Kuroda vs.

Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the
Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military
Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission
was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not
have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot
practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and
was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy.
Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention
and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all
persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of
laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and
regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted
even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and
people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation
are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled
“An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing
its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.”

G.R. No. L-22228 February 27, 1969

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, AL FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE
DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and THE REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

FACTS: The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar) rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA’s
Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169 for failure to submit the following:

1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly
verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods
from September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within
sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and

2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that
union within sixty days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV (1)
of its constitution and by-laws.
On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a
letter enclosing documents that supposed to comply with the abovementioned requirements, but the Registrar found
out that the following are still not complied with:

1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and
Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962.

2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly elected on October
(1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws.

Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to
November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one
Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial
statement to its members, said motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the
Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had “failed to submit the abovementioned requirements and
granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in
abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 (“Any labor organization, association or
union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire
legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations
within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and
the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph
“d” of this section:”) unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.

RULING: There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a
dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said
cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from those
conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby.

To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association or union of
workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents:

(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers of the association,
their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization;

(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not
members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of
the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and

(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last annual financial
report.

Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:

The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the
Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of
paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the
end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in
paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the
cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c) above
and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided.
The Paquete Habana
Citation. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320, 1900 U.S. LEXIS 1714 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1900)

Brief Fact Summary. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the U.S (P) officials was that
international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes of war.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the U.S (P) officials was that
international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes of war.

Facts. This appeal of a district court decree, which condemned two fishing vessels and their cargoes as prizes of war,
was brought by the owners (D) of two separate fishing vessels. Each of the vessel running in and out of Havana and
sailing under the Spanish flag was a fishing smack which regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. Inside
the vessels were fresh fish which the crew had caught.
The owners of the vessels were not aware of the existence of a war until they were stopped by U.S. (P) squadron. No
incriminating material like arms were found on the fishermen and they did not make any attempt to run the blockade
after learning of its existence not did they resist their arrest. When the owners (D) appealed, they argued that both
customary international law and writings of leading international scholars recognized an exemption from seizure at
wartime of coastal fishing vessels.

Issue. Are coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from prizes of war?

Held. (Gray, J.). Yes. Coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews are excluded from prizes of war. The
doctrine that exempts coastal fishermen with their vessels and crews from capture as prizes of war has been known
by the U.S. (P) from the time of the War of Independence and has been recognized explicitly by the French and
British governments. It is an established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels with their equipment
and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in
fish are exempt from capture as prizes of war. Reversed.

Discussion. Chief Justice Fuller who had a dissenting opinion which was not published in this casebook argued that
the captured vessels were of such a size and range as to not fall within the exemption. He further argued that the
exemption in any case had not become a customary rule of international law, but was only an act of grace that had
not been authorized by the President.

Human Rights Law Case Digest: Mejoff v. Director of Prisons (1949)

G.R. No. L-2855 July 30, 1949

Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights, constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law,

Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights

FACTS:
Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by
the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands.
He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there
was an order for his release.
But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines
illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October, 1948.
He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may justify the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a reasonable time

HELD: NO. Denied.

The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport,
the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the
deportee away.
Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense,
we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top
of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite
the expulsion of this petitioner.
On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was
apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the
deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the
Government admits that it cannot deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will
not interfere.
Nevertheless, supposing such precedents apply in this jurisdiction, still we have no sufficient data fairly to fix a
definite deadline.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due
process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under the shadows of
Philippine flag.

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,

vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

Lorenzo M. Tañada Jose W. Diokno and Haydee B. Yorac for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

Ponente: FERNANDO

FACTS:

Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an
open space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that
in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it
“to ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner filed suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because
it was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal of permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may be validly
enforced.

HELD:

NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.

RATIO:

[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising
from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances.”. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection
to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be confined
within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has
been here. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly
at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there
is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.

By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place.

Head Money Cases Edye v. Robertson 112 U.S. 580 (1884)

Facts:

In 1882 the Congress passed an act providing that a duty of fifty cents should be collected for each and every
passenger who was not a citizen of the United States, coming from a foreign port to any port within the United
States. Individuals and steamship companies brought suit against the collector of customs at New York, Mr. WH
Robertson, for the recovery of the sums of money collected. The act was challenge on the grounds that it violated
numerous treaties of the US government with friendly nations.

Issue:

WON the act is void because of the conflict with the treaty.

Ruling:

A treaty is a compact between independent nations, which depends for its enforcement upon the interest and honor
of the governments that are parties to a treaty. Treaties that regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the
contracting nations are in the same category as acts of Congress. When these rights are of such a nature as to be
enforced by a court of justice, the court resorts to the treaty as it would to a statute. However, a constitution gives a
treaty no superiority over an act on congress. In short, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign
nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as
Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.

Whitney v. Robertson
Citation. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386, 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1852 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1888)

Brief Fact Summary. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the court was that a treaty between the U.S and
the Dominican Republic guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the Dominican Republic
than was assessed on goods from any other country and that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar
imports.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, the one last in date will control.

Facts. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the court was that a treaty between the U.S and the Dominican
Republic guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the Dominican Republic than was
assessed on goods from any other country and that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar imports.

Issue. Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, will the one last in date control?

Held. (Field, J.). Yes. The one with a later date will control where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict. The act
of congress under which the duties were collected was passed after the treaty and therefore is controlling. Affirmed.

Discussion. A later inconsistent statute does not abrogate or repeal a treaty. The treaty still exists as an international
obligation although the terms of the treaty may not be enforceable.