1. CAYETANO vs.

MONSOD

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
 the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.]
, p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in
the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA
now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized
and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless,
a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems
in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value
of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing
a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
 "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer.
As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance
of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.
. . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
 by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is
far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

2. ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of
their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person participates
in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding
the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it,
is, to that extent, practicing law.

2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The
practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations
of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered
by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and
so forth. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13,
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals in
the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still have a restricted
concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by
FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.
(Illustrations: . . .)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and
definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted
the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS;
REASON. — It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .

7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of,
or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of
the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references;
and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.." . . The use of an
ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or
of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of
the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53
L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The
ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost
is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a
survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that
with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance
in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A’ and `B’ (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment
in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251

522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before
quoted.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and
Van O’Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,
i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?

x x x

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one’s
legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of establishing
a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed 4 .

x x x

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers,
as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds
of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant
to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law,
by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.chanrobles
law library : red
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen
that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las
Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the
place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary
newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of
acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

x x x

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than
a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only
if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering
a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take,
and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the

Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform
legal services.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s
acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject
to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor
can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

x x x

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in
law practice, albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call
for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to take measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that
legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s name — The Legal Clinic,
Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the
legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.

Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling
the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act could become justifiable.chanrobles
law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion International de Abogadas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing
law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar
with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the
law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice
for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to legal training or
lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the
law defining his client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by
law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant’s primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees’ wills.

"Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or
not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is
to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here,
since the situation is not presented by the proofs.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear `in
person, or by counsel, or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. `Counsel’ here means a licensed attorney, and `other representative’ one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succinctly states the rule of conduct:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A",
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in the
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of
law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record
does fully support, however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at
p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is
not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services"
or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term,
some of which we now take into account.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation
of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)."cralaw virtua1aw library

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations
of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of
computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services."
20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so
forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was
given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation
and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one of our specialists."cralaw
virtua1aw library

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
realtive who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with that
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case." 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards, or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered, as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance
only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity
to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments,
or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of
his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented
by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.chanrobles
law library : red

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%

Honest from 65% to 14%

Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time,
it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt
and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained
to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum,
since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for
or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
3. IN RE: CUNANAN

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules
of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held
since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72
per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although
the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was
enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy
per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three
bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions
for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally
to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of
the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

 1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because
they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated,
this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question
may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and
Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been
the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly
as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar
background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established
here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century?
From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day
(In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of
the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for
any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall
be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the
age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of
learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested
with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention
was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the
restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory
clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose
from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject,
unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in
the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to
entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants
for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot
find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the
mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the
court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and
explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the
students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that
it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing
statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted
to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken
in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of
this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to
the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law
has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it
stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In
so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which
properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in
the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting
upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney
General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration
of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the
powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which
it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department
of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of
sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of
the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of
justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of
our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution
of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which,
as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most
solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine
who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the
court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a
separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along
with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There
is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does
legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit
the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions.
There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit
to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to
the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J.
Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice
law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs.
Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right
upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is
and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises
from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious
practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex
rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the
bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of
government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the
exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit,
those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has
been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are
officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain
this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers
in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their
application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and
the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such
and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can
only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application
of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are
not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the
latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their
appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of
a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations
with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of
judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by
legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of
the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling
aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as
is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. —
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found
that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to
exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated
by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute
or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at
law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal,
modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to
the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the
inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the
practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in
the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that
would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission
to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of
provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An
Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,"
is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the
bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who,
prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the
United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or
judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position
of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of
the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant
city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction
of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass
the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that
he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be
delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in
the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that
despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute,
and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's
claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by
the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration
wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we
had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that
time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably
gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be
justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary
examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in
a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned
date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from
law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which
the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the
law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court
in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law,
either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31,
1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular
course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks
in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4,
1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the
proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in
a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue
of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by

the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in
the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of
evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of
persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const.
art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the
holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue
causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in
its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one,
having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35
N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl.
878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of
the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to
engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who
studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in
a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed
for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers
may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or
fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could
qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one
who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot
rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested.
The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-
648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of
being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted.
That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S.
Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to
follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as
are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open
to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of
study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of
the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of
those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C.
643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power
of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to
the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the
United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were
disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924,
known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application
of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as

follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must
rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished
from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens
only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In
other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the
difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to
operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent
in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then
the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means
his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the
bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent
and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during
those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been
done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has
been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice
law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the
years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the
order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will
or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal
should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to
the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article
is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of
the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only
this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No.
972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate
the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end
in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a
good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court
to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations
of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of
1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent
in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or
not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may
set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

4. IN RE: MELING

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA
BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because
the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the
Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction
can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending.Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.Petitions to take
the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied
by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing
his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As
held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render
a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended
that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
 Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4thJudicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Courtdeclared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn
task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein,
from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but
likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a
public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take
the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

5. IN RE: BENJAMIN DACANAY

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance
with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after
which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

6. PHIL. ASSOC. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS vs. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this
petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964,
of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a
non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on
29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their
non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf
of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided
in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but
his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the
motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the
motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The
case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al.
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the
division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by
a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members
of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees.
Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the
profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients
and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or
admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is
to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly
admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an attorney
with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and
the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of
law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact
that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot
be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an
attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees
should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU,
alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila
and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that
was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the
petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for
the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under
Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it
may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

7. CATU vs. RELLOSA

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was
then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for
free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the
contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2)
of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of
Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is
the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in
the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for
cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and
the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.14Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and
the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior
Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the
case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the
board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of
the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish
copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

8. ZETA vs. MALINAO

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,

vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:

Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the

municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney.
 Reliable information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He
makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with
attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for
a good government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he

would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has
cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them
telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the
judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes.
This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed
influences to urge persons to commit crimes.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time

record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he
would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can
be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has any application for leave.
He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed
as he has already committed crime.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable

information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we
are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed to practice
as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil
Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil
Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding
penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)

After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the
Honorable District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru
the Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-
complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has
also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by
the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving,
however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a
Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice
by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-
original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the
defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for
 Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To
Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)

the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and
answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for
investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report
pertinent parts of which read thus:

Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta,
who is said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said
Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person

Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection

with his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to
investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar,
Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.

Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books
the respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in
the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249
for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August
5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as
counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix
Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26,
1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as
counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17,
1970 in the same case.

From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the
following entries in his daily time record:

1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;

2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;

3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but
undertime by 1 hour;

4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;

5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and

 6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.

Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned
Municipal Courts with his daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15,
1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although according to the
testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962 as
well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent
appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his
daily time record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent
did not offer any plausible explanation for this irregularity.

xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the
evidence, he had made it appear that he was present in his office on December 15,
1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao,
et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil
Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest
Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand
for this irregularity.

With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act
2260, as amended, again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as
counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the
rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)

We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be
amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the
declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent,
apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in
violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear
therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts
appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal
practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they
could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as
counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants
a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative
than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court
or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

9. IN RE: ARGOSINO

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to
four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage
of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who
went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying
and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to
the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case,
to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take
the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

SO ORDERED.

10. A.C. No. 11316

CARONAN vs. CARONAN

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant

vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan
(respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former
has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice
of law.
The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born
on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where
complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at
the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started
working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11
Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a
Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the
family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three
(3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had
enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to
enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to
him.15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in
Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-
occupied with his job and had a family to support.17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to
report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in
relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer
Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his
and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3)
Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St.
Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his
Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St.
Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of
respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap
(Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from
Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's
contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning
respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using
the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant
also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent
tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he
was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession
of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among
his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the
present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.28

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense.
He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in
CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by
Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in
A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse,
Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he
filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties
failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date,
however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted
any.37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner)
issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert
all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo;
and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by
the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person
as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the
Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law
and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree
nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 46He also
recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a
member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to
institute appropriate actions against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College
of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from
the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A.
Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be
barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed
a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major
or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in
1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education
and earn a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's
name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law,
after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands
it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court explained the
essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables
a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar
when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had
been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his
client, as well as between him and the court.62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his
acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to
uphold its integrity and dignity.63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a
lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in
such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A.
Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

11. B.M. Noo. 2112

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO MUNESES

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support
of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice
his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE

Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

12. A.C. No. 10164

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint
against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of
a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full
payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance
fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent
documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of
the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that
on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which
they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each
time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of
the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return
the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his
professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan
Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but
denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he
received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be
filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents
relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not
commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants in
MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on
record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found
Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The
CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification
the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three
(3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren,
except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the
titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client
with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
 13. A. C. No. 5377

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.

ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1

In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga
guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's
Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of
Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law
for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries
public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006,
this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote
the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights
En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed]
[him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render
advisory opinions.13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009,
Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty.
Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a
notary public."15According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for
reconsideration.16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty.
Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold
the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17 The Commission
on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from
performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable
attention and action on the matter."18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19

In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the
period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear
as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of
this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require
him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from
performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.23

The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human
Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to
perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of
law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his
suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is
deemed excluded."25

In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's
allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:

(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift
relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they
may appear as counsel, stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of
law during the entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the
meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human Rights
[CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his
functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of complainant
against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift
order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he
continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These
managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office
and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human
Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and assistance
programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional level";33 and
"[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and expenditure of
the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of
the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35

Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed
thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the
penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that
may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive
authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and
would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty.
Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga
failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended
from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and
only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of
law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision
and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he
held his position as Regional Director.

With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law',
twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that]
moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be
disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to
resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for
issuance of a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty.
Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49

In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that
Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as
Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga
claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law,
the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to
comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing
of comment]."52

In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty.
Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty
imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on
him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of [Regional
Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will
"abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be
granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further
from the practice of law for six months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the
[legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano
v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that
work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal
talent"61 is practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power
to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into
regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in
its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations
and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and
functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of
the legal officer or investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of
action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution";68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or

subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and

f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are
usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily
members of the bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he
has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights
correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his
post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the
case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines resolved
to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of
Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of
CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77
(Emphasis in the original)

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights
did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga
an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was
also immaterial.1âwphi1 He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that
position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law
for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of
authority to practice law.1âwphi1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the
Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense will cause
his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before
the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc
Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by
Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted
Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a
notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth
by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277
dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly
repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for
having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty.
Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with
the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the
Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every
official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty.
Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being
served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is
sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and
imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution
caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority
to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this
court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has
the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary
qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83 To
enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
[maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months.
Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law,
effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

14. B.M. No. 1036

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant
further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of
the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar
bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On
the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel
for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed
the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act
as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there
was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

15. B.M. No. 2540

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw
virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9cralaw
virtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory
conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this
long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
and the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the
profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking
was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification.
At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar
because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have
made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the
necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of
criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this
case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of

law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the
one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNEDthat doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely
by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.