BJDC CONSTRUCTION v.
LANUZO Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police
Doctrine:
The party alleging the negligence of the other as
the cause of injury has the burden to establish
the allegation with competent evidence. If the
action based on negligence is civil in nature, the
proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Facts:
Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for
damages against BJDC Construction (company), a
single proprietorship engaged in the
construction business under its
Manager/Proprietor Janet S. de la Cruz. The
company was the contractor of the re-blocking
project to repair the damaged portion of one
lane of the national highway at San Agustin, Pili,
Camarines Sur from September 1997to
November 1997.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse
of the late Balbino Los Baños Lanuzo (Balbino)
who figured in the accident that transpired at the
site of the re-blocking work at about 6:30 p.m.
on October 30, 1997; that Balbino’s Honda
motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade
placed by the company in the right lane portion
of the road, causing him to lose control of his
motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented
road, resulting in his instant death; and that the
company’s failure to place illuminated warning
signs on the site of the project, especially during
night time, was the proximate cause of the death
of Balbino. She prayed that the company be held
liable for damages.
In its answer, the company denied Nena’s
allegations of negligence, insisting that it had
installed warning signs and lights along the
highway and on the barricades of the project;
that at the time of the incident, the lights were
working and switched on; that its project was
duly inspected by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the
Station; and that it was found to have
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the
safety of motorists.
The company insisted that the death of Balbino
was an accident brought about by his own
negligence, as confirmed by the police
investigation report that stated, among others,
that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that
time, and the accident occurred while Balbino
was overtaking another motorcycle; and that the
police report also stated that the road
sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.
Thus, it sought the dismissal of the complaint.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
company.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
W/N respondents had satisfactorily presented a
prima facie case of negligence which the
petitioner had not overcome with an adequate
explanation
Held:
The Court holds that an examination of the
evidence of the parties needs to be undertaken
to properly determine the issue. The Court must
ascertain whose evidence was preponderant, for
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the
party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
because a mere allegation is not evidence.
Generally, the party who denies has no burden
to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence
is given on either side. The burden of proof is on
the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual
allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on
the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly
the essential allegations but raises affirmative
defense or defenses, which if proved, will
exculpate him from liability.
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms
the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo
heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof,
did not establish by preponderance of evidence
that the negligence on the part of the company
was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of
Balbino.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight
to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal
than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo
heirs. There was justification for doing so,
because the greater probability pertained to the
former. Moreover, the trial court’s assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses and of their
testimonies is preferred to that of the appellate
court’s because of the trial court’s unique first-
hand opportunity to observe the witnesses and
their demeanor as such. The Court said in Cang
v. Cullen:
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
- even considered as conclusive and binding on
this Court - since the trial judge had the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and
note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grueling examination. Only the trial judge can
observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh of a witness, or his scant or full
realization of an oath - all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness'
honesty and sincerity. He can thus be expected
to determine with reasonable discretion which
testimony is acceptable and which witness is
worthy of belief.
Absent any showing that the trial court's
calibration of the credibility of the witnesses was
flawed, we are bound by its assessment. This
Court will sustain such findings unless it can be
shown that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misunderstood, misappreciated, or misapplied
substantial facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of
the case.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo
heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the
company considering that it has shown its
installation of the necessary warning signs and
lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal
accident was not caused by any instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the company. In
contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of
how he operated and managed his motorcycle.
The records disclose that he himself did not take
the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared,
Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a
fast speed, and in the process could not avoid
hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be
thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly
cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation
report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This
causation of the fatal injury went
uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and
findings that the company was not negligent in
ensuring safety at the project site. All the
established circumstances showed that the
proximate and immediate cause of the death of
Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the
Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on August 11, 2003 by
the Court of Appeals
MANONGSONG v. ESTIMO
Doctrine:
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of
evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, that which is offered
in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.
Facts:
Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and
Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children. The contested
property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street,
Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The
records do not show that the Property is
registered under the Torrens system.
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners")
[grandchildren of spouses Lopez] filed a
Complaint on 19 June 1992, alleging that
Manongsong and respondents are the owners
pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494
of the Civil Code, petitioners prayed for the
partition and award to them of an area
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or
its prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the
original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s
death, her children inherited the Property. Since
Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there
were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra.
Each of the five children, including Vicente
Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to
a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez’ sole
surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father’s
1/5 share in the Property by right of
representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are
the surviving spouses of Guevarra’s children and
their offspring, have been in possession of the
Property for as long as they can remember. The
area actually occupied by each respondent
family differs, ranging in size from approximately
25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only
descendants not occupying any portion of the
Property.
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters
and Leoncia Lopez – who each occupy 50 square
meter portions of the Property – and Joselito
dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement. However,
only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed
petitioners’ claim. The Jumaquio sisters
contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"),
supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the
Property to Guevarra’s daughter Enriqueta
Lopez Jumaquio. The Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN
NG LUPA ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful
possession of their portion of the Property for
more than thirty years, they also invoked the
defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners, and charged that petitioners were
guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that
the present action should have been filed years
earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was
alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached
legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for
partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was
already 33 years old.
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its
Decision of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of
petitioners. The trial court held that the
Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence
attacking its validity.
The CA reversed and set aisde the ruling of the
trial court.
Issue:
W/N petitioners were able to prove, by the
requisite quantum of evidence, that
Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and
therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of
evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, that which is offered
in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.
In this case, petitioners had the burden of proof
to establish their case by preponderance of
evidence.
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the
Kasulatan was void because the Property was
conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta
Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial
court’s conclusion that the Property was
conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather
on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil
Code applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
There was no evidence presented to establish
that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
to the present case. On the contrary, Tax
Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as
in 1949, the Property was declared solely in
Navarro’s name. This tends to support the
argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s
declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of
Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous
title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does
not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is
no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution of values, that is, the property sold
is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of
greater weight which petitioners failed to refute
by clear and convincing evidence, this Court
holds that petitioners were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the Property
belonged to Guevarra’s estate. There is
therefore no legal basis for petitioners’
complaint for partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA dismissing
the complaint of petitioners against Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is
AFFIRMED.
DATALIFT MOVERS v. BELGRAVIA REALTY
Doctrine:
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as
"inferences which the law makes so peremptory
that it will not allow them to be overturned by
any contrary proof however strong."
Facts:
The premises involved in this case is a warehouse
(bodega) used by petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc.
(Datalift for short) for its cargoes in connection
with its brokerage business. The warehouse
stands on a 3,967.70 squaremeter lot owned by
the Philippine National Railways (PNR) and
located at No. 883 Santibañez Street corner
Cristobal Street, Pandacan, Manila.
Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to
Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita,
hereafter), pursuant to a written contract
commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on
June 30, 1990 for a monthly rental of P6,282.49,
subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every
year.
Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special
arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia
Realty & Development Corporation (Belgravia
for short) whereby the latter would put up on the
lot a warehouse for its own use. True enough,
Belgravia did put up a warehouse occupying an
area of about 3,000 squaremeters of the lot.
However, instead of using the said warehouse
for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift.
After the one year contract period expired,
lessee Datalift continued in possession and
enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently
by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal
understanding of the parties. Subsequently,
Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly
rental. Because of the rental increase made by
Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly
rental for the warehouse. Thereafter,
Sampaguita addressed demand letters to
Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in
arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to
vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute.
The demands having proved futile, Belgravia
and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of
Manila their complaint for ejectment against
Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime
B. Aquino.
The MeTC of Manila, Branch 3, rendered
judgment for plaintiffs Sampaguita and Belgravia
but reduced the amount of rental arrearages to
a reasonable level of P80,000,00 a month.
The RTC, reechoing the MeTC’s ruling on the
authority of Sampaguita and Belgravia to
institute the complaint for ejectment as well as
the same court’s finding as to the reasonable
amount of rental in arrears due Belgravia,
affirmed in toto the assailed MeTC decision.
The CA dismissed the petitioners’ recourse
thereto and affirmed with slight modification the
challenged affirmatory decision of the RTC.
Issues:
W/N CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN IMPLIED
NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN PNR AND
RESPONDENTS (i.e. SAMPAGUITA and
BELGRAVIA) WHEN THE FORMER DID NOT TAKE
POSITIVE ACTION TO EJECT THE LATTER FROM
THE SUBJECT PREMISES;
W/N CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO QUESTION WHETHER
AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED
BETWEEN PNR AND THE RESPONDENTS
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
Relative to the first argument, the CA decision
pertinently reads:
There is no definite showing that the lease
contract between PNR and Sampaguita
Brokerage, Inc. had been effectively terminated.
As held by the court a quo: "(B)y PNR not taking
a positive action to eject Sampaguita from the
leased premises up to the present, again, there
is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between
PNR and Sampaguita.(Emphasis in the original.)
The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields
respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being
questioned by the petitioners as lessees,
regarding its title or better right of possession as
lessor because having admitted the existence of
a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are
barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better
right of possession as their lessor.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as
"inferences which the law makes so peremptory
that it will not allow them to be overturned by
any contrary proof however strong." As long as
the lessor-lessee relationship between the
petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case,
the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof,
however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or
better right of possession to the subject leased
premises than they have.
It was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to
rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title
or right of possession over the leased premises
as against the petitioners as lessees in this case.
If at all, Belgravia's title or right of possession
should only be taken cognizance of in a proper
case between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the
present case. Any ruling which the court may
render on this issue will, at the very least, be
an obiter dictum, if not outrightly ultra vires.
The apparent error made by the MeTC will,
however, not affect the result of the judgment
rendered in this case. In fact, the application of
the rule on conclusive presumption under the
afore-quoted Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens
the position of the MeTC that the petitioners
may be validly ordered to vacate the leased
premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise,
the logical consequence of the operation of this
conclusive presumption against the petitioners is
that they will never have the personality to
question whether an implied new lease was
created between PNR and the respondents,
because so long as there is no showing that the
lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the
lessor’s title or better right of possession as
against the lessee will eternally be a non-issue in
any proceeding before any court.
Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA,
being non-privies to the contract of lease
between PNR and respondent Sampaguita, the
petitioners have no personality to raise any
factual or legal issue relating thereto.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the CA is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the petitioners are ordered to pay only the
unpaid rentals from November 1994.
ZAFRA v. PEOPLE
Doctrine:
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of
regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by
bestowing distrust on the innocence of the
accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.
Facts:
The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Apolinario
Mendoza (SPO4 Mendoza), Chief of the
Investigation and Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Philippine National Police of Balagtas, Bulacan,
testified that on 12 January 2003, at around 4:30
in the afternoon, he conducted surveillance in
front of a sari-sari store at the corner of Miraflor
Subdivision and P. Castro Street in Balagtas,
Bulacan, due to reported drug trafficking in the
area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of
Zafra, Marcelino, and a certain Marlon Daluz
(Daluz) standing and facing each other. In that
position, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding
shabu, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil
and a disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal
activity, SPO4 Mendoza single-handedly
apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from
the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and
confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.
Then, he ordered the three to lie down; he
frisked them. Boarding a tricycle, he brought
them to the Balagtas Police Station, where he
personally marked the confiscated two (2)
sachets of shabu, one with VSD, the initials of
Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and the other with
EMR, the initials of Eroll Marcelino y Reyes.
On the following day, 13 June 2003, SPO4
Mendoza brought the accused and the items to
the crime laboratory for urine sampling and
laboratory examination, respectively. The test of
the items resulted to positive presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
The RTC convicted Zafra and Marcelino for the
crime of possession of shabu.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in affirming the conviction of
herein petitioners
Held:
We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and
Marcelino on the following grounds:
First, the prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4
Mendoza, testified that, from a distance, he saw
Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu by their bare
hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an
aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. Seeing
this illegal activity, he single-handedly
apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from
the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and
confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the
evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of
the witness and the testimony is entitled to great
weight and is generally not disturbed upon
appeal, such rule does not apply when the trial
court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact of weight or substance. In
the instant case, these circumstances are
present, that, when properly appreciated, would
warrant the acquittal of petitioners.
Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this
matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at
upon reliance on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of Mendoza’s official duty.
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of
regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by
bestowing distrust on the innocence of the
accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.
Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting
officer, who brought the petitioners to the police
station, who himself marked the confiscated
pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs,
media, and in the absence of the petitioners. His
colleagues were nowhere. And, worse, he was
the same person who took custody of the same
pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his
own to the crime laboratory for testing. No
inventory was ever done; no inventory was
presented in court.
The records readily raise significant doubts as to
the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4
Mendoza’s claim that the two sachets of shabu
presented in court were the same ones
confiscated from the petitioners, cannot be
taken at its face value, solely on the presumption
of regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO4
Mendoza blatantly broke all the rules
established by law to safeguard the identity of a
corpus delicti. There was even no mention about
the details of the laboratory examination of the
allegedly seized drugs. To allow this to happen is
to abandon everything that has been said about
the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of
custody. SPO4 Mendoza cannot alone satisfy the
requirements in RA No. 9165 which is anchored
on, expressly, the participation of several
personalities and the execution of specified
documents.
And, while jurisprudence has refined the
enumerated duties of an apprehending officer in
a drug case and has thus described the
equivalent requirements for a proper chain of
custody of the corpus delicti, still, the case at bar
cannot pass the constitutional requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In our constitutional system, basic and
elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on
the prosecution which must rely on the strength
of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may
be the reputation of the accused, for the law
presumes his innocence unless and until the
contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance,
acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
STAR TWO v. HOWARD KO
Doctrine:
Indeed, courts cannot consider evidence which
has not been formally offered because parties
are required to inform the courts of the purpose
of introducing their respective exhibits to assist
the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case
an objection thereto is made. Without a formal
offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take
no notice of the evidence even if it has been
marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception,
provided that the evidence has been identified
by testimony duly recorded and that it has been
incorporated in the records of the case.
Facts:
Jianshe Motorcycle Industries Philippines
Corporation (Jianshe) obtained various credit
facilities or loan accommodations from Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) from
2003-2004 to finance its importation of
motorcycles, motorcycle parts, motorcycle
accessories, and other related goods. To secure
the goods imported by Jianshe, RCBC required it
to execute trust receipts over these goods.
Moreover, to secure payment of all existing and
future obligations of Jianshe to RCBC,
respondents Howard Ko, Jimmy Ong, Min Min
See Ko, and Grace Ng Ong executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement3 dated
September 3, 2002, with a limited liability of ₱50
M.
Despite demand, Jianshe failed to pay its
obligations. RCBC thus filed a Complaint5 for
Specific Perfomance with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against Jianshe as
principal and respondents as sureties, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against all the
properties of Jianshe and respondents as may be
sufficient to satisfy RCBC’s principal claim of
₱25,636,339.40 conditioned upon the filing of
the required bond. The corresponding writ of
preliminary attachment was thereafter issued.
The RTC granted Howard Ko’s motion and
accordingly dismissed the case against
respondents, leaving Jianshe as the only
defendant. In dismissing the case, the trial court
stated that there was sufficient evidence to
prove that Howard Ko paid an amount more than
the limit provided under the Comprehensive
Surety Agreement.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the case against
respondents, RCBC filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
On August 31, 2007, the RTC denied RCBC’s
motion for reconsideration, but granted the
inclusion of petitioner as plaintiff in substitution
of RCBC.
Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On October 15, 2008, the CA
rendered the assailed Decision denying
petitioner’s petition.
Issue:
W/N THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND
WHIMSICALLY CONSIDERED AND RELIED ON
DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE NOT DULY
IDENTIFIED BY TESTIMONY OR OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE
Held:
The petition is without merit.
Indeed, courts cannot consider evidence which
has not been formally offered because parties
are required to inform the courts of the purpose
of introducing their respective exhibits to assist
the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case
an objection thereto is made. Without a formal
offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take
no notice of the evidence even if it has been
marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception,
provided that the evidence has been identified
by testimony duly recorded and that it has been
incorporated in the records of the case.
In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were
presented in support of respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the denial of their motion to
dismiss. A hearing was set for the reception of
their evidence, but petitioner failed to attend the
same. The pieces of evidence were thus
identified, marked in evidence, and incorporated
in the records of the case. Clearly, the trial court
correctly admitted and considered the evidence
of respondents warranting the dismissal of their
case.
The evidence in favor of the [respondents]
consisted of no less than RCBC documents
showing that said bank debited from their
various accounts the amounts which Jianshe
owed RCBC under the trust receipts. In the
subject petition, the petitioner has not claimed
that these evidence were fabricated. It cannot
say that, if present at the hearing or, if there
would be another hearing, it could prove that the
RCBC documents were false. It cannot because
those were genuine RCBC documents.
All it can say is that these were payments for "a
different credit line" or different "trust receipts"
secured by the Comprehensive Surety
Agreement which remains unpaid.
Petitioner, however, could not even allege the
specific "different credit line" or other trust
receipt. In the absence thereof, it could only
mean that the payments were for the Jianshe
accounts.

Granting arguendo that the receipts and trust

debit advices were for "a different credit line" or
different "trust receipts," it is immaterial as the
[respondents], as sureties, have already
exceeded their liability cap of ₱50 M.

The Court notes that the pieces of evidence

presented by respondents were documents,
such as official receipts, trust debit advices, and
passbooks, issued by no less than petitioner
itself. Payments were made by respondents
through the active participation of RCBC,
primarily by debiting the subject amounts from
respondents’ accounts with the bank.
Admittedly, it was Jianshe, as the principal,
which owed RCBC. Nowhere in petitioner’s
pleadings was it claimed that respondents also
owed the bank aside from their obligation as
surety to secure the principal obligation of
Jianshe. Undoubtedly, the debited amounts
from Howard Ko’s accounts were made to satisfy
his obligation as surety. Petitioner cannot now
claim that the payments were made by Jianshe
as principal and not by respondents as sureties
simply because the receipts were issued in the
name of Jianshe. As aptly observed by the CA,
the issuance of the receipts in the name of
Jianshe was done only to indicate that it was the
principal obligor. The issuance of the receipts
does not erase the fact that various amounts
were debited from the accounts of Howard Ko,
and certificates of time deposit in the name of
Howard Ko were applied as payment for
Jianshe’s obligations.

In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in

sustaining the dismissal of the case against
respondents as the claim or demand set forth in
the complaint has been paid or otherwise
extinguished.