G.R. No.

192957 September 29, 2014

EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR., (Deceased), substituted by his widow, CONCORDIA V. MORAN, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA and PGA CARS, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition . for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated March 13, 2009 1 and June 25,
2010,2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107059. In the Resolution dated March 13, 2009, the CA
outrightly struck down the petition for certiorari that the petitioner had filed to annul and set aside the
Decision3 dated April 3, 2007, and Order4 dated October 22, 2008 of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P.
Case No. 06-E-195. Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated June 25, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner's. motion
for reconsideration.

From the records, the following facts emerge:

On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant tothe relevant provisions of Republic Act
No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. Docketed as DTI Administrative
Case No. 04-17, the complaint alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for the product
imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to complainant.

On September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a Decision5 in favor of complainant and ordered the private
respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment of costs of litigation and
administrative fines:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondent is hereby found guilty for violation of the aforequoted
provisions and [is] hereby ordered to perform the following:

1. To refund the purchase price ofthe subject vehicle in the amount of three million three hundred
seventy five thousand pesos (₱3,375,000.00);

2. To pay complainant the amount of five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) as costs of litigation;

3. To pay an administrative finein the amount of ₱10,000.00 payable at 4th flr., DTI Cashier, 361 Sen.
Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City.

SO ORDERED.6

On October 19, 2005, the private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision but the CAO denied the
motion in an Order7 dated January 19, 2006. Thus, the private respondent appealed to the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the quasi-judicial agency designated by Article 1658 of RA 7394 to
entertain appeals from the adverse decisions and orders of the CAO. However, in a Resolution9 dated April 28,
2006, the DTI Secretary dismissed the appeal of the private respondent who then filed an appeal with the
herein public respondent OP.

On April 3, 2007, the OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary’s Resolution, and dismissed the
complaint. The OP ruled that the DTI erred in holding the private respondent liable for product defects which
issue was never raised by the complainant and because the private respondent was not the manufacturer,
builder, producer or importer of the subject BMW car but only its seller. Assuch, it could not be held liable
especially since none of the circumstances under Article 9810 of RA 7394 were present in the case. The OP
further ruled that the private respondent could also not be held liable for product imperfections because the
product was never proven to be unfit or inadequate under the conditions laid down by law. Neither was there
any inconsistency in the information provided in the container or product advertisements/messages. More, it
was only after the lapse of a considerabletime (nearly 10 months) since the purchase of the car and after it had
been driven for 12,518 kilometers, that the complainant first complained about it. The vehicle never once broke
down before then and the complainant could not, in fact, point to any specific part that is defective.

Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP, but the OP denied said motion in an Order dated
October 22, 2008. On November 25, 2008, complainant received a copy of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration.

On January 23, 2009, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394. On March 13, 2009, the CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of appeal and for the failure of the petitioner to
state material dates. On June 25, 2010, the CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner.

Since the original complainant Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. passed away on May 17, 2010, his widow, Concordia
V. Moran filed the present petition for review on certiorari on August 9, 2010. Petitioner argues that the CA
erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP. She contends
that in cases alleging error ofjurisdiction on the part of the OP, the proper remedy is to file a petition for
certiorari with the CA because appeal is not available to correct lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, even though
appeal is available, it is not considered as the plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.

Further, the petitioner claims that the OP lacked appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the DTI in cases
involving a violation of RA 7394 based on Article 16611 thereof, which expressly confers appellate jurisdiction to
review such decisions of the DTI to the proper court through a petition for certiorari. Hence, the OP cannot be
deemed as the "proper court" within the purview of Article 166.

On the other hand, private respondentargues that the CA was correct in denying the petition for certiorari since
this was an improper remedy in view of the availability of an appeal from the OP. Furthermore, the private
respondent confirms the appellate jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI based on the constitutional power of
control of the OP over Executive Departments and the well-entrenched doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Meanwhile, the public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claims that the availability
of an appeal from the OP precluded the petitioner from availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Even
though there is an allegation of error of jurisdiction, the OSG avers that appeal still takes precedence over a
petition for certiorari as long as the same is at the disposal ofthe petitioner. However, in the present case, the
OSG claims that the OP acted within its jurisdiction in deciding the case on appeal from the DTI Secretary as
Article 166 of RA 7394 must yield to the constitutional power of control of the OP over Executive Departments.
The OSG also cites the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to support the appellate jurisdiction of
the OP over the DTI.

Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that petitioner resorted to a wrong mode
of appeal?

We rule in the negative.

Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and the mandate to act upon complaints filed by
consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting the consumeragainst deceptive, unfair and
unconscionable sales, acts or practices.12 Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer
complaints are heard and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions are appealable to the
DTI Secretary.13 Article 166 thereof provides:
ART. 166. Decision on Appeal.– The Secretary shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days fromreceipt
thereof. The decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is
1âwphi 1

filed with the proper court. (Emphasis supplied.)

In his motion for reconsideration from the OP’s Decision dated April 3, 2007 which reversed and set aside the
resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary, complainant EmmanuelB. Moran, Jr. raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction of the OP, not being the proper court referred to in Article 166 of R.A. 7394. The OP,
however, denied his motion on the ground that the President’spower of control over the executive department
grants him the power to amend, modify, alter or repeal decisions of the department secretaries. On the other
hand, the CA, in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed by Moran, Jr., implicitly sustained such
reasoning when it held that the proper remedy from an adverse order or judgment of the OP is a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

We reverse the CA.

The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, 14 Series of 1987. Section 1
thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken
within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from… (Emphasis supplied.)

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,15 we interpreted the above provision
and declared that "a decision or order issued by a department or agency need notbe appealed to the Office of
the President when there is a speciallaw that provides for a different mode of appeal." Thus:

Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the President
should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the President to review acts of department secretaries
will be rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify orset aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."

Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government,
and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the
matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally
subject to this Court’s rulemaking power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
the procedure in all courts.

Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedyof appeal
to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1
thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the
President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the
enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relieffrom the decision of
respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should
prevail over A.O. No. 18.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, a special law, RA 7394,likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisionsof
the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent should
have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.
In filing a petition for certiorari beforethe CA raising the issue of the OP’s lack of jurisdiction, complainant
Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy.

Certiorariis an extraordinary remedy available in extraordinary cases where a tribunal, board or officer, among
others, completely acted without jurisdiction. Ineluctably, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
1âwphi1

subject matter is void.17 While errors of judgmentare correctible by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable
by certiorari.18 Considering that the OP had no jurisdiction to entertain private respondent’s appeal, certiorari
lies to correct such jurisdictional error. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground
of being an improper remedy.

Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary had become FINAL and
EXECUTORY with private respondent’s failure to appeal the same withinthe 15-day reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 13, 2009 and
June 25, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107059 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated April 3, 2007
and Order dated October 22, 2008 of the Office of the President are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Consequently, the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 181284

LO LOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO

DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING,
JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners
vs.
RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., .DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L.
GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI,
MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ, JR.,
ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON,
ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABE RAS TURI, LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A.
VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ,
ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO,
RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as represented by
attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's en bane Decision dated October 20, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its
Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it is the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), not the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving
ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (JCCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of
the parties involved.
Petitioners argue that the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, admits of exceptions and can be relaxed in view of the special and unique circumstances obtaining
this case, i.e., the actual issue, as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a conflicting claim over an
ancestral domain. They seek to apply by analogy the principles inlgrzacio v. CF! Bulacan, 1 Ferrer v.
Villamor,2 Nonan v. Plan,3among others, where it was held that the allegations of tenancy by the defendant in its
answer may be used in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court, and if indeed tenancy exists, the same
should be lodged before the Court of Industrial Relations (now the Department of Agrarian Reform and
Adjudication Board).

They also invoke Leoquinco v. Canada DryBottling Co., 4 and Mindanao Rapid Co. v. Omandam5 where it was
ruled that if allegations of labor disputes or employer-employee relations are alleged by defendants in their
answer and the same is shown to exist, the Industrial Court (now the National Labor Relations Commission)
takes cognizance of the case.

Petitioners also argue that the Court's interpretation of Section 666 of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," (JPRA)to the effect that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group, is contrary to law and the Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC or IP group is,
and has been since time immemorial, governed by their own customary laws, culture, traditions and
governance systems, and has the right to preserve and develop them as they may deem fit and necessary.
Thus, each ICC and IP group did not, and does not, need an act of Congress such as the IPRA, to enforce their
customary laws among themselves and their respective communities, and more so in further developing them.

Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using
customary laws, consistent with the State policy under the Constitution and the IPRA to recognize, respect and
protect the customs, traditions and cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs. They claim that cases of
disputes between IPs within the same ICC/IP group are always resolved completely and with finality in
accordance with their customary laws and practice, hence, the interpretation: that the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction in cases of disputes among IPs within the same ICC/IP group is not only absurd but
unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes between different ICCs/IPs shall also (all within the jurisdiction of
whatever their customary laws and practice provide since Section 657 of the IPRA does not so distinguish.
They presume that after coexisting for centuries in adjacent ancestral domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have
developed their own indigenous means of settling disputes between other ICCs/IPs.

With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IP groups and between ICCs/IPs and
non-IPs, petitioners theorize that they fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP pursuant to the provisions of the
IPRA. They cite the concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the second and third parts of
Section 66 of the law only provide for a condition precedent that is merely procedural and does not limit the
NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of ICC/IPs. They contend that such interpretation is
consistent with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out NCIP's jurisdiction under Sections
46(g),8 62,9 69,10 7011 and 7212 of the IPRA.

Petitioners further point out that Section 72 of the IPRA permits the imposition of penalties under customary law
even to non-IPs, and does not distinguish as to whom customary law may apply. According to them, any
natural or juridical person, IPs or not, found to have violated provisions of then IPRA, particularly those
identified in Section 72, may be dealt with by imposing penalties found in the corresponding customary laws.
They submit that Section 72 does not require as a condition precedent familiarity of the person to be penalized
to the existing customary law of the affected community nor does it require for the said customary law to have
been published to allow for its imposition to any person who committed the violation. Thus, they assert that
Section 72 negates the ruling that NCIP's jurisdiction applies only to Sections 52, 54, 62 and 66, insofar as the
dispute involves opposing parties belonging to the same tribe.

Petitioners likewise aver that Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of the IPRA, taken together and in harmony
with each other, clearly show that conflicts and disputes within and between ICCs/IPs are first under the
jurisdiction of whatever their customary law provides, but disputes that are not covered by their customary laws,
either between different ICCs/IPs or between an, ICC/IP and a non-IP are also within the jurisdiction within the
NCIP. Petitioners invoke The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng13 and Baguio Regreening Movement,
Inc. v. Masweng14 to support their theory that NCIP has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving
a dispute or controversy over ancestral domains even if one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to
the same ICC/IP group.

In essence, petitioners argue that (1) the IPRA was not enacted to protect an IP from another IP whether from
the same or different group, because they have their own means of resolving a dispute arising between them,
through customary laws or compromises, as had been done for a very long time even before the passage of
the law; (2) the IPRA is meant to address the greater prejudice that IPs experience from non-IPs or the majority
group; and (3) the limited interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA to its minute details without looking into the
intent of the law will result in an unimaginable situation where the jurisdiction of the NCIP is only limited to
those where both parties belong to the same ICCs/IPs; and (4) the application. of the provisions of the IPRA, as
a national law and a landmark social justice legislation, is encompassing and not limited to a
particular' group,.i.e., ICCs/IPs.

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that (1) the NCIP and not the regular courts
has jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto; (2)
the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA; (3) the IPRA
is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but more from
non-IPs; (4) the· IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs;

(5) in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to resolve
claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims· and disputes
involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe; (7) harmonizing the related provisions of the
IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the
parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to
justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights; (9) the NCIP
has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of justice with respect to protection
and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and (10) recognition and enforcement of customary laws and
indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.

While the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration fail to
persuade, there is a need to clarify the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs.

The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a case
is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced
by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the
defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 15 Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous16 in
denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of
the original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with the ponencia that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case:

Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the R TC. As correctly pointed out by
the ponencia, ''jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action." It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the mission of the parties or conferred
by acquiescence of the court. 17

In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion also concurred with the ponencia 's conclusion that the RTC
has jurisdiction over the case because (1) the CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, (2) jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and the
allegations of the complaint; and (3) the NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties
are members of the same ICC/IP group.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez agreed with the ponencia that jurisdiction over the
original and amended complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, correctly lies with the RTC, based on the
principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen likewise voted to dismiss the petition for review
on certiorari, and to affirm the assailed decision and resolution of the CA. He concurred with the ponencia in
holding that respondents' action, alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, does
not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.

In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for reconsideration to justify a reversal of
its ruling that jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' original and amended complaint based on the
allegations therein lies with the RTC.

The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the complex nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as
shown by the different but well reasoned opinions of the Associate Justices concerned vis-a-vis the arguments
in petitioners' motions for reconsideration.

To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to
the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to
the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain
of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try and decide the case. In
exceptional cases1 under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such
claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Velasco's position is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and. disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs, regardless of whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC group. According to him, all cases and
disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP; all cases and
disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts
regardless of the subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs; and regular courts
have jurisdiction over cases and disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.

For Justice Brion, the IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole jurisdiction over disputes involving
ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, he stresses that the NCIP
maintains primary jurisdiction over: (1) adverse claims and border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral
domains/lands; (2) cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs); and (3)
disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Perez opines that neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. He adds that the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to
determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another
ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-
ICC/ IP. He concludes that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited, and confined
only to cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Leonen is of the view that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to disputes where both parties are
members of ICC/IP group and come from the same ethnolinguistic group. He states that the requirements for
the proper exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, are as follows:
(1) the claim or dispute must involve the rights of ICCs/IPs; (2) both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP
group; (3) these parties must have exhausted remedies under their ICC/IP's customary laws; and (4)
compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under customary laws must be evidenced by a
certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute, to the
effect that the dispute has not been resolved.
Meanwhile, in Lim v. Gamosa, 18 which was penned by Justice Perez, the Court held that the limited jurisdiction
of the NCIP is at best concurrent with that of the regular trial courts:

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng,
et al. and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one
of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the
NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction, where there is no such
explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the
regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought
before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. 19

Guided by the foregoing ruling, the Court held in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan20 that the NCIP-Regional
Hearing Office (RHO), being the agency that first took cognizance of petitioner-appellant's complaint, has
jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the MCTC. In said case where both parties are members of the
same ICC and the subject of their dispute was an ancestral land, petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's
jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint against respondents for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of
Rights." When the RHO dismissed the complaint without prejudice for his failure to first bring the matter for
settlement before the Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA, petitioner-appellant filed instead a complaint
for forcible entry before the MCTC. Aside from its ruling that the NCIP has excluded the MCTC of its jurisdiction
over the same subject matter~ the Court said that petitioner is estopped from belatedly impugning the
jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a complaint before it and receiving an adverse ruling.

Based on the diverse views on the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs, the recent jurisprudence21 on the matter, as well as petitioners' arguments in
their motions for reconsideration, the Court is confronted again with the issue of whether the NCIP's jurisdiction
is limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs, or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or
original and exclusive to the exclusion of said courts, on all matters involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.

After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the jurisdiction of
the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who
do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.

To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general
jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. 22 In
contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction
expressly delegated.23An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling
statutes. 24 Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised
only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.25

As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the
qualifying provision under Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws." Bearing in mind that the primary
purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute,26 and that what
determines whether a clause is a proviso is the legislative intent,27 the Court stated that said qualifying provision
requires the presence of two conditions before such claims and disputes may be brought before the
NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by the·
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved. The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either
(1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary
laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws or a
Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would .be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who
do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the
NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the same
ICC/IP group.

That the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited can be further gathered from Justice Perez' discussion
in Lim v. Gamosa,28 thus:

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos.
122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,"
such an implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be
found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall
within the general jurisdiction of regular courts dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the
status of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where,
among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific
wording of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-21 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-35 on the exclusive· and original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal expression
of the will of the Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to
reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the
jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs"and (2) contained a
proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise
jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes
necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

In Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan, 29 the Court affirmed and emphasized I the afore-quoted ruling
in Lim v. Gamosa30where it struck down as void atj administrative rule that expanded the jurisdiction of the
NCIP beyond the boundaries of the IPRA.

However, exception must be taken to the pronouncement in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan31 that "[a]t best, the
limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent .with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's
general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies."

Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised by different courts at the same time over the
same subject matter and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either
court indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same subject matter, and
when a proceeding in respect of a certain subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts,
they are said to have concurrent jurisdiction. "32 While courts of concurrent jurisdiction are courts of equal
dignity as to matters concurrently cognizable, neither having supervisory power over process from the
other,33 the rule is that the court which first takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and
power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy without interference from
other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar actions are subsequently instituted between the same
parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same questions.34 Such rule is referred to as the principle of
priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to
abide by the priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such principle to reduce the possibility of
the conflicting exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, especially to reduce the possibility that a case involving the
same subject matter and the same parties is simultaneously acted on in more than one court. 35
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or
impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds
instead is that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary
jurisdiction is bestowed under Section 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54
thereof.

Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with
the regular courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP' s primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of
whether the parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely:(I) adverse claims and
border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently issued
CADTs, and (3) disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.

Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative
body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.36 Given that the provisions of the enabling
statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, 37 it is apt to underscore the
provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP
groups to the NCIP, as the primacy government agency responsible for the recognition of their ancestral
domain and rights thereto:38

1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain Office (ADO) to deny application
for CADTs, in relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse
claims:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:

xxxx

h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall teject
any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in
case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the
NCIP: Provided,furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the
boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending
parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without
prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.

XXXX

SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within
the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear
and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such
ancestral domains: Provided, That if thedispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the
traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The
NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,
further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for
Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.39

2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for CALTs and on the NCIP's power to grant
meritorious claims and resolve conflicting claims:
SECTION 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands,. -

xxxx

e) Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted including
a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen
(15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP
and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to
allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such
publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a
valid substitute: Provided,further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers and radio
station are not available;

f) Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each
application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case
of conflicting claims among individuals or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all
proceedings for the identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of
Lands shall represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and

g) The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed and
delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in turn, evaluate the report submitted. If the NCIP finds such claim
meritorious, it shall issue a certificate of ancestral land, declaring and certifying the claim of
each individual or corporate (family· or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.40

3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent claims over ancestral domains and lands:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. -The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs,
review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found
to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP
after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.41

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these cases even if
one of the parties is a non! CC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups.
Indeed, the questions involved in said cases demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience, and services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.42 No less than the IPRA states that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well:-
being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto, 43 with due
regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.44 At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that the
NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.45

Meanwhile, the fatal flaw in petitioners' insistence that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is exclusive and
original, can be gathered from records of the Bicameral Conference Committee cited in Justice Brion's
Separate Opinion:

The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill
1728 was originally worded exclusive and original jurisdiction. During the Bicameral Conference, the lower
house objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:
Sen. Juan Flavier: (Chairman of the Senate Panel) There is
exclusive original.
And so what do
you suggest?
……
Rep. Zapata (Chairman of the Panel for the House of Chairman, may I
Representatives) butt in?
Sen. Flavier Yes, please.
Rep. Zapata This was
considered. The
original, we were
willing in the
house. But the
"exclusive", we
objected to the
word "exclusive"
because it would
only be the
commission that
would exclude
the court and the
Commission may
not be able to
undertake all the
review
nationwide. And
so we remove
the word
"exclusive" so
that they will
have original
jurisdiction but
with the removal
of the word
"exclusive" that
would mean that
they may bring
the case to the
ordinary courts
of justice.
Sen Flavier Without passing
through the
commission?
Rep. Zapata Yes, Anyway, if
they go to the
regular courts,
they will have to
litigate in court,
because if its
(sic) exclusive,
that would be
good.
Sen. Flavier But what he is
 saymg is that ...
Rep. Zapata But they may not
have the facility
Rep. ___________ Senado na lang.
Rep. Zapata Oo, iyong original
na lang.
Sen. Flavier In other words,
it's not only the
Commission
that can
originate it,
pwedeng
magoriginate sa
courts.
Rep. Zapata Or else, we just
remove
"exclusive
original" so that
they will say, the
National will have
jurisdiction over
claims. So we
remove both
"exclusive and
original".
Sen. Flavier So what version
you are batting
for, Mr.
Chaorman?
Rep. Zapata Just to remove
the word
"exclusive
original" The
Commission wil
still have
jurisdiction only
that, if the
parties will opt
to go to courts
nationwide. Here
there may be not
enough courts of
the commision.
Sen. Flavier So we ae going
to adopt the
senate version
minus the words
"exclusive
original"?
Rep. Zapata Yes, Mr.
Chairman, that's
my proposal
 Sen. Flavier No, problem.
Okay, approved.
Rep. Zapata xxxx46

The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" mean that the NCIP shares
concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra
vires for the NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that it has exclusive jurisdiction.47

Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of the IPRA cannot be exclusive and original, is because of the so-called
"Contentious Areas/Issues" identified in the Joint Department of Agriculture-Land Registration Authority-
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DARDENR-
LRA-NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012.48 Such contentious matters arose in the course of the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,49 the IPRA, the Public Land Act,50 and the Land
Registration Act,51 as amended by the Property Registration Decree,52 which created not only issues of
overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR and NCIP, but also operational issues and conflicting claims
in the implementation of their respective programs.

Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order defines those contentious areas/issues
which are subject of operational issues and conflicting claims between and among the DAR, the DENR and the
NCIP, as follows:

a. Untitled lands being claimed by the ICCs/IPs to be part of their AD/AL which are covered by approved survey
plans and also being claimed by the DAR and/or the DENR.

b. Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLO As), Emancipation Patents (EPs ),
and Patents within Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT)/Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).

c. Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR over lands within Ancestral Land/Domain
Claims such as, but not limited to, Community-Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), Socialized Forest Management Agreement (SIFMA), Protected Area
Community""Based Resources Management Agreement (PACBRMA), Forest Land Grazing Management
Agreement (FLGMA), Co-Management Agreement, Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC), Certificate of
Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA), Wood Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land Use Permit
(SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP), Special Private Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore
Lease Agreement/Permit (FLAIFLP).

d. Exploration Permit (EP), Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); Mineral Agreement (either
Production Sharing, Co-Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-covered areas.

e. Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared areas a portion or the entirety of which is
subsequently issued a CADT/CALT.

f. Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of the CADTs/CAL Ts but for any reason not
segregated/excluded.

g. Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise between and amongst the DAR, the DENR and the
NCIP as may be determined by the National/Regional/Provincial Joint Committees, as created under Section
19 of the Joint Administrative Order.

h. Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP in behalf of the ICCs/IPs over those identified
titled areas found within the AD/AL.
It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-stated contentious areas/issues, and affecting the
rights of parties who are non-IPs or those who belong to different ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and
due process, however, such parties cannot be compelled to comply with the two conditions53 before such
disputes may be brought before the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are recognized to have
their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. Hence, the Court cannot sustain
the view that the NCIP shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs.

Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great
respect,54 the Court cannot ignore that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENRLRA- NCIP Administrative
Order provide for the proper forum where the contentious areas/issues involve lands with prior and vested
property rights, thus:

Section 14. Exclusion/Segregation of Lands Covered by Judicially Decreed Titles and Titles
Administratively issued by DENR and DAR. In the delineation and titling of ADs/ALs, the NCIP must exclude
and segregate all lands covered by titles. For this purpose, the registered owner of the land may opt to submit
to the NCIP a copy of the title of the property to facilitate segregation or exclusion pursuant to existing
guidelines and other pertinent issuances .

The ICCs/IPs, however, are not precluded from questioning the validity of these titles in a proper forum as
hereunder enumerated:

1. DAR Secretary for registered EPs or CLOAs; and

2. Regional Trial Court for registered patents/judicially-decreed titles.

On the other hand, the DAR and DENR shall not process titles pursuant to their mandate on lands certified by
NCIP as ancestral domain or ancestral lands except in areas with prior and vested rights. Provided, however,
that the certification by NCIP on lands as Ancestral Domains or Ancestral Lands pursuant to Section 52(i) of
IPRA presupposes that the provision of Section 13 hereof on the projection of survey plans and issuance of
Certification of Non-Overlap have already been complied with.

xxxx

Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties. Titled lands under the Torrens System issued prior to
IPRA are deemed vested rights pursuant to the provision of Section 56 of IPRA. Accordingly, the DAR shall
proceed with the CARP coverage of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by the Supreme Court
without prejudice, however, to the rights of the ICCs/IPs to question the validity of these titles before a court or
body of competent jurisdiction. 55

Note that the "property rights" referred to in Section 5656 of the IPRA belong to ·those acquired by individuals,
whether indigenous or nonindigenous peoples, as said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origin of
the ownership of these rights. 57 Considering the rule on statutory construction that courts should not distinguish
where the law does not do so, the IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether
they pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon
its

effectivity. 58

On petitioners' assertion that Section 7259 of the IPRA negates the ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction only
over claims and disputes under Sections 52, 54, and 62 thereof, even if the parties involved do not belong to
the same ICC/IP, the Court finds the same as misplaced.
Note that under Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of the IPRA
may be punished either(1) in accordance. with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the
penalty shall not be a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and that neither death penalty nor excessive
fines shall be imposed; or (2) upon conviction, by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not more than 12
years, or a fine of not less than ₱100,000.00 nor more than ₱500,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment
upon the discretion of the court. Again, it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for
1a\^/phi 1

those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its separate and distinct
customary laws, and to be punished in accordance therewith. The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall have
primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA provisions only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction over such violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court.

Justice Brion has aptly discussed that even if Section 72 of the IPRA is a special penal law that applies to all
persons, including non-ICCs/IPs, the NCIP jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights is limited to those
committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP group, thus:

Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the Rights of ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in
accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned .... without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP
concerned to avail of the protection of "existing laws . . .[i]n which case," the penalty shall be imprisonment
and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of the court."

"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while "the court" refers to the regular
courts as opposed to administrative bodies like the NCIP.

Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and file an action before the regular
courts, in which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective,
Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.

The phrase "without prejudice," however, means without limiting the course of action that one can take. Thus, a
recourse under customary laws does not take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing
national laws. An express caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must not be cruel,
degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death penalty or excessive fines.

Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, then the NCIP's jurisdiction is
limited to punishment under customary laws.

The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two important issues: first, whether it is
legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member
of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.

Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties .for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, must be published.

Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even the
regular courts have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary
ruling would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.

Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another. Otherwise, the former would be
forced to observe a nonbinding customary law.

Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to those
committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP.

This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights· of ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights
are violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the
regular courts. In this situation, the NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with "legal
assistance in litigation involving community interest."60

There is also no merit in petitioners' argument that the Court's interpretation of the NCIP's jurisdiction under
Section 66 of the IPRA runs counter to its purpose to protect the rights, customs, customary laws and cultural
integrity of the ICCs/IPs. To stress, even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all
their remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the
NCIP.61 And, in some instances that the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases involving rights of
ICCs/IPs, the governing law for such disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on
ICCs/IPs.62

It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict
resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanism under Section 1563 of the IPRA pertains only to
those customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the
national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights. In this regard, it is fitting to quote the
Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural
Resources64 on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and other related provisions, like Section 15, of the
IPRA:

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say
that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The
Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under
IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. xxx

xxxx

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a
dispute is a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the application of customary law is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning
ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of
customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation
passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil
1âwphi1

Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,
and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls
for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of
indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are
ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.65 1av vphi1

Likewise, unavailing is petitioners' contention that unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IPs

groups, and those between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this
regard, the Court shares the view of Justice Perez:

That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights
of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and
customary law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the
dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a
controversy involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a· court of general
jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and
nonmembers of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-
duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the
controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the
ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on
customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each
and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.66

Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation" done in The City Government of Baguio City v.
Masweng67 of the NCIP' s jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is not ICC/IPs, a careful review of
that case would show that the Court merely cited Sections 3(k),68 3869 and 66 of the IPRA and Section 570 of
NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure Before the NCIP, as bases of its ruling to the effect that disputes or controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. However, the
Court did not identify and elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's "original and exclusive jurisdiction" on
disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs. Hence, such description of the nature and
scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the point, can only be
considered as an obiter dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes
of res judicata and does not embody the determination of the court.71

On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or among parties belonging
to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong
to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and
53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over
adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of
fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/ IPs, or members of different
ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

ENGINEER BEN Y. LIM, RBL FISHING CORPORATION, PALAWAN AQUACULTURE CORPORATION, AND
PENINSULA SHIPYARD CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. SULPICIO G. GAMOSA, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, NCIP
REGIONAL HEARING OFFICE, REGION IV AND TAGBANUA INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITY OF BARANGAY
BUENAVISTA, CORON, PALAWAN, AS REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO P. AGUIDO, ERNESTO CINCO, BOBENCIO
MOSQUERA, JURRY CARPIANO, VICTOR BALBUTAN, NORDITO ALBERTO, EDENG PESRO, CLAUDINA BAQUID,
NONITA SALVA, AND NANCHITA ALBERTO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

While we recognize the rights of our Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) as determined
in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), we delineate, in this case, the jurisdiction of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as provided in Section 661 of the IPRA.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 which denied the petition for certiorari of petitioners Engr. Ben Y. Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation,
Palawan Aquaculture Corporation, and Peninsula Shipyard Corporation. Affirmed, then, is the Resolution3 of the NCIP in
NCIP Case No. RHO 4-01-2006.

Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan, represented by individual
respondents Fernando P. Aguido, Ernesto Cinco, Bobencio Mosquera, Jurry Carpiano, Victor Balbutan, Nordito Alberto,
Edeng Pesro, Claudina Baquid, Nonita Salva, and Nanchita Alberto, filed a petition before the NCIP against petitioners for
"Violation of Rights to Free and Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for
the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order."4

Thereafter, the NCIP issued an Order dated 20 October 2006 and directing the issuance and service of summons, and
setting the preliminary conference and initial hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order on
22 November 2006 and the conduct of an ocular inspection of the subject area on the following day, 23 November 2006.

Despite a motion to dismiss being a prohibited pleading under the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, petitioners
moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:

1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because

[petitioners] are not members of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples;

2) Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners], because summons

were served by mail rather than by personal service;

3) Lack of cause of action, because there is no allegation in the petition or

document attached thereto showing that [respondents] were indeed
authorized by the purported Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community,
and no Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title has as yet been issued over
the claim; [and]

4) Violation of the rule against forum shopping because [respondents]

have already filed criminal cases also based on the same alleged acts
before the Municipal Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga.5
Not contented with their filing of a Motion to Dismiss, petitioners, by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, arguing that "considering the nature of the issues raised [in the Motion to Dismiss], particularly, the issue on
jurisdiction, it is imperative that the [Motion to Dismiss] be resolved first before other proceedings could be conducted in
the instant case."6

On 30 November 2006, the NCIP issued a Resolution7 denying the motion to dismiss. While affirming that a Motion to
Dismiss is prohibited under Section 29 of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, the NCIP
squarely ruled that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents; (2) it acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of petitioners; (3) it was premature to rule on the issue of lack of cause of action; and (4) respondents did not
violate the rule on forum shopping.8

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court,
seeking to reverse, annul and set aside the NCIP's twin resolutions for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As previously stated, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the resolutions of the NCIP. The
appellate court echoed the NCIP's stance that from the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP was bestowed with an
all-encompassing grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and that the requirement in
the proviso contained in the section, i.e., obtaining a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders that the parties had
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary law prior to the filing of an action, applied only to instances where
both parties were members of an ICC/IP.

The NCIP also cited Section 14 of its own Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP which provides
exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under customary laws, such as where one of the
parties is: (1) either a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer or
employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions; and (2) a non-IP/ICC or does not
belong to the same IP/ICC. In all, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NCIP's resolution that when a claim or dispute involves
rights of the IPs/ICCs, the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the opposing party is a non-IP/ICC.

Adamant, petitioners appeal to us by a petition for review on certiorari, echoing the same issues raised before the
appellate court:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP
HAS] JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION x x x;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS IN HOLDING THAT x x x
THE [NCIP] ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PETITIONERS; and

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT x x x
RESPONDENTS HAVE CAUSE/S OF ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.9

Notably, petitioners have dropped their issue that respondents are guilty of forum shopping.

At the outset, we note that none of the petitioners, the NCIP, and the appellate court have proffered an argument, and
opined, on the specific nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, whether such is primary and concurrent with courts of general
jurisdiction, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of regular courts.

In the main, petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents because they
(petitioners) are non-IPs/ICCs. Essentially, they interpret the jurisdiction of the NCIP as limited to claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are IPs/ICCs.

On the other hand, the NCIP and the appellate court rely mainly on the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA and the averred
purpose for the law's enactment, "to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the rights of the indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral land and to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people."10 According to the
two tribunals, "[a]ny interpretation that would restrict the applicability of the IPRA law exclusively to its members would
certainly leave them open to oppression and exploitation by outsiders."11 The NCIP and the appellate court maintain that
Section 66 does not distinguish between a dispute among members of ICCs/IPs and a dispute involving ICC/IP members
and non-members. Thus, there is no reason to draw a distinction and limit the NCIP's jurisdiction over "all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."12 Effectively, even without asseverating it, the two tribunals interpret the statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP as primary, original and exclusive, in all cases and instances where the claim or dispute
involves rights of IPs/ICCs, without regard to whether one of the parties is non-IP/ICC.

In addition, the NCIP promulgated its rules and regulations such as NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated 9 April
2003, known as the "Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP," and Administrative Circular No. 1,
Series of 2014, known as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples."
Sections 5 and 1, respectively of both the 2003 and 2014 Administrative Circular, Rule III, provide for the jurisdiction of
the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer (RHO), thus:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of
ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

We first dispose of the primordial question on the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction as provided in the IPRA.
Specifically, the definitive issue herein boils down to whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties
are ICCs/IPs or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of the regular
courts, on all matters involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

We are thus impelled to discuss jurisdiction and the different classes thereof.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by statute, to hear and decide a case. 13 The
authority to decide a cause at all is what makes up jurisdiction.

Section 66 of the IPRA, the law conferring jurisdiction on the NCIP, reads:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
(Emphasis supplied).
The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the IPRA which recognizes and promotes all
the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate of the NCIP to
"protect and promote the interest and wellbeing of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and[,]
institutions".14

In connection thereto, from Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank,15 we learned that the provisions of the
enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.

Plainly, the NCIP is the "primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans
and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral
domains as well as their rights thereto."16 Nonetheless, the creation of such government agency does not per se grant it
primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the regular courts from taking cognizance and exercising
jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs.

Recently, in Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al.,17 we ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA does not endow the NCIP with
primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the
qualifying proviso, we held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur only when they arise between
or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two of the defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts
had jurisdiction over the complaint in that case.

In his concurring opinion in Unduran, Justice Jose P. Perez submits that the jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be definitively
drawn to settle doubts that still linger due to the implicit affirmation done in The City Government ofBaguio City, et al. v.
Atty. Masweng, et al.18 of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are not ICCs/IPs.

In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or exclusive and original grant of jurisdiction
to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where there is no clear intendment by the legislature.

Significantly, the language of Section 66 is only clear on the nature of the claim and dispute as involving rights of ICCs/IPs,
but ambiguous and indefinite in other respects. While using the word "all" to quantify the number of the "claims and
disputes" as covering each and every claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs, Section 66 unmistakably contains a
proviso, which on its face restrains or limits the initial generality of the grant of jurisdiction.

Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim and dispute involve the right of
ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. Both elements must be
present prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.

Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs,
we cannot be confined to that first alone and therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and
disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the intention of the legislative that: (1) the NCIP exercise
primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the regular courts be excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have easily done so as in other instances conferring primary, and original
and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific administrative body. We will revert to this point shortly but find it pertinent to first
discuss the classes of jurisdiction.

Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by
statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.19 The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the
jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.20 In one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or
should not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
before the question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered.21 The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question
arising in the proceeding before the court.22

Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction.23 It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.24 In some instances,
the Constitution and statutes grant the administrative body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized
government agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of jurisdiction bestowed by the Constitution and
statutes on the Ombudsman.

The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice25delineated primary and
concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to original and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution and statutes26 on
the Ombudsman concurrent, albeit primary, with the Department of Justice.

Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz.:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. If
it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment
of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15
thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its
own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990,
entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or employee
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative
proceedings, or both.

For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two
classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to
investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an
investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance,
either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of
the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction
between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the
nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the
second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial,
city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly declared: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation including preliminary
investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.

Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in
said case:chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees
is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies
referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the
judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.

In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.

A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the authority of
Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating
thus: chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public
official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 1[3]). The Ombudsman
is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against
a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 1[3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from,
the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative
authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals'
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was
deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers
regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties
of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in
Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring
public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising
from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of
official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and
honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.

At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case and
the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the
nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.

In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal
act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this
authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the approval of the
Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo; 191 SCRA 545
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of
any public official, i.e.; any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority
but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e.; the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-
involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection with the charge of
sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.

In Natividad v. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the Ombudsman and not the
provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the Court
held:chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo v. Domagas and Sanchez v. Demetriou.
However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former.

In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter, has been in a state of
flux.

These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, - the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b)
Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d)
Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.

The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
'SEC. A. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlib rary

'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

...

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000:
PROVIDED,

HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4(a)(2) for an offense to fall under
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and
than penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the first requirement is
wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed
by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a
requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.

It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pah materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution
and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on
the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or
to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretand," or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No.
1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had
in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree
No. 1861.

R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for
other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees in relation to their office.

In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial,
city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction[,] take over at
any stage.

xxxx

To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against
any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or
their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all
prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere
superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law
agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived
from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case as not being contrary to the
Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an
agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast to our holding in Honasan II, the NCIP cannot be said to have even primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP
cases comparable to what the Ombudsman has in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We
do not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA.

Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs.

Thus, we revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative
body which in all instances of such grant was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or the enabling statute, to wit:
1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections contests;28

2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A,29 prior to its transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court
by virtue of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation Code;

3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and
penalties imposed by it in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities;30

4. Department of Agrarian Reform's31 primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and its
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR);32

5. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving contracts of
construction, whether government or private, as long as the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration; 33

6. Voluntary arbitrator's or panel of voluntary arbitrator's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies;34

7. The National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC's) original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases listed in Article 217 of
the Labor Code involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural; and

8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all deportation
cases.35ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs
where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to govern in the
lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that customs and customary law cannot be applied to non-
IPs/ICCs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as a distinct sector of Philippine society. This recognition contemplates their
difference from the Filipino majority, their way of life, how they have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. The ICCs/IPs share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, which by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs
who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories, or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.36

In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause involving rights of IPs/ICCs, can only
be exercised under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.

To effect the IPRA and its thrust to recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the Constitution
goes hand in hand with the IPRA's running theme of the primary distinctiveness of customary laws, and its application to
almost all aspects of the lives of members of the IPs/ICCs, including the resolution of disputes among ICCs/IPs. The NCIP
was created under the IPRA exactly to act on and resolve claims and disputes involving the tights of ICCs/IPs. 37

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz, the first challenge to the IPRA, emphasizes the primacy
of customs and customary law in the lives of the members of ICCs/IPs:
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law. Some articles of
the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other
words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and
liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its
recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on
land titling and land registration38
ChanRoblesVi rtualawl ib rary

Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction
and its consequent application in dispute resolution.39 Demonstrably, the proviso in Section 66 of the IPRA limits the
jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where both parties are ICCs/IPs
because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply to non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP's limited
and special jurisdiction.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves
rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of
non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights
and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's
competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are
ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and
customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based
on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.

In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,40 we delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, specifically
paragraph 3 thereof, as all money claims of workers, limited to "cases arising from employer-employee relations." The
same clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today but the Court ruled that such
was a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code
x x x:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

4. Cases involving household services; and

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters."
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire
universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should not [be] read not in
isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2
(relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a
particular species of employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees
or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they
all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other
words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be [used] in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other
paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an examination of the terms
themselves of Article 217, as last amended by B.P. Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor
Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee
relations," which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be
presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee
relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by
the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive
basis. The court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article
217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect
or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the
employer-employee relationship.
Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" does not necessarily grant the NCIP all-
encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of the parties, i.e,
whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.
In Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. v. SEC, et al.,41 we learned to view the bestowal of jurisdiction in the light of the
nature and the function of the adjudicative body that was granted jurisdiction, thus:
This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of the SEC under the law. Section 4 of PD
No. 902-A confers upon the latter "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or
associations, who are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines x x x." The principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and
associations with the end in view that investrnent in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities
pursued for the promotion of economic development.

It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly
specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations,
partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.42 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Drawing a parallel to Union Glass,43 the expertise and competence of the NCIP cover only the implementation and the
enforcement of the IPRA and customs and customary law of specific ICCs/IPs; the NCIP does not have competence to
determine rights, duties and obligations of non-ICCs/IPs under other laws although such may also involve rights of
ICCs/IPs. Consistently, the wording of Section 66 that "the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs" plus the proviso necessarily contemplate a limited jurisdiction over cases and disputes
between IPs/ICCs.

That NCIP Administrative Circulars44 expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original and exclusive in Sections 5 and 1,
respectively of Rule III:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

(A.) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
1.) Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

xxx

5.) Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;

xxx

6.) Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial
sites, sacred places, or rituals;

xxx

8.) Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

9.) Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.45

It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect. The administrative regulation must be within the scope and
purview of the law.46 The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the
power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but
must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or
to modify, the law.47

However, administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate legislation, to implement the broad policies
laid down in the statute by 'filling in' the details. All that is required is that the regulation does not contradict, but conforms
with the standards prescribed by law.48

Perforce, in this case, the NCIP's Administrative Circulars' classification of its RHO's jurisdiction as original and exclusive,
supplants the general jurisdiction granted by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 to the trial courts and ultimately, modifies and
broadens the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the IPRA on the NCIP. We cannot sustain such a classification.

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.49 and
similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-
ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and
declare a grant of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit conferment by the
IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the
latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies.50

Jurisprudence has held on more than one occasion that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we consider
the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy as well as the status or relationship of the parties.51

Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in respondents' petition:

4. That [respondents] are members of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in the Calamianes group of islands
[in] Coron, Palawan;

5. That Barangay Buenavista, Coron is part of the ancestral domains of the Tagbanuas within Cluster 1 of the Calamianes
group of islands;

6. That prior to the enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), they have already filed their claim for
the recognition of their ancestral domains with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources under DAO-2-93
and DAO No. 61-91;

7. That because of the enactment of the IPRA, the Provincial Special Task Force on Ancestral Domains (PSTFAD)
recommended instead the validation of their proofs and claims with the newly created National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) for the corresponding issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domains Title (CADT).

8. That Sections 3.1 and 11 of the IPRA provided that the State recognizes the rights of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) to our ancestral domains by virtue of their Native Title and that, it was even optional on their part to
request for the issuance of a title or CADT;

9. That as such, it was not even required that they have to obtain first a CADT before their rights to their ancestral
domains be recognized;

10. That furthermore, their free and prior informed consent (FPIC) are required before any person or entity, whether
private or government can enter or undertake any activity within their ancestral domains;

11. That in order to ensure that their rights to FPIC are not violated, Section 59 of the IPRA provides that the NCIP had to
issue first a Certification Precondition (CP) that their consent had been elicited first;

12. That their Free and Prior Informed Consent was not elicited by [petitioners] Engr. Ben Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation,
Palawan Aquaculture Corporation and Peninsula Shipyard Corporation when they unlawfully entered and occupied portions
of their ancestral domains [in] Sitio Makwaw and Sitio Minukbay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan at a time when the IPRA was
already operative;

13. That the workers of the abovenamed persons had destroyed the houses of [their] tribal members, coerced some to
stop from cultivating their lands and had set up houses within the said portions of their ancestral domains;

14. That the unlawful intrusion and occupation of [petitioners] within the aforesaid portions of their ancestral domains and
their violation of the rights of [respondents] to Free and Prior and Informed Consent and the criminal acts committed by
[petitioners'] workers had cause (sic) incalculable sufferings among [respondents] x x x.52 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

In their petition before the NCIP, respondents alleged: (1) their status as Tagbanuas, claiming representation of the
Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in the Calamianes Group of Islands in Coron, Palawan; (2) the provision in the
law which recognizes native title of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous persons; (3) that they have already
filed their claim for the recognition of their ancestral domains with the DENR; (4) that they have yet to obtain a Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) from the NICP which, under the IPRA, is the agency tasked to validate their claim; (5)
the purported violation of petitioners of their rights to free and prior and informed consent; and (6) that petitioners
unlawfully intruded and occupied respondents' ancestral domains.

From their allegations in the petition, such call to the fore: (1) respondents' lack of CADT; and (2) the status of petitioners
as non-ICCs/IPs and petitioners' apparent ignorance that respondents are IPs, and their claim of ancestral domain over the
subject property.

It should be noted that a bare allegation that one is entitled to something is not an allegation but a conclusion. 53 Such
allegation adds nothing to the pleading, it being necessary to plead specifically the facts upon which such conclusion is
founded.54 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, entitled "Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings" requires in Section 1, as a
general rule, for "[e]very pleading [to] contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement
of mere evidentiary facts."

Respondents' status as Tagbanuas, as indigenous persons or members of an indigenous cultural community, is not an
ultimate fact from which respondents can anchor the rights they claim to have been violated by petitioners.

In this case, respondents' petition, as written, does not mention ultimate facts that lead to the conclusion that (1) they are
Tagbanuas, and (2) they are the representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. Neither are there
allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of petitioners which constitute a violation of
respondents' rights.

We elucidate.

In this case, respondents allege that prior to the enactment of the IPRA, they have previously applied for recognition of
their ancestral domain with the DENR under DENR Administrative Order No. 2-93 and No. 61-91; and with the advent of
the IPRA, it was no longer required that they first obtain a CADT. However, una voce, they aver that it has been
recommended that they validate "their proofs and claims" with the NCIP for the issuance of a CADT. The allegation itself
goes against respondents' conclusions that they are Tagbanuas.

Such a pronouncement does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership even without a paper title and that the
CADT is merely a formal recognition of native title.55 This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
SEC. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native
Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated.
And along those lines, we have subsequently held in Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-e56 that:
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration
proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of
ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land. Just like a
registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only
recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-
interest's possession of the property since time immemorial. 57 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Nonetheless, the allegation that respondents are Tagbanuas and that they are representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous
Cultural Communities are conclusions of their status not derived from facts that should have been alleged. Indeed,
respondents did not even attempt to factually demonstrate their authority to represent the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Community. This is crucial since intra IPs' conflicts and contest for representation are not impossible.

In that regard, Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines "customary laws" as "a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages,
customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs" Section
3(i), on the other hand, refers to "indigenous political structures" consisting of "organizational and cultural leadership
systems, institutions, relationships, patterns and processes for decision making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs
such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays, Bodong Holders, or any other tribunal or body of similar
nature." To establish their status as Tagbanuas or their representation as representatives of Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Community, respondents, as "plaintiffs" claiming relief under the IPRA, should have alleged the ultimate facts constitutive
of their customs, political structures, institutions, decision making processes, and such other indicators of indigenous
persons nature distinct and native to them.

Truly, respondents should have asserted their identification through a reduction into facts of the defmition and description
of an ICC/IP in the IPRA:
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self
ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such
territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains[.] 58ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Also, the right of ancestral property requires historical proof which, of course, must proceed from allegations in the
petition. As noted in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Sec of Environment & Natural
Resources,59 the IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs rights over ancestral domains and ancestral lands where land is the central
element of the IPs' existence, viz.:
x x x There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more
accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or
stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land
reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right
to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that
those who work the land are its mere stewards. Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership,
which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, or
ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal
ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic
production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and
swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be
communally-owned. For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights
and obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership. The
residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because
while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an
exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned
land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness,
death in the family, or loss of crops. Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any
village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land
ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon
as inferior, if not inexistent.60 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Under the IPRA, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are two concepts, distinct and different from one another:
a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families
and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.61 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Respondents made no allegation outlining and tracing the history of their indigenous ownership of domain and land.

To further highlight the necessity of respondents' allegation of their status as Tagbanuas is the stewardship concept of
property which is most applicable to land among the Philippine IP:62
Land is not an individual item which a man owns for himself and by himself. For he secures the rights to land in two ways:
Firstly, as a citizen of the tribe he is entitled to some arable land and building land, and to the use of public pasturage,
fishing waters, and wild products. Secondly, in all tribes except those who shift their gardens widely and have an
abundance of land, he gets rights from membership of a village and a group of kinsfolk. That is, a man's right to land in
the tribal home depends upon his accepting membership of a tribe, with all its obligations. The right of every subject, while
he is a subject, is jealously safeguarded.63 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

It is also significant to note that respondents do not identify themselves with other Tagbanuas who have been awarded a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim as of 1998.64

Palpably, in the factual milieu obtaining herein, the NCIP does not have ipso facto jurisdiction over the petition of
respondents just by the mere expedient that their petition involves rights of ICCs/IPs.

One other thing jumps out from all the discussions herein: the IPRA does not contain a repeal of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 limiting the general jurisdiction of the trial, courts even as the IPRA purportedly grants the NCIP jurisdiction over "all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and
122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly," such an implied repeal is
predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. The
two laws refer to different subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of
conflicts between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts
dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where, among others, all
the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific wording of Batasang Pambansa
Bilang 129, Sections 19-2165 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-3566 on
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will
of Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the
words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their
remedies provided under customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction
over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA and
the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs, requires that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their
customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. The validity of respondents' claim is
another matter and a question that we need not answer for the moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues
raised by petitioners given that we already declared that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the case of respondents
against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 dated 26 April 2010
and the Resolution of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in RHO 4-01-2006 dated 30 November 2006
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

The petition in RHO 4-01-2006 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples.
Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, promulgated on 9 October 2014 declaring the jurisdiction
of the Regional Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is declared VOID for expanding the law. Respondents may refile
their complaint against petitioners in a court of general jurisdiction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtual lawlib rary