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Topic Freedom of expression, unprotected speech Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire1”.

The Minnesota Court rejected the trial


court’s ruling that the Ordinance was “impermissibly content-based” on
Case No. 90-7675| Jun 22, 1992 the ground that “the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means towards
accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the
Case R.A.V. v. St. Paul community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order.”
Name
Full Case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul ISSUES
Name Was the Ordinance substantially overbroad in such as a way that
Ponente Scalia, J: it criminalized not only speech unprotected by the First
Amendment (fighting words), but also expression that is
Digest by Karl D. protected by the same?

Doctrine RATIO DECIDENDI


RELEVANT FACTS YES. The Court ruled that the Ordinance was facially violative of the
First Amendment because it applied only to fighting words that insult or
On June 21, 1990, the petitioner, RAV, together with other teenagers incite violence on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, or gender."
allegedly assembled made a cross out of broken chair legs. It was placed
and burned in the front yard of an African American family. The police
charged R.A.V. under a City of St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, First, the Court held that it was bound by the Minnesota Court’s ruling
which provided: that the Ordinance “reached only those expressions that constitute
‘fighting words’ within the meaning of Chaplinsky.”
Whoever places on public or private property, a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, wrote that while there are
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable categories of expression which are “not within the area of
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the constitutionally protected speech” or that “the protection of the First
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct Amendment does not extend to them”, these statements must be taken
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
1 In this case, Walter Chaplinsky was arrested and convicted under a state law that
R.A.V., who was juvenile at the time, petitioned the trial court, which prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is
dismissed the charge on the ground that “the ordinance was substantially lawfully in a street or public area. The Court, in upholding Chaplinksy’s conviction,
overbroad and impermissibly content-based”. However, the Minnesota identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, dismissing the overbreadth claim obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." Justice
on the ground that the phrase “‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in Murphy found that Chaplinsky's insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct
harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the
others’ had been construed in earlier state cases to limit the ordinance's peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay
reach to ‘fighting words’ within the meaning of this Court's decision in behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the
Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and
morality. Accessed at Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire." Oyez, 29 Oct. 2018,
www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/315us568.
in context. What they actually mean is that “these areas of speech can, city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) – not invalid…”
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so
that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated The Court concluded, “Let there be no mistake about our belief that
to their distinctively proscribable content.” For one, while the burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
government may proscribe libel, it may not make the further content sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. the First Amendment to the fire.”

The Court held that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional. “Although DISPOSITIVE
the phrase in the ordinance, ‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others,’ has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case
to reach only those symbols or displays that amount to ‘fighting words,’ is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
the remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies
It is so ordered.
only to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ Displays containing abusive SEPARATE OPINIONS
invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they
are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish Justice White, concurring in the result: He said he would have decided
to use ‘fighting words’ in connection with other ideas – to express the issue on overbreadth grounds, adding that the “Court has disregarded
hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union two established principles of First Amendment law without providing a
membership, or homosexuality – are not covered. The First Amendment coherent replacement theory.”2
does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects.” Justice Blackmun, concurring: He noted that by forbidding categorization
of prohibited speech, as the Court has done here, the Court weakens
The Court also assailed the Ordinance’s selectivity, singling out certain First Amendment protections in other instances.3
types of expression for prohibition. “The reason why fighting words are
categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not Justice Stevens concurring in the result: He found the reasoning used to
reach the decision was incorrect. Specifically, the concurrence argued that
that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their
the majority is essentially stating that a government is only able to
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) proscribe all speech or no speech at all to come within the confines of
mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul the First Amendment (finding that content-based restrictions are
has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression – it has presumptively invalid). He said First Amendment jurisprudence is not
not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that
communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious)
manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of whatever
2 Accessed at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/r-v-v-city-st-
manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious paul/
intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the 3 Ibid.
that inflexible.4

4 Ibid.

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