent a letter [8] to the Comelec, demanding that the SK
elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the
letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of
the House[9] and the Senate President[10] about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman
intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed
support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to
November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En
Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but
holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. [12]

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the
Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report [13] recommending
approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14] and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill
reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives
approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.

The Issues

Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

I.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK
ELECTIONS.

II.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE,
DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS [17] (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS
OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.

III.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND
THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND
MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE.

IV.

THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE
ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND CONSTITUTION. [18]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition:

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be at least 15 but less than 18 years of
age on the day of the election.[20] RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay
elections.

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them, preventing them
from voting and being voted for in the SK elections. Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002,
the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK
elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but
not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondents failure to hold the elections on May 6, 2002
would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.

Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed,
the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders
that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow petitioners and those who have turned more than 21
years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.

The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1)
the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[21]

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15,
2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there
is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.

Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the
filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress.Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.[23]

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review
the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress
by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so
would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent
branches of government.

Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age
for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The
Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to
youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation,
not judicial intervention.

Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some
personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. [25] A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[26]

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years
old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years
old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be
members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and
substantial interest in the SK elections.

This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and
reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any
provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law
unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]

The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a property right within
the meaning of the Constitution.[28] Since certain public offices are reserved for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally protected
opportunity to occupy these public offices. In petitioners own words, they and others similarly situated stand to lose their opportunity to work in
the government positions reserved for SK members or officers.[29] Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of
SK organizations in a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or provincial board,
respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31] The president of the national
federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary. [32]

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the
law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a
statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. [33] No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the Court already
ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however,
well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust
or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not
rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public
office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public
trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service[35] cannot
bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, [36] this policy refers to those who belong to the class of
people defined as the youth.Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of
Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In
government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same
manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now the law that
prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are not
even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002
SK elections.

Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of
the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of the following: (1)
Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003; (2) the letter of
then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate; and (3) the
Conference Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.

The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall[37] and to recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending.[38] The Comelecs acts enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there
exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law. As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v.
Comelec,[40] the Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.

The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the
practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to
Congress the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[41] Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and
duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.

Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in power,
depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164
contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their successors have been elected or qualified. On July 15,
2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices
and their ex-officio public offices.

In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE,
JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the
particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel
stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct
federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as
will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section
312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee
elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the
distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that
the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution,
transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the
area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects
selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials
or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount
each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration
bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation
reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man
controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government
Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in
turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork
Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or
non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480
Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure
and other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by
1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation
or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of
projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the
Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President,
₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published
by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in
the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were
reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable
and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing
agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School
Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The
allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund," 43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special
provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation
with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole
condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the
same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly
to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same single
provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of
the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects
of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well
as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500
Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd
Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007
(GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out
to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million
for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100
Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that
it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior
and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure projects;
(b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be
the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs
to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to
identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures
the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of
PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and
the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, 89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted.
Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from
dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were
public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has been
defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using
no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99covering the use of legislators'
PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety
of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the application of these funds
and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period. 102 Accordingly,
the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their mandated
functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either
found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on
the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even
date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica,
et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the
CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x
x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they
pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not
limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition),
seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on
the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any
of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and
(2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910
but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court,
seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September
10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. 113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate
Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica
Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on
October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision
dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of
Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as
prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are
of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing
for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken
by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had
already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional
authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the
laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and
that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now
if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of
the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-
blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done
that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been
lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court
upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately
the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as
the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality.
As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed
out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with
constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a
"PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends
a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading
review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which,
under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the
specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the
right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political
question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help
ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch
of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all
these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless
a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to
the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork
Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairperson‘s
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its
prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny
of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases
of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As
such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil Code, evokes
the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the
Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify
projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached
the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two,
the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel
System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader
legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare
decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it
follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within
the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as
embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific
projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA
Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which
cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent
case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator
participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional
Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate
lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse." 156 They assert that
the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual
officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to
spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or
Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; 158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya
Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork
Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; 160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated
words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, 165 belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these
powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated
when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there
is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of
budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent
in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives
which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains
to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks
and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;
and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have
ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority
to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals. 182 They maintain that the Court,
in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and
identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the
Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced
from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general
program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the
case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority
to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance,
as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special
Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ;
and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it –
"the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators
is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments –
have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source,
thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process: 192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he
is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he
cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact,
been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have,
after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and
both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013
PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful
that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments
which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation
is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or
tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that: 206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the
executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts
will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as
originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence
a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws,
through haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An
item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must
contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the
item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same.
Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.
Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall
be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would
equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed.
Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill
shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o
be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said
that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may
veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its
purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be
amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine,
again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the
integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the
principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of
the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a
modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-
grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting
the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. 215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion
would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." 216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar
operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies
cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do
not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders
Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a
direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally,
they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se
would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case
basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by
law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline
for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how
the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to
develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230 The
Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by
stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals
to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-
projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent
which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the
following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district,
but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork
Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since
the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund
incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of
the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and
Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their
proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution
"does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be"
for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed
(In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law
in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and
allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application
and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work
obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share
on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund
to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government
in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall
be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases
supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special
Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be
used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets
aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made
by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus,
construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy
development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
"to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting.
Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993
which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down
as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made
in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds,
the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x
from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential
Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to
disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly,
its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is
within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a
well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-
28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases
supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of
the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it
must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed
access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted
and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in
any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.: 259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter
may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may
be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and
third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-
8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM
and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first,
covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by
an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO
has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the
TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot
by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013,
among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution
of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time
this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically
speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact,
a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release
of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the
statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA,
Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x
x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending
on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time
of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the
declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those
merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8
of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and
complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine merely
"reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations
bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has
diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted
genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein
pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence
or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its
co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what
has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the
budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release
and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to
legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for
both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release
of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by
Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED.
The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the
Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete
lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official
documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the
custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case
which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as
the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EXDETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO
(SELDA), REPRESENTED BY DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C.
DALISAY, AND DANILO M. DELAFUENTE,* Petitioners, v. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND RETIREE AFFAIRS, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), THE
GRAVE SERVICES UNIT (PHILIPPINE ARMY), AND GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AND HEIRS OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, Respondents.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE A.C. SAGUISAG III, Intervenors.

G.R. No. 225984

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, IN HIS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AND AS A MEMBER OF CONGRESS AND AS
THE HONORARY CHAIRPERSON OF THE FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND);
FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), REPRESENTED BY ITS COCHAIRPERSON, NILDA L.
SEVILLA; REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.; REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN; REP. EDGAR R. ERICE; AND REP.
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN N. LORENZANA; AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA; AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR
ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ; AND HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226097

LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA F. SANTOSMARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S.
MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V.
RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR., LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, AND ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO,
JR., Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R.
VISAYA, AND PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA
(RET.), Respondents.

G.R. No. 226116

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X. MANGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O.

CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL,
EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F. TRINIDAD, JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR.
BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, AUGUSTO A. LEGASTO, JR., AND JULIA KRISTINA P.
LEGASTO, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL
ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AND PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) OF THE DND, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226117

ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA, JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL
MAGALANG, Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
RICARDO R. VISAYA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE ERNESTO G.
CAROLINA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226120

ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SUED IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO), Respondents.

G.R. No. 226294

LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYER, Petitioner, v. HON.
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R.
VISAYA, UNDERSECRETARY ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE
(PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR AND B/GEN. RESTITUTO L. AGUILAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHRINE CURATOR AND CHIEF
VETERANS MEMORIAL AND HISTORICAL DIVISION AND HEIRS OF FERDINAND EDRALIN MARCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

In law, as much as in life, there is need to find closure. Issues that have lingered and festered for so long and which unnecessarily divide
the people and slow the path to the future have to be interred. To move on is not to forget the past. It is to focus on the present and the
future, leaving behind what is better left for history to ultimately decide. The Court finds guidance from the Constitution and the
applicable laws, and in the absence of clear prohibition against the exercise of discretion entrusted to the political branches of the
Government, the Court must not overextend its readings of what may only be seen as providing tenuous connection to the issue before it.

Facts

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that he would
allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election,
garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañan Palace.

On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB

Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016.

In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of the late former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, kindly undertake all the necessary planning and preparations to
facilitate the coordination of all agencies concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and security requirements. Coordinate closely with
the Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the transport of the late former President's remains from Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.

The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO since the LNMB is under its supervision and administration. PVAO shall designate the focal
person for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the event.

Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as possible.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the following directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SUBJECT: Funeral Honors and Service

TO: Commanding General, Philippine Army

Headquarters, Philippine Army
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff for RRA, G9

1. Pursuant to paragraph 2b, SOP Number 8, GHQ, AFP dated 14 July 1992, provide services, honors and other courtesies for the
late Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as indicated:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary [x] Vigil - Provide vigil

[x] Bugler/Drummer
[x] Firing Party
[x] Military Host/Pallbearers
[x] Escort and Transportation
[x] Arrival/Departure Honors
2. His remains lie in state at Ilocos Norte
3. Interment will take place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ft. Bonifacio, Taguig City. Date: TBAL.
4. Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a President
5. POC: Administrator, PVAO BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VISAYA2

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,4 in their capacities as
human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights
Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention5 filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son,6 as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his
grandchild.7chanrobleslaw

3. Petition for Prohibition8 filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as
Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims
and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others,9 in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition10 filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and several
others,11 suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition12 filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust
the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others,13as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition14 filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others,15 as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition16 filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro17 who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime
of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition18 filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official
and concerned citizen.

Issues

Procedural

1. Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

Substantive

1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB.

2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws,
particularly:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Section 17 of Article VII, Section 1 of
Article XI, Section 3(2) of Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution;

(b) R.A. No. 289;

(c) R.A. No. 10368;

(d) AFP Regulation G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000;

(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(f) The "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly; and cralawlawlibrary

(g) The "Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity" of the U.N. Economic
and Social Council;

3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court
on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB.

4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered
into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be
brought back to and interred in the Philippines.

Opinion

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural Grounds

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19 In this
case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.20chanrobleslaw

An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 21 There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 22 Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite
of "ripeness," which means that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.23 Moreover, the
limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.24 Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.25cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure,26 political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been
limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it
shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below,
President Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question,27locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.28 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an
act complained of, such proper party has no standing.29 Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.30 In this case, what is essentially
being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners
merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or
implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al.,31 as members of the Bar, are required to allege any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the act complained of. 32 Suffice it to state that the averments in their
petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their
duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing. 33chanrobleslaw

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.34 In cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.35 In Marcos v. Manglapus,36 the majority opinion observed that the subject controversy
was of grave national importance, and that the Court's decision would have a profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class by itself, unique and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator
forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who, within the short
space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the Philippines to die.

At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine
would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27)
years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and
imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and
disregard of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon
intended by law to perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be discussed further,
reveals its nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine, under the administration of the AFP.

Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al.37 come before the Court as
legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or the institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot be
upheld.38 They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and
the directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as
legislators.39chanrobleslaw

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available.40 If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought.41 For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.42 While there are exceptions43 to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove
the presence of any of those exceptions.

Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be
given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the
implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the
Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the Department of National
Defense (DND).44chanrobleslaw

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
allowed under exceptional cases,45 which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve
questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the
power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the petitions should
still be denied.

Substantive Grounds

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 46 None is present in this case.

I
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the
Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." For them, the ratification of
the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism." To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections
2,4711,48 13,49 23,50 26,51 2752 and 2853 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII,54 Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV,55 Sec. 1 of Art. XI,56 and Sec. 26 of Art.
XVIII57 of the Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara58 already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles
and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them x x x.

xxx

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of
due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making."59chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to
clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As a matter of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees"), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of 1989"), R.A. No. 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and Republic Act No. 9485 ("Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007"). To complement these statutes, the
Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of
officials and employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client
feedback program.

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the
constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of
Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect
to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," which is
identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, 60 is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her
department.61 Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the
law.62 The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive
functions.63 It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. 64 The provision simply underscores the rule of law and,
corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.65chanrobleslaw

Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene
R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.

A. On R.A. No. 28966chanrobleslaw

For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn, R.A. No. 289
authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national
heroes and patriots.67 It also provided for the creation of a Board on National Pantheon to implement the law. 68chanrobleslaw

On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site of the National Pantheon at East Avenue, Quezon City. 69 On December 23,
1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally "withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve as a site for the construction of the National
Pantheon a certain parcel of land located in Quezon City." However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking
Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953, and reserving the parcels of land embraced therein for national park purposes to be known as
Quezon Memorial Park.

It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a person's mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that
AFP Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate its spirit and intent. Petitioners claim that it is known, both here
and abroad, that Marcos' acts and deed - the gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of government coffers, and his
military record that is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies - are neither worthy of perpetuation in our memory nor serve as a
source of inspiration and emulation of the present and future generations. They maintain that public respondents are not members of the Board on
National Pantheon, which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes,
and patriots.

Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to
their supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and
separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which
was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The
National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the
creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery, the
Manila South Cemetery, and other equally distinguished private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but without cost to the limited funds
of the government.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is
reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of
each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB
is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the
proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a
"hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to
confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners'
repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the
remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

B. On R.A. No. 1036870chanrobleslaw

For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos' burial at the LNMB because the
legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the
heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs)71 under his regime. They insist that the intended act of public
respondents damages and makes mockery of the mandatory teaching of Martial Law atrocities and of the lives and sacrifices of its victims. They
contend that "reparation" under R.A. No. 10368 is non-judicial in nature but a political action of the State through the Legislative and Executive
branches by providing administrative relief for the compensation, recognition, and memorialization of human rights victims.

We beg to disagree.

Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. To restore their
honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its moral and legal obligation72 to provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the
deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they experienced.

In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs, which is part of the right to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368 entitles them to
monetary and non-monetary reparation. Any HRVV qualified under the law73 shall receive a monetary reparation, which is tax-free and without
prejudice to the receipt of any other sum from any other person or entity in any case involving human rights violations. 74 Anent the non-monetary
reparation, the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education
(DepEd), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such other
government agencies are required to render the necessary services for the HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Human
Rights Victims' Claims Board (Board) pursuant to the provisions of the law.75chanrobleslaw

Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the violations committed against the HRVVs, regardless of whether they opt to seek
reparation or not. This is manifested by enshrining their names in the Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims (Roll) prepared by the
Board.76 The Roll may be displayed in government agencies designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission (Commission).77 Also, a
Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established and a compendium of their sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and accessed
in the internet.78 The Commission is created primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the Memorial/Museum/
Library/Compendium.79chanrobleslaw

To memorialize80 the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10368 further mandates that: (1) the database prepared by
the Board derived from the processing of claims shall be turned over to the Commission for archival purposes, and made accessible for the
promotion of human rights to all government agencies and instrumentalities in order to prevent recurrence of similar abuses, encourage
continuing reforms and contribute to ending impunity;81 (2) the lessons learned from Martial Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of
HRVVs shall be included in the basic and higher education curricula, as well as in continuing adult learning, prioritizing those most prone to
commit human rights violations;82 and (3) the Commission shall publish only those stories of HRVVs who have given prior informed
consent.83chanrobleslaw

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition
on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective,
our legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the HRVVs,
but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular,
if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial
legislation.

Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive
of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly,
the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. It must be emphasized that
R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-
375:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later
statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The
clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a
showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with
what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. x x x 84chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is
provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),85 the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law86 adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity87 dated February 8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

We do not think so. The ICCPR,88 as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the enactment of legislative
measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's
constitutional processes, that are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws. The U.N.
principles on reparation expressly states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms[.][Emphasis supplied]

The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the
successful People Power Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair share to
respect, protect and fulfill the country's human rights obligations, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect human rights and social justice.

As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo,89 and habeas data,90 the Supreme Court promulgated on March 1, 2007
Administrative Order No. 25-2007,91 which provides rules on cases involving extra-judicial killings of political ideologists and members of the
media. The provision of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the prevention of the victim's re-traumatization applies in the course of legal and
administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.92chanrobleslaw

On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of administrative and executive orders. Notable of which are the following:

1. A.O. No. 370 dated December 10, 1997 (Creating the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Human Rights)
2. E.O. No. 118 dated July 5, 1999 (Providing for the Creation of a National Committee on the Culture of Peace)
3. E.O. No. 134 dated July 31, 1999 (Declaring August 12, 1999 and Every 12th Day of August Thereafter as International
Humanitarian Law Day)
4. E.O. No. 404 dated January 24, 2005 (Creating the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Monitoring Committee [GRPMC]
on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law)
5. A.O. No. 157 dated August 21, 2006 (Creating an Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings)
6. A.O. No. 163 dated December 8, 2006 (Strengthening and Increasing the Membership of the Presidential Human Rights Committee,
and Expanding Further the Functions of Said Committee)93chanrobleslaw
7. A.O. No. 181 dated July 3, 2007 (Directing the Cooperation and Coordination Between the National Prosecution Service and Other
Concerned Agencies of Government for the Successful Investigation and Prosecution of Political and Media Killings)
8. A.O. No. 197 dated September 25, 2007 (DND and AFP Coordination with PHRC Sub-committee on Killings and Disappearances)
9. A.O. No. 211 dated November 26, 2007 (Creating a Task Force Against Political Violence)
10. A.O. No. 249 dated December 10, 2008 (Further Strengthening Government Policies, Plans, and Programs for the Effective
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
11. E.O. No. 847 dated November 23, 2009 (Creating the Church-Police-Military-Liaison Committee to Formulate and Implement a
Comprehensive Program to Establish Strong Partnership Between the State and the Church on Matters Concerning Peace and Order
and Human Rights)
12. A.O. No. 35 dated November 22, 2012 (Creating the Inter-Agency Committee on Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced Disappearances,
Torture and Other Grave Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of Persons)
13. A.O. No. 1 dated October 11, 2016 (Creating the Presidential Task Force on Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of
the Members of the Media)

Finally, the Congress passed the following laws affecting human rights:

1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodia/Investigation as well as the
Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof)
2. Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997)
3. Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of 2002)
4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)
5. Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004)
6. Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)
7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007)
8. Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women)
9. Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)
 10. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity)
11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010)
12. Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012)
13. Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012)
14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking In Persons Act of 2012)
15. Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation And Recognition Act of 2013)
16. Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of 2013)

Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the
public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in
varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving
citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission
in the memorialization of HRVVs, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical
Institute (NHI),94 is mandated to act as the primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters
relating to official Philippine history.95 Among others, it is tasked to: (a) conduct and support all kinds of research relating to Philippine national
and local history; (b) develop educational materials in various media, implement historical educational activities for the popularization of
Philippine history, and disseminate, information regarding Philippine historical events, dates, places and personages; and (c) actively engage in
the settlement or resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.96 Under R.A. Nos. 10066
(National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009)97 and 10086 (Strengthening Peoples' Nationalism Through Philippine History Act),98 the declared State
policy is to conserve, develop, promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources.99 Towards this end, means shall
be provided to strengthen people's nationalism, love of country, respect for its heroes and pride for the people's accomplishments by reinforcing
the importance of Philippine national and local history in daily life with the end in view of raising social consciousness. 100 Utmost priority shall
be given not only with the research on history but also its popularization. 101chanrobleslaw

II.
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias

Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will desecrate it as a sacred and hallowed place and a revered national shrine
where the mortal remains of our country's great men and women are interred for the inspiration and emulation of the present generation and
generations to come. They erred.

A. National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and
revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP. 102 The national shrines created by law and presidential issuance include, among
others: Fort Santiago (Dambana ng Kalayaan) in Manila;103 all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan;104 the site of First Mass in the
Philippines in Magallanes, Limasawa, Leyte;105 Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom Shrine in Kawit, Cavite;106 Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine
in Malate, Manila;107 Tirad Pass National Shrine in Ilocos Sur;108 Ricarte Shrine109 and Aglipay Shrine110 in Batac, Ilocos Norte; Liberty Shrine in
Lapu-Lapu, Cebu;111 "Red Beach" or the landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces in Baras, Palo, Leyte;112 Dapitan
City as a National Shrine City in Zamboanga Del Norte; 113 General Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine in Hamtic, Antique; 114 and Mabini
Shrine in Polytechnic University of the Philippines - Mabini Campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila.115 As sites of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or
death of great and eminent leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold and keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed
place.116 P.O. No. 105117 strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the desecration of national shrines by disturbing their peace
and serenity through digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and committing unbecoming acts within their premises. R.A. No.
10066 also makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or destroy the original features of, or undertake construction or real estate
development in any national shrine, monument, landmark and other historic edifices and structures, declared, classified, and marked by the
NHCP as such, without the prior written permission from the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCAA). 118chanrobleslaw

As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA,119 the NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical
sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value.120 In particular, the NHCP Board has the power to approve the declaration of
historic structures and sites, such as national shrines, monuments, landmarks and heritage houses and to determine the manner of their
identification, maintenance, restoration, conservation, preservation and protection.121chanrobleslaw

Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have
been under the administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND. Among the military
shrines are: Mt. Samat National Shrine in Pilar, Bataan; 122 Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan, Ifugao;123 Capas National Shrine in
Capas, Tarlac;124 Ricarte National Shrine in Malasin, Batac, Ilocos Norte;125 Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine in Jaro,
Iloilo;126 Balete Pass National Shrine in Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya;127 USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park in Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Ilocos
Sur;128 and the LNMB in Taguig City, Metro Manila.129chanrobleslaw

B. The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani

At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning for the death of thousands of Filipinos. Several places served as grounds for the
war dead, such as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, and other places throughout the country. The Republic
Memorial Cemetery, in particular, was established in May 1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of Filipino military personnel who died
in World War II.

On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which ordered "the remains of the war dead interred at the Bataan
Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province, and at other places in the Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the Republic Memorial
Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province" so as to minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and to make the remains
accessible to the widows, parents, children, relatives, and friends.

On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 86, which changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan
Ng Mga Bayani to symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers have died" and to "truly express the nations esteem and reverence for her war
dead."130chanrobleslaw

On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, which reserved for military purposes, under the administration of the
AFP Chief of Staff, the land where LNMB is located. The LNMB was part of a military reservation site then known as Fort Wm McKinley (now
known as Fort Andres Bonifacio).

On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military reservation and reserved the
LNMB for national shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.

On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as the AFP Commander-in-Chief, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 which reorganized
the Executive Branch of the National Government through the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP). Section 7, Article XV,
Chapter I, Part XII thereof abolished the NSC and its functions together with applicable appropriations, records, equipment, property and such
personnel as may be necessary were transferred to the NHI under the Department of Education (DEC). The NHI was responsible for promoting
and preserving the Philippine cultural heritage by undertaking, inter alia, studies on Philippine history and national heroes and maintaining
national shrines and monuments.131chanrobleslaw

Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the administration, maintenance and development of national shrines tentatively
integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.

On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP was repealed on the grounds
that "the administration, maintenance and development of national shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more
effectively accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter s greater capabilities and
resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."
Henceforth, the PVAO through the Military Shrines Service (MSS), which was created to perform the functions of the abolished NSC - would
administer, maintain and develop military memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.

On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the Administrative Code. The Code retains PVAO under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of National Defense.132 Among others, PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military shrines.133 With the approval of PVAO
Rationalization Plan on June 29, 2010, pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was renamed to Veterans Memorial and Historical
Division, under the supervision and control of PVAO, which is presently tasked with the management and development of military shrines and
the perpetuation of the heroic deeds of our nation's veterans.

As a national military shrine, the main features, structures, and facilities of the LNMB are as follows:

1. Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers - The main structure constructed at the center of the cemetery where wreath laying ceremonies are
held when Philippine government officials and foreign dignitaries visit the LNMB. The following inscription is found on the tomb:
"Here lies a Filipino soldier whose name is known only to God." Behind the tomb are three marble pillars representing the three main
island groups of the Philippines - Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Buried here were the remains of 39,000 Filipino soldiers who were
originally buried in Camp O'Donnell Concentration Camp and Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila.
2. Heroes Memorial Gate - A structure shaped in the form of a large concrete tripod with a stairway leading to an upper view deck and
a metal sculpture at the center. This is the first imposing structure one sees upon entering the grounds of the cemetery complex.
3. Black Stone Walls - Erected on opposite sides of the main entrance road leading to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers and just near
the Heroes Memorial are two 12-foot high black stone walls which bear the words, "I do not know the dignity of his birth, but I do
know the glory of his death." that General Douglas MacArthur made during his sentimental journey to the Philippines in 1961.
4. Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Pylon - Inaugurated on April 5, 1977 by Secretary Renato S. De Villa in memory
of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor during World War II. This monument is dedicated as an eternal acknowledgment of their
valor and sacrifice in defense of the Philippines.
5. Korean Memorial Pylon - A towering monument honoring the 112 Filipino officers and men who, as members of the Philippine
Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), perished during the Korean War.
6. Vietnam Veterans Memorial Pylon - Dedicated to the members of the Philippine contingents and Philippine civic action groups to
Vietnam (PHILCON-V and PHILCAG-V) who served as medical, dental, engineering construction, community and psychological
workers, and security complement. They offered tremendous sacrifices as they alleviated human suffering in war-ravaged Vietnam
from 1964-1971. Inscribed on the memorial pylon are the words: "To build and not to destroy, to bring the Vietnamese people
happiness and not sorrow, to develop goodwill and not hatred."
7. Philippine World War II Guerillas Pylon - Erected by the Veterans Federation of the Philippines as a testimony to the indomitable
spirit and bravery of the Filipino guerillas of World War II who refused to be cowed into submission and carried on the fight for
freedom against an enemy with vastly superior arms and under almost insurmountable odds. Their hardship and sufferings, as well as
their defeats and victories, are enshrined in this memorial.134

Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105135 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, 136 the LNMB was
not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. 137 The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall
phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.

(2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation." What P.D. No. 105 contemplates are the following national shrines: Fort Santiago
("Dambana ng Kalayaan"), all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan, the site of First Mass in the Philippines, Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom
Shrine, Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine, Tirad Pass National Shrine, Ricarte Shrine, Aglipay Shrine, Liberty Shrine, "Red Beach" or the
landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces, Dapitan City, General Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine, and Mabini
Shrine. Excluded are the military memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines under the PVAO, such as: Mt. Samat National
Shrine, Kiangan War Memorial Shrine, Capas National Shrine, Ricarte National Shrine, Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine, Balete
Pass National Shrine; USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park, and the LNMB.

(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. While P.D. No. 1 dated September 24, 1972
transferred the administration, maintenance and development of national shrines to the NHI under the DEC, it never actually materialized.
Pending the organization of the DEC, its functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973. Eventually,
on January 26, 1977, Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. The PVAO, through the MSS, was tasked to administer, maintain, and develop military
memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines. The reasons being that "the administration, maintenance and development of
national shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC]
and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter's greater capabilities and resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely
related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."

The foregoing interpretation is neither narrow and myopic nor downright error. Instead, it is consistent with the letter and intent of P.D. No. 105.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every
mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground.
Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nations
esteem and reverence for her war dead," as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands
unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of
the LNMB as a national military shrine.

At this juncture, reference should be made to Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), which is identical to the LNMB in terms of its
prominence in the U.S. It is not amiss to point that our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. and that its military code produced a
salutary effect in the Philippines' military justice system.139 Hence, relevant military rules, regulations, and practices of the U.S. have persuasive,
if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries,140 the Arlington is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. 141 The Secretary
of the U.S. Army has the responsibility to develop, operate, manage, administer, oversee, and fund the Army national military cemeteries in a
manner and to standards that fully honor the service and sacrifices of the deceased members of the armed forces buried or inurned therein, and
shall prescribe such regulations and policies as may be necessary to administer the cemeteries. 142 In addition, the Secretary of the U.S. Army is
empowered to appoint an advisory committee, which shall make periodic reports and recommendations as well as advise the Secretary with
respect to the administration of the cemetery, the erection of memorials at the cemetery, and master planning for the cemetery.143chanrobleslaw
Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are established as national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have served in the
U.S. Armed Forces.144 The areas are protected, managed and administered as suitable and dignified burial grounds and as significant cultural
resources.145 As such, the authorization of activities that take place therein is limited to those that are consistent with applicable legislation and
that are compatible with maintaining their solemn commemorative and historic character. 146chanrobleslaw

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain
military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require
statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. 147 This is why President Duterte is not bound
by the alleged 1992 Agreement148 between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac,
Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to
determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands
of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation.149 At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it
was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-
in-Chief,150 a legislator,151 a Secretary of National Defense,152 a military personnel,153 a veteran,154 and a Medal of Valor awardee,155 whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the
expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered. 156 Likewise, President Duterte's
determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a
presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the
Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even
so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

C. AFP Regulations on the LNMB

A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as to who may and may not be interred at the LNMB underscores the nature and
purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/grave site.

On May 13, 1947, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, by the direction of the President and by order of the Secretary of National Defense,
issued General Orders No. 111, which constituted and activated, as of said date, the Graves Registration Platoon as a unit of the Philippine Army.

On February 2, 1960, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-371 (Administrative
and Special Staff Services, Grave Registration Service), which provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) World War II dead
of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (b) Current dead of the AFP; (c) Retired military personnel of the AFP; (d) Remains of former members of
the AFP who died while in the active service and in the Retired List of the AFP now interred at different cemeteries and other places throughout
the Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense; and (e) Others upon approval of the Congress of the Philippines, the President of the
Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense. The regulation also stated that the AFP Quartermaster General will be responsible for, among
other matters, the efficient operation of the Graves Registration Service; the interment, disinterment and reinterment of the dead mentioned
above; and preservation of military cemeteries, national cemeteries, and memorials.

On July 31, 1973, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-372 (Administration and
Operation of AFP Graves Registration Installations), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-371. It provided that the following may be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Deceased Veterans of the Philippine Revolution of 1896/World War I; (b) Deceased World War II members of the
AFP and recognized guerillas; (c) Deceased military personnel of the AFP who died while in the active duty; (d) Deceased retired military
personnel of the AFP; (e) Deceased military personnel of the AFP interred at different cemeteries and other places outside the LNMB; and (f)
Such remains of persons as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP may direct. The remains of the following were not allowed to be interred in the
LNMB: (a) The spouse of an active, or retired, deceased military personnel, recognized guerillas who himself/herself is not a military personnel;
and (b) AFP personnel who were retireable but separated/reverted/discharged for cause, or joined and aided the enemy of the Republic of the
Philippines, or were convicted of capital or other criminal offenses, involving moral turpitude. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster
General shall be responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation of the AFP graves registration installations; the interment,
disinterment and reinterment of deceased military personnel mentioned above; and the preservation of military cemeteries, proper marking and
official recording of graves therein.

On April 9, 1986, AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, by order of National Defense Minister, issued AFP Regulations G 161-373 (Allocation of
Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-372. It enumerated a list of deceased person who
may be interred at the LNMB, namely: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Ministers of National
Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1896, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; and (h) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artist and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Batasang Pambansa or the Minister of
National Defense. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the allocation of specific section/areas for the
said deceased persons, while the Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Company shall be charged with the preparation
of grave sites, supervision of burials at LNMB and the registration of graves.

On March 27, 1998, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-374 (Allocation of
Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-373. It provided that the following may be interred in
the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-inChief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff,
AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890,
WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (h) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense; and (i) Former Presidents, Secretaries of
Defense, CSAFP, Generals/Flag Officers, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense
and Chief of Staff. The remains of the following were not allowed to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude. Like AFP Regulations G 161-373, it stated that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the allocation of specific
section/areas for the deceased persons, whereas the Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit shall be charged with the
preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials, and the registration of graves.

Finally, on September 11, 2000, the AFP Chief of Staff, by the order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-375
(Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-374. The regulation stated that the
Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the issuance of interment directive for all active military personnel for interment, authorized personnel
(such as those former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the Philippine Coast Guard [PCG] and the Philippine National Police
[PNP]), and retirees, veterans and reservists enumerated therein. The Quartermaster General is tasked to exercise over-all supervision in the
implementation of the regulation and the Commander ASCOM, PA through the Commanding Officer of Grave Services Unit is charged with the
registration of the deceased/graves, the allocation of specific section/area at the LNMB for interment of deceased, the preparation of grave sites,
and the supervision of burials.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or
Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and
retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active
Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the
PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who
were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining
who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting
the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP
Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

x x x In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryUnder this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation
omitted.)157chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law and, until set aside, is binding upon
executive and administrative agencies, including the President as the chief executor of laws. 158chanrobleslaw

1. Qualification under the AFP Regulations

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete,
whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.

To compare, We again refer to the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington. In the U.S., the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary
of Defense, determines eligibility for interment or inurnment in the Army national military cemeteries.159 Effective October 26, 2016, the
rule160 is as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Only those who qualify as a primarily eligible person or a derivatively eligible person are eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery,
unless otherwise prohibited as provided for in §§ 553.19161-553.20,162 provided that the last period of active duty of the service member or veteran
ended with an honorable discharge.

(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons for purposes of interment:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Any service member who dies on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces (except those service members serving
on active duty for training only), if the General Courts Martial Convening Authority grants a certificate of honorable service.

(2) Any veteran retired from a Reserve component who served a period of active duty (other than for training), is carried on the official retired
list, and is entitled to receive military retired pay.

(3) Any veteran retired from active military service and entitled to receive military retired pay.

(4) Any veteran who received an honorable discharge from the Armed Forces prior to October 1, 1949, who was discharged for a permanent
physical disability, who served on active duty (other than for training), and who would have been eligible for retirement under the provisions of
10 U.S.C. 1201 had the statute been in effect on the date of separation.

(5) Any veteran awarded one of the following decorations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Medal of Honor;163chanrobleslaw

(ii) Distinguished Service Cross, Air Force Cross, or Navy Cross;

(iii) Distinguished Service Medal;

(iv) Silver Star; or

(v) Purple Heart.

(6) Any veteran who served on active duty (other than active duty for training) and who held any of the following positions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) President or Vice President of the United States;

(ii) Elected member of the U.S. Congress;

(iii) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;

(iv) A position listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5 U.S.C. 5312 164 or 5313165 (Levels I and II of the Executive Schedule); or

(v) Chief of Mission of a Category 4, 5, or post if the Department of State classified that post as a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post during the person's
tenure as Chief of Mission.

(7) Any former prisoner of war who, while a prisoner of war, served honorably in the active military service, and who died on or after November
30, 1993.

(b) Derivatively eligible persons. The following individuals are derivatively eligible persons for purposes of interment who may be interred if
space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible person:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) The spouse of a primarily eligible person who is or will be interred in Arlington National Cemetery. A former
spouse of a primarily eligible person is not eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery under this paragraph.

(2) The spouse of an active duty service member or an eligible veteran, who was:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Lost or buried at sea, temporarily interred overseas due to action by the Government, or officially determined to
be missing in action;

(ii) Buried in a U.S. military cemetery maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission; or

(iii) Interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial (the derivatively eligible spouse may not be buried in the group burial
gravesite).

(3) The parents of a minor child or a permanently dependent adult child, whose remains were interred in Arlington National Cemetery based on
the eligibility of a parent at the time of the child's death, unless eligibility of the non-service connected parent is lost through divorce from the
primarily eligible parent.

(4) An honorably discharged veteran who does not qualify as a primarily eligible person, if the veteran will be buried in the same gravesite as an
already interred primarily eligible person who is a close relative, where the interment meets the following conditions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) The veteran is without minor or unmarried adult dependent children;

(ii) The veteran will not occupy space reserved for the spouse, a minor child, or a permanently dependent adult child;

(iii) All other close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur with the interment of the veteran with the primarily eligible person by signing
a notarized statement;

(iv) The veteran's spouse waives any entitlement to interment in Arlington National Cemetery, where such entitlement might be based on the
veteran's interment in Arlington National Cemetery. The Executive Director may set aside the spouse's waiver, provided space is available in the
same gravesite, and all close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur;

(v) Any cost of moving, recasketing, or revaulting the remains will be paid from private funds.

There is a separate list of eligible with respect to the inurnment of cremated remains in the Columbarium,166 interment of cremated remains in the
Unmarked Area,167 and group burial.168 As a national military cemetery, eligibility standards for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in
Arlington are based on honorable military service.169 Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves, which are rarely granted, are for
those persons who have made significant contributions that directly and substantially benefited the U.S. military.170chanrobleslaw

Judging from the foregoing, it is glaring that the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington and the AFP Regulations G 161-375 on the LNMB, as a
general rule, recognize and reward the military services or military related activities of the deceased. Compared with the latter, however, the
former is actually less generous in granting the privilege of interment since only the spouse or parent, under certain conditions, may be allowed
"if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible person."

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a
misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not
automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the
LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that
only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years.
Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related activities but also non-military
personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen, national
artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of
National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether
or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of
the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and
military-related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a
President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he
received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all
good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.

Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee and a veteran. R.A. No. 9049 171 declares the policy of the State "to consistently
honor its military heroes in order to strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military."172 For the "supreme self-
sacrifice and distinctive acts of heroism and gallantry,"173 a Medal of Valor awardee or his/her dependents/heirs/beneficiaries are entitled to the
following social services and financial rewards:

1. Tax-exempt lifetime monthly gratuity of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which is separate and distinct from any salary or
pension that the awardee currently receives or will receive from the government of the Philippines; 174chanrobleslaw
2. Precedence in employment in government agencies or government-owned or controlled corporation, if the job qualifications or
requirements are met;
3. Priority in the approval of the awardee's housing application under existing housing programs of the government;
4. Priority in the acquisition of public lands under the Public Land Act and preferential right in the lease of pasture lands and exploitation
of natural resources;
5. Privilege of obtaining loans in an aggregate amount not exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) from government-
owned or controlled financial institutions without having to put up any collateral or constitute any pledge or mortgage to secure the
payment of the loan;
6. Twenty (20%) percent discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, recreation and sport centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country;
7. Twenty (20%) percent discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other
similar places of culture, leisure and amusement;
8. Free medical and dental services and consultation in hospital and clinics anywhere in the country;
9. Exemption from the payment of tuition and matriculation fees in public or private schools, universities, colleges and other educational
institutions in any pre-school, baccalaureate or post graduate courses such as or including course leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine (MD), Bachelor of Laws (LLB), and Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) or allied and similar courses;
and cralawlawlibrary
10. If interested and qualified, a quota is given to join the cadet corps of the Philippine Military Academy or otherwise priority for direct
commission, call to active duty (CAD) and/or enlistment in regular force of the AFP.

On the other hand, in recognizing their patriotic services in times of war and peace for the cause of freedom and democracy; for the attainment of
national unity, independence, and socioeconomic advancement; and for the maintenance of peace and order, 175 R.A. No. 6948, as
amended,176 grants our veterans177 and their dependents or survivors with pension (old age, disability, total administrative disability, and death)
and non-pension (burial, education, hospitalization, and medical care and treatment) benefits as well as provisions from the local governments.
Under the law, the benefits may be withheld if the Commission on Human Rights certifies to the AFP General Headquarters that the veteran has
been found guilty by final judgment of a gross human rights violation while in the service, but this factor shall not be considered taken against
his next of kin.178chanrobleslaw

2. Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was
neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military
service.

Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the AFP regulations disregards historical context and the rule on statutory
construction. They urge the Court to construe statutes not literally but according to their spirit and reason.

It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and
dubious military records, as found by foreign and local courts as well as administrative agencies. By going into exile, he deliberately evaded
liability for his actions. And by allowing death to overtake him, he inevitably escaped the prospect of facing accountability for his crimes. They
also contend that his removal in the 1986 popular uprising is a clear sign of his discharge from the AFP. The People Power Revolution was the
direct exercise of the Filipinos' power to overthrow an illegitimate and oppressive regime. As a sovereign act, it necessarily includes the power to
adjudge him as dishonorably discharged from the AFP.

Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375 only to soldiers
would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an additional cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results (because soldiers who
were dishonorably discharged would be disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos). Also, the AFP regulations
would place Marcos in the same class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a class of his own, sui generis. The other Presidents
were never removed by People Power Revolution and were never subject of laws declaring them to have committed human rights violations.
Thus, the intended burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently situated.

Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving
moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law and that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presum innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf."179 Even the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity cited by petitioners unequivocally guarantee the rights of the accused,
providing that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

XIII. Rights of others

27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the right
of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due process.

xxx

PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED

Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals concerned shall be entitled to the following guarantees:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating individuals before they are named publicly;

(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide a statement setting forth their version of the facts either at a hearing
convened by the commission while conducting its investigation or through submission of a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion
in the commission's file.

To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital crime (i.e., a crime which a sentence of imprisonment for life or
death penalty may be imposed) but who has not been convicted by reason of not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid
prosecution, may be ineligible for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military cemetery. Nevertheless, such
ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in § 553.21. 180chanrobleslaw

The various cases cited by petitiOners, which were decided with finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are
merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at
the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the
Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not
legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not met. 181 In this case, there is a real and
substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of
War182 attach only to the members of the military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents
buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In
addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No.
1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for militarymemorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or
position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No.
6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987
(Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War.183 The NHCP
study184 is incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

With respect to the phrase "[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service," the same should be viewed in
light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G 161-375 to the term "active service" which is "[s]ervice rendered by a military person as a
Commissioned Officer, enlisted man/woman, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and service rendered
by him/her as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for which military and/or civilian service he/she shall have received pay from the Philippine Government, and/or such
others as may be hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638, as amended)."185 To my mind, the word "service" should be
construed as that rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation,
training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from
the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable
separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987
Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted
before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by
AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the
people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of
the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence- that of ousting him as president. To
do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising
from the various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of the number
of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of
getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding
stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the people.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the
President's discretion is not totally unfettered. "Discretion is not a freespirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to
keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.'"186 At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful
place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a person's
development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth. 187chanrobleslaw

There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in accordance with the
clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require
the better perspective that the passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must mov'e on and let this issue rest.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.

Sereno, C.J., See dissenting opinion.

Carpio, J., See dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr.,** J., I concur in the ponencia as also in the opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the ponencia and separate opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Brion, J., with separate concurring opinion.
Bersamin, J., See separate opinion.
Del Castillo, J., I join the separate opinion.
Perez, J., See separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., See separate opinion.
Reyes, J., Inhibited/no part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the separate opinion of J. Mendoza.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., I join dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.

Endnotes:

*
Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. filed a petition for certiorari-in-intervention.
**
On official leave.
1
See Annex "A" of Petition for Prohibition of Lagman, et al., G.R. No. 225984.
2
See Annex "B,", id. (Emphasis in the original)
3
G.R. No. 225973.
4
TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA) represented by DIONITO
CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARlO, FELIX C. DALISAY and DANILO M. DELA FUENTE.
5
G.R. No. 225973.
6
RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, JR.
7
RENE A. C. SAGUISAG, III.
8
G.R. No. 225984.
9
FIND CO-CHAIRPERSON, NILDA L. SEVILLA, REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, REP.
EDGAR R. ERICE and REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES.
10
G.R. No. 226097
11
HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA F. SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S. MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA.
CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V. RODRIGUEZ, LOUUE G. CRlSMO,
FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR., LIWAYWAY D. ARCE ond ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR.
12
G.R. No. 226116.
13
JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X. MAGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O. CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE
ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL, EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P.
OLIVARES, NOEL F. TRINIDAD, JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR. BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S.
VERZOLA, AUGUSTO A. LEGASTO, JR. and JULIA KRISTINA P. LEGASTO
14
G.R. No. 226117.
15
JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA, JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, and JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL MAGALANG
16
G.R. No. 226120.
17
Defined as native peoples who have historically inhabited Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu, who are largely of the Islamic Faith, under Sec. 4, par.
d.[8], RA 9710 othenvise known as The Magna Carta of Women.
18
G.R. No. 226294.
19
Belgica, et al., v. Han. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519 (2013).
20
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 471 (2010).
21
Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19, at 519, citing Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al., 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).
22
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al., supra.
23
Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19, at 519-520.
24
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Acestral Domain (GRP), et al., supra note 21.
25
cralawred Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957); Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19, at 526.
26
Id.; id.
27
Black's Law Dictionary, 941 (1991 6th ed.).
28
Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19, at 527.
29
Id. at 527, citing La Bugal-B'Laan, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 890 (2004).
30
Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 19, at 528.
31
Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and Rene A.Q. Saguisag, Jr.
32
Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 762 (2006).
33
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
34
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
35
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 46.
36
258 Phil 479 (1989).
37
REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT JR., REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, REP. EDGAR R. ERICE and REP. EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES.
38
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 648 (2000).
39
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, 651 Phil. 374, 439 (2010).
40
Maglalang v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 723 Phil. 546, 556 (2013).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 557.
43
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound
public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small
so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. (See Republic v.
Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 97-98 [2007]).
44
Book IV, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Administrative Code.
45
Direct resort to the Court is allowed as follows (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) when cases of first impression are involved; and (4) when
constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (5) when the time element presented in the case cannot be ignored; (6) when the filed
petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression;
and (8) when the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were foundo be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy." (See The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 35, at 45-49.
46
Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., 714 Phil. 127, 169 (2013).
47
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
48
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
49
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth atriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
50
SECTION 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation.
51
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.
52
SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
53
SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
54
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
55
SECTION 3. x x x

(2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes
in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
56
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
57
SECTION 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national
interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.

A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen
properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding
judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.

The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeying is commenced as herein provided.
58
338 Phil. 546 (1997).
59
Tañada v. Angara, supra, at 580-581. (Citations omitted). The case was cited in Tondo Medical Center Employees Ass'n v. Court of Appeals,
554 Phil. 609, 625-626 (2007); Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, 599 Phil. 455, 465 (2009); and Representatives Espina, et
al. v. Han. Zamora, Jr. (Executive Secretary), et al., 645 Phil. 269, 278-279 (2010). See also Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101-102
(1997).
60
Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, Signed on July 25, 1987.
61
Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 451 (2010).
62
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, 552.
63
Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426 & 212444, January 12, 2016.
64
Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra note 46, at 164, as cited in Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., supra note 63.
65
Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra note 46, at 164.
66
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Construction of a National Pantheon for Presidents of the Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the
Country," approved on June 16, 1948.
67
Section 1.
68
Sec. 2. There is hereby created a Board on National Pantheon composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and the Secretary of Education and two private citizens to be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments which shall have the following duties and functions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) To determine the location of a suitable site for the construction of the said National Pantheon, and to have such
site acquired, surveyed and fenced for this purpose and to delimit and set aside a portion thereof wherein shall be interred the remains of all
Presidents of the Philippines and another portion wherein the remains of heroes, patriots and other great men of the country shall likewise be
interred;

(b) To order and supervise the construction thereon of uniform monuments, mausoleums, or tombs as the Board may deem appropriate;

(c) To cause to be interred therein the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, the national heroes and patriots;

(d) To order and supervise the construction of a suitable road leading to the said National Pantheon from the nearest national or provincial road;
and cralawlawlibrary

(e) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
69
Office of the President of the Philippines. (1953). Official Month in Review. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 49(5), lxv-
lxxvi (http://www.gov.ph/1953/05/01/official-month-in-review-may-1953/, last accessed on October 28, 2016).
70
Approved on February 25, 2013, R.A. No. 10368 is the consolidation of House Bill (H.B.) No. 5990 and Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 3334. H.B. No.
5990, entitled "An Act Providing Compensation To Victims Of Human Rights Violations During The Marcos Regime, Documentation Of Said
Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes," was co-sponsored by Lorenzo R. Tañada III, Edcel C. Lagman, Rene L.
Relampagos, Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Walden F. Bello, Kaka J. Bag-ao, Teodoro A. Casiño, Neri Javier Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano,
Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio, Emerenciana A. De Jesus, and Raymond V. Palatino. No member of the House signified an intention to
ask any question during the period of sponsorship and debate, and no committee or individual amendments were made during the period of
amendments (Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14, 2012, p. 3). The bill was approved on Second Reading (Congressional Record,
Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14, 2012, p. 4). On Third Reading, the bill was approved with 235 affirmative votes, no negative vote, and no abstention
(Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 47, March 21, 2012, p. 15). On the other hand, S.B. No. 3334, entitled "An Act Providing For Reparation And
Recognition Of The Survivors And Relatives Of The Victims Of Violations Of Human Rights And Other Related Violations During The Regime Of
Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Documentation Of Said Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes," was co-
authored by Sergio R. Osmena III, Teofisto D. Guingona III, Francis G. Escudero, and Franklin M. Drilon. Senators Drilon and Panfilo M.
Lacson withdrew their reservation to interpellate on the measure (Senate Journal No. 41, December 10, 2012, p. 1171). The bill was approved on
Second Reading with no objection (Senate Journal No. 41, December 10, 2012, p. 1172). On Third Reading, the bill was approved with 18
senators voting in favor, none against, and no abstention (Senate Journal No. 44, December 17, 2012, p. 1281).
71
Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to a person whose human rights were violated by persons acting in an official capacity and/or
agents of the State as defined herein. In order to qualify for reparation under this Act, the human rights violation must have been committed
during the period from Soptomboc 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986: Provided, however, That victims of human rights violations that were
committed one (1) month before September 21, 1972 and one (1) month after February 25, 1986 shall be entitled to reparation under this Act if
they can establish that the violation was committed:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official capacity as defined hereunder;

(2) For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or promoting the said regime; or

(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects of Martial Law. (Sec. 3[c] of R.A. No. 10368).
72
Section 11 Article II and Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and other international human rights laws and conventions (See Sec. 2
of R.A. No. 10368).
73
The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No.
840, CA No. 86-0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii wherein a favorable judgment has been rendered, and the HRVVs
recognized by the Bantayog Ng Mga Bayani Foundation shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they are HRVVs. However, the
Human Rights Victims' Claims Board is not deprived of its original jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights
violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted (See Sec. 17 of R.A. No. 10368).
74
Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 10368.
75
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 10368.
76
Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 10368.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 10368.
80
"Memorialization" refers to the preservation of the memory of the human rights violations victims, objects, events and lessons learned during
the Marcos regime. This is part of the inherent obligation of the State to acknowledge the wrongs committed in the past, to recognize the heroism
and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of gross human rights violations during Martial Law, and to prevent the recurrence of similar
abuses. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule II, IRR of R.A. No. 10368).
81
Sec. 1, Rule VII, IRR of R.A. No. 10368.
82
Sec. 2, Rule VII, IRR of R.A. No. 10368.
83
Sec. 3, Rule VII, IRR of R.A. No. 10368.
84
Remman Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, et al., 726 Phil. 104, 118-119 (2014).
85
Article 2

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
86
IX. Reparation for harm suffered

15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law or
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can
be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim
or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.

16. States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and other assistance to victims in the event that the parties liable for
the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.

17. States shall, with respect to claims by victims, enforce domestic judgements for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm
suffered and endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements for reparation in accordance with domestic law and international legal
obligations. To that end, States should provide under their domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of reparation judgements.

18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include
the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights law
or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human
rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one's place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and
the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law, such as:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Physical or mental harm;

(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;

(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;

(d) Moral damage;

(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services.

21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.

22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;

(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the
safety and interests of the victim, the victim's relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence
of further violations;

(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance
in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural
practices of the families and communities;

(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected
with the victim;

(e) Public apology, including acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;

(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;

(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;

(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights law and international humanitarian law training
and in educational material at all levels.

23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;

(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;

(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;

(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;

(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training
for law enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;

(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;

(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution;

(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
87
PRINCIPLE 2. THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH

Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the
circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the
right to the truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.

PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY

A people's knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfillment
of the State's duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate
knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding
against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.
88
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into
force March 23, 1976, in accordance with Article 49 (http.//www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, last accessed on October 28,
2016).
89
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Effective on October 24, 2007.
90
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Effective on February 2, 2008.
91
Reiterated in OCA Circular No. 103-07 dated October 16, 2007 and OCA Circular No. 46-09 dated April 20, 2009.
92
VI. Treatment of victims

10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure
their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families. The State should ensure that its domestic laws,
to the extent possible, provide that a victim who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid his
or her re-traumatization in the course of legal and administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.
93
Originated from A.O. No. 101 dated Docember 13, 1988 and A.O. No. 29 dated January 27, 2002.
94
Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 10086.
95
Sec. 5 ofR.A. No. 10086.
96
Id.
97
Approved on March 26, 2010.
98
Approved on May 12, 2010 and took effect on June 13, 2010.
99
Sec. 2 of R.A. 10066 and Sec. 2 of R.A. 10086.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
See Sec. 4 (d) ofR.A. 10066 in relation to Sec. 3 (u) of R.A. No. 10066 and Sec. 3 (n) of R.A. No. 10086. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 10086 specifically defines National Historical Shrine as "a site or structure hallowed and revered for its association to
national heroes or historical events declared by the Commission." (Art. 6[q.], Rule 5, Title I)
103
R.A. No. 597, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1569 and 1607.
104
E.O. No. 58 issued on August 16, 1954 (See Arula v. Brig. Gen. Espino, etc., et al., 138 Phil. 570, 589-591 (1969)).
105
R.A. No. 2733.
106
R.A. No. 4039.
107
Proclamation No. 207 dated May 27, 1967.
108
Proclamation No. 433 dated July 23, 1968.
109
R.A. No. 5648.
110
R.A. No. 5649.
111
R.A. No. 5695.
112
Proclamation No. 618 dated October 13, 1969, as amended by Proclamation No. 1272 dated June 4, 1974.
113
R.A. No. 6468.
114
Batas Pambansa Bilang 309 dated November 14, 1982.
115
Proclamation No. 1992 dated February 8, 2010.
116
P.D. No. 105 dated January 24, 1973.
117
Entitled "Declaring National Shrines As Sacred (Hallowed) Places And Prohibiting Desecration Thereof" (Signed on January 24, 1973)
118
Sec. 48 (b).
119
Sec. 31 (d) of R.A. No. 10066.
120
Sec. 5 (d) of R.A. No. 10086.
121
Article 12 (e) and (f) Rule 8 Title III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10086.
122
Proclamation No. 25 dated April 18, 1966.
123
Proclamation No. 1682 dated October 17, 1977.
124
Proclamation No. 842 dated December 7, 1991 and R.A. No. 8221.
125
Proclamation No. 228 dated August 12, 1993.
126
Proclamation No. 425 dated July 13, 1994.
127
R.A. No. 10796.
128
http://server.pvao.mil.ph/PDF/shrines/usafipnl.pdf, last accessed on September 19, 2016.
129
Proclamation No. 208 dated May 28, 1967.
130
See Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 86.
131
Section I, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP.
132
Book IV, Title VIII, Subtitle II, Chapter 1, Sec. 18.
133
Book IV, Title VIII, Subtitle II, Chapter 5, Sec. 32(4).
134
See Annex to the Manifestation of the AFP Adjutant General and http://server.pvao.mil.ph/PDF/shrines/libingan.pdf (last accessed on October
25, 2016).
135
P.D. No. 105 is an issuance of Marcos, acting as the AFP Commander-in-Chief and by virtue of his powers under the Martial Law. It was not a
law that was enacted by the Congress.
136
P.D. No. 208 was signed on May 28, 1967 while P.D. No. 105 was signed on January 24, 1973.
137
Among those named were the birthplace of Dr. Jose Rizal in Calamba, Laguna, Talisay, Dapitan City, where the hero was exiled for four
years, Fort Santiago, Manila, where he was imprisoned in 1896 prior to his execution; Talaga, Tanauan, Batangas where Apolinario Mabini was
born, Pandacan, Manila, where Mabini's house in which he died, is located; Aguinaldo Mansion in Kawit, Cavite, where General Emilio
Aguinaldo, first President of the Philippines, was born, and where Philippine Independence was solemnly proclaimed on June 12, 1898; and
Batan, Aklan, where the "Code of Kalantiyaw" was promulgated in 1433.
138
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."

The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National Power Corporation v. Angas as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating
the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is
justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an
enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3 rd ed., pp. 395-400].
(See Pelizloy Realty Corp. v. The Province of Benguet, 708 Phil. 466, 480-481 [2013], as cited in Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of
Cebu, G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016)

139
See Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, 751 SCRA 469, 542.
140
Also includes the United States Soldiers' and Airmen's National Cemetery in the District of Columbia.
141
See 32 C.F.R. § 553.3 and 10 U.S.C.A. § 4721.
142
Id.
143
10 U.S.C.A. § 4723.
144
36 C.F.R. § 12.2.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See National Electrification Administration v. COA, 427 Phil. 464, 485 (2002).
148
On August 19, 1992, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, and the family of the late President Marcos, represented by his widow, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, agreed on the
following conditions and procedures by which the remains of the former President shall be brought back to and interred in the
Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is hereby agreed that the remains of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos shall be allowed to be brought back to the Philippines from Hawaii,
USA on 1 September 1992.

II

That the remains shall be brought directly from Hawaii, USA to Laoag, Ilocos Norte by means of an aircraft which shall fly directly to its port of
destination at Laoag International Airport, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. It shall be understood that once the aircraft enters the Philippine area of
responsibility, stopover for whatever reason in any airport other than the airport of destination shall be allowed only upon prior clearance from
the Philippine Government.

III

That the family of the late President Marcos undertakes to fix a wake period of nine (9) days beginning 1 September 1992 to allow friends,
relatives and supporters to pay their courtesy, last respect and homage to the former President at the Marcos family home at Batac, Ilocos Norte.
It shall undertake further to maintain peaceful and orderly wake and/or help and cooperate with the local government authorities ensure that the
same will not be used to foment and promote civil disorder.

IV

That the remains shall be buried [temporarily interred] on the 9th of September 1992 at the family burial grounds at Batac, Ilocos Norte, provided
that any transfer of burial grounds shall be with prior clearance from the Philippine Government taking into account the prevailing socio-political
climate.

The government shall provide appropriate military honors during the wake and interment, the details of which shall be arranged and finalized by
and between the parties thereto.

VI

The Government shall ensure that the facilities at Laoag International Airport will allow for a safe landing as well as processing of incoming
passengers, their cargoes and/or existing laws and regulations.

On August 26, 1992, DILG Secretary Alunan informed Mrs. Marcos of the government's decision that former President Marcos be accorded
honors befitting a war veteran, and a former member of the AFP which, in general terms, includes the following: Flag Draped Coffin, Vigil
Guards during the wake, Honor Guard, Firing Detail, Taps, and Pallbearers composed of retired generals under his command.
On August 25, 1993, Roque R. Ablan Jr. wrote DILG Secretary Alunan, confirming the previous arrangements between him and Mrs. Marcos,
and also the arrangements made by Ablan before President Fidel V. Ramos on the following matters:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. Direct flight of the remains of the late Pres. Marcos from Honolulu to Laoag.
2. That there will be an interim burial of the late Pres. Marcos in Batac, Ilocos Norte until such time when President Ramos will feel that
the healing period would have been attain[ed] and that he shall be transferred to Manila for final burial.
3. That the remains will not be paraded to the other provinces.
4. That [Ablan] discussed this with Mrs. Marcos this morning and that she had given me full authority to assure the government that
everything will be in accordance with the memo of understanding, and the pronouncement made by President Ramos that the remains
can stay at the Don Mariano Marcos State University provided no government expenditures will be incurred and that the place will not
be disturbed.

Ablan also informed DILG Secretary Alunan of the following details: (1) the remains of former President Marcos would arrive in Laoag City,
Ilocos Norte on September 7, 1993; (2) from the airport, the remains would be brought to the Laoag City Cathedral, and after the mass, it would
be brought to the Capitol for public viewing; (3) on the next day, the remains would be brought to Batac where it should be placed side by side
with the late Doña Josefa Edralin Marcos; (4) that on September 9, Doña Josefa Marcos would be buried in the cemetery besides Governor
Elizabeth Marcos Roca; and (5) on September 10, the late President Marcos would be buried in the mausoleum.

On September 10, 1993, the coffin of former President Marcos was opened inside the mausoleum and was subsequently placed inside a
transparent glass for viewing.
149
Book III, Title I, Chapter 4, Section 14 of the Administrative Code.
150
From December 30, 1965 until February 25, 1986 when he and his immediate family members were forcibly exiled in the USA because of the
EDSA People Power Revolution.
151
He was an Assemblyman (1949 to 1959) and a Senator (1959-1965), serving as Senate President during his last three (3) years.
152
From December 31, 1965 to January 20, 1967.
153
On November 15, 1941, Marcos was called and inducted to the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) as Third Lieutenant.
From November 16, 1941 to April 8, 1942, he was assigned as assistant G-2 of the 21st (Lightning) Division of the USAFFE, where he attained
the rank of First Lieutenant. He was then promoted to the rank of Colonel under Special Orders No. 68 dated September 25, 1962. In Special
Orders No. 264 dated June 11, 1963 and General Orders No. 265 dated May 19, 1964, he remained listed as Colonel. (See Annex "13" of the
Consolidated Comment filed by the OSG).
154
The PVAO recognized Marcos as a member of the retired army personnel. Based on a Certification dated August 18, 2016 issued by PVAO's
Records Management Division Chief, respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos is receiving P5,000.00 as Old Age Pension, being the surviving
spouse of a retired veteran under R.A. No. 6948, as amended. (See Annex "12" of the Consolidated Comment filed by the OSG).
155
During his military career, Marcos was awarded a Medal of Valor through General Orders No. 167 dated October 16, 1968 "for extraordinary
gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life, above and beyond the call of duty in a suicidal action against overwhelming enemy forces at the
junction of Salian River and Abo-Abo River, Bataan, on or about 22 January 1942." (See Annex "14" of Consolidated Comment filed by the
OSG).
156
See Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174, 188 (2010).
157
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 & 181527, December 8, 2015.
158
Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra note 46, at 166.
159
10 U.S.C.A. § 4722.
160
32 C.F.R. § 553.12
161
The following persons are not eligible for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in an Army National Military Cemetery:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) A father, mother, brother, sister, or in-law solely on the basis of his or her relationship to a primarily eligible
person, even though the individual is:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Dependent on the primarily eligible person for support; or

(2) A member of the primarily eligible person's household.

(b) A person whose last period of service was not characterized as an honorable discharge (e.g., a separation or discharge under general but
honorable conditions, other than honorable condbiatdions, a conduct discharge, a dishonorable discharge, or a dismissal), regardless of whether
the person:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Received any other veterans' benefits; or

(2) Was treated at a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital or died in such a hospital.

(c) A person who has volunteered for service with the U.S. Armed Forces, but has not yet entered on active duty.

(d) A former spouse whose marriage to the primarily eligible person ended in divorce.

(e) A spouse who predeceases the primarily eligible person and is interred or inurned in a location other than Arlington National Cemetery, and
the primarily eligible person remarries.

(f) A divorced spouse of a primarily eligible person.

(g) Otherwise derivatively eligible persons, such as a spouse or minor child, if the primarily eligible person was not or will not be interred or
inurned at Arlington National Cemetery.

(h) A service member who dies while on active duty, if the first General Courts Martial Convening Authority in the service member's chain of
command determines that there is clear and convincing evidence that the service member engaged in conduct that would have resulted in a
separation or discharge not characterized as an honorable discharge (e.g., a separation or discharge under general but honorable conditions, other
than honorable conditions, a bad conduct discharge, a dishonorable discharge, or a dismissal) being imposed, but for the death of the service
member.

(i) Animal remains. If animal remains are unintentionally commingled with human remains due to a natural disaster, unforeseen accident, act of
war or terrorism, violent explosion, or similar incident, and such remains cannot be separated from the remains of an eligible person, then the
remains may be interred or inurned with the eligible person, but the identity of the animal remains shall not be inscribed or identified on a niche,
marker, headstone, or otherwise. (See 32 C.F.R. § 553.19)
162
(a) Prohibition. Notwithstanding §§ 553.12-553.16, 553.18, and 553.22, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 985 and 38 U.S.C. 2411, the interment,
inurnment, or memorialization in an Army National Military Cemetery of any of the following persons is prohibited:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by the Attorney General of the United States, prior to
his or her interment, inumment, or memorialization, as a person who has been convicted of a Federal capital crime and whose conviction is final
(other than a person whose sentence was commuted by the President).

(2) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by an appropriate State official, prior to his or her interment, inurnment, or
memorialization, as a person who has been convicted of a State capital crime and whose conviction is final (other than a person whose sentence
was commuted by the Governor of the State).

(3) Any person found under procedures specified in § 553.21 to have committed a Federal or State capital crime but who has not been convicted
of such crime by reason of such person not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution. Notice from officials is not
required for this prohibition to apply.

(4) Any person identified in writing to the Executive Director by the Attorney General of the United States or by an appropriate State official,
prior to his or her interment, inurnment, or memorialization, as a person who has been convicted of a Federal or State crime causing the person to
be a Tier III sex offender for purposes of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, who for such crime is sentenced to a minimum of
life imprisonment and whose conviction is final (other than a person whose sentence was commuted by the President or the Governor of a State,
as the case may be).

(b) Notice. The Executive Director is designated as the Secretary of the Army's representative authorized to receive from the appropriate Federal
or State officials notification of conviction of capital crimes referred to in this section.

(c) Confirmation of person's eligibility.

(1) If notice has not been received, but the Executive Director has reason to believe that the person may have been convicted of a Federal capital
crime or a State capital crime, the Executive Director shall seek written confirmation from:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) The Attorney General of the United States, with respect to a suspected Federal capital crime; or

(ii) An appropriate State official, with respect to a suspected State capital crime.

(2) The Executive Director will defer the decision on whether to inter, inurn, or memorialize a decedent until a written response is received. (See
32 C.F.R. § 553.20)
163
The medal of honor awarded posthumously to a deceased member of the armed forces who, as an unidentified casualty of a particular war or
other armed conflict, is interred in the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia, is awarded to the member as the
representative of the members of the armed forces who died in such war or other armed conflict and whose remains have not been identified, and
not to the individual personally. (10 U.S.C.A. § 1134)
164
Includes the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of
Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Secretary of Transportation, United States Trade Representative, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Commissioner of Social Security, Social
Security Administration, Director of National Drug Control Policy, Chairman and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and
Director of National Intelligence.
165
Includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources,
Administrator of Agency for International Development, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Deputy Secretary
of Veterans Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Management, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Chairman of Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers,
Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy, Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration, Director of the National Science Foundation, Deputy Attorney General,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Director of the Office of Personnel Management, Administrator of Federal
Highway Administration, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Deputy Secretary of Labor, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Independent Members of Thrift Depositor
Protection Oversight Board, Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Deputy Secretary of Education,
Deputy Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Deputy Director for Management of Office of Management and Budget, Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Deputy Commissioner of Social Security, Social Security Administration, Administrator of the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund, Deputy Director of National Drug Control Policy, Members and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy, Chief Executive Officer of Millennium Challenge Corporation, Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center,
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Federal Transit Administrator.
166
The following persons are eligible for inurnment in the Arlington National Cemetery Columbarium, unless otherwise prohibited as provided
for in §§ 553.19-553.20, provided that the last period of active duty of the service member or veteran ended with an honorable discharge.

(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons for purposes of inurnment:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Any person eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery, as provided for in § 553.12(a).

(2) Any veteran who served on active duty other than active duty for training.

(3) Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces who dies while:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) On active duty for training or performing full-time duty under title 32, United States Code;

(ii) Performing authorized travel to or from such active duty for training or full-time duty;

(iii) On authorized inactive-duty training, including training performed as a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air
National Guard of the United States; or

(iv) Hospitalized or receiving treatment at the expense of the Government for an injury or disease incurred or contracted while on such active
duty for training or full-time duty, traveling to or from such active duty for training or full-time duty, or on inactive-duty training.

(4) Any member of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of the United States, Army, Navy, or Air Force, whose death occurs while:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Attending an authorized training camp or cruise;

(ii) Performing authorized travel to or from that camp or cruise; or

(iii) Hospitalized or receiving treatment at the expense of the Government for injury or disease incurred or contracted while attending such camp
or cruise or while traveling to or from such camp or cruise.

(5) Any citizen of the United States who, during any war in which the United States has been or may hereafter be engaged, served in the armed
forces of any government allied with the United States during that war, whose last service ended honorably by death or otherwise, and who was a
citizen of the United States at the time of entry into that service and at the time of death.

(6) Commissioned officers, United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (now National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) who die during or
subsequent to the service specified in the following categories and whose last service terminated honorably:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Assignment to areas of immediate military hazard.

(ii) Served in the Philippine Islands on December 7, 1941.

(iii) Transferred to the Department of the Army or the Department of the Navy under certain statutes.

(7) Any commissioned officer of the United States Public Health Service who served on full-time duty on or after July 29, 1945, if the service
falls within the meaning of active duty for training as defined in 38 U.S.C. 101(22) or inactive duty training as defined in 38 U.S.C. 101(23) and
whose death resulted from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty. Also, any commissioned officer of the Regular or Reserve
Corps of the Public Health Service who performed active service prior to July 29, 1945 in time of war; on detail for duty with the Armed Forces;
or while the service was part of the military forces of the United States pursuant to Executive order of the President.

(8) Any Active Duty Designee as defined in this part.

(b) Derivatively eligible persons. Those connected to an individual described in paragraph (a) of this section through a relationship described in §
553.12(b). Such individuals may be inurned if space is available in the primarily eligible person's niche. (32 C.F.R. § 553.13).
167
(a) The cremated remains of any person eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery as described in § 553.12 may be interred in the
designated Arlington National Cemetery Unmarked Area.

(b) Cremated remains must be interred in a biodegradable container or placed directly into the ground without a container. Cremated remains are
not authorized to be scattered at this site or at any location within Arlington National Cemetery.

(c) There will be no headstone or marker for any person choosing this method of interment. A permanent register will be maintained by the
Executive Director.

(d) Consistent with the one-gravesite-per-family policy, once a person is interred in the Unmarked Area, any derivatively eligible persons and
spouses must be interred in this manner. This includes spouses who are also primarily eligible persons. No additional gravesite, niche, or
memorial marker in a memorial area will be authorized. (32 C.F.R. § 553.14).
168
(a) The Executive Director may authorize a group burial in Arlington National Cemetery whenever several people, at least one of whom is an
active duty service member, die during a military-related activity and not all remains can be individually identified.

(b) Before authorizing a group burial that includes both United States and foreign decedents, the Executive Director will notify the Department of
State and request that the Department of State notify the appropriate foreign embassy. (32 C.F.R. § 553.15).
169
32 C.F.R. § 553.22(a).
170
Id.
171
Approved on March 22, 2001 and published in national newspapers of general circulation on April 9, 2001 as well as in the Official Gazette
on July 9, 2001. It repealed P.O. No. 1687 dated March 24, 1980.
172
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 9049.
173
Id.
174
In the event of the awardee's death, the gratuity shall accrue in equal shares and with the right of accretion to the surviving spouse until she
remarries and to the children, legitimate, or adopted or illegitimate, until they reach the age of eighteen (18) or until they marry, whichever comes
earlier.
175
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6948.
176
Amended by R.A. Nos. 7696, 9396, and 9499.
177
A veteran refers to "any person who: (1) rendered military service in the land, sea or air forces of the Philippines during the revolution against
Spain, the Philippine-American War, and World War II, including Filipino citizens who served with the Allied Forces in Philippine territory; (2)
was a member of the Philippine Expeditionary Forces sent to the Korean War and the Philippine Civic Action Group sent to the Vietnam War; (3)
rendered military service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and has been honorably discharged or retired after at least twenty (20)
years total cumulative active service or sooner separated while in the active service in the AFP due to death or disability arising from a wound or
injury received or sickness or disease incurred in line of duty." (Sec. 2 [a] of R.A. No. 6948, as amended by R.A. No. 9396).
178
Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 6948.
179
Section 14, Article III.
180
(a) Preliminary inquiry. If the Executive Director has reason to believe that a decedent may have committed a Federal capital crime or a State
capital crime but has not been convicted of such crime by reason of such person not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid
prosecution, the Executive Director shall submit the issue to the Army General Counsel. The Army General Counsel or his or her designee shall
initiate a preliminary inquiry seeking information from Federal, State, or local law enforcement officials, or other sources of potentially relevant
information.

(b) Decision after preliminary inquiry. If, after conducting the preliminary inquiry described in paragraph (a) of this section, the Army General
Counsel or designee determines that credible evidence exists suggesting the decedent may have committed a Federal capital crime or State capital
crime, then further proceedings under this section are warranted to determine whether the decedent committed such crime. Consequently the
Army General Counsel or his or her designee shall present the personal representative with a written notification of such preliminary
determination and a dated, written notice of the personal representative's procedural options.

(c) Notice and procedural options. The notice of procedural options shall indicate that, within fifteen days, the personal representative may:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Request a hearing;

(2) Withdraw the request for interment, inurnment, or memorialization; or

(3) Do nothing, in which case the request for interment, inurnment, or memorialization will be considered to have been withdrawn.

(d) Time computation. The fifteen-day time period begins on the calendar day immediately following the earlier of the day the notice of
procedural options is delivered in person to the personal representative or is sent by U.S. registered mail or, if available, by electronic means to
the personal representative. It ends at midnight on the fifteenth day. The period includes weekends and holidays.

(e) Hearing. The purpose of the hearing is to allow the personal representative to present additional information regarding whether the decedent
committed a Federal capital crime or a State capital crime. In lieu of making a personal appearance at the hearing, the personal representative
may submit relevant documents for consideration.

(1) If a hearing is requested, the Army General Counsel or his or her designee shall conduct the hearing.

(2) The hearing shall be conducted in an informal manner.

(3) The rules of evidence shall not apply.

(4) The personal representative and witnesses may appear, at no expense to the Government, and shall, in the discretion of the Army General
Counsel or his or her designee, testify under oath. Oaths must be administered by a person who possesses the legal authority to administer oaths.

(5) The Army General Counsel or designee shall consider any and all relevant information obtained.

(6) The hearing shall be appropriately recorded. Upon request, a copy of the record shall be provided to the personal representative.

(f) Final determination. After considering the opinion of the Army General Counsel or his or her designee, and any additional information
submitted by the personal representative, the Secretary of the Army or his or her designee shall determine the decedent's eligibility for interment,
inurnment, or memorialization. This determination is final and not appealable.

(1) The determination shall be based on evidence that supports or undermines a conclusion that the decedent's actions satisfied the elements of the
crime as established by the law of the jurisdiction in which the decedent would have been prosecuted.

(2) If an affirmative defense is offered by the decedent's personal representative, a determination as to whether the defense was met shall be made
according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the decedent would have been prosecuted.

(3) Mitigating evidence shall not be considered.

(4) The opinion of the local, State, or Federal prosecutor as to whether he or she would have brought charges against the decedent had the
decedent been available is relevant but not binding and shall be given no more weight than other facts presented.

(g) Notice of decision. The Executive Director shall provide written notification of the Secretary's decision to the personal representative. (See 32
C.F.R. § 553.21; Effective: October 26, 2016 ).
181
The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Ferrer. Jr. v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, 760 SCRA 652, 709-710).
182
Commonwealth Act No. 408 dated September 14, 1938, as amended.
183
ARTICLE 94. Various Crimes. - Any person subjected to military law who commits any crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinance, which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal
ordinances, on a Philippine Army reservation, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct; Provided, That in time of peace, officers and
enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-martial for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinances committed under this Article.

ARTICLE 95. Frauds Against the Government Affecting Matters and Equipments. - Any person subject to military law who, having charge,
possession, custody, or control of any money or other property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, furnished or intended for the military
service thereof, knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, to any person having authority to receive the same, any amount thereof less than
that for which he receives a certificate or receipt; or

Who, being authorized to make or deliver any paper certifying the receipt of any property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines furnished or
intended for the military service thereof, makes or delivers to any person such writing, without having full knowledge of the truth of the
statements therein contained and with intent to defraud the Philippines; or

Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willfully misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes
of any ordnance, arms, equipments, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
furnished or intended for the military service thereof; or

Who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness from any soldier, officer, or other person who is a part of or
employed in said forces or service, any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing subsistence stores, or other property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, such soldier, officer, or other person not having lawful right to sell or pledge the same;

Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all
of said penalties. And if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the military service of the Philippines, received his
discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the
same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed. And if any officer, being guilty, while in the
military service of the Philippines of embezzlement of ration savings, post exchange, company, or other like funds, or of embezzlement of money
or other property entrusted to his charge by an enlisted man or men, receives his discharge, or is dismissed, or is dropped from the rolls, he shall
continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not
been so discharged, dismissed, or dropped from the rolls.

ARTICLE 97. General Article. - Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary
court-martial according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court. (Commonwealth Act No. 408 dated
September 14, 1938, as amended by P.D. 1166 dated June 24, 1977)

Article 94 is under the jurisdiction of civil courts while Articles 95 to 97, as service-connected crimes or offenses, are under the jurisdiction of the
court-martial (See R.A. No. 7055, Approved on June 20, 1991)
184
On July 12, 2016, the NHCP published its study, entitled "Why Ferdinand E. Marcos Should Not Be Buried At The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani,"
concluding that Marcos' military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies. The NHCP study demonstrated that: (I) Marcos
lied about receiving U.S. Medals (Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and Order of Purple Heart); (2) his guerilla unit, the Ang Mga
Maharlika, was never officially recognized and neither was his leadership of it; (3) U.S. officials did not recognize Marcos' rank promotion from
Major in 1944 to Lt. Col. by 1947; and (4) some of Marcos' actions as a soldier were officially called into question by the upper echelons of the
U.S. Military, such as his command of the Alias Intelligence Unit (described as "usurpation"), his commissioning of officers (without authority),
his abandonment of USAFIP-NL presumably to build in airfield for Gen. Roxas, his collection of money for the airfield (described as "illegal"),
and his listing of his name on the roster of different units (called a "malicious criminal act").
185
Emphasis supplied.
186
Almario, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra note 46, at 163.
187
Vol. IV Record, September 19, 1986, pp. 829-831; See also Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers. 1995. pp.
116-117.

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, C.J.:

The whole thesis of respondents on the substantive issues lies in the absence of an express prohibition against the burial of former President
Marcos; hence, they argue that this Court cannot characterize the current President's decision to have him buried at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LMB) as one made in grave abuse of discretion.

Nothing can be more wrong, and no view more diminishing of the Judiciary's mandated role under the 1987 Constitution.

If the absence of an express prohibition were to be the primary or sole determinant of the merits of this case, then even the processing clerk of the
administrative office supervising the LMB could decide this matter by simply ticking off the appropriate box in a Yes or No question that asks:
"Is there an express statute that prohibits a President from burying a former bemedalled soldier or president in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani? If
yes, bury. If no, do not bury."

To the contrary, the case can only be decided by deeply and holistically analyzing the extent and implications of the legal phenomenon called the
power to exercise presidential discretion, and how it should be measured in this case.

In light of allegations that the decision to bury the late President will run counter to the Constitution, statutory standards and judicial
pronouncements, this Court must take a step back in history to understand what the Constitution that it is defending stands for; whether it is in
danger of being violated in spirit or in letter; and whether this danger is of such kind and degree that the exercise of presidential discretion should
be restrained. This Court must also compare the statutory standards that have been raised and determine whether the course of action proposed by
the President would run counter to those standards. This Court must also examine the doctrines and language employed in many of its decisions if
it is to guard against heresy directed at the spirit of the Constitution that could undermine not just one doctrine, but perhaps the moral legitimacy
of the Court itself.

This is how consequential any statement coming from the Court on this issue could be.

The Court's bounden duty is not only to preserve the Constitution, but also itself.

It has been posited that the Court should not meddle in a political maneuver that the President is compelled to make. Whether it is a maneuver
that is animated by the need to maintain credibility in the eyes of important supporters, or whether it is necessary to advance unity in this country,
is not a motivation that the President should be accountable for.

Likewise, it has been proposed that this Court should look beyond the past and shift its focus to today's political reality - that the present decision
maker is the most powerful and the most popular politician in the republic; that for him to undertake the reforms he has promised requires that he
be able to deliver on his promises; that the key to unity in this day and age is to forgive the past and give former President Marcos the honors due
the office that he held and the bemedalled soldiering he rendered; and that in any event, the state has enacted many measures not only to
compensate Martial Law victims but also to advance the cause of human rights.

At the initial stage of any discussion in this Court, these kinds of arguments are usually met with skepticism by its Members under the express
unction of the Constitution as interpreted in the post-Marcos decisions.1 For the relevant judicial powers provisions of the 1987 Constitution
impels the Court to relegate the political question argument, and any semblance of such argument - deference, political wisdom, etc. to a status of
non-importance, especially if it fails to satisfy the threshold test. Simply put, that test is whether indeed the question is one addressed to purely
political exercises internal to the workings of the legislature;2 or whether, on the part of the President, there are no legal standards against which
his particular action can be evaluated.3 Indeed, the Court has, in questions of grave national importance, generally exercised judicial review when
the allegations of grave abuse of discretion are sufficiently serious.

For the implications of this case goes to the very fulcrum of the powers of Government: the Court must do what is right by correctly balancing the
interests that are present before it and thus preserve the stability of Philippine democracy.

If the Court unduly shies away from addressing the principal question of whether a decision to bury the former President would contradict the
anti Martial Law and human rights underpinnings and direction of the 1987 Constitution, it would, wittingly or unwittingly, weaken itself by
diminishing its role as the protector of the constitutional liberties of our people. It would dissipate its own moral strength and progressively be
weakened, unable to promptly speak against actions that mimic the authoritarian past, or issue judicial writs to protect the people from the
excesses of government.

This Court must, perforce, painstakingly go through the process of examining whether any claim put forth herein by the parties genuinely
undermines the intellectual and moral fiber of the Constitution. And, by instinct, the Court must defend the Constitution and itself.

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations' enduring values, which this Court must zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos' enduring values. 4 The protection of
those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly
comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, 5 women,6 children,7 labor,8 the indigenous people,9 and
consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of their human rights. 10chanrobleslaw
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection of human rights, and how the Court in turn
described this duty when it promulgated the writs of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.11chanrobleslaw

Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the cherished values of the Constitution would be
a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be passive relative to the "active" nature of the political departments is a given. But when
called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights,
a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.

Not everything legally required is written in black and white; the Judges' role is to discern within the penumbra.

As early as 1950, the Civil Code, a creation of the Legislature, has instructed the Judiciary on how to proceed in situations where there is no
applicable law or where there is ambiguity in the legislation that seems to apply to the case at hand. The code
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.

I do not believe that this Court is bereft of sufficient guides that can aid in the exercise of its role of protecting and advancing constitutional
rights. It must with a magnifying lens examine whether clear intent, historical references, and express mandates can be found in the 1987

Constitution and whether these are relevant to this case. We must pick them out and examine them. The ill-gotten wealth statutes, the remedial
human rights legislation - all describe the burden of a nation that must recover from the financial and moral plunder inflicted upon this nation by
Marcos, his family and his cronies. We must get our bearings from these guideposts and find out if they instruct us on what must be done with
respect to his proposed burial beyond the express and implied condemnation of the wrongs he has committed against the country. The
pronouncements of this Court and those of the Sandiganbayan, the legal pleadings and administrative propositions submitted by the Philippine
government to international and local tribunals from 1987 to the present a full 29 years from these we must infer an indication of the treatment
that should be given to the proposed action of the Government.

That constitutional and statutory interpretation is the bread and butter of adjudication is beyond cavil. From the oldest cases in the Philippine
Reports to its latest decision,12 this Court has been in the business of filling in gaps, interpreting difficult texts, so that "right and justice will
prevail." That this is the entire reason for the existence of the Judiciary is self-evident. The end of "judging" is not to do what an administrative
clerk can very well do; it is to ensure that "right and justice" will prevail.

Indeed, that judges must interpret statutes as well as declare the existence and protection of individual rights so that "justice and right" might
prevail has been the essence of an independent Judiciary. This has been so from the time that the necessity for such independence was first
recognized by the 1215 Magna Carta signed by King John; that no man, not even the highest ruler of the land and King John believed in his
divine right to rule - can exercise power in such a way that denies the fundamental liberty of any man.

And the modern Judiciary has progressed considerably from that time. The Philippine Judiciary will thus be measured by the universal standard
of whether it has discharged its power of review, so that "right and justice will prevail."

There was a time when this Court hid under the "political question" doctrine and evaded constitutional and moral responsibility for the long
period of suppression of the people's basic rights. Rightly so, that same Court, after the repudiation by our people of the Marcos regime in 1986,
likewise repudiated the acts of the majority of the Court during Martial Law.

This Court cannot afford to retrogress and make the same mistakes as those made by its predecessor courts during Martial Law. To do so would
possibly merit the same kind of condemnation that former President Marcos reaped in the fullness of time.

Is the preference for the protection of human rights encoded in the legal DNA of the Constitution?

There is no question that the importance given to human rights is encoded in the very building blocks of the Philippine Constitution. For the
Constitution to make sense, the Supreme Court has to recognize that it is programmed to reject government actions that are contrary to the respect
for human rights, and to uphold those that do.

The recognition of the hallowed place given to the protection of human rights has been tirelessly repeated by all the Justices who ever walked the
halls of Padre Faura. Not one has said that it was unimportant; or that it should be sacrificed at the altar of something else - not economic
progress, not even peace not even by those who saw when, why, and how Martial Law began and progressed.

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno has said:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The sole purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve these [human] rights. And when govermnent not only defaults in its duty but
itself violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be replaced with
one to which the people consent. The Filipino people exercised this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.13

Chief Justice Puno unequivocably repudiated the "ends-justifies-means" mantra of Martial Law when he catapulted the rights that Marcos
trampled upon to the highest pinnacle of government priorities, and when as Chief Justice he made as his tenure's flagship the promulgation of the
extraordinary and novel human rights writs of amparo and habeas data.

If it is true that when the Government itself violates the very rights it was established to protect, that violation forfeits its right to govern, then it
becomes necessary for this Court to reject any governmental attempt that encourages the degradation of those rights. For this Court guards not
only against clear and direct violations of the Constitution, but also against actions that lead this country and its rulers to a slippery slope that
threatens to hurl its people to the abyss of helpless unprotectedness.

Contrary to the thesis of my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado Peralta, the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the protection of human
rights are not inert, coming to life only when there is a specific law that would make these rights accessible in specific cases. Each right that is
sought to be protected by the Constitution acts as a prohibition against the Government's derogation of those rights. Not all of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution direct the commission of positive acts. Yet these rights can, under the right circumstances, be invoked either
singly or collectively to bar public officers from performing certain acts that denigrate those rights.

Summary of the arguments on the substantive issues

Credit must be given to the Solicitor General for immediately agreeing that the Constitution, decisions of this Court, human right statutes and the
ill-gotten wealth laws and proceedings - in their totality - condemn the Martial Law regime of the late President Marcos, his family and his
cronies.14 Nevertheless, he posits that all of these are in the past; human rights victims are to be compensated, anyway; and the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth would continue, including the pursuit of criminal cases against the Marcos family and their cronies. In other words, while he admits
that it would be most difficult to make former President Marcos out as a hero, considering the latter's martial rule and recorded plunder,
nevertheless, Marcos was a bemedalled war soldier, and that, in addition, his being a former President who was never dishonorably discharged as
a soldier - this fact alone - entitles him to be interred at the LMB. To the Solicitor General, it is non sequitur for human rights victims to claim
that the burial of Marcos at a cemetery called Libingan ng mga Bayani will entomb him as a hero and negate the plethora of legal
pronouncements that he is not.

The candid admission made by the Solicitor General has made the job of this Court much easier. For the substantive issue now boils down to
whether, in fact and in law, the proposed burial of the late President Marcos at the LMB

(1) will derogate from the state's duty to protect and promote human rights under the Constitution, domestic statutes, and international law·

(2) will violate Presidential Decree No. 105, and Republic Act Nos. 10066, 10086 and 289;

(3) is an unconstitutional devotion of public property to a private purpose;

(4) is an illegal use of public funds;

(5) cannot be sourced from the residual powers of the President or his powers to reserve lands for public purposes;

(6) cannot find legal mooring in AFP Regulation G 161-375;

(7) is in violation of the clause on faithful execution of the laws

and thus the proposed burial is unconstitutional and illegal, and the presidential discretion sought to be exercised is being committed in grave
abuse of discretion.

On the procedural points, this Opinion fully agrees with the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Jr., but will
nevertheless, attempt to augment what has been so ably discussed by Justice Caguioa on the political question defense.

On the substantive points, I fully agree with Justice Caguioa, whose Dissenting Opinion had first been proposed as the main decision. I had
prepared this Opinion to elucidate my independent understanding of some of the issues he has covered.

DISCUSSION

I.

THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THIS CONTROVERSY UNDER THE EXPANDED CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

Respondents contend that the issue in this case is a matter within the discretion of the Executive and must consequently be considered beyond our
power of judicial review.

As will be further discussed, this Court cannot refuse to review an issue simply because it is alleged to be a political question. That train has
departed a long time ago. Prevailing jurisprudence is a generation apart from the former usefulness of the political question doctrine as a bar to
judicial review. The reason for that departure - Philippine Martial Law experience.

A. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no longer utilize the traditional political question doctrine to impede the power
of judicial review.

The 1987 Constitution has expanded the concept of judicial review15 by expressly providing in Section 1, Article VIII, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The above provision delineates judicial power and engraves, for the first time, the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.16chanrobleslaw

The first part of the provision represents the traditional concept of judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by
law. The second part represents the expansion of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory; that
is, the discretion of the political departments of the govemment.17chanrobleslaw

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, particularly in the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature, as well as to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction, should they be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.18chanrobleslaw

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide the nature and rationale of this expansion of judicial power. In his Sponsorship
Speech, former Chief Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a
number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime....

xxxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the govermnent as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. 19 (Emphasis supplied)

The expansion of judicial power resulted in constricting the reach of the political question doctrine. 20Marcos v. Manglapus21 was the first case
that squarely dealt with the issue of the scope of judicial power vis-a-vis the political question doctrine under the 1987 Constitution. In that case,
the Court explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.

xxxx

x x x When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide.22

The prerogative of the Court to review cases in order to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion was further clarified in Estrada v.
Desierto:23

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.24 (Citations omitted and Emphasis supplied)

Notably, the present Constitution has not only vested the judiciary with the right to exercise judicial power, but made it a duty to proceed
therewith - a duty that cannot be abandoned "by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine." 25cralawred This duty
must be exercised "to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions."26chanrobleslaw

Chief Justice Concepcion had emphatically explained to the 1986 Constitutional Commission that the Supreme Court, which he had been a part
of, used the political question theory to avoid reviewing acts of the President during Martial Law, and thus enabled the violation of the rights of
the people. In his words:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It [referring to the refusal of the Supreme Court to review] did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.27

The question I now pose to my colleagues in the Majority: "Are we not, by refusing to pass upon the question of the effects of the Marcos burial
at the LMB, encouraging authoritarianism, plunder, and the violation of human rights, by signaling that what Marcos and his Martial Rule
represents is not anathema?"

B. In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has decided issues that were traditionally considered political questions.

Following the effectivity of the present Constitution, only a select number of issues continue to be recognized by the Court as truly political and
thus beyond its power of review. These issues include the executive's determination by the executive of sovereign or diplomatic immunity,28 its
espousal of the claims of its nationals against a foreign government,29 and the electorate's expression of confidence in an incumbent
official.30chanrobleslaw

Apart from these matters, all other acts of government have been the subject of the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court under Article
VIII, Section II of the Constitution. As demonstrated in the following cases, the Court has reviewed the acts of the President, the Senate, the
House of Representatives, and even of independent bodies such as the electoral tribunals and the Commission on Elections, even for acts that
were traditionally considered political.

Acts of the President

The Court in Marcos v. Manglapus31 ascertained the validity of the President's determination that the return of the Marcoses posed a serious
threat to the national interest and welfare, as well as the validity of the prohibition on their return. As previously stated, the political question
doctrine was first invoked and then rejected by the Court in that case in view of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987
Constitution.
The Court then reviewed the constitutionality of a presidential veto in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.32 It ruled that "the political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court."

The expanded power of judicial review was likewise utilized to examine the grant by the President of clemency in administrative cases;33 and the
President's power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 34 The Court even tackled the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration in Estrada v. Desierto.35 Although it resolved the question as a constitutional issue, the Court clarified
that it would not defer its resolution based merely on the political question doctrine.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,36 it was the validity of then President Arroyo's declaration of national emergency that was assailed before the
Court. Significantly, it reviewed the issue even while it recognized that the matter was solely vested in the wisdom of the
executive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While the Court considered the President's "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Court's reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."37 (Citations omitted)

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,38 even the President's creation of a Truth Commission was reviewed by the Court. As will be
further explained, the fact that the commission was created to implement a campaign promise did not prevent the Court from examining
the issue.

Acts of the Legislature

The Court has likewise exercised its expanded power of judicial review in relation to actions of Congress and its related bodies. In Daza v.
Singson,39 it reviewed the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments by the House of Representatives. While the
review was premised on the fact that the question involved was legal and not political, the Court nevertheless held that "even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question."

In later cases, the Court rejected the political question doctrine and proceeded to look into the following political acts of the legislature: (a) the
decision of the House of Representatives to allow the dominant political party to change its representative in the House Electoral Tribunal; 40 (b)
the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to require the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry; 41 (c) the propriety of
permitting logging in the country;42 (d) the validity of the filing of a second impeachment complaint with the House ofRepresentatives; 43(d) the
validity of an investigation conducted in aid of legislation by certain Senate committees; 44 and (e) the decision of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice to take cognizance of two impeachment complaints.45chanrobleslaw

We also exercised our constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction"46 on the part of the Senate when it ratified the WTO Agreement and the three Annexes thereof in Tañada v. Angara.47 The Court
firmly emphasized in that case that "it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality, or department of
the govemment."48chanrobleslaw

Latest Jurisprudence

The most recent jurisprudence in this area remains in line with the notion of expanded certiorari jurisdiction. The Court has been consistent in its
rejection of the political question doctrine as a bar to its expanded power of review.

In 2013, the constitutionality of the pork barrel system was resolved in Belgica v. Ochoa.49 While the Court clarified that the issue involved legal
questions, it nonetheless rejected the invocation of the political question doctrine and upheld the expanded judicial powers of the Court.

In 2014, Araullo v. Aquino III50 delved into the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program of the executive department, again
emphasizing the Court's expanded power of review.

In 2015, the Court in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections51 rejected the application of the political question doctrine. It ruled that
the right of the non-candidate petitioners to post the subject tarpaulin in their private property was an exercise of their right to free expression. In
rejecting the COMELEC's political question defense, it held that "the concept of a political question.... never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right."52chanrobleslaw

A few months after Diocese of Bacolod, the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) requiring judges of first-level courts to render five years
of service before they could qualify as applicants to second-level courts was assailed as unconstitutional in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council.53 The Court resolved the issue by stating "since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now
assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy." 54chanrobleslaw

Early this year, the Court in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr.,55 determined the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. The Court affirmed therein its expanded
jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has been extended to the
determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise
of discretion has been attended with grave abuse. The expansion of this power has made the political question doctrine "no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review."56 (Citations omitted)

Notably, while there were instances when the Court deferred from interfering with an issue involving a political question, it did so not because
political questions were involved but because of a finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion.57 Otherwise stated, the Court still exercised
its expanded judicial power, but found no reason to annul the questioned acts. It held in Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,58 "the all-embracing
and plenary power and duty of the Court 'to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term 'grave
abuse of discretion.'"

It is evident from this long line of cases that the Court can no longer refuse to adjudicate cases on the basis of the "political question doctrine."
Whenever issues of a political nature are raised before it, it is the duty of the Court to meet the questions head-on for as long as grave abuse of
discretion or constitutionality is seriously involved.

C. The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an election campaign promise does not render the matter non-justiciable.
In view of the above rulings of this Court, it is evident that we must resolve the present controversy, notwithstanding the allegation that the
decision of the President to allow the burial is purely political in character. That the order was supposedly founded on an "election campaign
promise" does not transform the matter into a political issue that is beyond our power to review.

In fact, in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,59 the Court reviewed the validity of the creation of the Truth Commission, despite its
recognition that the act was meant to implement a campaign promise made by then President Benigno Aquino III:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).60

Even under those circumstances, however, the Court still decided the controversy and ultimately declared the creation of the Truth Commission
unconstitutional. While I maintain my dissenting view because unknowable standards were imposed in that case, I believe that the Court correctly
took cognizance of the dispute, notwithstanding the fact that a campaign promise was involved. There is no reason for the Court to deviate from
that course in the present case.

Having established the duty of the Court to review the assailed acts, it is now necessary to examine whether the decision of the President to allow
the burial of former President Marcos at the LMB is consistent with the Constitution and the laws.

II.

THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUTY TO FAITHFULLY
EXECUTE THE LAWS WHEN HE ORDERED THE BURIAL OF MARCOS IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the president to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.61 This duty of faithful execution circumscribes all the
actions of the President as the Chief Executive. It also limits every exercise of his discretion. As this Court declared in Almario v. Executive
Secretary:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
"discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing." The President's power must be exercised in
accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the
President:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute
the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.
It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that "[a]dministrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."62 (Citations omitted and Emphasis supplied)

In fulfilling this duty, the President is not only obligated to enforce the express terms of the Constitution or the statutes; he is likewise bound to
implement any right, duty, or obligation inferable from these primary sources. 63 This rule finds support in Cunningham v. Neagle,64 in which the
United States Supreme Court suggested that the duty of the President to faithfully execute the law is not limited to the enforcement of the
express terms of acts of Congress or of treaties, that duty extends to "all rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution."65chanrobleslaw

As a consequence of these principles, any act of the President that contravenes the law, its policies, or any right or duty inferable therefrom must
be considered grave abuse of discretion.66 By the same token, a refusal to execute the laws when necessary must be invalidated in the absence of
any statutory justification.67chanrobleslaw

As will be demonstrated, the directive of President Duterte to allow the burial of Marcos at the LMB contravenes the constitution, laws, policies,
and jurisprudence. Moreover, the basis for the directive was an invalid regulation issued by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in excess
of its statutory authority. Considering that the order was made in contravention of law, it cannot be justified by mere reference to the President's
residual powers. Such act is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

A. Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy to condemn the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively prohibits the
incumbent President from honoring him through a burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

It is the duty of the Court to give effect not only to the letter of the law, but more importantly to the spirit and the policy that animate it. In Alonzo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,68 the Court explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. x x x

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof; and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 69

To carry out this duty, the Court must examine not only the subject law itself, but the entire body of related laws including the Constitution,
domestic statutes, administrative issuances and jurisprudence. It is only by taking a holistic view of the matter that the Court can ensure that its
reading of the law is consistent with the spirit thereof. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,70 we explained the importance of taking a
holistic view when interpreting the law:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity of meaning is a
rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical,
the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are
meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the
vernacular that describes the Constitution - saligan - demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is
part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision
but a norm that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from
the Constitution.71

In this case, we are being asked to decide whether the President may validly order the burial of Former President Marcos in the LMB. The
resolution of this question requires more than an examination of the text of AFP Regulations 161-375. More than finding a textual anchor, we are
compelled by this issue to scrutinize the implications of the President's order and determine if it conflicts with the text, the policy, and the spirit of
the law.

At its core, the present dispute turns on whether the state, through the President and the AFP, may legally honor Former President
Marcos and his family. For that is the essence of the proposed burial at the LMB regardless of whether Marcos is to be buried as a hero,
as a soldier or as a former president. A clear understanding of our Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, and our international obligations
must lead to the conclusion that the grant of any such honors for the late dictator is prohibited.

Setting aside the validity of AFP Regulations 161-375 for the moment, their blind application to the present case would be an egregious mistake.
Considering that various laws and jurisprudence reveal the clear policy of the state to denounce both former President Marcos and the Martial
Law regime, it would be inappropriate, if not absurd, for the state to honor his memory.

1. Marcos is perpetuated as a plunderer and a perpetrator of human rights violations in our organic and statutory laws.

As soon as the EDSA Revolution succeeded in 1986, the revolutionary government - installed by the direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people72 - declared its objective to immediately recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by Marcos, his family, and his cronies. The importance of
this endeavor is evident in the fact that it was specifically identified in the 1986 Provisional Constitution as part of the mandate of the people.
Article II, Section 1 of that Constitution states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power.

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:

xxxx

d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts;

Pursuant to this mandate, then President Corazon Aquino issued three executive orders focused entirely on the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth
taken by Marccs and his supporters:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) Executive Order No. 173 created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) tasked to, among others, assist the President
in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates x x x by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship."74

b) Executive Order No. 275 authorized the freezing and sequestration of assets pertaining to Marcos, his relatives, associates, dummies,
agents or nominees, which had been "acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds
or properties owned by the Government of the Philippines;"76 or "by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence,
connections or relationship."77

c) Executive Order No. 1478 empowered the PCGG to file and prosecute all cases it had investigated pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1 and
2.

All three executive orders affirmed that Marcos, his relatives and supporters had acquired assets and properties through the improper or illegal
use of government funds or properties by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, or connections. These acts were proclaimed
to have caused "grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." 79chanrobleslaw

The gravity of the offenses committed by former President Marcos and his supporters even prompted the Court to describe the mandate of the
PCGG as the recovery of "the tremendous wealth plundered from the people by the past regime in the most execrable thievery perpetrated in all
history."80 The importance of this mandate was further underscored by the sovereign Filipino people when they ratified the 1987 Constitution,
including the following provision:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ARTICLE XVIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national
interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.

Apart from being declared a plunderer, Marcos has likewise been pronounced by the legislature as a perpetrator of human rights violations. In
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10368, the state recognized the following facts:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 a) Human rights violations were committed during the Martial Law period "from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons
acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State;"81 and

b) A number of these human rights violations occurred because of decrees, declarations or issuances made by Marcos; 82 and by "acts of
force, intimidation or deceit"83 done by him, his spouse, Imelda Marcos, and their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity,
associates, cronies and subordinates.84

Because of the human rights violations perpetrated by Marcos and his associates, the legislature has decreed that victims are entitled to both
monetary85 and non-monetary86 reparations to be principally sourced from the funds transferred to the Philippine government by virtue of the
Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.87 Those funds were earlier declared part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and forfeited in
favor of the Philippine government.

The statements in the above laws were clear indictments by both the revolutionary government and the legislature against the massive
plunder and the countless abuses committed by Marcos and his cronies during his tenure as President. These laws not only condemn him
as a thief; they equally recognize his criminal liability for the atrocities inflicted on innumerable victims while he was in power.

2. Decisions of this Court have denounced the abuses committed by Marcos during the Martial Law dictatorship.

Apart from earning the condemnation of the legislature, Marcos and the Martial Law regime have likewise received harsh criticism from this
Court. In dozens of decisions, it denounced the abuses he had committed; the pernicious effects of his dictatorship; and the grave damage
inflicted upon the nation by his corruption, thievery, and contempt for human rights. Foremost among these denunciations are found in are four
cases ordering the forfeiture of the ill-gotten wealth he amassed with the assistance of his relatives and cronies.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,88 the Court forfeited a total of USD

658 million in favor of the government. These funds, contained in Swiss deposit accounts in the name of certain foundations, were declared ill-
gotten, as they were manifestly out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcos family. The Court used the same reasoning
in Marcos, Jr. v. Republic89 to justify the forfeiture of the assets of Arelma, S.A., valued at USD 3,369,975 in 1983.

On the other hand, in Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi90 and in Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,91 the Court scrutinized the beneficial ownership of
certain shares of Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation, respectively. The Court concluded
in the two cases that the shares, although registered in the names of cronies and nominees of Marcos, were part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
dictator and were subject to forfeiture.

It must be emphasized that in the preceding cases, the Court noted the grand schemes employed by Marcos and his supporters to unlawfully
amass wealth and to conceal their transgressions. In Yuchengco, it declared:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In PCGG v. Peña, this Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a "well-entrenched plundering regime" of twenty years, noted the "magnitude of
the past regime's 'organized pillage' and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds
available in the market." The evidence presented in this case reveals one more instance of this grand scheme. This Court - guardian of the high
standards and noble traditions of the legal profession - has thus before it an opportunity to undo[,] even if only to a certain extent, the damage that
has been done.92 (citations omitted)

In addition to the plunder of the public coffers, Marcos was harshly condemned by this Court for the human rights abuses committed during the
Martial Law period.93 In Mijares v. Ranada, et al.,94 it stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom
and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however,
have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the
tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the
appropriate relief due them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage
done was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the
confines of the restored rule of law.

The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man
who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate.95 (Emphasis
supplied)

Marcos himself was severely criticized for abuses he had personally committed while in power. For instance, he was found to have unlawfully
exercised his authority for personal gain in the following cases: (a) Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,96 in which he ordered the general manager of the
Manila International Airport Authority to directly remit to the Office of the President the amount owed by the agency to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation; (b) Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,97 in which Marcos made a marginal
note prohibiting the foreclosure of the mortgaged assets of Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills and waiving the liabilities of the corporation and its
owners to the National Investment and Development Corporation; and (c) Republic v. Tuvera,98 in which Marcos himself granted a Timber
License Agreement to a company owned by the son of his longtime aide, in violation of the Forestry Reform Code and Forestry Administrative
Order No. 11.

Marcos was likewise deemed personally responsible for the corruption of the judicial process in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.99 Affirming the
findings of a commission created to receive evidence on the case, the Court stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code
named Olympus) had stage managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing
of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist", and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final
outcome of the case of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused of all criminal and civil liability.

xxxx

The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources
of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. x x x

Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-
moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and
precedent in our annals and jurisprudence.100 (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the abuses committed, the Court condemned the Marcos years as a "dark chapter in our history," 101 a period of "national
trauma"102 dominated by a "well-entrenched plundering regime,"103 which brought about "colossal damage wrought under the oppressive
conditions of the Martial Law period."104 The attempt by the dictator to return to the country after the EDSA Revolution was even described by
the Court as "the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country."105chanrobleslaw

The foregoing pronouncements are considered part of the legal system of the Philippines 106 and must be considered binding, since they are
integral parts of final and immutable judgments. It may be presumed that the Court made the above declarations only after a judicious
consideration of the evidence and the applicable law. Consequently, those declarations cannot be questioned, reversed, or disregarded without
running afoul of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. This doctrine of finality of judgments applies even to the highest court of the
land.107chanrobleslaw

The claim that judgment has not been rendered against Marcos for the plunder and the atrocities committed under his regime is belied by the
declarations of this very Court. In his Separate Opinion in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,108 former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
wrote of our nation's history during the Martial Law regime, and it would be well to recall his words:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It was a long and horrible nightmare when our people's rights, freedoms and liberties were sacrificed at the altar of "national security" even
though it involved nothing more than the President-dictator's perpetuation in office and the security of his relatives and some officials in high
positions and their protection from public accountability of their acts of venality and deception in government, many of which were of public
knowledge.

xxxx

The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the martyred Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., within minutes of his arrival at the Manila
International Airport, although ringed with 2,000 soldiers, shocked and outraged the conscience of the nation. After three years of exile following
almost eight years of detention since martial law, Aquino, although facing the military commission's predetermined death sentence, supra, yet
refused proper travel documents, was returning home "to strive for genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." The late Senator Jose W.
Diokno who passed away this year was among the first victims of the martial law coup d'etat to be locked up with Senator Aquino. In March,
1973, all of their personal effects, including their eyeglasses were ominously returned to their homes. Their wives' visitation privileges were
suspended and they lost all contact for over a month. It turned out that Aquino had smuggled out of his cell a written statement critical of the
martial law regime. In swift retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the army camp at Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in
solitary confinement in dark boarded cells with hardly any ventilation. When their persons were produced before the Court on habeas
corpus proceedings, they were a pitiable sight having lost about 30 to 40 lbs. in weight. Senator Diokno was to be released in September, 1974
after almost two years of detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed against him. His only fault was that he was a possible rival for the
presidency.

Horacia Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government service and then executive vice-president of the Development Academy of the
Philippines, was among the hard-working government functionaries who had been radicalized and gave up their government positions. Morales
went underground on the night he was supposed to receive his TOYM award, declaring that "(F)or almost ten years, I have been an official in the
reactionary government, serviced the Marcos dictatorship and all that it stands for, serving a ruling system that has brought so much suffering and
misery to the broad masses of the Filipino people. (I) refuse to take any more part of this. I have had enough of this regime's tyranny and
treachery, greed and brutality, exploitation and oppression of the people," and "(I)n rejecting my position and part in the reactionary government,
I am glad to be finally free of being a servant of foreign and local vested interest. I am happy to be fighting side by side with the people." He was
apprehended in 1982 and was charged with the capital crime of subversion, until he was freed in March, 1986 after President Corazon C.
Aquino's assumption of office, together with other political prisoners and detainees and prisoners of conscience in fulfillment of her campaign
pledge.

Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to the tyranny and repression of the past regime. Driven by their dreams to free our
motherland from poverty, oppression, iniquity and injustice, many of our youthful leaders were to make the supreme sacrifice. To mention a few:
U.P. Collegian editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr., worthy son of an illustrious member of the Court pricked the conscience of many as he asked on
the front page of the college paper: Sino ang kikibo kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino ang kikilos kung hindi tayo kikilos? Kung hindi ngayon, kailan
pa? He was locked up in the military camp and released only when he was near death from a severe attack of asthma, to which he succumbed.
Another TOYM awardee, Edgar Jopson, an outstanding honor student at the Ateneo University, instinctively pinpointed the gut issue in 1971 he
pressed for a "non-partisan Constitutional Convention;" and demanded that the then president-soon-to-turn dictator "put down in writing" that he
was not going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his disqualification to run for a third term or perpetuate himself in office and was called
down as "son of a grocer." When as he feared, martial law was declared, Jopson went underground to continue the struggle and was to be waylaid
and killed at the age of 34 by 21 military troops as the reported head of the rebel movement in Mindanao. Another activist honor student leader,
Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent member of the Court, was to disappear on Valentine's Day in 1976 at the young age of 24, reportedly
picked up by military agents in front of Channel 7 in Quezon City, and never to be seen again.

One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio B. Javier, 43, unarmed, governor of the province of Antique at 28, a Harvard-trained lawyer,
was mercilessly gunned down with impunity in broad daylight at 10 a.m. in front of the provincial capitol building by six mad-dog killers who
riddled his body with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite rifles (the standard heavy automatic weapon of our military). He was just taking a
breather and stretching his legs from the tedious but tense proceedings of the canvassing of the returns of the presidential snap election in the
capitol building. This was to be the last straw and the bloodless EDSA revolt was soon to unfold. The Court in Javier vs. Comelec, through Mr.
Justice Cruz, said these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against
tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he
chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-
exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and
shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too,
who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real
sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, swifter than eagles and stronger than
lions.109 (Citations omitted)

The pronouncements of the Court on this matter must be respected and considered conclusive. Hence, while Marcos may have evaded a criminal
proceeding by choosing to go on exile after the EDSA Revolution, the atrocities committed against the Filipino people during his regime must be
remembered. Our declarations on this matter cannot be disregarded or forgotten, as Chief Justice Teehankee reminded us
in Olaguer:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human memory. We must note here the unforgettable and noble sacrifices of the
countless brave and patriotic men and women who feel as martyrs and victims during the long dark years of the deposed regime. In
vacating the death sentence imposed on the petitioners who survived the holocaust, we render them simple justice and we redeem and honor the
memory of those who selflessly offered their lives for the restoration of truth, decency, justice and freedom in our beloved land. 110 (Emphasis
supplied)

3. The President may not contradict or render ineffective the denunciations, or the policies and principles enunciated in the foregoing statutes
and jurisprudence.
It is the obligation of the President to give effect to the pronouncements of the Legislature and the Judiciary as part of his duty to faithfully
execute the laws. At the very least, the President cannot authorize an act that runs counter to the letter and the spirit of the law.

In this case, the foregoing statutes and jurisprudence condemning Marcos and his regime effectively prohibit the incumbent President from
granting him any form of tribute or honor. The President's discretion in this matter is not unfettered. Contrary to the assertions of respondents,
the President cannot arbitrarily and whimsically decide that the acts attributed to Marcos during Martial Law are irrelevant, solely
because "he possessed the title to the presidency until his eventual ouster from office."111chanrobleslaw

Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity for the Executive branch to insist on paying tribute to an individual who has been condemned
by the two other branches of government as a dictator, a plunderer, and a human rights violator. Whether Marcos is to be buried in the
LMB as a hero, soldier, or former President is of little difference. The most important fact is that the burial would accord him honor. For
the Court to pretend otherwise is to sustain a delusion, as this controversy would not have arisen if not for this reality.

A state of affairs that would allow Marcos to reap any accolade or tribute from the state using public funds and property would obviously
contradict the laws and judicial findings described above. Clearly, there is more than sufficient basis to reject the proposed burial.

B. The AFP does not have the power to determine which persons are qualified for interment in the Libingan.

The argument of respondents that the burial is permitted under AFP Regulations 161-375 is unavailing, as the AFP does not have the authority to
select which persons are qualified to be buried in the LMB. For this reason, the enumeration contained in AFP Regulations 161-375 must be
deemed invalid.

In Proclamation No. 208,112 then President Marcos reserved a certain parcel of land in Taguig the proposed site of the LMB for "national shrine
purposes." This parcel of land was placed "under the administration" of the National Shrines Commission (NSC). The NSC was later transferred
to the Department of National Defense (from the Department of Education) and then abolished through the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The
functions of the former NSC were then transferred to the National Historical Institute (NHI).

On 26 January 1977, Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1076 113 created the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) under the Department of
National Defense. The PVAO was tasked to, among others, "administer, maintain and develop military memorials and battle monuments
proclaimed as national shrines." P.D. 1076 also abo1ished the NHI and transferred its functions to the PVAO. The transferred functions pertained
to military memorials, including the authority to "administer" the LMB.

The authority of the PVAO to administer, maintain and develop the LMB pertains purely to the management and care of the cemetery. Its power
does not extend to the determination of which persons are entitled to be buried there. This authority pertains to Congress, because the power
to deal with public property, including the right to specify the purposes for which the property may be used, is legislative in
character.114 Accordingly, the provision in AFP Regulations 161-375 enumerating the persons qualified to be interred in the LMB cannot bind
this Court.

At any rate, the AFP Regulations cannot be considered in isolation. As part of the legal system, administrative issuances must be interpreted and
implemented in a manner consistent with statutes, jurisprudence, and other rules.115 In the same manner, the purported discretion of the President
to determine the persons who may be interred in the LMB must be considered limited by statutes and judicial decisions. 116chanrobleslaw

Since the proposed interment of Marcos in the LMB runs counter to law as explained in the preceding section, AFP Regulations 161-375 must be
interpreted to mean that Marcos is specifically disqualified from being buried in that cemetery. Only by adhering to this interpretation can the
Court ensure that the issuance is in harmony with other existing laws. Consequently, we cannot choose to implement AFP Regulations 161-375
exclusively while disregarding the statutes and jurisprudence referred to above.

C. The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the President's residual powers; it is not unfettered, and such power can only be
exercised in conformity with the entire Constitution.

During the oral arguments, respondents attempted to justify the decision of the President to allow the burial primarily on the basis of his residual
power.117 Citing Marcos v. Manglapus118 and Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,119 they argued that the President is vested with powers other than
those enumerated in the Constitution and statutes, and that these powers are implicit in the duty to safeguard and protect the general
welfare.120chanrobleslaw

It must be emphasized that the statement in Marcos v. Manglapus acknowledging the "President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people" was not unconditional. The Court, in fact, explicitly stated that only acts "not forbidden" by the Constitution or the
laws were permitted under this concept:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to
do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power
borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman,The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President]. 121 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in that case also reiterated the underlying principles that must guide the exercise of presidential functions and powers, residual or
otherwise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus,
in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another
point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere
to them.122 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the residual power of the President cannot be used to justify acts that are contrary to the Constitution and the laws. To allow him to
exercise his powers in disregard of the law would be to grant him unbridled authority in the guise of inherent power. Clearly, that could not have
been the extent of the residual powers contemplated by the Court in Marcos v. Manglapus.

To reiterate, the President is not above the laws but is, in fact, obliged to obey and execute them. 123 This obligation is even more paramount in
this case because of historical considerations and the nature of the norms involved, i.e., peremptory nonns of human rights that are enshrined both
in domestic and intetnational law.

III.

TO ALLOW MARCOS TO BE BURIED IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI WOULD VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF STATE OBLIGATIONS, AND WOULD NEGATE THE REMEDIES
PROVIDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368.
An examination of the vast body of international human rights law establishes a duty on the part of the state to provide the victims of human
rights violations during the Marcos regime a range of effective remedies and reparations. This obligation is founded on the state's duty to ensure
respect for, and to protect and fulfill those rights.

Allowing the proposed burial of Marcos in the LMB would be a clear violation of the foregoing international law obligations. Consequently, the
planned interment must be enjoined in light of Article II, Section II of the Constitution, the established principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the
fact that the state has already acknowledged these duties and incorporated them in our domestic laws.

A. Under international law, the Philippines is obligated to provide effective remedies, including holistic reparations, to human rights victims.

The obligation of the Philippines to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights has its legal basis in international agreements and customary
international law. As will be discussed, this obligation includes the duty to provide effective remedies, which, in turn, incorporates the grant of
holistic reparations to victims of human rights violations.

1. The Philippines is bound to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights under its treaty obligations and customary international law.

As a party to the United Nations (UN) Charter124 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 125 the Philippines is
bound to comply in good faith with our obligations therein pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.126 These treaties form the normative
foundation of the duty of the state to provide effective remedies and reparations to victims of human rights violations.

The promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights norms are obligations woven throughout the entire UN Charter, beginning with the
Preamble which "reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small."127 In line with this statement, the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"128 was identified as one of the basic purposes of the
United Nations.129 These principles became part of a concrete obligation via Article 56 of the Charter, as states were mandated to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the UN for the achievement of its purposes.130chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, the ICCPR obligates states parties to respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within its territory. Article 2(1) of
this covenant provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Interpreting this provision, the United Nations Human Rights Committee131 (UNHRC) issued General Comment No. 31132 declaring that the
obligation in Article 2(1) is owed not just to individuals as the rights holders under the ICCPR, but to every state party therein.133 The duty to
respect basic human rights is likewise considered an erga omnes obligation in view of the importance of the rights involved.134 In other words, it
is an obligation towards the international community as a whole.135chanrobleslaw

Further establishing the obligation to respect human rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which defines and codifies
human rights norms provided for in the UN Charter. Considered the most important human rights document in the world, 136 the UDHR
enumerates the human rights that states are bound to respect, including the right to life, liberty, and security of persons;137 the prohibition against
torture and arbitrary arrest or detention;138 and the right to freedom from interference with one's privacy, family, home, or
correspondence.139While not a legally binding treaty, the UDHR is generally considered a codification of the customary international law on
human rights.140 Hence, it binds all nations including the Philippines.

The foregoing instruments clearly create rights that every state is obliged to recognize and respect. To give effect to these entitlements, a violation
of protected rights brings about the obligation on the part of the offending state to provide a corresponding remedy.

2. The duty to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights includes the obligation to provide an effective remedy.

The international guarantee of a remedy for human rights violations is well established 141 as one of the bedrock principles of contemporary
international human rights law.142Ubi ius ibi remedium - "where there is a right, there is a remedy."143 It is settled that gross human rights
violations give rise to a right to remedy for victims, which in turn implies a duty on the part of states to provide the same.144 This obligation is
based on the principle that failure to provide an adequate remedy for violations renders the duty to respect the rights involved meaningless and
illusory.145chanrobleslaw

Under Treaties

International human rights law instruments, both global and regional, impose upon states the duty not merely to offer a remedy, but also to ensure
that the remedy provided is "effective." This rule is clearly demonstrated in the provisions discussed below.

It is an accepted principle that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."146 This rule is further developed in Article 2 of the ICCPR, which
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 147

Explaining the nature of the obligations imposed by this provision, the UNHRC stated that the grant of reparations to individual victims is a
central component of this legal obligation.148chanrobleslaw

A similar guarantee of effective remedies is included in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 149 while the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture)150 refers to an
equivalent right in the form of redress and compensation.151 This right to redress was clarified in General Comment No. 3 152 of the UN Committee
Against Torture (UNCAT) as a comprehensive reparative concept, which embraces both "effective remedy" and "reparation." Redress "entails
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition and refers to the full scope of measures required to redress
violations under the Convention."153 The committee also emphasized that reparative measures must take into account the particular needs of the
victims and the gravity of the violations committed against them.154chanrobleslaw

Even regional instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,155 the American
Convention on Human Rights,156 and the Protocol to the African Charter,157 provide for effective remedies for human rights violations.
Under Customary International Law

At the same time, customary international law, as discerned from the law of state responsibility and the progressive development of human rights
treaty law, is further solidifying the legal basis of the right to remedy of victims of human rights violations.158chanrobleslaw

The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts codified by the International Law Commission (ILC Articles)
provides that state responsibility arising from an inte1nationally wrongful act 159 gives rise to the duty to make reparations. Under the ILC
Articles, a state held liable for the breach of an obligation may be required to perform the following acts: (1) cessation of the violation,160 (2)
guarantee of non repetition,161 and (3) full reparation for the injury caused.162chanrobleslaw

Because of the emergence of human rights in international law, 163 the duty to remedy a breach under the ILC Articles is deemed owed not only to
the injured state as traditionally imagined, but also to individuals whose human rights have been impaired by the breach under a state's
jurisdiction.164 The right to effective remedies and just reparations for individual victims may be culled from the obligations of the state to cease
violations, guarantee non-repetition and make full reparation.165 This right is further affirmed by Article 33 of the ILC Articles, which declares
that the obligation of the state to provide reparations is "without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State,
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State."166chanrobleslaw

To further substantiate the existence of a rule of customary international law on this matter, two declarations approved by the UNHRC and the
UN General Assembly, respectively, may be cited.

The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance167 issued by the UNHRC is a body of principles concerning
enforced disappearances, including a provision for the right of victims of acts of enforced disappearance to adequate compensation and complete
rehabilitation.168chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 169 offers guidelines in relation to
abuse of economic and political power. Through this declaration, the UN General Assembly recognized that millions of people suffer harm as a
result of crime and abuse of power, and that these victims are entitled to prompt redress and access to the mechanisms of justice.170chanrobleslaw

These instruments and customary nonns of international human rights law clearly provide for the duty to grant effective remedies to a victim of
violations. More than being an essential component of other substantive norms, they create a distinct obligation; hence, the failure to provide
effective remedies is an additional and independent violation of internationally recognized human rights. 171chanrobleslaw

Defining Effective Remedies

Because an exact definition of an effective remedy is not provided by the foregoing international instruments, it is necessary to examine the
interpretations of authorized bodies, as well as the theory and practice of international courts, in order to determine the exact scope of the
obligation.172chanrobleslaw

As the succeeding discussion will show, the duty to provide an "effective remedy" does not embrace a singular concept. Rather, that duty
embodies a variety of measures more aptly referred to as holistic "reparations."

3. The obligation of the state to provide an effective remedy incorporates the duty to offer holistic reparations.

The right to effective remedy is comprised of two dimensions: procedural and substantive. 173 As explained by the UNCAT in General Comment
No. 3:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The obligations of States parties to provide redress under Article 14 are two-fold: procedural and substantive. To satisfy their procedural
obligations, States parties shall enact legislation and establish complaints mechanisms, investigation bodies and institutions, including
independent judicial bodies, capable of determining the right to and awarding redress for a victim of torture and ill-treatment, and ensure that
such mechanisms and bodies are effective and accessible to all victims. At the substantive level, States parties shall ensure that victims of torture
or ill-treatment obtain full and effective redress and reparation, including compensation and the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.174 (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the procedural dimension refers to the legal means by which alleged human rights violations are addressed by an impartial
authority; the substantive dimension involves prompt and effective reparation for the harm suffered. 175chanrobleslaw

The right to reparations is therefore but one side of an effective remedy, and is a crucial element in delivering justice to victims.176 As such, the
duty to provide reparations is as binding as the duty to provide effective remedies. This principle is clearly enunciated in international
instruments, to the extent that it has achieved a non-derogable status.177 As the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga Case)178 ratiocinated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Chamber accepts that the right to reparations is a well-established and basic human right, that is enshrined in universal and regional
human rights treaties, and in other international instruments, including the UN Basic Principles; the Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; the Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime; the
Nairobi Declaration; the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization
and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa; and the Paris Principles. These international instruments, as well as certain significant
human rights reports, have provided guidance to the Chamber in establishing the present principles. 179 (Emphasis supplied)

Understanding Reparations

The term reparation is derived from the word repair. Thus, it is often perceived as making of amends by providing recompense to persons who
suffered loss or harm due to gross human rights violations.180 Within the context of State responsibility, it pertains to a series of actions
expressing the State's acknowledgment and acceptance of its responsibility in consequence of the gross violations. Reparation therefore denotes
all types of redress for victims of human rights violations,181 all seeking to make them whole again to the fullest extent possible. The Chorzow
Factory case182 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1928 provides the leading definition of the
concept:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.183

Reparation, as a means to provide redress for past violations, goes to the very heart of human protection. It has been recognized as a "vital
process in the acknowledgment of the wrong done to the victim, and a key component in addressing the complex needs of victims in the
aftermath of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law."184 As explained by the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACtHR) in its Report on the Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law:185

The [Inter-American Court of Human Rights] considers that, beyond the established legal system, the State has a key role and a primary
responsibility to guarantee that victims of crimes against international law will have effective access under conditions of equality to measures of
reparation, consistent with the standards of international law governing human rights. Access to reparations for victims of crimes against
humanity must never be subject exclusively to determination of the criminal liability of the perpetrators, or the prior disposal of their personal
goods, licit or illicit.186chanrobleslaw
xxxx

The State must play a primary, rather than a secondary, role in guaranteeing victims' access to reparations in accordance with the standards of
international law.187

UN Reparations Principles

The most important text dealing with the concept of reparations is the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Reparations
Principles).188 This text is regarded as the international standard for the provision of reparations around the world. 189chanrobleslaw

The UN Reparations Principles was the product of the work of Theodoor Van Boven, who was appointed in 1989 by the United Nations Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, to examine the possibility of developing basic principles and
guidelines on remedies for gross violations.190 Van Boven's work resulted in a landmark final report in 1993, also known as the Van Boven
Principles, which declared that human rights violations give rise to a right of reparation for victims. 191 These principles attribute the State's duty to
make such reparations to its obligation to afford remedies and ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.192chanrobleslaw

After 15 years of consideration, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Reparations Principles on 16 December 2005 193 without a vote. While
these principles are argued to be soft law, they are considered binding on states because they elucidate the basic standards applicable to
reparations internationally and domestically.194 The number of states in the UN General Assembly that accepted the resolution by consensus
likewise indicates the authoritative weight of the principles, and signifies the status of these rules as part of emerging customary international
law.195chanrobleslaw

It must be emphasized that the UN Reparations Principles is not a source of new commitments but rather a statement of existing obligations, as it
expresses the content of international law on reparations to ensure that this is respected. This view was explicitly set out in the prefatory statement
of the principles:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms x x x. 196

Therefore, the state obligation to provide reparations to victims of human right violations - as established in this text - takes its normative
character from existing legal obligations under international human rights law. As declared in the Preamble197 and Parts I198 and II199 of the UN
Reparations Principles, the underlying framework of this document is grounded on the right to effective remedies enshrined in international
human rights law.

"Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered" is, in fact, a component of the remedies required to be accorded to victims of gross
violations of international human rights law, and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 200 Elaborating on the purpose and scope of
reparation, the UN Reparations Principles provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IX. Reparation for harm suffered

15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law or
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can
be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim
or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.

xxxx

18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include
the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

Holistic Approach to Reparations

Although the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case201 declared that the ultimate goal of reparation is restitutio in integrum,202 or the return of the
victims to a situation prior to the unlawful conduct, it is acknowledged that human rights violations are impossible to rectify. As aptly stated by
Special Rapporteur Van Boven in his final report:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is obvious that gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly when they have been committed on a massive scale, are
by their nature irreparable. In such instances any remedy or redress stands in no proportional relationship to the grave injury inflicted
upon the victims. It is nevertheless an imperative norm of justice that the responsibility of the perpetrators be clearly established and that the
rights of the victims be sustained to the fullest possible extent.203 (Emphasis supplied)

This view was seconded by Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade of the IACtHR in his Separate Opinion in Bulacio v. Argentina,204 He opined "the
harm cannot be erased. Instead, reparations for human rights violations only provide the victims the means to attenuate their suffering, making it
less unbearable, perhaps bearable."205chanrobleslaw

These statements reflect the underlying idea that the reparations in the UN Reparations Principles are envisioned to extend beyond the pecuniary
or material dimension. Rather, holistic reparation is the key. This conclusion is supported by Principles 19 to 23 of the UN Reparations Principles
pertaining to the five forms of full and effective reparation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights law
or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human
rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one's place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.

20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and
the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law, such as:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Physical or mental harm;

 (b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;

(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;

(d) Moral damage;

(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services.

21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.

22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;

(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or
threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim's relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or
prevent the occurrence of further violations;

(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and
assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or
the cultural practices of the families and communities;

(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely
connected with the victim;

(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;

(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;

(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;

(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights law and international humanitarian law
training and in educational material at all levels.

23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;

(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;

(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;

(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;

(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and
training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;

(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;

(g) Promoting mechanisms tor preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution;
 (h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.

Clearly, aside from addressing the injuries suffered by victims through financial compensation, reparation also addresses a broader set of issues,
through the prevention of future human rights violations. It addresses "democracy, good governance, and building an inclusive political
community. Reparations includes recognition, acknowledgment of violations and state responsibility. It can contribute to structural
transformation"206 while also seeking to promote peace and reconciliation.207 This holistic approach to reparation is followed in other human
rights institutions like the UNCAT, the UNHRC, the ICC, the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

General Comment No. 3 of the UNCAT emphasizes that "monetary compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a victim of torture and
ill-treatment. The Committee affirms that the provision of only monetary compensation is inadequate for a State party to comply with its
obligations under article 14."208 General Comment No. 31 of the UNHRC likewise notes that "where appropriate, reparation can involve
restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in
relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations." 209chanrobleslaw

The holistic approach was likewise applied by the ICC to the Lubanga Case,210 in which it held that victims of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide have a fundamental right to receive reparations. The trial chamber observed that reparations "go beyond the notion of
punitive justice, towards a solution which is more inclusive, encourages participation and recognizes the need to provide effective remedies for
victims."211 It then explained that reparations must be applied in a broad and flexible manner, so as to allow it to approve the widest possible
remedies for violations of the rights of the victims.212chanrobleslaw

In Blazek v. Czech Republic, the UNHRC declared that a remedy is only effective if it results in adequate measures of reparation granted to
victims. It further provided that the approach must be holistic so as to put the needs and interests of the victim at the center of the process with the
aim of restoring the latter's dignity.213chanrobleslaw

For its part, the IACtHR made it clear that as a principle of international law, every violation of an international obligation that results in harm
creates a duty to make adequate reparation. In this respect, the Court ruled that reparation

consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the re establishment of the previous situation. If this is not feasible, as in most
cases of human rights violations, the Court will determine measures to guarantee the rights that have been violated and to redress the
consequences of the violations. Therefore, the Court has found it necessary to award different measures of reparation in order to redress the
damage fully, so that, in addition to pecuniary compensation, measures of restitution, rehabilitation and satisfaction, and parantees of non-
repetition, have special relevance to the harm caused.214

It is noteworthy that the IACtHR has constantly addressed human rights violations of a widespread nature, which can be attributed to the
authoritarian regimes and violent conflicts in Latin America during the 1970s and early 1980s. 215 Consequently, IACtHR rulings are particularly
relevant to our discussion of the authoritarian Marcos regime.

Lastly, while the ECHR has awarded "just satisfaction" partaking of a pecuniary nature in most of its cases, 216 the intention to provide a holistic
approach in providing effective satisfaction can be discerned in its Vagrancy Cases against the Belgian Government:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[I]f the victim, after exhausting in vain the domestic remedies before complaining at Strasbourg of a violation of his rights, were obliged to do so
a second time before being able to obtain from the Court just satisfaction, the total length of the procedure instituted by the Convention would
scarcely be in keeping with the idea of the effective protection of human rights. Such a requirement would lead to a situation incompatible with
the aim and object of the Convention.217chanrobleslaw

xxxx

Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 50 which recognise the Court's competence to grant to the injured party a just satisfaction also cover the
case where the impossibility of restitutio in integrum follows from the very nature of the injury; indeed common sense suggests that this must be
so a fortiori.218

B. The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to provide reparations to victims of human rights violations during the Marcos
regime.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the Philippines is obligated to provide holistic reparations to victims of human rights violations
during Martial Law. In fact, as discussed in the previous section, R.A. 10368 acknowledged the "moral and legal obligation [of the State] to
recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they
suffered under the Marcos regime."219 As stated in the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 54 - one of the progenitors of R.A. 10368 - this
recognition was one of the main features of the law:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Among the important features of this bill are:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOne, Congress recognition that those who have filed a case against the Marcoses before the US Federal District
Court in Hawaii and are given favorable judgment are considered human rights violations victims. This is called legislative cognizance.

Two, any person who has secured or can secure a favorable judgment from any court in the country arising from a human rights violation is given
a so-called conclusive presumption that he or she is a human rights violation victim.

Three, some ten billion pesos of funds seized from bank accounts and discovered investments of the Marcos family shall be used to compensate
the victims; and cralawlawlibrary

Four, an independent Human Rights Victims Compensation Board is created attached to, but not necessarily under the direct supervision of the
CHR to ensure the proper disposition of the funds guided by this Act.

No amount of money can really be enough to compensate our living heroes and those survived by their kinds for the democracy that our people
are now enjoying. The least we can do though is pass this bill to honor, in our small way, the sacrifices, that they have made for our country. 220

The law also recognized the binding nature of the Decision of the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, 221 by creating a conclusive
presumption that the claimants in the case against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos were human rights violations victims. 222 In that case,
compensatory and exemplary damages were awarded to (a) the class plaintiffs who were declared to have been tortured; or (b) the heirs and
beneficiaries of those who were summarily executed, or who disappeared while in the custody of Philippine military or paramilitary
groups.223 Several petitioners in the present case were claimants therein and are thus conclusively considered victims of human rights during the
Marcos regime.

Both monetary224 and non-monetary225 forms of reparations were provided for in R.A. 10368. These measures notwithstanding, the members of
the Bicameral Conference Committee emphasized the symbolic value of recognition in acknowledgment of the fact that material forms of
reparation are not sufficient to atone for the suffering of the victims of atrocities:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sen. Guingona: Page 5, letter (d) "Monetary Compensation refers to financial consideration equivalent to." Then, we changed "economically
assessable damage" just to - We just make it "refers to financial consideration extended to human rights violation victims."

Ang rationale dito kasi this one implies - The present definition implies that the damage - When you're human rights victim, it can be
equivalent to a material damage when actually there is no adequate compensation when your human rights are violated. So we just make
it just "financial consideration extended to human rights violation victims as defined in this Act." Ganoon.

Rep. Lagman: Baka instead of financial consideration, maski iyong consideration, ano, eh - Ah, financial reparation.

Sen. Guingona: Okay.

Rep. Lagman: Reparation.

Sen. Guingona: Reparation. Instead of "economically assessable" parang sinasabi mo you[r] right has been violated but that's eqivalent to
this amount.226chanrobleslaw

xxxx

Sen. Arroyo: x x x Here, we seemed to be concerned about the physical aspects of human rights, meaning torture and all that. But take for
instance, those who were economically depressed, harassed. You mean to say the family of Chino Roces, who lost his entire Manila Times and
his family, is not really living in poverty x x x.

Now they will not ask for compensation but they would want recognition. This is the purpose of recognition. That is why to us that roll of
honor is very important. Because to others, they just want to be recognized. 227 (Emphasis supplied)

Considering the foregoing, the intent is that not only must material reparation be provided by the state to human rights victims, the prohibition
against public acts and symbolisms that degrade the recognition of the injury inflicted - although not expressly mentioned in the statute - are
likewise included in the obligation of the state. Therefore, while the passage of legislative measures and the provision of government mechanisms
in an effort to comply with this obligation are lauded, the State's duty does not end there.

Contrary to the implications of the ponencia, the statutes, issuances, and rules enacted by the different branches of government to promote human
rights cannot suffice for the purpose of fulfilling the state's obligation to the human rights victims of former President Marcos. These enactments
cannot erase the violations committed against these victims, or the failure of the state to give them justice; more important, these enactments
cannot negate the further violation of their rights through the proposed burial.

It must be emphasized that the obligation owed by the Philippine government to the victims of human rights violations during Martial Law is
distinct from the general obligation to avoid further violations of human rights. As distinct species of obligations, the general duty to prevent
further human rights violations cannot offset the right of past victims to full and holistic reparations. Their rights under international law have
already been violated; they have already disappeared, been tortured or summarily executed. 228 The government cannot choose to disregard their
specific claims and assert that it has fulfilled its obligation to them merely by enacting laws that apply in general to future violations of human
rights.

As will be further discussed, victims of human rights violations during the Martial Law regime have a distinct right to holistic reparations,
including the grant thereof in symbolic form.

1. Symbolic reparation is an indispensable facet of an adequate reparations regime.

Symbolic forms of reparation are mandated by international law and are considered hallmarks of any reparations regime.229 Within the framework
of the UN Reparations Principles, satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition are described as symbolic, because they involve a greater
intangible element.230 On the other hand, restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation are typically financial or material in character. As earlier
explained, a comprehensive and holistic program of reparations is expected to contain aspects of both. 231chanrobleslaw

Symbols as sources of meaning

The collective dimension of symbolic reparations is the source of their value. 232 Symbolic reparations extend beyond the victim and their families,
and represent a demand for recognition, respect, dignity, and hope for a safe future. 233 They assist communities as a whole in dealing with the
process of remembering and commemorating the past.234 In other words, symbolic measures provide moral reparation, 235 which is considered by
victims to be of equal or higher importance than material or physical reparation.

The United Nations, in its guidelines for reparation programs for postconflict states, describes the significance of symbolic reparations in this
manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As many recent reparations programmes have been proposed by truth commissions (which have broader mandates and goals than typical judicial
instances), they are becoming less like mere compensation mechanisms and are increasingly proposing more complex reparations measures,
including symbolic ones. Individualized letters of apology signed by the highest authority in Government, sending each victim a copy of the truth
commission's report and supporting families to give a proper burial to their loved ones are some of the individual symbolic measures that have
been tried with some success in different contexts. Some of the collective symbolic measures that have been tried are renaming public spaces,
building museums and memorials, rededicating places of detention and torture, turning them into sites of memory, establishing days of
commemoration and engaging in public acts of atonement. Like other reparations measures, symbolic benefits are, at least in part, geared towards
fostering recognition. However, in contrast to other benefits, symbolic measures derive their great potential from the fact that they are
carriers of meaning, and therefore can help victims in particular and society in general to make sense of the painful events of the past.
Symbolic measures usually turn out to be so significant because, by making the memory of the victims a public matter, they disburden
their families from their sense of obligation to keep the memory alive and allow them to move on. This is essential if reparations are to
provide recognition to victims not only as victims but also as citizens and as rights holders more generally.236 (Emphasis supplied)

Restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation under the UN Reparations Principles, while necessary, are lacking in this symbolic dimension.
Monetary forms of reparation can indeed provide funds for certain necessities and improve the future of victims, but without more, it is unlikely
that they would lead to the justice sought.

Moreover, it has been observed that human rights victims want an apology, above all else. 237 They also place a premium on obtaining recognition
of the harm done to them.238 In contrast, financial reparations or damages are considered less important than emotional or symbolic reparations,
because the former fail to squarely address a person's need for "dignity, emotional relief, participation in the social polity, or institutional
reordering."239 If given in isolation, monetary reparation may even have a trivializing effect on suffering in certain cultural, social, and political
contexts.240chanrobleslaw

Forms of Symbolic Reparation

Because of its peculiar nature, symbolic reparation takes various forms. An examination of the UN Reparations Principles, as well as the
decisions of international and regional courts, reveals that different measures have been utilized to satisfy this requirement.

The following have been identified as examples of measures intended to offer satisfaction to victims of atrocities: (a) "verification of the facts
and full and public disclosure of the truth";241 (b) "an official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights
of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim";242 (c) "public apology";243 and (d) "commemorations and tributes to the
victims."244 These methods deal with the emotional, psychological, and symbolic aspects of the suffering of the victims,245 and are primarily
concerned with the restoration of their dignity through an acknowledgment by the state of the harm done.

Guarantees of non-repetition, on the other hand, focus on reform and restructuring initiatives pursuant to the state's commitment to never again
engage in the practices that led to human rights violations.246 The actual steps taken by state institutions represent the guarantees of non-
repetition. These steps include "promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution"247 and "reviewing and
reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of international human rights law." 248chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, the ICC in the Lubanga Case considered the conviction and the sentence issued by the Court itself as forms of reparation on account
of their significance to the victims and the communities.249 In turn, the IACtHR - the most progressive court in terms of granting reparations to
victims of human rights violations - has ordered the following measures as part of "other forms of reparation": (a) the construction of monuments
to commemorate the suffering of victims,250 (b) the naming of a school after them,251 (c) the designation of a day of remembrance for them,252 (d)
the conduct by the state of public ceremonies offering apologies in honor of the fallen; 253 (e) the establishment of memorial scholarships;254 and
(f) human rights courses.255chanrobleslaw

Memorials as Symbolic Reparation

In a report on memorialization processes utilized by states transitioning from conflicts or periods of repression, Farida Shaheed, the UN Special
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, identified memorials as "physical representation[s] or commemorative activities, located in public
spaces, that concern specific events regardless of the period of occurrence (wars and conflicts, mass or grave human rights violations), or the
persons involved (soldiers, combatants, victims, political leaders or activists for example)."256chanrobleslaw

In recent times, memorials have become principally focused on honoring the victims of human rights atrocities. As Special Rapporteur Shaheed
explained, memorials were utilized as a means of "ensuring recognition for the victims, as reparation for mass or grave violations of human rights
and as a guarantee of non-recurrence,"257 as well as a way to combat injustice and promote reconciliation.258 This trend was followed in post-
conflict states, where memorials commemorating victims of human rights violations were regularly established. The Report
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An exhaustive list of all truth and reconciliation commissions that have advocated the construction of memorials is beyond the scope of this
document. Nevertheless, one should mention the recommendations of the truth and reconciliation commissions in El Salvador, Germany,
Guatemala, Peru, Morocco and South Africa and the commission of inquiry in Chad, even though not all their recommendations were
implemented.

The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador clearly called in its report for the construction of a national monument in El Salvador bearing the
names of all victims of the conflict, recognition of their good name and the serious crimes of which they were the victims and the institution of a
national holiday in memory of the victims of conflict as a symbol of reconciliation.

Similarly, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala recommended, among other things, that monuments and parks be constructed
and the names of victims assigned to public buildings and highways in memory of the victims. The Commission stated that "the historical
memory, both individual and collective, forms the basis of national identity."259

The reason behind the creation of memorials intended to commemorate victims of atrocities was explained by Special Rapporteur Shaheed in
relation to the duty to provide symbolic reparations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With the passage of time, memorials have shifted from honouring soldiers dying in the line of duty to a victims' perspective and new visions of
reconciliation. Starting in the 1980s, the creation of memorials has become linked to the idea that ensuring public recognition of past crimes is
indispensable to the victims, essential for preventing further violence and necessary for redefining national unity. Memorialization is often a
demand of victims and society at large and the path to national reconciliation is seen to pass through not only legal reparations, but also symbolic
reparations such as memorials.260

2. The proposed burial would be the antithesis of an act of symbolic reparation.

In the present case, the dispute also involves the creation of a memorial in the form of a burial plot located at the LMB. Instead of
commemorating victims, however, the memorial proposes to honor Marcos, the recognized perpetrator of countless human rights violations
during the Martial Law regime. The establishment of this memorial would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended by symbolic
reparation, and would consequently violate the obligations of the Philippines under international human rights law.

For reasons previously discussed, the burial of Marcos would be more than a simple matter of the intennent of his remains, because it would
involve his victims' right to symbolic reparations. Undoubtedly, to honor the very perpetrator of human rights atrocities would be the direct
opposite of the duty of the state to respect, promote, and fulfil human rights.

These conclusions are supported by the opmwn of UN Special Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff in the analogous case of another dictator, General
Francisco Franco of Spain, and his burial place - the Valle de los Caidos (Valley of the Fallen).261 The site, located in Madrid, serves as a
monument and a memorial, as it is also the burial ground of almost 34,000 other individuals. The structure, however, is still considered by many
as "an exaltation of Francoism"262 and a reminder of the forced labor of thousands of political prisoners who were compelled to build the
structure.263chanrobleslaw

In his Report on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence,264 Special Rapporteur De Greiff studied the fate of
symbols of Francoism in relation to the then newly enacted 2007 Law of Historical Memory.265 This law dealt with the recognition of victims of
human rights violations during the Spanish Civil War and the 40-year regime of General Franco.

Special Rapporteur De Greiff reviewed, in particular, the effects of a provision in the Law of Historical Memory requiring the removal of all
memorials related to Franco and the latter's dictatorship. In his report, he welcomed the measures introduced to combat the exaltation of the coup
d'etat, the Civil War, and the repression by the Franco dictatorship, particularly through the removal of symbols and monuments. 266 He further
noted "majority of inventoried symbols and monuments had been removed, and that the remaining symbols and monuments either required a
lengthy administrative procedure or considerable expense, or were subject to protection rules for their historic or artistic value." 267chanrobleslaw

As part of the implementation of the Law of Historical Memory, the removal of Valle de los Caidos was proposed because of its ties to General
Franco and Francoism. However, because the structure could not be removed without disturbing the burial grounds of other individuals,268 De
Greiff made the following recommendation with respect to the site:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The site can be put to good use and "reinterpreted", with suitable techniques and pedagogy, in favour of the promotion of truth and memory, and
given an educational and preventive purpose. It can hardly be construed as a place devoted to peace and reconciliation, so long as silence is
maintained about the facts relevant to the context and origin of the site, and especially while the flower-covered tomb of the dictator
remains in the centre of the monument.269 [Emphasis supplied]

The necessity for the reinterpretation and "recontextualization" of the Valle de los Caidos highlights the fact that far from being an ordinary burial
plot, the final resting place of a dictator and perpetrator of human rights violations is a symbol and a source of meaning. The meaning it conveys,
particularly to the victims of atrocities, cannot be underestimated. Special Rapporteur Shaheed, in her report on memorialization processes, also
expressed concerns about the monuments and sites intended to honor past oppressive regimes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The question is how to manage an architectural legacy with strong symbolic connotations when oppressive regimes collapse. Should a new
democratic Government destroy, conserve or transform these legacies? Answers vary from situation to situation, frequently giving rise to intense
controversy, including amongst victims. Striking examples include debates in Spain over the memorial in Valle de los caidos (the Valley of the
Fallen) where Franco is buried, in Bulgaria over the mausoleum of former communist leader Georgy Dimitrov, which was finally destroyed, and
in Germany over Hitler's bunker, now located beneath a parking lot in the centre of Berlin, marked only by a small sign. 270

Shaheed therefore concludes "the choice to conserve, transform or destroy always carries meaning and so needs to be discussed, framed
and interpreted."271 In this undertaking, the concerns and views of victims are given primary consideration and for good reason - they
are, after all, the persons most affected by any decision on the matter.

In this case, the victims of human rights violations have expressed their objection to the proposed burial of Marcos in the LMB. They
assert that the burial would constitute a state-sanctioned narrative that would confer honor upon him.272This, in turn, would subject his
human rights victims to the same indignity, hurt, and damage that they have already experienced under his regime. 273chanrobleslaw

These opinions must be given paramount consideration by the state in compliance with its duty to provide symbolic reparations to victims of
human rights atrocities. For the President to allow the burial in disregard of these views would constitute a clear contravention of international
human rights law and would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

C. The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to combat impunity.

As part of their obligation to protect and ensure human rights under international law, 274 states have the duty to combat impunity and hold
perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. In fact, the clear nexus between the impunity of perpetrators of gross violations of human
rights, and the failure to provide adequate reparation to the victims275 indicate that the two obligations must go hand in hand.

In his report, Special Rapporteur Theodoor Van Boven concluded that "in many situations where impunity has been sanctioned by the law or
where de facto impunity prevails with regard to persons responsible for gross violations of human rights, the victims are effectively barred from
seeking and receiving redress and reparation."276 His conclusion is unsurprising, given the significant role of reparations in ensuring that the
perpetrators are held responsible for their actions.

Certainly, states cannot claim to look after the interest of the victims and at the same time endorse a social and political climate where impunity
prevails. This incongruity would be tantamount to a violation of the victims' right to effective remedy and reparations. In Van Boven's words, "it
is hard to perceive that a system of justice that cares for the rights of victims can remain at the same time indifferent and inert towards the gross
misconduct of perpetrators."277chanrobleslaw

The UN Impunity Principles

The primary instrument providing for the duty to combat impunity is the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity (UN Impunity Principles).278 Like the UN Reparations Principles, this document does not impose new
obligations, but only frames and emphasizes the existing state obligations under international human rights law. This rule is apparent in the
Preamble of the Principles, which cites the UN Charter and the UDHR as the bases for the statement that "the duty of every State under
international law to respect and to secure respect for human rights requires that effective measures should be taken to combat
impunity."279chanrobleslaw

In these Principles, the UN Human Rights Committee enumerates the acts from which impunity may arise. Principle 1
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished;
to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to
know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations. 280

A reading of the UN Principles on Impunity reveals the close relationship between impunity and the concepts of reparations and the preservation
of memory.

Impunity and the Right to Reparation

The provision of effective remedies and reparations for victims has been recognized as one of the means to combat impunity. Principles 31 and
34 provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

PRINCIPLE 31. RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARISING OUT OF THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE REPARATION

Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of
the State to make reparation and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.

xxxx

PRINCIPLE 34. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO REPARATION

The right to reparation shall cover all injuries suffered by victims; it shall include measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and
satisfaction as provided by international law.

In particular, symbolic reparations are considered significant. In his Report 281 on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
Violations (Civil and Political),282 Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet concluded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On a collective basis, symbolic measures intended to provide moral reparation, such as formal public recognition by the State of its responsibility,
or official declarations aimed at restoring victims' dignity, commemorative ceremonies, naming of public thoroughfares or the erection of
monuments, help to discharge the duty of remembrance. In France, for example, it took more than 50 years for the Head of State formally to
acknowledge, in 1996, the responsibility of the French State for the crimes against human rights committed by the Vichy regime between 1940
and 1944. Mention can be made of similar statements by President Cardoso concerning violations committed under the military dictatorship in
Brazil, and more especially of the initiative of the Spanish Government, which recently conferred the status of ex-servicemen on the anti-Fascists
and International Brigade members who fought on the Republican side during the Spanish civil war. 283
The Duty to Preserve Memory

Another facet of the fight against impunity involves the duty of a state to preserve the memory of its people. In this regard, the UN Impunity
Principles requires states to combat any measure that tends to encourage people to forget or downplay past human rights violations. Principle 3
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY

A people's knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in 61fulfillment
of the State's duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate
knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding
against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.

While the UN Impunity Principles sees reconciliation and justice as the primary goals, it is firm in asserting that these goals may not be achieved
by disregarding human rights atrocities that occurred in the past. In fact, the principles emphasize that before true reconciliation can be achieved,
the human rights violators must be held accountable. This dictum is reflected in the Preamble of the instrument:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Aware that there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is effectively satisfied,

Equally aware that forgiveness, which may be an important element of reconciliation, implies, insofar as it is a private act, that the victim or the
victim's beneficiaries know the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has acknowledged his or her deeds,

xxxx

Convinced, therefore, that national and international measures must be taken for that purpose with a view to securing jointly, in the interests of
the victims of violations, observance of the right to know and, by implication, the right to the truth, the right to justice and the right to reparation,
without which there can be no effective remedy against the pernicious effects of impunity.284

Consistent with the foregoing, the UN Impunity Principles imposes restrictions on certain rules of law like limiting the entitlement of perpetrators
to amnesties and other measures of clemency. In Principle 24, the restrictions are imposed even when clemency measures are "intended to
establish conditions conducive to a peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation." 285Joinet, in his report, emphasizes the importance of
accountability in the context of reconciliation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]here can be no just and lasting reconciliation without an effective response to the need for justice; as a factor of reconciliation, forgiveness,
insofar as it is a private act, implies that the victim must know the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been in a position to show
repentance. For forgiveness to be granted, it must first have been sought. 286

In this case, the burial of Marcos in the LMB would be tantamount to a disregard of the human rights violations perpetrated by his
regime. To allow it to proceed would sanction an egregious act of impunity and allow the government to bestow an honor that is clearly
not due upon a perpetrator of human rights violations. To allow it would be a rampant violation of the rights of victims under
international law.

In the process of mapping through the vast body of international human rights law, each turn leads to the conclusion that the burial of Marcos in
the LMB would be incompatible with the international obligations of the Philippines. For the Court to permit the burial would be to sanction
these violations and allow the state to disregard the latter's duty to provide effective remedies to victims of human rights violations, particularly
its duty to provide symbolic reparations and to combat impunity.

Incorporation of international law principles in Philippine law

The foregoing principles of international law have been incorporated in Philippine law as part of two domestic statutes intended for the protection
of human rights.

As discussed above, R.A. 10368 was enacted pursuant to generally accepted principles of international law. as well as the specific obligations of
the Philippines under international human rights laws and conventions.287 In accordance with these principles, the statute recognized the "heroism
and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human
rights violations" and vowed to "restore the victims' honor and dignity" through the grant of reparations to victims and/or their
families.288chanrobleslaw

The same principles were likewise incorporated in R.A. 9851, 289 a statute penalizing crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide, and
other crimes against humanity. In providing remedies for offenses under this law, courts were specifically mandated to follow international
principles relating to reparations for victims, including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. 290 The statute also enumerated the sources of
international law that may guide the courts in the application and interpretation of the statute. These sources include international instruments,
decisions of international courts and tribunals, as well as writings of most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries.

The obligation of the state to provide holistic reparations for victims of human rights violations is, therefore, enshrined in both international and
domestic laws. This obligation includes the responsibility to provide victims with reparations - both financial and symbolic - in recognition of
their suffering and heroism. The grant of reparations should likewise go hand in hand with the duty of the state to combat impunity by holding
perpetrators of human rights violations accountable.

As previously discussed, the proposed burial of former President Marcos in the LMB contravenes these principles, because it would honor the
identified perpetrator of human rights violations. As such, it would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended to be accomplished by
international and domestic principles on reparations, i.e., to recognize and honor the sufferings of victims; and to make amends for the physical,
emotional and psychological harm they have sustained. The burial would also perpetuate a climate of impunity, as it would effectively disregard
the human rights violations perpetrated by Marcos and permit the state to honor him despite his transgressions.

Clearly, the President cannot sanction the burial without going against domestic and international principles, as well as his solemn oath to
faithfully execute the law.

IV.

PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTY CANNOT BE USED FOR THE BURIAL AS IT SERVES NO LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE.

On a final note, I must point out that the discretion of the President in this case is not unlimited, as argued by respondents. Because their proposal
involves public funds and property, certain rules must be complied with.

Respondents propose the use of a portion of the LMB, a national cemetery owned by the government, for the interment of Marcos. They likewise
intend to use money from the government coffers for the preparation and maintenance of the gravesite, as well as for military honors to be
accorded to the deceased by the AFP.

Considering that public resources would be used for the interment, it is necessary for this Court to determine if the planned expenditures are for a
legitimate public purpose. The reason is simple public property, including public funds, belongs to the people.291 Hence, it is the duty of the
government to ensure the prudent use of these resources at all times to prevent dissipation and waste. 292 As a necessary corollary to these
principles, it is settled that public property and funds may only be used for public purposes.293chanrobleslaw

This Court has explained the nature and the meaning of the term "public purpose" in the context of public expenditures in several cases. It has
declared that the term includes not only activities that will benefit the community as a body and are related to the traditional functions of
government,294 but also those designed to promote social justice, general welfare and the common good. 295 This broad understanding of the public
purpose requirement, however, does not authorize the use of public funds and property for unmistakably personal and political
motives.296chanrobleslaw

Ultimately, the validity of a public expenditure depends on the essential character of its direct object. In Albon v. Fernando,297 the Court
explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to
which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental
advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business does
not justify their aid by the use of public money.298 (Citations omitted and Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing standard, the validity of public expenditures must be determined based on the nature of the particular expense involved,
and the public purpose sought to be accomplished.

As will be explained in further detail, the proposed burial would promote only the private interest of the Marcos family. Significantly,
respondents have failed to prove that any sort of public purpose would be served by the planned interment; in fact, the event would contravene
the public purposes of the LMB. Consequently, the intended public expenditure cannot be allowed.

A. The burial would contravene the public purpose of the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

The government in this case proposes to shoulder the expenses for the burial of Marcos in the LMB, a military cemetery maintained on public
property and a declared national shrine. The expenses contemplated are comprised of the cost of a plot inside a military cemetery, the
maintenance expenses for the gravesite, and the cost of military honors and ceremonies. 299chanrobleslaw

Generally, burial expenses are not borne by the government because interments are customarily private affairs. However, as exceptions to the
foregoing rule, public expenditure is allowed in the case of cemeteries that serve certain public purposes, for instance: (a) burial grounds set aside
for the indigent in the name of social justice;300 and (b) cemeteries reserved for individuals deemed worthy of honor and reverence, i.e., the
nation's war dead, soldiers or dignitaries, of the government.301 The LMB belongs to this second exception.

Formerly known as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the LMB was designated by former President Ramon M. Magsaysay as the national
cemetery for the nation's war dead in 1954. Through Executive Order No. 77, 302 he ordered that the remains of the war dead interred at the Bataan
Memorial Cemetery and other places be transferred to the LMB to accord honor to dead war heroes; improve the accessibility of the burial
grounds to relatives of the deceased; and consolidate the expenses of maintenance and upkeep of military cemeteries. He thereafter issued
Proclamation No. 86,303 which renamed the cemetery to "Libingan ng mga Bayani," because the former name was "not symbolic of the cause for
which our soldiers have died, and does not truly express the nation's esteem and reverence for her war dead."

It is therefore evident that the LMB is no ordinary cemetery, but a burial ground established on public property to honor the nation's war dead and
fallen soldiers. Further, the designation of the cemetery as a national shrine confirms its sacred character and main purpose, that is, to serve as a
symbol for the community and to encourage remembrance of the honor and valor of great Filipinos. 304 Respondents themselves acknowledged
this fact when they argued that the LMB implements a public purpose because it is a military shrine and a military memorial.305chanrobleslaw

To allow the LMB to fulfill the foregoing purposes, it has been and continues to be the recipient of public funds and property. Not only was the
cemetery established on land owned by the government, public funds are also being utilized for the cost of maintenance and other expenses. The
use of these resources is justified because of the public purpose of the site. As a necessary consequence of this principle, an expenditure that does
not further this public purpose is invalid.

Applying the foregoing standards, the proposed expenditures for the burial of Marcos in the LMB must be considered invalid. As earlier
discussed, Marcos was an ousted dictator and disgraced president. Consequently, he is clearly not worthy of commendation from the
state and no public purpose would be served by his interment therein. In fact, his burial in the LMB would result in a contravention of
the public purpose of the site as it would no longer be a sacred symbol of honor and valor.

B. Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve the avowed policy of national unity and healing.

Considering that the public purpose of the LMB would not be served by the intennent, we must now examine the other public purpose supposedly
fulfilled by the proposal. According to respondents, that purpose pertains to national unity and healing. In their Comment, they
contend:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Undeniably, no cadaver has polarized this nation for the longest time other than that of the former President Marcos. Thus, President Duterte
deems that it is but high time to put an end to this issue by burying the mortal remains of a former President, Commander-in-Chief, and soldier.

President Duterte's decision to accord respect to the remains of former President Marcos is not simply a matter of political accommodation, or
even whims. Viewed from a wider perspective, this decision should be dovetailed to his war against corruption and dangerous drugs, and his
recent dealings with the CPP/NPA/NDF. All these are geared towards changing the national psyche and beginning the painful healing of this
country.306chanrobleslaw

xxxx

It should likewise be emphasized that President Duterte's order to allow former President Marcos' interment at the Libingan is based on his
determination that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness, and redound to the benefit of the Filipino people. Surely, this is an exercise
of his executive prerogative beyond the ambit of judicial review.307

It is significant to note, however, that respondents fail to explain how the burial would lead to national unity and healing. Consequently, their
statements remain meaningless assertions. To emphasize, mere reference to an avowed public purpose cannot automatically justify the use of
public funds and property. This Court must still review the validity of the declared purpose of public expenditure, as well as the reasonable
connection between the objective and the proposed means for its attainment. Our duty to safeguard public funds and property demands no less.
To reiterate, "[p]ublic funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and
waste."308chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, as previously discussed, it is the essential character of the direct object of public expenditure that determines its validity, 309 and not
the incidental advantage derived from it by the community. Hence, assuming for the sake of argument that the burial· would bear an incidental
benefit of promoting unity and healing, this supposed benefit would not erase the reality that the interment would principally be for the promotion
of the personal interest of former President Marcos and his family.

C. The burial would promote only the private interest of the Marcos family.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the burial would ultimately benefit only the Marcos family. No general advantage is derived by the
public from the interment; as it stands, divisiveness instead of unity has resulted from the plan.

The circumstances surrounding the order of the President to allow the burial likewise reveal the political color behind the decision. In their
Comment, respondents admit that the President ordered the burial to fulfill a promise made during his presidential campaign.310 It must be pointed
out, however, that the President made that pledge not at any random location, but while campaigning in Ilocos Norte, 311 a known stronghold of
the Marcos family. During the oral arguments held in this case, it was also revealed that the preparations for the burial were prompted by a letter
sent by the Marcos heirs to Secretary Lorenzana, urging him to issue the orders required for the interment at the earliest
opportunity.312chanrobleslaw

Needless to state, the private interest of the Marcos family and the personal objective of the President to fulfill a pledge to his political allies will
not justify the proposed public expenditure for the burial.

Indeed, it is completely unseemly for the Marcos family to expect the Filipino people to bear the financial and emotional cost of burying
the condemned former President even while this country has yet to recover all the ill-gotten wealth that he, his family, and unrepentant
cronies continue to deny them.313 It is wrong for this Government and the Marcos family to refer human rights victims to the financial
reparation provided by Republic Act 10386 as recompense, which moneys will come, not from the private wealth of the Marcos family,
but from the money they illegally acquired while in office, and on which the Philippine state spent fortunes to recover. Every Filipino
continues to suffer because of the billions of unwarranted public debt incurred by the country under the Marcos leadership; 314 and every
Filipino will incur more expenses, no matter how modest, for the proposed burial. No situation can be more ironic indeed.

EPILOGUE

Stripped to its core, this case involves an order by the President to bury a dictator - one declared to have perpetrated human rights violations and
plundered the wealth of the nation - with all the trappings of a hero's burial. It may not be an express declaration, as respondents themselves
concede that the President does not have the power to declare any individual a hero, but it is a pronouncement of heroism nevertheless. It is far
from being an empty statement bereft of significance. As respondents themselves recognize, the nature of the office held by the President
provides him the opportunity to "profoundly influence the public discourse x x x by the mere expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the
day."315 Clearly, the order of the President to allow the burial is, at the very least, a declaration that Marcos is worthy of a grave at a cemetery
reserved for war heroes, despite the objections of countless victims of human rights violations during the Martial Law regime. It is an executive
pronouncement that his memory may be preserved and maintained using public funds.

Justice Isagani Cruz once stated: "liberty is not a gift of the government but the rights of the govemed."316 Throughout his regime, Marcos
trampled upon this statement by his own acts and those of his subordinates, in a stampede wrought by the fervor to supposedly protect the nation
from lawless elements. It pitted Filipino against Filipino, masking each face in shades of black or white and sowing fear and terror whilst reaping
a harvest of public treasure. The nation was silenced. But people like petitioners persevered, keeping in their hearts the essence of Justice Cruz's
words. They fought, and the people ultimately rose and won back the freedom we all now enjoy. The statement
continues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public
welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely
affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family.317

To forget that Marcos took this right away from the citizens of the Philippines would be the peak of intellectual and moral complacency. As a
nation of laws, we cannot tolerate anything less than the full remembrance of a dark past from which we derive lessons that we imbue into the
legal firmament. We cannot tolerate another instance in which our rights would be run to the ground, in which we would lose sight of the values
held in our own Constitution, the symbols we hold dear, the aspirations we cherish. The LMB is revered because of the symbolism it carries. One
treatise on geography and public memory explains:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Cemeteries, as one type of memorial space, create a symbolic encounter between the living and the dead in the form of individual gravesites and
the ritual activities taking place in the burial space. In contrast to communal cemeteries, national cemeteries are state shrines that belong to the
national narrative of the people. The heroes buried there - most prominently national leaders and fallen soldiers - are privileged members of the
national pantheon.318

A grave in the LMB is a testament to the honor and valor of the person buried therein. The Marcos family has long sought a burial for the dictator
at this site for this exact reason.

The Court cannot order that a particular event be remembered in a particular way, but it can negate an act that whimsically ignores legal truths. It
can invalidate the arbitrary distillation of the nation's collective memory into politically convenient snippets and moments of alleged glory. The
Court is empowered to do justice, and justice in this case means preventing a whitewash of the sins of Marcos against the Filipino people.

The burial of Marcos in the earth from whence he came is his right, despite all that he did. However, his burial in the grave of heroes on the
impulse of one man would continue the desecration of other citizens' rights, a chilling legacy of the Marcos regime that curiously survives to this
very day, long after the death of the dictator.

Respondents may deny the implications of their actions today,319 but the symbolism of the burial will outlive even their most emphatic
refutations. Long after the clarifications made by this administration have been forgotten, the gravesite at the LMB will remain. That is the
peculiar power of symbols in the public landscape they are not only carriers of meaning, but are repositories of public memory and ultimately,
history.

For the Court to pretend that the present dispute is a simple question of the entitlement of a soldier to a military burial is to take a regrettably
myopic view of the controversy. It would be to disregard historical truths and legal principles that persist after death. As important, it would be to
degrade the state's duty to recognize the pain of countless victims of Marcos and Martial Law. Regardless of the promised national unity that the
proposed burial will bring, I cannot, in good conscience, support such an expedient and shortsighted view of Philippine history.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Petitions.

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco,
Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.

Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong
and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the
Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator
Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.

It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution
No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from
each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November,
1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March
16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according
to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the
same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution."2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.3

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of
8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the
date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an
application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4

II

Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress
acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the
qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election
of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful
convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power in
Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can
reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

III

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and
therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it
collides.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates
to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If
the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each
representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts.5

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed
and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320
delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a
minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official
population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to
effect the desired proportional representation.

The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the
amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The
Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the
preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p.
2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint
Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night,
we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the above-stated method."

Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such apportionment.6The fact that the lone and small
congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a
population very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-
represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional
apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor
complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and
birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a
minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau of Census and
Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4
is unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation.

In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as unconstitutional, granted more representatives
to a province with less population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132
Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The
present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.

The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of
congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province
shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according
to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an
absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.

IV

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection
of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive
office or position in any branch of the government government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our constitutional system. The State through its
Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a
public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly
elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting
influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot
easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining
leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his
actuations as delegate; otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of the
welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final
adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in
approximately seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.

As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a member of Congress, during the
time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been
increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel
the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and
commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention.
The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the
appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-
32443.)

Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state
police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial
distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. 7 The function of
a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the
fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the
people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public
officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of
justice of the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the
masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.

Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970.

Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of
association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be
lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. 8

In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine whether a statute which trenches upon the
aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police power.9

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and

2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever
nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.

The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization
support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his
campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not
more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly,
because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The
right of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts
individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is
guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies
or constitutional proposals for amendments.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially
intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation on the period for nomination
of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: "It shall be
unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large
earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.

The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment
is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed.
Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so
unanimously. 10

In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election campaign or partisan political activity
may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger
of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other group of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or
indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which
could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not
merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close
one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;

Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster the required eight votes to
declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c),
(d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major compelling interests that moved Congress into
prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court
gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was by the
explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by
the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election
campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of
remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure
prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation,
according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of
the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator
Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to
disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience.
Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a rare
phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and
otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the
guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and
equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-
making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization
support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support." 18

The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. 19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the grave
economic, social and political problems besetting the country. Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a
Constitutional Convention which shall have the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people. Because
what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates truly
representative of the people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a
particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character.
Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function of a
constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage of the candidates — but
to encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional
system means, not the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."

So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee thereto be
independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they have been chosen with the aid and resources
of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow
political, religious or economic interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20

We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does
not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated.
The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is
germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among
individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and other facilities, which, the individual
candidate who is without any organization support, does not have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign
machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the
individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common
candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru
the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa"
group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention, which
organized support is nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint collective
effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our
leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could have presented a solid front with
very bright chances of capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted from the ban; because then by such
exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all
organization engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes
of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional
associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence,
they must likewise respect the ban.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A person may run
independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the
candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As
emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well
as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.

Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Tañada for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132,
demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to
entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot
be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in expression, has much to
recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis for the challenge hurled
against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a
candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional,
or other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election: ..."1 It
is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and other
organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced
within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin
being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963 article, that it is
primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly and of petition "that
provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed
the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech." 4

Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the scope of the right of
association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful
means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not extremely included in the First Amendment its existence
is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful."5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at
once the instrument" and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty"6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom."7

2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged provision. There is much
to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a
candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be represented as such of any political party or any other
organization as well as of such political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized
group intervening in his nomination, in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe therefore, that what the
constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent
on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same section of the Act forbids any
construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political, religious, professional, trade organizations or organized
groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to
advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein
shall limit or curtail the right of their members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention."8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently with the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the
fundamental law, as they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out
whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain
as to its lack of validity is further strengthened and fortified.
3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a limitation on such
cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As repression is permissible only when the danger of
substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a
realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at
those extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is
whether the words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The majority of the Court would find the
existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship running riot unless political
parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved. The Convention might not be able to live up to the
high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the
present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we
will not have a Convention truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency was won by the opposition
candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the
then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant political party would
continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people can, if so minded, make their
wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels would automatically insure the success of a candidacy.
Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no such danger is presented by
allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support,
directly or indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or apprehension need
arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be
valid. The electorate can see through such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that
whatever work the Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard against such undesirable
eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be
coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of an existing Constitution,
political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief
Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to
maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is
to carry this essential process one step farther to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates
who, by their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in keeping
with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making
their influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is decisive of this
aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it be successfully argued that
the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such legislative determination. This is merely to stress that
however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference. Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the
practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized
group is concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the commendable
admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to
assert their influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus favored
is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be
doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be realized.
The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem possibly tainted with
constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a fresh and untried solution to a problem of
gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise are
undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations. Considering the well-settled principle that even
though the governmental process be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties, if the end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or associations from
lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards,
magnified by the probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the
imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v. Comelec 12 does not
compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision. What survived the test of constitutional
validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political party, political committee or political group to
nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public
office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although
the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court
unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to muster the necessary two-thirds
majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly
or indirectly as well as the holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality. What emerges clearly, then, is that
definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and thereafter working for them in effect were considered
by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization or organized group are
precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden
domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our
previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending
its approval to what otherwise are invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is in agreement with the
views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the provisions of Republic Act
6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I
reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the
considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate
and support their own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive device to preserve the built-in
advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the
purported objective of the law of equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to
maintain said ban only as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their
members have made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual candidates
who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage unless they are allowed to seek and
use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions
intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results
can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as
the right to form other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering particularly the
shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights and liberties of all the people
of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the people against political parties which may be inclined
towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to
stifle the people's only opportunity for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in the use of platforms by
political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are important, but unrelated to each other, each of
them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because the issues in this election of candidates are of
paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition
for those who are minded to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a new
constitutional convention has been conceived.

Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 and for the reasons
therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign
in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as Section 8(a) stands and
taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against other associations within the contemplation of
Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons, groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in expression, has much to
recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis for the challenge hurled
against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a
candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional,
or other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election: ..." 1 It
is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and other
organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced
within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin
being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963 article, that it is
primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly and of petition "that
provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed
the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech."4
Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the scope of the right of
association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful
means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not extremely included in the First Amendment its existence
is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful."5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at
once the instrument" and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty" 6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom."7

2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged provision. There is much
to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a
candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be represented as such of any political party or any other
organization as well as of such political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized
group intervening in his nomination, in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe therefore, that what the
constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent
on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same section of the Act forbids any
construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political, religious, professional, trade organizations or organized
groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to
advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein
shall limit or curtail the right of their members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention."8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently with the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the
fundamental law, as they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out
whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain
as to its lack of validity is further strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a limitation on such
cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As repression is permissible only when the danger of
substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a
realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at
those extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is
whether the words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The majority of the Court would find the
existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship running riot unless political
parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved. The Convention might not be able to live up to the
high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the
present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we
will not have a Convention truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency was won by the opposition
candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the
then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant political party would
continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people can, if so minded, make their
wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels would automatically insure the success of a candidacy.
Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no such danger is presented by
allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support,
directly or indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or apprehension need
arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be
valid. The electorate can see through such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that
whatever work the Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard against such undesirable
eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be
coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of an existing Constitution,
political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief
Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to
maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is
to carry this essential process one step farther to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates
who, by their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in keeping
with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making
their influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is decisive of this
aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it be successfully argued that
the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such legislative determination. This is merely to stress that
however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference. Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the
practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized
group is concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the commendable
admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to
assert their influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus favored
is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be
doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be realized.
The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will.
If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem possibly tainted with
constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a fresh and untried solution to a problem of
gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise are
undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations. Considering the well-settled principle that even
though the governmental process be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties, if the end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or associations from
lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards,
magnified by the probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the
imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v. Comelec 12 does not
compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision. What survived the test of constitutional
validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political party, political committee or political group to
nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public
office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although
the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court
unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to muster the necessary two-thirds
majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly
or indirectly as well as the holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality. What emerges clearly, then, is that
definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and thereafter working for them in effect were considered
by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization or organized group are
precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden
domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our
previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending
its approval to what otherwise are invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is in agreement with the
views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the provisions of Republic Act
6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I
reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the
considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate
and support their own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive device to preserve the built-in
advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the
purported objective of the law of equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to
maintain said ban only as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their
members have made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual candidates
who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage unless they are allowed to seek and
use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions
intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results
can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as
the right to form other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering particularly the
shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights and liberties of all the people
of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the people against political parties which may be inclined
towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to
stifle the people's only opportunity for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in the use of platforms by
political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are important, but unrelated to each other, each of
them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because the issues in this election of candidates are of
paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition
for those who are minded to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a new
constitutional convention has been conceived.

Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 and for the reasons
therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign
in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as Section 8(a) stands and
taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against other associations within the contemplation of
Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons, groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers
of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the
State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against
those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web
of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members
to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial
conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law
to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4
which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview
of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.
26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for
Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA
6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged
were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense
of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later
or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for
certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative
measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts
should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor
of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain
whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of
the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient
to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the
hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate
beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And
petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes
the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, ormalversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them
liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged
with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM
OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection
with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although
subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between
the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to
enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,
or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. [8] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to usestatutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and"series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to
obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or
more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one
act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be,
at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In
the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must
form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness
that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In suchinstance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act
will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of
the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." [19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. [23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have
been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length
by petitioner, is more imagined than real.Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish
support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by
reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to
declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par.
(e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional
defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different
modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information
does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International
Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8,
12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt
or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds
in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the
moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is
also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has
acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the
right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed
is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by
the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not
prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel
that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill
through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that
could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that
provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need notprove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-
product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of
a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of
plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you
not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the
crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have
to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided
by the prosecution.[32]

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec.
2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure,
Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to
an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it
may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions,
assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he
says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner
cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act
but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. [33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's
view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act
done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates
quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true
that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes
said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with
death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or
the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . .
. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is
raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim
is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the
larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged
masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the
most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say
however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest
and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This
continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho &
Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas
and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon,
THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL
ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and
in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo,
Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest
of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL
ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of
hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning
dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to
tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country
as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the
reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful
eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly
embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the
Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision
may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);
and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are
abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that
are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty
to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to
their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail
of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or
fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to
manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real
dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family.
In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine
whether their child should use contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes
upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH
Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents, 55 Congressman Edcel
C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the
Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects
and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised
by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13,
and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As
far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed
"unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional
substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or
preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by
a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem should be
considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to
mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a
National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will
be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8, 1972,
which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all
health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or
preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the
International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta
for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family
planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of
just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The
executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory
for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and
population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State
is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act
No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the
Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet
secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family
planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal
issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH
Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the
political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the
Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation
of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three
branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint,
born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the
Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation
- but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they
were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the
kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back
to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to
review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged
with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In
short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon
the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing
precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law
are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all,
the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and
other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by
the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing
the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the
party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be
violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the
RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it
also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central
idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and
Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not
be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which
already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply
is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the
FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it
can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion.
They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health
care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the
RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts
in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular
drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of
the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the
law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of
R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and
the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been
grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection
to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of
the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn
to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from
fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the
recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible,
the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting
in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in
the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages
in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was
referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x. 150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive?
Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by
itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a
geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that
biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the
sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes.
A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night
follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt
when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may
be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of
conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress
to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very,
dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not
give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during
the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient
or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred,
the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop
the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should
be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient.
Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection
to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would
allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination
of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the
unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal
and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications
this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not
"maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree
with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops
the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that
some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was
conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:
Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines
conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human
life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or
germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the
mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is
a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic
genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood
Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at
a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him,
"fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing
a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception
and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to
the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the
fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal
proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the
Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make
any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized
ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or
expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health
and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life
and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the
number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an
abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any
drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction
of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also
does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To
repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any
drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the
proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL
must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient."
Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether
natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in
the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word
"primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of
the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient"
if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of
their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with
the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that
its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the
word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-
IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing
breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills
is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate
effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the
RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive
pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and
promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower
development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In
fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all
to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution
and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there
exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and
Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines
and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which
provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose
of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred
pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device
shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore
or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH
Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in
the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of
family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement
this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections
of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act
and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect,
and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be
held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court
to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines
available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground
is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and
non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the
expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third
sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the
proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who,
because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these
are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates
the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious
objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the
patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the
petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it
allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape
is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that
the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public
officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the
RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service
provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against
their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion
of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health
services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to
another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious
sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive
acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public. 193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no
emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights,
sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood
seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH
Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-
compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it
natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty
to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which
deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the
constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking
the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a
carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -
and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act
professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to
freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters
of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the
Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious
beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and
to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government
that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people,
shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society,
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On
the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation
follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes
the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes
a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives,
the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It
mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious
freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is
invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970)
But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with
penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the
stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the
freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of
others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been
clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained
that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose
of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory
of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the compelling state
interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it
was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American
Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a
law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear
and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of
society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of
the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and
"grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine,
aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while
others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed,
is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson.
This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can
limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state.
This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in
the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support
of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or
belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where
it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it
does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the
no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation.
Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and
modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR
and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern
natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to
the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and
their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions
and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations,
the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs
will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise
a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according
to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent
with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud
his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in
line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a
more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no
doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament
of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers
complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot
do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought
and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that
should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights
guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks
to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to
provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH
Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow
and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967,
could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if
'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity
and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would
be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care
service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same
applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an
active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation
of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider,
who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its
free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think
what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek
other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom
of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such
as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals
cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a
more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that
the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more
compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose
the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious
objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical
doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in
number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes.
And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions.
After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or
not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at
all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents
have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to
religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering
that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents
to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures
with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the
Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The
pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-
sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes
of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's
religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health
services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are
encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and
accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due
regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and the right of children
to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day,
hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and
figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from
1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal
deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot
be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of
a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are
objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can
act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other.
If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have
been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding
and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital
privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is
devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid
social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny.
It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or
authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall
prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require
mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art.
XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The
right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a
procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from
the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision
they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own
destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State
should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides
that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing
of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section
23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the
zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to
an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority
is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace
her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable
social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard, Commissioner
Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to
that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually
decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close
family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the
latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting
spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family
planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other.
Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to
under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access
to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk
simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental
consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is
not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become
productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution
makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not
only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-
protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the
teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the
legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with
parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates
Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program
provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them,
Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive
health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health
information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to
define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is
a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to
the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who
is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health
worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care
services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be
a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem
family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict
and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby
quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty;
failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public
health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because
it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are
the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of
the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH
Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But
if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class.
It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
"underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise
them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the
implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14,
suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational
institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They
posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts
against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery,
as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG
points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege
and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should
they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check
for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only
after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the
law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the
FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared
policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units
(LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against
it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled
health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the
local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of
the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the
RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance
of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the express
and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on
all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for
upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only
seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more
readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the
society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising
poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the
very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such
a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on
their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their
economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is
failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample
supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement
level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH
Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body.
That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to
remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive
health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act
(R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710),
sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any
family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as
the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203299

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203306

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO"
CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR.,
DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203359

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203378

ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R.
BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203391

HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE
ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE
LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203407

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L.
LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA
E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice
President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party, ADOLFO ARES P.
GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS CAESAR
R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National
Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203440

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V.
SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive
Department of Government), Respondents.

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G.R. No. 203453

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR
MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH
ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-
ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT
AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203454

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203469

ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS
D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD
A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S.
REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC.
PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E.
RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; HON.
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A.
BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203501

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications
Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and
DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203509

BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.

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G.R. No. 203515

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and in
his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE
HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518

PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM,
represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO,
MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES,
JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E.
OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.

The Facts and the Case

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a
system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure
curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like associates,
classmates, or friends and read postings from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;

4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies,
public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet.
The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the
system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of
them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements
against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing
theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can
use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or
highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has
the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime
law until further orders.

The Issues Presented

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions are:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

The Rulings of the Court

Section 4(a)(1)

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the
people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, 1 useful in determining the constitutionality of
laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as
well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.3

In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental
freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It
is a universally condemned conduct.4

Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques used by
criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and
report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the
equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.5

Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used,
and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from
the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of
protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. 7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the fear of possible prosecution that
hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal
laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the
chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency
to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be
valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others
from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain
name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a
user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting
both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be
his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil
purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge
to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the
freedom of the press.

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, 14 it ruled that the
right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon" 15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and
in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches 16 and seizures, which is the basis of the
right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 18

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and
date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. 19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity
theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not
intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of
personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted
user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the
law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring
and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed
from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is
present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 21 They express fear that private communications of
sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded
as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially
tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.

But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper perspective on the
issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private persons x x x although that
may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a
business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography
for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. 25

The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to
engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by
another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration. 27

The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for
violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if containing
pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by
some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity. 30The Court will not declare
Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining,
controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775.

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography
using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the
intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. 32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of
child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. 34 Petitioners are
wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child
pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies
to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.

The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now the Court must hold that
the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system
which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers
or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce
the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The term
referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from
a menu.35

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with
the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams
enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people,
before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance
since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is
true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. 36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus
Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal
code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence
requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be
public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he
published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. 43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The
defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a
public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land
Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that
these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure.
Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.44

Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual malice or malice in fact
when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence
of malice in fact in that case. Thus:

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner
cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article
being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.
(Emphasis ours)

Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above case, cinema and television
personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of ₱6,000.00.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its
existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. 45 For his defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 46

Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s obligations under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, 47 the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.

But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens,
Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives
and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be
acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been
made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws
be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. 48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy
freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain
restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings
with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct
from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness
of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as
well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory
statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the
Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or
attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom
of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence
sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and
common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law. 51 The legislature is not required to define every
single word contained in the laws they craft.

Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in destroying a
forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is
susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and
human experience.

But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or abetting"
wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.

According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a year, translating to about 31
million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social networking. 56 Social
networking sites build social relations among people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.57

Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests use Facebook to get in
touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their profile. 59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be
made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy settings.

If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can react to the posting, clicking
any of several buttons of preferences on the program’s screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes the
posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user
"Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook
Friends.

Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and read short text-based
messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of digital content—which
could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other media—on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers," those
who subscribe to this particular user’s posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed to,
enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to the general public. If a
post is available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another person’s tweet
without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the
internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e)
the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger)
maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun Broadband
(Internet Service Provider).

One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with a movie star. Linda, one
of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Maria’s original post is then multiplied by
her friends and the latter’s friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda,
comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena’s "Followers"
then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.

Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s "Retweet" of Nena’s original tweet and posts this on her Facebook account.
Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even press the Share button,
resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.

The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be
regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a
thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not
author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses
agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a
crime.

But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or Followers, availing
themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of
cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk
sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And,
considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed
in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?

The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the
legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the
millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.

The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 61 a case involving the constitutionality of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of

"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive computer service to send
to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age communications that, in
context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.

Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech for being overbroad. The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed and ruled:

The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. §223, is a matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the
CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its
obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction,
the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may
well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this
increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns
than those implicated by certain civil regulations.

xxxx

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the
statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on
protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast
across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms.62

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust
discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence, Section
5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The
inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission
on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims
no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order
to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. 67

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of
punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that
they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice"
or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one
netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?

Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against Armand like
"He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the
cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to
cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or
economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.

In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography and facilitates the
completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google and its users aiders and abettors in the
commission of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law
lacks—the exemption of a provider or notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as follows:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. 69

When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does this make
him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may give
consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial
communication could be disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution of
this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious
chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a
fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. 71 In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on
Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.

The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance have done
all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate
his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is
alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username
and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability
simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.

Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent.73 While this may be true with respect to cybercrimes
that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section
4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the
actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works.
Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there
exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes
committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims
or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized
simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the
determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice
versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense.
Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section
4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities
in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate
to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred
thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a
fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than
that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred
thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.

Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of
Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is
committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of
severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to
determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of
another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. 77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. 78

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content,
nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties
or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they
are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every
individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally
considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, 79 that there is a compelling
State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. 80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should
balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees. 81

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in
cyberspace for public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its
ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with
the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as
Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower
state authorities to collect or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And this is precisely what Section 12
does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or record such data.

But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes and,
therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system
without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration; 86 and producing child
pornography87 could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to
day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide free
internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with
unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can
quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding
their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and
seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.

Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal
boundaries and invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc 88 that
certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an
independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms. 89

But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy
and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational privacy—that those who
oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.92

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners’
challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who
use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general
public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.

As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider, must of necessity disclose
to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who writes a text
message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient,
accompanying the message sent. It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an
envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one
will read the information appearing outside the envelope.

Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that
are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of these packets is a
wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the
packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits
together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names
and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one
computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the
recipient.

For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service provider’s communication’s system will put his voice message
into packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are refitted together and heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the
caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his
call through. He also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically follow the same basic
pattern.

In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users in the ‘70s must realize that
they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation
that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over cyberspace except through
some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The
conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not
prepared to recognize as reasonable.

The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together,
and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic
data, analysts may be able to determine a person’s close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such
information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has
the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time.
Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the
discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in
drafting the law.

Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation,
fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or
motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the
collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is
akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.

Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to
identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent
cybercrimes from happening?

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should
not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these
data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the
citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no
limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently
threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get a court
warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police officer’s
determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is
immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.

The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that the procedure envisioned
by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the
provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their
sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95

Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine.
These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates
nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place them under
surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services provided
by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly
preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved,
transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document
to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order
that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents
internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the
benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating
to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation.

Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service provider has never
assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not
made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person
or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two
(72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is
necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a
judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power
to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.98

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search
or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement
authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the
measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of
the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data storage medium and to make
a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face, however, Section
15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system
or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law
enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.

Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of the prescribed
period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service provider’s storage systems and prevent overload. It would also
ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the user’s right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in
his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of
this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must
satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video
recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced
or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over
cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as
illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the
opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. 100

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity
of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency
doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. 101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked
be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply
in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities
shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative
finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, 102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not
have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.

P.D. 1829 states:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination
of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid
insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an
inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the
Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity
plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary
to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. 104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC
should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by
facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast
and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of
information and communications technologies;

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as
specified content data for six months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in
relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System

Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section
4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice