Perlas-Bernabe Cases Syllabus

KMB HOTINGOY | PERLAS-BERNABE JURISPRUDENCE SYLLABI
G.R. No. 203466. February 25, 2015.*

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Estafa; The elements of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the offender’s
receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or
property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) demand by he offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.—Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as
amended, under which Benabaye was charged and prosecuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by
any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The
penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed. prisión mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.] x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence, namely: x x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to
the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property[.] The elements of estafa under
this provision are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money
or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c)
the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return
the money or property received.
Same; Theft; So long as the juridical possession of the thing
appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense
committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. —It bears to
stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the
employee. The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by
reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of
the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing
Page 1 of 682
appropriated did not pass to the employee perpetrator, the offense

committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence,
conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having
mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same
property constitutes estafa.
Same; Estafa; There is an essential distinction between the possession
of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise
delivered to him in agency by his principal.—In Chua-Burce v. CA, 331
SCRA 1 (2000), the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-
Burce (Chua-Burce) of estafa onthe ground that the element of juridical
possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that
she had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto,
in Guzman v. CA, 99 Phil. 703 (1956), where a travelling sales agent
was convicted of the crime of estafa for his failure to return to his
principal the proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the
Court had occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of
a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability
for estafa, viz.: There is an essential distinction between the possession
of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise
delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment
by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a
mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the
bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances, he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault.
Page 2 of 682
G.R. No. 191703. March 12, 2012.*

CRESENCIO BAÑO AND HEIRS OF THE DECEASED AMANCIO
ASUMBRADO, NAMELY: ROSALINDA ASUMBRADO, VICENTE
ASUMBRADO, ROEL ASUMBRADO, ANNALYN ASUMBRADO,
ARNIEL ASUMBRADO, ALFIE ASUMBRADO and RUBELYN
ASUMBRADO, petitioners, vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC./CERES
LINER, INC. and WENIFREDO SALVAÑA, respondents.
Civil Law; Common Carriers; Gross Negligence; Words and Phrases;
Gross Negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be effected.
—In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific
Airways Corporation, 629 SCRA 219 (2010), the Court has defined gross
negligence as “one that is characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.”
Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary Damages are
awarded to serve as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against
the repetition of similar deleterious actions.—The CA erred in deleting
the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve as a
warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar
deleterious actions. However, the award should be tempered as it is not
intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. Thus, the Court
reinstates the separate awards of exemplary damages to petitioners in
the amount of P50,000.00.
Page 3 of 682
G.R. No. 186469. June 13, 2012.*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOVER
MATIAS y DELA FUENTE, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Sexual Abuse; Statutory Rape; Under Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610 in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-
A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua
—on the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA
7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code.—In the case of People v. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16 (2011),
which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v.
Dahilig, 651 SCRA 778 (2011), and People v. Abay, 580 SCRA 235
(2009), the Court explained: Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in
relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of
age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be
subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a
felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b),
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) is penalized with reclusion perpetua.—The RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, convicted appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that
AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the
records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make
her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6,
2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A
of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). It bears pointing out
that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for sexual
abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal
medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.
Page 4 of 682
G.R. No. 190875. June 13, 2012.*

ANICETO BANGIS substituted by his heirs, namely: RODOLFO B.
BANGIS, RONNIE B. BANGIS, ROGELIO B. BANGIS, RAQUEL B.
QUILLO, ROMULO B. BANGIS, ROSALINA B. PARAN, ROSARIO B.
REDDY, REYNALDO B. BANGIS, and REMEDIOS B. LASTRE,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF SERAFIN AND SALUD ADOLFO,
namely: LUZ A. BANNISTER, SERAFIN ADOLFO, JR., and
ELEUTERIO ADOLFO rep. by his Heirs, namely: MILAGROS, JOEL,
MELCHOR, LEA, MILA, NELSON, JIMMY and MARISSA, all
surnamed ADOLFO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court involves only
questions of law and not of facts.—At the outset, it should be
emphasized that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court involves only questions of law and not of facts. A
question of law exists when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
given set of facts while a question of fact arises when there is doubt as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Civil Law; Antichresis; For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article
2134 of the Civil Code requires that the amount of the principal and of
the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of
antichresis shall be void.—For the contract of antichresis to be valid,
Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that “the amount of the principal
and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract
of antichresis shall be void.” In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were
indisputably unable to produce any document in support of their claim
that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis was an antichresis, hence,
the CA properly held that no such relationship existed between the
parties.
Same; Land Titles; If two certificates of title purport to include the same
land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the
original certificates from which the certificates of titles were derived.—
As held in the case of Top Management Programs Corporation v. Luis
Fajardo and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City, 652 SCRA 18
(2011): “if two certificates of title purport to include the same land,
whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original
certificates from which the certificates of titles were derived.” Having,
thus, traced the roots of the parties’ respective titles supported by the
records of the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay City, the courts a quo
were correct in upholding the title of the Heirs of Adolfo as against TCT
No. T-10567 of Bangis, notwithstanding its earlier issuance on August
18, 1976 or long before the Heirs of Adolfo secured their own titles on
May 26, 1998. To paraphrase the Court’s ruling in Mathay v. Court of
Appeals, 295 SCRA 556 (1998): where two (2) transfer certificates of
title have been issued on different dates, the one who holds the earlier
title may prevail only in the absence of any anomaly or irregularity in
Page 5 of 682
the process of its registration, which circumstance does not obtain in

this case.
Same; Same; No title in derogation of that of the registered owner can
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.— Settled is the rule
that no title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, even if
acquisitive prescription can be appreciated in this case, the Heirs of
Bangis’ possession being in bad faith is two years shy of the requisite
30-year uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137
of the Civil Code.
Same; Interest Rates; Loans; A liability based on a loan or forbearance
of money, shall be subject to legal interest of 12% per annum.—
Following the Court’s ruling in the iconic case of Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), the foregoing liability,
which is based on a loan or forbearance of money, shall be subject to
legal interest of 12% per annum from the date it was judicially
determined by the CA on March 30, 2009 until the finality of this
Decision, and not from 1975 (the date of the constitution of the
mortgage); nor from 1998 (when an attempt to pay was made) or in
2000 at the time the complaint was filed, because it was the Heirs of
Adolfo and not Bangis who filed the instant suit to collect the
indebtedness. Thereafter, the judgment award inclusive of interest shall
bear interest at 12% per annum until its full satisfaction.
Page 6 of 682
G.R. No. 180308. June 19, 2012.*

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN and
MANUEL D. ANDAL, petitioners, vs. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON and HON.
SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Article VI, Section 21 of

the Constitution, provides as follows: “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.”—The respondents Senate Committees’
power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and
upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of
the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of
the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this
case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
Same; Right to Counsel; The right to be assisted by counsel can only be
invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the
commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. —Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal’s
allegation that their constitutionallyguaranteed right to counsel was
violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is
specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a
person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a
crime, and therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation.
Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel.
Page 7 of 682
G.R. No. 190144. August 1, 2012.*

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. CARLITO LEE,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Parties; Section 5, Rule

65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in court must be impleaded as private
respondents.—Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
that persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in court must be
impleaded as private respondents. Upon the merger of Citytrust and
BPI, with the latter as the surviving corporation, and with all the
liabilities and obligations of Citytrust transferred to BPI as if it had
incurred the same, BPI undoubtedly became a party interested in
sustaining the proceedings, as it stands to be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case.
Actions; Garnishment; Upon service of the writ of garnishment, the
garnishee becomes a “virtual party” or “forced intervenor” to the case
and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to
comply with its orders and processes.—It is a settled rule that upon
service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual
party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby
acquires jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and
processes. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Ramolete, 203 SCRA
487 (1991), the Court ruled: In order that the trial court may validly
acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not
necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not
be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial
court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who
has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is
service upon him of the writ of garnishment. The Rules of Court
themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons
or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable. xxxx Through the
service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual
party” to, or a “forced intervenor” in, the case and the trial court
thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with all orders
and processes of the trial court with a view to the complete satisfaction
of the judgment of the court.
Same; Same; Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment
for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him
from a stranger to the litigation.—Garnishment has been defined as a
specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment
debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. A writ of
attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates
at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It places the
attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until
the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is
established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.
Page 8 of 682
Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not permitted to dissolve
or discharge a preliminary attachment or garnishment except on
grounds specifically provided in the Revised Rules of Court.—The RTC is
not permitted to dissolve or discharge a preliminary attachment or
garnishment except on grounds specifically provided in the Revised
Rules of Court, namely, (a) the debtor has posted a counter-bond or has
made the requisite cash deposit; (b) the attachment was improperly or
irregularly issued as where there is no ground for attachment, or the
affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or insufficient; (c) the
attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the
excess; (d) the property attachment is exempt from preliminary
attachment; or (e) the judgment is rendered against the attaching
creditor.
Page 9 of 682
G.R. No. 191792. August 22, 2012.*

ANGELITO CASTRO, RAYMUNDO SAURA and RAMONITO
FANUNCION, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY and MANUEL V. PANGILINAN,
respondents.
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA); The benefits of a

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) extend only to laborers and
employees who are members of the collective bargaining unit.—Settled
is the rule that the benefits of a CBA extend only to laborers and
employees who are members of the collective bargaining unit. x x x
Petitioners were no longer employees of PLDT nor members of the
collective bargaining unit represented by MKP when the CBA was signed
on March 14, 2001 or when it became effective on November 9, 2000
and are, thus, not entitled to avail of the benefits under the new CBA.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in
directing each of the petitioners to return the amount of P133,000.00
which they respectively received from respondents.
Page 10 of 682
G.R. No. 196883. August 22, 2012.*

GLOBAL RESOURCE FOR OUTSOURCED WORKERS (GROW), INC.
and MS RETAIL KSC/MS RETAIL CENTRAL MARKETING CO. and
MR. EUSEBIO H. TANCO, petitioners, vs. ABRAHAM C. VELASCO
AND NANETTE T. VELASCO, respondents.
Labor Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A party who has not
appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than the one
granted in the appealed decision; Exception.—In the case of Bahia
Shipping Services, Inc. v. Chua, 550 SCRA 600 (2008), the Court cited
an exception to the rule that a party who has not appealed cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed
decision. It stated: Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a
judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
already granted under said judgment. However, when strict adherence
to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that of an
illegally dismissed employee to monetary compensation as provided by
law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to pave the
way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
Same; Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts, like an
employment contract, have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.—Obligations arising
from contracts, like an employment contract, have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.
When the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations governs. However, when the contract is vague and
ambiguous, as in the case at bar, it is the Court’s duty to determine the
real intention of the contracting parties considering the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the latter.
Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; In case of conflict
between the text of a contract and the intent of the parties, it is the
latter that prevails.—It should be emphasized that in case of conflict
between the text of a contract and the intent of the parties, it is the
latter that prevails, for intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording
which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere
typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Two-Notice Rule; To be totally
free from liability, the employer must not only show sufficient ground
for the termination of employment but it must also comply with
procedural due process by giving the employees sought to be dismissed
two notices.—To be totally free from liability, the employer must not
only show sufficient ground for the termination of employment but it
Page 11 of 682
must also comply with procedural due process by giving the employees
sought to be dismissed two notices: 1) notice of the intention to
dismiss, indicating therein the acts or omissions complained of, coupled
with an opportunity for the employees to answer and rebut the charges
against them; and 2) notice of the decision to dismiss.
Same; Same; Nominal Damages; The employers’ failure to observe due
process when it terminated the worker’s employment for just cause did
not invalidate the dismissal but rendered the former liable for nominal
damages.—The petitioners’ failure to observe due process when it
terminated respondents’ employment for just cause did not invalidate
the dismissal but rendered petitioners liable for nominal damages.
Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The amount
thereof is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Considering
the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, the Court deems it
proper to award to each of the respondents PhP30,000.00 as nominal
damages.
Page 12 of 682
G.R. No. 189774. September 18, 2012.*

DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, FORMER CHAIRMAN, TARIFF
COMMISSION, EDGARDO B. ABON, CHAIRMAN, JAIME A. CASAS,
EPICTETUS PATALINGHUG, ANTHONY R. A. ABAD, ILUMINADA O.
BOBADILLA, FLORDELIZA A. HERNANDEZ, MA. TERESITA M.
PERALTA, RAYMUND GED T. VEGA, RIZALINA C. SOLANO,
WILFREDO M. AQUINO, OCTAVILLA L. MALANA, GRACELYN L.
RAMOS, RICO S. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS G. NAZARETH, CRISANTO
ABARQUEZ, NELIA A. VARGAS, MA. FELICIDAD D. DONOR,
EUNICE S. NARCISO, ISAGANI D. GARDUQUE, NINA EDISSA M.
SANTOS, EDWIN B. DE GUZMAN, ROSALINDA D. LAMBOJON,
ROMEO U. SALUTA, VICENTE M. QUEROL, JR., MERLY NAGAMOS,
LIWAYWAY A. GUIAM, LOURDES C. DEL ROSARIO, WILSON M.
RUIZ, DIANA MAR T. CASAS, DELIA T. DELLORO, MA. ISABEL M.
DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA M. CASTRO, EVANGELINE D. ALENSUELA,
VERONICA S. DEVERA, ROBERTO A. LAVIÑA, ERIC F. DE LOS
REYES, FATIMA P. COMSON, JULIETTA G. GUTIERREZ, RAQUEL H.
SANTIAGO, TERESITA M. SAUS, RICARDO A. MALANA, ERENESTO
T. TUMBAGAHAN, JR., WILFREDO C. PEÑAVERDE, MANUEL A.
VALLEJO, PEDRO P. RAZO, PEDRO G. TAN, HERMINIO A. SANTOS,
RODOLFO A. TANDAS, IÑIGO L. WANIWAN, WILSON V. PAMISAL,
ALFREDO M. GOMEZ, NORBERTO M. BANTUG, MONTE R. DEL
ROSARIO, LEONCIA N. AREVALO, BENJAMIN SANTOS, JR., DANILO
T. POSTOLERO, DANILO VALDEMORO, VISITACION N. CABUNDOC,
MICAELO P. DEL ROSARIO, FILOMENA M. GERONIMA, EDGARDO
R. MARALIT, ARTEMIO D. BERNARDINO, ZAIDA B. PASCUAL, POE
C. ALCAZAREN, SOLEDAD BANGAY, MA. LUISA D. LABORTE,
NIEVES CRISTINA M. CAPULONG, THELMA G. JACOBE, VICTORIA
TAGONG, MA. TERESITA RAPIRAP, VICTOR JOSE ZAMORA, MA.
THERESA NORIEGA, LILIBETH CASAKIT, NORMA BUENVISTA,
CESARIO S. GONZALES, JR., MARILYN BITANGA, EULALIA L.
AQUINO, ENRIQUETA OCAMPO, GLORIA MELANIE R. LUIS-ISAAC,
MILAGROSA TUAZON, JAIME G. DIZON, SALVADOR H. DE LUNA,
EDWARD S. A. BESANA, REYNALDO G. CRUZ, RAMIRO CRUZ,
LORETO CARSI-CRUZ, JENNIFER G. BONDOC, CESAR M. PALAFOX,
JR., ATTY. REYNATO R. DEVERA, CEFERINO G. BAUTISTA,
MANUEL R. AGDEPPA, RUBEN ROZAL, ROMAN ADRIOSULA,
GUILLERMO COMAYAS, ISIDORA ACOLOLA, ESPERANZA
PALOMATA, ELVIRA IGNACIO, MA. LOURDES SALUTA, GLORIA
RUEDA, JOCELYN A. DE LOS REYES, ELISEO YUTOB, GLORIA M.
AGATO, RAMON LUCERO, JR., DANNY JOSE MATUTINA, ANGELITA
R. FERNANDO, JEAN CABALLES, FRANKLIN PRESTOUSA, MEIJI
TEMPLO, ZENAIDA LACAR, EMMANUEL A. CRUZ, MARISSA
MARICOSA MACAM, MA. THERESA PACLIBARE, JESUS EMEN,
REBECCA DOMINGO, VEDASTO TINANA, MA. SOCORRO CHUA,
IMELDA LIGUATON, CHARITY MALTO, BEVERLY TUMBAGAHAN,
LUCIA AYSON, LETICIA T. FERNANDEZ, LODIVINA PUNZALAN,
MONETTE DEAPERA, AMELIA P. DOMINGO, MARILOU P.
MENDOZA, LEONARDO D. GABRIEL, JR., NYDIA COMETA,
Page 13 of 682
ROMULO PANTI, ORLANDO TUPAZ, ZENAIDA SALDUA, ROWENA

PAJE, BRAULIO BANGAY, DELIA CRUZ, MARILYN A. ALBAR,
LOURDES SALAZAR, FERNANDA Z. NATIVIDAD, DIONISIA
CANONIZADO, CECILIA DOMINGUEZ, MELITTA VELACRUZ,
JONATHAN ALABOT, and RODELIO DAMPIL, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE I, respondents.
Administrative Law; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Administrative

Order No. 161; Administrative Order (AO) 161 was issued to rationalize
the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a uniform set of rules.
—AO 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive
benefits under a uniform set of rules. It sought to address the
dissension and dissatisfaction—which came about when some
department heads granted incentive benefits of varying amounts to
their officials and employees based on the provisions of Sections 31, 35
and 36 (2), Chapter 5, Subtitle I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987—among those government employees who received less or no
benefits due to lack of funds. It recognized the need to have a
“standard system of incentive pay based on productivity and
performance among officials and employees of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds that Administrative Order
(AO) 161 was issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments; There is only one Chief Executive who directs
and controls the entire executive branch, and all other executive
officials must implement in good faith his directives and orders.—In the
present case, and in line with the pronouncements in Casal v.
Commission on Audit, 509 SCRA 138 (2006) and Blaquera v. Alcala, 295
SCRA 366 (1998), the Court finds that AO 161 was issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments, which
Chairman Velasco was duty bound to observe. “Executive officials who
are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive branch. There is only
one Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire executive
branch, and all other executive officials must implement in good faith
his directives and orders. This is necessary to provide order, efficiency
and coherence in carrying out the plans, policies and programs of the
executive branch.”
Same; Public Officials; Public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted beyond their scope of authority or
where there is a showing of bad faith.—Indeed, a public officer is
presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted beyond their scope of authority or where there is a
showing of bad faith. Thus, in the case of Casal v. Commission on Audit,
509 SCRA 138 (2006), the Court held liable the approving officers who
authorized the grant of productivity award in complete disregard of the
Page 14 of 682
prohibition declared by a presidential issuance, ratiocinating that: The

failure of petitioners-approving officers to observe all these issuances
cannot be deemed a mere lapse consistent with the presumption of
good faith. Rather, even if the grant of the incentive award were not for
a dishonest purpose as they claimed, the patent disregard of the
issuances of the President and the directives of the COA amounts to
gross negligence, making them liable for the refund thereof. Similarly in
the present case, the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers
to abide with the provisions of AO 103 and AO 161 overcame the
presumption of good faith. The deliberate disregard of these issuances
is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Therefore, the
petitioners approving officers are accountable for the refund of the
subject incentives which they received.
Same; Same; With regard to the employees who had no participation in
the approval of the subject incentives, they were neither in bad faith
nor were they grossly negligent for having received the benefits under
the circumstances; Being in good faith, they are therefore under no
obligation to refund the subject benefits which they received.—With
regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval of the
subject incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly
negligent for having received the benefits under the circumstances. The
approving officers’ allowance of the said awards certainly tended to
give it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees.
Being in good faith, they are therefore under no obligation to refund the
subject benefits which they received.
Page 15 of 682
G.R. No. 171633. September 18, 2013.*

JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA, petitioner, vs. ERINEO S. MALIKSI,
in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Cavite, RENATO A.
IGNACIO, in his capacity as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Province of Cavite, MARIETTA O’HARA DE VILLA, HEIRS OF
HIGINO DE VILLA, GOLDENROD, INC., SONYA G. MATHAY, AND
ELEUTERIO M. PASCUAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; Jurisprudence dictates

that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or
ordinance.—Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case, public funds of the
Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise
judgment. As such, Remulla — being a resident-taxpayer of the Province
of Cavite — has the legal standing to file the petition for annulment of
judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on
said ground. Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds
have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla from
assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be
misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural
technicality which may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so
warrant. As observed in Mamba v. Lara, 608 SCRA 149 (2009), the Court
did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious
legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of
pesos were involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer
need not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or
to seek the annulment of the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to
question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
Page 16 of 682
G.R. Nos. 187308 and 187517. September 18, 2013.*

HILARIA BAGAYAS, petitioner, vs. ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD
BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS, MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL
BAGAYAS, respondents.
Civil Law; Partition; Co-ownership; An action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.—An
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved. The determination, therefore, as to the existence of
co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. As
held in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576
(1989): The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists,
and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may
be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand,
with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received
by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either
the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the
order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Torrens Title; Collateral Attack; In Lacbayan v.
Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677 (2011), which is an action for partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of coownership between
the parties, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.—In Lacbayan v.
Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677 (2011), (Lacbayan) which is an action for
partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne
in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan: There is no
dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,
but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of
Page 17 of 682
title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the

certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action or proceeding is deemed to
be an attack on a certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the
same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the
certificate of title was decreed.—Jurisprudence instructs that an action
or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title when its
objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment
pursuant to which the certificate of title was decreed. Corollary thereto,
it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of
title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated in Borbajo v.
Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., 450 SCRA 315 (2005): It is a well-known
doctrine that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title was
procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only
for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral
proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed,
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Page 18 of 682
G.R. No. 170018. September 23, 2013.*

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by OIC-
SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and BASILAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING
CORPORATION (BATCO), respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Lands; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP); Under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) shall cover all public and private agricultural lands,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced; Lands
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising are classified as
industrial, not agricultural lands and, thus, exempt from agrarian
reform.―Under RA 6657, the CARP shall cover all public and private
agricultural lands, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced. Section 3(c) thereof defines “agricultural land” as land
devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Lands devoted to livestock,
poultry, and swine raising are classified as industrial, not agricultural
lands and, thus, exempt from agrarian reform. As such, the DAR has no
power to regulate livestock farms.
Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Jurisdiction; The
determination of the land’s classification as either an agricultural or
industrial land — and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under
agrarian reform exemption — must be preliminarily threshed out before
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), particularly, before the DAR
Secretary.―The determination of the land’s classification as either an
agricultural or industrial land — and, in turn, whether or not the land
falls under agrarian reform exemption — must be preliminarily threshed
out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Verily, issues
of exclusion or exemption partake the nature of Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the competence and
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Towards this end, the latter is ordained
to exercise his legal mandate of excluding or exempting a property from
CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in
accordance with the law and applicable jurisprudence. Thus,
considering too his technical expertise on the matter, courts cannot
simply brush aside his pronouncements regarding the status of the land
in dispute, i.e., as to whether or not it falls under CARP coverage.
Same; Same; In order to be entitled to exclusion/exemption, it must be
shown that the land is exclusively devoted to livestock, swine or poultry
raising.―It is settled that in order to be entitled to exclusion/exemption,
it must be shown that the land is exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
or poultry raising. The land must be shown to have been used for such
purposes as of the effectivity of RA 6657, or on June 15, 1988, in order
to prevent any fraudulent declaration of areas supposedly used for
these purposes as well as to protect the rights of agrarian beneficiaries
Page 19 of 682
therein. This is in consonance with Section 73(c) of RA 6657 which

prohibits the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into
any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657
to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land
tilled by them.
Same; Same; In order to be entitled to exemption, the applicant must
prove that: (a) the land sought to be excluded from Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage is exclusively, directly and
actually used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of June 15,
1988; (b) there should be one head of cattle per hectare of land and
seven heads of goat per hectare of land; and (c) there should be 21
heads of cattle for every 1.7815 has. of infrastructure, 147 heads of
goat or sheep for every 0.7205 hectare of infrastructure, and 21 heads
of swine for every 0.5126 hectare of infrastructure.―Under DAR AO 09-
93, in order to be entitled to exemption, the applicant must prove that:
(a) the land sought to be excluded from CARP coverage is exclusively,
directly and actually used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of
June 15, 1988; (b) there should be one head of cattle per hectare of
land and seven heads of goat per hectare of land; and (c) there should
be 21 heads of cattle for every 1.7815 has. of infrastructure, 147 heads
of goat or sheep for every 0.7205 hectare of infrastructure, and 21
heads of swine for every 0.5126 hectare of infrastructure. Consistent
with the prohibition under Section 73(c) of RA 6657, DAR AO 09-93
likewise provided that “[a]ny act of a landowner to change or convert
his agricultural land to livestock, poultry and swine raising after [June
15, 1988], with the intent to avoid the application of [RA 6657] to his
landholdings, shall be considered invalid and illegal and shall not affect
the coverage of his landholding under CARP.”
Page 20 of 682
G.R. No. 171206. September 23, 2013.*

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLAVIANO MAGLASANG and
SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG,
EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A. MAGLASANG,
GLENDA A. MAGLASANG ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA
A. MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A.
MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A. MAGLASANG, MA. MILALIE A.
MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A.
MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-
NAMED DECEASED PARENTS, petitioners, vs. MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT [SPV-AMC], INC. [FSAMI], respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons; Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the
settlement proceedings of their estate.―Claims against deceased
persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found
under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary
actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these
special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86)
provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate: SEC.
7. Mortgage debt due from estate.—A creditor holding a claim against
the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may
abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in
this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or
other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or
he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose
the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and
in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing
herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from
redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for
which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court
shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.
Civil Law; Mortgages; The secured creditor has three remedies/options
that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b)
foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other
security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription,
without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.―Jurisprudence
Page 21 of 682
breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the
secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively
adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may
choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the
estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the
mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the
same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim
for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these
remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each
other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
others. With respect to real properties, the Court in Bank of America v.
American Realty Corporation, 321 SCRA 659 (1999), pronounced: In our
jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are
deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one
remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the
filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant
to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice
but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Venue;
The stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be
applied alternatively. In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the
foreclosure sale to be done within the province where the property to be
sold is situated.―Case law states that absent such qualifying or
restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the
stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue.
As a consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act
No. 3135 can be applied alternatively. In particular, Section 2 of Act No.
3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province where
the property to be sold is situated, viz.: SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be
made legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated;
and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be
made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or
in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or
part thereof is situated.
Page 22 of 682
G.R. No. 204603. September 24, 2013.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER,
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, petitioners, vs. HERMINIO HARRY
ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE’S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON,
RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES
ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, SHERYL
BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA
CARAMOAN, ALDWIN CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY
DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, ANNA MARIE GO, ANNA
ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN LEE, LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III,
WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES,
MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO,
and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, respondents.
Remedial Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal

can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act
is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; Case law states that not every error in
the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.―An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross as to constitute an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law. In this relation, case law states that
not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law
or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degree of gravity, as
above-described, must be met.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; Requisites for an Action
for Declaratory Relief.―Case law states that the following are the
requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of
the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second,
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of
the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose
Page 23 of 682
interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Same; Justiciable Controversy; Words and Phrases; A justiciable
controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.―Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by
“ripening seeds” it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be
dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it
has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and
violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes
a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided
that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
Page 24 of 682
G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.*

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M.
ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, petitioners, vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and
MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer
and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Petitioners had the burden of

proving their own allegation.—Petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar
case of Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 206 (1999) citing United
States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the
presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that
public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack
of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-
compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local
government’s noncompliance was a negative allegation essential to the
oppositor’s cause of action.
Page 25 of 682
G.R. No. 196112. February 26, 2014.*

GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondent.
Telecommunication Industry; Public Service Act; National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC); Jurisdiction; The National
Telecommunications Commission’s authority to impose fines for a public
service utility’s violation or failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate/s issued by it is expressly sanctioned under
Section 21 of the Public Service Act.— The NTC’s authority to impose
fines for a public service utility’s violation or failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of any certificate/s issued by it is expressly
sanctioned under Section 21 of the Public Service Act which reads as
follows: Section 21. Every public service violating or failing to comply
with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions
or regulations of the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not
exceeding two hundred pesos per day for every day during which such
default or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized
or empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing. The
fines so imposed shall be paid to the Government of the Philippines
through the Commission, and failure to pay the fine in any case within
the time specified in the order or decision of the Commission shall be
deemed good and sufficient reason for the suspension of the certificate
of said public service until payment shall be made. The remedy
provided in this section shall not be a bar to, or affect any other remedy
provided in this Act but shall be cumulative and additional to such
remedy or remedies.
Same; Criminal Law; Prescription of Offenses; The 60-day prescriptive
period provided under Section 28 of the Public Service Act can be
availed of as defenses only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter
IV thereof, and not in proceedings that pertain to the regulatory or
administrative aspects of a public service utility’s observance of the
terms and conditions of his permit to operate.— The 60-day prescriptive
period provided under Section 28 of the Public Service Act can be
availed of as defenses only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter
IV thereof, and not in proceedings that pertain to the regulatory or
administrative aspects of a public service utility’s observance of the
terms and conditions of his permit to operate, viz.: This Court has
already held, in Collector of Internal Revenue et al. vs. Buan, G.R. L-
11438; and Sambrano v. Public Service Commission, G.R. L-11439 and
L-11542, decided on July 31, 1958, that the 60-day prescriptive period
fixed by section 28 of the Public Service Law is available as a defense
only in criminal or penal proceedings filed under Chapter IV of the Act.
Consequently, the Public Service Commission is not barred from
receiving evidence of the prescribed violations for the purpose of
determining whether an operator has or has not faithfully kept the
conditions of his certificate of permit, whether he failed or not to render
Page 26 of 682
the services he is required to furnish to the customers, and whether or

not the infractions are sufficient cause to cancel or modify the
certificate. Proceedings of this kind are held primarily to ensure
adequate and efficient service as well as to protect the public against
the operator’s malfeasances or abuses; they are not penal in character.
True, the cancellation of the certificate may mean for an operator actual
financial hardship; yet the latter is merely incidental to the protection of
the traveling public. Hence, in refusing to admit evidence of prescribed
violations as part of the complainant’s case against the Philippine
Rabbit Lines for a modification or cancellation of the latter’s permit, we
hold that the Commission committed error.
Same; Same; Same; It is well to note that the criminal proceedings
under Chapter IV of the Public Service Act, as mentioned in the
Sambrano ruling, pertain to those found under Sections 23, 24, 25, and
26 thereof as these provisions pertain to fines imposed “in the
discretion of the court” — which means they are imposed in criminal
court proceedings — as contradistinguished from Section 21 which may
be imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission (then, by
the Public Service Commission), after due notice and hearing.—It is well
to note that the criminal proceedings under Chapter IV of the Public
Service Act, as mentioned in the Sambrano ruling, pertain to those
found under Sections 23, 24, 25, and 26 thereof as these provisions
pertain to fines imposed “in the discretion of the court” — which means
they are imposed in criminal court proceedings — as
contradistinguished from Section 21 which may be imposed by the NTC
(then, by the Public Service Commission), after due notice and hearing.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds GMA’s reliance on the 60-
day prescriptive period under Section 28 of the Public Service Act to be
misplaced considering that the fine it assails was imposed in an
administrative and not a criminal proceeding. Akin to the action taken
by the Public Service Commission in the Sambrano case, the fine
imposed by the NTC was made in line with its authority to enforce the
rules and regulations concerning the conduct and operation of GMA as a
public service utility, which was particularly meted out to ensure its
compliance with the terms and conditions of its PA. There being no
cogent reason to depart from established jurisprudence on the matter,
the Court therefore holds that the NTC’s action in this case had not
been barred under the parameters of Section 28 of the Public Service
Act.
Same; Same; Same; The proceedings under Section 23 of the Public
Service Act (PSA) pertain to criminal proceedings conducted in court,
whereby the fine imposed, if so determined, is made in the court’s
discretion, whereas Section 21 pertains to administrative proceedings
conducted by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) on
the grounds stated thereunder.—The proceedings under Section 23
pertain to criminal proceedings conducted in court, whereby the fine
imposed, if so determined, is made in the court’s discretion, whereas
Section 21 pertains to administrative proceedings conducted by the NTC
on the grounds stated thereunder. As the present case evidently
involves the latter violation, Section 21 and not Section 23 of the Public
Page 27 of 682
Service Act applies. Thus, finding that the fine imposed by the NTC at
the reduced rate of P50.00 per day is consistent with the P200.00 per
day limitation under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, the fine of
P76,500.00 for GMA’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of
its PA for a period of 1,521 days was proper. The conscionability of the
amount imposed should not be at issue as it is the law itself which had
provided the allowable threshold for the amount therefor.
Same; Provisional Authority; The operational validity of a temporary
permit flows only from “a previously updated PA.” This means that there
should be an effective Provisional Authority (PA) before a temporary
permit is issued.—The operational validity of a temporary permit flows
only from “a previously updated PA.” This means that there should be
an effective PA before a temporary permit is issued. The latter is a
specific issuance which proceeds from a pre-requisite PA. While GMA
may have been able to secure the successive issuance of temporary
permits from the NTC to cover even the PA’s expired period, this does
not detract from the apparent irregularity of the procedure. The fact
remains that GMA operated its radio station between the time that its
PA expired on July 14, 1998 and the application for its renewal was filed
on April 13, 2002. Without an updated PA therefor, GMA should not have
been issued temporary permits.
Same; Administrative Agencies; National Telecommunications
Commission; Jurisdiction; The National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC), insofar as the regulation of the telecommunications industry is
concerned, has exclusive jurisdiction to “establish and prescribe rules,
regulations, standards and specifications in all cases related to the
issued Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) and administer and
enforce the same.”—GMA must be reminded that the NTC, insofar as
the regulation of the telecommunications industry is concerned, has
exclusive jurisdiction to “establish and prescribe rules, regulations,
standards and specifications in all cases related to the issued Certificate
of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same.” As such,
and considering further its expertise on the matter, its interpretation of
the rules and regulations it itself promulgates are traditionally accorded
by the Court with great weight and respect. As enunciated in Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. International Communication
Corporation, 481 SCRA 163 (2006): The NTC, being the government
agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its
special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making
power to implement its objectives, is in the best position to interpret its
own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently
yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by
administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
Civil Law; Estoppel; The State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents.—Equally significant is the principle
that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. Hence, whatever irregularity had attended the
Page 28 of 682
issuance of the temporary permits in this case does not render correct
what appears to be erroneous procedure. The NTC itself recognizes this
when it stated in its Comment that: Technically speaking, [GMA] should
not have been issued a Temporary Permit. The Temporary Permits relied
upon by [GMA] were issued to it on the assumption that its P.A. was up
to date. Had [NTC] known that [GMA] had an expired P.A., it would not
have granted [GMA] a Temporary Permit to operate its subject radio
broadcasting station. Before [GMA] could legally operate its subject
radio station, it should have both an updated P.A. and a Temporary
Permit for such purpose. Verily, the Court agrees with the NTC’s
submission that although GMA was granted numerous temporary
permits, it does not remove the fact that it was operating on an expired
PA, which infraction is subject to the penalty of fine under Section 21 of
the Public Service Act. The Court, however, expresses that the NTC
should be more circumspect with the enforcement of its internal
procedures if only to prevent any future incident similar to the present
case. The ideal of public accountability befittingly demands that
administrative agencies, such as the NTC, devise appropriate
governance systems to ensure that its rules and regulations are
followed and complied, and deviations therefrom deterred and quelled.
Truth be told, it is through an honest and effective bureaucracy that the
government gains the people’s trust and deference.
Page 29 of 682
G.R. No. 192984. February 28, 2012.*

ROLANDO D. LAYUG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MARIANO VELARDE (alias “BROTHER MIKE”) and
BUHAY PARTY-LIST, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Congress; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of its Members. —Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the
same Article identifies who the “members” of the House are: Sec. 5. (1).
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Underscoring added).
Same; Same; The members of the House of Representatives are of two
kinds: (1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and
(2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.—Clearly, the
members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1)
members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those
who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-
List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two
nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng.
On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a
seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike’s qualifications.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); PartyList System
Act; Section 6 of said Party-List System Act states that “the COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”—Neither
does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-
List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon
the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that “the COMELEC may
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in
the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
Page 30 of 682
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they

sought the disqualifications of said party-lists. Thus, it is the Court,
under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has
jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Every pleading
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office box.—A party
may sue or defend an action pro se. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, “(e)very pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which
should not be a post office box.” x x x From the fact alone that the
address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was incorrect, his
pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation
of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being in violation of his
constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to
rectify the error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to conclude that
he deliberately stated an inexistent address with the end in view of
delaying the proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process. As the
COMELEC aptly pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of
election laws and procedure by appearing before the Commission by
himself or by different counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitious
address to ensure that he does not receive mails addressed to him. He
cannot thus be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. To rule
otherwise, considering the circumstances in the instant case, would
place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes within
Layug’s power to determine at his pleasure. This, We cannot
countenance.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus, as a remedy, is
available to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of
discretion one way or the other.— Mandamus, as a remedy, is available
to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It
cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of discretion
one way or the other. Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides: SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.
Page 31 of 682
Same; Civil Procedure; Motions; A motion without a notice of hearing is

considered pro forma.—It should likewise be pointed out that the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed without the requisite
notice of hearing. We have held time and again that the failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the motion defective. As a rule, a
motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma. None of the
acceptable exceptions obtain in this case.
Page 32 of 682
A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC. March 6, 2012.*

RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF JUDGE IRMA ZITA V.
MASAMAYOR
Administrative Law; Appointments; Disqualifications for appointment to
any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.—Section 5,
Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: “SEC. 5. Disqualification.—The
following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with
pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with pending
criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have
been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where
the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he
has been granted judicial clemency.”
Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial
Clemency.—In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C.
Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency), 533 SCRA 539 (2007), the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There
must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed
from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform; 3. The
age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution
to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that
may justify clemency.”
Page 33 of 682
G.R. No. 179382. January 14, 2013.*

SPOUSES BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL and SONIA P. MAMARIL,
petitioners, vs. THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB
SECURITY AGENCY, INC., CESARIO PEÑA,** and VICENTE GADDI,
respondents.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every
person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.―Article 20 of the Civil
Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states: Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the
loss of Sps. Mamaril’s vehicle was the negligent act of security guards
Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the
subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the
result would not have occurred. Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to
refute Sps. Mamaril’s contention that they readily admitted being at
fault during the investigation that ensued.
Same; Same; Security Guards; It is settled that where the security
agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards and
watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security
guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or
customers of such agency.―Neither will the vicarious liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is
uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by
AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore,
no employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the
security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter’s
negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to
AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. In the case of Soliman, Jr. v.
Tuazon, 209 SCRA 47 (1992), the Court enunciated thus: It is settled
that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and
not to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a
client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises
Page 34 of 682
or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client
company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful
acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no
more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency.
Same; Same; Agency; Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that “[b]y
the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service
or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.”―Nor can it be said that a principal-
agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards Peña
and Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter’s complained act.
Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that “[b]y the contract of agency, a
person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of
the latter.” The basis for agency therefore is representation, which
element is absent in the instant case. Records show that BSP merely
hired the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely
for the protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere can it be
inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an
agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties intended was a pure principal-
client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB rendered its security
services to BSP.
Same; Stipulation Pour Autrui; Requisites in order that a third person
benefited by a stipulation pour autrui may demand its fulfillment.―In
order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article
1311, referred to as a stipulation pour autrui, may demand its
fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a
stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not
the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor to the third person―the favor is not
merely incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
(5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor
before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent,
or are not authorized, by the third party. However, none of the foregoing
elements obtains in this case.
Same; Lease; It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a
garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease.―The Court concurs
with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein
was one of lease as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has
been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment
of a fixed amount, is a lease. Even in a majority of American cases, it
has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car
in any available space in the lot, locks the car and takes the key with
him, the possession and control of the car, necessary elements in
bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual
relationship between the parties is one of lease.
Page 35 of 682
Same; Same; Article 1664 of the Civil Code states that “[t]he lessor is
not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person
may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a
direct action against the intruder.”―In the instant case, the owners
parked their six (6) passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a
monthly fee of P300.00 for each unit and took the keys home with
them. Hence, a lessor-lessee relationship indubitably existed between
them and BSP. On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that
“[t]he lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver the thing which is the object
of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use
intended; (2) to make on the same during the lease all the necessary
repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been
devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract.” In relation thereto, Article
1664 of the same Code states that “[t]he lessor is not obliged to answer
for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of
the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the
intruder.” Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps.
Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired
security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held
liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
Same; Contracts; Contracts of Adhesion; Contracts of adhesion are not
void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a party who
enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms
thereof are accepted without objection, then the contract serves as the
law between them.―Anent Sps. Mamaril’s claim that the exculpatory
clause: “Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any
of its accessories or article left therein” contained in the BSP issued
parking ticket was void for being a contract of adhesion and against
public policy, suffice it to state that contracts of adhesion are not void
per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a party who
enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms
thereof are accepted without objection, as in this case, where plaintiffs-
appellants have been leasing BSP’s parking space for more or less 20
years, then the contract serves as the law between them. Besides, the
parking fee of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit is too
minimal an amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to
be an insurer of the safety of plaintiffs-appellants’ vehicles.
Same; Damages; Actual Damages; Actual damages must be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and a party is entitled only to such
compensation for the pecuniary loss that was duly proven.―On the
matter of damages, the Court noted that while Sonia P. Mamaril testified
that the subject vehicle had accessories worth around P50,000.00, she
failed to present any receipt to substantiate her claim. Neither did she
submit any record or journal that would have established the purported
P275.00 daily earnings of their jeepney. It is axiomatic that actual
damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty and a
party is entitled only to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that
Page 36 of 682
was duly proven. Thus, absent any competent proof of the amount of
damages sustained, the CA properly deleted the said awards.
Page 37 of 682
G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013.*

RIVULET AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANTHONY PARUÑGAO, NARCISO B. NIETO, in their respective
capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field
Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform; FELIX
SERVIDAD, in his capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
II and the Officer-inCharge of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Provincial Office of Negros Occidental; and JEFFERSON
DESCALLAR, in his capacity as Police Chief Inspector of the
PNP-Negros Occidental Police Provincial Office, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; Words and Phrases;
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a
willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice.―Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies
not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary
to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be
punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless
the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to
what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
Agrarian Reform; Land Registration; Republic Act No. 9700; It is the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register the land in the
name of the Republic after full payment has been made and no
injunctive relief can be issued, except by the Court, pursuant to Section
5549 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700.―It bears to stress
that in G.R. No. 193585, the Court had already ruled that the issuance
of title in the name of the Republic was a necessary part of the
implementation of the government’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. As such, it is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to
register the land in the name of the Republic after full payment has
been made and no injunctive relief can be issued, except by the Court,
pursuant to Section 55 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700.
While the Court issued a TRO, records reveal that the acts sought to be
enjoined had already been accomplished prior to its issuance, rendering
the same of no practical purpose. Besides, the installation of farmer-
beneficiaries on Hacienda Bacan was undertaken only after respondent
Undersecretaries had sought the legal support and clearance of the
OSG, notwithstanding that the first paragraph of Section 24 of R.A. No.
6657 as amended by R.A. No. 9700 provides that the award to
beneficiaries, including their receipt of a duly registered emancipation
patent or CLOA and their actual physical possession of the awarded
Page 38 of 682
land, shall be completed not more than one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; The power to punish for
contempt should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive
principle, and only when necessary in the interest of justice.―Time and
again, the Court has stressed that the power to punish for contempt
should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive principle,
and only when necessary in the interest of justice. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Court finds no contumacious disobedience on the
part of respondents, particularly with respect to the TRO in G.R. No.
193585.
Page 39 of 682
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013.*

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF AMA LAND, INC. AGAINST HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON and HON.
RICARDO R. ROSARIO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
Administrative Law; Judges; Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding
that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies.―A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’
respective allegations disclosed that the acts complained of relate to
the validity of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices and
the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done
in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with
cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of
his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,
supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
Same; Same; Actions; Resort to administrative disciplinary action prior
to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes an
abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’
dockets.―Resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final
resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court
processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who
seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal
rules and abuse court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights.
Page 40 of 682
G.R. No. 191667. April 17, 2013.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M.
CACAYURAN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; For a taxpayer’s suit to
prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived
from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality
and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and
(2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.—It is hornbook
principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A
person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper,
two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from
taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and
in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2)
the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
Local Government Units; Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA); The
Municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment, which serves as the local
government unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of
public funds derived from taxation.—Although the construction of the
APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans,
which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying
that public funds derived from taxation are bound to be expended as
the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the
foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves
as the local government unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the
nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes,
however, that although these funds may be posted as a security, its
collateralization should only be deemed effective during the
incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those
who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it is
observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been
converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds
coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics
of public funds when they are under official custody.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; A taxpayer need not be
a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are
involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.—As a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is
directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which was funded
by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas
are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public
dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise
over it the rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct
Page 41 of 682
interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for
commercial purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover,
Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his
objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, 608 SCRA 149 (2009), it has been
held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question
contracts entered into by the government.
Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; An act which is outside of the
municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while
an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the
municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation.—Generally, an ultra vires act is one
committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as
defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law. There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. As
held in Middletown Policemen’s Benevolent Association v. Township of
Middletown, 162 N.J. 361, 368 (2000): There is a distinction between an
act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the
irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters
not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the
primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense
which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of
estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) In other words, an act which is outside of the
municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while
an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the
municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal contracts
which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or inherent
powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the
substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds
is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and certificate of
availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a) are
entered into by the improper department, board, officer of agent; and
(b) do not comply with the formal requirements of a written contract
e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
Civil Law; Contracts; Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights or obligations or
any juridical relations.—Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a
contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights
or obligations or any juridical relations. Consequently, given the
unlawful purpose behind the Subject Loans which is to fund the
commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment
Plan, they are considered as ultra vires in the primary sense thus,
rendering them void and in effect, nonbinding on the Municipality. At
this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on which the Agoo
Plaza is situated cannot be converted into patrimonial property―as the
SB tried to when it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007―absent
Page 42 of 682
any express grant by the national government. As public land used for
public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the
administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence,
without the said grant, the Municipality has no right to claim it as
patrimonial property.
Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; Case law states that public
officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted
ultra vires.—Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the
Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who authorized the
passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law
states that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires, as in this case.
Page 43 of 682
G.R. No. 168137. August 7, 2013.*

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) and KUTANGBATO
CONVENTIONAL TRADING MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,1
respondents.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.—It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every
error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as “grave,” the
abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law. Finding that this characterization does
not fit the CTA’s exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that
no grave abuse of discretion attended its grant of KCTMPC’s motion to
release.
Page 44 of 682
G.R. No. 171904. August 7, 2013.*

BOBBY TAN, petitioner, vs. GRACE ANDRADE, PROCESO
ANDRADE, JR., CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE,
ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, GLORY ANDRADE, MIRIAM
ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 172017. August 7, 2013.*
GRACE ANDRADE, CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE,
ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE,
AND JOSEPH ANDRADE, petitioners, vs. BOBBY TAN,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; When the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon the Supreme Court, and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45
petitions.—Settled is the rule that when the trial court’s factual findings
have been affirmed by the CA, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon the Court, and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45
petitions. While there exists exceptions to this rule — such as when the
CA’s and RTC’s findings are in conflict with each other — the Court
observes that none applies with respect to the ruling that the subject
transaction was one of sale and not an equitable mortgage. Records
readily reveal that both the RTC and the CA observed that there is no
clear and convincing evidence to show that the parties agreed upon a
mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error therein or any other
compelling reason to hold otherwise, this finding should now be deemed
as conclusive and perforce must stand.
Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.—
Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil
Code which states that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove
that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in
Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x x x As a condition sine qua non
for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership,
the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the
presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting it.
Page 45 of 682
G.R. No. 183014. August 7, 2013.*

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE,
represented by its Founding Partner, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Under Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may
immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause.―Under Section 5(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately
dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. x x x It must, however, be observed that the
judge’s power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be
warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. In De Los Santos-
Dio v. CA, 699 SCRA 614 (2013), the Court illumined that a clear-cut
case of lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; A court ― or any of its officers for that matter
― which has no jurisdiction over a particular case has no authority to
act at all therein.―Since it is explicitly required that the subject
issuance be made within the scope of a superior authority’s jurisdiction,
it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of the crime of
Open Disobedience does not exist. Lest it be misunderstood, a court ―
or any of its officers for that matter ― which has no jurisdiction over a
particular case has no authority to act at all therein. In this light, it
cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime based
on the premise that the Court’s pronouncement as to Branch 203’s lack
of jurisdiction came only after the fact. Verily, Branch 203’s lack of
jurisdiction was not merely a product of the Court’s pronouncement in
Reyes. The said fact is traced to the very inception of the proceedings
and as such, cannot be accorded temporal legal existence in order to
indict Atty. Fria for the crime she stands to be prosecuted.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is wellsettled that an
act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”―In fine, based on
the above-stated reasons, the Court holds that no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the MTC as correctly found by the RTC. It
is wellsettled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
“evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.” Consequently, the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
46400 for lack of probable cause is hereby sustained.
Page 46 of 682
G.R. No. 198457. August 13, 2013.*

FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A.
ANTONI, and MAUREEN A. BIEN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, represented by its Commissioners, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA); Check and Balance;
The exercise of the Commission on Audit’s general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government. —At the outset, it
must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use
of the government’s, and ultimately the people’s, property. The exercise
of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
Same; Same; Judgments; It is the general policy of the Supreme Court
to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the Commission on Audit, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.—It
is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order
are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and
despotism. In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed
below.
Same; Same; Public Officers; It is a standing rule that public officers
who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure
to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage,
and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in
accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of
prescribed documents and necessary records.— It is a standing rule that
public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable
for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against
loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or
transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on
the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records. However, as
Page 47 of 682
pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No.
(NBC) 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the
release of funds for a congressman’s PDAF authorized under Republic
Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT
Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations
governing the procurement of medicines.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Absent any
showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties.—Jurisprudence holds that, absent any
showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail
in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in
Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), 642 SCRA 210(2011), the Court affirmed the
liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered
claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the
Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations.
Page 48 of 682
A.M. No. P-13-3147. July 2, 2014.*

(formerly A.M. No. 11-4-78-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. PAZ P. CAPISTRANO, COURT
STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 224, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Daily Time Records; Under Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 72003 dated January 9,
2003, it is incumbent upon every court official and employee to
truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and
departure from office in their respective Daily Time Records
(DTRs)/Bundy Cards.—Under OCA Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9,
2003, it is incumbent upon every court official and employee to
truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and
departure from office in their respective Daily Time Records
(DTRs)/Bundy Cards, viz.: In the submission of Certificates of Service
and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards by Judges and court
personnel, the following guidelines shall be observed: 1. After the end of
each month, every official and employee of each court shall accomplish
the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating
therein truthfully and accurately the time of arrival in and departure
from the office.
Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Jurisprudence dictates that erring court
employees who falsify their Daily Time Records (DTRs) are guilty of
dishonesty.—Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who
falsify their DTRs are guilty of dishonesty. Further, under Rule XIV,
Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents,
which includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses.
Accordingly, the commission of these acts carries the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Section 53, Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RURACCS) grants the disciplining authority, the Supreme Court (SC) in
this case, the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of the final penalty.— Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the
disciplining authority, the Court in this case, the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These
factors range, among others, from the erring individual’s admission of
guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance rating. In this
case, Capistrano readily admitted to the fact that she indeed falsified
the entries in her April and May 2009 bundy cards, and concomitantly,
has expressed her remorse and promised not to commit the same.
Thus, considering too that said infraction would be Capistrano’s first
administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to adopt the OCA’s
recommendation to impose against her the penalty of suspension for a
Page 49 of 682
period of six (6) months, without pay, and not the supreme penalty of
dismissal in view of the mitigating factors attendant herein.
Same; Same; Judiciary; The Supreme Court (SC) reminds every
employee of the Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a Court
dispensing justice is mirrored in its very own personnel.— The Court
reminds every employee of the Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a
Court dispensing justice is mirrored in its very own personnel. As
pronounced in Re: Falsification of Daily Time Records of Maria Fe P.
Brooks, Court Interpreter, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Br. 96, and
Andria FortezaCrisostomo, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
39, 473 SCRA 483 (2005): [N]o other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from
an employee than in the Judiciary. [The Court has] repeatedly
emphasized that the conduct of court personnel, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them
be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. The Court
condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Page 50 of 682
G.R. No. 183901. July 9, 2014.*

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. SALUD
GACIAS BERIÑA,1 CESAR GACIAS, NORMA GACIAS TANDOC,2
LYDIA LEANDER GACIAS and GREGORIO MEDEN GACIAS,
respondents. G.R. No. 183931. July 9, 2014.* LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SALUD GACIAS BERIÑA, CESAR
GACIAS, NORMA GACIAS TANDOC, LYDIA LEANDER GACIAS and
GREGORIO MEDEN GACIAS, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where
payment for the subject portion acquired under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 27 has yet to be made, just compensation should be determined
and the process be concluded under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,
otherwise known as “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,”
with PD 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228 having mere suppletory
effect.— Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete, as in this case where payment for the subject portion
acquired under PD 27 has yet to be made, just compensation should be
determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act No. (RA)
6657, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988,” with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory effect. This
means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are gaps in RA
6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
Same; Same; The procedure for the determination of just compensation
under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as summarized by this Court in Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004),
commences with the LBP determining the value of the lands under the
land reform program; A party who disagrees with the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) adjudicator may bring the matter
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) designated as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC) for final determination of just compensation.—The procedure for
the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, as summarized
by this Court in LBP v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004), commences
with the LBP determining the value of the lands under the land reform
program. Using the LBP’s valuation, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner through a notice of coverage and acquisition pursuant to
Section 16(a) of RA 6657. If the landowner accepts the offer, the LBP
shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor
of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR
adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP, and
other interested parties to submit evidence in this relation. A party who
disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter
to the Regional Trial Court designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC)
for final determination of just compensation.
Page 51 of 682
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; It is

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
that should make the final determination of just compensation and
which has the final say on what the amount of just compensation will be
pursuant to the well-settled rule that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function.—While the LBP is charged with the
initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the
land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking,
guided by the records/docu ments contained in the claim folders, it
must be emphasized that its valuation is considered only as an initial
determination, which is not conclusive. Verily, it is the Regional Trial
Court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final
determination of just compensation and which has the final say on what
the amount of just compensation will be pursuant to the well-settled
rule that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
This rule notwithstanding, a review of the records, nonetheless, impels
the Court to order the remand of the case to the RTC considering the
failure of both the RTC and the CA to consider the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, in determining the just
compensation for the subject portion.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. For
purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of
RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the
current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the
property and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e)
the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government
assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property,
and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.
Same; Same; Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines.—Compensation must be valued at the time of taking,
or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the
parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject portion
must be based on the values prevalent at such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment
since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be
Page 52 of 682
an effective forbearance on the part of the State; Beginning July 1,

2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall
earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the
amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board
(BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.—The Regional Trial Court
may impose interest on the just compensation as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In
previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the land owners was deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at
the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal
rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB
Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) is reminded, however, that while it should take into account the
different formula created by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
in arriving at the just compensation for the subject portion, it is not
strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their
application.—The Regional Trial Court is reminded, however, that while
it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in
arriving at the just compensation for the subject portion, it is not strictly
bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application.
Page 53 of 682
G.R. No. 178343. July 14, 2014.*

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. ALEX M.
VALENCERINA, respondent.
Ombudsman; Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Section 7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the office’s
decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be
executed as a matter of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal
thereto.—Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Section 7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the office’s decision
imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a
matter of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice
of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. An
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the
decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer.
Statutory Construction; It is a fundamental legal principle that when two
rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for
the said case must prevail over the other.—It is a fundamental legal
principle that when two rules apply to a particular case, that which was
specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to
administrative complaints cognizable by the OMB, while Section 12,
Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals from quasi-judicial bodies in
general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules, Section 7,
Rule III should prevail over the application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the
Rules in appeals from a decision of the OMB in an administrative case.
Page 54 of 682
G.R. No. 198226. July 18, 2014.*

ABOITIZ TRANSPORT SYSTEM CORPORATION and ABOITIZ
SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CARLOS A. GOTHONG
LINES, INC. and VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN, respondents. G.R. No.
198228. July 18, 2014.* ABOITIZ TRANSPORT SYSTEM
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC.
and VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Arbitration; Disputes do not go
to arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the
arbitrator’s decision.—In Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd., 512 SCRA 148
(2007), the Court explained that “[d]isputes do not go to arbitration
unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s
decision. Necessarily, a contract is required for arbitration to take place
and to be binding.” Furthermore, in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court
of Appeals, 351 SCRA 373 (2001), the Court stated that “[t]he provision
to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the
relationship of the parties is part of that contract. As a rule, contracts
are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce
effect as between them, their assigns and heirs.” Succinctly put, only
those parties who have agreed to submit a controversy to arbitration
who, as against each other, may be compelled to submit to arbitration.
Page 55 of 682
G.R. No. 190706. July 21, 2014.*

SHANG PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION (formerly THE
SHANG GRAND TOWER CORPORATION) and SHANG PROPERTIES,
INC. (formerly EDSA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), petitioners,
vs. ST. FRANCIS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines; Section 168 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known
as the “Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines” (IP Code), provides
for the rules and regulations on unfair competition.—Section 168 of
Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the “Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines” (IP Code), provides for the rules and regulations
on unfair competition. To begin, Section 168.1 qualifies who is entitled
to protection against unfair competition. It states that “[a] person who
has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or
deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a
registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the
said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in
the same manner as other property rights.” Section 168.2 proceeds to
the core of the provision, describing forthwith who may be found guilty
of and subject to an action of unfair competition — that is, “[a]ny
person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to
good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or
in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one
having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result x x x.” Same; Same; Passing off (or
palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on
the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers
into buying his merchandise under the impression that they are buying
that of his competitors.—The statutory attribution of the unfair
competition concept is well-supplemented by jurisprudential
pronouncements. In the recent case] of Republic Gas Corporation v.
Petron Corporation, 698 SCRA 666 (2013), the Court has echoed the
classic definition of the term which is “‘the passing off (or palming off)
or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of
one person as the goods or business of another with the end and
probable effect of deceiving the public.’ Passing off (or palming off)
takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on the general
appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying
his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his
competitors. [In other words], the defendant gives his goods the
general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of
deceiving the public that the goods are those of his competitor.” The
“true test” of unfair competition has thus been “whether the acts of the
defendant have the intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the
ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of
the particular trade to which the controversy relates.” Based on the
foregoing, it is therefore essential to prove the existence of fraud, or the
Page 56 of 682
intent to deceive, actual or probable, determined through a judicious

scrutiny of the factual circumstances attendant to a particular case.
Same; Same; Geographically Descriptive Term; Words and Phrases; A
‘geographically descriptive term’ is any noun or adjective that
designates geographical location and would tend to be regarded by
buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of origin of the goods
or services.—The Court finds the element of fraud to be wanting; hence,
there can be no unfair competition. The CA’s contrary conclusion was
faultily premised on its impression that respondent had the right to the
exclusive use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS,” for which the latter had
purportedly established considerable goodwill. What the CA appears to
have disregarded or been mistaken in its disquisition, however, is the
geographically-descriptive nature of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” which thus
bars its exclusive appropriability, unless a secondary meaning is
acquired. As deftly explained in the U.S. case of Great Southern Bank v.
First Southern Bank: “[d]es crip tive geographical terms are in the
‘public domain’ in the sense that every seller should have the right to
inform customers of the geographical origin of his goods. A
‘geographically descriptive term’ is any noun or adjective that
designates geographical location and would tend to be regarded by
buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of origin of the goods
or services. A geographically descriptive term can indicate any
geographic location on earth, such as continents, nations, regions,
states, cities, streets and addresses, areas of cities, rivers, and any
other location referred to by a recognized name. In order to determine
whether or not the geographic term in question is descriptively used,
the following question is relevant: (1) Is the mark the name of the place
or region from which the goods actually come? If the answer is yes,
then the geographic term is probably used in a descriptive sense, and
secondary meaning is required for protection.”
Same; Same; Same; Unless secondary meaning has been established, a
geographically-descriptive mark, due to its general public domain
classification, is perceptibly disqualified from trademark registration.—
Under Section 123.2 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to be
met in order to conclude that a geographically-descriptive mark has
acquired secondary meaning, to wit: (a) the secondary meaning must
have arisen as a result of substantial commercial use of a mark in the
Philippines; (b) such use must result in the distinctiveness of the mark
insofar as the goods or the products are concerned; and (c) proof of
substantially exclusive and continuous commercial use in the
Philippines for five (5) years before the date on which the claim of
distinctiveness is made. Unless secondary meaning has been
established, a geographically-descriptive mark, due to its general public
domain classification, is perceptibly disqualified from trademark
registration. Section 123.1(j) of the IP Code states this rule as follows:
SEC. 123. Registrability.—123.1 A mark cannot be registered if it: x x x x
(j) Consists exclusively of signs or of indications that may serve in trade
to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value,
geographical origin, time or production of the goods or rendering of the
services, or other characteristics of the goods or services.
Page 57 of 682
G.R. No. 203434. July 23, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELINO
VITERBO y REALUBIT and RONALD VITERBO y REALUBIT,
accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs;
Elements of.—In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must
concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the
corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from
the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the
corpus delicti.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The presentation of the drugs
which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of
proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.—The
Court concludes that there exists reasonable doubt on the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items, necessitating therefor strict
compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As it
has been established that there was noncompliance with its provisions,
i.e., that there was no physical inventory or photographs of the seized
evidence, nor was there any representative from the media, or the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official present during the
subject seizure and confiscation, it is therefore clear that the identity of
the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, hence, rendering improper accused-appellants’
conviction. Verily, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the
corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral
certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a
matter of right.
Page 58 of 682
G.R. No. 191053. November 28, 2011.*

MARIO B. DIMAGAN, petitioner, vs. DACWORKS UNITED,
INCORPORATED and/or DEAN A. CANCINO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists when a party
repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and
all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely, by some other court; Elements of Forum Shopping.
—“Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court.” The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same set of facts; and (3) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
Same; Appeals; It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law; Rule that the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding is not an ironclad.—It must be pointed out that
the main issue in this case involves a question of fact. It is an
established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is
not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of
fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our
function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. This rule, however,
is not ironclad. One of the recognized exceptions is when there is a
divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the
CA, as in this case. There is, therefore, a need to review the records to
determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to
evidentiary facts.
Labor Law; Constructive Dismissal; Words and Phrases; The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position
under the circumstances.—Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a
diminution of pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled
to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting
Page 59 of 682
to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive

dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and
resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their
rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
Same; Same; The burden falls upon the company to prove that the
employee’s assignment from one position to another was not
tantamount to constructive dismissal.—As held in the case of Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. Del Villar, 632 SCRA 293 (2010), the burden
falls upon the company to prove that the employee’s assignment from
one position to another was not tantamount to constructive dismissal. In
the case at bar, respondents failed to discharge said burden. In fact,
respondents never even disputed that petitioner was relegated from the
position of OIC to supervisor and, subsequently, to an ordinary
technician. Clearly, the reduction in petitioner’s responsibilities and
duties, particularly from supervisor to ordinary technician, constituted a
demotion in rank tantamount to constructive dismissal.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment is the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment; Elements
to Constitute Abandonment of Work.—“Abandonment is the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.” To
constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: “(1) the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear
intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt act.” The employer bears the
burden of proof to show the deliberate and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
Page 60 of 682
A.M. No. P-11-3011. November 29, 2011.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3143-P) EVELINA C. BANAAG,
complainant, vs. OLIVIA C. ESPELETA, Interpreter III, Branch 82,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct;
Immorality; Definition of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.—After a
careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court finds
respondent Olivia C. Espeleta guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
under Section 46(b)(5), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which, as defined in Section 1 of CSC
Resolution No. 100912 dated May 17, 2010 (Revised Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct), is “an act
which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum
abhorred and condemned by the society” and “conduct which is willful,
flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.”
Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit
relationship with a married man comes within the purview of disgraceful
and immoral conduct.—Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit
relationship with a married man comes within the purview of disgraceful
and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense punishable
with suspension from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Same; Same; Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion is required.—In
administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if
such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
Same; Same; Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
courts of justice; Resignation should not be used either as an escape or
as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an
administrative sanction.—It cannot be overstressed that the image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
courts of justice.” This Court has thus consistently penalized court
personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they
have precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not
Page 61 of 682
be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an

administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
Page 62 of 682
G.R. No. 175552. July 18, 2012.*

SPOUSES ROLANDO D. SOLLER and NENITA T. SOLLER,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JEREMIAS ULAYAO, namely, NELSON
ULAYAO, FERELYN ULAYAO-DEL MUNDO, EDJUNNE ULAYAO,
WILMA ULAYAO, LAILA ULAYAO, ANALYN ULAYAO, and LILIBETH
ULAYAO respondents.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary Judgments; Summary judgments
are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the
court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a
genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.—Summary judgments are proper when,
upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the
answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any
material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. In Viajar v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 (1979), the Court explained:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a
doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by
the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment.
Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
x x x [R]elief by summary judgment can only be allowed after
compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a
party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly
the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is
resolved against the movant.
Same; Prescription; Acquisitive Prescription; The defense of acquisitive
prescription inevitably involves the issue of actual, physical and
material possession, which is always a question of fact. The existence of
this issue therefore necessitates, for its proper resolution, the
presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which can only be
done in the course of a full-blown trial.—In this case, records show that
the original defendant, Jeremias, raised the special and affirmative
defense of acquisitive prescription in his answer, claiming that he was in
open, continuous and notorious possession or the disputed property as,
in fact, his house and other permanent improvements are still existing
thereon. As succinctly explained by the CA in its assailed Decision, the
defense of acquisitive prescription inevitably involves the issue of
actual, physical and material possession, which is always a question of
fact. The existence of this issue therefore necessitates, for its proper
resolution, the presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which
can only be done in the course of a fullblown trial.
Page 63 of 682
G.R. No. 178584. October 8, 2012.*

ASSOCIATED MARINE OFFICERS AND SEAMEN’S UNION OF THE
PHILIPPINES PTGWO-ITF, petitioner, vs. NORIEL DECENA,
respondent.
Civil Law; Contract to Sell; Words and Phrases; A contract to sell is
defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite
delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds itself to sell the said
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.—It is
basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is
called by the contracting parties. A contract to sell is defined as a
bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly
reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof
to the prospective buyer, binds itself to sell the said property
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition
agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
Same; Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act (R.A. No. 6552); R.A. No.
6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act,
recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial,
commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract
upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an
event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force.—As we emphasized in Pagtalunan vs. Dela Cruz
Vda. De Manzano, 533 SCRA 242 (2007), “R.A. No. 6552, otherwise
known as the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act, recognizes in
conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial,
residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-
payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring
binding force.” While we agreed that the cancellation of a contract to
sell may be done outside of court, however, “the cancellation by the
seller must be in accordance with Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 6552, which
requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the
full payment of the cash surrender value of the payments on the
property.”
Page 64 of 682
G.R. No. 194366. October 10, 2012.*

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D.
NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERIMILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI,
EUTROPIA D. ILLUTCOCKINOS and VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY and JULPHA**
IBRAHIM UY, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Legitimate Children; Legitimate children from the
first and second marriages are entitled to inherit pursuant to Articles
979 and 980 of the Civil Code.―It bears to stress that all the petitioners
herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first
and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and
consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant
to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read: ART. 979.
Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages. xxx ART. 980. The children of the
deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
Same; Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates; No extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.―In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the
heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia
and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not
valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity. Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs.―x x x The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
Same; Guardianship; A father or mother, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only
to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with
courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set
forth by the Rules of Court.―Administration includes all acts for the
preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the
natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits
of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of
the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose
or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only
Page 65 of 682
with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings

set forth by the Rules of Court.
Same; Ratification; Words and Phrases; Ratification means that one
under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction
would not be binding on him.―Ratification means that one under no
disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized
act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be
binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and
becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.
Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly
received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects
from the moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.
Same; Sales; A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to
sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the
seller can legally transfer.―“A person can only sell what he owns, or is
authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more
than what the seller can legally transfer.” On this score, Article 493 of
the Civil Code is relevant, which provides: Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
Same; Prescription; An action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe in accordance with Article
1410 of the Civil Code.―On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees
with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the
ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the
extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in
the subject estate. Besides, an “action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe” in accordance with
Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; The action to recover property held in trust prescribes
after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues, which is from
the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.―The action to
recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time
the cause of action accrues, which is from the time of actual notice in
case of unregistered deed. In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale
after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed
to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
Page 66 of 682
G.R. No. 183774. November 14, 2012.*

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ARTURO DY,
BERNARDO DY, JOSE DELGADO and CIPRIANA DELGADO,
respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; The subsequent nullification of title to a property is
not a ground to annul the contractual right which may have been
derived by a purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee who acted in
good faith.—While it is settled that a simulated deed of sale is null and
void and therefore, does not convey any right that could ripen into a
valid title, it has been equally ruled that, for reasons of public policy,
the subsequent nullification of title to a property is not a ground to
annul the contractual right which may have been derived by a
purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee who acted in good faith.
Same; Loans; Banks and Banking; Extraordinary Diligence; In the case
of banks and other financial institutions, greater care and due diligence
are required since they are imbued with public interest, failing which
renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before approving a loan
application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to
conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and
to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner(s)
thereof.—Primarily, it bears noting that the doctrine of “mortgagee in
good faith” is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title. This is in deference to the public
interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title as
evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance
thereon. In the case of banks and other financial institutions, however,
greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued with
public interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus,
before approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice
for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property
offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to
determine the real owner(s) thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular
inspection is to protect the “true owner” of the property as well as
innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a
usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing short of extraordinary diligence is
required of banks whose business is impressed with public interest.—A
finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the
attendant circumstances of a particular case. As aptly held in Philippine
National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar, 494 SCRA 308 (2006), “the
diligence with which the law requires the individual or a corporation at
all times to govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which one is placed, and the importance of the act which is
to be performed.” Thus, without diminishing the timehonored principle
that nothing short of extraordinary diligence is required of banks whose
Page 67 of 682
business is impressed with public interest, Philbank’s inconsequential

oversight should not and cannot serve as a bastion for fraud and deceit.
Same; Fraud; Words and Phrases; Fraud comprises “anything calculated
to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a
breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.”—To be sure, fraud
comprises “anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or
by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.”
In this light, the Dys’ and Sps. Delgado’s deliberate simulation of the
sale intended to obtain loan proceeds from and to prejudice Philbank
clearly constitutes fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps. Delgado cannot
now be allowed to deny the validity of the mortgage executed by the
Dys in favor of Philbank as to hold otherwise would effectively sanction
their blatant bad faith to Philbank’s detriment.
Page 68 of 682
G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012.*

WILLEM BEUMER, petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, respondent.
Civil Law; Succession; Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.―In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, 500 SCRA 65 (2006), the Court
had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller,
against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held
that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land
enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which reads: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Same; Equity; The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.―As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that
he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done
inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
Same; Same; Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is
null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.―In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds
of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no
right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is wellestablished that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary
thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to
an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into.
Same; Principle of Unjust Enrichment; No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.―Neither can the Court grant
petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Page 69 of 682
As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking

monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine
land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too, is petitioner’s reliance
on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The
provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by
the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may
be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid
for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman v. Johnson: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal
as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill
in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff.”
Same; The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon.―Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the
rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the
two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to
state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
Page 70 of 682
G.R. No. 199481. December 3, 2012.*

ILDEFONSO S. CRISOLOGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
Mercantile Law; Corporation Law; Trust Receipts Law; Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law explicitly provides that if the violation or offense is
committed by a corporation, as in this case, the penalty provided for
under the law shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees
or other officials or person responsible for the offense, without prejudice
to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.―Section 13 of
the Trust Receipts Law explicitly provides that if the violation or offense
is committed by a corporation, as in this case, the penalty provided for
under the law shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees
or other officials or person responsible for the offense, without prejudice
to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense. In this case,
petitioner was acquitted of the charge for violation of the Trust Receipts
Law in relation to Article 315 1(b) of the RPC. As such, he is relieved of
the corporate criminal liability as well as the corresponding civil liability
arising therefrom. However, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA,
he may still be held liable for the trust receipts and L/C transactions he
had entered into in behalf of Novachem.
Same; Same; Debts incurred by directors, officers, and employees
acting as corporate agents are not their direct liability but of the
corporation they represent.―Settled is the rule that debts incurred by
directors, officers, and employees acting as corporate agents are not
their direct liability but of the corporation they represent, except if they
contractually agree/stipulate or assume to be personally liable for the
corporation’s debts, as in this case.
Civil Law; Evidence; Payment; Burden of Proof; The burden rests on the
debtor to prove payment rather than on the creditor to prove
nonpayment.―On the matter of interest, while petitioner assailed the
unilateral imposition of interest at rates above the stipulated 18% p.a.,
he failed to submit a summary of the pertinent dates when excessive
interests were imposed and the purported over-payments that should
be refunded. Having failed to prove his affirmative defense, the Court
finds no reason to disturb the amount awarded to Chinabank. Settled is
the rule that in civil cases, the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable
judgment. Thus, the burden rests on the debtor to prove payment
rather than on the creditor to prove nonpayment.
Page 71 of 682
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013.*

RE: COMPLAINT OF LEONARDO A. VELASCO AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR., ALEX L. QUIROZ, AND
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
Administrative Law; Misconduct; To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions of a public officer.―“Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions
of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.”
Same; Execution of Judgments; The becoming modesty that the
Sandiganbayan Justices have exhibited in this case cannot detract from
the fact that the judgment of conviction of accused Velasco should have
been immediately executed, absent any restraining order from the
Court, in violation of the Court’s directive in A.M. Circular No. 07-7-12-
SC, adopting amendments to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.―The
becoming modesty that the Sandiganbayan Justices have exhibited in
this case cannot detract from the fact that the judgment of conviction of
accused Velasco should have been immediately executed, absent any
restraining order from the Court, in violation of the Court’s directive in
A.M. Circular No. 07-7-12-SC, adopting amendments to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, inter alia. Thus, Section 7 of Rule 65 now states: SEC. 7.
Expediting pro8ceedings; injunctive relief.―The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may
also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case. The public respondent shall proceed with the
principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for
certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the
public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground
for an administrative charge.
Page 72 of 682
G.R. No. 189801. October 23, 2013.*

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and BERMELA A. GABUYA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Remand of Cases; Dismissal of Actions; It must be borne
in mind that a remand and a dismissal are distinct procedural concepts
and hence should not be confused with one another, else the Rules be
subverted.―It must be borne in mind that a remand and a dismissal are
distinct procedural concepts and hence should not be confused with one
another, else the Rules be subverted. On the one hand, a remand
means an order “to send back”; or the “sending of the case back to the
same court out where it came for the purpose of having some action on
it there”; and, on the other hand, a dismissal refers to an order or
judgment finally disposing of an action, suit, motion, etc. which may
either be with prejudice or without. The dismissal is deemed “with
prejudice” when the adjudication is based on the merits and bars the
right to bring an action on the same claim or cause and “without
prejudice” when the case can be refiled despite its having been
previously dismissed.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; It is a standing rule
that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional in nature and
is integrally linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main
case.―Verily, it is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is
merely provisional in nature and is integrally linked to the subsistence
of the proceedings in the main case. Stated differently, the ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as part or an
incident of an independent action or proceeding. Thus, since the CA
already remanded the case to the Ombudsman for the purpose of
resolving Gabuya’s pending motion for reconsideration, the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it, absent any countervailing
justification therefor, must be dissolved. In this relation, it is observed
that the CA’s issuance of the aforesaid writ was essentially hinged on
the 2008 Samaniego ruling which, however, did not contain any
pronouncement on the legal status of the writ issued in that case. The
Court only remarked that the injunctive writ issued in Samaniego was a
“mere superfluity” and, in fact, ordered the same to be “lifted” since the
appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision already had the effect of staying
its execution. In any case, the treatment of appeals of Ombudsman
decisions had already been modified by the Court in the 2010
Samaniego ruling as above-explained.
Page 73 of 682
G.R. No. 194307. November 20, 2013.*

BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE GMBH AND CO. KG (formerly
BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE GMBH), petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It is well-settled that “the
rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the
rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary
objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice.―It is well-settled that “the rules of procedure are mere tools
aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration.
A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.” “Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of
[procedural rules], and their relaxation or suspension should only be for
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.” This is especially true
with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are
not bound by technical rules of procedure.
Mercantile Law; Intellectual Property Rights; Trademarks; Under Section
2 of RA 166, which is also the law governing the subject applications, in
order to register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must
have actually used the mark in commerce in the Philippines for two (2)
months prior to the application for registration.―Under Section 2 of RA
166, which is also the law governing the subject applications, in order to
register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must have
actually used the mark in commerce in the Philippines for two (2)
months prior to the application for registration. Section 2-A of the same
law sets out to define how one goes about acquiring ownership thereof.
Under the same section, it is clear that actual use in commerce is also
the test of ownership but the provision went further by saying that the
mark must not have been so appropriated by another. Significantly, to
be an owner, Section 2-A does not require that the actual use of a
trademark must be within the Philippines. Thus, under RA 166, one may
be an owner of a mark due to its actual use but may not yet have the
right to register such ownership here due to the owner’s failure to use
the same in the Philippines for two (2) months prior to registration.
Same; Same; Same; Registration merely creates a prima facie
presumption of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s
ownership of the trademark, and of the exclusive right to the use
thereof.―It must be emphasized that registration of a trademark, by
itself, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. If the applicant is not the
Page 74 of 682
owner of the trademark, he has no right to apply for its registration.

Registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of the validity of
the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the trademark, and of
the exclusive right to the use thereof. Such presumption, just like the
presumptive regularity in the performance of official functions, is
rebuttable and must give way to evidence to the contrary.
Same; Same; Same; A trademark is an industrial property over which its
owner is entitled to property rights which cannot be appropriated by
unscrupulous entities that, in one way or another, happen to register
such trademark ahead of its true and lawful owner.―Clearly, it is not the
application or registration of a trademark that vests ownership thereof,
but it is the ownership of a trademark that confers the right to register
the same. A trademark is an industrial property over which its owner is
entitled to property rights which cannot be appropriated by
unscrupulous entities that, in one way or another, happen to register
such trademark ahead of its true and lawful owner. The presumption of
ownership accorded to a registrant must then necessarily yield to
superior evidence of actual and real ownership of a trademark.
Page 75 of 682
G.R. No. 179155. April 2, 2014.*

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, petitioner, vs. EULALIA BRACEWELL,
EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL,
JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and
HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (P.D.
No. 1529); The land registration laws were updated and codified under
PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979, and under Section 17
thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still
vested on the Courts of First Instance CFIs (now, Regional Trial Courts
[RTCs]) of the province or city where the land is situated.—Under Act
No. 496 (Act 496), or the “Land Registration Act,” as amended, — which
was the law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties
of their respective registration proceedings — jurisdiction over all
applications for registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the
land sought to be registered is situated. The land registration laws were
updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23,
1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for
land registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or
city where the land is situated.
Remedial Law; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) now have the power to hear and determine all questions,
even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for
original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such
registration.—To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should
take cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral
court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, however, that with
the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a
cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and
determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising
from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions
filed after such registration. Accordingly, and considering further that
the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction, petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement to
advance its theory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law instructs that for “as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the (Land Registration Authority [LRA])
and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.”—Since the LRA’s issuance of a
decree of registration only proceeds from the land registration court’s
Page 76 of 682
directive, a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a

review of the land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs
that for “as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA]
and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; Venue is only a matter of procedure and,
hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
administration of justice.—As the land subject of this case is undeniably
situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its original registration
should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the
fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time the application
was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the
complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction
(given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree
cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the
peculiarity of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the
authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed
in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las
Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules
of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only
because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevail
ing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from applying
the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure
and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
administration of justice.
Page 77 of 682
G.R. No. 205382. April 2, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAURICIO
HALLARTE y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Time and again, the Supreme
Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal.—Time and again, the Court has held that
factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions such as
where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
has been ignored or misconstrued, or where the trial court has acted
arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Child Witnesses; Testimonies of child-
victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed.—[T]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl’s revelation that
she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be
compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be
so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
Criminal Law; Rape; There must be independent evidence proving the
age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and the absence of denial by the accused.—While the Court upholds the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon appellant in Criminal Case
No. Q-00-93225 for Simple Rape, there is a need to modify the penalty
imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 for Rape by Sexual Assault in
view of the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily prove the age of
BBB. While the information alleged that BBB was “8 years of age, a
minor,” and the parties stipulated on her minority during the pre-trial
conference, the same are insufficient evidence of her age which must
be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. As the Court
succinctly explained in People v. Soria: 685 SCRA 483 (2012), “[T]here
must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by
the accused.” Documents such as her original or duly certified birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as
competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to
Page 78 of 682
prove the minority of “AAA” other than her testimony, appellant’s

absence of denial, and their pretrial stipulation. The prosecution also
failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost,
destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent.
Page 79 of 682
G.R. No. 193787. April 7, 2014.*

SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE and BEATRIZ DELA CRUZ ROQUE, with
deceased Jose C. Roque represented by his substitute heir
JOVETTE ROQUE-LIBREA, petitioners, vs. MA. PAMELA P.
AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP), represented by its
Secretary General SHARON ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), represented by Branch
Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY. MARIO S.P. DIAZ, in his
Official Capacity as Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch,
and CECILIO U. PULAN, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff, Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Reconveyance; The essence of an action for
reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right.—The essence of an action
for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon
the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the property
superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not
yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Same; Contracts; Contracts to Sell; In a contract to sell, ownership is
retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price.—Examining its provisions, the Court
finds that the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the 1977 Deed
of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to sell and not
one of sale contrary to Sps. Roque’s belief. In this relation, it has been
consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the
purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their
agreement is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this
case. This treatment stems from the legal characterization of a contract
to sell, that is, a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite
delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the
subject property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon, such as, the full payment of the purchase
price. Elsewise stated, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price.
Same; Same; Double Sales; Circumstances which Must Concur in Order
to Determine the Applicability of Article 1544.— On the matter of double
sales, suffice it to state that Sps. Roque’s reliance on Article 1544 of the
Civil Code has been misplaced since the contract they base their claim
of ownership on is, as earlier stated, a contract to sell, and not one of
Page 80 of 682
sale. In Cheng v. Genato, 300 SCRA 722 (1998), the Court stated the
circumstances which must concur in order to determine the applicability
of Article 1544, none of which are obtaining in this case, viz.: (a) The
two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the
same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions; (b) The two
(or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (c) The two (or
more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each have bought from the same seller.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play and justice.—Regarding Sps. Roque’s claims of acquisitive
prescription and reimbursement for the value of the improvements they
have introduced on the subject property, it is keenly observed that none
of the arguments therefor were raised before the trial court or the CA.
Accordingly, the Court applies the well-settled rule that litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice. In any event, such claims appear to
involve questions of fact which are generally prohibited under a Rule 45
petition.
Page 81 of 682
G.R. No. 190021. October 22, 2014.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs.
BURMEISTER AND WAIN SCANDINAVIAN CONTRACTOR
MINDANAO, INC., respondent.
Taxation; In the recent case of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690
SCRA 336, promulgated on February 12, 2013, the Supreme Court (SC)
clarified that (a) the Atlas doctrine was effective only from its
promulgation on June 8, 2007 until its abandonment on September 12,
2008 in CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corp., 565 SCRA 154, and (b) prior to the
Atlas doctrine, Section 112(A) should be applied following the verba
legis rule adopted in Mirant.—In the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Dev’t. Corp. v. CIR (Atlas), 524 SCRA 73, which was promulgated on
June 8, 2007, the two-year prescriptive period stated in Section 112(A)
was counted from the date of payment of the output VAT. At that time,
the output VAT must be paid at the time of filing of the quarterly tax
returns, which meant within 20 days following the end of each quarter.
However, on September 12, 2008, the Atlas doctrine was abandoned in
the case of CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corp., 565 SCRA 154, which adopted
the verba legis rule and counted the two-year prescriptive period from
the “close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made” as
expressly stated in the law, regardless when the input VAT was paid. In
the recent case of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque), 690
SCRA 336, promulgated on February 12, 2013, the Court clarified that
(a) the Atlas doctrine was effective only from its promulgation on June 8,
2007 until its abandonment on September 12, 2008 in Mirant, and (b)
prior to the Atlas doctrine, Section 112(A) should be applied following
the verba legis rule adopted in Mirant.
Same; Tax Refund; Tax Credit; The taxpayer can file its administrative
claim for refund or credit at any time within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is
still filed on time. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) will have
one hundred twenty (120) days from such filing to decide the claim. If
the CIR decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on
that day, the taxpayer still has thirty (30) days to file its judicial claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA); otherwise, the judicial claim would
be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time and not, as
the CTA En Banc puts it, prescribed.—In fine, the taxpayer can file its
administrative claim for refund or credit at any time within the two-year
prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is
still filed on time. The CIR will have 120 days from such filing to decide
the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not
decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file its judicial
claim with the CTA; otherwise, the judicial claim would be, properly
speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time and not, as the CTA En
Banc puts it, prescribed. It bears emphasis that Section 112(D) (now
renumbered as Section 112[C]) of RA 8424, which is explicit on the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day period, was
already effective on January 1, 1998. Hence, it is of no consequence
Page 82 of 682
that the Aichi and San Roque rulings were not yet in existence when
respondent’s administrative claim was filed in 1999, so as to rid itself of
the said section’s mandatory and jurisdictional application.
Same; Same; Same; The inaction of the Commissioner of In- ternal
Revenue (CIR) on the claim during the one hundred twenty (120)-day
period is, by express provisions of law, “deemed a denial” of such claim,
and the failure of the taxpayer to file its judicial claim within thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the 120-day period shall render the
“deemed a denial” decision of the CIR final and inappealable.—The
inaction of the CIR on the claim during the 120-day period is, by express
provision of law, “deemed a denial” of such claim, and the failure of the
taxpayer to file its judicial claim within 30 days from the expiration of
the 120-day period shall render the “deemed a denial” decision of the
CIR final and inappealable. The right to appeal to the CTA from a
decision or “deemed a denial” decision of the Commissioner is merely a
statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. The exercise of such
statutory privilege requires strict compliance with the conditions
attached by the statute for its exercise. Thus, respondent’s failure to
comply with the statutory conditions is fatal to its claim. This is so,
notwithstanding the fact that the CIR, for his part, failed to raise the
issue of noncompliance with the mandatory periods at the earliest
opportunity. Same; Same; Same; In the case of Nippon Express
(Philippines) Corporation v. CIR, 693 SCRA 456 (2013), the Supreme
Court (SC) ruled that, because the 120+30-day period is jurisdictional,
the issue of whether the taxpayer complied with the said time frame
may be broached at any stage, even on appeal.—In the case of Nippon
Express (Philippines) Corporation v. CIR, 693 SCRA 456 (2013), the
Court ruled that, because the 120+30-day period is jurisdictional, the
issue of whether the taxpayer complied with the said time frame may
be broached at any stage, even on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that
the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any
time during the proceedings. Jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is
conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent or objection or
the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. Therefore,
respondent’s contention on this score is of no moment.
Same; It has been pronounced time and again that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government and, consequently, tax laws must be
faithfully and strictly implemented as they are not intended to be
liberally construed.—Indeed, it has been pronounced time and again
that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and, consequently, tax
laws must be faithfully and strictly implemented as they are not
intended to be liberally construed. Hence, with this in mind and in light
of the foregoing considerations, the Court so holds that the CTA En Banc
committed reversible error when it granted respondent’s claim for
refund or tax credit despite its noncompliance with the mandatory
periods under Section 112(D) (now renumbered as Section 112[C]) of
RA 8424. Accordingly, the claim for refund/tax credit must be denied.
Page 83 of 682
A.C. No. 6116. August 1, 2012.*

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO R.
PEFIANCO, respondent.
Attorneys; Practice of Law; The practice of law is considered a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.—The
practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above
standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
Same; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.—Respondent
did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to
be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is
that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently,
We find no reason to disturb the IBP’s finding that respondent violated
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes
a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”
Same; Illegal Money Lending; The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made available to other persons on
a consistent basis cannot be construed as indicia that respondent is
engaged in the business of lending.—We find the charge of engaging in
illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently established. A
“business” requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis. The lending of money to a single person without showing that
such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis
cannot be construed as indicia that respondent is engaged in the
business of lending.
Same; Disbarment; The power to disbar should be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as
member of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or
Page 84 of 682
committed under scandalous circumstance.—We rule that respondent

should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the power to
disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar, or the
misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance, which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances
of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
Page 85 of 682
August 1, 2012. A.C. No. 9390.*

EMILIA O. DHALIWAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B.
DUMAGUING, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client.—Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as payment for the balance of the purchase price
of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used for the purpose,
should be immediately returned. “A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.”
Page 86 of 682
A.M. No. P-12-3087. September 24, 2012.*

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2720-P) DIONISIO P. PILOT,
petitioner, vs. RENATO B. BARON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Sheriffs play an important
role in the administration of justice since they are tasked to execute
final judgments of the courts that would otherwise become empty
victories for the prevailing party if not enforced.―Sheriffs play an
important role in the administration of justice since they are tasked to
execute final judgments of the courts that would otherwise become
empty victories for the prevailing party if not enforced. The 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court characterizes sheriffs’ functions as
purely ministerial, to wit: Sheriffs are ministerial officers. They are
agents of the law and not agents of the parties, neither of the creditor
nor of the purchaser at a sale conducted by him. It follows, therefore,
that the sheriff can make no compromise in an execution sale. As a
ministerial officer, a sheriff is expected to faithfully perform what is
incumbent upon him, even in the absence of instruction. Thus, he must
discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence. In serving
court writs and processes and in implementing court orders, he cannot
afford to err without affecting the integrity of his office and the efficient
administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Grave Misconduct; The Court finds
respondent sheriff guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct when he
unlawfully collected and pocketed the amount of P15,000.00 intended
to defray the expenses for the publication of the notice and
enforcement of the writ of execution but which was not accordingly
spent.―Consequently, the Court finds respondent sheriff guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct when he unlawfully collected and
pocketed the amount of P15,000.00 intended to defray the expenses for
the publication of the notice and enforcement of the writ of execution
but which was not accordingly spent. He is likewise guilty of dereliction
of duty in failing to observe the proper procedure in collecting execution
expenses and conducting an execution sale. Moreover, he violated
Canon III, Section 2(b) of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, which prohibits court
employees from receiving tips or any remuneration from parties to the
actions or proceedings with the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS); Under Section 52 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and grave
misconduct are classified as grave offenses meriting the supreme
penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense.―Under
Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as grave
offenses meriting the supreme penalty of dismissal from service even
for the first offense. On the other hand, dereliction of duty for failure to
Page 87 of 682
comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is punishable
with a fine of P5,000.00.
Page 88 of 682
G.R. No. 199547. September 24, 2012.*

THE NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC. and/or JENNIFER M.
EÑANO-BOTE, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO N. DAKILA,
respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Employer-Employee
Relationship; The issue of illegal dismissal is premised on the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. It is
essentially a question of fact, beyond the ambit of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court unless there is a clear
showing of palpable error or arbitrary disregard of evidence.―The issue
of illegal dismissal is premised on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties herein. It is essentially a
question of fact, beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court unless there is a clear showing of
palpable error or arbitrary disregard of evidence which does not obtain
in this case. Records reveal that both the LA and the NLRC, as affirmed
by the CA, have found substantial evidence to show that respondent
Dakila was a regular employee who was dismissed without cause.
Same; Same; An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages computed from the time he was
illegally dismissed.―Following Article 279 of the Labor Code, an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
his full backwages computed from the time he was illegally dismissed.
However, considering that respondent Dakila was terminated on May 1,
2007, or one (1) day prior to his compulsory retirement on May 2, 2007,
his reinstatement is no longer feasible. Accordingly, the NLRC correctly
held him entitled to the payment of his retirement benefits pursuant to
the CBA. On the other hand, his backwages should be computed only
for days prior to his compulsory retirement which in this case is only a
day. Consequently, the award of reinstatement wages pending appeal
must be deleted for lack of basis.
Same; Same; Petitioner cannot be made personally liable for the
liabilities of the corporation which, by legal fiction, has a personality
separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders and members.―The
Court finds no basis to hold petitioner Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote, President
and General Manager of The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc., jointly and
severally liable with the corporation for the payment of the monetary
awards. The mere lack of authorized or just cause to terminate one’s
employment and the failure to observe due process do not ipso facto
mean that the corporate officer acted with malice or bad faith. There
must be independent proof of malice or bad faith which was not
established in this case. Perforce, petitioner Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote
cannot be made personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation
which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers, stockholders and members. Moreover, for lack of factual and
Page 89 of 682
legal bases, the awards of moral and exemplary damages cannot also
be sustained.
Page 90 of 682
G.R. No. 179115. September 26, 2012.*

ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Taxation; Tax Amnesty; A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the
intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties
on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law.―A tax amnesty is a
general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its
authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violating a
tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the government of its right
to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a
chance to start with a clean slate.
Same; Same; Tax Amnesty Program (R.A. No. 9480); The Tax Amnesty
Program under RA 9480 may be availed of by any person except those
who are disqualified under Section 8 thereof.―The Tax Amnesty
Program under RA 9480 may be availed of by any person except those
who are disqualified under Section 8 thereof, to wit: Section 8.
Exceptions.―The tax amnesty provided in Section 5 hereof shall not
extend to the following persons or cases existing as of the effectivity of
this Act: (a) Withholding agents with respect to their withholding tax
liabilities; (b) Those with pending cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government; (c) Those with
pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth or
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (d) Those with pending
cases filed in court involving violation of the Anti-Money Laundering
Law; (e) Those with pending criminal cases for tax evasion and other
criminal offenses under Chapter II of Title X of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and the felonies of frauds, illegal
exactions and transactions, and malversation of public funds and
property under Chapters III and IV of Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
and (f) Tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts.
Same; “Indirect Taxes” and “Excise Taxes,” Distinguished.―Indirect
taxes, like VAT and excise tax, are different from withholding taxes. To
distinguish, in indirect taxes, the incidence of taxation falls on one
person but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another
person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching
the consumer who ultimately pays for it. On the other hand, in case of
withholding taxes, the incidence and burden of taxation fall on the same
entity, the statutory taxpayer. The burden of taxation is not shifted to
the withholding agent who merely collects, by withholding, the tax due
from income payments to entities arising from certain transactions and
remits the same to the government.
Page 91 of 682
G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012.*

LIVING @ SENSE, INC., petitioner, vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Indispensable Parties; An indispensable
party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs
or defendants.―The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety
does not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or
proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case is to
implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering that parties
may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action.―Even on the assumption that
DMI was, indeed, an indispensable party, the RTC committed reversible
error in dismissing the complaint. Failure to implead an indispensable
party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in
such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable,
considering that parties may be added by order of the court, on motion
of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action.
Page 92 of 682
G.R. No. 192951. November 14, 2012.*

ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC., ARSENIO L. MENDOZA, IGNACIO A.
GALINDEZ, WILSON E. SAGADRACA, and FILIPINAS MENZEN,
petitioners, vs. JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN, ARTEMIO M. VILLALUZ, SR.,
TERESITA ARREOLA, FORTUNATA ANDAYA, SALVADOR C.
AQUINO, ROBERTO M. TUGAWIN and JOSE O. RUPAC,
respondents, and ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC., DR. WILLIE A.
DAMASCO, REV. ELMER V. LUNA, JEMZ R. LUDAN, SAMUEL V.
FULGENCIO, REV. ISMAEL A. DAMASCO, VICENTE V. RAMEL,
SALVADOR C. AQUINO, CAMILO V. GALLARDO, NORMALITA C.
ORDONEZ, and ARSENIO L. SOLIMEN, respondents-intervenors.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions to Dismiss; In an ordinary civil
action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint.— In an ordinary civil
action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed “within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint” and on the grounds
enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) That
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; (b)
That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on
which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with.
Same; Same; Same; Intra-corporate Controversies; Under Section 8,
Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate
Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading.—Under
Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading. As this case
involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is undeniably
a prohibited pleading. Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the
dismissal of the case based on the mere issuance of a board resolution
by the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner
corporation recommending its dismissal, especially considering the
various issues raised by the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the
RTC should not have entertained, let alone have granted the subject
motion to dismiss.
Page 93 of 682
G.R. No. 191660. December 3, 2012.*

DELIA T. SUTTON, petitioner, vs. ROMANITO P. LIM, EFREN C. LIM
AND ALLAN C. LIM, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF
AROROY, MASBATE, PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER
OF MASBATE, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE
OF MASBATE, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Agrarian Disputes; Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); Jurisdiction; For the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to acquire jurisdiction, the
controversy must relate to an agrarian dispute between the landowners
and tenants in whose favor Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) have been issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Secretary.―While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of
CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction is, however, confined only to
agrarian disputes. As explained in the case of Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs
of Cruz, 475 SCRA 743 (2005), and reiterated in the recent case of
Bagongahasa v. Spouses Cesar Caguin, 646 SCRA 338 (2011), for the
DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the controversy must relate to an
agrarian dispute between the landowners and tenants in whose favor
CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As defined in Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
6657, an agrarian dispute relates to “any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.―As defined in Section 3(d)
of R.A. No. 6657, an agrarian dispute relates to “any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under the
said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.”
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; An agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture.―Verily, an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating
to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial
arrangements pertain to agreements which set out the rights between a
landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm worker or other agrarian reform
beneficiary involving agricultural land. Traditionally, tenurial
arrangements are in the form of tenancy or leasehold arrangements.
Page 94 of 682
However, other forms such as a joint production agreement to effect the

implementation of CARP have been recognized as a valid tenurial
arrangement.
Statutory Construction; It is a rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context―particularly, that every part of the statute must be interpreted
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.―It is a rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context―particularly, that every part of the statute must be interpreted
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. Therefore, in line with the purpose of
recognizing the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners under the
agrarian reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3(d) of
R.A. No. 6657 should be understood within the context of tenurial
arrangements, else the intent of the law be subverted.
Agrarian Reform; Elements of Tenurial, Leasehold, or Agrarian
Relations.―To be sure, the tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations
referred to may be established with the concurrence of the following: 1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the
agricultural relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
Same; Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure clearly provides that
“matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of R.A. No.
6657, and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall be the
exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Secretary.”―In this regard, petitioner has not alleged any
tenurial arrangement between the parties, negating the existence of
any agrarian dispute and consequently, the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Indisputably, the controversy between the parties is not agrarian in
nature and merely involves the administrative implementation of the
agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the DAR Secretary.
Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure clearly provides
that “matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
R.A. No. 6657, and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall
be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary.”
Same; Republic Act No. 9700; Under the new law, R.A. No. 9700, which
took effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the cancellation of
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.―It bears to emphasize that
under the new law, R.A. No. 9700, which took effect on July 1, 2009, all
cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles issued under
any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and original
Page 95 of 682
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Section 9 of the said law provides:

Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is further
amended to read as follows: x x x All cases involving the cancellation of
registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award,
and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.
Page 96 of 682
G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013.*

ROMEO A. GONTANG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF
GAINZA, CAMARINES SUR, petitioner, vs. ENGR. CECILIA
ALAYAN, respondent.
Attorneys; Right to Counsel; In instances where personal liability on the
part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure
the services of private counsel.—The damages sought therein could
have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be deemed
to have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v.
RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 553 (1993),
the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal
liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may
properly secure the services of private counsel, explaining: It can
happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official
capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been
underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been
his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to
him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a
counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the
discharge of governmental functions, ‘municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to
the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof. In such instance, this Court
has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case, We
held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local
officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for
a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And
in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued
in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when
“the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them
in their private capacity.
Page 97 of 682
G.R. No. 199338. January 21, 2013.*

ELEAZAR S. PADILLO,+ petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF
NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S. OROPEZA, respondents.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Disease; Article 297 of the
Labor Code contemplates a situation where the employer, and not the
employee, initiates the termination of employment on the ground of the
latter’s disease or sickness.—As held in Villaruel vs. Yeo Han Guan, 650
SCRA 64 (2011), a precedent which the CA correctly applied, Article 297
of the Labor Code contemplates a situation where the employer, and
not the employee, initiates the termination of employment on the
ground of the latter’s disease or sickness, viz.: A plain reading of the
[Article 297 of the Labor Code] clearly presupposes that it is the
employer who terminates the services of the employee found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of
his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the
employee who severs his or her employment ties. This is precisely the
reason why Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not
terminate the services of the employee unless there is a certification by
a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature
or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment.
Same; Managerial Employees; Confidential Employees; Types of
Employees That Are Prohibited to Self-Organize.—In this case, it cannot
be said that Padillo belonged to the same class of employees prohibited
to self-organize which, at present, consist of: (1) managerial employees;
and (2) confidential employees who assist persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations. Therefore, absent this equitable peculiarity, termination pay
on the ground of disease under Article 297 of the Labor Code and the
Court’s ruling in Abaquin should not be applied.
Same; Retirement; In the absence of any applicable agreement, an
employee must (1) retire when he is at least sixty (60) years of age and
(2) serve at least (5) years in the company to entitle him/her to a
retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year
of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as
one whole year.—Simply stated, in the absence of any applicable
agreement, an employee must (1) retire when he is at least sixty (60)
years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the company to entitle
him/her to a retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year. Notably, these age and tenure
requirements are cumulative and non-compliance with one negates the
employee’s entitlement to the retirement benefits under Article 300 of
the Labor Code altogether. In this case, it is undisputed that there exists
no retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement or any other
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equivalent contract between the parties which set out the terms and
condition for the retirement of employees, with the sole exception of
the Philam Life Plan which premiums had already been paid by the
Bank.
Same; Company Practice; Words and Phrases; To be considered a
company practice, the giving of the benefits should have been done
over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent
and deliberate.—Neither was it proven that there exists an established
company policy of giving early retirement packages to the Bank’s aging
employees. In the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 589 SCRA 376 (2009), it has been
pronounced that to be considered a company practice, the giving of the
benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be
shown to have been consistent and deliberate. In this relation,
petitioners’ bare allegation of the solitary case of Lusan cannot—
assuming such fact to be true—sufficiently establish that the Bank’s
grant of an early retirement package to her (Lusan) evolved into an
established company practice precisely because of the palpable lack of
the element of consistency. As such, petitioners’ reliance on the Lusan
incident cannot bolster their claim.
Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; Damages may be recoverable due
to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however,
obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.—While the
Court mindfully notes that damages may be recoverable due to an
abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain:
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that
none of these elements exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages
on account of abuse of right may he recovered.
Same; Labor Law; Bad Faith; It is axiomatic that bad faith can never be
presumed—it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.—
Neither can the grant of an early retirement package to Lusan show that
Padillo was unfairly discriminated upon. Records show that the same
was merely an isolated incident and petitioners have failed to show that
any bad faith or motive attended such disparate treatment between
Lusan and Padillo. Irrefragably also, there is no showing that other Bank
employees were accorded the same benefits as that of Lusan which
thereby dilutes the soundness of petitioners’ imputation of
discrimination and bad faith. Verily, it is axiomatic that held faith can
never be presumed—it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. This petitioners were unable to prove in the case at bar.
Page 99 of 682
Adm. Case No. 6148. January 22, 2013.*

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, respondent. RE: PETITION (FOR
EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its
duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways.—
From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of
age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even
remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those
Page 100 of 682

G.R. No. 199149. January 22, 2013.*

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.
PANOTES, respondents.
G.R. No. 201350. January 22, 2013.*

ELMER E. PANOTES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,
respondents.
Election Law; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is
exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the tribunal; otherwise, it shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s
exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.—“It is hornbook principle that
our jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is
exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the tribunal”; otherwise, we shall not interfere with the electoral
tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the
abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty.” The acts complained of in these cases pertain to the HRET’s
exercise of its discretion, an exercise which we find to be well within the
bounds of its authority and, therefore, beyond our power to restrict or
curtail.
Same; Automated Election System (AES); Words and Phrases; An
automated election system, or Automated Election System (AES), is a
system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in
the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process.— Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369 defines “official ballot” where AES is utilized as the “paper ballot,
whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully
captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be
recorded in electronic form.” An automated election system, or AES, is a
system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in
the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process. There are two types of AES
identified under R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2)
direct recording electronic election system. A paper-based election
system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is
the type of AES that “use paper ballots, records and counts votes,
tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the
results of the vote count.” On the other hand, direct recording electronic
election system “uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a
ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component
that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of
Page 101 of 682
computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and

transmits voting results electronically.”
Same; Same; Encryption; Words and Phrases; Encryption is the process
of encoding messages (or information) in such a way that
eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that authorized parties
can.—It bears stressing that the digital images of the ballots captured
by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards.
“Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in
such a way that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that
authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or
information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an encryption
algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done
with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is
to be encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be
able to determine anything about the original message. An authorized
party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a decryption
algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key, that
adversaries do not have access to.”
Same; Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); The Constitution mandates that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications” of its members.—The
Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of its
members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic
that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests
involving its members is intended to be its own—full, complete and
unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its exclusive
control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows: Rule 7. Exclusive
Control of Functions.— The Tribunal shall have exclusive control,
direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions
and operation.
Same; Same; Same; At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive
prerogative of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) as
the sole judge of election contests involving its members, we cannot
substitute our own judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of
whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect
the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the
revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the
electorate.—At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive
prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving
its members, we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the
HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial
revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the
continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination
of the true will of the electorate. In any case, as pointed out by the
HRET, the revision proceedings for the remaining 75% protested
clustered precincts had already been conducted from May 2-9, 2012
thereby rendering the issue moot and academic.
Page 102 of 682
G.R. No. 199938. January 28, 2013.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CAMALODING LABA y
SAMANODING, appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Words and Phrases; “Transport” as
used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or
convey from one place to another”; While it may be argued that
appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the
illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at
the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of
transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to
another.―“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined
to mean “to carry or convey from one place to another.” The essential
element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one
place to another. In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the
airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for Davao City
with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic
bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued
that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with
the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence
at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of
transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; With respect to the chain of
custody of the confiscated drugs, the Supreme Court finds no reason to
disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals that the same had been
faithfully observed by the arresting officers: from the time that the
illegal substance was seized from appellant and properly marked by the
arresting officers, to its laboratory examination until its presentation in
open court for identification purposes.―With respect to the chain of
custody of the confiscated drugs, the Court likewise finds no reason to
disturb the findings of the CA that the same had been faithfully
observed by the arresting officers: from the time that the illegal
substance was seized from appellant and properly marked by the
arresting officers, to its laboratory examination until its presentation in
open court for identification purposes. Considering that the integrity of
the seized substance has been duly preserved, failure to strictly comply
with Sec. 21, Par. (a) of RA 9165 requiring the apprehending officers to
physically inventory and photograph the confiscated items shall not
render the evidence inadmissible.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries Made in Official Records; Under Section
44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made
in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts
they state.―Neither will the nonpresentation in court of Police Senior
Inspector Ebuen, the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory
examination on the confiscated substance, operate to acquit appellant.
The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the
court to decide. It has the discretion as to how to present its case and it
Page 103 of 682
has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.

Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the
chemical analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist
regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the
performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they
state.
Page 104 of 682

G.R. No. 192826. February 27, 2013.*

PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. MA. FLORA
M. EPISCOPE, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; It is settled that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to consider a
factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.―At the outset, it is settled that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing
errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual
issue as it is not a trier of facts. The rule, however, is not ironclad and a
departure therefrom may be warranted where the findings of fact of the
CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court or
quasi-judicial agency, as in this case. There is therefore a need to
review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as
more conformable to evidentiary facts.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;
Reinstatement; Backwages; If an employer terminates the employment
without a just or authorized cause, then the employee is considered to
have been illegally dismissed and is thus, entitled to reinstatement or in
certain instances, separation pay in lieu thereof, as well as the payment
of backwages.―Article 293 (formerly Article 279) of the Labor Code
provides that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except only for a just or authorized cause. If an employer
terminates the employment without a just or authorized cause, then the
employee is considered to have been illegally dismissed and is thus,
entitled to reinstatement or in certain instances, separation pay in lieu
thereof, as well as the payment of backwages. Among the just causes
for termination is the employer’s loss of trust and confidence in its
employee. Article 296 (c) (formerly Article 282 [c]) of the Labor Code
provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee
for fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in him. But in order for
the said cause to be properly invoked, certain requirements must be
complied with namely, (1) the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence and (2) there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence.
Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; There are fiduciary rank-
and-file employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or
those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though
rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employer’s money or property, and are thus classified as occupying
positions of trust and confidence.―It is noteworthy to mention that
there are two classes of positions of trust: on the one hand, there are
managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or
Page 105 of 682
a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the

managerial staff; on the other hand, there are fiduciary rank-and-file
employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those
who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though
rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employer’s money or property, and are thus classified as occupying
positions of trust and confidence. Episcope belongs to this latter class
and therefore, occupies a position of trust and confidence.
Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, employers are allowed a wider
latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees who
perform functions by which their nature require the employer’s full trust
and confidence.―Primarily, it is apt to point out that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required in dismissing an employee on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence; it is sufficient that there lies
some basis to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for
the misconduct and that the nature of the employee’s participation
therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence
demanded by his position. On this point, the Court, in the case of Bristol
Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, 574 SCRA 198 (2008), citing Atlas
Fertilizer Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA
551 (1997), ruled as follows: [A]s a general rule, employers are allowed
a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees
who perform functions by which their nature require the employer’s full
trust and confidence. Mere existence of basis for believing that the
employee has breached the trust and confidence of the employer is
sufficient and does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his employer
has ample reason to distrust him, a labor tribunal cannot deny the
employer the authority to dismiss him.
Page 106 of 682

G.R. No. 201167. February 27, 2013.*

GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., JOSE C. GO, EVELYN GO, LOURDES
G. ORTIGA, GEORGE GO, and VICENTE GO, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES EUGENIO and ANGELINA FAJARDO, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Subdivisions and Condominiums;
In a contract to sell, the seller’s obligation to deliver the corresponding
certificates of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to the buyer’s full
payment of the purchase price; Section 25 of PD 957 imposes on the
subdivision owner or developer the obligation to cause the transfer of
the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon full payment.—It
is settled that in a contract to sell, the seller’s obligation to deliver the
corresponding certificates of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to the
buyer’s full payment of the purchase price. In this relation, Section 25 of
PD 957, which regulates the subject transaction, imposes on the
subdivision owner or developer the obligation to cause the transfer of
the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon full payment, to
wit: Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit.
No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in
the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In
the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of
the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall
redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six
months from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot
or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance
herewith.
Same; Same; Rescission of Contracts; Rescission does not merely
terminate the contract and release the parties from further obligations
to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and
restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been
made.—It is noteworthy to point out that rescission does not merely
terminate the contract and release the parties from further obligations
to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and
restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been
made. Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of the
benefits that each party may have received as a result of the contract,
is thus required. To be sure, it has been settled that the effects of
rescission as provided for in Article 1385 of the Code are equally
applicable to cases under Article 1191.
Same; Presidential Decree No. 957; It is the intent of P.D. No. 957 to
protect the buyer against unscrupulous developers, operators and/or
sellers who reneged on their obligations.―It is apt to mention that it is
the intent of PD 957 to protect the buyer against unscrupulous
developers, operators and/or sellers who reneged on their obligations.
Thus, in order to achieve this purpose, equity and justice dictate that
the injured party should be afforded full recompense and as such, be
Page 107 of 682

allowed to recover the prevailing market value of the undelivered lot

which had been fully paid for.
Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Officers; In the absence of
malice and bad faith, as in this case, officers of the corporation cannot
be made personally liable for liabilities of the corporation which, by
legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers,
stockholders, and members.—The Court finds no basis to hold individual
petitioners solidarily liable with petitioner GPI for the payment of
damages in favor of Sps. Fajardo since it was not shown that they acted
maliciously or dealt with the latter in bad faith. Settled is the rule that in
the absence of malice and bad faith, as in this case, officers of the
corporation cannot be made personally liable for liabilities of the
corporation which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and
distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members.
Page 108 of 682

G.R. No. 200727. March 4, 2013.*

IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. JOSE CAILIPAN,
MARIA OFELIA M. GONZALES, LAURA J. CAYABYAB, ROGELIO
COSTALES, and FERNANDO V. AUSTRIA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Certiorari; The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.―It is
well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one
remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that
there should be no appeal.
Page 109 of 682

A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.*

GLORIA P. JINON, complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ,
respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Practice of Law; The practice of law is
considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.—The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. “Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above
standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.”
Same; Same; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that
he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.—
Undeniably, “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he
will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to
the legal profession, the court and society.”
Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. —Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but
not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. “A lawyer’s
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.”
Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence; In administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required.—The Court notes that in administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. Having carefully scrutinized the records of this
case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence
has been more than satisfied.
Page 110 of 682

G.R. Nos. 207199-200. October 22, 2013.*

WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAÑADA,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
respective members.—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective
members: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; Case law states
that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.—Case law states that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The
phrase “election, returns and qualifications” refers to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term
“election” refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; “returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and
the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and “qualifications” refers to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.
Page 111 of 682

G.R. No. 173802. April 7, 2014.*

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, BERNABE NOBLE, WILLIAM GAN, JULIO RODRIGUEZ,
JR., SAMUEL LIM, SANDRA YAP NG, ALFONSO UY, and BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; It
is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.—It is well-settled that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether
it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. This principle, commonly known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be
easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be
faithfully complied.
Page 112 of 682

G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012.*

VASHDEO GAGOOMAL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RAMON AND
NATIVIDAD VILLACORTA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Judgments; Levy; Writs of Possession; A writ of
possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a
person in possession of a real or personal property.—A writ of
person in possession of a real or personal property. We clarified in the
case of Motos v. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc., 593 SCRA 216 92009),
that a writ of possession may be issued under any of the following
instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No.
496; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Money judgments are enforceable only
against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and
if property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to
answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the
Rules of Court.—It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are
enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the
judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is
mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such
person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the
remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39
thereof specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly
or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment
debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate their
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
However, “a person other than the judgment debtor who claims
ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim”.
Same; Civil Procedure; Lis Pendens; Legal Effects of Filing a Notice of Lis
Pendens.—The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to
keep the property subject matter of the litigation within the power of
the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the
defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property subject of the
litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently promulgate.
Relative thereto, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
actions and their concomitant proceedings: “(a) an action to recover
possession of real estate; (b) an action to quiet title thereto; (c) an
action to remove clouds thereon; (d) an action for partition; and (e) any
other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.”
Page 113 of 682
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a

proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money
judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected.—To be sure, in Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal
Cove Realty Corporation, 399 SCRA 409 (2003), We have previously
explained that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a
proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money
judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected
such as when the relief sought in the action or suit includes the
recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication
between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession
to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party
initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in
court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a
purely personal action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes
functus officio.
Same; Same; Writs of Execution; Sheriffs; Should the sheriff levy upon
the assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has not even
the remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his
authority. A judgment can only be executed or issued against a party to
the action.—It bears to stress that the court issuing the writ of execution
may enforce its authority only over properties or rights of the judgment
debtor, and the sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to execution
property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor. Should the
sheriff levy upon the assets of a third person in which the judgment
debtor has not even the remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the
limits of his authority. A judgment can only be executed or issued
against a party to the action, not against one who has not yet had his
day in court.
Same; Same; Judgments; A judgment which has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be
modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes.—As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of
possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the
judgment of the RTC. “The settled rule is that a judgment which has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may
no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes—all the issues between the parties being deemed
resolved and laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court’s power with
regard to execution of judgments extends only to properties irrefutably
belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.
Page 114 of 682

A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC. June 13, 2012.*

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCHES 72 AND 22, NARVACAN,
ILOCOS SUR.
Administrative Law; Judges; Judges have the sworn duty to administer
justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied; delay
in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the judicial system.— Judges have the sworn duty to
administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice
denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a
major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial
system.
Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Under the 1987 Constitution,
trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days
from submission.—Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are
mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.
Same; Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Without an extension granted
by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required
period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
—In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a
judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before
him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to
comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
Page 115 of 682

G.R. No. 178046. June 13, 2012.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MONTINOLA-
ESCARILLA and CO., INC., respondent.
Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation; For purposes of determining
just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and price at the time of taking.—For
purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the
time of taking. In the implementation of R.A. No. 6657, Section 17
provides the manner by which just compensation is determined, thus:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation. The potential use of the expropriated property
is only considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the
general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control
the determination of just compensation.
Page 116 of 682

G.R. No. 185527. July 18, 2012.*

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO and JANE GO, petitioners,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY,
LTD., ET AL., respondents.
Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Depositions; The examination of
witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court; It is not
without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.—The examination
of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is
true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the
accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him
face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the
witness’ credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.
It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; For purposes of taking the
deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending.—For purposes of taking the
deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To take the deposition of the prosecution
witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’ deportment and
properly assess his credibility.—Certainly, to take the deposition of the
prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of
Page 117 of 682
his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’ deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the
witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the
accused.
Criminal Procedure; Right of Confrontation; The right of confrontation is
held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a two-fold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony
of witnesses by crossexamination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe
the deportment of witnesses.—The right of confrontation, on the other
hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge
to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People
v. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (1980), that the constitutional requirement
“insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus
deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to
submit to crossexamination, a valuable instrument in exposing
falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to
observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.”
Page 118 of 682

G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.*

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS–INVESTIGATIVE and
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA,
in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex officio
member of the Monetary Board, respondents.
Administrative Law; Presidency; Reorganizations; Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292); Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.—Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following
actions undertaken for such purpose: (1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other departments or agencies.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC); The
abolition of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and the
transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) is properly
within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated
legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292;
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with
the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing
him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of
units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and
offices from one unit to another.—Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and
the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292. Generally, this authority to implement
organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a
function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the
President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the
Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the
Page 119 of 682
less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since both the Presidential AntiGraft
Commission (PAGC) and the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) belong to the Office of the President Proper,
the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.—
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is
crucial not only as it affects employees’ tenurial security but also
insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is,
whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed
directly “under the Office of the President.” On the other hand, the
ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred,
is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization
by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The abolition of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) did not require the creation of a new, additional and
distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct
anti-graft body were simply transferred to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), which is an existing
office within the Office of the President Proper.—The abolition of the
PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office
as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office
within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no
more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division—the Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division—through which ODESLA could take on the
additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A reorganization is said to be carried out in
good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.—A valid
reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority
but must also be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be
carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions
within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such
purposes in mind. In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the
reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the
government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy.
Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the
fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the
PAGC’s operation in the 2010 annual budget, no separate or added
Page 120 of 682

funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the

transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Administrative Agencies; The Investigative and Adjudicatory Division,
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA)
is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having
the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.—Under E.O. 12,
the PAGC was given the authority to “investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government” and to “submit its report and recommendations to the
President.” The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body
to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and
adjudicate cases.
Ombudsman; The Ombudsman’s authority to investigate both elective
and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by
no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies.—Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is
an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may
not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the
IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsman’s authority to investigate both elective and appointive
officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means
exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection
of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government; The equal protection clause, however, is
not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that
aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently
from each other.—The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is
embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in
the application of the law, “all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but
subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
Administrative Law; Presidency; Having the power to remove and/or
discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary
authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct
in office.—Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled principle
that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint
is vested. Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential
appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such
public officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a
presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of
the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of
Page 121 of 682

the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into
matters that require his informed decision.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain one’s side. —In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain one’s side. Hence, as long as petitioner was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because
what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The
records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to
submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of
grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his
explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due
process.
Page 122 of 682

G.R. No. 196990. July 30, 2012.*

ARTURO DELA CRUZ, SR., petitioner, vs. MARTIN and FLORA
FANKHAUSER, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgments; Appeals; Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court states that no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution; Exceptions.—Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court
indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.
However, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 (1985), the
Court stated that there are certain instances when an appeal from an
order of execution should be allowed, to wit: It is also a settled rule that
an order of execution of judgment is not appealable. However, where
such order of execution in the opinion of the defeated party varies the
terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, or
when the terms of the judgment are not clear and there is room for
interpretation and the interpretation given by the trial court as
contained in its order of execution is wrong in the opinion of the
defeated party, the latter should be allowed to appeal from said
order so that the Appellate Tribunal may pass upon the legality and
correctness of the said order. (Underscoring supplied) Recently, the
Court En Banc, in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Aumentado, Jr., 625 SCRA 241 (2010), reiterated that there are
exceptions to the general rule that an order of execution is not
appealable, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the
judgment.
Page 123 of 682

G.R. No. 189041. July 31, 2012.*

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. DR. AGNES OUIDA P.
YU, respondent.
Local Government Units; Devolution; Words and Phrases; As defined,
“devolution” is the act by which the national government confers power
and authority upon the various local government units to perform
specific functions and responsibilities.—As defined, “devolution” is the
act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities. Specifically, Section 17(i) of the same Code prescribes
the manner of devolution, as follows: (i) The devolution contemplated in
this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the
records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national
agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions
and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall
be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in
whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively
viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided,
further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers
and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot
be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the
national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.
Administrative Law; Detail; Words and Phrases; A detail is the
movement of an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited
period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and
scientific positions.—A detail is defined and governed by Executive
Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus:
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed,
only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes
that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the
Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall
be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Same; Abandonment of Office; Abandonment of an office is the
voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of
terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute
abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstance as
clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.—“Abandon ment of an
office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to
constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There
must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that
the law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a
Page 124 of 682
voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and

freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or
‘external’ act by which the intention is carried into effect.”
Administrative Law; Abandonment of Office; Devolution; View that Dr.
Castillo did indeed abandon her statutory right to the position by
acquiescence. Otherwise, there would have been no vacancy in the said
devolved position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu could be validly
appointed.—I fully concur with the factual and legal basis of the
conclusion reached by the ponencia of the Honorable Justice Estrella M.
Perlas-Bernabe save with respect to her opinion that Dr. Fortunata A.
Castillo (Dr. Castillo) did not abandon the devolved position of Public
Health Officer II (PHO II). With due respect, I maintain contrary view that
Dr. Castillo did indeed abandon her statutory right to the said position
by acquiescence. Otherwise, there would have been no vacancy in the
said devolved position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu) could be
validly appointed.
Same; Same; View that Dr. Castillo’s manifest inaction to assert a legal
right from 1992 up to her retirement from government service in 1996
constituted abandonment by acquiescence, of whatever legal right she
had over the devolved position of Public Health Officer II (PHO II).—Dr.
Castillo’s manifest inaction to assert a legal right from 1992 up to her
retirement from government service in 1996 constituted abandonment
by acquiescence, of whatever legal right she had over the devolved
position of PHO II. Coupled with her acceptance or consent to her re-
absorption by the DOH in the DOH Regional Health Field Office No. IX in
Zamboanga City, she effectively abandoned any legal right she had to
the PHO II position devolved to the Province, which resulted in a
vacancy in the said position. This paved the way for the valid
appointment in 1994 of Dr. Yu who then was a de jure, not a de facto
officer. Having been validly appointed to a vacant position that was
mandatorily and automatically devolved to the Province by operation of
law, Dr. Yu, as correctly pointed out by the assailed ruling of the Court of
Appeals, had a vested right to the position of PHO II that was later re-
nationalized and reclassified as Chief of Hospital II by operation of a
subsequent law. As such, she is entitled to all the corresponding salaries
and benefits pertaining to the said office which she had not received for
the period not exceeding the day of her retirement which was on August
24, 2004.
Page 125 of 682

G.R. No. 192945. September 5, 2012.*

CITY OF IRIGA, petitioner, vs. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CASURECO III), respondent.
Remedial Law; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Republic Act
No. (RA) 9282, which took effect on April 23, 2004, expanded the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to include, among others,
the power to review by appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.—RA 9282,
which took effect on April 23, 2004, expanded the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to include, among others, the power to
review by appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
Void Judgments; A void judgment has no legal or binding force or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place.—Considering that RA 9282 was
already in effect when the RTC rendered its decision on February 7,
2005, CASURECO III should have filed its appeal, not with the CA, but
with the CTA Division in accordance with the applicable law and the
rules of the CTA. Resort to the CA was, therefore, improper, rendering its
decision null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. A
void judgment has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose
or at any place. Hence, the fact that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration from the CA Decision was belatedly filed is
inconsequential, because a void and non-existent decision would never
have acquired finality.
Taxation; Cooperatives; Electric Cooperatives; The tax privileges
granted to electric cooperatives registered with National Electrification
Administration (NEA) under P.D. 269 were validly withdrawn and only
those registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
under R.A. 6938 may continue to enjoy the tax privileges under the
Cooperative Code.—In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, 403 SCRA 558 (2003), the Court held that the
tax privileges granted to electric cooperatives registered with NEA
under PD 269 were validly withdrawn and only those registered with the
CDA under RA 6938 may continue to enjoy the tax privileges under the
Cooperative Code. Therefore, CASURECO III can no longer invoke PD
269 to evade payment of local taxes. Moreover, its provisional
registration with the CDA which granted it exemption for the payment of
local taxes was extended only until May 4, 1992. Thereafter, it can no
longer claim any exemption from the payment of local taxes, including
the subject franchise tax.
Same; Local Taxation; The power of the local government units to
impose and collect taxes is derived from the Constitution itself which
grants them “the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as
Page 126 of 682
the Congress may provide.”—The power of the local government units

to impose and collect taxes is derived from the Constitution itself which
grants them “the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as
the Congress may provide.” This explicit constitutional grant of power to
tax is consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy and
decentralization of governance. With this power, local government units
have the fiscal mechanisms to raise the funds needed to deliver basic
services to their constituents and break the culture of dependence on
the national government. Thus, consistent with these objectives, the
LGC was enacted granting the local government units, like petitioner,
the power to impose and collect franchise tax.
Same; Franchise Tax; Words and Phrases; A franchise tax is a tax on the
privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate
franchises granted by the state.—In National Power Corporation v. City
of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003), the Court declared that “a
franchise tax is ‘a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the
state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state.’ ” It is
not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon
its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges
granted to it by the government. “It is within this context that the
phrase tax on businesses enjoying a franchise in Section 137 of the LGC
should be interpreted and understood.”
Same; Same; Requisites That Must Concur in Order to be Liable for
Local Franchise Tax.—To be liable for local franchise tax, the following
requisites should concur: (1) that one has a “franchise” in the sense of a
secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or
privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local
government unit.
Same; Same; Franchise tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely
because it is a tax on business, rather than on persons or property.—It
should be stressed that what the petitioner seeks to collect from
CASURECO III is a franchise tax, which as defined, is a tax on the
exercise of a privilege. As Section 137 of the LGC provides, franchise tax
shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on
business, rather than on persons or property. Since it partakes of the
nature of an excise tax, the situs of taxation is the place where the
privilege is exercised, in this case in the City of Iriga, where CASURECO
III has its principal office and from where it operates, regardless of the
place where its services or products are delivered. Hence, franchise tax
covers all gross receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
Page 127 of 682

G.R. No. 174982. September 10, 2012.*

JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II, HEIRS OF CARLOS V. TAN represented
by Conrad K. Tan, Carlos K. Tan, Camilo Karl K. Tan, Carisa
Rosenda T. Go, NELIDA F. ATILANO and ISIDRA K. TAN,
petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City and ATLANTIC
MERCHANDISING, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; Payment of the
full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of
an appeal, and the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
such payment.—Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an
indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment. Corollary
to this, the Court has consistently held that procedural rules are not to
be disregarded simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
Same; Execution of Judgments; Execution of a judgment can only be
issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one
who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court.—It is well-
settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment
rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can only be issued
against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not
being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process
dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and
not against innocent third parties.
Page 128 of 682

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838. March 12, 2014.*

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI NO. 10-2260-MTJ]
SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO, complainants, vs.
JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 78, PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Judgments; The Constitution requires our
courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases
and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower
courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted
for decision or resolution.—The Constitution requires our courts to
conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and
resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts,
is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for
decision or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.: Section 15. (1) All
cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
Same; Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Noncompliance with the periods
prescribed under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
constitutes gross inefficiency, and, perforce, warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge.—In Re: Cases
Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge,
Branch 1, Tagbilaran City Bohol, 704 SCRA 415 (2013), the Court held
that non compliance with the periods prescribed under Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution constitutes gross inefficiency, and,
perforce, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against
the defaulting judge, viz.: The Court has consistently impressed upon
judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the
time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to
decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
Same; Same; Same; Trial court judges are given the option to, for good
reasons, ask for an extension of the period within which to resolve a
particular case or any pending incident therein.—While trial court
judges are often burdened with heavy case loads which, in turn,
preclude the expeditious resolution of disputes, they are given the
option to, for good reasons, ask for an extension of the period within
which to resolve a particular case or any pending incident therein. In Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Page 129 of 682
Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, 672 SCRA 21 (2012), citing
the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Javellana, 438
SCRA 1 (2004), the Court thus remarked: x x x [A] judge cannot choose
his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period
for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an
extension. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed
90 -day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition
of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay
or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case,
depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the
reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the
parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and
other analogous circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.—As
correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay failed to
resolve the subject motions, namely the motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion, within the three (3) month-period prescribed
therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo’s period to file their
comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/or rejoinder to the
reply lapsed on October 18, 2009, at which time, the pending incidents
were, as stated in the Order dated October 1, 2009, already deemed
submitted for resolution. This is concordant with Section 15(2), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that “[a] case or matter shall
be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Ejectment cases are
summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right of possession of property,” and
that “it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a
writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory.
—As case law instructs, “[e]jectment cases are summary proceedings
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right of possession of property,” and that “it becomes
mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to
enforce the judgment which has become executory,” as in Civil Case
No. 2004-286. To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical
attention on June 7, 2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that
on such date, the subject motions were already due for resolution. Thus,
without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge
Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the said case
within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This,
he, however, failed to do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative
sanctions against him remains in order.
Page 130 of 682
Administrative Law; Judges; Undue Delay in Rendering Decision;

Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering a decision or order is considered as a less serious offense
which is punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.—Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered as a less
serious offense which is punishable by either: (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. Considering, however, that Judge Pichay was
held administratively liable for the same offense in A.M. No. MTJ-10-
1763 (formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ), and hitherto warned that a
repetition of a similar infraction would warrant a more severe penalty,
the Court deems it apt to increase the fine recommended by the OCA
from P10,000.00 to P12,000.00.
Page 131 of 682

G.R. Nos. 130714 & 139634. October 16, 2012.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VAL DE LOS
REYES and DONEL GO, accused-appellants.
G.R. Nos. 139331 & 140845-46. October 16, 2012.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VAL DE LOS
REYES, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; With the Court’s
pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640
[2004], providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by
the Court of Appeals of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to
remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an
intermediate review.—At the outset, the Court notes that these cases
were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC’s imposition
of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision.
However, with the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v.
Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and making mandatory the
intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action
would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct
of an intermediate review.
Same; Same; Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses
his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief therefrom.—Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during
the proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact, tried and convicted in
absentia. There is dearth of evidence showing that he has since
surrendered to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray for
affirmative relief before the courts. Once an accused escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders
or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief therefrom.
Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.—It bears to stress that the
right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.
Page 132 of 682

A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013.*

RE: REQUEST OF (RET.) CHIEF JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
FOR RECOMPUTATION OF HIS CREDITABLE SERVICE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF RECOMPUTING HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
Administrative Law; Judges; Retirement; The Supreme Court has
unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
upon retirement claims of judges and justices.―The Supreme Court has
unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack
of required length of service in cases of disability or death while in
actual service or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave
credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify
one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to
complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the
full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian
considerations; and (5) considering legal counselling work for a
government body or institution as creditable government service.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 910; Under the beneficient
provisions of Rep. Act 910, as amended, a Justice who reaches age 70 is
entitled to full retirement benefits with no length of service
required.―The generous extent of the Court’s liberality in granting
retirement benefits is obvious in Re: Justice Efren I. Plana: It may also be
stressed that under the beneficient provisions of Rep. Act 910, as
amended, a Justice who reaches age 70 is entitled to full retirement
benefits with no length of service required. Thus, a 69 year old lawyer
appointed to the bench will get full retirement benefits for the rest of his
life upon reaching age 70, even if he served in the government for only
one year. Justice Plana served the government with distinction for 33
years, 5 months, and 11 days, more than 5 years of which were served
as a Justice of the Court of Appeals of this Court.
LEONARDO-CASTRO, J., Dissenting Opinion: Administrative Law;
Consultancy; Government Service; View that consultants are not
required to take an oath of office because they are not rendering
“government service” in the sense the term is understood for purposes
of applying the laws and regulations applicable to public officers and
employees; One who does not take an oath of office which demands the
highest standard and responsibilities of public service is understandably
not entitled to enjoy the benefits and privileges of a public officer or
employee.―All public officers and employees from the highest to the
lowest are required to take an oath of office which marks their
assumption to duty. Notably, even the Court’s appointed utility
personnel are required to take the oath of office mandated by the
Constitution and the law. To be sure, since it is long settled that not all
services rendered to the government partake of the nature of
“government service,” consultants are not required to take an oath of
office because they are not rendering “government service” in the
sense the term is understood for purposes of applying the laws and
regulations applicable to public officers and employees, among which
are the retirement laws, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Page 133 of 682
(Republic Act No. 3019 as amended), and the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No.
6713). Consultants can engage in the practice of their profession like
former Chief Justice Panganiban who admitted in his personal data
sheet submitted to the Court that he was a practicing lawyer as Senior
Partner of PABLAW during the period for which he was deemed by the
majority opinion to have rendered “government service.” One who does
not take an oath of office which demands the highest standard and
responsibilities of public service is understandably not entitled to enjoy
the benefits and privileges of a public officer or employee. It is well-
settled that an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for public office,
a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Same; Same; Same; View that the ruling of the majority, having set a
precedent, may have now opened a Pandora’s box of claims for
retirement benefits previously denied because prior to the ruling of the
majority in this case, consultancy services rendered to the government
have consistently not been credited as part of government
service.―The ruling of the majority, having set a precedent, may have
now opened a Pandora’s box of claims for retirement benefits previously
denied because prior to the ruling of the majority in this case,
consultancy services rendered to the government have consistently not
been credited as part of government service. The Court will be hard put
to take the position that its ruling applies only to former Chief Justice
Panganiban and to the Members of this Court who may invoke this
ruling in the future due to their having previously rendered similar
services to the government.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion: Administrative Law; Retirement;
Government Service; Republic Act No. 910; View that R.A. No. 910, as
amended by R.A. No. 9946, only reduced the minimum requirement of
government and/or judicial service for eligibility to lifetime pension from
twenty (20) years to fifteen (15) years; It did not change the legal
nature of the service that falls under the term “government service,”
nor did it change the legal meaning and characterization of
“consultancy.”―R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, only
reduced the minimum requirement of government and/or judicial
service for eligibility to lifetime pension from twenty (20) years to
fifteen (15) years. The amendment only widened the extension of
benefits to retirees by covering even the retirees who had rendered at
least 15 years of government and/or judicial service, but retired prior to
R.A. No. 9946; it did not change the legal nature of the service that falls
under the term “government service,” nor did it change the legal
meaning and characterization of “consultancy.”
Same; Same; Same; View that those who may render service with the
government, without occupying any public office or without having been
elected or appointed a public officer evidenced by a written
appointment recorded in the Civil Service Commission, do so outside of
the concept of government service. The ponencia interestingly
broadens this concept of “government service.”―In sum, those who
may render service with the government, without occupying any public
Page 134 of 682
office or without having been elected or appointed a public officer

evidenced by a written appointment recorded in the CSC, do so outside
of the concept of government service. The ponencia interestingly
broadens this concept of “government service.” It literally interprets the
term to include any service performed for the government; it thus
claims that the “law x x x did not require a specific job description or job
specification” and “the absence of a specific position in a governmental
structure is not a hindrance.”
Same; Same; Same; View that rendering “government service” within
the meaning of the law requires that (1) the person occupies, by
appointment or by election, a public office that was created by law, not
simply by contract; and (2) the office requires him to render service in
the performance of a governmental function.―For clarity, rendering
“government service” within the meaning of the law requires that (1)
the person occupies, by appointment or by election, a public office that
was created by law, not simply by contract; and (2) the office requires
him to render service in the performance of a governmental function.
This signification should particularly apply in construing retirement laws
in order not to defeat the intent and purpose of the recognition of
retirement and the grant of retirement benefits. Rep. Act No. 910 (as
amended), in particular, is founded on this intent and purpose. It
provides for retirement based either on age or disability, or on years of
service. The intent to reward past service is made patent by the
requirement for years of service, both in government and the Judiciary.
This is the intent that the Supreme Court itself should be very careful
about because it is an intent that applies to the Court itself.
Same; Public Office; Words and Phrases; View that “public office” is the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by the individual
for the benefit of the public.―“Public office” is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by the individual for the benefit of the
public. When the term is used with reference to a person having to do a
particular act or to perform a particular function in the exercise of
governmental power, it includes any government employee, agent or
body to do the act or exercise that function.
Same; Government Service; Consultancy; View that the requirement of
a public office in considering “government service” also signifies service
within the governmental structure and the exclusion of service outside
of this structure, although beneficial work for the government might
have been rendered in this role and capacity.―The requirement of a
public office in considering “government service” also signifies service
within the governmental structure and the exclusion of service outside
of this structure, although beneficial work for the government might
have been rendered in this role and capacity. This exclusion specifically
Page 135 of 682
refers to consultancy rendered pursuant to a contract of service,

involving work and delivery to the government of results produced in
the consultant’s own time and for his own account in the exercise of his
profession. This exclusion also encompasses services outsourced by the
government to private individuals for their special qualifications and
expertise; these services do not constitute government service and do
not characterize the private individuals as public officers. These aspects
of the case are dwelt with at length at the proper places below. It is
sufficient for now to simply state that the mere claim of having
rendered services (and even proof of actual rendition of service) will be
for naught unless made within an employment relationship existing
under the structure established by law within the government.
Same; Same; Same; View that in a consultancy, no tie links the
consultant to a public office that has been previously created by law;
the elements of public office, and the fact of appointment and of the
required oath are likewise missing.―As a contract of service,
consultancy has been excluded as “government service” for retirement
purposes because it does not satisfy the basic requirement that there
be a public office as understood under the law. In a consultancy, no tie
links the consultant to a public office that has been previously created
by law; the elements of public office, and the fact of appointment and of
the required oath are likewise missing. The CSC has fleshed out the
requirements by pointedly excluding “consultancy services” for lack of
the required employer-employee relationship.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993, expressly provides
that consultancy services “where no employer employee relationship
exists” are not considered government service.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Consultants; Words and Phrases; View that a
“legal consultant” is one who has “adequate external” professional
expertise in the law that no one in the agency could provide or render,
and whose services therefore must be procured.―A “legal consultant” is
one who has “adequate external” professional expertise in the law that
no one in the agency could provide or render, and whose services
therefore must be procured. A procured service is not government
service, as it is service hired after the conduct of the procurement
process; it is not part of the internal and regular services of the
procuring governmental entity. Under Memorandum Circular No. 17,
series of 2002, a consultancy contract or job order need not be recorded
by the CSC because the “services to be rendered thereunder are not
considered as government service.”
Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; View that to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has
consistently adhered to the four-fold test.―To determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has consistently
adhered to the four-fold test and has asked: “(1) whether the alleged
employer has the power of selection and engagement of an employee;
(2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means
and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) whether he has
the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages. Of
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the four, the control test is the most important element,” and its
absence renders any further discussion a surplusage. Recent
jurisprudence adds another test, applied in conjunction with the control
test, in determining the existence of employment relations. The two-
tiered test involves an inquiry into: “(1) the putative employer’s power
to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished [control test]; and (2) the
underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship [broader
economic reality test].”
Same; Government Service; Consultancy; Unlike the Justices he cited in
comparison, former Chief Justice Panganiban’s work did not involve the
performance of duties pursuant to a public office, i.e., for work in a
specific position under the governmental structure in the performance
of public functions.―Unlike the Justices he cited in comparison, former
Chief Justice Panganiban’s work did not involve the performance of
duties pursuant to a public office, i.e., for work in a specific position
under the governmental structure in the performance of public
functions. As I adverted to above, that he did consultancy work is what
the affiants―Justice Pardo and Secretary Roces―attested to. Under
what specific positions, under what specific role or capacity, and under
what terms and structures are, at best, unclear as neither affiants gave
definitive answers. As already mentioned in passing and as more fully
discussed elsewhere, former Chief Justice Panganiban―by his own claim
on file with the Court ― was at that time operating in the private sector
and was then in active law practice. These undisputed facts cannot but
significantly affect the characterization of the work former Chief Justice
Panganiban rendered.
Same; Same; Same; View that in the absence of substantial proof
creating a reasonable inference that the work rendered by Chief Justice
Panganiban fell within the term “government service,” there is no
reason, legal or factual, to grant former Chief Justice Panganiban’s
request.―In the absence of substantial proof creating a reasonable
inference that the work rendered by Chief Justice Panganiban fell within
the term “government service,” there is no reason, legal or factual, to
grant former Chief Justice Panganiban’s request. In any event, former
Chief Justice Panganiban’s consultancy service, even if somehow
considered service with the government (contrary to his own
declaration of record with the Court), is still work excluded by law from
the term “creditable government service.”
Same; Retirement; View that the discretionary power of the Supreme
Court to exercise a liberal approach in the application of retirement laws
is not unlimited.―The discretionary power of the Court to exercise a
liberal approach in the application of retirement laws is not unlimited.
The discretionary power is wielded only under circumstances where the
retiree has adduced proof of entitlement that can be justified in a
generous and expansive interpretation. The bottom line is that proof
must be adduced; liberality must be exercised in the process of
appreciating the proof adduced and in the interpretation of the law. The
Page 137 of 682

Court’s exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case basis premised on the

circumstances of each case.
Same; Same; Government Service; View that a ruling that certifications
alone, without more, are sufficient to establish government service
leaves the door open to a possible deluge of similar claims from those
who might have in the past entered into consultancy services with the
government.―A ruling that certifications alone, without more, are
sufficient to establish government service leaves the door open to a
possible deluge of similar claims from those who might have in the past
entered into consultancy services with the government. In the Judiciary
alone, those of us who were in private law practice before entering
judicial service might have, at one time or another, rendered
consultancy service for the government. To be sure, there are many
more out there among the professionals as this kind of service is a
phenomenon that is not specific to lawyers and the Judiciary. Where
does the line lie now and what happens to the rule of law when
stretching the interpretation of law to its limits becomes the rule?
Should the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security
System, and the concerned agencies now entertain applications for
crediting, without the benefit of an appointment to public office and
based solely on certifications that the applicant indeed delivered
service? Should inaction now be excused by a claim of lapse of time?
Page 138 of 682

G.R. No. 198694. February 13, 2013.*

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Enshrined in the
fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions by
the government.―Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right
against unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that: Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides that: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding; the traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of “stop and frisk” measures and searches incidental
to a lawful arrest.―Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same
sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government
authorities in contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section
3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that: 2. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to
Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the “exclusionary rule,” the above-cited
proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches,
searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view,
consented searches, “stop and frisk” measures and searches incidental
to a lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of particular
significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; A valid warrantless arrest which
justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the
parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.―A valid
warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is
carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court which requires that the apprehending officer must have been
spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.
To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
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accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically

with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In this light,
the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the factual incidents.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that the legality of arrest depends
upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the
law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the
act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty, this should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a
person’s liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse.―Indeed, while it is
true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion
of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for
the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, this should not be
exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it is largely expected of them to
conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The
determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold
liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the
line between legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible
criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performed
wisely and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably
discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed rights
lie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed
with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of
public accountability.
Page 140 of 682

G.R. No. 182130. June 19, 2013.*

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS,
petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO
A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA,
JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 182132. June 19, 2013.*

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS
KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO, petitioners, vs. ATTY. RODRIGO A.
REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA,
JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Courts; Separation of Powers; Courts
of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors
and the Department of Justice on the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless
such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.―It is well-settled that courts of law are
precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ
on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of
filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of
powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while
the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances,
whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has
been tasked by the present Constitution “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Same; Same; Probable Cause; In the context of filing criminal charges,
grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the determination of
probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility.―In the context of filing
criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the
determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. The abuse
of discretion to be qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this regard, case law
states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-
Page 141 of 682
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof.―To note, probable cause, for the
purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does
not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute
certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.―Under Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of Rape are: (a) that
the offender is a man; (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (c) that such act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Due to the nature of the
commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be
sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things.―It is a standing rule that due to the nature of
the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may
be sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Applying the same, the Court deems it prudent
to test the credibility of Iris’s testimony during trial, in which her
demeanor and deportment would be properly observable, and likewise
be subject to cross-examination.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; The rule is that conspiracy must be proved as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. It can
be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interests.―As may be gleaned from the Amended
Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and
Grace for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet, other than
his general imputation thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any
rational explanation for his finding of conspiracy against the
aforementioned respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be
proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself. It can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests. In this case, the Amended
Resolution is bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of the
foregoing respondents figured into the common design of raping Iris
and as such, the Court finds no reason to charge them for the same.
Same; Rape; Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610); If the victim is 12 years
or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
Page 142 of 682
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced.―At this juncture, the Court observes
that the DOJ charged Gil for Rape in relation to Child Abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 on account of the December 28, 2001
and April 23, 2002 incidents. Existing jurisprudence, however,
proscribes charging an accused for both crimes, rather, he may be
charged only for either. As held in People v. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16
(2011): [I]f the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape
under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same
act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of
Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code
(on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as
rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
Same; Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.―The elements of the
crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC are: (a)
that the offender is a private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the
act of detention is illegal, not being ordered by any competent authority
nor allowed by law; and (d) that any of the following circumstances is
present: (1) that the detention lasts for more than five days; or (2) that
it is committed by simulating public authority; or (3) that any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or threats to
kill him shall have been made; or (4) that the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
Same; Forcible Abduction; Elements of.―The elements of Forcible
Abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) that the person
abducted is any woman, regardless of her age or reputation; (b) that
the abduction must be against her will; and (c) that the abduction must
be with lewd designs. As this crime is complexed with the crime of Rape
pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the elements of the latter offense
must also concur. Further, owing to its nature as a complex crime
proper, the Forcible Abduction must be shown to be a necessary means
for committing the crime of Rape. As earlier discussed, there lies no
evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during the
period of her captivity from June 23 to November 9, 2003 thus, denying
the element of abduction. More importantly, even if it is assumed that
there was some form of abduction, it has not been shown ― nor even
sufficiently alleged ― that the taking was done with lewd designs. Lust
or lewd design is an element that characterizes all crimes against
chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender. As
such, the said element must be always present in order that they may
be so considered as a crime of chastity in contemplation of law.
Page 143 of 682

G.R. No. 194247. June 19, 2013.*

BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
ROSA REYES, CENANDO REYES and CARLOS REYES,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Two Modes of Appealing a
Judgment or Final Order of the Regional Trial Court in the Exercise of its
Original Jurisdiction.―Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction: (a) If the issues raised
involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper
recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in
relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (b) If the issues raised
involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Question of Law; Question of Fact; Jurisprudence
dictates that there is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances;
on the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the issue raised on
appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.―Jurisprudence dictates that there is a “question of law” when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts
or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when
the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of
“law” or “fact” is not the appellation given by the parties raising the
same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues
raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no
dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions
drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the
question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
Same; Same; Same; It has been consistently held that appellate courts
are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised
during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal.―It bears to note that the
second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its opposition
to respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for
reconsideration from the RTC’s Order dated November 27, 2007. It has
been consistently held that appellate courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings
below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for
reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues may be classified
as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of
the evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the
Page 144 of 682
same. Consequently, only the first and third issues were left for its
determination.
Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; A final judgment
may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be
it the highest Court of the land, rendered it, except in the interest of
substantial justice and where there are special and compelling reasons
for such actions.―In fine, given the special and compelling reasons as
above-discussed, the Court finds it appropriate to relax the rules of
procedure in the interest of substantial justice. In Twin Towers
Condominium Corp. v. CA, 398 SCRA 203 (2003), the Court held that the
merits of the case may be regarded as a special or compelling reason to
relax procedural rules. Likewise, in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank
of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), special and compelling reasons
constitute recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of
judgment, viz.: As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we have recognized
exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their
entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special and
compelling reasons for such actions.
Page 145 of 682

G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.*

JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPEGARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act
of 1997 (R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children.—At the outset, it must be
stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family
Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one
Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony
with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,
“this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion
of their conformity to the fundamental law.”—Inspite of its designation
as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds
of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power
to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only
in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3
SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of
final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.”
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
Page 146 of 682
opposition to the petition and not an answer. —Section 20 of A.M. No.

04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition
to petition. —(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not include
in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint,
but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.—We cannot
subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded
from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be
raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or
other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.
Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be
supported by evidence.—That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797
are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising
the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality
of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.
Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the
said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment
is rendered.—To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant
to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due
to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period
of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as
may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate
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the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very

purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so
as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue
an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law
against Violence Against Women and Children.—As the rules stand, a
review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is
valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The
mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does
not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v.
Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal
statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if
such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged
criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for
relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the
trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however,
that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle
of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.—It is settled
that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained
in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as
erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation
of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in
this case.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
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treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by
a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.—
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
of true equality.”
Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine
Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to
be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women
and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”—According to
the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-
based violence.” Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
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men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men’s companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control
to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of
controlling women to retain power.
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women.
—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized
by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.
Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and
that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.” Justice Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift
changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”
Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to
the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.—
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of
R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2.
Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall
exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children
in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for
as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse.—The application of R.A. 9262 is not
limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
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their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies
equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.—There is
nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and
the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application. Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like “depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,” “marital
infidelity,” and “causing mental or emotional anguish” are so vague
that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we
have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While
the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).— VAWC may likewise be committed “against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008),
the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation
that they and their son (GoTan’s husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and
in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A
protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members,
and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that petitions for
protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner
thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein.—A protection order is an order issued to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their children, their family
or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose
is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
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disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord
the victim and any designated family or household member safety in
the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to
protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.” The rules require that
petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for
every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC
if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence Against Women
and Children may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented.—The grant of a TPO
ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO
is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition
within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that
notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued
ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of
the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice.
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Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should

be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity
to present his side; “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.—It is clear from the
foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
“stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened” is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded
from private respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.
—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check”
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The
wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available
to the offended party.—The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the
respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights
are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany
the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has
gathered his things and escort him from the residence; x x x x
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court
shall not refer the Violence Against Women and Children case or any
issue thereof to a mediator.—Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary
on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties
to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a
process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
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reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,

however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an
order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay
Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all
laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”—
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the other
hand, executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” As clearly
delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm
to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to
“maintain public order in the barangay.” We have held that “(t)he mere
fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided,
an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such
a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.—Before a
statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to
leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however,
no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
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powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested
with jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a
summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it
may not be considered on appeal.—I agree with Justice Bernabe that the
RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide
issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in
accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on
appeal. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act
No. 9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.—(a) The respondent
may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the
alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that
would have prevented the trial court from granting the petition for
protection order against the petitioner.—The alleged unconstitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial
court from granting the petition for protection order against the
petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a
defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the
constitutionality of the law cannot be filed separately even with another
branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be
no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that can be
the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order against the petitioner.—For all intents and
purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals
was precipitated by and was ultimately directed against the issuance of
the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the
constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even with
another branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there
will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that
can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance
of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a
separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would
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still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another
case in the RTC.
Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law
must be raised at the earliest opportunity.—The challenge to the
constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In
Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 565 SCRA
624 (2008), we said: A law is deemed valid unless declared null and
void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts
will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.) This Court held that such
opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court that can
resolve it, such that “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.” The decision upon the constitutional question is
necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued against
petitioner. Such question should have been raised at the earliest
opportunity as an affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the
RTC handling the protection order proceedings, which was the
competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing
of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result
to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality and
propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are
inextricably intertwined.—The filing of a separate action before the
Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that
the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order
raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether
it is an appellate court or a trial court, cannot resolve the
constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the
petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an unresolved
prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the
proceedings for the protection order is not suspended, it does create
the danger of having inconsistent and conflicting judgments between
the two separate courts, whether of the same or different levels in the
judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject
of separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate
petitions for review before this Court – the exact scenario the policy
against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, “the law
and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity
of actions.”
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest
requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping
with the Supreme Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies
or even co-equal branches of government have remained within the
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limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given
them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve
the constitutional issue.— Notwithstanding my position that the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of
petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, should still pass upon the said issue in
the present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the petitioner, but
the private respondent as well, pray that the Court resolve the
constitutional issue considering its novelty and paramount importance.
Indeed, when public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional
issue raised, and in keeping with this Court’s duty of determining
whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have
remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent
Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different
standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of classifications.—
Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply
different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of
classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 585 SCRA 36
(2009), this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a
suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then “the
rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of
the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge.”
Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to
“ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men”
the level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the classification
in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the
middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review.—
Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to
men, when the reality is that there are men, regardless of their number,
who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational basis test
may be too wide and liberal to justify the statutory classification which
in effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In
the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny
applicable, to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No.
9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middletier scrutiny or
the intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive intermediate
review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important
governmental objectives, and (2) be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.
Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is
committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
fully enjoyed by everyone.—By constitutional mandate, the Philippines
is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms
are fully enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in
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favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was a

mere two years after it gained independence from the United States of
America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture,
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No.
9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the
government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of
women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic
violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.—The
Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of
the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard
the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing
effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological,
and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or
father of the victim. The said law is also viewed within the context of
the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted
as follows: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this
case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human
life, commonly designated as the police power. —The ex parte issuance
of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists
of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. However, it is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this
case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human
life, commonly designated as the police power.
Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere
provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the
pressing need of the victims for instant protection; Under the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a
Barangay Protection Order or the pendency of an application for a
Barangay Protection Order shall not preclude the victim from applying
for, or the court from granting, a Temporary Protection Order or
Page 158 of 682
Permanent Protection Order.—While judicial power rests exclusively in

the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government officials,
quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in
connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not
amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in
the courts. In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy under
Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the
victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of
appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that provide a more
effective and comprehensive protection to the victim. In fact, under the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or
the pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim
from applying for, or the court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a
TPO has already been granted by any court, the barangay official may
no longer issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also require that
within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the barangay
official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO
with the nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no
Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and
Phrases; View that a suspect classification is one where distinctions are
made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate
the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin,
alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual
orientation.—When the court uses a strict standard for review to
evaluate the constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise that
the law established a “suspect classification.” A suspect classification is
one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for
classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis
of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain
extent, sex and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the
most stringent scrutiny of the classification is applied: the ordinary
presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the government carries
the burden of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This approach is
unlike the lowest level of scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court
has applied in the past where the classification is scrutinized and
constitutionally upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law.
Under a reasonableness test, there is a presumption of constitutionality
and that the laws enacted by Congress are presumed to fall within its
constitutional powers.
Same; Same; View that there is no indication that Congress actually
intended to classify women and children as a group against men, under
the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification,
the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to harmonize family
Page 159 of 682
relations and protect the family as a basic social institution.—I do not

really see any indication that Congress actually intended to classify
women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A.
No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding
intent of the law is indisputably to harmonize family relations and
protect the family as a basic social institution. After sifting through the
comprehensive information gathered, Congress found that domestic
and other forms of violence against women and children impedes the
harmony of the family and the personal growth and development of
family members. In the process, Congress found that these types of
violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly
experienced by women and children due to the unequal power relations
of men and women in our society; Congress had removed these types of
violence as they are impediments that block the harmonious
development that it envisions for the family, of which men are
important component members.
Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect classification
and the accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the
circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential
treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and the
impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification.—
In my view, a suspect classification and the accompanying strict
scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact
of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the
needed protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect classification
on future classification. A suspect classification label cannot solely and
automatically be triggered by the circumstance that women and
children are accorded special protection by the Constitution. In fact,
there is no place for a strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself
has recognized the need for special protection; where such recognition
has been made, congressional action should carry the presumption of
validity.
Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not
immediately brought on by considerations of gender or sex; it was
simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a
marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.—A
suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard
cannot be solely based on the circumstance that the law has the effect
of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the classification in the law
was not immediately brought on by considerations of gender or sex; it
was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine
society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.
An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did not solely
depend on gender is because the law also covers children, without
regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail
civil and human rights of other persons falling outside the classification,
particularly of the men members of the family who can avail of
remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their own
Page 160 of 682
rights and interests.—With the objective of promoting solidarity and the

development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal redress for
domestic violence that particularly affects women and their children.
Significantly, the law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of
the men members of the family who can avail of remedies provided by
other laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and interests.
Consequently, the resulting classification under R.A. No. 9262 is not
wholly intended and does not work an injustice by removing remedies
that are available to men in violence committed against them. The law
furthermore does not target men against women and children and is
there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional objective, and it does
not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification that can be
labeled “suspect” in the sense already established by jurisprudence.
Under the circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny
review, or even the use of an expanded equal protection perspective,
strike me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive
equality.—Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right to equal protection
casts another shadow when the issue raised under it involves persons
protected by the social justice provision of the Constitution, specifically,
Section 1, Article XIII. The equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive
equality. “It ought to be construed,” said the Chief Justice, “in
consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987
Constitution — a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people
agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged
groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy.” This means that
the weak, including women in relation to men, can be treated with a
measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; View that the
expanded equal protection clause should be understood as meant to
“reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.”—Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded Equal
Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed
as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in the
patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his
or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status.”
Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should be
understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.” Borrowing the
language of Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his
own thoughts, the Chief Justice said: The purpose of the Expanded
Equal Protection Clause is to protect and enhance the right to dignity
by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation “of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social
Page 161 of 682

prejudice”; and 2) promo[ting a Philippine] society in which all persons

enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings.
Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); View that in the context of
women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an
equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to
achieve equality of results.—In the context of women’s rights,
substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as
equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that
they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of
results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical
to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into
account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of
women and men will be required in order to address such differences.
Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women
who have been victims of domestic violence.—Clearly, the substantive
equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For one thing, Congress enacted it
because of compelling interest in preventing and addressing the serious
problem of violence against women in the context of intimate
relationships — recognized all over the world as one of the most
insidious forms of gender discrimination. For another, R.A. 9262 is
based on the experiences of women who have been victims of domestic
violence. The list of acts regarded as forms of violence come from true-
to-life stories of women who have suffered abuses from their male
partners. Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks women’s full participation in society.
Hence, the law grants them needed relief to ensure equality, protection,
and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social,
and economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance,
precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from further harm, minimizing
any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity
and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.”
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus
Standi; Words and Phrases; View that Locus standi is defined as “a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Legal
standing in cases that raise constitutional issues is essential. Locus
standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.” The fundamental question is “whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. issue.—In this light, it may be said that violence in the
context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a
gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are not
gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer from
double victimization first by their abusers and second by the judicial
Page 162 of 682
system. Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims entrenches

some level of heteronormativity. It is blind to the possibility that,
whatever moral positions are taken by those who are dominant, in
reality intimate relationships can also happen between men. Statutes;
View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x
as inoperative as though it had never been passed.—We have declared
that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x
as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” However, the
seemingly all-inclusive statement of absolute retroactive invalidity may
not always be justified. One established exception is the doctrine of
operative fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid Law.
Page 163 of 682

G.R. No. 201251. June 26, 2013.*

INTER-ORIENT MARITIME, INCORPORATED and/or TANKOIL
CARRIERS, LIMITED, petitioners, vs. CRISTINA CANDAVA,
respondent.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC); Work-Related Illness; The
prevailing rule under the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) was that the
illness leading to the eventual death of a seafarer need not be shown to
be workrelated in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have
been contracted during the term of the contract.―The prevailing rule
under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to the eventual
death of seafarer need not be shown to be workrelated in order to be
compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the
term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or
illness. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of
employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at a
place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling
his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. A
meticulous perusal of the records reveals that Joselito contracted his
illness in the course of employment. It cannot also be denied that the
same was aggravated during the same period. Thus, there was a clear
causal connection between such illness and his eventual death, making
his death compensable.
Same; Same; Quitclaims; As a rule, quitclaims, waivers, or releases are
looked upon with disfavor and are largely ineffective to bar recovery of
the full measure of a worker’s rights, and the acceptance of benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel.―As a rule, quitclaims, waivers,
or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are largely ineffective to
bar recovery of the full measure of a worker’s rights, and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. This is
especially true in this case where instead of promoting the orderly
settlement of disputes; petitioners’ acts encouraged the circumvention
of the proper legal procedures and the evasion of the payment of
legitimate claims to a seafarer succumbing to a life-threatening disease.
Therefore the settlements that Joselito entered into must be struck
down for being contrary to public policy.
Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; In a number of cases, the Supreme
Court disregarded the medical report issued by the company
designated physician that the seafarer was fit to work in view of the
evidence on record that the latter had in fact been unable to engage in
his regular work within the allowable period.―Despite the declaration of
fitness that would have entitled him to reinstatement to his former
position, Joselito was not provided work, apparently due to his
worsening health. He was thus constrained to seek medical attention at
his own expense and was continuously unable to work until his death.
Page 164 of 682
This only shows that his medical condition effectively barred his
chances of being hired by other maritime employers and deployed
abroad on an ocean-going vessel. In a number of cases, the Court
disregarded the medical report issued by the company designated
physician that the seafarer was fit to work in view of the evidence on
record that the latter had in fact been unable to engage in his regular
work within the allowable period, as in this case.
Page 165 of 682

A.M. SB-13-20-P. June 26, 2013.*

[Formerly A.M. No. 12-29-SB-P] RIA PAMELA B. ABULENCIA and
BLESSIE M. BURGONIO, complainants, vs. REGINO R.
HERMOSISIMA, SECURITY GUARD II, SHERIFF AND SECURITY
DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Misconduct; Words and Phrases;
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially
by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the elements of
corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of
established rules are present.―Misconduct has been defined as an
intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct
is grave where the elements of corruption, a clear intent to violate the
law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules are present. Otherwise,
a misconduct is only simple. Accordingly, simple misconduct has been
defined as an unacceptable behavior which transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers, work-related or not.
Same; Same; Simple Misconduct; Respondent’s act of hurling invectives
on the complainants during office hours and within the court premises
was correctly held to be a case of simple misconduct.―In the case at
bar, respondent’s act of hurling invectives on the complainants during
office hours and within the court premises was correctly held to be a
case of simple misconduct. Verily, respondent’s foul and vulgar
utterances, albeit not work related, constitute clear deviations from the
established norms of conduct which ought to be followed by public
officers. For such infractions, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent
should be held administratively liable for the same.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (URACCS); Under Rule 10, Section 46(D)(2) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty
for simple misconduct is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months for the first offense.―In fine, having failed to live up to
the high standards of propriety and decorum expected of employees of
the judiciary, the Court finds that respondent was correctly held
administratively liable for simple misconduct. Under Rule 10, Section
46(D)(2) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, the penalty for simple misconduct is suspension for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.
Accordingly, the penalty recommended by the OCA, being within the
range prescribed under the aforesaid rules, is therefore deemed to be
proper.
Page 166 of 682

G.R. No. 178947. June 26, 2013.*

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of
H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74,
Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND,
respondents.
G.R. No. 179079. June 26, 2013.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TIMOTHY J.
DESMOND, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Determination of
probable cause may be either executive or judicial; The first is made by
the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for
the purpose of filing a criminal information in court; The second is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused.―Determination of probable cause may be
either executive or judicial. The first is made by the public prosecutor,
during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a
criminal information in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect,
the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence
submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere
superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by
asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.
Same; Same; Same; A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must
himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents
whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest.―It bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of
the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and
must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting
documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the
Page 167 of 682
Constitution which provides that “no warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.” While a judge’s determination of probable
cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest
warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
Same; Same; Once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record,
he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause;
(b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit
additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable
cause.―In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s
authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must
be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails
to establish probable cause — that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if
the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of
the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate
course of action would be to order the presentation of additional
evidence. In other words, once the information is filed with the court
and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the
evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he
finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the
prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the
existence of probable cause.
Same; Same; A judge’s discretion to dismiss a case immediately after
the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure
to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence
presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful.―Lest it be
misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a
perceived gap in the evidence leads to a “neither this nor that”
conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a
doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge’s discretion to dismiss a
case immediately after the filing of the information in court is
appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be
clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence
is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of
the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented
all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the
objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being
merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Page 168 of 682
G.R. No. 198759. July 1, 2013.*

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Taxation; Excise Taxes; Under Section 129 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, excise taxes are imposed on two (2)
kinds of goods, namely: (a) goods manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other
disposition; and (b) things imported. —Under Section 129 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, excise taxes are
imposed on two (2) kinds of goods, namely: (a) goods manufactured or
produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any
other disposition; and (b) things imported. With respect to the first kind
of goods, Section 130 of the NIRC states that, unless otherwise
specifically allowed, the taxpayer obligated to file the return and pay
the excise taxes due thereon is the manufacturer/producer. On the
other hand, with respect to the second kind of goods, Section 131 of the
NIRC states that the taxpayer obligated to file the return and pay the
excise taxes due thereon is the owner or importer, unless the imported
articles are exempt from excise taxes and the person found to be in
possession of the same is other than those legally entitled to such tax
exemption.
Same; Indirect Taxes; Jurisprudence states that indirect taxes are those
which are demanded in the first instance from one person with the
expectation and intention that he can shift the economic burden to
someone else.—Jurisprudence states that indirect taxes are those which
are demanded in the first instance from one person with the
expectation and intention that he can shift the economic burden to
someone else. In this regard, the statutory taxpayer can transfer to its
customers the value of the excise taxes it paid or would be liable to pay
to the government by treating it as part of the cost of the goods and
tacking it on to the selling price. Notably, this shifting process,
otherwise known as “passing on,” is largely a contractual affair between
the parties. Meaning, even if the purchaser effectively pays the value of
the tax, the manufacturer/producer (in case of goods manufactured or
produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any
other disposition) or the owner or importer (in case of imported goods)
are still regarded as the statutory taxpayers under the law. To this end,
the purchaser does not really pay the tax; rather, he only pays the
seller more for the goods because of the latter’s obligation to the
government as the statutory taxpayer.
Same; Tax Refunds; Section 204(c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code states that it is the statutory taxpayer which has the legal
personality to file a claim for refund.—Section 204(c) of the NIRC states
that it is the statutory taxpayer which has the legal personality to file a
claim for refund. Accordingly, in cases involving excise tax exemptions
on petroleum products under Section 135 of the NIRC, the Court has
consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer who is entitled to
Page 169 of 682
claim a tax refund based thereon and not the party who merely bears
its economic burden.
Same; Same; The propriety of a tax refund claim is hinged on the kind
of exemption which forms its basis.—It may be observed that the
propriety of a tax refund claim is hinged on the kind of exemption which
forms its basis. If the law confers an exemption from both direct or
indirect taxes, a claimant is entitled to a tax refund even if it only bears
the economic burden of the applicable tax. On the other hand, if the
exemption conferred only applies to direct taxes, then the statutory
taxpayer is regarded as the proper party to file the refund claim.
Same; Same; Tax Exemptions; In view of Philippine Airline’s payment of
either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax, whichever is
lower, it is exempt from paying: (a) taxes directly due from or imposable
upon it as the purchaser of the subject petroleum products; and (b) the
cost of the taxes billed or passed on to it by the seller, producer,
manufacturer, or importer of the said products either as part of the
purchase price or by mutual agreement or other arrangement.—PAL’s
payment of either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax,
whichever is lower, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties,
registration, license, and other fees and charges, except only real
property tax. The phrase “in lieu of all other taxes” includes but is not
limited to taxes that are “directly due from or imposable upon the
purchaser or the seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of said
petroleum products but are billed or passed on the grantee either as
part of the price or cost thereof or by mutual agreement or other
arrangement.” In other words, in view of PAL’s payment of either the
basic corporate income tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower, PAL is
exempt from paying: (a) taxes directly due from or imposable upon it as
the purchaser of the subject petroleum products; and (b) the cost of the
taxes billed or passed on to it by the seller, producer, manufacturer, or
importer of the said products either as part of the purchase price or by
mutual agreement or other arrangement. Therefore, given the foregoing
direct and indirect tax exemptions under its franchise, and applying the
principles as above-discussed, PAL is endowed with the legal standing
to file the subject tax refund claim, notwithstanding the fact that it is
not the statutory taxpayer as contemplated by law.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and often, remands cases to the
lower courts for the determination of questions of such character.—It is
hornbook principle that the Court is not a trier of facts and often,
remands cases to the lower courts for the determination of questions of
such character. However, when the trial court had already received all
the evidence of the parties, the Court may resolve the case on the
merits instead of remanding them in the interest of expediency and to
better serve the ends of justice.
Page 170 of 682

G.R. No. 185734. July 3, 2013.*

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO
and CARMEN T. LAZARO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Preliminary
Attachment; By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its
own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is
a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.—By its nature,
preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is
an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be
granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or
incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency
which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a
final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in
order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
Page 171 of 682

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841. June 2, 2014.*

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2388-MTJ) GERSHON N. DULANG,
complainant, vs. JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN[1] G. REGENCIA,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT (MCTC), ASTURIAS-
BALAMBAN, CEBU, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Prompt
disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges.—Prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If
judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is
inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be
imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that “[a]
judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods” and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides
that “[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”
Remedial Law; Rules of Summary Procedure; Being an ejectment case,
it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a
period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or
position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.—Being
an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure
which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of
the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must
be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about
two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011. While
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy
disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the
Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has
been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from
promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed
extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia
failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the
ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision.
Administrative Law; Judges; Undue Delay in Rendering Decision; Undue
delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge,
punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b)
a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.—Undue
delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge,
punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b)
a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In
Page 172 of 682
imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that
aside from her aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also
previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency where she
was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover,
as correctly observed by Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations
of this case, her length of service of more than 17 years should be
taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she
should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an
ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be
expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of
suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia’s
misconduct.
Page 173 of 682

A.M. No. P-13-3132. June 4, 2014.*

(formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT
INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARANGANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, respondent.
Administrative Jurisdiction; Court Personnel; Administrative jurisdiction
over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.—Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on
the issue of jurisdiction in the same case, viz.: It is true that the CSC has
administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
“control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.” This
authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution.
It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the
Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel;
it undermines the independence of the judiciary. x x x That she
committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take
her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The
bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs
to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed
before or after employment in the judiciary.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Immutability of Judgments; The doctrine
of immutability of judgment states that “a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law.”—Pursuant to the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, which states that “a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,” Ampong could no longer
seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal.
Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account of
Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In line with
Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Page 174 of 682
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following

administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b)
forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including
any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the
same.
Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Leave Credits; It is a
standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government
employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned
during the period of their employment.—Despite Ampong’s dismissal on
the ground of dishonesty, she should nevertheless be entitled to receive
her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned
provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the
same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service,
government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have
earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness
and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they
have earned prior to their dismissal.
Same; Court Personnel; Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
the courts of justice.—It must be stressed that every employee of the
Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.
Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also
in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the
court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who
work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order
to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here,
Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
Page 175 of 682

G.R. No. 192861. June 30, 2014.*

LINDA RANA, petitioner, vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY
LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG, represented by their Attorney-
in-fact WILSON UY, and SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 192862. June 30, 2014.*
SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact
of TERESITA LEE WONG, and SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN
ANG ONG, petitioners, vs. SPS. REYNALDO and LINDA RANA,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Nuisance; Words and Phrases; Based on case law,
the term “nuisance” is deemed to be “so comprehensive that it has
been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of
the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property,
or his comfort.”—Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is
defined as “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.” Based on case law,
however, the term “nuisance” is deemed to be “so comprehensive that
it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his
property, or his comfort.”
Same; Same; Same; Classifications of Nuisance.—Article 695 of the Civil
Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they
affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or
one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal”); or (b) a private nuisance
(or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” [or, as case law
puts it, one which “violates only private rights and produces damages to
but one or a few persons”]). Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in
relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that is,
corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which “affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity”); or (b) a nuisance per
accidens (or that which “depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.”)
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Aside from the remedy of summary
abatement which should be taken under the parameters stated in
Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the
Page 176 of 682
Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or

unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment,
business or condition of the property of another may file a civil action to
recover personal damages.—Aside from the remedy of summary
abatement which should be taken under the parameters stated in
Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the
Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or
unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment,
business or condition of the property of another may file a civil action to
recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through
a civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code
for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a
nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and
damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nominal Damages; Temperate Damages;
Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to
determine awards of nominal and temperate damages without actual
proof of pecuniary loss.—As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without
prior consultation with Wong, et al. and to their sole advantage,
elevated and cemented almost half of the 10meter wide subject road.
As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the
rights to the unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject
road. By constructing the subject portion, Sps. Rana introduced a
nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the aforesaid
rights. Thus, for the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights,
Sps. Rana should be similarly held liable for nominal damages. Under
Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to determine
awards of nominal and temperate damages without actual proof of
pecuniary loss, as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pari Delicto Rule; The principle of in pari
delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them.
However, this principle does not apply with respect to inexistent and
void contracts.—Assessing the respective infractions of the parties
herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict offsetting
the damage caused by said parties against each other. The Court can,
however, only concur with the CA in result since the latter inaccurately
applied, as basis for its ruling, the in pari delicto principle enunciated in
the case of Yu Bun Guan v. Ong (Yu Guan), 367 SCRA 559 (2001). In said
case, the Court discussed the in pari delicto principle with respect to the
subject matter of inexistent and void contracts, viz.: Inapplicability of
the in Pari Delicto Principle The principle of in pari delicto provides that
when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are
and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does
not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts. Said this Court
in Modina v. Court of Appeals: “The principle of in pari delicto non oritur
actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases
where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the
purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally at fault, the law
does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when the
Page 177 of 682
principle is invoked with respect to inexistent contracts.” (emphasis

supplied; citations omitted) Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is
herein at issue, hence, the Court’s disagreement with the CA’s
invocation of Yu Guan in this respect.
Same; Same; Recovery of Property; Settled is the rule that in order that
an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party
prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his
ownership thereof.—Settled is the rule that in order that an action for
the recovery of property may prosper, the party prosecuting the same
need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof. In
the present cases, the report of the courtappointed commissioner, Atty.
Pintor, who conducted a relocation survey of the Rana and Uy properties
identified and delineated the boundaries of the two properties and
showed that Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of the Rana
property. Both the RTC and the CA relied upon the said report; thus,
absent any competent showing that the said finding was erroneous, the
Court sees no reason to deviate from the conclusions reached by the
courts a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are,
therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq. m. encroached portion.
Corollary thereto, compliance by Linda Rana with the directive in Civil
Case No. CEB-20893 to build a retaining wall on their property shall be
held in abeyance pending return of the encroached portion.
Malicious Prosecution; The mere filing of a suit which subsequently
turns out to be unsuccessful does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.—As the Court sees it, the filing by the
parties of their respective complaints against each other was not clearly
and convincingly shown to have been precipitated by any malice or bad
faith, sufficient enough to warrant the payment of damages in favor of
either party. As correctly pointed out by the CA, malicious prosecution,
both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two (2)
elements, namely: (a) malice; and (b) absence of probable cause.
Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person; and that it was initiated
deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless. Hence, the
mere filing of a suit which subsequently turns out to be unsuccessful
does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution, for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. As the
aforementioned elements were not duly proven, the claims for
malicious prosecution are hereby denied.
Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.—With
respect to the claims for moral damages, although the Court found the
parties to have sustained nominal damages as a result of the other
parties’ acts, an award of moral damages would nonetheless be
improper in this case. Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that “[m]oral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
Page 178 of 682
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary

computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.” Corollary
thereto, Article 2219 of the same code (Article 2219) states that
“[m]oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other
form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in
Article 309; [and] (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.”
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages are imposed
only “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”—The
Court deems that an award of exemplary damages would be
inappropriate since these damages are imposed only “by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.” Bluntly placed, the
Court does not view the present matters of such caliber. Hence, there is
no reason to grant the parties’ claims for the same.
Attorney’s Fees; Damages; Considering that neither of the parties was
able to successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious prosecution, (b)
their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, and (c) the
attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
against each other are also denied.— Considering that neither of the
parties was able to successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious
prosecution, (b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages,
and (c) the attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 2208
of the Civil Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses against each other are also denied.
Page 179 of 682

G.R. No. 173008. February 22, 2012.*

NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES GENEROSA GONZALES AND
RODOLFO FERRER, SPOUSES FELIPE GONZALES AND CAROLINA
SANTIAGO, SPOUSES LOLITA GONZALES AND GERMOGENES
GARLITOS, SPOUSES DOLORES GONZALES AND FRANCISCO
COSTIN, SPOUSES CONCHITA GONZALES AND JONATHAN CLAVE,
AND SPOUSES BEATRIZ GONZALES AND ROMY CORTES,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND CO-PETITIONER
NENITA GONZALES, petitioners, vs. MARIANO BUGAAY AND
LUCY BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA BUGAAY AND FELIPE
BARCELONA, CONEY “CONIE” BUGAAY, JOEY GATAN, LYDIA
BUGAAY, SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA BUGAAY AND REY PAGATPATAN
AND BELEN BUGAAY, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Being considered
a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed
before the court renders its judgment.—In passing upon the sufficiency
of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to
evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. In
this case, respondents demurred to petitioners’ evidence after the RTC
promulgated its Decision. While respondents’ motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving
and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a
demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned.
Consequently, the RTC’s original Decision stands.
Page 180 of 682

G.R. No. 201363. March 18, 2013.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAZARENO
VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, accused appellant.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Elements
that must concur for warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5
to operate; Paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it. —For the warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had
in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
Same; Same; Same; A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even
for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest.—A previous arrest or existing criminal record,
even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the arresting officer
that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret
“personal knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation or past
criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous
criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out
under Section 5. It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on
the validity of appellant’s arrest based on “personal knowledge of facts
regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record,” as this is
unquestionably not what “personal knowledge” under the law
contemplates, which must be strictly construed.
Same; Same; Same; Flight; Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt
and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.—
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of
guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are
many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of
being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s
attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various
explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise
signify innocence.
Page 181 of 682

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases;

“Probable cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.—In fine, appellant’s acts of
walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if
they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge
for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. “Probable
cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s
case.
Constitutional Law; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; There
being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from
appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.— There being no lawful warrantless arrest,
the shabu purportedly seized from appellant.
Page 182 of 682

G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013.*

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE
TORRES-GOMEZ, respondents.
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; The Omnibus Election Code
provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public
office.—The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies
to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain
particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification
under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel
a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between
the two are well-perceived.
Same; Same; One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically
considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as
such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however,
deny his or her statutory eligibility.—Primarily, a disqualification case
under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b)
his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the
latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In particular,
these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy;
(3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5)
violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section
68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or
she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing
acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already
been elected. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under
Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In
other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and
citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to
discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought about
by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
Same; Same; Certificate of Candidacy; If a candidate states a material
representation in the Certificate of Candidacy that is false, the
Commission on Elections is empowered to deny due to or cancel such
certificate.—A denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
Page 183 of 682
proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s

misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the
elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the
relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false
representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78
petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 574 SCRA 782
(2008), where the Court illumined: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial
of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack
of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation
to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false the COMELEC, following
the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is fired before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificates of Candidacy;
While a disqualified candidate under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and
purposes, on the other hand, a person whose certificate of candidacy
had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all.—Pertinently, while a
disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been
a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person
whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason
being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In
Talaga v. COMELEC (Talaga), 683 SCRA 197 (2012), the Court ruled that:
x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Same; Same; Same; Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to
and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified.—Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the
same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. It states that: Sec. 77. Candidates in case
Page 184 of 682
of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last day

for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate”
before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for
substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the
said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a
registered or accredited party may be substituted. As defined under
Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political
party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires
that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a
candidate.
Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Candidacy; A candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code can be
validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose certificate of candidacy
has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.―As
explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya (Miranda), 311 SCRA 617
(1999), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly
substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate
until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course
to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he
is not considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be
no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be
substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification
case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although
his or her candidacy is discontinued.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); While it is
well-recognized that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has
been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House, the Supreme Court maintains jurisdiction over it
to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter.—
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a
lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has
been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check
“whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In other words,
Page 185 of 682

when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the
matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is not
bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House.—Lest it be misunderstood,
the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative
to the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC
resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be circumvented and
rendered nugatory.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Dissenting Opinion: Election Law; Election
Protests; View that in Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383 (2004), the Supreme Court sustained the
dismissal by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal of the
election protest for failure to comply strictly with the period prescribed
by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules.—This
Court has emphasized the importance of compliance with the HRET
Rules prescribing reglementary periods to be observed by the parties in
an election contest to expedite the disposition of election controversies
so as not to frustrate the will of the electorate. In Hofer v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383 (2004), the Court
sustained the dismissal by the HRET of the election protest for failure to
comply strictly with the period prescribed by the HRET Rules.
Same; View that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the
Supreme Court cannot set aside at will the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules mandating the timely filing of election
contests.—The HRET and this Court cannot set aside at will the HRET
Rules mandating the timely filing of election contests. Otherwise, a
dangerous precedent will be set that will cause uncertainty in the
application of the HRET Rules and instability in the holding of an
elective post by a proclaimed winning candidate that may aversely
affect public service. In view of the foregoing, I submit that the HRET is
bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by
Tagolino, after the lapse of the reglementary period prescribed by its
own Rules. The proclamation of respondent Gomez has become
incontrovertible or unassailable after the expiration of ten (10) days
from its date.
Same; View that the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal to entertain the untimely Petition for
Quo Warranto assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez
would suffice to dismiss outright the instant petition.—The lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the HRET to entertain the untimely Petition for
Quo Warranto assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez
would suffice to dismiss outright the instant petition. Moreover, the
substantive issue extensively discussed in the ponencia of the
Honorable Associate Justice Estela Perlas Bernabe, particularly as to the
“divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of COC (Certificate of Candidacy) cases vis-àvis candidate
Page 186 of 682
substitution” is inappropriate. Firstly, the certificate of candidacy of

Richard Gomez, the husband of respondent Gomez, was not cancelled
by the COMELEC. Secondly, the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel
said certificate of candidacy was proper as the COMELEC did not reach
any finding that Richard Gomez deliberately committed a
misrepresentation, which is a requisite for the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; View that since the Commission
on Elections did not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard
Gomez but only disqualified him from running in the elections, the
substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard Gomez squarely falls
within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
which uses the broad language “disqualification for any cause.”—Since
the COMELEC did not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard
Gomez but only disqualified him from running in the elections, the
substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard Gomez squarely falls
within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
which uses the broad language “disqualification for any cause,” as
follows: Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another.―If after the last day for the filing of certificates
of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-
day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate,
or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
Same; Quo Warranto; Substitution of Candidates; View that the fact that
the Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of time, there is no need to
dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo Warranto may validly
question the validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss
the constitutional boundaries of the respective jurisdictions of the
Commission on Elections and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.—Regarding the issue of whether a Petition for Quo Warranto is
a proper legal remedy to assail the validity of the substitution of a
candidate under Section 77 of the OEC, it suffices here to state that,
under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for a Petition for Quo
Warranto are ineligibility to run for a public office or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. Pertinently, Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides for the qualifications of a Member of the
House of Representatives, states as follows: Section 6. No person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
Page 187 of 682
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be

elected, and a resident thereat for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election. The above-quoted
provision refers to the personal attributes of a candidate. The ponencia
did not find any of the above qualifications absent in the case of
respondent Gomez. However, the ponencia attributed the ineligibility of
respondent Gomez to its erroneous assumption that the certificate of
candidacy of Richard Gomez, whom she substituted, should have been
cancelled. As explained above, the COMELEC correctly did not so cancel
said certificate, it having found no factual basis to do so. This being the
case and the fact that the Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of
time, there is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for
Quo Warranto may validly question the validity of the substitution of a
candidate and to discuss the constitutional boundaries of the respective
jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET.
ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion: Election Law; House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has no authority to review final and executory
resolutions or decisions of the Commission on Elections that it rendered
pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, no matter if such
resolutions or decisions are erroneous.—So the Court comes to the real
issue in this case: whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a
COMELEC decision, involving a member of the House of
Representatives, that had already become final and executory. The
HRET has no authority to review final and executory resolutions or
decisions of the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers under
the Constitution, no matter if such resolutions or decisions are
erroneous. The parties cannot by agreement confer such authority on
HRET. Neither the HRET nor the Court can set aside the COMELEC’s final
and executory resolutions that paved the way for Lucy Gomez to
substitute her husband.
Page 188 of 682

G.R. No. 185830. June 5, 2013.*

ECOLE DE CUISINE MANILLE (CORDON BLEU OF THE
PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner, vs. RENAUD COINTREAU & CIE
and LE CORDON BLEU INT’L., B.V., respondents.
Intellectual Properties; Trademarks; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, in
order to register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must
have actually used the mark in commerce in the Philippines for two (2)
months prior to the application for registration.—Under Section 2 of R.A.
No. 166, in order to register a trademark, one must be the owner
thereof and must have actually used the mark in commerce in the
Philippines for two (2) months prior to the application for registration.
Section 2-A of the same law sets out to define how one goes about
acquiring ownership thereof. Under Section 2-A, it is clear that actual
use in commerce is also the test of ownership but the provision went
further by saying that the mark must not have been so appropriated by
another. Additionally, it is significant to note that Section 2-A does not
require that the actual use of a trademark must be within the
Philippines. Thus, as correctly mentioned by the CA, under R.A. No. 166,
one may be an owner of a mark due to its actual use but may not yet
have the right to register such ownership here due to the owner’s
failure to use the same in the Philippines for two (2) months prior to
registration.
Same; Same; Trademark Infringement; Foreign marks which are not
registered are still accorded protection against infringement and/or
unfair competition.—Nevertheless, foreign marks which are not
registered are still accorded protection against infringement and/or
unfair competition. At this point, it is worthy to emphasize that the
Philippines and France, Cointreau’s country of origin, are both
signatories to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention).
Same; Same; Same; Paris Convention; The Philippines is obligated to
assure nationals of the signatory-countries to the Paris Convention that
they are afforded an effective protection against violation of their
intellectual property rights in the Philippines in the same way that their
own countries are obligated to accord similar protection to Philippine
nationals.—The Philippines is obligated to assure nationals of the
signatory-countries that they are afforded an effective protection
against violation of their intellectual property rights in the Philippines in
the same way that their own countries are obligated to accord similar
protection to Philippine nationals. “Thus, under Philippine law, a trade
name of a national of a State that is a party to the Paris Convention,
whether or not the trade name forms part of a trademark, is protected
“without the obligation of filing or registration.’ ”
Same; Same; Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
8293); The present law on trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, as
amended, has already dispensed with the requirement of prior actual
Page 189 of 682
use at the time of registration.—In any case, the present law on

trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed
with the requirement of prior actual use at the time of registration.
Thus, there is more reason to allow the registration of the subject mark
under the name of Cointreau as its true and lawful owner.
Same; Same; Same; Courts will protect trade names or marks, although
not registered or properly selected as trademarks, on the broad ground
of enforcing justice and protecting one in the fruits of his toil.—As a final
note, “the function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or
ownership of the goods (or services) to which it is affixed; to secure to
him, who has been instrumental in bringing into the market a superior
article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill; to assure the
public that they are procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and
imposition; and to protect the manufacturer against substitution and
sale of an inferior and different article as his product.” As such, courts
will protect trade names or marks, although not registered or properly
selected as trademarks, on the broad ground of enforcing justice and
protecting one in the fruits of his toil.
Page 190 of 682

G.R. No. 193747. June 5, 2013.*

JOSELITO C. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. JUAN T. MINA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Theory of the Case; Settled is the rule that a party who
adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the
lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal, not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as
a matter of fairness.—Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a
certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower
courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter
of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when
their factual bases would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet
the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory,
issue or argument (a) is subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already
been judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case.
Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; P.D. No. 27 prohibits the
transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October
21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon.—PD
27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn
lands after October 21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-
tillers thereon. As held in the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corporation v. DAR Regional Director for Region III, 555
SCRA 97 (2008) citing Heirs of Batongbacal v. CA, 389 SCRA 517 (389).
x x x P.D. No. 27, as amended, forbids the transfer or alienation of
covered agricultural lands after October 21, 1972 except to the tenant-
beneficiary. x x x. In Heirs of Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals, 389 SCRA
517 (2002), involving the similar issue of sale of a covered agricultural
land under P.D. No. 27, this Court held: Clearly, therefore, Philbanking
committed breach of obligation as an agricultural lessor. As the records
show, private respondent was not informed about the sale between
Philbanking and petitioner, and neither was he privy to the transfer of
ownership from Juana Luciano to Philbanking. As an agricultural lessee,
the law gives him the right to be informed about matters affecting the
land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it. x x x x In other
words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after
October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers
thereon. Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985
in favor of petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted provision of P.D.
27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and
void.
Civil Law; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void contract is equivalent to
nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or
extinguish a juridical relation.—In consequence, petitioner cannot assert
Page 191 of 682
any right over the subject landholding, such as his present claim for
landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void
source. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil
effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.
Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous identification of the subject
landholding by the MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact
remains that petitioner had no right to file a petition for landholding
exemption since the sale of the said property to him by Garcia in 1982
is null and void. Proceeding from this, the finding that petitioner’s total
agricultural landholdings is way below the retention limits set forth by
law thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption
precisely because he has no right over the aforementioned landholding.
Page 192 of 682

G.R. No. 202690. June 5, 2013.*

HENRY L. SY, petitioner, vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON
CITY, respondent.
Civil Law; Excusable Negligence; The party invoking excusable
negligence should be able to show that the procedural oversight or
lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen
fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
so as to justify the relief sought.—A claim of excusable negligence does
not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking
such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is
attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify
the relief sought. The standard of care required is that which an
ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this
accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly
maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court notices
sent to him.
Attorneys; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The rule which states
that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.—
Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the
most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which
states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation
of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so
requires.
Expropriation; Interest Rates; In the case of Republic v. CA, 383 SCRA
611, 622-623 (2002), the Supreme Court ruled that the debt incurred by
the government on account of the taking of the property subject of an
expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore,
warrants the application of the 12% legal interest rate.— Based on a
judicious review of the records and application of jurisprudential rulings,
the Court holds that the correct rate of legal interest to be applied is
twelve percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum, owing to the
nature of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance. In the case of
Republic v. CA, 383 SCRA 611, 622-623 (2002), the Court ruled that the
debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the
property subject of an expropriation constitutes an effective
forbearance which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal
interest rate.
Same; Same; Interest “runs as a matter of law and follows from the
right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of the taking.”—As to the reckoning point on
which the legal interest should accrue, the same should be computed
Page 193 of 682
from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not from
the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996.
Records show that the City itself admitted in its Appellee’s Brief filed
before the CA that as early as 1986, “a burden was already imposed
upon the owner of the [subject] property x x x, considering that the
expropriated property was already being used as Barangay day care
and office.” Thus, the property was actually taken during that time and
from thereon, legal interest should have already accrued. In this light,
the Court has held that: x x x [T]he final compensation must include
interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court[.] x x x (Emphasis supplied) This is based on the principle
that interest “runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish,
as of the date of the taking.”
Same; Taking; Case law dictates that there is “taking” when the owner
is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his
property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.—Notably,
the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect expropriation,
did not affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject property
in 1986 as the CA, in its January 20, 2012 Decision, suggests. Case law
dictates that there is “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived
of the ordinary use thereof. Therefore, notwithstanding the lack of
proper authorization, the legal character of the City’s action as one of
“taking” did not change. In this relation, the CA noted that the City
enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on April 12, 1994 and filed its
expropriation complaint on November 7, 1996. However, as it
previously admitted, it already commenced with the taking of the
subject property as early as 1986. Accordingly, interest must run from
such time.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; It is well-settled that the amount of
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking.—
The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5,500.00/sq. m. as just
compensation which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said
valuation was actually arrived at after considering: (a) the September 4,
1996 recommendation of the City Appraisal Committee; (b) several
sworn statements made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration
for 1996. It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking. However, the abovestated
documents do not reflect the value of the subject property at the time
of its taking in 1986 but rather, its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the
case must be remanded to the RTC in order to properly determine the
amount of just compensation during such time the subject property was
actually taken.
Page 194 of 682

A.C. No. 7749. July 8, 2013.*

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RAMON SG CABANES, JR., respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill,
and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free.―The relationship between an attorney
and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Same; Same; Case law illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence
and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the
counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging
their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him
or her to do so.―Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or
the court to prod him or her to do so. Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence
in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court
has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.
Same; Same; Gross Negligence; Penalties; Several cases show that
lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6)
months.―As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that
lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6)
months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission
of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence,
suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v.
Apiag, 471 SCRA 111 (2005), a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief
and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended
for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, 452 SCRA 1 (2005), a lawyer
who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of
Page 195 of 682
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months.
Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to
impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends
him for a period of six (6) months.
G.R. No. 197789. July 8, 2013.*
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR PAUL A.
AQUINO, FRANCIS A. PALAFOX, petitioners, vs. JOSELITO L.
ESTRELLA, respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Not every
form of misconduct can be considered as a just cause for termination.
The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct must be both serious
and made in connection with the employee’s work.―Fundamental is the
rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a
valid cause. Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination
under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which reads in part: ART. 282.
Termination By Employer.—An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; x x x x Thus, not every
form of misconduct can be considered as a just cause for termination.
The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct must be both serious
and made in connection with the employee’s work. As clarified in
Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Fermin, 674 SCRA 310 (2012): Misconduct
involves “the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.” For
misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it
must be (1) of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant and (2) connected with the work of the employee.
Same; Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; The employer bears the
burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just
cause ― or any other valid cause for that matter―forms the basis of the
employee’s dismissal from work.―It is well to stress that the employer
bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the
aforesaid just cause — or any other valid cause for that matter — forms
the basis of the employee’s dismissal from work. Substantial evidence is
the amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. As long as this
evidentiary threshold is met, the dismissal of the employee should, as a
general rule, be upheld.
Page 196 of 682

G.R. No. 198680. July 8, 2013.*

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, namely, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA
Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, and
HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, petitioners, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS
RICAFORTE a.k.a. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,” and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS of TOLEDO CITY, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Words and Phrases;
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.―Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.
Same; Civil Law; Succession; Matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights.―In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 581 SCRA 70
(2009), the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in
the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs
of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for
recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right. In the early case of Litam, et al. v.
Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in
a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x: In the more
recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated
its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must
be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
Page 197 of 682
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing

the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could
not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
for the recovery of property.
Same; Same; By way of exception, the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed
with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented
their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the Regional Trial
Court had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.―By way of exception, the
need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened. In this case,
none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Page 198 of 682

G.R. No. 196741. July 17, 2013.*

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known as TOURISM
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY),
petitioner, vs. MARCOSA A. SABANDALHERZENSTIEL, PEDRO
TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, and ROMEO TAPALES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Forcible Entry; In an action for
forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of
the disputed property and that the defendant deprived him of his
possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.—In an
action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the disputed property and that the defendant deprived
him of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and
stealth. In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and
continued possession of the subject property after its sale in favor of
petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer
to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by
instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons.
Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion
to be well-founded, the MCTC properly adjudged petitioner to have prior
possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel,
who never claimed ownership or possession thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of
unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor — as petitioner
had sufficiently demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of
force.—Petitioner’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of
respondents’ entry into the subject property is inconsequential.
Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the
exclusion of the lawful possessor — as petitioner had sufficiently
demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in
Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., 663 SCRA 17 (2012): x x x
Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the
prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all
that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not
have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the
instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged
that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them
through violence and force.
Page 199 of 682

G.R. No. 171307. August 28, 2013.*

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
Taxation; Tax Refunds; Tax Credit; Case law dictates that in a claim for
tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement
to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and
evidentiary requirements therefor.—Case law dictates that in a claim for
tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement
to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and
evidentiary requirements therefor. Section 110(A)(1) of the NIRC
provides that creditable input taxes must be evidenced by a VAT invoice
or official receipt, which must, in turn, comply with Sections 237 and
238 of the same law, as well as Section 4.108.1 of RR 7-95. The
foregoing provisions require, inter alia, that an invoice must reflect, as
required by law: (a) the BIR Permit to Print; (b) the TIN-V of the
purchaser; and (c) the word “zero-rated” imprinted thereon. In this
relation, failure to comply with the said invoicing requirements provides
sufficient ground to deny a claim for tax refund or tax credit.
Page 200 of 682

G.R. No. 187174. August 28, 2013.*

FELY Y. YALONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
LUCILA C. YLAGAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Notice of Appeal; Section 2(a),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
latter court.―While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state
that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required
notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse, i.e., the filing of a
notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a petition for
review), Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that
appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
latter court.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; It is fundamental that a petition
for certiorari is an original action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid
that the Regional Trial Court took cognizance of and resolved the
aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.―It is
fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original action and, as
such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and
resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Hence, based on the abovecited rule, Yalong should have filed a notice
of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA. As a
consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC
within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained
finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The perfection of an appeal within the
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.―Verily,
jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period
and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the
rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial
business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule,
rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect
to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are
strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances
on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case.
As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and
perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Venue; The court wherein any of the crime’s
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction
Page 201 of 682
to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other.―It is well-settled that
violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these
principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of
the places where any of its elements occurred — in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
Page 202 of 682

G.R. No. 196723. August 28, 2013.*

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. SUMITOMO CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 196728. August 28, 2013.*

SUMITOMO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the
act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another.―Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who
repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. More
particularly, forum shopping can be committed in three ways, namely:
(a) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (b) by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for
dismissal is res judicata); and (c) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata). Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in
this accord, constitutes a ground for the summary dismissal of the
actions involved. To be sure, the rule against forum shopping seeks to
prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a
party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes
and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.
Administrative Agencies; Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC); Appeals; A petition for review from a final award of the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission may be taken by any of
the parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.―Executive Order
No. (EO) 1008, which vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts
entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines,
Page 203 of 682
plainly states that the arbitral award “shall be final and inappealable
except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the [Court].”
Later, however, the Court, in Revised Administrative Circular (RAC) No.
1-95, modified this rule, directing that the appeals from the arbitral
award of the CIAC be first brought to the CA on “questions of fact, law
or mixed questions of fact and law.” This amendment was eventually
transposed into the present CIAC Revised Rule which directs that “a
petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the
parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.” Notably, the current
provision is in harmony with the Court’s pronouncement that “despite
statutory provisions making the decisions of certain administrative
agencies ‘final,’ [the Court] still takes cognizance of petitions showing
want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process,
denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law” and
that, in particular, “voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their
functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity, such that their decisions are
within the scope of judicial review.”
Attorney’s Fees; In the absence of a governing stipulation, attorney’s
fees may be awarded only in case the plaintiff’s action or defendant’s
stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad
faith.―Jurisprudence dictates that in the absence of a governing
stipulation, attorney’s fees may be awarded only in case the plain tiff’s
action or defendant’s stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith. This is embodied in Article 2208 of the Civil Code
which states: Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except: x x x x (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just
and demandable claim. It is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
Page 204 of 682

G.R. No. 200222. August 28, 2013.*

INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., petitioner, vs. ADONIS
A. PIONILLA, respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;
Reinstatement; Backwages; As a general rule, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if
reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages.―As a
general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement (or separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable) and
payment of full backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has
carved out an exception to the foregoing rule and thereby ordered the
reinstatement of the employee without backwages on account of the
following: (a) the fact that dismissal of the employee would be too harsh
of a penalty; and (b) that the employer was in good faith in terminating
the employee.
Page 205 of 682

G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.*

RIVELISA REALTY, INC., represented by RICARDO P. VENTURINA,
petitioner, vs. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION,
represented by RAMON A. PANGILINAN, as President,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration; While a
motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a
petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts.—While a
motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a
petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was
first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, 138 SCRA
46 (1986) wherein it was held that: Beginning one month after the
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny the extension requested.
Civil Law; Contracts; Quantum Meruit; Case law instructs that under the
principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a
written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.—The Court
concurs with the CA that First Sta. Clara is entitled to be compensated
for the development works it had accomplished on the project based on
the principle of quantum meruit. Case law instructs that under this
principle, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the
thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in
order to avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit means that, in an
action for work and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as
the plaintiff reasonably deserves. The measure of recovery should relate
to the reasonable value of the services performed because the principle
aims to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate
that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying for it.
Page 206 of 682

G.R. No. 191590. April 21, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TRANSUNION
CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Dismissal of Actions;
Interlocutory Orders; An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits.—An order denying a motion to dismiss is
an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.—To
elaborate, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides
that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial
power can be sought. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; It is well-established that the
touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard.—The Court
finds that there was no violation of Transunion’s right to administrative
due process since, as the Republic pointed out, not only did it file an
answer, but it also presented its evidence and formally offered the
same. It is well-established that the touchstone of due process is the
opportunity to be heard. This Transunion was unquestionably afforded in
this case, despite having been denied the remedies of reconsideration
and appeal which, however, remain unavailable, either by statute or
regulation, against the investigation report and recommendation
Page 207 of 682
assailed herein. At any rate, lack of administrative due process, on the

assumption of its truth, is not a ground for a motion to dismiss; hence,
the RTC’s ruling was altogether proper.
Page 208 of 682

A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011.*

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. GEORGE M.
FLORENDO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Possession of good moral
character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a
continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal
profession.—It has been consistently held by the Court that possession
of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar
but is a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the
legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in
his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant his suspension or disbarment.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of having an affair with his
client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.— Respondent’s act of
having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on
him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit
relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, among others.
Same; Same; Same.—It bears to stress that a case of suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant
as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and
the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a
husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15,
1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect
of abating the instant proceedings.
Page 209 of 682

G.R. No. 195770. July 17, 2012.*

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON
ALCANTARA, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Autonomy of Local Governments; State Policies; The
Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of
local governments.―The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to
ensure the autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full
article on the subject of local governance which includes the following
pertinent provisions: Section 3. The Congres shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. x x x
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions
for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region. (Underscoring
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; While it is through a system of decentralization
that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local
government structure, the concept of local autonomy does not imply
the conversion of local government units into “mini-states.”―The Court
held in Ganzon v. Court of Apeals, 200 SCRA 271 (1991), that while it is
through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a
more responsive and accountable local government structure, the
concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local
government units into “mini-states.” We explained that, with local
autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than “to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the afairs of the local
government” and, thus, did not intend to sever “the relation of
partnership and interdependence betwen the central administration and
local government units.”
Same; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.―Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
Page 210 of 682
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.

Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity
of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion
budget for an intervention program formulated by the national
government itself but implemented in partnership with the local
government units to achieve the common national goal development
and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the
autonomy of local governments.
Page 211 of 682

G.R. No. 175002. February 18, 2013.*

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
ANECITO MOLON, AUGUSTO TECSON, JONATHAN VILLONES,
BIENVENIDO LAGARTOS, JAIME CADION,+ EDUARDO TROYO,
RODULFO MENDIGO, AURELIO MORALITA, ESTANISLAO
MARTINEZ, REYNALDO VASQUEZ, ORLANDO GUANTERO,
EUTROPIO MERCADO, FRANCISCO GABON, ROLANDO ARANDIA,
REYNALDO TALBO, ANTONIO DEVARAS, HONORATO ABARCA,
SALVADOR MAQUILAN, REYNALDO ANDUYAN, VICENTE CINCO,
FELIX RAPIZ, ROBERTO CATAROS, ROMEO DOROTAN, RODOLFO
ARROPE, DANILO CASILAN, and SAUNDER SANTIAGO
REMANDABAN III, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; The Supreme
Court has the authority to sift through the factual findings of both the
Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission in the
event of their conflict.— Parenthetically, in a special civil action for
certiorari, the CA is authorized to make its own factual determination
when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking
or disregarding evidence which are material to the controversy. The
Court, in turn, has the same authority to sift through the factual findings
of both the CA and the NLRC in the event of their conflict. Thus, in
Plastimer Industrial Corporation v. Gopo, 643 SCRA 502 (2011), the
Court explained: In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of
Appeals has ample authority to make its own factual determination.
Thus, the Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when it
finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by
disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To make this finding,
the Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make
its own factual determination. In the same manner, this Court is not
precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting
findings by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
x x x x.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; Words and
Phrases; Retrenchment is defined as the termination of employment
initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee and without
prejudice to the latter, resorted by management during periods of
business recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or
during lulls over shortage of materials.—Retrenchment is defined as the
termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of
the employee and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by
management during periods of business recession, industrial depression
or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over shortage of materials. It is a
reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize
business losses incurred in the operation of its business. Under Article
297 of the Labor Code, retrenchment is one of the authorized causes to
validly terminate an employment.
Page 212 of 682

Same; Same; Same; The employer must prove the requirements for a
valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, said
ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming
employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their
business ventures in order to ease out employees.—Essentially, the
prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised
only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the
employees’ livelihood. It is justified only when all other less drastic
means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate. Corollary
thereto, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, said ground
for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers
who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business
ventures in order to ease out employees. These requirements are: (1)
That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis,
but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the
employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the
employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its
prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of
its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to
security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be
retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority,
physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
Same; Union Busting; Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is
union busting when the existence of the union is threatened by the
employer’s act of dismissing the former’s officers who have been duly-
elected in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. —Under Article
276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting when the existence of
the union is threatened by the employer’s act of dismissing the former’s
officers who have been duly-elected in accordance with its constitution
and by-laws. On the other hand, the term unfair labor practice refers to
that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core,
violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to
selforganization, with the sole exception of Article 257(f) (previously
Article 248[f]). As explained in the case of Philcom Employees Union v.
Philippine Global Communications, 495 SCRA 214 (2006): Unfair labor
practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. The
prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and
to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter
how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article
248(f) [now Article 257(f)].
Same; Quitclaims; A waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding
agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible
Page 213 of 682
and reasonable settlement and the one accomplishing it has done so

voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import.—A waiver or
quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties,
provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement and
the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full
understanding of its import. The applicable provision is Article 232 of
the Labor Code which reads in part: ART. 232. Compromise
Agreements.―Any compromise settlement, including those involving
labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of
Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. x x x
Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; An illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.—An
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if
viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and
backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has ordered the
reinstatement of the employee without backwages considering the fact
that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty;
and (2) the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. For
instance, in the case of Cruz v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 120
SCRA 15 (1983), the Court ruled as follows: The Court is convinced that
petitioner’s guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, we agree
with respondent Minister’s order of reinstating petitioner without
backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of
backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank
officials acted in good faith. They should be exempt from the burden of
paying backwages. The good faith of the employer, when clear under
the circumstances, may preclude or diminish recovery of backwages.
Only employees discriminately dismissed are entitled to backpay. x x x.
Page 214 of 682

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.*

(Formerly A.M. No. 10-3-94-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JESUS L. GRAGEDA,
respondent.
Administrative Proceedings; Public Officers; In order for the Court to
acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint
must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or
employee.—Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the
Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the
complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public
official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case
is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government
service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by
the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office
during the pendency of the case. In fine, cessation from office by reason
of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case
filed against the said officer or employee at the time that he was still in
the public service or render it moot and academic.
Same; Same; In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr.,
654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court ruled that while the Ombudsman is not
precluded from conducting an investigation against the errant
employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case against
Andutan who had already resigned, more so since his resignation or
severance of employment from the service was not availed of to
prevent the continuation of the pending administrative case or to pre-
empt the imminent filing of one.—In the case of Office of the
Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court ruled that
while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an
investigation against the errant employee, it can no longer institute an
administrative case against Andutan who had already resigned, more so
since his resignation or severance of employment from the service was
not availed of to prevent the continuation of the pending administrative
case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. The Court also dismissed
an administrative case filed against a retired court stenographer for
having been initiated over a month after her retirement from the
service. Moreover, in Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, 692 SCRA
8 (2013), the Court absolved herein respondent, Judge Grageda, from
any administrative liability since the complaint against him was filed
after his retirement from the judiciary.
Page 215 of 682

G.R. No. 200667. March 11, 2013.*

RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., petitioner, vs.
GERRY CENTENO, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Consolidation of Titles; After consolidation
of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner.—It is well-established that after
consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession
ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the
issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of
title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely
a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in
possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the
mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which partly provides.
Same; Same; In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177
(2008), the Court held that the phrase “a third party who is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or
right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.—In China
Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held
that the phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor” contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a
coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not
merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another
co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; Absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.—
On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent
in his Comment, records show that the RTC had already passed upon
petitioner’s title over the subject lots during the course of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been
established for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession. It is
hornbook principle that absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness
or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are
binding and conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.
Page 216 of 682

G.R. No. 200667. March 11, 2013.*

RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., petitioner, vs.
GERRY CENTENO, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Consolidation of Titles; After consolidation
of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner.—It is well-established that after
consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession
ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the
issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of
title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely
a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in
possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the
mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which partly provides.
Same; Same; In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177
(2008), the Court held that the phrase “a third party who is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” contemplates a
right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.—In China
Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held
that the phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor” contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a
coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not
merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another
co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; Absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.—
On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent
in his Comment, records show that the RTC had already passed upon
petitioner’s title over the subject lots during the course of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been
established for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession. It is
hornbook principle that absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness
or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are
binding and conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.
Page 217 of 682

G.R. No. 191411. July 15, 2013.*

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGAN- BAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 191871. July 15, 2013.*

EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.
AMUGOD, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; A person’s
right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section
16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This constitutional
right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well
as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.—A person’s right to
the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which
provides: SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either
judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration
of justice.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence dictates that the right to speedy disposition
of cases is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without
cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. —It must be noted, that the
right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a
relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that
the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without
cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Hence, in the determination of
whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and
balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Page 218 of 682

Same; Same; The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely

hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration
of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.—Lest it
be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration
of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to
the right to speedy trial, its “salutary objective” is to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest
possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest
as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time
should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not
bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case
based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.—Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an
acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party from
pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the
judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. As explained in the case
of Abejuela v. People, 200 SCRA 806 (1991), citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,
156 SCRA 325 (1987): The Rules provide: “The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to
the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of
the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.” x x x x
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987), we declared: “While an act
or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see
that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.”
Page 219 of 682

G.R. No. 192306. July 15, 2013.*

JESSIE G. MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL PANGA- SINAN
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENPELCO), respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence; To
validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence under Article 296(c) (formerly Article 282[c]) of the Labor
Code, the following guidelines must be observed: (1) the employee
concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2)
there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence.―To validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence under Article 296(c) (formerly Article 282[c]) of the
Labor Code, the following guidelines must be observed: (1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence;
and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. Anent the first requisite, it is noteworthy to mention that
there are two classes of positions of trust, namely: (1) managerial
employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a
subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial
staff; and (2) fiduciary rank-and-file employees such as cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of
their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or
property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged
with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property, and are
thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence. Being an
employee tasked to collect payments and remit the same to CENPELCO,
Martinez belongs to the latter class and thus, occupies a position of
trust and confidence. Anent the second requisite, the audit report
conducted on Martinez’s cash count revealed that he had a shortage in
the amount of P44,846.77 in his remittance for April 25, 2002. When
asked to explain such shortage, Martinez not only admitted the same
but even tried to exculpate himself from liability by attempting to offset
said shortage with his alleged overage on April 23, 2002 in the amount
of P45,682.58. The Court agrees with the CA that this practice should
never be countenanced because it would allow the employees to patch
up inaccuracies or even their own wrongdoings and thus, the true
revenues or losses of the company will never be correctly identified.
Verily, this irregular practice would be detrimental to the interests of the
employer whose bread and butter depends solely on realized profits.
Perforce, Martinez’s failure to properly account for his shortage of such
a significant amount is enough reason for CENPELCO to lose trust and
confidence in him.
Page 220 of 682

G.R. No. 188514. August 28, 2013.*

MARIA LOURDES D. CASTELLS and SHALIMAR CENTI-
MANDANAS, petitioners, vs. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules
should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice.―It is well-settled that procedural rules should
be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed
to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem
of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized
exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would
defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. These exceptions, as
enumerated in the case of Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), are as
follows: x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s
fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. x x x.
Same; Certiorari; Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari; Despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC ― which now disallows an
extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for
certiorari ― courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its
sound discretion.―Despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12SC ― which now disallows an
sound discretion. As instructively held in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul
Colleges, Inc., 678 SCRA 738 (2012): To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court [as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC] x x x, the
general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the
sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended x x x.
Page 221 of 682

G.R. No. 188514. August 28, 2013.*

MARIA LOURDES D. CASTELLS and SHALIMAR CENTI-
MANDANAS, petitioners, vs. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules
should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice.―It is well-settled that procedural rules should
be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed
to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem
of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized
exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would
defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. These exceptions, as
enumerated in the case of Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), are as
follows: x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. x x x.
Same; Certiorari; Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari; Despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC ― which now disallows an
sound discretion.―Despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12SC ― which now disallows an
sound discretion. As instructively held in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul
Colleges, Inc., 678 SCRA 738 (2012): To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court [as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC] x x x, the
general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the
sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended x x x.
Page 222 of 682

G.R. No. 193078. August 28, 2013.*

B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. and ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI,
petitioners, vs. ANGELINE M. GUECO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint-in-Intervention; Complaint-in-
intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely
an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action.―With respect
to the first incident, it bears to stress that Arlene’s and the Heirs of
Edgardo’s complaint-inintervention in the dismissed reformation case
had been effectively discharged since the principal complaint therein
had already been terminated with finality. Clearly, their complaint-
inintervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is
merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. In other
words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the
complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the
complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Applying these principles
to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the
main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of Arlene’s and the Heirs of Edgardo’s complaint-in-
intervention lodged in the same case.
Same; Same; Parties; It is a standing rule that no person shall be
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party.―Anent the second incident, records disclose
that Arlene or the Heirs of Edgardo were not parties ― either as
defendants or intervenors ― in the surrender of titles case nor did they,
in any manner, participate in the proceedings of the same. It is a
standing rule that no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome
of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. In this light, it
cannot be gainsaid that Arlene and the Heirs of Edgardo cannot be
adversely affected by the outcome of the surrender of titles case and,
as such, cannot therefore interpose an appeal therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; Board of Directors; It is fundamental that the power
of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the
board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents.―To
note, neither can Arlene file the instant appeal on behalf of B. Sta. Rita
since there lies no evidence on record to show that she had been
properly authorized by the said corporation to file the same. It is
fundamental that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any
court is lodged with the board of directors and/or its duly authorized
officers and agents, which Arlene clearly is not. Consequently, for her
lack of authority, the appeal of Arlene on behalf of B. Sta. Rita must
necessarily fail.
Page 223 of 682

G.R. No. 190080. June 11, 2014.*

GOLDEN VALLEY EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. PINKIAN
MINING COMPANY and COPPER VALLEY, INC., respondents.
Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal
obligations, either party may rescind the contract upon the other’s
substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed thereunder.—In
reciprocal obligations, either party may rescind the contract upon the
other’s substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed
thereunder. The basis therefor is Article 1191 of the Civil Code which
states as follows: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied
in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with
what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between
the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court
shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period. This is understood to be without
prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. More
accurately referred to as resolution, the right of rescission under Article
1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the reciprocity
between parties to the contract. This retaliatory remedy is given to the
contracting party who suffers the injurious breach on the premise that it
is “unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when the
other violates his.”
Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the power to rescind an
obligation must be invoked judicially and cannot be exercised solely on
a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation.—As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must
be invoked judicially and cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own
judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation. This
is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations
as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement.
As a well-established exception, however, an injured party need not
resort to court action in order to rescind a contract when the contract
itself provides that it may be revoked or cancelled upon violation of its
terms and conditions.
Same; Same; Same; The invocation of a stipulation allowing
extrajudicial rescission effectively puts an end to the contract and, thus,
releases the parties form the obligations thereunder, notwithstanding
the lack of a judicial decree for the purpose.—The invocation of a
stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission effectively puts an end to
the contract and, thus, releases the parties from the obligations
thereunder, notwithstanding the lack of a judicial decree for the
purpose. In the case at bar, PMC, through its Letter dated June 8, 1999
to GVEI, invoked Section 8.01, Article VIII in relation to Section 5.01,
Page 224 of 682
Article V of the OA which allows it to extrajudicially rescind the contract

for GVEI’s nonpayment of royalties. Thus, at that point in time, PMC had
effectively rescinded the OA and was then considered to have been
released from its legal effects. Accordingly, there stood no legal
impediment so as to hinder PMC from entering into a contract with CVI
covering the same mining claims subject of this case.
Page 225 of 682

G.R. No. 190080. June 11, 2014.*

Same; Same; Same; Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing
extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is necessary for rescission to
take place; the extrajudicial rescission immediately releases the party
from its obligation under the contract, subject only to court reversal if
found improper.—While it remains apparent that PMC had not judicially
invoked the other grounds to rescind in this case, the only recognizable
effect, however, is with respect to the reckoning point as to when the
contract would be formally regarded as rescinded. Where parties agree
to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is
necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial rescission
immediately releases the party from its obligation under the contract,
Page 226 of 682
subject only to court reversal if found improper. On the other hand,

without a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, it is the judicial
decree that rescinds, and not the will of the rescinding party. This may
be gathered from previous Court rulings on the matter.
Page 227 of 682

G.R. No. 190080. June 11, 2014.*

Same; Same; Same; Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing
extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is necessary for rescission to
take place; the extrajudicial rescission immediately releases the party
from its obligation under the contract, subject only to court reversal if
found improper.—While it remains apparent that PMC had not judicially
invoked the other grounds to rescind in this case, the only recognizable
effect, however, is with respect to the reckoning point as to when the
contract would be formally regarded as rescinded. Where parties agree
to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is
Page 228 of 682
necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial rescission

immediately releases the party from its obligation under the contract,
subject only to court reversal if found improper. On the other hand,
without a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, it is the judicial
decree that rescinds, and not the will of the rescinding party. This may
be gathered from previous Court rulings on the matter.
Page 229 of 682

G.R. No. 171591. June 25, 2012.*

ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE
CORPORATION and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.
Mercantile Law; Bill of Lading; A bill of lading is defined as “an
instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent, describing the
freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the terms
of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight to
be delivered to the order or assigns of a specified person at a specified
place.”—A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing, signed
by a carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it,
stating the name of the consignor, the terms of the contract for
carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight to be delivered to
the order or assigns of a specified person at a specified place.” It
operates both as a receipt and as a contract. As a receipt, it recites the
date and place of shipment, describes the goods as to quantity, weight,
dimensions, identification marks and condition, quality, and value. As a
contract, it names the contracting parties, which include the consignee,
fixes the route, destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates
the rights and obligations assumed by the parties. As such, it shall only
be binding upon the parties who make them, their assigns and heirs.
Civil Law; Agency; An agent is not personally liable to the party
with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds
the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of
his powers.—Article 1868 of the Civil Code states: “ART. 1868. By the
contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to
do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.” Corollarily, Article 1897 of the same
Code provides that an agent is not personally liable to the party with
whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the
limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his
powers.
Page 230 of 682

G.R. No. 175900. June 10, 2013.*

KAPISANANG PANGKAUNLARAN NG KABABAIHANG POTRERO,
INC. and MILAGROS H. REYES, petitioners, vs. REMEDIOS
BARRENO, LILIBETH AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK D.
DIONISIO and MARITES CASIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists
“when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.”—
Forum shopping exists “when one party repetitively avails of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.”
What is truly important to consider in determining whether it exists or
not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the
same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the pro cess creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.
Page 231 of 682

G.R. No. 187722. June 10, 2013.*

SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and/or
DANNY Z. ESCALANTE, petitioners, vs. TEOFILO GONZAGA,
respondent.
Certiorari; It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally
limited to reviewing errors of law as the former is not a trier of facts.―It
must be pointed out that the main issue in this case involves a question
of fact. In this light, it is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the
Court in cases brought before it from the CA via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law as the former is not a trier of facts. In the Court’s
exercise of its power of review, thus, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding as it is not the former’s function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. However, one of the recognized
exceptions to this rule is when there resides a conflict between the
findings of facts of the NLRC and of the CA. In such instance, there is a
need to review the records to determine which of them should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts, as in this case.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to examine the cause and procedure
attendant to the termination of Gonzaga’s employment.
Labor Law; Termination of Employees; Illegal Dismissals; The burden of
proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a valid
cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal.―In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the
employer to show that the dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in
which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this
relation, the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is
substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount
of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise.
Same; Statutory Construction; Procedural Rules and Technicalities;
Technical rules of evidence are not strictly followed in labor cases and
thus, their liberal application relaxes the same.―To note, petitioners
could not be faulted for not presenting each and every bill or receipt
due to their voluminous character. Corollarily, the Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that documents of such nature could indeed consist of
multiple pages; likewise, it is clear that petitioners only sought to
establish a general result from the whole, i.e., the total cash shortage.
In this regard, the requirement that the offeror first establish the
voluminous nature of the evidence sought to be presented, as
discussed in the CA’s March 30, 2009 Resolution, is dispensed with.
Besides, technical rules of evidence are not strictly followed in labor
cases and thus, their liberal application relaxes the same.
Page 232 of 682
Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Gross and

Habitual Neglect of Duty; Serious Misconduct and gross and habitual
neglect of duty are just causes for termination which are explicitly
enumerated under Article 296 of the Labor Code.―The Court finds the
evidence presented by the petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of
Gonzaga, sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to prove that he
committed serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty to
warrant his dismissal from employment. Such are just causes for
termination which are explicitly enumerated under Article 296 of the
Labor Code, as amended: Article 296. Termination by Employer.—An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes: (a) Serious Misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
x x x x At any rate, Gonzaga had admitted that he failed to remit his
collections daily in violation of SURNECO’s company policy, rendering
such fact conclusive and binding upon him. Therefore, for his equal
violation of Section 7.2.2 of the Code of Ethics (failure to remit
collections/monies), his dismissal is justified altogether.
Same; Same; Formal Hearing; Jurisprudence dictates that it is not
enough that the employee is given an “ample opportunity to be heard”
if company rules or practices require a formal hearing or
conference.―Jurisprudence dictates that it is not enough that the
employee is given an “ample opportunity to be heard” if company rules
or practices require a formal hearing or conference. In such instance,
the requirement of a formal hearing and conference becomes
mandatory. In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,
584 SCRA 110 (2009), the Court laid down the following principles in
dismissing employees: (a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any
meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to
answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his
defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and
reasonable way. (b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory
only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial
evidentiary disputes exists or a company rule or practice requires it, or
when similar circumstances justify it. (c) the “ample opportunity to be
heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing and
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
[emphases and underscoring supplied] The rationale behind this
mandatory characterization is premised on the fact that company rules
and regulations which regulate the procedure and requirements for
termination, are generally binding on the employer. Thus, as
pronounced in Suico v. NLRC, et al., 513 SCRA 325 (2007): Company
policies or practices are binding on the parties. Some can ripen into an
obligation on the part of the employer, such as those which confer
benefits on employees or regulate the procedures and requirements for
their termination.
Same; Same; In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442
SCRA 573 (2004), the Supreme Court pronounced that where the
dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should
Page 233 of 682
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the

employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights.―In this relation, case law states that an employer who
terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v.
NLRC (Agabon), 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that where
the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation
of his statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to
pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00. By
analogy, the Court finds that the same principle should apply to the
case at bar for the reason that an employer’s breach of its own
company procedure is equally violative of the laborer’s rights, albeit not
statutory in source. Hence, although the dismissal stands, the Court
deems it appropriate to award Gonzaga nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
BRION, J., Separate Concurring Opinion: Remedial Law; Civil Law; Labor
Law; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; View that a labor case is
generally elevated to the Supreme Court through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, after it has been
resolved by the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.―Pursuant to the established rules and
jurisprudence, a labor case is generally elevated to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
after it has been resolved by the CA through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The object of a Rule 45 petition is to
determine the correctness of the assailed decision, i.e., whether the
respondent court committed a reversible legal error in resolving the
case. In contrast, the object of a Rule 65 petition is to determine
jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent court, i.e., whether the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. In light of this review process, the Court
takes on a unique approach in reviewing a CA decision on a labor case
in that “we ... examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the [National Labor Relations Commission] decision before
it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
case was correct.” Hence, the question to ask is whether the CA
correctly determined whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling in this case. In this particular case, I believe that the
CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; View that as ruled in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), where the
dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights.―Gonzaga’s misappropriation of the funds under his
custody constitutes a just and valid cause for his dismissal.
Nonetheless, as the ponencia found, Gonzaga was not afforded the
Page 234 of 682
procedural due process for failure of the petitioners to observe their

own established policy in investigating erring employees. As ruled in
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004),
“[w]here the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it
illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights...” Hence, the
employer should be required to pay the employee nominal damages,
which has been set by jurisprudence at P30,000.00.
Page 235 of 682

G.R. No. 188500. July 24, 2013.*

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T.
ANTONIO, Governor, and ROBERT ADAP, Environmental and
Natural Resources Officer, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH LASAM LARA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Writ of Injunction; It is well-settled
that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2)
requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b)
acts which are violative of the said right.―It is well-settled that a writ of
injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites,
namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which
are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where
the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing
right is not a ground for an injunction.
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160); Quarrying Operations; Section
138(2) of RA 7160 requires that such entity must first secure a
governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations.―In
order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must
first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national
government, but also by the local government unit where his business
is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 7160 requires that such
entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his
quarrying operations, viz.: SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other
Quarry Resources.—x x x. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other
quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor,
pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
Page 236 of 682

G.R. No. 193874. July 24, 2013.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RICOR DITO N. DE
ASIS, JR., respondent.
Civil Law; Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution requires that (a) notice
of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of hearing.―At the outset, the Court notes that
the present amended petition for reconstitution is anchored on the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240 — a source for reconstitution of
title under Section 3(a) of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed by the
provisions of Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to
the publication, posting, and notice requirements. Section 10 reads:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered
owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section
five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on
sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this
Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the
petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the
manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That
certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.
Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part: SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court
shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of
the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to
be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall
determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity
may require. x x x. The foregoing provisions, therefore, clearly require
that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive
issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at
least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial
compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears
stressing that the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is
hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
Same; Same; The thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing
should be reckoned from the time of the actual circulation or release of
the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on the date of its issue as
reflected on its front cover.―The thirty-day period that precedes the
scheduled hearing should be reckoned from the time of the actual
circulation or release of the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on
the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. To interpret it
otherwise, as the CA had erroneously done in this case, would render
nugatory the purposes of publication in reconstitution proceedings,
which are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership
claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action,
and to give them enough time to intervene. Otherwise, unscrupulous
parties would merely invoke compliance with the requirement of two-
Page 237 of 682
time publication in the Official Gazette, without regard to the date of its
actual release, as a convenient excuse for their failure to observe the
mandatory prerequisite of publication.
Same; Same; While it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was
short by only three (3) days, the principle of substantial compliance
cannot apply, as the law requires strict compliance, without which the
Supreme Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the
petition.―While it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was
Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition. As
the Court has declared in the case of Castillo v. Republic, 652 SCRA 600
(2011): x x x In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must
be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks
authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the proceedings
before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for
reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Strict compliance with the requirements of the law aims to
thwart dishonest parties from abusing reconstitution proceedings as a
means of illegally obtaining properties otherwise already owned by
other parties.―It bears stressing that the nature of reconstitution
proceedings under RA 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which
is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and
condition. As such, reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof
that the title sought to be restored had previously existed and was
issued to the petitioner. Strict compliance with the requirements of the
law aims to thwart dishonest parties from abusing reconstitution
proceedings as a means of illegally obtaining properties otherwise
already owned by other parties.
Page 238 of 682

G.R. No. 175844. July 29, 2013.*

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. SARABIA
MANOR HOTEL CORPORATION, respondent.
Certiorari; It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law;
Exceptions.―It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. In
this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed
upon by the Court unless, the following exceptions are found to exist:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d)
when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (g) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,”
Distinguished.―The distinction between questions of law and questions
of fact is well-defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of
the CA are final and conclusive and the Court will not review them on
appeal.
Corporation Law; Corporate Rehabilitation; The purpose of rehabilitation
proceedings is to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and
thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its
earnings.―Recognizing the volatile nature of every business, the rules
on corporate rehabilitation have been crafted in order to give
companies sufficient leeway to deal with debilitating financial
predicaments in the hope of restoring or reaching a sustainable
operating form if only to best accommodate the various interests of all
its stakeholders, may it be the corporation’s stockholders, its creditors
and even the general public. In this light, case law has defined
corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the
assets of an insolvent corporation in the hope of its eventual return
from financial stress to solvency. It contemplates the continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and liquidity.
Verily, the purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be
Page 239 of 682
paid their claims from its earnings. Thus, rehabilitation shall be

undertaken when it is shown that the continued operation of the
corporation is economically more feasible and its creditors can recover,
by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more, if
the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated.
Same; Same; In order to determine the feasibility of a proposed
rehabilitation plan, it is imperative that a thorough examination and
analysis of the distressed corporation’s financial data must be
conducted.―In order to determine the feasibility of a proposed
rehabilitation plan, it is imperative that a thorough examination and
analysis of the distressed corporation’s financial data must be
conducted. If the results of such examination and analysis show that
there is a real opportunity to rehabilitate the corporation in view of the
assumptions made and financial goals stated in the proposed
rehabilitation plan, then it may be said that a rehabilitation is feasible.
In this accord, the rehabilitation court should not hesitate to allow the
corporation to operate as an on-going concern, albeit under the terms
and conditions stated in the approved rehabilitation plan. On the other
hand, if the results of the financial examination and analysis clearly
indicate that there lies no reasonable probability that the distressed
corporation could be revived and that liquidation would, in fact, better
subserve the interests of its stakeholders, then it may be said that a
rehabilitation would not be feasible. In such case, the rehabilitation
court may convert the proceedings into one for liquidation.
Same; Same; Although undefined in the Interim Rules, it may be said
that the opposition of a distressed corporation’s majority creditor is
manifestly unreasonable if it counter-proposes unrealistic payment
terms and conditions which would, more likely than not, impede rather
than aid its rehabilitation.―Although undefined in the Interim Rules, it
may be said that the opposition of a distressed corporation’s majority
creditor is manifestly unreasonable if it counter-proposes unrealistic
payment terms and conditions which would, more likely than not,
impede rather than aid its rehabilitation. The unreasonableness
becomes further manifest if the rehabilitation plan, in fact, provides for
adequate safeguards to fulfill the majority creditor’s claims, and yet the
latter persists on speculative or unfounded assumptions that his credit
would remain unfulfilled.
Same; Same; Oppositions which push for high interests rates are
generally frowned upon in rehabilitation proceedings given that the
inherent purpose of a rehabilitation is to find ways and means to
minimize the expenses of the distressed corporation during the
rehabilitation period.―It must be pointed out that oppositions which
push for high interests rates are generally frowned upon in
rehabilitation proceedings given that the inherent purpose of a
rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of
the distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period. It is the
objective of a rehabilitation proceeding to provide the best possible
framework for the corporation to gradually regain or achieve a
Page 240 of 682
sustainable operating form. Hence, if a creditor, whose interests remain

well-preserved under the existing rehabilitation plan, still declines to
accept interests pegged at reasonable rates during the period of
rehabilitation, and, in turn, proposes rates which are largely counter-
productive to the rehabilitation, then it may be said that the creditor’s
opposition is manifestly unreasonable.
Page 241 of 682

G.R. No. 193874. July 24, 2013.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RICOR DITO N. DE
ASIS, JR., respondent.
Civil Law; Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution requires that (a) notice
of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of hearing.―At the outset, the Court notes that
the present amended petition for reconstitution is anchored on the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240 — a source for reconstitution of
title under Section 3(a) of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed by the
provisions of Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to
the publication, posting, and notice requirements. Section 10 reads:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered
owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section
five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on
sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this
Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the
petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the
manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That
certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.
Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part: SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court
shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of
the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to
be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall
determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity
may require. x x x. The foregoing provisions, therefore, clearly require
that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive
issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at
least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial
compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears
stressing that the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is
hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
Same; Same; The thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing
should be reckoned from the time of the actual circulation or release of
the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on the date of its issue as
reflected on its front cover.―The thirty-day period that precedes the
scheduled hearing should be reckoned from the time of the actual
circulation or release of the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on
the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. To interpret it
otherwise, as the CA had erroneously done in this case, would render
nugatory the purposes of publication in reconstitution proceedings,
which are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership
claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action,
and to give them enough time to intervene. Otherwise, unscrupulous
parties would merely invoke compliance with the requirement of two-
Page 242 of 682
time publication in the Official Gazette, without regard to the date of its
actual release, as a convenient excuse for their failure to observe the
mandatory prerequisite of publication.
Same; Same; While it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was
Supreme Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the
petition.―While it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was
Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition. As
the Court has declared in the case of Castillo v. Republic, 652 SCRA 600
(2011): x x x In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must
be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks
authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the proceedings
before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for
reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Strict compliance with the requirements of the law aims to
thwart dishonest parties from abusing reconstitution proceedings as a
means of illegally obtaining properties otherwise already owned by
other parties.―It bears stressing that the nature of reconstitution
proceedings under RA 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which
is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and
condition. As such, reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof
that the title sought to be restored had previously existed and was
issued to the petitioner. Strict compliance with the requirements of the
law aims to thwart dishonest parties from abusing reconstitution
proceedings as a means of illegally obtaining properties otherwise
already owned by other parties.
Page 243 of 682

G.R. No. 165014. July 31, 2013.*

HEIRS OF ALEJANDRA DELFIN, namely: LEOPOLDO DELFIN
(deceased), represented by his spouse, LUZ C. DELFIN, and
children, LELANE C. DELFIN and ANAS- TACIA C. DELFIN,
MARCELITO1 DELFIN, FRANCISCO2 DELFIN, APOLLO DELFIN,
ABRILES DELFIN, LYDIA D. DACULAN, OLIVIA D. CABALLERO,
ALEJANDRO DELFIN, JULITO DELFIN, and CANDIDO DELFIN, JR.,
petitioners, vs. AVELINA RABADON, PACIANO PANOGALING,3
HILARIA RABADON, PABLO BOQUILLA, CATALINA RABADON,
PACIANO RABAYA, FE RABADON, GONZALO DABON, and
ROBERTO RABADON, respondents.
Civil Law; Certificate of Title; As against an array of proofs consisting of
tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence
of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original
certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the
registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail.—It is an
elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights
which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By
the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted,
subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration
decree. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393 (1987), the
Court ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax
declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate
of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered
owners over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly,
respondents’ Decree No. 98992 for which an original certificate of title
was issued should be accorded greater weight as against the tax
declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.
Same; Tax Declaration; Tax Receipts; Tax declarations and tax receipts
may only become the basis of a claim for ownership when they are
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property.—Tax
declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for
ownership when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property. In this case, records are bereft of any showing that petitioners,
or any of their predecessors-ininterest, have been in actual possession
of the subject property prior to 1989 as they claim. The tax declarations
and tax receipts are insufficient to prove their proffered theory that
their predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, was the lawful possessor and
owner of the foregoing property even before the last World War. In fact,
petitioners altogether failed to prove the legitimacy of Remegio’s
possession and ownership since they failed to present the pertinent
deed of sale or any other evidence of the latter’s title. On the contrary,
aside from the LRA certification and daybook entry which prove the
existence of Decree No. 98992, respondents’ possession of the subject
property prior to petitioners’ entry in 1989 was attested to by one
Marcelina Tabora who, as the CA notes, appears to be an unbiased
witness. All told, by sheer preponderance of evidence, respondents
Page 244 of 682
have shown a better right to the ownership and possession of the

subject property and hence, must be awarded the same.
Page 245 of 682

G.R. No. 191219. July 31, 2013.*

SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY1 AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Sandiganbayan; It bears

pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of
law and not questions of fact may be raised.—At the outset, it bears
pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case,
only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues
brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption
of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was
satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly
appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. Hence, absent any of
the recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule, the
Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed
as conclusive.
Page 246 of 682

G.R. No. 178451. July 30, 2014.*

RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., petitioner, vs. JORGITA A.
MELECIO-YAP, LILIA MELECIO PACIFICO (deceased, substituted
by her only child ERLL** ISAAC M. PACIFICO, JR.), REYNALDO A.
MELECIO, ROSIE MELECIO DELOSO and SARAH MELECIO PALMA-
GIL, respondents.
Certiorari; The rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law,
not of fact.—Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law, not of fact. The theory of forgery advanced by
respondents involves a question of fact. While it is not the function of
the Court to undertake a reexamination of the evidence presented by
the contending parties during the trial of the case, there are, however,
recognized exceptions, among which is when the findings of the trial
court and the appellate court are conflicting, as in this case.
Civil Law; Mortgages; The settled rule is that persons constituting a
mortgage must be legally authorized for the purpose. —The settled rule
is that persons constituting a mortgage must be legally authorized for
the purpose. In the present case, while Erna appears to be a co-owner
of the mortgaged properties, she made it appear that she was duly
authorized to sell the entire properties by virtue of the notarized SPA
dated August 24, 1990.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; Generally, a notarized
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect
to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.—Generally, a notarized
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect
to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, the
presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only
so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private document. Hence, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed
with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is
preponderance of evidence.
Same; Same; Private Documents; Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that “before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written,
or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.”—Having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the
Page 247 of 682
execution of the SPA, the presumption of regularity accorded by law to

notarized documents can no longer apply and the questioned SPA is to
be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court which provides that “[b]efore any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document executed
or written, or (b) [b]y evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.”
Civil Law; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it.—The Court cannot subscribe to RBCI’s contention that
respondents are barred by laches from laying claim over the subject
properties in view of their inexplicable inaction from the time they
learned of the falsification. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. In this case, the complaint for
nullification of the SPA was filed before the RTC on April 17, 1996, or
barely three years from respondents’ discovery of the averred forgery in
1993, which is within the four-year prescriptive period provided under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code to institute an action upon the injury to
their rights over the subject properties. A delay within the prescriptive
period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that
would bar relief. Laches applies only in the absence of a statutory
prescriptive period. Furthermore, the doctrine of laches cannot be used
to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the more prudent
rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or
bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice would result, as in this
case.
Same; Estoppel; Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, an essential
element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been influenced
and has relied on the representations or conduct of the person sought
to be estopped.—Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, an essential
element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been influenced
and has relied on the representations or conduct of the person sought
to be estopped.
G.R. No. 184295. July 30, 2014.*
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ALPHAOMEGA INTEGRATED CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in
this case, “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.”—TRANSCO seeks through this petition a recalibration of the
evidence presented before the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal, insisting that AIC
is not entitled to any damages not only because it had previously
waived all claims for standby fees in case of project delays but had
Page 248 of 682
eventually failed to perform the workable portions of the projects. This

is evidently a factual question which cannot be the proper subject of the
present petition. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that
a petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this case,
“shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”
Thus, absent any of the existing exceptions impelling the contrary, the
Court is, as a general rule, precluded from delving on factual
determinations, as what TRANSCO essentially seeks in this case.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasijudicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect,
but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
—The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal on the matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which
the CA affirmed as being well supported by evidence and properly
referred to in the record. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect,
but also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. The CIAC
possesses that required expertise in the field of construction arbitration
and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and
conclusive, not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who
does not appealand that a party who did not appeal the decision may
not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than
what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is
brought up on appeal.—It must be emphasized that the petition for
review before the CA was filed by TRANSCO. AIC never elevated before
the courts the matter concerning the discrepancy between the amount
of the award stated in the body of the Final Award and the total award
shown in its dispositive portion. The issue was touched upon by the CA
only after AIC raised the same through its Comment (With Motion to
Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award) to TRANSCO’s petition for review.
The CA should not have modified the amount of the award to favor AIC
because it is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does
not appeal and that a party who did not appeal the decision may not
obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he
had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up
on appeal. The disposition, as stated in the fallo of the CIAC Arbitral
Tribunal’s Final Award, should therefore stand.
G.R. No. 212705. September 10, 2014.*
ROBERTO CO, petitioner, vs. KENG HUAN JERRY YEUNG and
EMMA YEUNG, respondents.
Certiorari; Well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable
in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions,
among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial
court’s judgment of the appellate court’s misapprehension of the
Page 249 of 682
adduced facts.—The Court’s review of the present case is via a petition

for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which generally bars any
question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under
Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of
sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the
appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.
Same; Same; Same; Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight
and respect by the Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record.— Co, who mainly interposes a
denial of the acts imputed against him, fails to convince the Court that
any of the exceptions exists so as to warrant a review of the findings of
facts in this case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA,
are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court and are deemed
final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. The
Court finds that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence
presented by the parties, and have adequately explained the legal and
evidentiary reasons in concluding that Co committed acts of unfair
competition.
Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Words and Phrases; Unfair
competition is defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting
to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one person as
the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of
deceiving the public.—Unfair competition is defined as the passing off
(or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods
or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the
end and probable effect of deceiving the public. This takes place where
the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of
his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods
are those of his competitor. Here, it has been established that Co
conspired with the Laus in the sale/distribution of counterfeit
Greenstone products to the public, which were even packaged in bottles
identical to that of the original, thereby giving rise to the presumption
of fraudulent intent. In light of the foregoing definition, it is thus clear
that Co, together with the Laus, committed unfair competition, and
should, consequently, be held liable therefor.
Page 250 of 682

A.C. No. 7184. September 17, 2014.*

FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO B.
SUERTE- FELIPE, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; For misrepresenting in the said
acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of
Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was
not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is
undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath.—As the Investigating
Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted
that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and
the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the
years 19981999, could not notarize the subject document’s
acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond
the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The
territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: Sec. 11.
Jurisdiction and Term.—A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made,
unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) Said principle is
equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume
I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which
Section 240, Article II states: Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction.—The
jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be coextensive with the
province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be
coextensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary
public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact,
uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form
of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath.
Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Page 251 of 682

A.C. No. 9115. September 17, 2014.*

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROBERTO L. UY, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Members of the Bar are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.—The Court finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property,
notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the
merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent
restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed
himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor
any action which would endanger the Bar’s reputation. Verily, members
of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of
the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct
fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law
and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been
ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense
as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
Page 252 of 682

G.R. No. 184000. September 17, 2014.*

PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. PACIFIC WIDE REALTY
and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,** respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and
Phrases; Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental
principle of law which precludes parties from relitigating issues actually
litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.—Res judicata
(meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which
precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment. It means that “a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit.” Res judicata has
two (2) concepts. The first is “bar by prior judgment” in which the
judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action before the same or other tribunal. The second is “conclusiveness
of judgment” in which any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Bar by prior judgment” and
“Conclusiveness of judgment,” Distinguished.—There is a bar by prior
judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of
judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action.
Page 253 of 682

G.R. No. 190198. September 17, 2014.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. CE
LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., respondent.
Taxation; Prescription; Once the administrative claim is filed within the
two (2)-year prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the one
hundred twenty (120)-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a
thirty (30)-day period to file his judicial claim before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed
the aforementioned 2-year prescriptive period.—In CIR v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), 632 SCRA 422 (2010), the Court held that
the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional
requisite to the filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA.
Consequently, its nonobservance would lead to the dismissal of the
judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also clarified
that the two (2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative
claims and not to judicial claims. Succinctly put, once the administrative
claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, the claimant
must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a
30-day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-
day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year
prescriptive period. However, in CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation
(San Roque), 690 SCRA 336 (2013), the Court categorically recognized
an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day
period. It ruled that BIR Ruling No. DA -489-03 dated December 10,
2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of
the NIRC. In essence, the aforesaid BIR Ruling stated that “taxpayer-
claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.”
Page 254 of 682

G.R. No. 206555. September 17, 2014.

ATTY. FORTUNATO PAGDANGANAN, JR., ATTY. ABIGAIL D.
SUAREZ and EUGENIO A. VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs.
FLORENTINO P. SARMIENTO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, an aggrieved
party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or
resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari.—Under Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed
decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari,
viz.: SEC. 4. When and where to file petition.—The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed
not latter than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of
the motion.
Pleadings and Practice; If a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of
all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said
counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his client.—In the
present case, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the 60 -day
reglementary period for the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari
should be reckoned from January 12, 2011, the date Atty. Borromeo,
Sarmiento’s then counsel of record, had the notice of the December 30,
2010 Resolution, and not February 10, 2011, the date when Sarmiento
was personally notified thereof. This is in consonance with the well-
settled rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all
kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said
counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his client.
Same; Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or
withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent to him binds the
client, despite an internal arrangement between them.—The Court
cannot give credence to Sarmiento’s contention that Atty. Borromeo had
been discharged as counsel even before Sarmiento received the
December 30, 2010 Resolution, considering that Atty. Borromeo never
filed a formal withdrawal of appearance prior thereto, conformably with
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe the proper
legal formalities, Atty. Borromeo remained as Sarmiento’s counsel on
record. Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or
withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent to him binds the
client, despite an internal arrangement between them terminating their
professional relationship, as in this case.
Page 255 of 682

G.R. No. 203254. October 8, 2014.*

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.—A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ
of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.”—As defined in Section 1 of the
Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section
6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it
bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the
nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.—In
Page 256 of 682
this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege
that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be
violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of this video — which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging
and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases,
so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
Page 257 of 682

G.R. No. 190161. October 13, 2014.*

ANITA N. CANUEL, for herself and on behalf of her minor
children, namely: CHARMAINE, CHARLENE, and CHARL SMITH,
all surnamed CANUEL, petitioners, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME
CORPORATION, EDUARDO U. MANESE, and KOTANI
SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Benefits; The seafarer’s beneficiaries may

successfully claim death benefits if they are able to establish that the
seafarer’s death is (a) work-related, and (b) had occurred during the
term of his employment contract.—The provisions currently governing
the entitlement of the seafarer’s beneficiaries to death benefits are
found in Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC. Part A(1) thereof states that
the seafarer’s beneficiaries may successfully claim death benefits if
they are able to establish that the seafarer’s death is (a) work-related,
and (b) had occurred during the term of his employment contract.
Same; Same; Same; If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or
disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical
condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for
injury independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.—That
Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was found to have been
preexisting, hardly impels a contrary conclusion since — as the LA
herein earlier noted — the February 20, 2007 injury actually led to the
deterioration of his condition. As held in More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v.
NLRC, 307 SCRA 189 (1999), “[i]f the injury is the proximate cause of
[the seafarer’s] death or disability for which compensation is sought,
[his] previous physical condition x x x is unimportant and recovery may
be had for injury independent of any preexisting weakness or disease,”
viz.: Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or
disease was preexisting at the time of the employment but rather if the
disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed
safe to presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the
seafarer’s] employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury,
if indeed it was preexisting at the time of his employment. Therefore, it
is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in
order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have
been in perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or
that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his
employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them,
and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by
some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy
person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for
which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the
employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.
Page 258 of 682

Same; Same; Same; While the general rule is that the seafarer’s death
should occur during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death
occurring after the termination of his employment due to his medical
repatriation on account of a workrelated injury or illness constitutes an
exception thereto.—With respect to the second requirement for death
compensability, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the
general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur during the term of
his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of
his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-
related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is based
on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight
of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable
compensation for the seafarer’s death, notwithstanding its evident
work-connection. The present petition is a case in point. Here, Nancing’s
repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year
employment contract. Were it not for his injury, which had been earlier
established as work-related, he would not have been repatriated for
medical reasons and his contract consequently terminated pursuant to
Part 1 of Section 18(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Same; Same; Liberal Construction; A strict and literal construction of the
2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), especially when the same would
result into inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed to
in this jurisdiction.—A strict and literal construction of the 2000
POEASEC, especially when the same would result into inequitable
consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in this jurisdiction.
Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and
full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are
deemed to be so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial
conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. The rule
therefore is one of liberal construction. As enunciated in the case of
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47 (2001): The
POEA-Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily
for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment onboard ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must
[therefore] be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in
their favor [as it is only] then can its beneficent provisions be fully
carried into effect.
Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; It is enough that the seafarer’s work-
related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have
occurred during the term of his employment. —Applying the rule on
liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that
medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to
Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC. Accordingly, the phrase “work-related
death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract”
under Part A(1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally
construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have
precisely occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is
enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which
Page 259 of 682
eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his
employment. Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is
by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and
his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be
championed. For if the laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully
or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master’s profit, then it
is but proper that his demise be compensated. Here, since it has been
established that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related
injury or illness during the term of his employment, (b) his injury or
illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was later
determined that the injury or illness for which he was medically
repatriated was the proximate cause of his actual death although the
same occurred after the term of his employment, the above mentioned
rule should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim for death
benefits should be granted.
Same; Same; Same; If the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness (that
eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his death)
occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer becomes
liable for death compensation benefits under Section 20(A) of the 2000
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC).— Considering the constitutional mandate on labor
as well as relative jurisprudential context, the rule, restated for a final
time, should be as follows: if the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness
(that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his
death, as in this case) occurs during the term of his employment, then
the employer becomes liable for death compensation benefits under
Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be construed
otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing
constitutional policy and deride the bearings of relevant case law but
also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice.
Page 260 of 682

G.R. No. 198732. June 10, 2013.*

CHRISTIAN CABALLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
Criminal Law; Child Prostitution; Elements of.―Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610 pertinently reads: SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x (b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As determined in the case of
Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), 465 SCRA 465 (2005), the elements of the
foregoing offense are the following: (a) The accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) The said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Same; Same; Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610); Republic Act No. 7610
was meant to advance the state policy of affording “special protection
to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development”
and in such regard, “provide sanctions for their commission.”―To put
things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was
meant to advance the state policy of affording “special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development”
and in such regard, “provide sanctions for their commission.” It also
furthers the “best interests of children” and as such, its provisions are
guided by this standard.
Same; Same; Same; Congress crafted Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in order
to penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse.―Driven
by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same
law in order to penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual
abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is considered a
“child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” As illumined in
Olivarez v. CA, 465 SCRA 465 (2005), citing People v. Larin, 297 SCRA
309 (1998), and Amployo v. People, 457 SCRA 282 (2005), the final
version of the aforesaid provision was a product of various deliberations
to expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may have
Page 261 of 682
been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, viz.: The second element,
i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly
explained in People v. Larin, 297 SCRA 309 (1998): A child is deemed
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the
child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group... It must be noted that the law covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious
conduct. We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People, 457 SCRA 282
(2005): ... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct
through coercion or intimidation...
Same; Same; Same; As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the
child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.”―As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the
child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.” In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent
to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their
development. In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s
free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse
Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence
which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as: The employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in
cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; Unlike
rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.―Jurisprudence settles that consent is
immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts
remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The
language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish “[t]hose who commit the
Page 262 of 682
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in

prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” Unlike rape, therefore,
consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily
be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm
which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law
should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at
adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to
have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself
in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to
afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be
justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair
game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law
to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
Page 263 of 682

G.R. No. 192890. June 17, 2013.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VIRGINIA
PALMARES, LERMA P. AVELINO, MELILIA P. VILLA, NINIAN P.
CATEQUISTA, LUIS PALMARES, JR., SALVE P. VALENZUELA,
GEORGE P. PALMARES, and DENCEL P. PALMARES herein
represented by their ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LERMA P. AVELINO,
respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Principal Factors Enumerated
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 that Guide Special Agrarian Courts in
the Determination of Just Compensation.— The principal basis of the
computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which
enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in
the determination thereof: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the
current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income;
(4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the
assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and
by the government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any. Pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 49 of the
same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula.
Page 264 of 682

Adm. Case No. 7332. June 18, 2013.*

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS,
JR., respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; A lawyer who holds a government
office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.―Chapter
1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01
engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03
proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying
any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule
6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining
them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere
with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
In this light, a lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the
abovementioned rules should be taken into consideration in
determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; The possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission
to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession; Any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.―To note, “the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission
to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.” This
proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity. Consequently, any
errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or
private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment.
Labor Law; Backwages; Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the
rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee
who has been illegally dismissed.―Fundamental in the realm of labor
law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an
employee who has been illegally dismissed. There is nothing in the
records that could confound the finding that complainant was illegally
dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in
decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that
respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to
Page 265 of 682

backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.

In this regard, respondent’s defense deserves scant consideration.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; Immoral Conduct; Gross
Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community; On
the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes “improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.”―Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts
that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of
the community. It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolt ing
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. On the
other hand, gross misconduct constitutes “improper or wrong conduct,
the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.”
Same; Same; Same; Suspension; Penalties; Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred.―Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when
a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred: SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or
suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.―A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, as
respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and
gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of course.
However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already
been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr.
v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 615 SCRA 206 (2010), which therefore
precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of
the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in
the amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondent’s
transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission
of the same or similar acts in the future.
Page 266 of 682

Same; Same; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege accorded

only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications.―As a
final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice
of law is a privilege accorded only to those who continue to meet its
exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which
the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its
integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its
members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect
moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well
as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for the
deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
Page 267 of 682

G.R. No. 205033. June 18, 2013.*

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACOSALAZAR, ROEL B.
NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K.
SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY,
and ELBERT C. ATILANO, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Motion for
Reconsideration; Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial power.―Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters
concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions. The
distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v.
COMELEC, 319 SCRA 470 (1999): [T]he term ‘administrative’ connotes,
or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by managing
or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or
conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be
heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon. While a ‘quasijudicial function’ is a term which
applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Same; Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificate of
Candidacy; The COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation
of a Certificate of Candidacy in view of a candidate’s disqualification to
run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its
mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
elections.―In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), the Court
held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
a CoC in view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office
based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce
and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly,
in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the
candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating
a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As petitioner’s disqualification to run for
public office had already been settled in a previous case and now
stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to
cancel his Certificate of Candidacy as a matter of course, else it be
remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.―In this light, there is
also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc
would be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s
Page 268 of 682
disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a

previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be
remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Equally compelling is
the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a
registered voter in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by
virtue of the RTC’s Order dated October 31, 2012. In this accord,
petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter registration requirement
under Section 39(a) of the LGC is already beyond question and likewise
provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation of his CoC altogether.
Statutory Construction; Every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they
can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.―Well-
established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they
can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.
Same; Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; While Section 40(a)
of the Local Government Code allows a prior convict to run for local
elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves
his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases
wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,
which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective
office.―Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective
candidates, provides: SEC. 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC
reads: ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification.—The penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which
the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election. 2.
The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office
or to be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or
public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is
comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the
term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other
pension for any office formerly held. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction
principle, the Court observes that the conflict between these provisions
of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of
the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the
lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said
provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes
Page 269 of 682
a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of

disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of this
would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal:
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal―Their accessory
penalties.―The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this
relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the
convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office. To note, this
penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the
presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to
hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State
grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise
it for the common good.
Same; Same; Same; Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code should
be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield
to the more definitive Revised Penal Code provisions in line with the
principle of lex specialis derogat generali ― general legislation must
give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are
not applicable.―Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41
in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and specific in nature
― insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to
his conviction ― as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly
speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment without any consideration of
certain disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly,
Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general
application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC
provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali ―
general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail.
Same; Same; Same; Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.―Article 41 of the RPC
expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
Page 270 of 682
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to

suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case,
the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the
Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such,
petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to
subsist. Further, it is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in
the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction
and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term
which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the
Court’s ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, 24 SCRA 780 (1968), where the Court
explained the meaning of the term “perpetual” as applied to the
penalty of disqualification to run for public office: The accessory penalty
of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during
the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October
1961. But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right
of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to
vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of
the sentence.
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificate of Candidacy;
View that the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Romeo G.
Jalosjos should be cancelled for his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement in light of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) final
judgment denying Jalosjos’ inclusion as a voter.―I CONCUR with the
ruling that the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Romeo G.
Jalosjos should be cancelled for his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement in light of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) final
judgment denying Jalosjos’ inclusion as a voter. To the extent that the
RTC’s basis for its denial was the perpetual absolute disqualification of
Jalosjos arising from the reclusion perpetua imposed on him, I also
agree that the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc’s ruling
cannot legally be faulted.
Same; Same; Same; View that the perpetual absolute disqualification is
an improper ground whose proper place and role is the basis for
disqualification, not for the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy,
and one that cannot be made motu proprio.―I make a reservation,
however, on the latter ground to the extent that the perpetual absolute
disqualification is motu proprio cited by the Comelec en banc in the
exercise of its administrative power and as an independent ground for
the cancellation it ordered. From this perspective, I take the position
that the perpetual absolute disqualification is an improper ground
whose proper place and role is the basis for disqualification, not for the
cancellation of a CoC, and one that cannot be made motu proprio. A
candidate who has filed an otherwise valid CoC may, for example, put
up as a defense that he or she has been granted an absolute pardon
Page 271 of 682
that erased the accessory penalties attached to his offense and its
penalty (as in the recent case of former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada). This example glaringly shows that a perpetual absolute
disqualification involves a question of fact that requires the full
application of due process and cannot, motu proprio and in the exercise
of administrative powers, be simply cited as a ground for the
cancellation of a CoC.
Same; Same; Same; View that a party whose Certificate of Candidacy is
denied or is cancelled would not be considered a candidate; on the
other hand, one who filed a valid Certificate of Candidacy but who is
subsequently disqualified (e.g., for unlawful electioneering under
Sections 68 and 12 of the Omnibus Election Code) was a candidate but
was not allowed to be voted for or, after elections, would not be allowed
to serve if he would win.―A party whose CoC is denied or is cancelled
would not be considered a candidate; on the other hand, one who filed
a valid CoC but who is subsequently disqualified (e.g., for unlawful
electioneering under Sections 68 and 12 of the Omnibus Election Code)
was a candidate but was not allowed to be voted for or, after elections,
would not be allowed to serve if he would win. Directly relevant to this
distinction is Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which allows the
substitution of disqualified candidates as has been extensively
discussed by Mr. Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the recent case of Talaga v.
Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 197 (2012).
Page 272 of 682

G.R. No. 158866. September 9, 2013.*

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner, vs.
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE,
REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H.
PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, ADD
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED, and NANCY L. TY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 181933. September 9, 2013.*
NANCY L. TY, petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
G.R. No. 187551. September 9, 2013.*
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION,
NANCY L. TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER,
PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM,
RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO and ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES,
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Civil Law; Implied Trusts; In Pari Delicto Rule; The implied trust
agreement between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty is “inexistent and
void for being contrary to law”; Neither can any affirmative relief be
accorded to one party against the other since they have been found to
have acted in pari delicto.―Pertinently, in these cases, the Court
applied the earlier case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, docketed as G.R. No. 137533, 392
SCRA 506 (2002), wherein it declared, in no uncertain terms, that the
implied trust agreement between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty is
“inexistent and void for being contrary to law.” As such, Banco Filipino
cannot demand the reconveyance of the subject properties in the
present cases; neither can any affirmative relief be accorded to one
party against the other since they have been found to have acted in
pari delicto.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Principle of Stare Decisis;
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, enjoins adherence
to judicial precedents.―Dictated by the principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which enjoins adherence to judicial precedents, the
Court therefore enforces its ruling in G.R. No. 137533, as duly applied in
the succeeding cases, i.e., G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201,
and 166608; and G.R. No. 188302, as the controlling and binding
doctrine in the resolution of these consolidated petitions. In view of the
nullity of the trust agreement, Banco Filipino has no cause of action
against Tala Realty, thereby validating the dismissal of the former’s
reconveyance complaints filed before the courts a quo. For these
reasons, the Court denies the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158866 and 187551
given that they both seek the reversal of the CA’s Decision granting
defendants’ motions to dismiss. On the contrary, the Court grants the
Page 273 of 682

petition in G.R. No. 181933 since it properly seeks to reverse the CA’s
denial of Nancy’s motions to dismiss the reconveyance cases.
Page 274 of 682

G.R. No. 184732. September 9, 2013.*

CORAZON S. CRUZ under the name and style, VILLA CORAZON
CONDO DORMITORY, petitioner, vs. MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Jurisprudence dictates that the
appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of
refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant.―Jurisprudence
dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only
to the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant.
Since the appellee is not the party who instituted the appeal and
accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he
merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to
the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the
right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly
erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any
affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without
interposing its own appeal.
Page 275 of 682

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285. September 11, 2013.*

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J.
MARTIREZ, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 168, respondents.
G.R. No. 192073. September 11, 2013.*

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. MARISSA
MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 and
UNICAPITAL, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Actions; Words and
Phrases; A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It is wellsettled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.—A
cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause
of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish
adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action is properly
a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.—As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines,
Inc. v. Todaro, 524 SCRA 153 (2007), citing Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC), 440 SCRA 498 (2004):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of
the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the
defendants. (Emphasis supplied) Stated otherwise, the resolution on
this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the
complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the
complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to
state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss
under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter
is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; It is a standing rule that issues that
require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as
the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not
Page 276 of 682
be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss.—It is a standing

rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of
the case, should not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss,
as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations
furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
Court — in view of the above-stated reasons — finds that the RTC-Pasig
City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion which would necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling.
Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Cause of Action; Misjoinder of Causes of Action; The rule is
that a party’s failure to observe the conditions under Section 5, Rule 2
of the Rules of Court results in a misjoinder of causes of action.—The
rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action:
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in one pleading assert,
in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a)
The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on
joinder of parties; (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules; (c) Where the causes of action are between
the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue
lies therein; and (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint
provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.—Neither
should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the
dismissal of his complaint. It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint
provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.
Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on
non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that
Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay
the correct amount of filing fees.
Page 277 of 682

Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; It is hornbook principle that when

or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related
subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in
order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues
between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases.—It is hornbook principle that when or two or
more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject
matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to
serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between
them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of
avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in
two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single
suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which
provides: SEC. 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
or delay.
Page 278 of 682

G.R. No. 173154. December 9, 2013.*

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK JANG, JISSO JANG,
WISSO JANG, and NORBERTO TADEO, petitioners, vs. SANGWOO
PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION–OLALIA, represented by
PORFERIA SALIBONGCOGON,1 respondents.
G.R. No. 173229. December 9, 2013.*
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA,
represented by PORFERIA SALIBONGCOGON, petitioners, vs.
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK JANG, JISSO JANG,
WISSO JANG, and NORBERTO TADEO, respondents.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Closure of Business; Closure of
business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims
to prevent further financial drain upon an employer who cannot pay
anymore his employees since business has already stopped.—Closure of
business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there is a
complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up
of the doors of establishment, usually due to financial losses. Closure of
business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims
to prevent further financial drain upon an employer who cannot pay
anymore his employees since business has already stopped. In such a
case, the employer is generally required to give separation benefits to
its employees, unless the closure is due to serious business losses.
Same; Same; Same; Article 297 of the Labor Code provides that before
any employee is terminated due to closure of business, it must give a
one (1) month prior written notice to the employee and to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).— Article 297 of the
Labor Code provides that before any employee is terminated due to
closure of business, it must give a one (1) month prior written notice to
the employee and to the DOLE. In this relation, case law instructs that it
is the personal right of the employee to be personally informed of his
proposed dismissal as well as the reasons therefor; and such
requirement of notice is not a mere technicality or formality which the
employer may dispense with. Since the purpose of previous notice is to,
among others, give the employee some time to prepare for the eventual
loss of his job, the employer has the positive duty to inform each and
every employee of their impending termination of employment. To this
end, jurisprudence states that an employer’s act of posting notices to
this effect in conspicuous areas in the workplace is not enough. Verily,
for something as significant as the involuntary loss of one’s
employment, nothing less than an individually addressed notice of
dismissal supplied to each worker is proper.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Based on existing jurisprudence,
an employer which has a valid cause for dismissing its employee but
conducts the dismissal with procedural infirmity is liable to pay the
employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 if the ground
for dismissal is a just cause, or the amount of P50,000.00 if the ground
Page 279 of 682
for dismissal is an authorized cause. However, case law exhorts that in

instances where the payment of such damages becomes impossible,
unjust, or too burdensome, modification becomes necessary in order to
harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances.—It is well
to stress that while SPI had a valid ground to terminate its employees,
i.e., closure of business, its failure to comply with the proper procedure
for termination renders it liable to pay the employee nominal damages
for such omission. Based on existing jurisprudence, an employer which
has a valid cause for dismissing its employee but conducts the dismissal
with procedural infirmity is liable to pay the employee nominal damages
in the amount of P30,000.00 if the ground for dismissal is a just cause,
or the amount of P50,000.00 if the ground for dismissal is an authorized
cause. However, case law exhorts that in instances where the payment
of such damages becomes impossible, unjust, or too burdensome,
modification becomes necessary in order to harmonize the disposition
with the prevailing circumstances. Thus, in the case of Industrial Timber
Corporation v. Ababon, 480 SCRA 181 (2006), (Industrial Timber), the
Court reduced the amount of nominal damages awarded to employees
from P50,000.00 to P10,000.00 since the authorized cause of
termination was the employer’s closure or cessation of business which
was done in good faith and due to circumstances beyond the
employer’s control.
Page 280 of 682

G.R. No. 207949. July 23, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO
DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON,
accused-appellants.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Well-settled is the rule that the
question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine.—Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its assessment of
the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or
that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering
all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations.—Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the
RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy
exists when two or more person s come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when
conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is
collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless
of the extent of their respective participations. In this relation, direct
proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed
from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action, and community of interests. Hence, as the
factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-appellants
acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that
their acts emanated from the same purpose or common design,
showing unity in its execution, the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly
ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In a criminal case, an
appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.—The Court is, however, constrained to
modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-
appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear,
merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of
the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a)
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specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established

during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among
the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case,
an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for
review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned,
that may be found in the appealed judgment.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Death Penalty; The enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty.—
Further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction
must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which
carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA
9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means
that the accusedappellants could, as the CA and trial court properly
ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this,
the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, moral
damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention.— Similarly, the
Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case.
Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim’s
family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the
detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the
victim.
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages must be
awarded in this case in order to deter others from committing the same
atrocious acts.—Exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in
view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in
order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the family of the
kidnap victim.
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G.R. No. 205952. February 11, 2015.*

ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR., petitioner, vs. ERWIN
YERRO, ERICO YERRO and RITCHIE YERRO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; A dismissal
grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has
the effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the
accused for the same offense.—At the outset, it must be borne in mind
that a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to
speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would bar the further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. In People v. Judge
Hernandez, 499 SCRA 688 (2006), the Court explained the parameters
of this rule: As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring
error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.
Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case by
the trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there
was denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is
so as while it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the
prosecution appeals a [D]ecision acquitting the accused, an acquittal
rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and therefore does not terminate
the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void
indictment. In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases
against private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial.
In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of
the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and
the court reset the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim
double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final
and cannot be reconsidered.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While the remedy of certiorari
may be availed of in order to challenge the judgment or order of
acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—While the
remedy of certiorari may be availed of in order to challenge the
judgment or order of acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Under its classic formulation, grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse
of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
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act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted

without jurisdiction.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Provisional Dismissals; The provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to
the reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court; Requisites of.—The provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement
thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
reads: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Under the
aforecited provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following
requisites concur: (a) The prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin
perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for
its provisional dismissal; (b) The offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (c) The court issues an Order
granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (d) The
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
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G.R. No. 196231. September 4, 2012.*

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR.
ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITO D.
CATAYONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 196232. September 4, 2012.*

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.
SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., in their
capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF
MALACAÑANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, respondents.
Ombudsman; Administrative Law; While Section 21 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand,
grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.—While the Ombuds man’s
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of
congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject
to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21
declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Statutory Construction; A construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.—It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should
be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in
truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
Page 285 of 682

Ombudsman; Administrative Law; The Ombudsman is possessed of

jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative
sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service. However, it is equally without question that the President
has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
conditions.—Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of
jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative
sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service. However, it is equally without question that the President
has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of
jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a
case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the
Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner
through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President’s
assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge
involved “demanding and soliciting a sum of money” which constitutes
either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds
reserved for the President’s exercise of his authority to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman.
Presidency; Power to Remove; As a general rule, all officers appointed
by the President are also removable by him except when the law
expressly provides otherwise—that is, when the power to remove is
expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing
power.—Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries
with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers
appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to
this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—that is, when the
power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than
the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President’s power to appoint.
Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of
the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article
XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme
Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel
(Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the
Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the
Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be
appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but
may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
Constitutional Law; Deputy Ombudsman; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A.
No. 6770); Impeachment; Paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770
states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the
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same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through

impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust.”—Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the
Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary
acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the
President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman
must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.
Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770
states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the
same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
trust.” Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that
matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection
of the independence of the Ombudsman’s Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only
be had on grounds provided by law.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Administrative decisions in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof
of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.—The invariable rule
is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud, or error of law. In the instant case, while the evidence may show
some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court
seriously doubts the correctness of the OP’s conclusion that the
imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct
constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner’s offenses,
as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of
public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature’s
intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the
Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only
for the most serious violations that justify the removal by impeachment
of the highest officials of the land.
Constitutional Law; Impeachment; Betrayal of Public Trust; Words and
Phrases; Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment
under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and
other high crimes.—Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for
impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing
grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad
enough to cover any violation of the oath of office, the impreciseness of
its definition also created apprehension that “such an overarching
standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary
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exercise by the legislature.” Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of

public trust that referred to “all acts not punishable by statutes as penal
offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office”
could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence
in office.
Same; Same; Deputy Ombudsman; Special Prosecutors; A Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers.—A
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable
officers. However, by providing for their removal from office on the
same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not
have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less
stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of
impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing
and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes
of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office.
Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made
statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of
their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could
not suddenly “overreach” to cover acts that are not vicious or
malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
Administrative Law; Ineptitude; Neglect of Duty; The disciplining
authority’s finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the
prosecution in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the
government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds “grossly disadvantageous,” could result in
administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea
bargaining agreement entered into.—While the court’s determination of
the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing
prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority’s
determination of the prosecutor’s administrative liability is based on
whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious
consideration of the government’s best interest and the diligent and
efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute
crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority’s
finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the
prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-
Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in
this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds
“grossly disadvantageous,” could result in administrative liability,
notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement
entered into.
Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Plea bargaining is allowable when
the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the accused of the crime charged.—Plea bargaining is allowable when
the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the accused of the crime charged. However, if the basis for the
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allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then

it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution promulgated on
January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of
twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that “the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by
the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of
bail.” Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the
OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Major
General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a
conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the
“standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to
an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.” Hence, in light of
the apparently strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the
disciplining authority would be hardpressed not to look into the whys
and wherefores of the prosecution’s turnabout in the case.
Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; View that the Supreme Court cannot
assume that the independence of the Ombudsman is the same as the
independence of the Judiciary. Neither is the independence of the
Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the National Economic
and Development Authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the
Commission on Human Rights.—Our Constitution does not impart a
fixed and rigid concept of independence among the offices that it
creates. While it declares certain bodies as “‘independent”, we cannot
assume that the independence of the Ombudsman is the same as the
independence of the Judiciary. Neither is the independence of the
Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the National Economic
and Development Authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the
Commission on Human Rights. This Court cannot make a “one size fits
all” concept of independence because the Constitution itself
differentiates the degree of independence of these bodies.
Same; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770); View that Section 8(2)
of the Ombudsman Act does not violate the Constitution; One of the
constitutive principles of our constitutional structure is the system of
checks and balances — a check that is not within a body, but outside of
it.—I agree with the ponencia that Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act
does not violate the Constitution. The constitutional principle of
independence does not obviate the possibility of a check from another
body. After all, one of the constitutive principles of our constitutional
structure is the system of checks and balances—a check that is not
within a body, but outside of it. This is how our democracy operates—on
the basis of distrust.
Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that Section 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution prescribes how all public officers and employees,
both impeachable and non-impeachable, may be removed.—Section 2,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution prescribes how all public officers and
employees, both impeachable and non-impeachable, may be removed.
Section 2 provides: The President, the Vice President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
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and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,

and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Same; Same; View that Congress, pursuant to Section 2, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution and in the exercise of its plenary power, enacted
the Ombudsman Act, conferring on the President the power to remove
the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor as provided in
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.—The Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor are not among the impeachable officers under the
1987 Constitution. Thus, as expressly provided in Section 2, Article XI of
the Constitution, they “may be removed from office as provided by law.”
Congress, pursuant to this constitutional provision and in the exercise of
its plenary power, enacted the Ombudsman Act, conferring on the
President the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor as provided in Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.
Same; Same; View that pursuant to Section 8(2) and Section 21 of the
Ombudsman Act, the legislative intent is to grant concurrent jurisdiction
to the President and the Ombudsman in the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.—In view of Section 8(2) and
Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act, the legislative intent is to grant
concurrent jurisdiction to the President and the Ombudsman in the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. An
“endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law x x x so
that each shall be effective.” This is not a hollow precept of statutory
construction. This is based not only on democratic principle but also on
the separation of powers, that this Court should not be so casual in
voiding the acts of the popularly elected legislature unless there is a
clear violation of the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that any reading of the 1987 Constitution does
not warrant the conclusion that all bodies declared by the Constitution
as “independent” have exclusive disciplinary authority over all their
respective officials and employees. Unlike the Judiciary where such
exclusivity is expressly provided for in the Constitution, there is no
reason to read such provision in the Ombudsman where the
Constitution is silent.—Any reading of the 1987 Constitution does not
warrant the conclusion that all bodies declared by the Constitution as
“independent” have exclusive disciplinary authority over all their
respective officials and employees. Unlike the Judiciary where such
exclusivity is expressly provided for in the Constitution, there is no
reason to read such provision in the Ombudsman where the
Constitution is silent. On the contrary, the constitutional provision that
non-impeachable officers and employees “may be removed from office
as provided by law” removes any doubt that Congress can determine
the mode of removal of non-impeachable officers and employees of
“independent” bodies other than the Judiciary. An “independent” body
does not have exclusive disciplinary authority over its officials and
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employees unless the Constitution expressly so provides, as in the case

of the Judiciary.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; View that there is no office that is
insulated from a possible correction from another office. The executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government operate through the
system of checks and balances.—A completely “independent” body is
alien to our constitutional system. There is no office that is insulated
from a possible correction from another office. The executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government operate through the system of
checks and balances. All independent constitutional bodies are subject
to review by the courts. A fiscally autonomous body is subject to audit
by the Commission on Audit, and Congress cannot be compelled to
appropriate a bigger budget than that of the previous fiscal year.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Ombudsman is not
constitutionally empowered to act alone. Congress can even authorize
the Department of Justice or the Office of the President to investigate
cases within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.— Clearly, the
Ombudsman is not constitutionally empowered to act alone. Congress
can even authorize the Department of Justice or the Office of the
President to investigate cases within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Similarly, the Ombudsman can investigate public officers and
employees ho are under the disciplinary authority of heads of other
bodies or agencies. The cases cited in the ponencia, i.e. Hagad v. Gozo-
Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 (1995), and Office the Ombudsman v. Delijero,
Jr., 634 SCRA 135 (2010)—illustrate that concurrent jurisdiction does not
impair the independence of the Ombudsman. Duplication of functions
may not at all times promote efficiency, but it is not proscribed y the
Constitution.
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; View that the Ombudsman’s duty to
protect the people from unjust, illegal and inefficient acts of all public
officials emanates from Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution.—The
Ombudsman’s duty to protect the people from unjust, illegal and
inefficient acts of all public officials emanates from Section 12, Article XI
of the Constitution. These broad powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members
of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
Same; Checks and Balances; View that as a checks and balance
mechanism, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and their
implementing laws provide measures to check on the “independence”
granted to the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of all legal
questions, may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions
and the Office of the Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse
of discretion.—The independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, by the Constitutional Commissions, and by the Judiciary
shares certain characteristics—they do not owe their existence to any
act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
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they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. For most, if not for all of these
“independent” bodies, the framers of the Constitution intended that
they be insulated from political pressure. As a checks and balance
mechanism, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and their
implementing laws provide measures to check on the “independence”
granted to the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of all legal
questions, may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions
and the Office of the Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse
of discretion. Of course, foisted over the Members of the Supreme Court
is the power of impeachment that Congress has the authority to initiate,
and carry into its logical end a meritorious impeachment case. Such is
the symmetry that our Constitution provides for the harmonious
balance of all its component and “independent” parts.
Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that the absence of a
constitutional provision providing for the removal of the Commissioners
and Deputy Ombudsmen does not mean that Congress can empower
the President to discipline or remove them in violation of the
independence that the Constitution textually and expressly provides.—
The President can appoint Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman and her Deputies, but
the Constitution categorically provides that the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman can only be removed
by impeachment. The absence of a constitutional provision providing for
the removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen does not
mean that Congress can empower the President to discipline or remove
them in violation of the independence that the Constitution textually
and expressly provides. As members of independent constitutional
bodies, they should be similarly treated as lower court judges, subject
to discipline only by the head of their respective offices and subject to
the general power of the Ombudsman to dismiss officials and
employees within the government for cause. No reason exists to treat
them differently.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot simply construe
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution to be a blanket authority for
Congress to empower the President to remove all other public officers
and employees, including those under the independent constitutional
bodies.—While I agree with Justice Carpio’s opinion that the Constitution
empowered Congress to determine the manner and causes for the
removal of nonimpeachable officers, we cannot simply construe Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution to be a blanket authority for Congress to
empower the President to remove all other public officers and
employees, including those under the independent constitutional
bodies. When the Constitution states that Congress may provide for the
removal of public officers and employees by law, it does not mean that
the law can violate the provisions and principles laid out in the
Constitution.
ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Page 292 of 682

Constitutional Law; Removal of Public Officers; Ombudsman; View that

with the exception of those who are removable only by impeachment,
the Office of the Ombudsman can investigate and take action against
any appointive or elected official for corruption in office, be they
Congressmen, Senators, Department Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or
Barangay Captains.—The Constitution has reasons for making the Office
of the Ombudsman “independent.” Its primordial duty is to investigate
and discipline all elective and appointive government officials.
Specifically, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution vests in that Office
the absolute power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance, or
non-feasance of public officers or employees. This function places it a
notch higher than other grievance-handling, investigating bodies. With
the exception of those who are removable only by impeachment, the
Office of the Ombudsman can investigate and take action against any
appointive or elected official for corruption in office, be they
Congressmen, Senators, Department Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or
Barangay Captains.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Impeachment; View that the power
to impeach is a function of check and balance under the Constitution.
But the power to remove “public officers and employees” from office, in
the realm of administrative law, is a function of supervision, if not
control.—The power to impeach is a function of check and balance
under the Constitution. But the power to remove “public officers and
employees” from office, in the realm of administrative law, is a function
of supervision, if not control. Keeping the Deputies in the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor independent as the
Constitution commands and subjecting them to the President’s control
or supervision are incompatible ideas.
Page 293 of 682

A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013.*

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3662-P) MARIANO T. ONG,
complainant, vs. EVA G. BASIYASARATAN, CLERK OF COURT,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 32, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Clerks of Court; Clerks of Court are
primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court
processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their
work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and
the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders,
and giving certified copies of records upon request.—Section 1, Canon
IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to
perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times.
Clerks of Court like respondent are primarily responsible for the speedy
and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they
cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with
the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing
processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of
records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high
degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions
to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-
bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of her
officially-designated duties as clerk of court, 18 failing which, warrants
the imposition of administrative sanctions.—As an officer of the court,
respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing
which, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case,
respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of execution to
implement the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite orders from
the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard
of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and
processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in
clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the charges.
Page 294 of 682

G.R. No. 193960. January 7, 2013.*

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA.
ANGELICA T. PARASQUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1
respondents.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Their Children; Republic Act
No. 9262; The law on violence against women and their children is
broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or
her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with
whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has
a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm
or suffering.— Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—
As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children”
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. The law is broad in scope but
specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the
woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had
sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Same; Same; Same; In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592 (2010)
the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment.—In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592
(2010), the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The
offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Same; Same; Same; While it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to
be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship.—Notably, while it is required that the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
Page 295 of 682
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law

can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence
against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and
give credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should
be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent is to purposely impose a
more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically
harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating
relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the
protection of women and children.—Neither can the Court construe the
statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While
the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for
prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent
is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose
violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a
sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view
of promoting the protection of women and children.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Amendment of
Pleadings; Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.—Sec. 14 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in
directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion
to quash the same.
Page 296 of 682

G.R. No. 197442. October 22, 2014.*

MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
Jose D. Tito, respondent. CORNELIO MENDOZA and PAULINA
CRUZ, petitionersintervenors, vs. JOSE NAZAL and ROSITA
NAZAL, respondents-intervenors.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Intervention; Case law states
that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary
and supplemental to the existing litigation.— Case law states that
intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but
merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a certain
right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be
joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. In other
words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the
original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has
ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently,
the right of intervention ceases.
Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The
expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as
the court.—While Sps. Nazal moved to set the case for pretrial on
December 9, 1987, no further action was taken by them after the court
a quo failed to calendar the case and set the same for pretrial.
Disconcerting is the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven (11)
years, or on October 20, 1998 to move for the setting of the case for
hearing, as they were apparently compelled to act only upon the threat
of being dispossessed of the subject property with the filing of the
unlawful detainer case by the new registered owners, Sps. Lim. Notably,
while under both the present and the old Rules of Court, the clerk of
court has the duty to set the case for pretrial, the same does not
relieve the plaintiffs of their own duty to prosecute the case diligently.
Truth be told, the expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of
the plaintiff as the court.
Page 297 of 682

G.R. No. 203760. December 3, 2014.*

HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural
guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA, petitioner, vs. SUSAN
LUMONTAD, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; In forcible entry, the
complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a
land or building has been deprived of that possession by another
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.— As explicated
in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 662 SCRA 14 (2011), “[t]he invariable
rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary
remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint
must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or
building has been deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that
the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took
place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege
that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical
possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as
long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; Jurisdiction; Municipal Trial Courts; Even
in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to
make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
the issue of possession.— Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by express provision of
Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule
70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as
they are given the authority to make an initial determination of
ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It must be
clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.
Page 298 of 682

G.R. No. 204745. December 8, 2014.*

MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, petitioner, vs.
Taxation; Tax Refunds; During the period December 10, 2003 (when
Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to
October 6, 2010 (when the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
[Aichi], 632 SCRA 422 [2010], case was promulgated), taxpayers-
claimants need not observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period
before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input Value-
Added Tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after
the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6,
2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.—Recently, in Taganito Mining
Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the
pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632
SCRA 422 [2010], and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA
336 (2013), cases in the following manner: Reconciling the
pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must
therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi
case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-
day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input
VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e.,
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case, records disclose
that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for
refund/credit of its input VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 on December 28,
2009 and March 30, 2010, respectively, or during the period when BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to
October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the 120-
day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is
deemed timely filed. In view of the foregoing, both the CTA Division and
the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s claim on the
ground of prematurity.
Page 299 of 682

G.R. No. 208261. December 8, 2014.*

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. LORENIA P. DE GUZMAN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, an appeal is
not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may
only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules;
However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict application of
the rules in perfecting an appeal, such as when said appeal is
meritorious.—As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a
mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only be availed in the
manner provided by the law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to
exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost. Therefore, an appeal must be
perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory. However, as in all cases,
there are exceptions to the strict application of the rules in perfecting
an appeal, such as when said appeal is meritorious. Verily, strict
implementation of the rules on appeals must give way to the factual
and legal reality that is evident from the records of the case. After all,
the primary objective of the laws is to dispense justice and equity, not
the contrary.
Administrative Proceedings; Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service; Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in administrative
disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the
employee concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or
omissions complained of, and directing him to answer the charges
stated therein.—Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in administrative
disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the
employee concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or
omissions complained of, and directing him to answer the charges
stated therein, viz.: Section 16. Formal Charge.—After a finding of a
prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the
person complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification of
charge(s), a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied
by certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn
statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a directive to answer
the charge(s) in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in
his answer whether or not he elects a formal investigation of the
charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to be assisted by a counsel of
his choice.
Same; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is the proper
disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees, and as such, formal
charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary
Page 300 of 682
proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors.—In

the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that
appointed De Guzman to her position. Adhering to the well-settled
principle that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has the
power to discipline or remove De Guzman for any transgressions she
may have committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR may only act
through its Board of Directors as a collective body, which is vested with
the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate powers under the
law. Simply put, PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR
employees, and as such, formal charges against its employees in
administrative disciplinary proceedings should emanate from it, through
its Board of Directors, as in this case.
Page 301 of 682

G.R. No. 208890. December 8, 2014.*

JOEL N. MONTALLANA, petitioner, vs. LA CONSOLACION
COLLEGE MANILA, SR. IMELDA A. MORA, and ALBERT D.
MANALILI,** respondents.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; “Willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work” is one of the just causes to
terminate an employee under Article 296(a) (formerly Article 282[a]) of
the Labor Code. —“Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work” is
one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296(a)
(formerly Article 282[a]) of the Labor Code. In order for this ground to
be properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal, the conduct must be
willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and
perverse mental attitude. In Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders
Co., Inc., 704 SCRA 56 (2013), “willfulness” was described as “attended
by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s
act inconsistent with proper subordination.” It is well to stress that it is
the employer who bears the burden of proving, through substantial
evidence, that the aforesaid just cause — or any other authorized cause
for that matter — forms the basis of the employee’s dismissal from
work. Failing in which, the dismissal should be adjudged as illegal.
Same; Same; Same; The case of an employee who is compelled to
apologize for a previous infraction but fails to do so is not one which
would properly warrant his termination, absent any proof that the
refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his employer.— Even on the
assumption that there was willful disobedience, still, the Court finds the
penalty of dismissal too harsh. It bears to stress that not every case of
insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee reasonably
deserves the penalty of dismissal. The penalty to be imposed on an
erring employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his offense.
To the Court’s mind, the case of an employee who is compelled to
apologize for a previous infraction but fails to do so is not one which
would properly warrant his termination, absent any proof that the
refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his employer. While there is no
question that teachers are held to a peculiar standard of behavior in
view of their significant role in the rearing of our youth, educational
institutions are, in the meantime, held against a legal standard imposed
against all employers, among which, is the reservation of the ultimate
penalty of dismissal for serious infractions enumerated as just causes
under Article 296 of the Labor Code. Unfortunately, respondents herein
failed to prove the seriousness of Montallana’s omission by the
evidentiary benchmark of substantial evidence. And to add, on a related
note, while La Consolacion’s Administrative Affairs Manual discloses
that acts of insubordination (particularly, that of refusing or neglecting
to obey the school’s lawful directive) are dismissible violations, they are
only so if imposed as a third sanction. In the same vein, records are
Page 302 of 682

bereft of any showing that Montallana’s failure to apologize was being

punished as such.
Corporations; Liability of Corporate Officers; Circumstances When
Personal Liability of Corporate Directors, Trustees or Officers Attaches.—
It is a rule that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or
officers attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of
the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence
in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they
consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having
knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves
personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are
made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their
corporate action. None of these circumstances, insofar as Mora and
Manalili are concerned, were shown to be present in this case; hence,
there is no reason for them to be held liable for Montallana’s
backwages.
Page 303 of 682

G.R. No. 209386. December 8, 2014.*

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Elements of.—The elements of Qualified
Theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal
property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be
done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner’s consent; (e)
it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.—Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence
suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at
the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Same; Same; Flight; While it is true that flight per se is not synonymous
with guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience, especially when taken together with all
the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case.—Threading
these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture
that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that
Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure, this determination is
not sullied by the fact that Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had died
before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former
had threatened him with a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping
hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under
Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not
proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and
merely banked on a general denial, which, as case law holds, is an
inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted.
With these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not
returned or reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court
draws no other reasonable inference other than that which points to his
Page 304 of 682
guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience, especially when taken together with all
the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all things
considered, Candelaria’s conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft
stands. Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Penalties; The imposable penalty
for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing
stolen.—The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends
upon the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the stolen
property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309
and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v.
Anabe, 566 SCRA 92 (2008), that the prosecution must present more
than a mere uncorroborated “estimate.” In the absence of independent
and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply
the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property
taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. In Merida v.
People (Merida), 554 SCRA 366 (2008), which applied the doctrine
enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator), 344 SCRA 222 (2000), the Court
deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at
the time of the commission of its theft, as such evidence would be
“unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and
competent source of such information.”
Page 305 of 682

G.R. No. 210148. December 8, 2014.*

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Civil Liability; Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable; The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged,
however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.—Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of
an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA
387 (2001), the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal
recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability
of the accused, as follows: Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal,
with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; In case of an acquittal,
the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment
state “whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
Page 306 of 682

G.R. No. 209295. February 11, 2015.*

DIANA YAP-CO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY and
ESTER GO-UY, respondents.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Relief is accorded to the client who suffered by
reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence and where the
interest of justice so requires.—Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by the court.” However, the application of
the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this case
since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted
negligently in failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even
notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to travel all the
way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Verily,
relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s
palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so
requires. Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that respondents
would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their
claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case — on a procedural technicality
at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their
counsel — is sustained. Considering that respondents appear to have
legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would better serve the
higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting
claims to be resolved on the merits.
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Fundamental is the rule
that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action
refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading.—It bears pointing out
that while the RTC dismissed the case impliedly by reason of
respondents’ repeated failure to appear in court and prosecute their
case, it also inaccurately expressed the view that such dismissal may
properly be taken as its favorable action on peti tioner’s standing
motion to dismiss. The Court takes note, however, that the cited motion
to dismiss was not premised on the respondents’ failure to prosecute
their case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on
failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency of the
pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence
of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) the
legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant;
and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. If
these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not
be dismissed. In this case, the Court finds that the subject complaint
sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of petitioner in procuring
her title to the subject property to the prejudice of respondents who
Page 307 of 682
claim to have acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to

state a cause of action was improper.
Page 308 of 682

G.R. No. 204672. February 18, 2015.*

SPOUSES RODOLFO and MARCELINA GUEVARRA, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMONER LENDING CORPORATION, INC., respondent.
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Rural Banks Act; In an
extrajudicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent,
the mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the
date of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under
Republic Act (RA) No. 720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural
Banks Act, or within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate
of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks
pursuant to Act No. 3135.—In an extrajudicial foreclosure of registered
land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor may redeem the
property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the land is
mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as
amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks Act, or within one (1)
year from the registration of the certificate of sale if the land is
mortgaged to parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If
the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the
aforementioned redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, which states: SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Same; Redemption; The Supreme Court (SC) has rules that
redemptions from lending or credit institutions, like The Commoner
Lending Corporation, Inc. (TCLC), are governed by Section 78 of the
General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law of
2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the
proper redemption price when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or
credit institution.—The Court has, however, ruled that redemptions from
lending or credit institutions, like TCLC, are governed by Section 78 of
the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law of
2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the
proper redemption price when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or
credit institution.
Interest Rates; In a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has
affirmed that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month
and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant,
hence, illegal and void for being contrary to morals.— The Court notes
that the stipulated three percent (3%) monthly interest is excessive and
unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that
stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, hence, illegal and
void for being contrary to morals.
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Redemption; In addition to
the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all
the expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee,
Page 309 of 682
and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with Section 47 of the General Banking

Law of 2000.—In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase
price should also include all the expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial
Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with
Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000. Considering further that
Sps. Guevarra failed to redeem the subject property within the one-year
reglementary period, they are liable to reimburse TCLC for the
corresponding Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) and Capital Gains Tax
(CGT) it paid pursuant to Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue
Regulations No. 4-99, which requires the payment of DST on
extrajudicial foreclosure sales of capital assets initiated by banks,
finance and insurance companies, as well as CGT in cases of non-
redemption. CGT and DST are expenses incident to TCLC’s custody of
the subject property, hence, likewise due, under the above provision of
law.
Page 310 of 682

G.R. No. 212151. February 18, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAY HINLO
a.k.a. “INDAY KABANG” – (at large), accused, RICHARD PALMA
y VARCAS a.k.a. “INDAY ATET,” RUVICO SENIDO y HAMAYBAY
a.k.a. “RUBY,” and EDGAR PED ROSO y PALASOL a.k.a. “LIBAT,”
accused appellants.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that the Supreme Court (SC) will evaluate the factual
findings of the court below.—It is settled that in criminal cases, factual
findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and
respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters,
that the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below.
Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
Criminal Law; Robbery With Homicide; Elements of.—In People v. Uy,
649 SCRA 236 (2011), the Court explained that the elements for the
crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the
property belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo lucrandi or with
intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
homicide was committed. A conviction requires that the robbery is the
main purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery.
Same; Same; Conspiracy having been established, when a homicide
takes place by reason of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there
is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.—It is settled
that the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their
defense of alibi considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is
considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot outweigh the
testimony of eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants
committed the crime. Moreover, conspiracy having been established,
when a homicide takes place by reason of or on occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
Page 311 of 682

G.R. No. 206942. February 25, 2015.*

VICENTE C. TATEL, petitioner, vs. JLFP INVESTIGATION SECURITY
AGENCY, INC., JOSE LUIS F. PAMINTUAN, and/or PAOLO C.
TURNO, respondents.
Certiorari; It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court (SC) being bound by the
findings of fact made by the appellate court; Exceptions.—It is a well-
settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the appellate
court. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower court. The rule, however, is not
without exception. In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 460 SCRA 220
(2005), the Court recognized the following exceptions to the general
rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal;
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain, on the part of the employer has become so
unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego
continued employment, or when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay.—Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain, on the part of the employer has become so
unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego
continued employment, or when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay.
Same; Same; Abandonment; To constitute abandonment, two (2)
elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the
Page 312 of 682
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more

determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.—In this
regard, the Court concurs with the finding of the NLRC that respondents
failed to establish that Tatel abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest
his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have abandoned his
work, and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to
return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.—Tatel
refuted respondents’ allegation that he did not heed their directive to
return to work following his receipt of the November 26, 2009
Memorandum. The Court finds no compelling reason not to give
credence to such rebuff, especially in light of the filing of the instant
complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps
to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have
abandoned his work, and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of
his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment. As the Court sees it, it is simply incongruent for Tatel to
refuse any offer of an assignment and thereafter, seek redress by filing
a case for illegal dismissal.
Same; Strained Relations; Separation Pay; As reinstatement is no longer
feasible in this case because of the strained relations between the
parties and the fact that Tatel had since been employed with another
company, separation pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement.—The CA
therefore erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC which, in fact, correctly found Tatel to have been illegally
dismissed. Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; this is clearly not the case with respect to the
pronouncement of the NLRC here. In consequence of the foregoing,
Tatel is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However, as
reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case because of the strained
relations between the parties and the fact that Tatel had since been
employed with another company, separation pay is awarded in lieu of
reinstatement. On the matter of the computation of the monetary
awards, the Court delegates and defers the same to the NLRC, being a
matter falling within its expertise.
Page 313 of 682

G.R. No. 212565. February 25, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN
CASAS y VINTULAN, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; There can be no
self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against
the person who resorted to self-defense.— Preliminarily, Casas failed to
prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which
is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense
unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to selfdefense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who
was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife,
brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again
on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and
overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that
there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the
contrary happened in this case.
Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that the moment the first
aggressor runs away unlawful aggression on the part of the first
aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed.—It bears
clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not
indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against
the latter considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl
and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled that the moment the
first aggressor runs away — if and so such was the case with respect to
Eligio — unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to
exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation,
and not self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured
party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was
injured by the accused.
Same; Murder; Elements of.—The elements of Murder that the
prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; To appreciate treachery,
it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed,
Page 314 of 682
treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and

convincing evidence.—Among the qualifying circumstances thus
enumerated in Article 248 is treachery. Under Article 14 of the RPC,
“[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.” In other words, to appreciate treachery, it
must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed,
treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
Page 315 of 682

G.R. No. 183553. November 12, 2012.*

DIAGEO PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
Taxation; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The Court has categorically declared
that “[t]he proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax
is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by
law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to
another.”—The phrase “any excise tax paid thereon shall be credited or
refunded” requires that the claimant be the same person who paid the
excise tax. In Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 544 SCRA 100 (2008), the Court has categorically declared
that “[t]he proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax
is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by
law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to
another.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of
the Tax Code are taxes on property which are imposed on “goods
manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or
consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported.”—
Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on
property which are imposed on “goods manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other
disposition and to things imported.” Though excise taxes are paid by
the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from
the place of production or by the owner or importer before the release
of imported articles from the customs house, the same partake of the
nature of indirect taxes when it is passed on to the subsequent
purchaser.
Same; Same; Same; Indirect Taxes; Indirect taxes are defined as those
wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but
the burden thereof can be shifted to another person.— Indirect taxes
are defined as those wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls
on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person.
When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the
tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the
price of goods sold or services rendered. Accordingly, when the excise
taxes paid by the supplier were passed on to Diageo, what was shifted
is not the tax per se but an additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the
supplier remains the statutory taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser,
actually shoulders the burden of tax.
Same; Taxpayer; Words and Phrases; As defined in Section 22(N) of the
Tax Code, a taxpayer means any person subject to tax. —As defined in
Section 22(N) of the Tax Code, a taxpayer means any person subject to
tax. He is, therefore, the person legally liable to file a return and pay the
tax as provided for in Section 130(A). As such, he is the person entitled
to claim a refund.
Page 316 of 682

Same; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The person entitled to claim a tax
refund is the statutory taxpayer or the person liable for or subject to
tax.—The person entitled to claim a tax refund is the statutory taxpayer
or the person liable for or subject to tax. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the supplier of Diageo imported the subject raw alcohol,
hence, it was the one directly liable and obligated to file a return and
pay the excise taxes under the Tax Code before the goods or products
are removed from the customs house. It is, therefore, the statutory
taxpayer as contemplated by law and remains to be so, even if it shifts
the burden of tax to Diageo. Consequently, the right to claim a refund, if
legally allowed, belongs to it and cannot be transferred to another, in
this case Diageo, without any clear provision of law allowing the same.
Same; Tax Exemptions; Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed
stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.—Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A
claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and based on language in
law too plain to be mistaken. Unfortunately, Diageo failed to meet the
burden of proof that it is covered by the exemption granted under
Section 130(D) of the Tax Code. In sum, Diageo, not being the party
statutorily liable to pay excise taxes and having failed to prove that it is
covered by the exemption granted under Section 130(D) of the Tax
Code, is not the proper party to claim a refund or credit of the excise
taxes paid on the ingredients of its exported locally produced liquor.
Page 317 of 682

G.R. No. 189984. November 12, 2012.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ, RICHARD B.
LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE
LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON, respondents.
Civil Law; Wills; Testamentary Succession; Attestation Clause; The law is
clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.—The law is clear that
the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial
compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually
consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through
the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Page 318 of 682

G.R. No. 192975. November 12, 2012.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 3, petitioner, vs. ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, respondent.
Page 319 of 682

G.R. No. 192994. November 12, 2012.*

SAMAHANG KABUHAYAN NG SAN LORENZO KKK, INC.,
represented by its Vice President Zenaida Turla, petitioner, vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motions to Dismiss; Interlocutory Orders; As a
general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in
a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the
denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.—An
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that the
nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such
action are to be determined from the material allegations of the
complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the
character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims averred.—It is axiomatic that the
nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such
action are to be determined from the material allegations of the
complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the
character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the
complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
Page 320 of 682

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336. November 20, 2012.*

JOCELYN C. TALENS-DABON, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERMIN E.
ARCEO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, respondent. RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
OF THEN JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO.
Administrative Law; Judges; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines Laid Down by
the Supreme Court in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.―In A.M.
No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA
534 (2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit: 1. There must be proof of remorse
and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity.
A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The age of the person
asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship
and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be
other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
(Citations omitted)
Same; Same; Same; In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 239 SCRA 268 (1994), the
Court lifted the penalty of disqualification imposed against the
respondent judge found guilty of immorality after he showed sincere
repentance and taking into account his contributions during his tenure
in the judiciary.―Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
reformation after his dismissal from the service meriting the Court’s
liberality. While it may be conceded that respondent at 71 years old had
already reached retirement age and can no longer be eligible for regular
employment in the public service, yet, considering his achievements
and mental aptitude, it cannot be doubted that he could still be of
service to the government in some other capacity. In Castillo v. Calanog,
Jr., 239 SCRA 268 (1994), the Court lifted the penalty of disqualification
imposed against the respondent judge found guilty of immorality after
he showed sincere repentance and taking into account his contributions
during his tenure in the judiciary. In Re: Conviction of Imelda B. Fortus,
Clerk III, RTC, Br. 40, Calapan City for the Crime of Violation of B.P. 22,
461 SCRA 231 (2005), the Court dismissed the errant probationer-
employee on the ground that the crime she committed involved moral
turpitude but at the same time decreed that “she may be allowed to re-
enter the government service if she can prove that she is fit to serve
again.”
Page 321 of 682
Same; Same; Same; Accrued Leaves; Penalties; Forfeiture of Benefits;

Section 11, paragraph 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court explicitly
exempts accrued leave credits from the forfeiture of benefits.―On
respondent’s request for payment of accrued leave credits during his
tenure in the government, Section 11, paragraph 1 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court explicitly exempts accrued leave credits from the
forfeiture of benefits, thus: Section 11. Sanctions.―A. If the respondent
is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, That
the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
Moreover, Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 41,
Series of 1998, as amended by MC No. 14, s. of 1999, provides: Section
37. Payment of terminal leave.―Any official/employee of the
government who retires, voluntarily resigns, or is separated from the
service and who is not otherwise covered by special law, shall be
entitled to the commutation of his leave credits exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and Holidays without limitation and regardless of the period
when the credits were earned. Section 65. Effect of decision in
administrative case.―An official or employee who has been penalized
with dismissal from the service is likewise not barred from entitlement
to his terminal leave benefits. Jurisprudence is likewise replete with
cases wherein dismissed judges and government personnel or officials
were allowed to claim their earned/accrued leave credits and other
monetary benefits.
Page 322 of 682

G.R. No. 192294. November 21, 2012.*

GREAT WHITE SHARK ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. DANILO
M. CARALDE, JR., respondent.
Mercantile Law; Trademarks; A trademark device is susceptible to
registration if it is crafted fancifully or arbitrarily and is capable of
identifying and distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer or seller
from those of another.―A trademark device is susceptible to
registration if it is crafted fancifully or arbitrarily and is capable of
identifying and distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer or seller
from those of another. Apart from its commercial utility, the benchmark
of trademark registrability is distinctiveness. Thus, a generic figure, as
that of a shark in this case, if employed and designed in a distinctive
manner, can be a registrable trademark device, subject to the
provisions of the IP Code.
Same; Same; Dominancy Test; Holistic Test; In determining similarity
and likelihood of confusion, case law has developed the Dominancy Test
and the Holistic or Totality Test.―In determining similarity and likelihood
of confusion, case law has developed the Dominancy Test and the
Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of
the dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause
confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the ordinary
purchaser, and gives more consideration to the aural and visual
impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little
weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market
segments. In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test considers the entirety
of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and
packaging, and focuses not only on the predominant words but also on
the other features appearing on both labels to determine whether one is
confusingly similar to the other as to mislead the ordinary purchaser.
The “ordinary purchaser” refers to one “accustomed to buy, and
therefore to some extent familiar with, the goods in question.”
Page 323 of 682

G.R. No. 212932. January 21, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL
BALUTE y VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It must be stressed that in
criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record.—It must be stressed that
in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters, that the Court will recalibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below. Guided by the
foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; In People v. Ibañez, 698 SCRA
161 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) exhaustively explained that [a]
special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the
robbery.—In People v. Ibañez, 698 SCRA 161 (2013), the Court
exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of robbery with
homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason,
or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery
with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1)
the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to
gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide,
as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery.” Homicide is said to have been
committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b)
to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime.
Same; Alibi; Denials; It is well-settled that “alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying
on the matter.”—In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s
finding that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute
poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical
intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive
identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed
to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both
Page 324 of 682
the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that

“alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.” This is especially true when
the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim — such as Cristita and
Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively —
since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the
victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter
them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.”
Page 325 of 682

G.R. No. 206381. March 25, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL
MATIBAG y DE VILLA @ “DANI” or “DANILO,” accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In the review of a case, the
Supreme Court (SC) is guided by the long-standing principle that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA), deserve great weight and respect.—In the review of a
case, the Court is guided by the longstanding principle that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve
great weight and respect. These factual findings should not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance
that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect
the disposition of the case. The Court has carefully scrutinized the
records and finds no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA’s factual
findings. There is no indication that the trial court, whose findings the
CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial
court on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.
Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.—Matibag is charged with the crime
of Murder, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC,
as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was
killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.—Under Article 14 of the
RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
offended party might make. In People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375 (1999), the
Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked. In People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001), it was
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery.
The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was
so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare
for his or her defense.
Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of.— This
finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-defense.
Page 326 of 682
Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the

commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this
admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the
killing of Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.
Same; Same; Same; Unlawful Aggression; It is well-settled that there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense.—It is well-settled that there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense. Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of
aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Special Aggravating Circumstances;
Use of Unlicensed Firearm; If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.—As the RTC and CA held,
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm,
which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the
imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or
murder as a special aggravating circumstance: Section 1. Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—x
x x. x x x x If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm,
the use thereof was unauthorized under the purview of Republic Act
(RA) 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating
circumstance.—Under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term
“unlicensed firearm” has already been expanded as follows: Sec. 5.
Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm.—The term unlicensed firearm
shall include: 1. firearms with expired license; or 2. unauthorized use of
licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof
was unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally
appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is reduced to
Page 327 of 682
reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346, stands proper. To this, the Court

adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.
Same; Murder; Civil Liability; Liabilities for Death Resulting from Murder.
—Case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder,
the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or
compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary
damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; In line with recent jurisprudence,
civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime and Duhan’s death.—
In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of
P100,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are
awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime and Duhan’s death. Considering further that
the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages in the
sum of P100,000.00 is also granted.
Page 328 of 682

A.M. No. P-14-3281. January 28, 2015.* (formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
12-3998-P)
FELISICIMO** R. SABIJON and ZENAIDA A. SABIJON,
complainants, vs. BENEDICT*** M. DE JUAN, SHERIFF IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO,
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Sheriffs are expected to
know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of
the court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and
should at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the
performance of their duties.—Sheriffs, like respondent being ranking
officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties
with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing writs, as well
as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an
important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law,
high standards are expected of them. They should always hold inviolate
and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. In this
light, sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to
their functions as officers of the court, relative to the implementation of
writs of execution, and should at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating
from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that
warrants disciplinary action, which may be deemed as Simple Neglect
of Duty or even Grave Abuse of Authority.
Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Grave Abuse of Authority; Words and
Phrases; Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee
to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, Grave Abuse of
Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public
officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person
any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty,
severity, or excessive use of authority.—Simple Neglect of Duty is
defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.
On the other hand, Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his
office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.
Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Respondent sheriff should have known
that under Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, he is required to
make a return on the writ of execution and make periodic reports on the
execution proceedings until either the full satisfaction of the judgment
or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, as well as to furnish the parties
copies of such return and periodic reports.—In this case, respondent, as
a Sheriff, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules
Page 329 of 682
of Court, a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay all

or part of the judgment debt, is given the option to choose which
among his properties or a part thereof may be levied upon. Moreover,
respondent should have known that under Section 14 of the same Rule,
he is required to make a return on the writ of execution and make
periodic reports on the execution proceedings until either the full
satisfaction of the judgment or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, as
well as to furnish the parties copies of such return and periodic reports.
Same; Penalties; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service; Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) provides that “[i]f the respondent is
found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.”—Anent the
proper penalty to be meted to respondent, the Court deems it
appropriate to modify the penalty recommended by the OCA. Section
50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) provides that “[i]f the respondent is found guilty of
two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be
that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances.” Under the RRACCS, Grave
Abuse of Authority (or Oppression) is punishable by suspension for a
period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal from service for the second offense, while the
Simple Neglect of Duty is only punishable by suspension for the period
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and
dismissal for the second offense. Hence, the OCA correctly deemed the
former to be the more serious offense, thus rendering the latter offense
as a mere aggravating circumstance.
Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; When a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
mandate.—It bears noting that a Sheriff is a frontline representative of
the justice system in this country. Once he loses the people’s trust, he
diminishes the people’s faith in the judiciary. High standards of conduct
are expected of sheriffs who play an important role in the
administration of justice. They are tasked with the primary duty to
execute final judgments and orders of the courts. When a writ is placed
in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with
its mandate. Doubtless, a sheriff must always act with a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in
accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands
greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an
office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people’s respect and
faith in the judiciary. The conduct of court personnel, therefore, must
not only be, but must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of
impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to
Page 330 of 682
their behavior outside the court. Any act or omission of any court
employee diminishing or tending to diminish public trust and confidence
in the courts will not be tolerated. The Court will not hesitate to impose
the ultimate penalty on those who fall short of their accountabilities.
Page 331 of 682

G.R. No. 196750. March 11, 2015.*

MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE
OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, petitioner, vs.
CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA,
CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, and MAUDE NOBLEZA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Words and
Phrases; An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.—An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought
are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Co-Heirs; All the coheirs and persons having
an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action
for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.—With
regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.
—A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature
and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus,
all the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of the said parties.
Civil Law; Partition; Co-Ownership; In actions for partition, the court
cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of coownership.—Santiago’s
contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of
the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable
parties deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for
partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which
is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Non-
Joinder of Indispensable Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable
Page 332 of 682
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action; The remedy is to

implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.—The CA erred in
ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure
to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of
Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., 695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court definitively
explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or
on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with
the order. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be
indispensable.
Page 333 of 682

G.R. No. 203774. March 11, 2015.*

CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
Taxation; Tax Refunds; In the more recent case of Taganito Mining
Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC)
reconciled the pronouncements in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010) and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690
SCRA 336 (2013), holding that from December 10, 2003 to October 6,
2010 which refers to the interregnum when Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued until the date of promulgation of
Aichi, taxpayer-claimants need not observe the stringent one hundred
twenty (120)-day period; but before and after said window period, the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period remained in
force.—In the more recent case of Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR,
726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the pronouncements in CIR
v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v.
San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), holding that from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 which refers to the interregnum
when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued until the date of
promulgation of Aichi, taxpayer-claimants need not observe the
stringent 120-day period; but before and after said window period, the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period remained in
force, viz.: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque
cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10,
2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010
(when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not
observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund
of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the
aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010),
the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to
the filing of such claim.
Page 334 of 682

G.R. No. 212054. March 11, 2015.*

ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. MARIA
THERESA V. SANCHEZ, respondent.
Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; Among the employer’s
management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or
concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said
rules and to assure that the same would be complied with.— The right
of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called
“management prerogative,” gives employers the freedom to regulate,
according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of
employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes
to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate
business decisions of employers. In fact, labor laws discourage
interference in employers’ judgment concerning the conduct of their
business. Among the employer’s management prerogatives is the right
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for
the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary
measures to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be
complied with. At the same time, the employee has the corollary duty to
obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and
willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies
termination of the contract of service and the dismissal of the
employee.
Same; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; For an
employee to be validly dismissed on willful disobedience, the
employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions must be: (1) reasonable
and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.”—
Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code provides: Article
296. Termination by Employer.—An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or his representative in connection with his work; x x x x Note
that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the
employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions must be: (1) reasonable
and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.”
Same; Same; Same; Whatever maybe the justification behind the
violation of the company rules regarding excess medical supplies is
immaterial since it has been established that an infraction was
deliberately committed.—The Court observes that there lies no
competent basis to support the common observation of the NLRC and
the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated
practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were
Page 335 of 682
previous incidents of “hoarding,” it appears that such acts were — in

similar fashion — furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any
excess items found in the concerned nurse’s possession would have to
be confiscated. Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or
sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that
the socalled “hoarding” practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides,
whatever maybe the justification behind the violation of the company
rules regarding excess medical supplies is immaterial since it has been
established that an infraction was deliberately committed. Doubtless,
the deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee
cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him or her to do even
worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that
employees are required to observe.
Same; Same; Conviction in Criminal Case; An employee’s guilt or
innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a
just or authorized cause for his or her dismissal. It is well-settled that
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for
termination of employment.—The Court finds it inconsequential that
SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates
the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee’s
liability. Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of the appropriate criminal charges
relevant to this analysis. An employee’s guilt or innocence in a criminal
case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause
for his or her dismissal. It is well-settled that conviction in a criminal
case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of employment,
as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an employee arising
from the same infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which
should not arrest any judgment from one to the other. As it stands, the
Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause,
supported by substantial evidence, and is therefore in order. By
declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a
patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA erred when it affirmed the
same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.
Page 336 of 682

A.C. No. 10672. March 18, 2015.*

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE,** complainant, vs. ATTY. DELFIN R.
AGCAOILI, JR., respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Attorney-Client Relationship; Once a lawyer
takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence,
care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—It must
be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a
lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,
which reads: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client
despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him
and is indicative of his lack of integrity.— Respondent also violated
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund
the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated
demands, viz.: CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client. x x x x Rule 16.03 –
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x. Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used
accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client. A
lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of
his lack of integrity, as in this case. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment, and hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension; Jurisprudence provides that
in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the
same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite
demand, the Supreme Court (SC) meted out the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law.— Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same time,
failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the
Page 337 of 682
Court meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In
Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended
the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to
return the money given to him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v.
Macalino, 483 SCRA 212 (2006), the same penalty was imposed on a
lawyer who failed to render any legal service to his client as well as to
return the money he received for such purpose. In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year.
Same; Same; Same; It is well to note that “while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not
his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable
only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance,
when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client
in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked
to his professional engagement.”—The Court sustains the directive for
respondent to account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to
complainant. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held
that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his
civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when
the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement.” Since the aforesaid amount was
intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the
lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent, the
Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
Page 338 of 682

G.R. No. 203240. March 18, 2015.*

NORTHERN ISLANDS CO., INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DENNIS
and CHERYLIN** GARCIA, doing business under the name and
style “Ecolamp Multi Resources,” respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Notice of Appeal; Section 9,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.—Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that
in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Note that in Sps. Olib v.
Judge Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692 (1990), the Supreme Court (SC), in view
of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an
incident of such action.—Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, 188
SCRA 692 (1990), the Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary
attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the
subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because
the attachment was only an incident of such action, viz.: Attachment is
defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse
party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an
action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It
is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart
from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the
defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the
attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the
purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The consequence is that
where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have
been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed
and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an
incident of such action.
Page 339 of 682

A.C. No. 8826. March 25, 2015.*

SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, complainant, vs. ATTY. OTILIO SY
BONGON, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Negligence; Code of Professional Responsibility;
A lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).—It must be stressed that once a
lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite
numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is
indicative of his lack of integrity.—Verily, when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money
must be returned immediately to the client. As such, a lawyer’s failure
to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a
violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity, as in this case.
Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension from Practice of Law; Jurisprudence
provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s
affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or
property despite demand, the Supreme Court (SC) imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.—Jurisprudence
provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s
affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or
property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709
SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one
(1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the
latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino, 483 SCRA 212 (2006), the
same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal
service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such
purpose. These pronouncements notwithstanding, there have been
instances where the Court tempered the penalty imposed upon a lawyer
due to humanitarian and equitable considerations. In view of the
foregoing, and taking into consideration respondent’s advanced age,
medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense, the Court
Page 340 of 682

finds it appropriate to sustain the recommended penalty of suspension

from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month.
Page 341 of 682

G.R. No. 202943. March 25, 2015.*

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by SECRETARY
ENRIQUE T. ONA, and THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
(formerly the Bureau of Food and Drugs), represented by
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HEALTH NICOLAS B. LUTERO III,
Officer-in-Charge, petitioners, vs. PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.
Tobacco Sales Promotions; Statutes; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that
Republic Act (RA) No. 9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of
RA No. 7394 with respect to the authority of the Department of Health
(DOH) to regulate tobacco sales promotions.—After a meticulous
examination of the above quoted pertinent provisions of RA 7394 and
RA 9211, the Court finds that the latter law impliedly repealed the
relevant provisions of the former with respect to the authority of the
DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotions. At this point, the Court notes
that both laws separately treat “promotion” as one of the activities
related to tobacco: RA 7394 defines “sales promotion” under Article
4(bm), while RA 9211 speaks of “promotion” or “tobacco promotion”
under Section 4(1).
Same; Outside Republic Act (RA) No. 7394, “sales promotion” refers to
activities which make use of “media and non-media marketing
communication for a predetermined, limited time to increase consumer
demand, stimulate market demand or improve product availability,” “to
provide added value or incentives to consumers, wholesalers, retailers,
or other organizational customers to stimulate immediate sales” and
“product interest, trial, or purchase.”—Outside RA 7394, “sales
promotion” refers to activities which make use of “media and non-
media marketing communication for a predetermined, limited time to
increase consumer demand, stimulate market demand or improve
product availability,” “to provide added value or incentives to
consumers, wholesalers, retailers, or other organizational customers to
stimulate immediate sales” and “product interest, trial, or purchase.”
Examples of devices used in “sales promotion” are contests, coupons,
freebies, point-of-purchase displays, premiums, raffle prizes, product
samples, sweepstakes, and rebates.
Statutory Construction; Where two (2) statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefore
should prevail.—Finally, it must be stressed that RA 9211 is a special
legislation which exclusively deals with the subject of tobacco products
and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is broader and more
general in scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of
consumers vis-à-vis proper conduct for business and industry. As such,
lex specialis derogat generali. General legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted
as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical
Page 342 of 682

application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefore

should prevail.
G.R. No. 205469. March 25, 2015.*
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. ST. MICHAEL
MEDICAL CENTER, INC., respondent.
Mercantile Law; Corporations; Corporate Rehabilitation; Case law
explains that corporate rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency,
the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life
and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings.—
Restoration is the central idea behind the remedy of corporate
rehabilitation. In common parlance, to “restore” means “to bring back
to or put back into a former or original state.” Case law explains that
corporate rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life
and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being
to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors
to be paid their claims out of its earnings. Consistent therewith is the
term’s statutory definition under Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise
known as the “Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010”
(FRIA), which provides: Section 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this
Act, the term: x x x x (gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of
the debtor to a condition of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its
creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments
projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going concern
than if it is immediately liquidated. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) In other
words, rehabilitation assumes that the corporation has been operational
but for some reasons like economic crisis or mismanagement had
become distressed or insolvent, i.e., that it is generally unable to pay its
debts as they fall due in the ordinary course of business or has liability
that are greater than its assets. Thus, the basic issues in rehabilitation
proceedings concern the viability and desirability of continuing the
business operations of the distressed corporation, all with a view of
effectively restoring it to a state of solvency or to its former healthy
financial condition through the adoption of a rehabilitation plan.
Same; Same; Same; A material financial commitment becomes
significant in gauging the resolve, determination, earnestness and good
faith of the distressed corporation in financing the proposed
rehabilitation plan.—A material financial commitment becomes
significant in gauging the resolve, determination, earnestness and good
rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary
undertakings of the stockholders or the would-be investors of the
debtor-corporation indicating their readiness, willingness and ability to
contribute funds or property to guarantee the continued successful
operation of the debtor corporation during the period of rehabilitation.
In this case, aside from the harped on merger of St. Michael Hospital
Page 343 of 682
with SMMCI, the only proposed source of revenue the Rehabilitation Plan
suggests is the capital which would come from SMMCI’s potential
investors, which negotiations are merely pending. Evidently, both
propositions commonly border on the speculative and, hence, hardly fit
the description of a material financial commitment which would inspire
confidence that the rehabilitation would turn out to be successful.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is not
only to enable the company to gain a new lease on life but also to allow
creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings, when so
rehabilitated.—While the Court recognizes the financial predicaments of
upstart corporations under the prevailing economic climate, it must
nonetheless remain forthright in limiting the remedy of rehabilitation
only to meritorious cases. As above mentioned, the purpose of
rehabilitation proceedings is not only to enable the company to gain a
new lease on life but also to allow creditors to be paid their claims from
its earnings, when so rehabilitated. Hence, the remedy must be
accorded only after a judicious regard of all stakeholders’ interests; it is
not a one-sided tool that may be graciously invoked to escape every
position of distress. In this case, not only has the petitioning debtor
failed to show that it has formally began its operations which would
warrant restoration, but also it has failed to show compliance with the
key requirements under the Rules, the purpose of which are vital in
determining the propriety of rehabilitation. Thus, for all the reasons
hereinabove explained, the Court is constrained to rule in favor of BPI
Family and hereby dismiss SMMCI’s Rehabilitation Petition. With this
pronouncement, it is now unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary
issues raised herein.
Page 344 of 682

G.R. No. 209370. March 25, 2015.*

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
VALENTIN L. FONG, respondent.
Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts have the force
of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith.—Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith. As such, the stipulations in contracts are binding on them unless
the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. The same principle on obligatory force applies by
extension to the contracting party’s assignees, in turn, by virtue of the
principle of relativity of contracts which is fleshed out in Article 1311 of
the Civil Code, viz.: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
Same; Assignment of Credit; Case law states that when a person
assigns his credit to another person, the latter is deemed subrogated to
the rights as well as to the obligations of the former. —Case law states
that when a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is
deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the
former. By virtue of the Deed of Assignment, the assignee is deemed
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by
exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor.
Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those
pertaining to the assignor. The general rule is that an assignee of a
nonnegotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than what was
possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the latter.
Page 345 of 682

G.R. No. 212635. March 25, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHARLIE
SORIN y TAGAYLO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs;
Elements of.—In order to convict an accused charged with violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must be able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The dangerous drug presented in
court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized
from him.—It must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of
such seized items have been preserved. In other words, the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the
same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.
Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 as well as jurisprudence,
nevertheless provides that noncompliance with the requirements of this
rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items
void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such
noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.—Note that while the “chain of custody rule”
demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as
jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that noncompliance with the
requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any deviation from
the prescribed procedure must be justified, but, at all times, should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
Same; Same; Same; Marking; The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus,
preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.—The
Court cannot overemphasize the significance of marking in illegal drugs
cases. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Hence, in People v. Sabdula,
722 SCRA 90 (2014), the Court acquitted the accused on the ground of
failure to mark the plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust
operation.
Page 346 of 682
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the Court’s mind, the act of marking only
the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus
delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching, planting, and
contamination of the evidence — the very acts which the requirement
of marking seeks to prevent.—In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that
he did not mark the plastic sachets which contained the seized drugs,
but instead placed the marking on the “transparent plastic cellophane”
wherein he placed the seized sachets. To the Court’s mind, the act of
marking only the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets
renders the corpus delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching,
planting, and contamination of the evidence — the very acts which the
requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the cellophane passed
hands, it can now no longer be determined with certainty that its
contents have remained intact, especially considering the dearth of
testimony from SPO1 Mugot that the cellophane was tightly sealed or,
at the very least, secured.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Object Evidence; It is well-settled that in
criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the
drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized
items.—It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal
drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti
of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that
they are the same seized items. The lack of conclusive identification of
the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates
against a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt
persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused,
the latter’s acquittal should come as a matter of course.
Page 347 of 682

G.R. No. 195168. November 12, 2012.*

BENJAMIN C. MILLAN, petitioner, vs. WALLEM MARITIME,
SERVICES, INC., REGINALDO A. OBEN and/or WALLEM
SHIPMANAGEMENT,1 LTD., respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; A seafarer’s inability
to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time
he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that
automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability
benefits in his favor.—A seafarer’s inability to resume his work after the
lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or
illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of
total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. In Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court
elucidated on the seeming conflict between Paragraph 3, Section 20(B)
of the POEA-SEC (Department Order No. 004-00) and Article 192 (c)(1)
of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, thus: As these provisions operate,
the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed
120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is
declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is
defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by
applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and
no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further
medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the
employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit
to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical
condition.
Same; Same; Same; Instances When a Seafarer may be Allowed to
Pursue an Action for Total and Permanent Disability Benefits.—Applying
Vergara, the Court in the recent case of C.F. Sharp Crew Management,
Inc. v. Taok, 677 SCRA 296 (2012), enumerated the following instances
when a seafarer may be allowed to pursue an action for total and
permanent disability benefits, to wit: (a) The company-designated
physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea
duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is
no indication that further medical treatment would address his
temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to
240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by
the company-designated physician; (c) The company-designated
physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-
day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the
doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
Page 348 of 682
opinion; (d) The companydesignated physician acknowledged that he is

partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on
his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not
only permanent but total as well; (e) The company-designated physician
recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a
dispute on the disability grading; (f) The companydesignated physician
determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-
related under the POEA-SEC but his doctorof-choice and the third doctor
selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and
declared him unfit to work; (g) The company-designated physician
declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses
to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The company-designated
physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the
120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.
Same; Same; Temporary Total Disability; The rule is that a temporary
total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after
the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.—Despite the
lapse of the 120-day period, petitioner was still considered to be under
a state of temporary total disability at the time he filed his complaint on
August 29, 2003, 184 days from the date of his medical repatriation
which is well-within the 240-day applicable period in this case. Hence,
he cannot be said to have acquired a cause of action for total and
permanent disability benefits. To stress, the rule is that a temporary
total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after
the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.
Page 349 of 682

G.R. No. 198770. November 12, 2012.*

AURELIA GUA-AN and SONIA GUA-AN MAMON, petitioners, vs.
GERTRUDES QUIRINO, represented by ELMER QUIRINO,
respondent.
Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; Upon the promulgation of
P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the land they were
tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for themselves. Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any
transfer of such landholding except to the government or by hereditary
succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries.—
It bears to stress that upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants
were deemed owners of the land they were tilling and given the rights
to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. Thus,
P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to
the government or by hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657
further allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and
to other qualified beneficiaries. Consequently, any other transfer
constitutes a violation of the above proscription and is null and void for
being contrary to law. Relevant on this point is Ministry of Agrarian
Reform Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979 which provides:
“Despite the x x x prohibition, x x x many farmerbeneficiaries of P.D. 27
have transferred their ownership, rights and/or possession of their
farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their
former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of
P.D. 27 and therefore null and void.”
Same; Same; Reversion; Reversion of the landholding to the former
owner is proscribed under P.D. No. 27.—The redemption made by
petitioner Aurelia was ineffective and void since reversion of the
landholding to the former owner is likewise proscribed under P.D. No. 27
in accordance with its policy of holding such lands under trust for the
succeeding generations of farmers.
Same; Abandonment of Landholding; Words and Phrases; As defined in
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 2, series
of 1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the agrarian reform
beneficiary, together with his farm household, “to cultivate, till, or
develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific
economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.”—
While CLT No. 0-025227 remains in Prisco’s+ name, the Court cannot
turn a blind eye to the fact that Prisco+ surrendered possession and
cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a mere temporary
period, but for a period of 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such
act constituted abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume
possession of the land upon payment of the loan. As defined in DAR
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a willful
failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm
household, “to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or
Page 350 of 682
to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a
period of two calendar years.” It is a ground for cancellation by the
DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary. Consequently,
respondent and/or Prisco’s+ heirs had lost any right to redeem the
subject landholding.
Page 351 of 682

G.R. No. 189689. November 13, 2012.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O.
LADAGA, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU,
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY’S 10TH
INFANTRY DIVISION (ID); COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF
STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK
FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY
POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN DOES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 189690. November 13, 2012.*
OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF ANGELA A. LIBRADO-TRINIDAD:
ANGELA A. LIBRADO-TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE ARMY’S 10TH ID; COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF
STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK
FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY
POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN DOES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 189691. November 13, 2012.*
OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE: CARLOS
ISAGANI T. ZARATE, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO
MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY’S
10TH ID; COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT.
COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT.
RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR;
AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The writ of amparo was
promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in
response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings; The Court has previously held
that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address
violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that,
being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on
amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable
certainty.―The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant
to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number
of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays
the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well
as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the
perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768 (2008), the Court
has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
Page 352 of 682
intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty
or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not
one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon
reasonable certainty.
Same; Same; The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well
as, the use of substantial evidence as standard of proof shows the
intent of the framers of the rule to address situations of enforced
disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is
akin to administrative proceedings.―Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo provide as follows: SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and
Standard of Diligence Required.―The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence. x x x x SEC. 18. Judgment.―The court shall
render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against
the person charged. The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as
well as, the use of substantial evidence as standard of proof shows the
intent of the framers of the rule to address situations of enforced
disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is
akin to administrative proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence is not to be rejected outright because
it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies the most
basic test of reason―i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evi
dence.―Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and
informal treatment of amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized
the evidentiary difficulties that beset amparo petitioners, arising as they
normally would from the fact that the State itself, through its own
agents, is involved in the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing
that it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus, in Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court laid down a new standard of
relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet
the required amount of proof showing the State’s direct or indirect
involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair and proper
rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality” and “to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.” Put simply, evidence is not to be
rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long
as it satisfies “the most basic test of reason―i.e. relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces
of adduced evidence.”
Same; Same; Freedom from Fear; A person’s right to security is, in one
sense, “freedom from fear” and that any threat to the rights to life,
Page 353 of 682
liberty or security is an actionable wrong.―In the case of Secretary of

National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court ruled that a
person’s right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from fear” and that
any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong.
The term “any threat,” however, cannot be taken to mean every
conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear for his life,
liberty or security. The Court explicated therein that “[f]ear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by
the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.” Certainly,
given the uniqueness of individual psychological mindsets, perceptions
of what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.
Same; Same; Same; Only actual threats, as may be established from all
the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that
may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Am paro.―The alleged
threat to herein petitioners’ rights to life, liberty and security must be
actual, and not merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of
happening. And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to
be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying
that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo
proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in
the context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be
established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify
as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
Same; Same; Extraordinary Diligence; An amparo petitioner’s failure to
establish by substantial evidence the involvement of government forces
in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to
order the conduct of further investigation where it appears that the
government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the performance
of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or
enforced disappearance.―Emphasizing the extraordinary character of
the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the cases of Roxas and Razon, Jr.
that an amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence
the involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of rights
is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of further
investigation where it appears that the government did not observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duty to investigate the
complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance. The Court
directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest
efforts of police investigators were effectively putting petitioner’s right
to security in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her
abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court found it necessary to explicitly order
the military and police officials to pursue with extraordinary diligence
the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a known
activist because not only did the police investigators conduct an
incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed their
ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to
Page 354 of 682
cooperate with the authorities. In both of these cases, the incidents of

abduction and torture were undisputed and they provided the
evidentiary support for the finding that the right to security was violated
and the necessity for further investigation into such violation.
Page 355 of 682

G.R. No. 200238. November 20, 2012.*

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) and PASCUAL M. GARCIA
III, as representative of Philippine Savings Bank and in his
personal capacity, petitioners, vs. SENATE IMPEACHMENT
COURT, consisting of the senators of the Republic of the
Philippines acting as Senator Judges, namely: JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, VICENTE C. SOTTO III,
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JOKER P.
ARROYO, PIA S. CAYETANO, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRANCIS G.
ESCUDERO, TEOFISTO GUINGONA III, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II,
PANFILO M. LACSON, MANUEL M. LAPID, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, FRANCIS
“KIKO” PANGILINAN, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, RALPH G. RECTO,
RAMON REVILLA, JR., ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, MANNY VILLAR;
and THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE PROSECUTION PANEL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Courts; Moot and Academic; Courts will not determine
questions that have become moot and academic because there is no
longer any justiciable controversy to speak of.—It is well-settled that
courts will not determine questions that have become moot and
academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to
speak of. The judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any
practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be
enforced. In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 271
SCRA 204 (1997), the Court ruled: It is a rule of universal application
that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no
actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona
on May 29, 2012, as well as his execution of a waiver against the
confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign
currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.—
Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted
arbitrarily when it issued the assailed subpoena to obtain information
concerning the subject foreign currency deposits notwithstanding the
confidentiality of such deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by
events. The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29,
2012, as well as his execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of
all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign currency, has rendered
the present petition moot and academic.
Page 356 of 682

G.R. No. 170029. November 21, 2012.*

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. and RIZALINA
LAMSON, petitioners, vs. MARICEL N. BAJARO, PAMELA P.
MORILLA, DAISY L. MAGDAONG, LEAH J. TABUJARA, LEA M.
CANCINO, MICHIEL D. MELIANG, RAQUEL SUMIGCAY, ROSE R.
SARIA, LEONA L. ANGULO and MELODY B. INGAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Issues not raised in the
proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Specifically, points of law, theories and arguments not raised before the
appellate court will not be considered by the Supreme Court.―At the
outset, the Court notes that petitioners are raising before the Court for
the first time, the applicability of the principles of private international
law and the labor standards laws of the Republic of China in the proper
interpretation of respondents’ employment contracts. Records show
that petitioners never advanced this issue at the first opportunity before
the Labor Arbiter, and even in the subsequent proceedings before the
NLRC and the CA. Instead, petitioners’ arguments consistently centered
on the existence of a valid retrenchment and compliance with the
requirements to legally effect the same. It bears stressing that issues
not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Specifically, points of law, theories and arguments not raised
before the appellate court will not be considered by the Court.
Labor Law; Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW); Recruitment; Solidary
Liability; If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation for any claims and damages that may be due
to the overseas workers.―Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides that “[i]f the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers
and directors x x x shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with
the corporation x x x” for any claims and damages that may be due to
the overseas workers.
Statutes; The Supreme Court declared that an unconstitutional clause in
the law, being inoperative at the outset, confers no rights, imposes no
duties and affords no protection.―In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and
Skippers Maritime Services, Inc. Ltd. v. Doza, 665 SCRA 412 (2012), the
Court declared that an unconstitutional clause in the law, being
inoperative at the outset, confers no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. Hence, even if respondents’ illegal dismissal
occurred sometime in August 2000, the declaration of
unconstitutionality found in the Serrano case promulgated in March
2009 shall retroactively apply.
Page 357 of 682

G.R. No. 209180. February 24, 2016.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REGHIS M.
ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 209253. February 24, 2016.*
OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, petitioner, vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological

Incapacity; It has consistently been held that psychological incapacity,
as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.—The policy of the Constitution is to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been
held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To warrant the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.—Verily, all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with
certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases. Thus, to warrant the declaration of
nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence,
i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That he married Olivia not out of love, but
out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is
psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family
Page 358 of 682
Code.—After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court

finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed
out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to
comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the
existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part.
Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in
purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his
duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated
that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them.
That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the
latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically
incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie.—
Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of
psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these
are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State.
Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially
where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show
the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and
perform the essential marital duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same Absent sufficient evidence to prove
psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36 of the Family
Code, the Supreme Court (SC) is compelled to uphold the indissolubility
of the marital.—The Court can only commiserate with the parties’ plight
as their marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated, however, that
the remedy is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code must
not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be
limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to
assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity
within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
Page 359 of 682

G.R. No. 207010. February 18, 2015.*

MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE
PTE. LIMITED, and JESUS AGBAYANI, petitioners, vs. TORIBIO C.
AVESTRUZ,** respondent.
Certiorari; Considering that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter (LA)
and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), on the one hand,
and the Court of Appeals (CA), on the other hand, are contradictory, the
general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the
Supreme Court (SC) retains the authority to pass upon the evidence
presented and draw conclusions therefrom.—Generally, a reexamination
of factual findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews
only questions of law. Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may generally be put into issue. This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions. In this case, considering that the factual
findings of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the CA, on the
other hand, are contradictory, the general rule that only legal issues
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the authority to
pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; It is well-
settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee
was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer.—It is well-
settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee
was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the
employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge
this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is
defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on
mere surmises or conjectures.
Same; Same; Insubordination; Insubordination, as a just cause for the
dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two
(2) requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and
(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.—Insubordination, as a just cause for the
dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two
requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge.
Page 360 of 682

Same; Same; Two-Notice Rule; Due Process; The Supreme Court (SC)
affirms the finding of the Court of Appeals (CA) that Avestruz was not
accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the
provisions of Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).—The Court
affirms the finding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded procedural
due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section
17 of the POEA-SEC as above cited, which requires the “two-notice
rule.” As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira, 392 SCRA 371
(2002): An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against
him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should
sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons
for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional
case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that
the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete
report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial
evidence of the findings.
Page 361 of 682

G.R. No. 212081. February 23, 2015.*

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), petitioner, vs. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC.
(UPCI), respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004;
Republic Act (RA) No. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines.—Republic
Act No. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however,
was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR
system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving
cases pending before all courts in the Philippines. Accordingly, A.M. No.
07-1108-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (referred herein as Special ADR Rules)
that shall govern the procedure to be followed by the courts whenever
judicial intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases
where it is allowed.
Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; Execution is
fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law.—
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the Special ADR
Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed
arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’
procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but
necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the
doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory
grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Money Judgments; Section 26 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1445 expressly provides that execution of money
judgment against the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities is within the primary jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit (COA).—Section 26 of PD 1445 expressly provides
that execution of money judgment against the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities is within the primary
jurisdiction of the COA, to wit: SEC. 26. General jurisdiction.—The
authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years,
the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers
relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by
them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and
Page 362 of 682
settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or -controlled
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing
boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein
prescribed, including non governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donation through the government, those
required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the
government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by
the government. (Emphases supplied) From the foregoing, the
settlement of respondent’s money claim is still subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the COA despite finality of the confirmed arbitral award by
the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR Rules. Hence, the respondent has
to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. This
appears to have been complied with by the latter when it filed a
“Petition for Enforcement and Payment of Final and Executory Arbitral
Award” before the COA. Accordingly, it is now the COA which has the
authority to rule on this latter petition.
Page 363 of 682

A.C. No. 10567. February 25, 2015.*

WILFREDO ANGLO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MA. V.
VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO,
ATTY. LILY UY-VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,** ATTY. RODNEY K.
RUBICA,*** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PEÑALOSA,
respondents.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; There is conflict of interest
when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more
opposing parties.—In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), the
Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise: There is
conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof. As such, a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action
or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.
Same; Same; Same; The termination of attorney-client relation provides
no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.—As a final point, the Court
clarifies that respondents’ pronounced liability is not altered by the fact
that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated.
Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The client’s confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
Page 364 of 682

G.R. No. 202632. July 8, 2015.*

ROBERTO STA. ANA DY, JOSE ALAINEO DY, and ALTEZA A. DY for
themselves and as heirs/substitutes of deceased-petitioner
CHLOE ALINDOGAN DY, petitioners, vs. BONIFACIO A. YU,
SUSANA A. TAN, and SOLEDAD ARQUILLA substituting
deceased-respondent ROSARIO ARQUILLA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata
literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.”— Res judicata literally
means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.” Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court state the doctrine of res judicata.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar
to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must
be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.—Res judicata comprehends two
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. “For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or
order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an
identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect
as res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits
the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The res judicata doctrine applies only when
a judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first complaint; A
judgment on the merits presupposes that trial has been conducted,
evidence presented, and issues sufficiently heard and passed upon.—
Material to this discourse is the doctrine’s second element, which
evokes that the res judicata doctrine applies only when a judgment on
the merits is finally rendered on the first complaint. The term “merits”
has been defined as a matter of substance in law, as distinguished from
matter of form; it refers to the real or substantial grounds of action or
defense as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter raised in
the course of the suit. Thus, a judgment on the merits presupposes that
trial has been conducted, evidence presented, and issues sufficiently
heard and passed upon. It is a judgment rendered after a determination
Page 365 of 682
of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon

some preliminary or formal technical point. Stated differently, a
judgment is “on the merits” when it amounts to a legal declaration of
the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the disclosed
facts and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another. —Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who
repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the most important factor to ask is whether the element of litis
pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by
virtue of a party’s commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one
which already exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum
shopping infraction is committed.
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; As opposed to res judicata, litis pendentia
refers to a situation where two (2) actions are pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.—As opposed to res judicata which
was already hereinabove explained, litis pendentia refers to a situation
where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. The
requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Under the last sentence of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.”—With
Page 366 of 682
the elements of litis pendentia attendant hereto as caused by Rosario’s

institution of the Annulment Case while the Reconveyance Case was
pending, the conclusion is that forum shopping was committed. Under
the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “[i]f the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.”
Civil Law; Reconveyance; Words and Phrases; It is well to point out that
an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to
the rightful land owner whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to
transfer or reconvey the land to him.—It is well to point out that an
action for reconveyance — as in Roberto’s Recovery Case — is a legal
and equitable remedy granted to the rightful land owner whose land
was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to
compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. By
fraudulently including in his application for the registration of title over
Lot 1519 the disputed portion, i.e., Lot 1519-A, in his name, Roberto
holds the title to said portion in trust for the benefit of Rosario as the
true owner. Indeed, registration does not vest title but merely confirms
or records title already existing and vested. Thus, not being the owner
of the subject portion, Roberto could not have transferred ownership
thereof to his children, petitioners Jose and Alteza.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.—With all these
considerations in mind, the Court has come to the conclusion that it
cannot precipitately order the summary dismissal of the Annulment
Case and set aside the judgments therein rendered in view of a mere
forum shopping infraction as aforediscussed. To act otherwise would be
tantamount to a blatant disregard of substantial justice in the name of
unwarranted technical adherence. Case law dictates that technicalities
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. As aptly pointed out in Barcelona v. CA, 412 SCRA 41
(2003), the rule on forum shopping should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. After all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.
Accordingly, the partial nullification of the June 28, 1994 Deed of
Donation between spouses-petitioners Roberto and Chloe and
petitioners Jose and Alteza insofar as it concerns Lot 1519-A owned by
Rosario and, now respondents, as her heirs, is in order.
Attorney’s Fees; It bears to stress that power of the court to award
attorney’s fees demands factual, legal, and equitable justification,
without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
Page 367 of 682
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.—It bears to stress

that power of the court to award attorney’s fees demands factual, legal,
and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture. In fact, such failure or oversight of the trial court cannot
even be supplanted by the CA.
Page 368 of 682

G.R. No. 211649. August 12, 2015.*

AQA GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondent.
G.R. No. 211742. August 12, 2015.*

JE-AN SUPREME BUILDERS AND SALES CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Writ of Possession; Words and Phrases; A
writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to
place a person in possession of a real or personal property.—A writ of
person in possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued
under any of the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings
under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the “The Land
Registration Act”; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to
the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of
a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; The general rule is
that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
who is entitled to the possession of the said property; The exception,
however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, which
applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages.—The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption
period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased who is entitled to the possession of the said
property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to
issue the writ of possession in his favor. The exception, however, is
provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, which applies
suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages. Under
the said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged property may
be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
Same; Same; Same; Where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is
occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for
the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse
possession.—Where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is
occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for
the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse
possession. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by him adversely to
the judgment obligor — such as that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant
or usufructuary, who possess the property in their own right and not
Page 369 of 682

merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of, or privy

to, the judgment obligor.
Civil Law; Lease; Tenants; In China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA
177 (2008), the “tenant” contemplated clearly refers to an “agricultural
tenant” who: (a) possesses the property in his own right; and (b) is
protected by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1038 wherein a tenant-tiller of
private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn
shall not be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farmholding
unless directed by a final decision or order of the court for causes
provided by law, which does not include sale of the land — and not to a
“civil law tenant.”—Clearly, the stay of the implementation of the writ of
possession prayed for by Je-An on the basis of such inchoate right would
becloud the integrity and derogate the indefeasibility of the torrens title
issued in favor of Plantersbank as a confirmed owner, which the Court
cannot allow. Corollarily, the enforcement of the writ of possession
cannot also be stayed in favor of AQA which merely derived its
possession from Je-An through an unregistered contract of lease. The
Court simply cannot subscribe to AQA’s claim that its status as a tenant
renders its possession adverse to that of Plantersbank, in consonance
with the ruling in China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008).
In the said case, the “tenant” contemplated clearly refers to an
“agricultural tenant” who: (a) possesses the property in his own right;
and (b) is protected by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1038 wherein a
tenanttiller of private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice
and/or corn shall not be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his
farmholding unless directed by a final decision or order of the court for
causes provided by law, which does not include sale of the land — and
not to a “civil law tenant.”
Same; Land Registration; Under Section 51 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, “no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting
to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land” until its registration. —It bears to emphasize that a civil
law lease is a mere personal right. It partakes of the nature of a real
right when it is recorded on the title of the lessor only in the sense that
it is binding even as against third persons without actual notice of the
transaction. Under Section 51 of PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Decree, “no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land” until its registration.
In the present case, AQA’s unregistered lease with Je-An is, thus, not
binding on Plantersbank. Consequently, Je-An and AQA cannot be
considered third parties holding the subject properties adversely to KTC,
the default ing debtor-mortgagor. Resultantly, the general rule, and not
the exception, applies to the instant petitions, rendering it the
mandatory and ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of
possession in favor of Plantersbank as the confirmed owner, and of the
Sheriff to implement the said writ. As this Court ruled in St. Dominic
Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 577 (1987).
Page 370 of 682

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-Party Claims; In Gagoomal v.

Spouses Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444 (2012), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled
that aside from such remedies, the adverse third party may take other
legal remedies to prosecute his claim, such as invoking the supervisory
power of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to enjoin the
enforcement/implementation of the writ of possession, as what
petitioners did in this case.—The Court would like to take exception to
the CA’s ruling, limiting the remedies of the adverse third party to
vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed
property to a terceria and an independent separate action once a writ of
possession had already been issued, as in this case. In Gagoomal v.
Spouses Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444 (2012), the Court ruled that aside
from such remedies, the adverse third party may take other legal
remedies to prosecute his claim, such as invoking the supervisory
power of the RTC to enjoin the enforcement/implementation of the writ
of possession, as what petitioners did in this case. Unquestionably, the
RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process,
and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question
which may be invariably involved in the execution, and ensure that it is
enforcing its judgment only against properties irrefutably belonging to
the judgment debtor. However, in such instances, the RTC does not and
cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any
character of finality, and can treat of the matter only as may be
necessary to decide the question of whether or not the person in
possession holds the property adversely to the judgment obligor. If the
claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or
right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.
Page 371 of 682

G.R. No. 193176. February 24, 2016.*

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL M.
REINOSO, GENEROSO TANSECO, MANUEL MORALES, RUBEN B.
ANCHETA, GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, JR.,
FERNANDO MARAMAG, EDGARDO TORDESILLAS, ARTURO R.
TANCO, JR., GERARDO SICAT, PANFILO O. DOMINGO,
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MANUEL B. SYQUIO, RAFAEL M. ATAYDE,
HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., GEORGE T. SCHOLEY,1 TIRSO
ANTIPORDA, JR., CARLOS L. INDUCTIVO, and TEODORO
VALENCIA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify judicial
intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.— Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 requires that there be injury caused
by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private
parties who conspire with public officers.—Violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire
with public officers. Its elements are: (1) that the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that
said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance
of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Same; Same; Section 3(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 does not
require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences
to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element
being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. —Section 3(g) of RA
3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages
or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its
core element being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The
Page 372 of 682
elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2)
that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation;
Ombudsman; The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is to establish whether there exists probable
cause to file an information in court against the accused.—It bears
stressing that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is to establish whether there exists probable
cause to file an information in court against the accused. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, the accused committed the crime. Taking into account the
quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the
Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. —That the PCGG
failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the properties in
order to support its stance that the loans were under collateralized is of
no moment. Included in the records of this case is the Executive
Summary of the TWG, citing as evidence numerous documents from
PNB showing, on its face, that the loans granted to HMOI by PNB were
undercollateralized. Hence, the lack of independent valuation alone is
not sufficient to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence to
establish mere probable cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a wellfounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a
party’s accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies
and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper.
Page 373 of 682

G.R. No. 208948. February 24, 2016.*

JOSE B. LURIZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The
reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title
of a person to a piece of land.—The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It
partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted
only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed
issued to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest, and such title was
in force at the time it was lost or destroyed. In the present case, the
reconstitution petition is anchored on a purported owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 1297 — a source for reconstitution of title under Section
3(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 26. Based on the provisions of the said law,
the following must be present for an order of reconstitution to issue: (a)
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) the
petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest
therein; (d) the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and
destroyed; and (e) the description, area, and boundaries of the property
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title. Particularly, when the reconstitution is based on an
extant owner’s duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and
genuineness of the certificate. Tested against the foregoing, the Court
finds that Luriz was not able to prove that TCT No. 1297 sought to be
reconstituted was authentic, genuine, and in force at the time it was
lost and destroyed.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Vesting Order No. P-89; Official Records; Being
an official record of a duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the
Philippines at the time it was issued, Vesting Order No. P-89 is,
therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.—Being an
official record of a duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the
Philippines at the time it was issued, Vesting Order No. P-89 is,
therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Vesting
Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 stated that, after proper
investigation, the Philippine Alien Property Administration had found
that the properties particularly described in Exhibit A, i.e., the Transcript
of TCT No. 1297; B[oo]k T-9 P[age] 47, were owned or controlled by
“nationals of a designated enemy country (Japan).”
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 39(a) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, properties of Japanese nationals vested after December 17, 1941
shall not be returned to their owners, and the United States (U.S.) shall
not pay compensation therefor. Instead, the vested properties were to
be conveyed to the Republic as part of its overall plan of rehabilitation.
Page 374 of 682
—The legal effect of a vesting order was to effectuate immediately the

transfer of title to the US by operation of law, without any necessity for
any court action, and as completely as if by conveyance, transfer, or
assign ment, thereby completely divesting the former owner of every
right with respect to the vested property. It is worthy to note that under
Section 39(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, properties of Japanese
nationals vested after December 17, 1941 shall not be returned to their
owners, and the US shall not pay compensation therefor. Instead, the
vested properties were to be conveyed to the Republic as part of its
overall plan of rehabilitation. Nonetheless, to safeguard the rights of
citizens and friendly aliens — i.e., persons who are not enemies or
allies of enemies — claiming any interest, right, or title to the vested
properties, the Trading with the Enemy Act, both in its original and
amendatory provisions, permits the filing of suits for the recovery of any
property vested or seized on or after December 18, 1941, until April 30,
1949 or after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of vesting,
whichever is later.
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; After the
execution of Vesting Order No. P-89 on April 9, 1947, the registered
owner, Yoichiro Urakami, was divested of any title or interest in the
vested properties registered in his name under TCT No. 1297, which was
thereby rendered of no force and effect at the time it was lost or
destroyed, i.e., on June 1988 and, thus, cannot be reconstituted.—It is
clear that after the execution of Vesting Order No. P-89 on April 9, 1947,
the registered owner, Yoichiro Urakami, was divested of any title or
interest in the vested properties registered in his name under TCT No.
1297, which was thereby rendered of no force and effect at the time it
was lost or destroyed, i.e., on June 1988 and, thus, cannot be
reconstituted. In addition, the records are bereft of showing that any
citizen or friendly alien made any claim to the vested properties under
Vesting Order No. P-89 within the prescriptive period ending April 30,
1949. Accordingly, the vested properties were transferred by the
Attorney General of the US to the Republic under Transfer Agreement
dated May 7, 1953, and thereafter became the subject of two (2)
Presidential Proclamations, namely: (a) Proclamation No. 438 issued by
then President Elpidio R. Quirino on December 23, 1953, reserving them
for dormitory, site purposes of the North General Hospital; and (b)
Proclamation No. 732 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on
February 28, 1961, reserving them, instead, for dormitory site purposes
of the National Orthopedic Hospital, now POC, which is presently in
possession thereof.
Same; Same; Same; A reconstitution of title proceeding involves only
the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition.—Notably, these findings should not be
taken as an adjudication on the ownership of the subject lands. As
priorly intimated, they are but determinations of whether or not the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is authentic, genuine, and
in force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed, which, based on
case law, are central to resolving petitions for reconstitution of title.
Clearly, a reconstitution of title proceeding involves only the re-issuance
Page 375 of 682
of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and

condition. In this light, the court does not pass upon the ownership of
the land covered by the lost or destroyed certificate, as the said matter
should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for the purpose.
Page 376 of 682

G.R. No. 204965. March 2, 2016.*

SPOUSES ROMULO H. ESPIRITU and EVELYN ESPIRITU,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES NICANOR SAZON and ANNA LIZA G.
SAZON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Words and
Phrases; A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a
party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts.—A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a
party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in
order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision,
or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper
or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits.
In a sense, it is a regulatory process meant to prevent a case from
being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial
of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court
because the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.—In the present case, the CA found that the RTC correctly
appreciated the evidence presented during the hearing on the
application for writ of preliminary injunction. At this point, it bears to
stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on
initial or incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show
that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint. As such, the evidence need only be a sampling intended
merely to give the trial court an evidence of justification for a
preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case.
Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a
writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court
because the assessment and evaluation of evi dence towards that end
involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo
— or the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the
actual controversy, which is existing at the time of the filing of the case
— must be preserved until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
Same; Same; Same; Injunctive reliefs are not granted for the purpose of
taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the
possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before
the right of ownership is determined.—It is apropos to reiterate the
settled rule that injunctive reliefs are not granted for the purpose of
Page 377 of 682
taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the
possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before
the right of ownership is determined. The reason for this doctrine is that
before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the evidence
presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in
their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other.
Page 378 of 682

G.R. No. 210972. March 2, 2016.*

ROGER ALLEN BIGLER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and LINDA SUSAN PATRICIA E. BARRETO,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Findings of fact made by a trial
court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can
otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be
ignored.—It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable, absent any of the exceptions recognized by case
law. This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by a
trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
ignored. Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Under the
doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
—Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final
judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and
prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c)
the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e)
the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
Criminal Law; Penalties; In a catena of similar cases where the accused
failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of
conviction, the Supreme Court (SC) corrected the penalties imposed,
notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside
the range of penalty prescribed by law.— In a catena of similar cases
where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective
Page 379 of 682
judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed,

notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside
the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to
deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the
aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the
defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum
which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which
the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction
as to the excess.
Page 380 of 682

G.R. No. 218399. March 2, 2016.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GODOFREDO COMBOY y CRONICO, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors.—At the outset, it must be
stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.—The elements of Rape under Article
266-A(1)(a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or
intimidation. The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will. On the other hand, Statutory Rape under Article 266-
A(1)(d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a woman below
twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the
sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the
offended party is unnecessary as these are not elements of statutory
rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law
presumes that the offended party does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain
a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the
following:
(a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused
and the complainant. The foregoing acts of Rape shall be
qualified pursuant to Article 266-B(1) of the RPC if: (a) the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Same; Denials; Alibi; Suffice it to say that Comboy’s flimsy defense
of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of AAA identifying him as the perpetrator of the crimes.
—In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts
a quo that the prosecution was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had
carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2) separate
occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in
February 2008; and (b) attempted to have carnal knowledge of her
Page 381 of 682
on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other than his own
desistance, i.e., BBB’s intervention. Suffice it to say that Comboy’s
flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crimes.
Same; Rape; It has been long settled that a young girl would not
concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of
her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and
subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. —In
this regard, it has been long settled that “a young girl would not
concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of
her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and
subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify against
her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this
crime did not happen,” as in this case.
Page 382 of 682

G.R. No. 206957. June 17, 2015.*

CHERITH A. BUCAL, petitioner, vs. MANNY P. BUCAL,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for
Reconsideration; The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.—The
settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004; Protection Order; As defined in Section 8
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, [a] protection order is an order issued x
x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other
necessary relief.—The urgency for resolution also rendered such filing
unnecessary. It should be emphasized that Cherith had already been
issued a PPO. As defined in Section 8 of RA 9262, “[a] protection order is
an order issued x x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act
and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a
protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently
regain control over her life. x x x.” With a standing PPO issued for the
purpose of protecting not only the woman, but also her child against
acts of violence committed by the person against whom the order is
issued — in this case, Manny — the resolution of the issue of whether or
not Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any discernible
basis therefor, is urgent, else Cherith and Francheska be unduly
exposed to the very danger which they are seeking protection from. As
Page 383 of 682
the Court sees it, any further delay would substantially prejudice their
interests, thus, allowing a direct recourse to certiorari.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; It is well-settled that courts
cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by a party to a case.—It is wellsettled that courts cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by a party to a case. The rationale for the rule was
explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 545 SCRA
422 (2008), viz.: Due process considerations justify this requirement. It
is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought
by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The
fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the
defendant. For the same reason, this protection against surprises
granted to defendants should also be available to petitioners. Verily,
both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and
arbitrary judgments. The very essence of due process is “the sporting
idea of fair play” which forbids the grant of relief on matters where a
party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be heard. The records
do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was
present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he
neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he
was seeking for such relief.
Page 384 of 682

G.R. No. 207804. June 17, 2015.*

ACE NAVIGATION COMPANY and VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE
LIMITED, petitioners, vs. SANTOS D. GARCIA, respondent.
Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached
thereby are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.—To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes,
grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia,
its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In a
seafarer’s claim for disability, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer to
establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of
evidence to justify the relief sought.
Same; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Permanent Total Disability; It is
only upon the lapse of two hundred forty (240) days, or when so
declared by the company-designated physician, that a seafarer may be
deemed totally and permanently disabled. —A judicious review of the
records reveals that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain any gainful
employment for more than 120 days after his repatriation; however, this
fact does not ipso facto render his disability total and permanent. In
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the
Court held that the company-designated physician is given a leeway of
an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give
the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to
the nature of the latter’s disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240
days, or when so declared by the company-designated physician, that a
seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
Same; Same; Same; The assessment of the companydesignated
physician should be given more credence for having been arrived at
after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the
assessment of a private physician done in one (1) day on the basis of an
examination or existing medical records. —In any case, the findings of
Dr. Salvador and Dr. Cruz, the company-designated physicians, should
prevail considering that they examined, diagnosed, and treated Garcia
from his repatriation on May 20, 2010 until he was assessed with a
Grade 10 disability rating; whereas the independent physician, Dr.
Escutin, only examined Garcia sparingly on April 25, 2011 after he filed
Page 385 of 682
his claim for total and permanent disability benefits before the NLRC on
November 8, 2010. Jurisprudence holds that, under these
circumstances, the assessment of the companydesignated physician
should be given more credence for having been arrived at after months
of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of
a private physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or
existing medical records.
Page 386 of 682

G.R. No. 209830. June 17, 2015.*

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of
the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.—Jurisdiction
is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide
a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority
to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and
not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss
the action.
Taxation; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection
cases originally decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—The CTA has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the RTC. In the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over
respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action on the same
except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court. Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful
appeal before it to the CTA under the guise of furthering the interests of
substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be
corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8 (2013), the Court held that
the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic wand that would
readily dispel the application of procedural rules.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is settled that the perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an
appeal within the period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed
from final and executory.—In view of respondent’s availment of a wrong
mode of appeal via notice of appeal stating that it was elevating the
case to the CA — instead of appealing by way of a petition for review to
the CTA within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the RTC’s
August 3, 2012 Order, as required by Section 11 of RA 1125, as
amended by Section 9 of RA 9282 — the Court is constrained to deem
the RTC’s dismissal of respondent’s collection case against petitioner
final and executory. It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an appeal within the
period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and
executory.
Page 387 of 682
A.M. No. 2014-07-SC. July 8, 2015.*

RE: REPORT OF ATTY. CARIDAD A. PABELLO, Chief of Office,
Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court
Administrator (OAS-OCA), on Neglect of Duty of FERDINAND F.
ANDRES, Human Resource Management Officer III, Regional
Trial Court (RTC)-Personnel Division, OAS-OCA, the Processor-
in-Charge of Appointment and the Alleged Erroneous
Recording, Erasure, and Alteration of the Performance Rating
on the Record Book.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Human Resource Management
Officers; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; Simple neglect of
duty is defined as “the failure of an employee to give proper attention
to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or
indifference.”—Under Item XIV(14)(a) of Revised A.C. No. 50-2001, “[f]or
appointment by promotion, the performance rating of the appointee for
the last rating period prior to the effectivity date of the appointment
should be at least very satisfactory” — a requirement which Andres is
aware of. Nonetheless, he failed to meticulously check Puerto’s
qualifications and indicate in the list of lacking requirements, the
absence of Puerto’s PR form. While applications “with incomplete form
or lacking requirement/s shall still be included in the list to be submitted
to the SPB-LC with a notation as to the lacking form or requirement/s,”
subject to subsequent accomplishment/submission as the SPB-LC may
require, Andres likewise erroneously reported Puerto’s performance
rating as “Very Satisfactory” instead of “Satisfactory,” which eventually
led to the latter’s promotion from Clerk III to Sheriff IV, albeit
disqualified. From the foregoing circumstances, Andres was clearly
remiss and negligent in performing his assigned tasks as a processor-in-
charge, and is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure of
an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge
a duty due to carelessness or indifference.”
Same; Same; Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise
known as the “Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that
“[c]ourt personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and
with diligence.”—Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise
known as the “Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that
“[c]ourt personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and
with diligence. x x x.” The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
“[j]udicial machinery can only function if every employee performs his
task with the highest degree of professionalism. Court personnel are
obligated to perform their duties properly and with diligence. Any task
given to an employee of the judiciary, however menial it may be, must
be done in the most prompt and diligent way.” Andres’ attribution of the
mistake to human error and his alleged heavy workload at the time
cannot be given credence because a heavy workload is not a
compelling reason to justify failure to perform one’s duties properly.
Otherwise, every government employee charged with negligence and
dereliction of duty would always proffer a similar excuse to escape
Page 388 of 682
punishment, to the prejudice of the government service. Truth be told, it

is incumbent upon every government employee to adapt all reasonable
means to cope with the heavy workload, for the occupation demands
no less than full and uncomplaining dedication to the public service.
Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; The disciplining
authority, the Supreme Court (SC) in this case, is granted the discretion
to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final
penalty. These factors range, among others, from the erring individual’s
admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance
rating.—Under Section 46(D)(1), Rule 10 of Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Resolution No. 1101502 dated November 8, 2011, otherwise
known as the “Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service” (RRACCS), simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense,
punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense. This notwithstanding, the disciplining
authority, the Court in this case, is granted the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These
factors range, among others, from the erring individual’s admission of
guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance rating.
Page 389 of 682

G.R. No. 175733. July 8, 2015.*

WESTMONT BANK (now UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.),**
petitioner, vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, SPOUSES
ANTONIO and SYLVIA YUTINGCO, PANAMAX CORPORATION,
PEPITO ONG NGO, RICHARD N. YU, AIMEE R. ALBA, ANNABELLE
BAESA, NENITA RESANE, and MARIA ORTIZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 180162. July 8, 2015.*
CARMELO V. CACHERO, petitioner, vs. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK
PHILS. and/or WESTMONT BANK, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Failure to State a
Cause of Action; Lack of Cause of Action; Failure to state a cause of
action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particular action.—“Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause
of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former
refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the
latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages
of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised
any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.”
Same; Same; Cause of Action; A complaint states a cause of action if it
sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a
cause of action.—“A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently
avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.”
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; While the facts alleged in the
complaint are hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical
admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded
in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly deductible therefrom.—It
bears to stress that “while the facts alleged in the complaint are
hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it must,
nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission extends
only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as
Page 390 of 682
well as inferences fairly deductible therefrom.” Verily, the filing of the

motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint “does not
admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal
conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or
conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor
allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor
matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor
scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to
legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a
record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; nor
to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.”
Attorney’s Fees; The courts possess the power to reduce the amount of
attorney’s fees whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the
same is iniquitous or unconscionable.—Anent the award of attorney’s
fees, it is relevant to note that the stipulations on attorney’s fees
contained in the PNs constitute what is known as a penal clause. The
award of attorney’s fees by the CA, therefore, is not in the nature of an
indemnity but rather a penalty in the form of liquidated damages in
accordance with the contract between Westmont and the original
defendants. “Such a stipulation has been upheld by [the] Court as
binding between the parties so long as it does not contravene the law,
morals, public order or public policy.” Nevertheless, the courts possess
the power to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees whether intended as
an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable.
Thus, in Trade & Investment Dev’t. Corp. of the Phils. v. Roblett
Industrial Construction Corp., 474 SCRA 510 (2005), the Court equitably
reduced the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid since interests (and
penalties) had ballooned to thrice as much as the principal debt. In the
present case, interest alone runs to more than thrice the principal
amount of the loan obligation. In real terms, therefore, attorney’s fees
at the stipulated rate of 20% of the total amount due of over
P42,000,000.00, or about P8,400,000.00, is manifestly exorbitant.
Hence, the Court concurs with the CA that the amount of attorney’s fees
should be equitably reduced to five percent (5%) of the principal debt,
which the Court finds reasonable under the premises.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; In serving the court’s
writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court,
sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the
process of the administration of justice.—It is well-settled that a sheriff
performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound
to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and
be vigilant in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the
ministerial duty to implement writs of execution promptly, they are
bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention
which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs.
Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution of a judgment
depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior. Anything
less is unacceptable because in serving the court’s writs and processes
and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err
Page 391 of 682

without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of

justice.
Same; Same; Same; Injunction; Settled is the rule that where a party
has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly
informing him from what he must abstain, he is “legally bound from that
time to desist from what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and
will be punished for a violation thereof, even though it may not have
served, or may have been served on him defectively.”—The Court does
not find credence in Sheriff Cachero’s insistence that while he may have
“gotten wind” of the TRO through a cellular phone call, he was not
bound thereby unless an official copy of the TRO was duly served upon
him. Settled is the rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter
how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing him from what he must
abstain, he is “legally bound from that time to desist from what he is
restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation
thereof, even though it may not have served, or may have been served
on him defectively.”
Page 392 of 682

G.R. No. 208928. July 8, 2015.*

ANDY ANG, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P.
TORRALBA, SUSANA LOBERANES, CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO,
and PEDRITO P. AZARCON, represented by their Attorney-in-
Fact, GALILEO P. TORRALBA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Parties-inInterest; The rule
on real parties-in-interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to
institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and
(b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-
interest.—The rule on real partiesin-interest has two (2) requirements,
namely: (a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party-ininterest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved. One having no material interest cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action. In Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, 481
SCRA 348 (2006), the Court expounded on the purpose of this rule, to
wit: Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in
the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the
one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid multiplicity of suits; and 4)
discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to
public policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic is the rule that no relief can be
extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a
case.—Having established that respondents are not the real parties-in-
interest to the instant suit, the proper course of action was for the CA to
merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of their complaint. It therefore erred in
proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case and
granting one of the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the
declaration of the nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. In
the same vein, the CA erred in awarding portions of the subject land to
various nonparties to the case, such as the Heirs of Gaccion and
Udiaan’s children. Basic is the rule that no relief can be extended in a
judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case.
Page 393 of 682

G.R. No. 209822. July 8, 2015.*

DIONISIO DACLES,** petitioner, vs. MILLENIUM ERECTORS
CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show
that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it.—It must be stressed that to justify the grant of the
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” discretion must be
exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence, “or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
Labor Law; Project Employees; For an employee to be considered
project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the employee was
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the
duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee
was engaged for such project.— For an employee to be considered
project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the employee was
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the
duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee
was engaged for such project. Being assigned to a project or a phase
thereof which begins and ends at determined or determinable times,
the services of project employees may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of such project or phase. Consequently, in order to
safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
“project” to prevent them from attaining regular status, employers
claiming that their workers are project employees should prove that: (a)
the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time
they were engaged; and (b) there was indeed a project.
Same; Same; The repeated and successive rehiring of project
employees does not, by and of itself, qualify them as regular
employees.—At any rate, the repeated and successive rehiring of
project employees does not, by and of itself, qualify them as regular
employees. Case law states that length of service (through rehiring) is
not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure, but whether
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking,
with its completion having been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee. While generally, length of service
provides a fair yardstick for determining when an employee initially
Page 394 of 682
hired on a temporary basis becomes a permanent one, entitled to the

security and benefits of regularization, this standard will not be fair, if
applied to the construction industry because construction firms cannot
guarantee work and funding for its payrolls beyond the life of each
project as they have no control over the decisions and resources of
project proponents or owners. Thus, once the project is completed it
would be unjust to require the employer to maintain these employees in
their payroll since this would be tantamount to making the employee a
privileged retainer who collects payment from his employer for work not
done, and amounts to labor coddling at the expense of management.
Page 395 of 682

A.M. No. CA-15-33-P. August 24, 2015.*

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-207-CA-P)
TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, Clerk of Court, COURT OF APPEALS,
MANILA, complainant, vs. RONELO G. LABAR, Driver, Mailing
and Delivery Section, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU STATION,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Insubordination; Words and
Phrases; Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order,
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed.—
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a
superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a
willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions
of the employer.
Same; Same; Same; Labar’s acts of loitering in the maintenance section
of the premises of Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu without any official
business and without a valid pass slip from the office of the Assistant
Clerk of Court and at the same time, gambling thereat during office
hours do not constitute insubordination, there being no willful or
intentional disregard of a directive or order of a superior officer.—In this
case, Labar’s acts of loitering in the maintenance section of the
premises of CA-Cebu without any official business and without a valid
pass slip from the office of the Assistant Clerk of Court and at the same
time, gambling thereat during office hours do not constitute
insubordination, there being no willful or intentional disregard of a
directive or order of a superior officer. His transgressions, which violated
the April 14, 2011 Memorandum of the CA-Cebu, do not sufficiently
demonstrate a refusal to abide by the same.
Same; Same; Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; Gambling
Prohibited by Law; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that Labar should be
held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under
Section 52(C)(3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (RURACCS) for his unjustified presence at the
maintenance section of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu without official
business thereat or without a valid pass slip from the Assistant Clerk of
Court, in direct contravention of the April 14, 2011 Memorandum.
Likewise, he should be held liable for the offense of gambling prohibited
by law under Section 52(C)(5) of the same Rules, for having committed
gambling on the same incident.—Instead, the Court finds that Labar
should be held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations under Section 52(C)(3) of the Revised URACCS for his
unjustified presence at the maintenance section of the CA-Cebu without
official business thereat or without a valid pass slip from the Assistant
Clerk of Court, in direct contravention of the April 14, 2011
Memorandum. Likewise, he should be held liable for the offense of
gambling prohibited by law under Section 52(C)(5) of the same Rules,
for having committed gambling on the same incident. As Labar offered
Page 396 of 682
his apology and vowed not to commit the same acts again, and
considering that his offense would be his first administrative infraction,
the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of reprimand, instead of
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day, as recommended by the
OCA.
Same; Same; No other office in the government service exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee
than the judiciary.—On this score, it bears to stress that no other office
in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The
conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Any act which falls short of the
exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be
countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true
temple of justice.
Page 397 of 682

G.R. Nos. 200841-42. August 26, 2015.*

CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.
Taxation; Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals; Under Section 3,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), an
amended decision is issued when there is any action modifying or
reversing a decision of the CTA En Banc or in Division.—Under Section 3,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, an amended
decision is issued when there is any action modifying or reversing a
decision of the CTA En Banc or in Division. Pursuant to these
parameters, it is clear that the CIR’s motions for partial reconsideration
— i.e., (a) motion for partial reconsideration of the June 24, 2009
Decision; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration of the January 19,
2010 Amended Decision — assailed separate and distinct decisions that
were rendered by the CTA Division. Notably, its amended decision
modified and increased CE Luzon’s entitlement to a refund or tax credit
certificate in the amount of P17,277,938.47. Essentially, it was therefore
a different decision and, hence, the proper subject of a motion for
reconsideration anew on the part of the CIR. Thus, CE Luzon’s
procedural objection must fail.
Same; Tax Refunds; Reconciling the pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi
Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San
Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases, the rule must
therefore, be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau
of Internal Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA489-03 was issued) to October 6,
2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need
not observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period before it could
file a judicial claim for refund of excess input value-added tax (VAT)
before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the
aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010),
the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to
the filing of such claim.—In the more recent case of Taganito Mining
pronouncements in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA
422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336
(2013), holding that from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 which
refers to the interregnum when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued
until the date of promulgation of Aichi, taxpayerclaimants need not
observe the stringent 120-day period; but before and after said window
period, the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period
remained in force, viz.: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and
San Roque cases, the rule must therefore, be that during the period
December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to
October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated),
taxpayersclaimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could
file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before
and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to
Page 398 of 682

October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory

and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
Page 399 of 682

G.R. No. 214241. January 13, 2016.*

SPOUSES RAMON and LIGAYA GONZALES, petitioners, vs.
MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION, represented by MARIANO
MANALO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him.—The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed. In view of this doctrine,
jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first
before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The
premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. However, it must be clarified that
the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain
exceptions, one of which is when the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
Same; Same; Lis Pendens; A notice of lis pendens is an announcement
to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does
so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
said property.—“Lis pendens,” which literally means pending suit, refers
to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a
property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and
until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis
pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated; and to prevent the defeat
of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in
litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis
pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land
Page 400 of 682
subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled “after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded.”—Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled “after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded.” In the same vein, case law likewise instructs that a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are
exceptional circumstances imputable to the party who caused the
annotation; (b) the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of
the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner;
(c) the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was
dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or (d)
judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation.
Page 401 of 682

G.R. No. 214430. March 9, 2016.*

FELICITO M. MEJORADO, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; It is settled that
mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty.—It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce
a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt
exists. In Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto
Princesa City, 722 SCRA 66 (2014), a case cited at length by petitioner
himself, the Court elucidated on the propriety of the issuance of the writ
of mandamus.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of mandamus may only issue if the party
claiming it has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded, and that it was the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required to accord the same upon him.—It bears
reiteration that the writ of mandamus may only issue if the party
claiming it has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded, and that it was the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required to accord the same upon him. Petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of the NCA to cover the amount of his second
claim falls short of this standard, there being no clear and specific duty
on the part of the respondent to issue the same.
Page 402 of 682

G.R. No. 214752. March 9, 2016.*

EQUITABLE SAVINGS BANK (now known as the merged entity
“BDO Unibank, Inc.”), petitioner, vs. ROSALINDA C. PALCES,
respondent.
Civil Law; Sales; Sale on Installments; Article 1484 of the Civil Code
governs the sale of personal properties in installments. —Article 1484 of
the Civil Code, which governs the sale of personal properties in
installments, states in full: Article 1484. In a contract of sale of personal
property the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may
exercise any of the following remedies: (1) Exact fulfilment of the
obligation, should the vendee fail to pay; (2) Cancel the sale, should the
vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments; (3) Foreclose
the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted,
should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments. In
this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to
recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary
shall be void.
Same; Same; There was no vendor-vendee relationship between
respondent and petitioner. A judicious perusal of the records would
reveal that respondent never bought the subject vehicle from petitioner
but from a third party, and merely sought financing from petitioner for
its full purchase price.—In this case, there was no vendor-vendee
relationship between respondent and petitioner. A judicious perusal of
the records would reveal that respondent never bought the subject
vehicle from petitioner but from a third party, and merely sought
financing from petitioner for its full purchase price. In order to document
the loan transaction between petitioner and respondent, a Promissory
Note with Chattel Mortgage dated August 18, 2005 was executed
wherein, inter alia, respondent acknowledged her indebtedness to
petitioner in the amount of P1,196,100.00 and placed the subject
vehicle as a security for the loan. Indubitably, a loan contract with the
accessory chattel mortgage contract — and not a contract of sale of
personal property in installments — was entered into by the parties with
respondent standing as the debtor-mortgagor and petitioner as the
creditor mortgagee. Therefore, the conclusion of the CA that Article
1484 finds application in this case is misplaced, and thus, must be set
aside.
Same; Same; Chattel Mortgage; In view of petitioner’s prayer for and
subsequent possession of the subject vehicle in preparation for its
foreclosure, it is only proper that petitioner be ordered to commence
foreclosure proceedings, if none yet has been conducted/con cluded,
over the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, i.e., within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision.—There is nothing in the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage that bars petitioner from receiving any late partial payments
from respondent. If at all, petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s late
partial payments in the aggregate amount of P103,000.00 will only
Page 403 of 682
operate to reduce her outstanding obligation to petitioner from

P664,500.00 to P561,500.00. Such a reduction in respondent’s
outstanding obligation should be accounted for when petitioner
conducts the impending foreclosure sale of the subject vehicle. Once
such foreclosure sale has been made, the proceeds thereof should be
applied to the reduced amount of respondent’s outstanding obligation,
and the excess of said proceeds, if any, should be returned to her. In
sum, the CA erred in ordering petitioner to return the amount of
P103,000.00 to respondent. In view of petitioner’s prayer for and
subsequent possession of the subject vehicle in preparation for its
foreclosure, it is only proper that petitioner be ordered to commence
foreclosure proceedings, if none yet has been conducted/concluded,
over the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, i.e., within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision.
Attorney’s Fees; Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still, attorney’s fees
may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of his cause.— Anent the issue of
attorney’s fees, it is settled that attorney’s fees “cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still, attorney’s fees
conviction of the righteousness of his cause.” In this case, suffice it to
say that the CA correctly ruled that the award of attorney’s fees and
costs of suit should be deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
Page 404 of 682

G.R. Nos. 212593-94. March 15, 2016.*

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 213163-78. March 15, 2016.*

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213540-41. March 15, 2016.*

JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-
MORALES in her official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213542-43. March 15, 2016.*

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,
petitioners, vs. CONCHITA CARPIOMORALES, in her official
capacity as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 215880-94. March 15, 2016.*

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,
petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213475-76. March 15, 2016.*

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-
MORALES, in her official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and SANDIGAN BAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
respondents.
Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the
Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when
there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.—At the outset, it must be
stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be
filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
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discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Being merely based
on opinion and belief, finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
—In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of
discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling — that,
is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,
677 SCRA 113 (2012), “[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
‘actual or positive cause’ nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.”
Same; Same; Same; In determining the elements of the crime charged
for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are
required, not absolute certainty.”—In determining the elements of the
crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
“only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused]
are required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, petitioners were
charged with the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
Criminal Law; Plunder; Elements of.—Plunder, defined and penalized
under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements:
(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b)
that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d)
thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the
other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a)
that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy
with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
Page 406 of 682
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or

giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions. Owing to the nature of a
preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements
need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence
becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause — the
determinative matter in a preliminary investigation — implies mere
probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The
validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. —It should be
pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence, and that the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Therefore, “the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.”
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.—Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations,
the “technical rules of evidence should not be applied” in the course of
its proceedings, keeping in mind that “the determination of probable
cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation
or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies presented.”
Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared
that since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the
rights and obligations of parties, “probable cause can be established
with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay.”
Same; Same; State Witnesses; The decision to employ an accused as a
state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors
whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several
accused before the courts.—The Court rejects Reyes’s theory that the
whistleblowers and Tuason are the “most guilty” in the perpetuation of
the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the Ombudsman
violated Section 17, Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by
granting immunity to them. To begin with, “[t]he authority to grant
immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has
vested such power in the Ombudsman[,] as well as in the Secretary of
Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness
must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is
to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the
courts. The latter do not, as a rule[,] have a vision of the true strength
of the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently,
courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and
Page 407 of 682
deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness

only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17,
Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure].”
Forgery; The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been
forged.—Anent Reyes’s claim that her signatures in the documentary
evidence presented were false, falsified, and fictitious, it must be
emphasized that “[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged
signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged
forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to
have been forged.” Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to
present clear and convincing evidence to prove her claim of forgery,
especially in light of the following considerations pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the petition in G.R.
Nos. 212593-94: (a) in a letter dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the
COA, Senator Enrile himself admitted that his signatures, as well as
those of Reyes, found on the documents covered by the COA’s Special
Audit Report are authentic; and (b) Rogelio Azores, the supposed
document examiner who now works as a freelance consultant, aside
from only analyzing photocopies of the aforesaid documents and not
the originals thereof, did not categorically state that Reyes’s signatures
on the endorsement letters were forged. As there is no clear showing of
forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot
subscribe to Reyes’s contrary submission. Notably, however, she retains
the right to raise and substantiate the same defense during trial proper.
Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof, the
Supreme Court (SC) is convinced that there lies probable cause against
Janet Napoles for the charge of plunder.— Anent Janet Napoles’s
complicity in the above mentioned crimes, records similarly show that
she, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated
misuse of Senator Enrile’s PDAF. As exhibited in the modus operandi
discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the availability of
a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the “lead employee” of the JLN
Corporation, would prepare a listing of the available projects specifically
indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the Office of Senator
Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from her
own pockets for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the
remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO and/or
NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napoles’s
NGOs to undertake the PDAFfunded projects, which were “ghost
projects” that allowed Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF
allocation. Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is
convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the
charge of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in
conspiracy with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was
Page 408 of 682
significantly involved in the aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain

Senator Enrile’s PDAF, who supposedly abused his authority as a public
officer in order to do so; (b) through this modus operandi, it appears
that Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of
“kickbacks” in the years 2004-2010; and (c) the total value of
“kickbacks’’ given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least
P172,834,500.00
Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; There is probable cause
against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3019.—In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet
Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that:
(a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief-
of-staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would
enter into transactions involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b)
Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest partiality and evident
bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as
beneficiaries of his PDAF-funded projects — even without the benefit of
a public bidding and/or negotiated procurement, in direct violation of
existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; and
(c) the “ghost” PDAF-funded projects caused undue prejudice to the
government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.
Same; Same; Plunder; Conspiracy; While the primary offender in
Plunder and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if
they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the
same.—At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Janet Napoles of her
mistaken notion that as a private individual, she cannot be held
answerable for the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers. While
the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private
individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to
have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds
from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. In this case, given that the evidence gathered
perceptibly shows Janet Napoles’s engagement in the illegal
hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile’s PDAF, the Ombudsman rightfully
charged her, with Enrile and Reyes, as a coconspirator for the
aforestated crimes.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or
information is, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.— There is no merit in
Janet Napoles’s assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form
and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities
such as the time, place, and manner of the commission of the crimes
charged. “According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
Page 409 of 682
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the

commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts
alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of
the offense.” In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated that:
(a) Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the
ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being
accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019; (c) they
used a certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of
which were stated therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine
government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount
of P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime
between the years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City,
Quezon City, and Pasay City. The aforesaid allegations were essentially
reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations — one (1) for Plunder and
fifteen (15) for violation of RA 3019 — filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Evidently, these factual assertions already square with the requirements
of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above cited.
Upon such averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet Napoles has
been completely informed of the accusations against her to enable her
to prepare for an intelligent defense. The NBI and the FIO Complaints
are, therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.
at “[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.”— As
regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and
De Asis, it must be first highlighted that they are placed in the same
situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with crime/s
principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or
multiple violations of Section 3[e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as
private individuals on account of their alleged conspiracy with public
officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that
“[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.” Thus, the
reasonable likelihood that conspiracy exists between them denotes the
probable existence of the elements of the crimes above discussed
equally as to them. “Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by
the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; The res inter alios
acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly
applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings;
Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are
not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation.”—Neither can the Napoles
siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the
admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the
same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on
Page 410 of 682
evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of

preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned
the Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would
otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that
there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the
whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings
under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately,
as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding
on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that there are
equally well-grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis,
thru his participation as President of Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma
Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI) and member/incorporator of Countrywide Agri
and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED), as well as
his acts of receiving checks in the name of said Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts,
delivering money to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the delivery of
“kickbacks” and “commissions” of the legislators, conspired with the
other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.—In the
same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for De Asis’s
involvement as a coconspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as
violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. A perusal thereof readily reveals
that De Asis is the President of KPMFI and a member/incorporator of
CARED — two (2) among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used
in the perpetuation of the scam particularly involved in the illegal
disbursement of Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Moreover, in the Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their
respective Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay they tagged De Asis as
one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker; that he,
among others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and
deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn
from the bank, De Asis was also one of those tasked to bring the money
to Janet Napoles’s house. With these, the Court finds that there are
equally well-grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis,
thru his participation as President of KPMFI and member/incorporator of
CARED, as well as his acts of receiving checks in the name of said
NGOs, depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts, delivering money
to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the delivery of “kickbacks” and
“commissions” of the legislators, conspired with the other petitioners to
commit the crimes charged against them.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or absence of
the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial
Page 411 of 682
on the merits.—Certainly, De Asis’s defenses, which are anchored on

the want of criminal intent, as well as the absence of all the elements of
the crime of Plunder on his part, are better ventilated during trial and
not during preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point,
a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Hence, for De Asis’s apparent participation in
the PDAF scam, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding probable cause against him for one (1) count of Plunder and
fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as charged.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Once the public prosecutor (or the
Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case to
the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of
probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest
should be issued ordering the detention of the accused.—Once the
public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and
thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a
judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if
a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the
accused. The Court, in People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95 (2009),
delineated the functions and purposes of a determination of probable
cause made by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the trial
court, on the other: There are two kinds of determination of probable
case: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law
and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the
quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If
the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.
Same; Same; Same; The option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory and reiterated that the court’s
first option x x x is for it to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.— The Court in
Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014), clarified that the trial court
(or the Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing
of a criminal information before it, namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the
Page 412 of 682
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b) issue a

warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause. The Court went on to elaborate that “the option to
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory”
and reiterated that “the court’s first option x x x is for it to ‘immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.’” Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the
trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is
entitled to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to
determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order
the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line with the
fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion
of the court.” Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the trial
courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature: Although
jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always
proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause,
considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only
when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to
support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case.
On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not
hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may
be served.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Unlike an appeal, a petition for
certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings
in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction,
including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.—No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part
of the Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes’s motion to suspend
proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning the Ombudsman’s issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R.
Nos. 21259394. Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari in relation to a case
pending before the court a quo does not ipso facto stay the proceedings
therein, unless the higher court issues a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction against the conduct of such proceedings.
Otherwise stated, a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before
them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original action; it is
not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of
Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order
to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65
petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious
ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the
Page 413 of 682
proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the

existence of an, urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious
damage may be prevented. In this case, since the Court did not issue
any temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for
continuing with the proceedings before it.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Moot and Academic; View that the
Petitions before the Supreme Court (SC) could also be dismissed for
being moot and academic.—The Petitions before us could also be
dismissed for being moot and academic. When the Sandiganbayan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners after finding probable
cause, all petitions questioning the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause, including these Petitions before us, have already become moot.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that the determination of probable
cause by the prosecutor is different from the determination of probable
cause by the trial court.—The determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is different from the determination of probable cause by the
trial court. A preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecutor to
determine whether there is probable cause to file an information or
whether the complaint should be dismissed. Once the information is
filed, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case. The trial court
then determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Any question relating to the disposition of the case
should be addressed to the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; View that executive determination of probable
cause is outlined by the Rules of Court, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770, and
various issuances by the Department of Justice (DOJ).—Although both
the prosecutor and the trial court may rely on the same records and
evidence, their findings are arrived at independently. Executive
determination of probable cause is outlined by the Rules of Court,
Republic Act No. 6770, and various issuances by the Department of
Justice. It is the Constitution, however, that mandates the conduct of
judicial determination of probable cause.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; View that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is also not a venue for an exhaustive display of
petitioners’ evidence.—The conduct of a preliminary investigation is
also not a venue for an exhaustive display of petitioners’ evidence. It is
merely preparatory to a criminal action. In Drilon v. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 280 (1996): Probable cause should be determined in a
summary but scrupulous manner to prevent material damage to a
potential accused’s constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the
presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime. The validity and merits of a party’s
Page 414 of 682
defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and

preliminary investigation level.
Same; Same; Same; View that once the trial court finds the existence of
probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, any
question on the prosecutor’s conduct of preliminary investigation has
already become moot.—A trial court’s finding of probable cause does
not rely on the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Once the trial
court finds the existence of probable cause, which results in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, any question on the prosecutor’s
conduct of preliminary investigation has already become moot.
Page 415 of 682

G.R. No. 214243. March 16, 2016.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NILDA B.
TAMPUS, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Judicial Declaration
of Presumptive Death; Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four (4) consecutive years and the present spouse had a
wellfounded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.— Before a
judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for
four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the
present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the presaent spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present
spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse
to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of
declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative
of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with
him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.—The “wellfounded
belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.
As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive,
failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts, but
more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.
Page 416 of 682

G.R. No. 217799. March 16, 2016.*

CITA C. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. FIDEL D. AQUINO, respondent.
Agrarian Reform; Right of Redemption; An agricultural lessor has the
right to sell his land, with or without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessee, subject, however, to the latter’s right of redemption over the
said land.—An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his land, with or
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, subject, however, to
the latter’s right of redemption over the said land. In this relation,
Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, pertinently provides: Section 12.
Lessee’s Right of Redemption.—In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption
under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days
from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all
lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of
the land at the time of the sale.
Same; Same; Requirements for a Valid Exercise of the Right of
Redemption.—The right of redemption is validly exercised upon
compliance with the following requirements: (a) the redemptioner must
be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land must have been
sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale
given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR; (c) only the area cultivated
by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; and (d) the right of
redemption must be exercised within 180 days from written notice of
the sale by the vendee.
Same; Same; Case law holds that tender or consignation is an
indispensable requirement to the proper exercise of the right of
redemption by the agricultural lessee.—Case law further holds that
tender or consignation is an indispensable requirement to the proper
exercise of the right of redemption by the agricultural lessee. Thus, an
offer to redeem can be properly effected through: (a) a formal tender
with consignation, or (b) a complaint filed in court coupled with
consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It
must be stressed that in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a
person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase.
This statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment of the full amount of the repurchase
price, i.e., the consideration of the sale, otherwise the offer to redeem
will be held ineffectual.
Same; Same; While the right of redemption under Section 12 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended, is an essential mandate of the
agrarian reform legislation to implement the State’s policy of owner-
Page 417 of 682
cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, self-reliant existence for small

farmers, such laudable and commendable policy is never intended to
unduly transgress the corresponding rights of purchasers of land.—
Having elected to exercise his right to redeem the subject land by filing
a complaint in court, it behooved upon respondent to comply with the
requirements for a valid and effective exercise of such right, i.e., the
filing of the complaint should have been coupled with the consignation
of the redemption price to show his willingness and ability to pay.
Considering that respondent failed to consign the redemption price of
P20,000.00 when he filed the complaint for redemption before the
PARAD on January 15, 2002, there was no valid exercise of the right to
redeem the subject land. It bears stressing that while the right of
redemption under Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, is an essential
mandate of the agrarian reform legislation to implement the State’s
policy of ownercultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, self-reliant
existence for small farmers, such laudable and commendable policy is
never intended to unduly transgress the corresponding rights of
purchasers of land. Consequently, the dismissal of the complaint for
redemption is in order.
Same; Agricultural Leasehold Relationship; Under the law, the existence
of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes in
ownership in case of sale, as in this case, since the purpose of the law is
to strengthen the security of tenure of tenants.—This notwithstanding,
petitioner, as the new owner, is bound to respect and maintain
respondent as tenant of the subject land because of the latter’s tenancy
right attached to the land regardless of who its owner may be. Under
the law, the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not
terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale, as in this case,
since the purpose of the law is to strengthen the security of tenure of
tenants.
Page 418 of 682

G.R. No. 218172. March 16, 2016.*

UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. ELMER ABLAY, ILDEFONSO CLAVECILLAS, STANLEY BLAZA,
VINCENT VILLAVICENCIO, ROBERTO CACAS, and ELSA
CADAYUNA, in behalf of her deceased husband, ELEAZAR
CADAYUNA, respondents.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; To
constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of
Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be
serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character, and not merely
trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct must be related to
the performance of the employee’s duties showing him to be unfit to
continue working for the employer.—Misconduct is defined as an
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text
and meaning of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee’s
misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated
character, and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the
misconduct must be related to the performance of the employee’s
duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
Further, and equally important and required, the act or conduct must
have been performed with wrongful intent. In other words, for serious
misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the
following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b)
it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that
the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer;
and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; As a
general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement (or separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable) and
payment of full backwages; Exceptions.—As a general rule, an illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if
reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages. In certain
cases, however, the Court has carved out an exception to the foregoing
rule and thereby ordered the reinstatement of the employee without
backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact that the dismissal of
the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (b) that the employer
was in good faith in terminating the employee.
Same; Same; The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly observed that Ablay’s
conviction as an accomplice to the murder of petitioner’s former
assistant manager had strained the relationship between Ablay and
petitioner.—The CA correctly observed that Ablay’s conviction as an
accomplice to the murder of petitioner’s former assistant manager had
strained the relationship between Ablay and petitioner. Hence, Ablay
should not be reinstated in the company and, instead, be paid
Page 419 of 682
separation pay, as reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of

antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect his
efficiency and productivity. In this relation, it should be clarified that
said strained relation should not affect the grant of benefits in his favor
prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains to an offense entirely
separate and distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges
against him in the case at bar, i.e., taking of the company equipment
without authority. Petitioner’s payment of separation pay to Ablay in lieu
of his reinstatement is therefore warranted.
Page 420 of 682

G.R. No. 196117. August 13, 2014.*

KRYSTLE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, WILLIAM C. CU, petitioner, vs.
DOMINGO ALIBIN, as substituted by his heirs, namely: BEATRIZ
A. TORZAR, VIRGINIA A. TARAYA, ROSARIO A. MARCO, JESUS A.
ALIBIN, and JAY ALIBIN, as substituted by his children, namely:
JAYNES ALIBIN, JAY ALIBIN, and JESUS ALIBIN, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 196129. August 13, 2014.*
CARIDAD RODRIGUEZA, as substituted by RUFINO
RODRIGUEZA, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ALIBIN, as substituted
by his heirs, namely: BEATRIZ A. TORZAR, VIRGINIA A. TARAYA,
ROSARIO A. MARCO, JESUS A. ALIBIN, and JAY ALIBIN, as
substituted by his children, namely: JAYNES ALIBIN, JAY ALIBIN,
and JESUS ALIBIN, JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled rule that the
Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts and, hence, does not normally
undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) are generally conclusive
and binding on the Court, especially if they do not contradict those of
the trial court, as in this case.—It is a settled rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts and, hence, does not normally undertake the
reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case, considering that the factual findings of the
CA are generally conclusive and binding on the Court, especially if they
do not contradict those of the trial court, as in this case.
Same; Evidence; Handwriting Experts; The opinion of a handwriting
expert, therefore, does not mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s
function being to place before the court data upon which it can form its
own opinion.—As correctly pointed out by the CA, the authenticity of a
signature is a matter that is not so highly technical as to preclude a
judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon the
question of whether the signature on a document is forged or not. The
opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore, does not mandatorily bind
the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data
upon which it can form its own opinion.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage.—The Court likewise rejects
the belated claim of res judicata anchored on the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 127995 filed by Domingo as per its
Resolution dated April 28, 1997, which became final and executory on
June 16, 1997. As the records disclose, petitioners never raised this
issue in the appeal in C.A.G.R. CV No. 54912 before the CA, and even in
the subsequent proceedings before the RTC and the CA in C.A.-G.R. CV
Page 421 of 682
No. 92765. Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first
time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process
impel this rule.
Page 422 of 682

G.R. No. 210861. July 29, 2015.*

CENTRAL BICOL STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE,
represented by its President, ATTY. MARIO T. BERNALES,
petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by
GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and GAWAD
KALINGA FOUNDATION, INC. represented by its Executive
Director, JOSE LUIS OQUIÑENA,** and its Camarines Sur Chapter
Head, HARRY AZANA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; As a general rule, a
petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.—As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12SC where no provision for
the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists,
unlike in the previous Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons and
in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the
Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the
court’s sound discretion. Eventually, in Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723
(2010), the Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the
strict observance of the 60-day reglementary period: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again, the Supreme Court
(SC) has held that although procedural rules ought to be strictly
enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, the
SC has, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. —Time and again, the Court has
held that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by
courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, the Court has,
Page 423 of 682
nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in

several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice would be better
served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. After all, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the
application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties,
bearing always in mind the principle that procedure must not hinder
but, rather, promote the administration of justice.
Page 424 of 682

G.R. No. 215555. July 29, 2015.*

CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. and ANTONIO STEVEN L.
CHAN, petitioners, vs. JANET T. SIASON, respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Resignation; Resignation is the
formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the
voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where he believes
that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of
the service, and he has then no other choice but to disassociate himself
from employment.— Resignation is the formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an
employee who is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has
then no other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment;
hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact
intended to terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a
fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the
employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive dismissal exists
where there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits.—
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay
and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,
constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment. It must be
noted, however, that bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
Same; Same; Resignation; It is settled that there is nothing
reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee a
chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter’s
employment record.—Verily, Chan’s decision to give Siason a graceful
exit rather than to file an action for redress is perfectly within the
discretion of the former; as it is not uncommon that an employee is
permitted to resign to avoid the humiliation and embarrassment of
being terminated for just cause after the exposure of her malfeasance.
It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the
employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather
than smear the latter’s employment record, as in this case.
G.R. No. 211302. August 12, 2015.*
Page 425 of 682
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., CARLOS C. SALINAS,

and NORWEGIAN CREW MANAGEMENT A/S, petitioners, vs.
CESAR C. PELAGIO, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreements; To be considered valid
and binding between the contracting parties, a compromise agreement
must be: (a) not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
and public policy; (b) freely and intelligently executed by and between
the parties; and (c) compliant with the requisites and principles of
contracts.—A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties,
by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. To be considered valid and binding between the
contracting parties, a compromise agreement must be: (a) not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; (b) freely
and intelligently executed by and between the parties; and (c)
compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts. Once entered
into, it has the effect and the authority of res judicata upon the parties.
In other words, a valid compromise agreement may render a pending
case moot and academic. However, the parties may opt to put therein
clauses, conditions, and the like that would prevent a pending case from
becoming moot and academic — such as when the execution of such
agreement is without prejudice to the final disposition of the said case.
After all, a compromise agreement is still a contract by nature, and as
such, the parties are free to insert clauses to modify its legal effects, so
long as such modifications are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
Page 426 of 682

G.R. No. 213729. September 2, 2015.*

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. ALEXANDER P.
BICHARA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Dispositive Portion; A
judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its
dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule.—A judgment
should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion
is a long and well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution
is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the
writ has pro tanto no validity.
Same; Same; Same; Immutability of Final Judgments; A companion to
this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states
that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of what court renders it.—A companion to this rule is the
principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final
judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of
what court renders it. Any attempt to insert, change or add matters not
clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments. But like any other rule, this principle has
exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter
the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts when
after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts
and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or
unjust.—It should be pointed out that the principle of immutability of
judgments, from which the above stated rule on writ of executions
proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize circumstances that
transpire after the finality of the decision which would render its
execution unjust and inequitable and act accordingly. Thus, in view of
the supervening events above mentioned, this Court deems the award
of salary differential to be the just and equitable award under the
circumstances herein prevailing. Jurisprudence holds that courts may
modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and
the facts when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has
become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its
execution impossible or unjust, as in this case.
Labor Law; Demotion; Since Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally
decreed, he should be entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a
flight purser, from the time of retrenchment in July 1998 up until his
compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight
Page 427 of 682
purser in accordance with the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement

(CBA) at the time of Bichara’s retirement; and (c) attorney’s fees, moral,
and exemplary damages, if any.—It deserves mentioning that since
Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be
entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the
time of retrenchment in July 1998 up until his compulsory retirement in
July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in accordance with
the existing CBA at the time of Bichara’s retirement; and (c) attorney’s
fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, but only if this Court, in
the Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn. of the Phils. v. PAL, Patria T.
Chiong, and CA, 559 SCRA 252 (2008), case, finally rules that the
subject retrenchment is invalid. Otherwise, he should only be entitled to
the above stated salary differential, as well as the corresponding
separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Article 297 (formerly
Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The
awards of backwages, and retirement benefits, including attorney’s
fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, cannot, however, be
executed in these proceedings since they are incidents which pertain to
the illegal retrenchment case, hence, executable only when the FASAP
case is finally concluded.
Page 428 of 682

G.R. No. 208802. October 14, 2015.*

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ROMEO
L. BATTUNG, JR., represented by ROMEO BATTUNG, SR.,
respondents.
Civil Law; Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence; The law exacts
from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e.,
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers.—The
law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations,
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree
of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its
passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state: Art. 1733.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755.”—In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that “[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.” This disputable
presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; It is imperative for a party claiming against a
common carrier to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s
arose from the negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees
in providing safe transport to its passengers.—It is imperative for a
party claiming against a common carrier under the above said
provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose
from the negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in
providing safe transport to its passengers. In Pilapil v. CA, 180 SCRA 546
(1989), the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the
passenger was in no way due (1) to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the negligent or
willful acts of the common carrier’s employees with respect to the
foregoing — such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created
Page 429 of 682
by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to

prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as
competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil
Code should not apply.
Same; Same; Diligence of a Good Father of the Family; Since Battung’s
death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article
1763 of the Civil Code, which states that “a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.”—Since Battung’s death was caused by a co-passenger, the
applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that
“a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.” Notably, for this obligation, the law
provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a
family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common
carrier’s part.
Same; Same; Same; Case law states that the concept of diligence of a
good father of a family connotes reasonable care consistent with that
which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation.—Case law states that the concept of
diligence of a good father of a family “connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to
determine whether negligence attended the performance of an
obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.”
Page 430 of 682

G.R. No. 213014. October 14, 2015.*

MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly PNB-Republic Bank),1
petitioner, vs. SPOUSES OSCAR and NENITA TARROSA,
respondent.
Civil Law; Mortgages; Prescription; An action to enforce a right arising
from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time
the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the
payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred
by prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights under the
mortgage.—An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should
be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his
obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription
and the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage. However,
mere delinquency in payment does not necessarily mean delay in the
legal concept. To be in default is different from mere delay in the
grammatical sense, because it involves the beginning of a special
condition or status which has its own peculiar effects or results.
Same; Same; Default; In order that the debtor may be in default, it is
necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor
requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is
not necessary — i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect;
where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling motive or
the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where
demand would be useless.— In order that the debtor may be in default,
it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor
requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is
not necessary — i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect;
where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling motive or
the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where
demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or
obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly
that after the period lapses, default will commence. Thus, it is only
when demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the aforementioned
circumstances, or when required, such demand is made and
subsequently refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default
and the mortgagee obtains the right to file an action to collect the debt
or foreclose the mortgage.
Page 431 of 682

G.R. No. 212070. January 27, 2016.*

CEBU PEOPLE’S MULTI -PURPOSE COOPERATIVE and MACARIO G.
QUEVEDO, petitioners, vs. NICERATO E. CARBONILLA, JR.,
respondent.
conferred upon it.—To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are
not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that
the CA committed reversible error in granting Carbonilla, Jr.’s certiorari
petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that
he was validly dismissed from employment as CPMPC was able to prove,
through substantial evidence, the existence of just causes warranting
the same.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Basic is the rule that an
employer may validly terminate the services of an employee for any of
the just causes enumerated under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of
the Labor Code.—Basic is the rule that an employer may validly
terminate the services of an employee for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code,
namely: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a
crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Same; Same; Misconduct; Case law characterizes misconduct as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies
Page 432 of 682
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.—Case law

characterizes misconduct as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
For misconduct to be considered as a just cause for termination, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious;
(b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; According to jurisprudence,
loss of trust and confidence will validate an employee’s dismissal when
it is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence; and (b) he performs an act that would justify such loss
of trust and confidence.—Carbonilla, Jr.’s dismissal was also justified on
the ground of loss of trust and confidence. According to jurisprudence,
loss of trust and confidence will validate an employee’s dismissal when
it is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence; and (b) he performs an act that would justify such loss
of trust and confidence. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust:
first, manage rial employees whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members
of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-andfile employees,
such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the
normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts
of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are
routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or
property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and
confidence.
Page 433 of 682

G.R. No. 213863. January 27, 2016.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDGARDO L.
SANTOS, represented by his assignee, ROMEO L. SANTOS,
respondent. G.R. No. 214021. January 27, 2016.* EDGARDO L.
SANTOS, represented by his assignee, ROMEO L. SANTOS,
petitioner, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; If the agrarian reform process is
still incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under Republic Act (RA)
No. 6657.—The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure of
landholdings or properties covered by PD 27 did not take place on
October 21, 1972, but upon the payment of just compensation. Thus, if
the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the
just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
RA 6657.
Same; Same; Special Agrarian Courts; A party who disagrees with the
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) adjudicator may
bring the matter to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), designated as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC) for final determination of just
compensation.—As summarized in LBP v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA 543
(2004), the procedure for the determination of just compensation under
RA 6657 commences with the LBP determining the initial valuation of
the lands under the land reform program. Using the LBP’s valuation, the
DAR makes an offer to the landowner. In case the landowner rejects the
offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the LBP, and other interested parties to submit evidence on
the just compensation of the land. A party who disagrees with the
decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC,
designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just
compensation.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse must be patent and
gross.—Grave abuse of discretion connotes an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse must be patent and
gross.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of
res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.—Res
Page 434 of 682
judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or

decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res
judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The
elements of res judicata are (a) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) particulars is such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Regional Trial Courts; The original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation is vested in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), hence, it
cannot be unduly restricted in the exercise of its judicial function.—It
bears stressing that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation is vested in the
RTC, hence, it cannot be unduly restricted in the exercise of its judicial
function.
Same; Same; It is doctrinal that the concept of just compensation
contemplates of just and timely payment.—It is doctrinal that the
concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment.
It embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation cannot be considered
“just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Expropriation Proceedings; In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if
there is delay in the payment of just compensation to the landowner
since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State.—In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is
delay in the payment of just compensation to the landowner since the
obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the
State. Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned
from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred
to the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government,
until full payment. To clarify, unlike the six percent (6%) annual
incremental interest allowed under DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994, DAR
AO No. 2, Series of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve
percent (12%) annual interest is not granted on the computed just
compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by
the landowner due to the delay in its payment.
Page 435 of 682

G.R. No. 214230. February 10, 2016.*

SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE
DEVELOPMENT BANK)/HERMINIO M. FAMATIGAN, JR.,
petitioners, vs. CHARLES M. SINGSON, respondent.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Separation Pay; As an
exception, case law instructs that in certain circumstances, the grant of
separation pay or financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee
has been allowed as a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity.
—Separation pay is warranted when the cause for termination is not
attributable to the employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles
298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal
where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an
employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 297 of the same Code, being causes attributable to the
employee’s fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to separation pay.
The non-grant of such right to separation pay is premised on the reason
that an erring employee should not benefit from their wrongful acts.
Under Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, such dismissed employee is nonetheless entitled to
whatever rights, benefits, and privileges he may have under the
applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or
voluntary employer policy or practice. As an exception, case law
instructs that in certain circumstances, the grant of separation pay or
financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee has been allowed
as a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity. In Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC (PLDT), 164 SCRA 671 (1988), the Court
laid down the parameters in awarding separation pay to dismissed
employees based on social justice.
Same; Same; Same; In the later case of Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Workers Association v. NLRC (Toyota), 537 SCRA 171
(2007), the Supreme Court (SC) further excluded from the grant of
separation pay based on social justice the other instances listed under
Article 282 (now 296) of the Labor Code, namely, willful disobedience,
gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and
commission of a crime against the employer or his family.—In the PLDT
case, the Court required that the grant of separation pay as financial
assistance given in light of social justice be allowed only when the
dismissal: (a) was not for serious misconduct; and (b) does not reflect
on the moral character of the employee or would involve moral
turpitude. However, in the later case of Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Workers Association v. NLRC (Toyota), 537 SCRA 171
(2007), the Court further excluded from the grant of separation pay
based on social justice the other instances listed under Article 282 (now
296) of the Labor Code, namely, willful disobedience, gross and habitual
neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a
crime against the employer or his family. But with respect to analogous
cases for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the social
justice exception could be made to apply depending on certain
Page 436 of 682
considerations, such as the lengths of service of the employee, the

amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance
of the employee, and the like.
Same; Same; Same; The grant of separation pay to a dismissed
employee is primarily determined by the cause of the dismissal.—The
grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily
determined by the cause of the dismissal. In the case at bar,
respondent’s established act of repeatedly allowing Branch Manager
Pinero to bring the checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank’s
premises in violation of the company’s rules and regulations had
already been declared by the LA to be gross and habitual neglect of
duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which finding was not
contested on appeal by respondent. It was petitioners who interposed
an appeal solely with respect to the award of separation pay as financial
assistance. As they aptly pointed out, the infractions, while not clearly
indicative of any wrongful intent, is, nonetheless, serious in nature
when one considers the employee’s functions, rendering it inequitable
to award separation pay based on social justice. As the records show,
respondent was the custodian of accountable bank forms in his
assigned branch and as such, was mandated to strictly comply with the
monitoring procedure and disposition thereof as a security measure to
avoid the attendant high risk to the bank. Indeed, it is true that the
failure to observe the processes and risk preventive measures and
worse, to take action and address its violation, may subject the bank to
regulatory sanction. It bears stressing that the banking industry is
imbued with public interest. Banks are required to possess not only
ordinary diligence in the conduct of its business but extraordinary
diligence in the care of its accounts and the interests of its
stakeholders. The banking business is highly sensitive with a fiduciary
duty towards its client and the public in general, such that central
measures must be strictly observed. It is undisputed that respondent
failed to perform his duties diligently, and therefore, not only violated
established company policy but also put the bank’s credibility and
business at risk. The excuse that his Branch Manager, Pinero, merely
prompted him towards such ineptitude is of no moment. He readily
admitted that he violated established company policy against bringing
out checkbooks and bank forms, which means that he was well aware of
the fact that the same was prohibited. Nevertheless, he still chose to,
regardless of his superior’s influence, disobey the same not only once,
but on numerous occasions. All throughout, there is no showing that he
questioned the acts of Branch Manager Pinero; neither did he take it
upon himself to report said irregularities to a higher authority. Hence,
under these circumstances, the award of separation pay based on social
justice would be improper.
Same; Same; Length of Service; Length of service is not a bargaining
chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. —Notably,
respondent’s long years of service and clean employment record will
not justify the award of separation pay in view of the gravity of the
foregoing infractions. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can
simply be stacked against the employer. As ruled in Central Pangasinan
Page 437 of 682
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 528 SCRA 146 (2007): Although long
years of service might generally be considered for the award of
separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the
effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for
generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact
that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years
with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case,
does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an
employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become
a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.
Page 438 of 682

G.R. No. 218867. February 17, 2016.*

SPOUSES EDMOND LEE and HELEN HUANG, petitioners, vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; The payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection
of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected.—In
Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute, 726 SCRA 559 (2014), citing Gonzales
v. Pe, 655 SCRA 176 (2011), the Court clarified the requirement of full
payment of docket and other lawful fees under the above quoted rule in
this wise: [T]he procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is
not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It
bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory
privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to
the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this
period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount
of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without
such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the
Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Further, under Section 1(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the
CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the
nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step
for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.
Same; Same; Same; Perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such
requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.—That the RTC retained jurisdiction to
dismiss the appeal is beyond cavil, as provided under Section 9, Rule 41
above quoted. As a result of respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal
within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the RTC decision. To reiterate, perfection of an
appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and noncompliance with such requirements is considered
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It
bears to stress that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one
who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules.
Page 439 of 682

G.R. No. 213054. June 15, 2016.*

TERESITA TAN, petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON LORI
HOLDINGS, INC., PENTACAPITAL INVEST MENT CORPORATION,
FORTUNATO G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE, JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR.,
and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROMMEL IGNACIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Judicial Stability; Doctrine of
Non-interference; The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in
the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction.—In Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 437 (2015), the Court
explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of
judicial stability or noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of
a coequal court is an elementary principle in the administration of
justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or
orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction
over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an
execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that
all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A
court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law and the
rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a
remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to
another coequal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the
action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of
and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Void Judgments; A judgment rendered
by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked
anytime.—A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and
produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the
proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is
Page 440 of 682

no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims

emanating from it have no legal effect.
Page 441 of 682

G.R. Nos. 193383-84. January 14, 2015.*

CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 193407-08. January 14, 2015.*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. CBK
POWER COMPANY LIMITED, respondent.
International Law; Pacta Sunt Servanda; The time-honored international
principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith
of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement.—The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to the
general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The
time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the
states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have
the force and effect of law.
Taxation; Tax Refunds; As the Supreme Court (SC) exhorted in Republic
v. GST Philippines, Inc., 707 SCRA 695 (2013), while the taxpayer has an
obligation to honestly pay the right taxes, the government has a
corollary duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to discharge its duty
to collect what is due to it; and to justly return what has been
erroneously and excessively given to it.—It bears reiterating that the
application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to
confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief. Since CBK Power
had requested for confirmation from the ITAD on June 8, 2001 and
October 28, 2002 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative
claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should
be deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000, as in
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
704 SCRA 216 (2013). To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of
Section 229 of the NIRC in providing the taxpayer a remedy for
erroneously paid tax solely on the ground of failure to make prior
application for tax treaty relief. As the Court exhorted in Republic v. GST
Philippines, Inc., 707 SCRA 695 (2013), while the taxpayer has an
obligation to honestly pay the right taxes, the government has a
corollary duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to discharge its duty
to collect what is due to it; and to justly return what has been
erroneously and excessively given to it.
Same; Same; Sections 204 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) pertain to the refund of erroneously or illegally collected
taxes.—Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC pertain to the refund of
erroneously or illegally collected taxes. Section 204 applies to
administrative claims for refund, while Section 229 to judicial claims for
refund. In both instances, the taxpayer’s claim must be filed within two
(2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty. However,
Section 229 of the NIRC further states the condition that a judicial claim
Page 442 of 682

for refund may not be maintained until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner.
Page 443 of 682

G.R. No. 206032. August 19, 2015.*

JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. ELBURG
SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., AUGUSTEA
SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, and/or Captain ANTONIO S.
NOMBRADO,** respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; The entitlement of overseas
seafarers to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by
medical findings, but also by law and contract.—The entitlement of
overseas seafarers to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only
by medical findings, but also by law and contract. The pertinent
statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Articles 191 to
193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2, Rule X of the Rules
implementing Title II, Book IV of the said Code; while the relevant
contracts are: (a) the POEA-SEC, which is a standard set of provisions
that is deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s contract of
employment; (b) the CBA, if any; and (c) the employment agreement
between the seafarer and his employer.
Same; Same; Work-Related Injury; Work-Related Illness; Words and
Phrases; The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) defines “work-related
injury” as “injury(ies)” resulting in disability or death arising out of and
in the course of employment” and “work-related illness” as “any
sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied.”—The 2000 POEA-SEC defines “work-related injury” as
“injury(ies)” resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment” and “work-related illness” as “any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease
listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied,” viz.: 1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described
herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s
exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a
period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract
it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Same; Same; Occupational Diseases; Cardiovascular Disease; Section
32(A)(11) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) expressly con siders
Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) as an occupational disease.—Section
32(A)(11) of the 2000 POEA-SEC expressly considers Cardiovascular
Disease (CVD) as an occupational disease if it was contracted under any
of the following instances, to wit: (a) If the heart disease was known to
have been present during employment, there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reasons of the nature of his work. (b) The strain of work that brings
about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed
within 24 hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal
relationship. (c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before
Page 444 of 682
being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of

cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms
and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; A party in whose favor the legal
presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue.—A party in whose favor the legal presumption
exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact
in issue. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie
case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.
However, other than their bare and self-serving assertion that
petitioner’s Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease was a mere
complication of his Diabetes Mellitus II, respondents failed to introduce
countervailing evidence that would otherwise overcome the disputable
presumption of compensability of the said disease.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Occupational Diseases; It is safe to presume that,
at the very least, the nature of petitioner’s employment had contributed
to the aggravation of his illness, considering that as Chief Cook, he was
exposed to constant temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.—
Verily, it is not required that the employment of petitioner as Chief Cook
should be the sole factor in the development of his hypertensive
cardiovascular disease so as to entitle him to claim the benefits
provided therefor. It suffices that his employment as such had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.
Thus, it is safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of
petitioner’s employment had contributed to the aggravation of his
illness, considering that as Chief Cook, he was exposed to constant
temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.
Page 445 of 682

G.R. No. 172352. June 8, 2016.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO
HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife, CONSOLACION, and
children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR, WILSON, JIMMY,
ALFREDO, JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed HABABAG,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172387-88. June 8, 2016.*
ALFREDO HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife,
CONSOLACION, and children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR,
WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO, JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed
HABABAG, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; In Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP,
632 SCRA 727 (2010), the Supreme Court (SC) had illuminated that the
substantiality of the payments made by the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) is not the determining factor in the imposition of
interest as nothing less than full payment of just compensation is
required.—In Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), the
Court had illuminated that the substantiality of the payments made by
the LBP is not the determining factor in the imposition of interest as
nothing less than full payment of just compensation is required. The
value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the
principal sum of the just compensation due, and that interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal
sum after the taking has been completed.
Same; Same; In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016),
the Supreme Court (SC) reemphasized that just compensation
contemplates of just and timely payment, and elucidated that “prompt
payment” of just compensation encompasses the payment in full of the
just compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the
courts.—In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the
Court reemphasized that just compensation contemplates of just and
timely payment, and elucidated that “prompt payment” of just
compensation encompasses the payment in full of the just
compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the
courts. Hence, the requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere
deposit by the LBP with any accessible bank of the provisional
compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent
release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements
set forth by RA 6657.
Same; Same; The interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance, reckoned from the time
of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic
of the Philippines (Republic), or emancipation patents (EPs) are issued
by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent
Page 446 of 682
(6%) p.a. until full payment.—That being said, the Court, in view of the
LBP’s alternative Motion for Clarification, illumines that the interest shall
be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the
unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such
as when title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until June 30,
2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment. However, while the LBP averred that the landowner’s title was
cancelled in favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic’s title/s
was/were not attached to the records of these consolidated cases.
Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit certified true
copies of the Republic’s title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases,
and the latter to compute the correct amount of legal interests due to
the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the said titles/s.
Page 447 of 682

G.R. No. 208383. June 8, 2016.*

FIRST MEGA HOLDINGS CORP., petitioner, vs. GUI- GUIN TO
WATER DISTRICT, respondent.
Attorneys; Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; As a
general rule, government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs),
their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings, and government acquired
asset corporations (collectively referred to as GOCCs) are not allowed to
engage the legal services of private counsels.—As a general rule,
government-owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other
corporate offsprings, and government acquired asset corporations
(collectively referred to as GOCCs) are not allowed to engage the legal
services of private counsels. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative
Code of 1987,” is clear that the OGCC shall act as the principal law
office of GOCCs. Accordingly, Section 1 of AO No. 130, S. 1994 enjoined
GOCCs to exclusively refer all legal matters pertaining to them to the
OGCC, unless their respective charters expressly name the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) as their legal counsel. Nonetheless, in
exceptional cases, private counsel can be hired with the prior written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, and the prior written concurrence of the
Commission on Audit (COA). Case law holds that the lack of authority on
the part of a private lawyer to file a suit in behalf of any GOCC shall be
a sufficient ground to dismiss the action filed by the said lawyer.
Same; Same; Public policy considerations are behind the imposition of
the requirements relative to the engagement by government-owned
and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) of private counsel.—Public policy
considerations are behind the imposition of the requirements relative to
the engagement by GOCCs of private counsel. In Phividec Industrial
Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, 414 SCRA 327 (2003), the Court
held: It was only with the enactment of Memorandum Circular No. 9 in
1998 that an exception to the general prohibition was allowed for the
first time since P.D. No. 1415 was enacted in 1978. However,
indispensable conditions precedent were imposed before any hiring of
private lawyer could be effected. First, private counsel can be hired only
in exceptional cases. Second, the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, before any hiring can be done.
And third, the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured
prior to the hiring. There are strong reasons behind this public policy.
One is the need of the government to curtail unnecessary public
expenditures, such as the legal fees charged by private lawyers against
GOCCs. x x x: x x x x The other factor is anchored on the perceived
strong ties of the OGCC lawyers to their client government corporations.
Thus, compared to outside lawyers the OGCC lawyers are expected to
be imbued with a deeper sense of fidelity to the government’s cause
and more attuned to the need to preserve the confidentiality of
sensitive information. Evidently, OGCC is tasked by law to serve as the
Page 448 of 682
law office of GOCCs to the exclusion of private lawyers. Evidently again,

there is a strong policy bias against the hiring by GOCCs of private
counsel.
Water Permits; Water Controversy; It is well to note that in an
application for a water permit before the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB), the presence of a protest converts the proceeding to a
water controversy, which shall then be governed by the rules prescribed
for resolving water use controversies, i.e., Rule IV of the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR).—It is well to note that in an application for a
water permit before the NWRB, the presence of a protest converts the
proceeding to a water controversy, which shall then be governed by the
rules prescribed for resolving water use controversies, i.e., Rule IV of
the IRR. However, absent a protest, or where a protest cannot be
considered — as in this case where the protestant, a GOCC, was not
properly represented by the OGCC — the application shall subsist. The
existence of a protest is only one of the factors that the NWRB may
consider in granting or denying a water permit application. The filing of
an improper protest only deprives the NWRB of the authority to consider
the substantial issues raised in the protest but does not strip it of the
power to act on the application.
Same; Same; It should be emphasized that it is only through a duly
issued water permit that any person acquires the right to appropriate
water, or to take or divert waters from a natural source in the manner
and for any purpose allowed by law.—Where extraction of ground water
is sought, as in this case, a permit to drill must first be secured from the
NWRB. However, before a permit to drill is issued, the NWRB shall
conduct a field investigation to determine any adverse effect that may
be caused to public or private interests. Only after it has determined
that the application meets the requirements and is not prejudicial to
any public or private interests shall it issue the permit to drill which
shall be regarded as a temporary permit, until the rate of water
withdrawal/yield of the well has been determined and assessed, and the
application is finally (a) approved and a water permit is issued subject
to such conditions as the NWRB may impose, or (b) disapproved and
returned to the applicant, stating the reasons therefor. It should be
emphasized that it is only through a duly issued water permit that any
person acquires the right to appropriate water, or to take or divert
waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose
allowed by law.
Same; Permit to Drill; The drilling of a well and appropriation of water
without the necessary permits constitute grave offenses under Section
82 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and shall subject
the violator who is not a permittee or grantee — as petitioner in this
case — to the imposition of appropriate fines and penalties, and the
stoppage of the use of water, without prejudice to the institution of a
criminal/civil action as the facts and circumstances may warrant. —The
drilling of a well and appropriation of water without the necessary
permits constitute grave offenses under Section 82 of the IRR, and shall
subject the violator who is not a permittee or grantee — as petitioner in
Page 449 of 682
this case — to the imposition of appropriate fines and penalties, and the
stoppage of the use of water, without prejudice to the institution of a
criminal/civil action as the facts and circumstances may warrant. There
having been a willful and deliberate nonobservance and/or
noncompliance with the IRR and the NWRB’s lawful order, which would
have otherwise subjected a permittee or grantee to a summary
revocation/sus pension of its water permit or other rights to use water,
the NWRB was well within its authority to deny petitioner’s WPA. To rule
otherwise would effectively emasculate it and prevent it from exercising
its regulatory functions.
Page 450 of 682

G.R. No. 211269. June 15, 2016.*

RUBEN E. TIU, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Acting
Chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Parole, HON.
FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA of the Department of
Justice, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., the Executive Secretary,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; The object of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and,
if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee.—The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the writ
will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. The
writ is denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled
thereto ex merito justicias. In this case, petitioner is serving sentence
by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the offense of selling and
delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15,
Article III of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659. He failed to show,
however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that he is
entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; Pardon is an act of
grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.—It must be
emphasized that pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime
he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended
and not communicated officially to the court. A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential.
Same; Same; Same; Conditional Pardon; A conditional pardon, which is
a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the
pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion
of the sentence or an additional one.—The executive clemency
extended by PGMA on June 3, 2010 to a number of prisoners including
petitioner was made “subject to the conditions indicated in the
corresponding documents.” It is undisputed, however, that no individual
pardon papers were issued in petitioner’s favour, thereby rendering the
grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and ineffective, as
clarified by Deputy Executive Secretary Aguinaldo. The necessity for the
individual pardon papers is best explained by the nature of a conditional
Page 451 of 682
pardon, which is “a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief

Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will
release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply
with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve
the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the
pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the
pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief
Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the
pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.” The
individual pardon papers, therefore, contain the terms and conditions of
the contract of pardon, the compliance of which is essential to the
pardonee’s freedom from recommitment to prison.
Same; Colonist Status; Section 5 of Act No. 2489 is clear and
unambiguous: “[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment
receiving and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties
will automatically have the sentence of life imprisonment modified to a
sentence of thirty (30) years when receiving the executive approval (or
this classification upon which the regular credit now authorized by law
and special credit authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good
conduct, may be made.”—As correctly argued by the OSG, the
conferment by the Director of Corrections of a colonist status to
petitioner did not operate to reduce the latter’s sentence. Section 5 of
Act No. 2489 is clear and unambiguous: “[p]risoners serving sentences
of life imprisonment receiving and retaining the classification of penal
colonists or trusties will automatically have the sentence of life
imprisonment modified to a sentence of thirty (30) years when
receiving the executive approval for this classification upon which the
regular credit now authorized by law and special credit authorized in the
preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made.”
Same; Same; The Director of Corrections may, upon the
recommendation of the Classification Board of the Bureau of Corrections
(BuCor), classify an inmate as a colonist; It is the classification of the
penal colonist and trustie of the Director of Corrections which
subsequently receives executive approval.—The wording of the law is
such that the act of classification as a penal colonist or trustie is
separate from and necessarily precedes the act of approval by the
Executive. Under Section 6, Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the BuCor-OM
quoted earlier, the Director of Corrections may, upon the
recommendation of the Classification Board of the Bureau of
Corrections, classify an inmate as a colonist. It is crucial, however, that
the prisoner not only receives, but retains such classification, because
the grant of a colonist status may, for cause, be revoked at any time by
the Superintendent with the approval of the Director of Corrections
pursuant to Section 9 of the same Chapter. It is the classification of the
penal colonist and trustie of the Director of Corrections which
subsequently receives executive approval.
Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; The reduction of a
prisoner’s sentence is a partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in
the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend the
Page 452 of 682
same.—The reduction of a prisoner’s sentence is a partial pardon, and

our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive
prerogative to extend the same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
under Section 19, Article VII thereof, provides that the President
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of
executive clemency, which petitioner explicitly recognized by applying
for commutation of sentence even during the pendency of his request
for the implementation of the conditional pardon.
Same; Same; Same; Since the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to
pardon prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency.—It has
long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused,
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to
pardon prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which
“essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions
taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should
disapprove such acts.”
Page 453 of 682

G.R. No. 214901. June 15, 2016.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. APO- LONIO
KHO, represented by his heirs, namely: PERLA LUZ, KRYPTON,
KOSELL, KYRIN, and KELVIN, all surnamed KHO, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Case law dictates that when the
acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 is still
incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation due to the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under Republic Act (RA) No.
6657, as amended.—Case law dictates that when the acquisition
process under PD 27 is still incomplete, such as in this case where the
just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
RA 6657, as amended.
Same; Same; Fair Market Value; For purposes of determining just
compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the
time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the
beneficiaries.—For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character
and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors
enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the
acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c)
the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
(d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and
by the government to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any, must be equally considered.
Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; The
Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is
reminded that it is not strictly bound by the different formula created by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) if the situations before it do
not warrant their application.—The RTC, acting as a SAC, is reminded
that it is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR
if the situations before it do not warrant their application. To insist on a
rigid application of the formula goes beyond the intent and spirit of the
law, bearing in mind that the valuation of property or the determination
of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested
with the courts, and not with administrative agencies. Therefore, the
RTC must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the
evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be
restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR when faced with situations
Page 454 of 682
that do not warrant its strict application. However, the RTC must explain
and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the
prescribed factors and formula.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the Remand of Agrarian Cases.— While the
parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1,
Series of 2010, the Court finds a need to remand the case to the RTC for
the determination of just compensation to ensure compliance with the
law, and to give everyone — the landowner, the farmers, and the State
— their due. To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the
following guidelines in the remand of the case: 1. Just compensation
must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, when
emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer-
beneficiaries on May 27, 2002. Hence, the evidence to be presented by
the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject land
must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like
agricultural lands. 2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to
the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to
its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it
should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in
arriving at the just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly
bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application.
In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable,
it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for
using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just
compensation for the acquired property. 3. Interest may be awarded as
may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the
grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the
payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was
deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.
Page 455 of 682

G.R. No. 211015. June 20, 2016.*

CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO)
and CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO),
formerly CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES & TRADING CORPORATION
(CESTCO), petitioners, vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR
UNIONASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), respondent.
G.R. No. 213835. June 20, 2016.*
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO)
and CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO),
formerly CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES & TRADING CORPORATION
(CESTCO), petitioners, vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR
UNIONASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), respondent.
Labor Law; Labor-only Contracting; Under Article 106 of the Labor Code,
as amended, labor-only contracting is an arrangement where the
contractor, who does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others,
supplies workers to an employer and the workers recruited are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business
of such employer.—Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended,
labor-only contracting is an arrangement where the contractor, who
does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, supplies
workers to an employer and the workers recruited are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such
employer. Section 5 of Department Order No. 18-02, Series of 2002,
otherwise known as the “Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the
Labor Code, As Amended” (DO 18-02), provides the following criteria to
gauge whether or not an arrangement constitutes laboronly
contracting: Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting.—
Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose,
labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers
to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following
elements are present: i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have
substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or
service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or
placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities
which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or ii) the
contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance
of the work of the contractual employee. The foregoing provisions shall
be without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of the Labor
Code, as amended. “Substantial capital or investment” refers to capital
stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools,
equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and
directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or
Page 456 of 682
completion of the job, work or service contracted out. The “right to

control” shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the
services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not
only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used
in reaching that end.
Same; Same; Unfair Labor Practices; Labor-only contracting is
considered as a form of unfair labor practice (ULP) when the same is
devised by the employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to selforganization.”—Labor-
only contracting is considered as a form of ULP when the same is
devised by the employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to selforganization.” Article 259
of the Labor Code, as amended, which enumerates certain prohibited
activities constitutive of ULP, provides: Article 259. Unfair Labor
Practices of Employers.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit
any of the following unfair labor practice: x x x x (c) To contract out
services or functions being performed by union members when such will
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights to selforganization. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The need to determine whether or not the contracting out of services
(or any particular activity or scheme devised by the employer for that
matter) was intended to defeat the workers’ right to selforganization is
impelled by the underlying concept of ULP.
Same; Same; In cases of labor-only contracting, “the person or
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer
who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent
as if the latter were directly employed by him.”—If at all, it would be the
employees of CESCO who are entitled to seek the foregoing reliefs since
in cases of labor-only contracting, “the person or intermediary shall be
considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible
to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were
directly employed by him.” However, they have not been impleaded in
these cases. Thus, as prayed for by petitioners, the Court must set
aside the portions of the assailed CA Decisions declaring: (a) the
workers hired by CESCO, pursuant to the contracts subject of these
cases, as regular employees of CEPALCO; and (b) the latter responsible
to said workers in the same manner and extent as if they were directly
employed by it. This pronouncement not only squares with the rules on
real party-in-interest and legal standing, but also with the precept that
no one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered
by the court.
Page 457 of 682

G.R. No. 206528. June 28, 2016.*

PHILIPPINE ASSET GROWTH TWO, INC. (Successor-inInterest of
Planters Development Bank) and PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT
BANK, petitioners, vs. FASTECH SYNERGY PHILIPPINES, INC.
(formerly First Asia System Technology, Inc.), FASTECH
MICROASSEMBLY & TEST, INC., FASTECH ELECTRONIQUE, INC.,
and FASTECH PROPERTIES, INC., respondents.
Attorneys; Notice to any one of the several counsels on record is
equivalent to notice to all, and such notice starts the running of the
period to appeal notwithstanding that the other counsel on record has
not received a copy of the decision or resolution.—It is a long standing
doctrine that where a party is represented by several counsels, notice
to one is sufficient, and binds the said party. Notice to anyone of the
several counsels on record is equivalent to notice to all, and such notice
starts the running of the period to appeal notwithstanding that the
other counsel on record has not received a copy of the decision or
resolution.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Generally, the failure to perfect
an appeal in the manner and within the period provided for by law
renders the decision appealed from final and executory, and beyond the
competence of the Supreme Court (SC) to review.—Generally, the
failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period
provided for by law renders the decision appealed from final and
executory, and beyond the competence of the Court to review.
However, the Court has repeatedly relaxed this procedural rule in the
higher interest of substantial justice. In Barnes v. Padilla, 439 SCRA 675
(2004), it was held that: [A] final and executory judgment can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land. However, this Court has relaxed
this rule in order to serve substantial justice[,] considering (a) matters
of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Mercantile Law; Corporations; Words and Phrases; “Rehabilitation,”
Defined.—Rehabilitation is statutorily defined under Republic Act No.
10142, otherwise known as the “Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency
Act of 2010” (FRIA), as follows: Section 4. Definition of Terms.—As used
in this Act, the term: x x x x (gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to
the restoration of the debtor to a condition of successful operation and
solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically
feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going
concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
Page 458 of 682

Same; Same; Corporate Rehabilitation; Case law explains that corporate

rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
to be paid their claims out of its earnings.—Case law explains that
corporate rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life
and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
to be paid their claims out of its earnings. Thus, the basic issues in
rehabilitation proceedings concern the viability and desirability of
continuing the business operations of the distressed corporation, all
with a view of effectively restoring it to a state of solvency or to its
former healthy financial condition through the adoption of a
rehabilitation plan.
Same; Same; Same; A material financial commitment becomes
significant in gauging the resolve, determination, earnestness, and good
rehabilitation plan.—A material financial commitment becomes
significant in gauging the resolve, determination, earnestness, and good
rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary
undertakings of the stockholders or the would-be investors of the
debtor-corporation indicating their readiness, willingness, and ability to
contribute funds or property to guarantee the continued successful
operation of the debtor-corporation during the period of rehabilitation.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy of rehabilitation should be denied to
corporations that do not qualify under the Rules. Neither should it be
allowed to corporations whose sole purpose is to delay the enforcement
of any of the rights of the creditors.—The failure of the Rehabilitation
Plan to state any material financial commitment to support
rehabilitation, as well as to include a liquidation analysis, renders the
CA’s considerations for approving the same, i.e., that: (a) respondents
would be able to meet their obligations to their creditors within their
operating cash profits and other assets without disrupting their business
operations; (b) the Rehabilitation Receiver’s opinion carries great
weight; and (c) rehabilitation will be beneficial for respondents’
creditors, employees, stockholders, and the economy, as actually
unsubstantiated, and hence, insufficient to decree the feasibility of
respondents’ rehabilitation. It is well to emphasize that the remedy of
rehabilitation should be denied to corporations that do not qualify under
the Rules. Neither should it be allowed to corporations whose sole
purpose is to delay the enforcement of any of the rights of the creditors.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy of rehabilitation should be denied to
corporations whose insolvency appears to be irreversible and whose
sole purpose is to delay the enforcement of any of the rights of the
creditors.—The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is not only to
enable the company to gain a new lease on life, but also to allow
Page 459 of 682
creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings when so rehabilitated.

Hence, the remedy must be accorded only after a judicious regard of all
stakeholders’ interests; it is not a one-sided tool that may be graciously
invoked to escape every position of distress. Thus, the remedy of
rehabilitation should be denied to corporations whose insolvency
appears to be irreversible and whose sole purpose is to delay the
enforcement of any of the rights of the creditors, which is rendered
obvious by: (a) the absence of a sound and workable business plan; (b)
baseless and unexplained assumptions, targets, and goals; and (c)
speculative capital infusion or complete lack thereof for the execution of
the business plan, as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; A distressed corporation should not be
rehabilitated when the results of the financial examination and analysis
clearly indicate that there lies no reasonable probability that it may be
revived, to the detriment of its numerous stakeholders which include
not only the corporation’s creditors but also the public at large.—In view
of all the foregoing, the Court is therefore constrained to grant the
instant petition, notwithstanding the preliminary technical error as
above discussed. A distressed corporation should not be rehabilitated
when the results of the financial examination and analysis clearly
indicate that there lies no reasonable probability that it may be revived,
to the detriment of its numerous stakeholders which include not only
the corporation’s creditors but also the public at large.
Page 460 of 682

G.R. No. 213582. June 28, 2016.*

NYMPHA S. ODIAMAR,1 petitioner, vs. LINDA ODIAMAR
VALENCIA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; Judicial Admissions; It is settled
that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive
and do not require further evidence to prove them.—Having admitted
that she obtained loans from respondent without showing that the same
had already been paid or otherwise extinguished, petitioner cannot now
aver otherwise. It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the
same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove
them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is
shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was actually made, neither of which was shown to exist
in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her admission of liability
and the only material question remaining is the extent of such liability.
Civil Law; Obligations; Novation; In S.C. Megaworld Construction and
Development Corporation v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013), the Supreme
Court (SC) held that to constitute novation by substitution of debtor, the
former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the
third person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the
contractual relations. —In S.C. Megaworld Construction and
Development Corporation v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013), the Court
held that to constitute novation by substitution of debtor, the former
debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the third
person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the
contractual relations. Moreover, the Court ruled that the “fact that the
creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed the
obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors and not
novation.” At its core, novation is never presumed, and the animus
novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken. Here, the intent to novate was not
satisfactorily proven by respondent. At best, petitioner only manifested
her desire to shoulder the debt of her parents, which, as above
discussed, does not amount to novation. Thus, the courts a quo erred in
holding petitioner liable for the debts obtained by her deceased parents
on account of novation by substitution of the debtor.
Same; Interest Rates; Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides that “[n]o
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing.”—It is fundamental that for monetary interest to be due, there
must be an express written agreement therefor. Article 1956 of the Civil
Code provides that “[n]o interest shall be due unless it has been
expressly stipulated in writing.” In this relation, case law states that the
lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount bars a
Page 461 of 682

creditor from charging monetary interest and the collection of interest

without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
Page 462 of 682

G.R. No. 214399. June 28, 2016.*

ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA SHAW/ PASIG,
INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; Consolidation of
cases is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which
involve a common question of law or fact before the court.—At the
outset, the Court notes that consolidation of cases is a procedure
sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which involve a common
question of law or fact before the court. It is a procedural device
granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to
be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.
The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which are intimately
related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered and in effect, prevent confusion,
unnecessary costs, and delay. It is an action sought to avoid multiplicity
of suits; guard against oppression and abuse; clear congested dockets;
and to simplify the work of the trial court in order to attain justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
Same; Same; Same; In order to determine whether consolidation is
proper, the test is to check whether the cases involve the resolution of
common questions of law, related facts, or the same parties.—In order
to determine whether consolidation is proper, the test is to check
whether the cases involve the resolution of common questions of law,
related facts, or the same parties. Consolidation is proper whenever the
subject matter involved and the relief demanded in the different suits
make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved
and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.
However, it must be stressed that an essential requisite of consolidation
is that the several actions which should be pending before the court,
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like
issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence. As
succinctly stated in the rules, consolidation is allowed when there are
similar actions which are pending before the court — for there is
nothing to consolidate when a matter has already been resolved and
the very purpose of consolidation, to avoid conflicting decisions and
multiplicity of suits, rendered futile.
Same; Same; Same; Consolidation of cases is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and the latter’s action in consolidation will not be
disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion tantamount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, which is absent in this case.—It should be emphasized that the
consolidation of cases is aimed to simplify the proceedings as it
contributes to the swift dispensation of justice. As such, it is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and the latter’s action in
consolidation will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of
Page 463 of 682

discretion tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law, which is absent in this case.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Due Process; Substantive due
process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or
an authorized cause under Articles 297, 298 or 299 (formerly Articles
282, 283, and 284) of the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on the
other hand, mandates that the employer must observe the twin
requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected.
—It is settled that “for a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the
employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the
dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause
under Articles 297, 298 or 299 (formerly Articles 282, 283, and 284) of
the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on the other hand, mandates
that the employer must observe the twin requirements of notice and
hearing before a dismissal can be effected.” Thus, to determine the
validity of Puncia’s dismissal, there is a need to discuss whether there
was indeed just cause for his termination.
Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Case law instructs that “gross
inefficiency” is analogous to “gross neglect of duty,” a just cause of
dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code, for both involve specific
acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the
employer or to his business.—In the instant case, records reveal that as
a Marketing Professional for Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of
seven (7) vehicles from March 2011 to June 2011. As he was having
trouble complying with said quota, Toyota even extended him a
modicum of leniency by lowering his monthly sales quota to just three
(3) vehicles for the months of July and August 2011; but even then, he
still failed to comply. In that six (6)-month span, Puncia miserably failed
in satisfying his monthly sales quota, only selling a measly five (5)
vehicles out of the 34 he was required to sell over the course of said
period. Verily, Puncia’s repeated failure to perform his duties — i.e.,
reaching his monthly sales quota — for such a period of time falls under
the concept of gross inefficiency. In this regard, case law instructs that
“gross inefficiency” is analogous to “gross neglect of duty,” a just cause
of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code, for both involve
specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in
damage to the employer or to his business.
Same; Same; While Toyota afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the
charge of gross inefficiency against him, the latter was completely
deprived of the same when he was dismissed for gross insubordination
— a completely different ground from what was stated in the Notice to
Explain.—A reading of the Notice of Termination shows that Puncia was
dismissed not for the ground stated in the Notice to Explain, but for
gross insubordination on account of his nonappearance in the scheduled
October 17, 2011 hearing without justifiable reason. In other words,
while Toyota afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of
gross inefficiency against him, the latter was completely deprived of the
same when he was dismissed for gross insubordination — a completely
Page 464 of 682
different ground from what was stated in the Notice to Explain. As such,
Puncia’s right to procedural due process was violated.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Considering that Toyota had
dismissed Puncia for a just cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper
procedural requirements, the former should pay the latter nominal
damages in the amount of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.— Considering that Toyota had
dismissed Puncia for a just cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper
procedural requirements, the former should pay the latter nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in accordance with recent
jurisprudence.
Page 465 of 682

G.R. No. 215764. July 13, 2016.*

RICHARD K. TOM, petitioner, vs. SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ,
respondent.
Mercantile Law; Corporations; A corporation can only exercise its
powers and transact its business through its board of directors and
through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or
its bylaws.—The Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that a corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its
business through its board of directors and through its officers and
agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. As held in
AF Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight Services, Co., 373
SCRA 385 (2002): Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly
provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised
by the board of directors. Just as a natural person may authorize
another to do certain acts in his behalf, so may the board of directors of
a corporation validly delegate some of its functions to individual officers
or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or acts of a corporation must
be made either by the board of directors or by a corporate agent duly
authorized by the board. Absent such valid delegation/authorization, the
rule is that the declarations of an individual director relating to the
affairs of the corporation, but not in the course of, or connected with,
the performance of authorized duties of such director, are held not
binding on the corporation. As the provisions of the MOA are in direct
contravention of the foregoing precepts, which the Court had earlier
espoused in the July 6, 2015 Decision, its execution cannot in any way
affect, change, or render the Court’s previous disquisitions moot and
academic. In fact, the MOA is, clearly and in all respects, contrary to
law. Therefore, the writ of preliminary injunction must stand.
Page 466 of 682

G.R. No. 210801. July 18, 2016.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVIN
CENIDO y PICONES and REMEDIOS CONTRERAS y CRUZ,
accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; Death of the
Accused; As Remedios’s death transpired before the promulgation of
the Court’s July 7, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when her appeal
before the Court was still pending resolution, her criminal liability is
totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).—On April 11, 2014, the Court received a Letter dated
April 10, 2014 from the Correctional Institution for Women informing the
Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case,
Remedios, on March 7, 2014. In a Resolution dated September 9, 2015,
the Court required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for
Women to furnish the Court with a certified true copy of Remedios’s
death certificate and, in compliance thereto, the same was submitted
by Officer-In-Charge Elsa AquinoAlabado on February 11, 2016. As
Remedios’s death transpired before the promulgation of the Court’s July
7, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when her appeal before the Court
was still pending resolution, her criminal liability is totally extinguished
in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the
Supreme Court (SC) explained that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his
civil liability ex delicto.—In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013),
the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his civil liability
ex delicto. Consequently, Remedios’s death on March 7, 2014 renders
the Court’s July 7, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her,
and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against
Remedios is dismissed.
Page 467 of 682

G.R. No. 203370. April 11, 2016.*

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and HELEN Y. DEE,
petitioners, vs. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA GATMAYTAN, MA.
ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ,
JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON, ROLANDO PAREJA, WONINA M.
BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE
ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR.,
RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C. SUCHIANCO, and TRENNIE
MONSOD, respondents.
G.R. No. 215106. April 11, 2016.*
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIP
PICCIO, MIA GATMAYTAN, MA. ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS,
JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON,
ROLANDO PAREJA, WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ,
CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA GOMEZ
JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C.
SUCHIANCO, and TRENNIE MONSOD, respondents.
Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; The authority to represent the
State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court (SC) and
the Court of Appeals (CA) is vested solely in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which is “the law office of the Government whose
specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic
and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any court in any action
which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.”—The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Court and the CA is vested solely in the OSG which is
“the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the
Philippines] before any court in any action which affects the welfare of
the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that:
Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer,
x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
Criminal Law; Venue; Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that
the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
—“Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle
Page 468 of 682
acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 [of
the RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No. 4363], specifically provides
for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases.”
Same; Same; Libel; Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where
the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two (2)
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published.”—Generally speaking, “the
venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
Page 469 of 682

G.R. No. 220978. July 5, 2016.*

CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., petitioner, vs. EDWIN J. BABIANO
and EMMA B. CONCEPCION, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; Article 1370 of the Civil
Code provides that “[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations shall control.”—Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides
that “[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.” In Norton Resources and Development
Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation, 605 SCRA 370 (2009), the
Court had the opportunity to thoroughly discuss the said rule as follows:
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to
extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered
from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently,
where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the
contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to
mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the
words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make
for the parties better or more equitable agreements than they
themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter
them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or
by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he
voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Control Test; The control
test is commonly regarded as the most important indicator of the
presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.—Anent the
nature of Concepcion’s engagement, based on case law, the presence
of the following elements evince the existence of an employer-
employee relationship: (a) the power to hire, i.e., the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power
of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s
conduct, or the so called “control test.” The control test is commonly
regarded as the most important indicator of the presence or absence of
an employer-employee relationship. Under this test, an
employeremployee relationship exists where the person for whom the
services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end
achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that
end.
Same; Same; The existence of employer-employee relations could not
be negated by the mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract.—
While the employment agreement of Concepcion was denominated as a
“Contract of Agency for Project Director,” it should be stressed that the
existence of employer-employee relations could not be negated by the
mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract. In the case of Insular Life
Page 470 of 682
Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC (4th Division), 287 SCRA 476 (1998), it was
ruled that one’s employment status is defined and prescribed by law,
and not by what the parties say it should be, viz.: It is axiomatic that
the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated
by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and providing
therein that the “employee” is an independent contractor when the
terms of the agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment
status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the
parties say it should be. In determining the status of the man agement
contract, the “four-fold test” on employment earlier mentioned has to
be applied. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Therefore, the CA
correctly ruled that since there exists an employer-employee
relationship between Concepcion and CPI, the labor tribunals correctly
assumed jurisdiction over her money claims.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, a party who
has not appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than the one
granted in the appealed decision.—As a general rule, a party who has
not appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than the one
granted in the appealed decision. However, jurisprudence admits an
exception to the said rule, such as when strict adherence thereto shall
result in the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties
concerned. In Global Resource for Outsourced Workers (GROW), Inc. v.
Velasco, 678 SCRA 751 (2012): Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal
from a judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what
was already granted under said judgment. However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as
that of an illegally dismissed employee to monetary compensation as
provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to
pave the way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
Page 471 of 682

G.R. No. 209271. July 26, 2016.*

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-
BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. GREENPEACE
SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO
SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO
CASIÑO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG,
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ
LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO
QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR.,
FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR
EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ,
respondents. CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
inintervention.
G.R. No. 209276. July 26, 2016.*
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, BUREAU OF
PLANT INDUSTRY and the FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE
AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD
NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASIÑO, DR. BEN
MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III,
CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA,
DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO
MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN,
and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention.
G.R. No. 209301. July 26, 2016.*
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS FOUNDATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD
NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASIÑO, DR. BEN
MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III,
CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA,
DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO
MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN,
and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 209430. July 26, 2016.*

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, petitioner, vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT
SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG),
REP. TEODORO CASIÑO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA
Page 472 of 682
GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY.

MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR.
ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL
CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN
MARTHINE LOPEZ, respondents.
Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; The requirement of the
existence of a “case” or an “actual controversy” for the proper exercise
of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.—As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. The requirement of the existence of a “case” or
an “actual controversy” for the proper exercise of the power of judicial
review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly,
the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
Actions; Moot and Academic; Words and Phrases; An action is
considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties.—An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Nevertheless, case
law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus,
jurisprudence recognizes these four instances as exceptions to the
mootness principle.
Same; Same; A survey of cases would show that, as a common
guidepost for application, there should be some perceivable benefit to
the public which demands the Court to proceed with the resolution of
otherwise moot questions.—Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no
hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a case involves paramount
Page 473 of 682
public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey

of cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there
should be some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the
Court to proceed with the resolution of otherwise moot questions.
Genetically Modified Organisms; Bt Talong; There are three (3) stages
before genetically modified organisms (GMOs) may become
commercially available under Department Administrative Order (DAO)
08-2002 and each stage is distinct, such that “[s]ubse quent stages can
only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is
given to engage in the next regulatory stage.”—At this juncture, it is
important to understand that the completion and termination of the
field tests do not mean that herein petitioners may inevitably proceed
to commercially propagate Bt talong. There are three (3) stages before
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially
available under DAO 08-2002 and each stage is distinct, such that
“[subsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are
completed and clearance is given to engage in the next regulatory
stage.” Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed to
be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must
be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be shown that based on the field
testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose
any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety
studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks
to human and animal health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-
protected plant, its transformation event has been duly registered with
the FPA.
Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; It would appear to be more
beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong —
or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for that matter — until an
actual and justiciable case properly presents itself before the Supreme
Court (SC).—As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase,
none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were pursued or the
requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed
after-effects to the already concluded Bt talong field trials that demand
an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any
future threat to the right of herein respondents or the public in general
to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than
real. In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a
verdict on the safeness of Bt talong — or GMOs, for that matter — until
an actual and justiciable case properly presents itself before the Court.
In his Concurring Opinion on the main, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen) had aptly pointed out that “the findings
[resulting from the Bt talong field trials] should be the material to
provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the various claims made in
relation to Bt talong.” True enough, the concluded field tests — like
those in these cases — would yield data that may prove useful for
future studies and analyses. If at all, resolving the petition for Writ of
Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of further research and
testing on Bt talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to
hinder scientific advancement on the subject matter.
Page 474 of 682
Writs of Kalikasan; To resolve respondents’ petition for Writ of Kalikasan

on its merits, would be tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly
exercise for the Supreme Court (SC) to assess alleged violations of
health and environmental rights that arose from a past test case whose
bearings do not find any — if not minimal — relevance to cases
operating under today’s regulatory framework.— It is clear that no
benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the merits of field
trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt
talong tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the
supervening change in the regulatory framework applied to GMO field
testing. To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by Joint
Department Circular No. 1, Series of 2016 (JDC 01-2016), issued by the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR, the
Department of Health (DOH), and the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), which provides a substantially different
regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002 as will be detailed
below. Thus, to resolve respondents’ petition for Writ of Kalikasan on its
merits, would be tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly exercise for
the Court to assess alleged violations of health and environmental
rights that arose from a past test case whose bearings do not find any
— if not minimal — relevance to cases operating under today’s
regulatory framework.
Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; The supersession of Department
Administrative Order (DAO) 08-2002 by Joint Department Circular (JDC)
01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being one capable of repetition
so as to warrant review despite its mootness.—More obviously, the
supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case
from being one capable of repetition so as to warrant review despite its
mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that: Section 1.
Applicability.—This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the research,
development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into
the environment, and management of genetically modified plant and
plant products derived from the use of modern technology, included
under “regulated articles.” As earlier adverted to, with the issuance of
JDC 01-2016, a new regulatory framework in the conduct of field testing
now applies.
Genetically Modified Organisms; Joint Department Circular (JDC) 01-
2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the members of the
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists that
evaluates the risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial,
commercial propagation, or direct use of regulated articles.—JDC 01-
2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the members of the
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists that
evaluates the risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial,
commercial propagation, or direct use of regulated articles. Aside from
not being an official, staff or employee of the DA or any of its attached
agencies, JDC 01-2016 requires that members of the STRP: (a) must not
be directly or indirectly employed or engaged by a company or
institution with pending applications for permits under JDC 01-2016; (b)
must possess technical expertise in food and nutrition, toxicology,
Page 475 of 682
ecology, crop protection, environmental science, molecular biology and

biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding, or animal nutrition; and (c)
must be well-respected in the scientific community.
Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; The regulatory framework now
applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters involving the
research, development, handling, movement, and release into the
environment of genetically modified plant and plant products derived
from the use of modern biotechnology is substantially different from
that which was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot
be said that the present case is one capable of repetition yet evading
review.—Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory
framework now applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters
involving the research, development, handling, movement, and release
into the environment of genetically modified plant and plant products
derived from the use of modern biotechnology is substantially different
from that which was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it
cannot be said that the present case is one capable of repetition yet
evading review. The essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading
review was succinctly explained by the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,
710 SCRA 1 (2013), where the constitutionality of the Executive
Department’s lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013 General
Appropriations Act, known as the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), was assailed. In that case, the Court rejected the view that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by the Executive Department and former President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III’s declaration that he had already
“abolished the PDAF.”
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) discerns that there are two (2)
factors to be considered before a case is deemed one capable of
repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration;
and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party would be subjected to the same action.— At this point, the Court
discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is
deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior
to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the
same action. Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the
subject field tests was too short to be fully litigated. It must be
emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were
issued on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2)
years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen, respondents
filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 — just a
few months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field
testing activities were already over. Obviously, therefore, the cessation
of the subject field tests before the case could be resolved was due to
respondents’ own inaction.
Page 476 of 682

Same; Separation of Powers; The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling

on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary, in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.—While
the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were averred to be inadequate to protect
(a) the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology since “said regulation failed, among others, to anticipate ‘the
public implications caused by the importation of GMOs in the
Philippines’”; and (b) “the people from the potential harm these
genetically modified plants and genetically-modified organisms may
cause human health and the environment, [and] thus, x x x fall short of
Constitutional compliance,” respondents merely prayed for its
amendment, as well as that of the NBF, to define or incorporate “an
independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and socio-
economic risk assessment, public information, consultation, and
participation, and providing for their effective implementation, in accord
with international safety standards[.]” This attempt to assail the
constitutionality of the public information and consultation requirements
under DAO 08-2002 and the NBF constitutes a collateral attack on the
said provisions of law that runs afoul of the well-settled rule that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.
Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, in
deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the
measure had first been carefully studied by the executive department
and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally
enacted and approved.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Judicial Review; View that a more becoming appreciation of the
judiciary’s role in the entire constitutional order should always give
pause to go beyond the issues crystallized by an actual case with a real,
present controversy.—I reserve opinion on whether the “exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest” can be a
ground for ruling on a case despite it becoming moot and academic. In
my view, a more becoming appreciation of the judiciary’s role in the
entire constitutional order should always give pause to go beyond the
issues crystallized by an actual case with a real, present controversy.
Going beyond the parameters of a live case may be an invitation to
participate in the crafting of policies properly addressed to the other
departments and organs of government. I am of the belief that the
judiciary should take an attitude of principled restraint.
Page 477 of 682

G.R. No. 210606. July 27, 2016.*

GRACE PARK** INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and WOODLINK
REALTY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. EASTWEST BANKING
CORPORATION, SECURITY BANKING CORPORATION, ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, represented by the Trustee and
Attorneyin-Fact of EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION TRUST
DIVISION, EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, in his capacity as the Ex
Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan,
EDRIC C. ESTRADA, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the Regional
Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases;
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if
not in one court, then in another.—At the outset, it must be emphasized
that “[forum shopping] is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if
not in one court, then in another. What is important in determining
whether [forum shopping] exists is the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different
fora upon the same issues.”
Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—In Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte,
716 SCRA 175 (2014), the Court held that “[t]he test to determine the
existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following
elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration.”
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; As a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to the situation where
two (2) actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one (1) of them becomes unnecessary and
Page 478 of 682
vexatious.—In reference to the foregoing, litis pendentia is a Latin term,

which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in
some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two (2)
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, so that one (1) of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It
is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Identity of Parties; Absolute identity of
parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke
the coverage of this principle.—Anent the first requisite of forum
shopping, “[t]here is identity of parties where the parties in both actions
are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-
in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of
interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is
enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the
first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case.”
Same; Same; Same; Identity of Causes of Action; The test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two (2) actions.—With
respect to the second and third requisites of forum shopping,
“[h]ornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean
absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation
of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is
a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies. Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two
suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used
to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test
of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed
at the time of the filing of the first complaint.”
Page 479 of 682

G.R. No. 215723. July 27, 2016.*

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. “DOREEN GRACE
MEDINA KOIKE,” petitioner, vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family
Code — which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.—At the outset, it
bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the
Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.—The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), the Court had
the occasion to rule that: The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Same; Same; Same; Since our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.—In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), it
Page 480 of 682
was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the
divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering
that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki,
as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are
essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The resolution of factual issues
is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions.—Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in
fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled
that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Page 481 of 682

G.R. No. 193089. July 9, 2012.*

ROSEÑA FONTELAR OGAWA, petitioner, vs. ELIZABETH GACHE
MENIGISHI, respondent.
Evidence; Receipts; Words and Phrases; A receipt is defined as a written
and signed acknowledgment that money or good was delivered or
received.—A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment
that money or good was delivered or received. Exhibit 1, upon which
respondent relies to support her counterclaim, sufficiently satisfies this
definition. However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both
parties, a plain reading of the contents of Exhibit 1 negates any
inference as to the nature of the transaction for which the 1,000,000
Yen was received and who between the parties is the obligor and the
obligee. What is apparent is a mere written and signed acknowledgment
that money was received. There are no terms and conditions found
therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it
cannot be considered an actionable document upon which an action or
defense may be founded.
Same; Burden of Proof; It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the
party who asserts his/her right.—It is settled that the burden of proof
lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the
burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant, by
the quantum of evidence required by law, which in this case is
Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases; “Preponderance
of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of credible
evidence.”—“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.” From the evidence
on record, it is clear that respondent failed to prove her counterclaim by
Page 482 of 682

G.R. No. 196461. July 15, 2015.*

WARLITO C. VICENTE, petitioner, vs. ACIL CORPORATION,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Forum Shopping; While a
litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his
case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final
judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to
secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations
detrimental to the administration of justice.—Indeed, Vicente’s
protraction of this case should not be countenanced. It is fundamental
that every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to
initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been
adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should
not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable
ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the
administration of justice. After all, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the
law,” as Acil in this case.
Page 483 of 682

G.R. No. 212049. July 15, 2015.*

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES,
MARLON R. ROÑO and “STAR PRINCESS,” petitioners, vs.
ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon it.—To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In
labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; A seafarer shall be entitled to
the payment of the full amount of disability compensation only if his
injury, regardless of the degree of disability, results in loss of profession,
i.e., his physical condition prevents a return to sea service.—A seafarer
shall be entitled to the payment of the full amount of disability
compensation only if his injury, regardless of the degree of disability,
results in loss of profession, i.e., his physical condition prevents a return
to sea service. Based on the submissions of the parties, this contractual
attribution refers to permanent total disability compensation as known
in labor law. Thus, the Court examines the presence of such disability in
this case. Preliminarily, the task of assessing the seaman’s disability or
fitness to work is entrusted to the company-designated physician.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Labor Code, there are three (3) kinds of
disability, namely: (1) temporary total disability; (2) permanent total
disability; and (3) permanent partial disability.— Under the Labor Code,
there are three kinds of disability, namely: (1) temporary total disability;
(2) permanent total disability; and (3) permanent partial disability.
Section 2, Rule VII of the AREC differentiates the disabilities as follows:
SEC. 2. Disability.—(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as
otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and
permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable
to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Temporary total
disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company-
designated physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon
Page 484 of 682
the expiration of the maximum two hundred forty (240)-day medical

treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the
existence of a permanent disability.—Recent jurisprudence now holds
that the said 120-day rule is not a magic wand that automatically
warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his
favor. As clarified by the Court in the later case of Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008): [T]he petitioner has
repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,
apparently for its statement that the respondent in the case “was
unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which
constitutes permanent total disability.” This declaration of a permanent
total disability after the initial 120 days of temporary total disability
cannot, however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all
cases in all contexts. The specific context of the application should be
considered, as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of
the law and of the implementing regulations. Elucidating on this point,
Vergara discussed the seeming conflict between Section 20(B)(3) of the
2000 POEA-SEC and Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code on permanent
total disability in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the AREC that
provided for a 240-day period in case of further medical treatment,
thus: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his
vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three
(3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on
temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his
basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-
Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the
120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Thus, temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician
within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of
either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
Same; Same; Same; The employer is liable for a seafarer’s disability,
arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree of
disability has been established by the companydesignated physician
and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice whose
assessment disagrees with that of the company-designated physician,
the disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a final
assessment.—Note that while respondent has the right to seek the
opinion of other doctors under Section 20(B) of the POEASEC and the
CBA, it bears stressing that the employer is liable for a seafarer’s
Page 485 of 682
disability, arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the

degree of disability has been established by the company-designated
physician and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice
whose assessment disagrees with that of the companydesignated
physician, the disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a
final assessment. No such mandated third doctor was, however,
consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the company-designated
physicians (Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan) and the respondent’s own doctor
(Dr. Jacinto).
Same; Same; Same; Case law dictates that the assessment of the
company-designated physician should be given more credence for
having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and
diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in
one (1) day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.
—The findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan should prevail over that of
Dr. Jacinto considering that the former examined, diagnosed, and
treated respondent from his repatriation on May 9, 2010 until he was
assessed fit to work on September 15, 2010; whereas, it appears that
the independent physician, Dr. Jacinto, only examined respondent on
October 13, 2010 which was the same day the latter filed his claim for
permanent total disability benefits. While the medical certificate
indicates that respondent was under Dr. Jacinto’s service beginning
“September 2010,” no supporting document on record shows this to be
true. In fact, the NLRC even observed that the medical certificate of Dr.
Jacinto was issued after a one- time examination and worse, without
any medical support. Case law dictates that, under these
circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician
should be given more credence for having been arrived at after months
of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of
a private physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or
existing medical records.
Page 486 of 682

G.R. No. 201892. July 22, 2015.*

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO B.
MARTINEZ, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements of.—A
case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following
elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition
of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.
Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; Litis
pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious.—To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as
a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked,
the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The
underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the
public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and
status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole
cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of
action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground
of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).
Loans; In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage (REM), the
rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against
the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a
personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real
action to foreclose on the mortgage security.—In loan contracts secured
by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a
single cause of action against the debtor -mortgagor, i.e., to recover the
debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of
Page 487 of 682
money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage

security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or
successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-
mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the
action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery
of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the
debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale
of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall
only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
Same; While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the
promissory note (PN) executed by respondent who was not the original
debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of
loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon
breach.—While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the
promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original
debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of
loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon
breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that respondent’s
agreement to pay Rafael’s loan obligation and the execution of the
subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan between
Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act
of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed
but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new
agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must
expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a
new one, which was not shown here.
Foreclosure of Mortgage; As petitioner had already instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now
barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection,
regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had
attained finality.—As petitioner had already instituted judicial
attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order.
Considering, however, that respondent’s claim for return of excess
payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and,
thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner’s collection suit, the same
should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
Foreclosure of Mortgage; As petitioner had already instituted judicial
attained finality.—As petitioner had already instituted judicial
attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order.
Page 488 of 682
Considering, however, that respondent’s claim for return of excess

payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and,
thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner’s collection suit, the same
should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support. not
merely in its dispositive portion, as the appellate courts are precluded
from supplementing the bases for such award.
Page 489 of 682

G.R. No. 205575. July 22, 2015.*

VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNIONALU-TUCP and
CASMERO MAHILUM, petitioners, vs. VISAYAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC. (VECO), respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed “not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution”
sought to be assailed.—Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed “not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution” sought to be assailed.
The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The
timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this
Court cannot trifle with.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition
for certiorari was only one (1) day is not a legal justification for
noncompliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution.—
The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only
one day is not a legal justification for noncompliance with the rule
requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to
the theory that the ends of justice would be better subserved by
allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one-day late. When the law
fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one (61)
days, as the Court had previously declared in this wise: [W]hen the law
fixes thirty days [or sixty days as in the present case], we cannot take it
to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to
thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further
stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by step,
until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion
resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a
period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law
is founded on reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its
application.
Same; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence; The
Supreme Court (SC) has consistently held that loss of trust and
confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the
employee by his employer.—The Court has consistently held that “x x x
loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly
or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence
and not on the employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions[,] otherwise,
the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.
Page 490 of 682
x x x. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act

complained of must be work-related and show that the employee
concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss
of confidence x x x is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust, and confidence or
that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect
to delicate matters, such as handling or care and protection of the
property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.”
Same; Same; Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled
to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of
the employer. A company has the right to dismiss its employee if only
as a measure of self-protection.—With the derogatory statements issued
by Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just public condemnation
of VECO, but antagonism and obstruction against rate increases in
electricity that it may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no dispute
that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his
ability to perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected
of an employee entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the
rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who
is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has
the right to dismiss its employee if only as a measure of selfprotection.
Same; Social justice does not mandate that every dispute should be
automatically decided in favor of labor.—As a final word, while it is the
state’s responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should not
be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In
resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and justice
should always prevail. Social justice does not mandate that every
dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be
granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
Page 491 of 682

G.R. No. 205926. July 2, 2015.*

ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Search
Warrants; Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.—Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule
which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry
Searches); Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law
enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable
cause.—The Court finds respondent’s assertion that there was a valid
“stop and frisk” search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v.
Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), the Court had an opportunity to
exhaustively explain “stop and frisk” searches: “Stop and frisk”
searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the
concept of “suspiciousness” present where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience
of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they
should have the ability to discern —based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act. x x x x Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the
law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases
adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
Page 492 of 682
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same. For warrantless
searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged.”
Page 493 of 682

G.R. No. 211972. July 22, 2015.*

WILSON GO and PETER GO, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENAVENTURA, represented by
RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS;
and RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, respondents.
G.R. No. 212045. July 22, 2015.*
BELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER
ALVIN A. GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
FELISA TAMIO DE BUENAVENTURA, herein represented by
RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS,
and RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, respondents.
Civil Law; Trusts; Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of
property, the legal title to which is vested in another. —Trust is the right
to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested
in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal
with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations
between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied
trust comes into being by operation of law.
Same; Same; Express Trusts; Express trusts are created by direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.—
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil
Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” It is possible to
create a trust without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely,
the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate
an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the
trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which
to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows
that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and
whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship
which is called a trust.
Same; Same; Same; Reconveyance; Anent the issue of prescription, the
Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents
has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express
trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.
—Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for
reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed,
following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten
(10) years from the time the trust is repudiated. In this case, there was
a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee,
Page 494 of 682
sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As
the complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents
on October 17, 1997, or only a few months after the sale of the subject
property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has
prescribed.
Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A purchaser in
good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in the
property.—A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other
person’s claim or interest in the property. Corollary thereto, when a
piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller,
the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a
buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his
duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is
there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence,
which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in
making purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The
buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
Page 495 of 682

G.R. No. 205722. August 19, 2015.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
vs. LEGAL HEIRS OF JOSE L. AFRICA, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreements; Words and Phrases; A
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
—A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts such as compromise
agreements is that “if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations shall control.”
Same; Same; Stipulation Pour Autrui; For a stipulation pour autrui to be
appreciated, it is indispensable that there be a stipulation deliberately
conferring a benefit or favor to a third person.—For a stipulation pour
autrui to be appreciated, it is indispensable that there be a stipulation
deliberately conferring a benefit or favor to a third person. Article 1311
of the Civil Code states: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation, or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. If a
contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he
may demand its fulfilment provided he communicated his acceptance to
the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of
a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of a Stipulation Pour Autrui.— In
Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Quilala, 463 SCRA 586 (2005), the Court laid
down the requisites of a stipulation pour autrui, namely: (1) there is a
stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the
whole, of the contract; (3) the contracting parties clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor to the third person — the favor is not an
incidental benefit; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
(5) the third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor
before its revocation; and (6) the contracting parties do not represent,
or are not authorized by, the third party.
Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; It is settled that for a defendant
to benefit from the compromise agreement executed between the
plaintiff and the other defendants, it must be established that: (1) the
plaintiff alleged a common cause of action against the defendants; and
(2) all the defendants are indispensable parties to the case.—Relatedly,
respondents neither argued nor showed that the causes of action
against the defendants are the same and that they are all indispensable
parties as to benefit from the dismissal of a case as a result of the
Compromise Agreement. It is settled that for a defendant to benefit
Page 496 of 682
from the compromise agreement executed between the plaintiff and the
other defendants, it must be established that: (1) the plaintiff alleged a
common cause of action against the defendants; and (2) all the
defendants are indispensable parties to the case. This was the crux of
the Court’s ruling in Imson v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 58 (1994),
viz.: In sum, Lim Tanhu states that where a complaint alleges a common
cause of action against defendants who are all indispensable parties to
the case, its dismissal against any of them by virtue of a compromise
agreement with the plaintiff necessarily results in the dismissal of the
case against the other defendants, including those in default. The ruling
is rooted on the rationale that the court’s power to act in a case
involving a common cause of action against indispensable parties is
integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of them and
at the same time render judgment against the rest.
Page 497 of 682

G.R. No. 213189. September 8, 2015.*

FAUSTINO A. SILANG, VENERANDO R. REA, LUZVI- MINDA B.
CUADRA, MARIA CIELITO V. ZETA, ESTELITO M. QUERUBIN, LYKA
MONIKA J. OABEL, GINALYN CELESTINO, GENER B. ABORDO, JOY
O. TAGUILASO, GERMAN L. JAMILANO, ROLANDO P. BORROMEO,
RENATO TABERNILLA, ROMEO G. CARIAGA, ROMEO O. GAMBOA,
ADELMO M. ABESAMIS, ROEL O. TADIOSA, RUPERTO R.
ZARSAGA, JOSELITO C. TALABONG, EMMANUEL L. AVERILLA,
MARIO G. QUESEA, FELIX T. MARQUEZ, ROLANDO Z. OLIVAR,
MARCELITO R. AYALA, DIONISIO N. SOMBRERO, REYNALDO J.
MADERAL, CARLOS G. ABANTO, ESMERALDO Z. RIVERE,
REGALADO O. ROMERO, ROMEO S. BOMBANI, MARCELINO U.
CONTRERAS, EDMERLITO P. YBARDOLAZA, SR., MANUEL S.
ABRAGON, GERARDO S. EDRESA, ESMERALDO V. MADRONIO,
TEODORO V. RIVADENERA, RODRIGO A. MAGTIBAY, MARVIN
JACELA, MICHAEL CASTILLO, ROBERTO S. VILLA, ALEXANDER A.
OLIVAR, ODILON O. PINEDA, RUFINO N. CABULA, RIZALYN Z.
ESPEDIDO, ARLENE O. AYALA, ROSELLE Y. VILLAVERDE, LORNA
S. BOMBANI, JOSEFINA O. PEREZ, MARY JANE Z. CALUPIG,
NECIAS C. PATAUNIA, AILEEN R. RANERA, MARIO C. REYES, JR.,
ERMELO A. ESCOBIÑAS, ENRICO T. NAÑEZ, RIZALINO O. AGUAS,
ANTONIO Z. SALVAN, MAIDE D. JADER, ISADORA G. REYES,
DALMACIA AIZELE P. RAFA, RONALDO Q. CARILLO, NANCY N.
BABLES, ESPERANZA E. CABRIGA, LUISA ROSAN B. ABULENCIA,
AMELIA F. BABIERRA, MARILOU D. VILLANUEVA, SONIA C. TABI,
MELANIE C. TALABONG, MA. CECILIA R. POTESTADES, REMEDIOS
A. VILLORIA, ARMANDO TABERNILLA, CELINA B. OABEL,
BENILDA O. DE GUZMAN, NARCISO P. RAMALLOSA, CRISTINO V.
ZAGALA, AUREA S. RESARE, ROY Z. SU
* EN BANC MINISTRADO, PAZ V. JAVAL, GALLARDO N. EBINA,
BRENDA B. SUMALABE, ERLITO A. OBDIANELA, HECTOR D.
OABEL, NELSON V. COLADILLA, FABIAN JABALLA, EVANGELINA L.
LAVADIA, MANOLO G. ROMERO, SUSANA V. AÑONUEVO, DR.
CESAR ANTHONY ORIAS, CRISTETA O. BAJAR, ERLINDA C.
TAGULINAO, ROSITA M. AMOYO, MERCEDITA C. REYES, LETECIA
B. SANDOVAL, ISABEL S. CARANDANG, MARIAN JOY INES N.
ABADILLA, LAARNI Q. LUNA, LORENA D. PADUA, MAROCHELLE S.
ABAS, MA. VERONICA C. NACA, LORENZO GUAÑO, AVELINA S.
MARINAY, IRMA C. ILOCARIO, VENERACION R. SAN JUAN,
MARIDEL C. BALLARD, LILIA D. LACORTE, REMEDIOS Z.
JUACALLA, JOSEFINA N. MANTES, DELIA S. TABERNILLA, JOCELYN
S. CADAVIDO, FLORENCE O. CAGAUAN, CONCEPCION C.
CABRIGA, LEOVINA C. FLORES, HERMINIA V. LADINES, ROMMEL
N. ABUYAN, ABNER A. ZUBIETA, DANIEL A. LAVADO, MIGUEL O.
QUINSANOS, RUELITO O. AÑOSO, RADITO C. LABITA, RODEL M.
CADEMIA, ELADIO V. MANZANO, JR., GILBERT T. OABEL, EFREN
A. ZARSUELO, RUBEN S. ABLAÑA, ILUMINADA R. CUEVAS,
VIRGILIO A. CABAÑAS, RENATO M. MANLULU, RAMON M.
VALDEAVILLA, FLORENCIA E. REMOLONA, VERONICA N. GARCIA,
ALLAN C. ZAGALA, RAYMUNDO L. CONSTANTINO, ISAGANI C.
Page 498 of 682
REQUISO, ARNEL V. RATUISTE, FREDIE R. FLORES, LORD R.

QUINTO, WARREN A. OBEÑA, and BELEN D. PANDEZ,
petitioners,** vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds;
As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for any
illegal expenditure of public funds are personally liable therefor.—As a
general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for any illegal
expenditure of public funds are personally liable therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V, Book II of the Local
Government Code (LGC) states that the superior officer directing, or the
department head participating in the illegal or improper use or
application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly
and severally liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer,
or other accountable officer for the sum or property so illegally or
improperly used, applied or deposited.—Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V,
Book II of the LGC states that the superior officer directing, or the
department head participating in the illegal or improper use or
application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly
and severally liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer,
or other accountable officer for the sum or property so illegally or
improperly used, applied or deposited.
Same; Same; Same; Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing Code
provides that the treasurer of the local government unit (LGU) shall
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising the
accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and
solidarily liable with them for the loss of government funds or property
under their control.—Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing Code
provides that the treasurer of the local government unit shall exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising the accountable
officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and solidarily liable
with them for the loss of government funds or property under their
control.
Same; Same; Same; By way of exception, however, passive recipients
or payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other
allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they received
the same in good faith.—By way of exception, however, passive
recipients or payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and
other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they
received the same in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials
and employees who unwittingly received disallowed benefits or
allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of
bad faith. In Lumayna v. COA, 601 SCRA 163 (2009), the Court declared
that notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected
personnel who received the said benefits in good faith should not be
ordered to refund the disallowed benefits.
Same; Same; Local Government Units; View that Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local chief
executive and the Sanggunian to use savings from released
Page 499 of 682
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash

incentives to rank-and-file employees of the local government, through
a Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA).—Under the local government
code, an ordinance is necessary for the use of local funds. The local
chief executive prepares the budget proposal, which is the basis for the
budget to be enacted by the local Sanggunian. As a rule, savings
generated from the annual budget revert back to the general fund. DBM
Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local chief executive and the
Sanggunian to use savings from released Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash incentives to rank-and-
file employees of the local government, through a CNA.
Same; Same; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; View that the Court En
Banc held the approving officers who acted in bad faith to be solidarily
liable for the return of the disallowed funds even if they did not receive
any part of the fund.—That these approving officers did not receive any
of these funds is not sufficient justification to absolve them from
liability. The receipt or nonreceipt of illegally disbursed funds is
immaterial to the solidary liability of government officials directly
responsible therefor. We had the occasion to rule on this point in the
recent case Maritime Industry Audit v. COA, 745 SCRA 300 (2015),
where the Court En Banc held the approving officers who acted in bad
faith to be solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed funds even if
they did not receive any part of the fund.
Same; Same; Same; View that the only set of employees who are not
obliged to reimburse the illegally disbursed funds in the present case
are its passive recipients, i.e., the ordinary rank-andfile employees of
the local government unit (LGU) of Tayabas, including the Unyon ng
mga Kawani ng Pamahalaang Lokal ng Tayabas (UNGKAT) members and
officers who had no direct participation in the negotiations.—The only
set of employees who are not obliged to reimburse the illegally
disbursed funds in the present case are its passive recipients, i.e., the
ordinary rank-andfile employees of the LGU of Tayabas, including the
UNGKAT members and officers who had no direct participation in the
negotiations. The reason for this conclusion is that they had been mere
passive recipients of good graces and they had (and still have) every
right to rely on the presumptions of regularity and good faith accorded
to public officers responsible for the disbursement and expenditure of
public funds. In particular, as mere passive recipients, they did not
actively take part in the CNA, had no responsibility to undertake in
carrying out the requirements for union registration and accreditation,
and could not have known the taints of irregularities that the funds
released to them carried.
Page 500 of 682

G.R. No. 194906. September 9, 2015.*

LORALEI P. HALILI, petitioner, vs. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN
INTERNATIONAL, ROB MORRIS, and GUNDELINA A. VELAZCO,
respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Applicable laws form part of, and are read into,
contracts without need for any express reference thereto; more so,
when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public interest.
—Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without
need for any express reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a
labor contract which is imbued with public interest. Each contract thus
contains not only what was explicitly stipulated therein, but also the
statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter.
Page 501 of 682

G.R. No. 207949. September 9, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO
DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON,
accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; Criminal Liability;
Civil Liability; The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.—
In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained that
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently,
Renato’s death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court’s July 23, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set
aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is dismissed.
Page 502 of 682

G.R. No. 211588. September 9, 2015.* * FIRST DIVISION.

WORLD’S BEST GAS, INC., petitioner, vs. HENRY VITAL, joined by
his and wife FLOSERFINA VITAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is wellsettled that courts
cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party. —With the RTC’s jurisdiction established
over the above mentioned causes of action, Vital’s claim of P500,000.00
due from WBGI’ s acquisition of his shares of stocks should therefore be
offset against the P923,843.59 in arrearages payable to WBGI by ERJ
Enterprises owned by respondents, as prayed for by him. Hence, no
amount can be adjudicated in Vital’s favor, since it is the respondents
who, after due computation, would be left liable to WBGI in the net
amount of P423,843.59. This notwithstanding, WBGI cannot recover this
latter amount in this case since it never interposed a permissive
counterclaim therefor in its answer. It is well-settled that courts cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. WBGI may, however, opt to file a separate
collection suit, including those related thereto (e.g., moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees), to recover such sum.
Page 503 of 682

G.R. No. 172352. September 16, 2015.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO
HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife, CONSOLACION, and
children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR, WILSON, JIMMY,
ALFREDO, JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed HABABAG,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172387-88. September 16, 2015.*
ALFREDO HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife,
CONSOLACION, and children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR,
WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO, JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed
HABABAG, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; In the
landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the
Supreme Court (SC) defined the term “just compensation” as follows:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s
gain but the owner’s loss.—In the landmark case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court defined the term “just compensation”
as follows: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s
gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the
meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full [and] ample.
Same; Same; Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 enumerates the
factors which must be taken into consideration to accurately determine
the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a particular case.—
The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with
the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for
parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to the agrarian reform
program. To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657
enumerates the factors which must be taken into consideration to
accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in
a particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the
current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the
property, and the income therefrom; (d) the owner’s sworn valuation;
(e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government
assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property;
and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any. Corollarily, pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR
translated these factors into a basic formula, which courts have often
Page 504 of 682
referred to and applied, as the CA did in this case. It, however, bears
stressing that courts are not constrained to adopt the said formula in
every case since the determination of the amount of just compensation
essentially partakes the nature of a judicial function. In this accord,
courts may either adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own
application for as long as the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657
have been duly considered.
Same; Same; Market Value; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court
(SC) has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market
value of the property, which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government.—To elucidate, in determining the amount of
just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied the Income
Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the
remaining productive life of the crops therein, without considering the
fortuitous events and plant diseases, and with the expectation that they
would be compensated by developments which could be made by the
property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional
limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent
of the market value of the property, which is, in turn, defined as the
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government. In this accord, therefore,
the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was “based
on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a
property is dependent on the potential net benefit that may be derived
from its ownership.” Clearly, this approach, which is largely
characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of
valuing the expropriated property at the time of the taking.
Same; Same; In order to be just, the compensation for the land must be
what the farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based on
what the land can produce.—Since they generally live on a hand-to-
mouth existence, their source of repaying the just compensation is but
derived out of their income from their cultivation of the land. Hence, in
order to be just, the compensation for the land must be what the
farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based on what the
land can produce. It would therefore be highly inequitable that in the
30-year allowable period to pay the annual amortizations for the lands,
farmer-beneficiaries would be required to pay for the same income they
expect to earn therefrom on top of the computed market value of the
landholdings. Such could not have been the intent of the State’s
agrarian reform program. In fine, the Court cannot sustain the RTC’s
application of the Income Productivity Approach used as one of its bases
in arriving at its decreed valuation. Not only is the same aversive to the
jurisprudential concept of “market value,” but it also deviates from the
Page 505 of 682

factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657 and thus, remains legally

baseless and unfounded.
Page 506 of 682

A.C. No. 10465. June 8, 2016.*

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO and GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES, respondent.
Attorneys; Practice of Law; When the Supreme Court (SC) orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to practice law.—It is
settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law. The practice of law
embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes
performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or
rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.
Same; Same; The government office of Assistant City Prosecutor
requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent’s
continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law
and, thus, a clear defiance of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) order of
suspension against him.—Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,
otherwise known as the “Prosecution Service Act of 2010,” provides the
powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit: Section 9. Powers and
Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor.—The provincial
prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall: (a) Be the law officer of the
province of the city officer, as the case may be; (b) Investigate and/or
cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct
of such investigations he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive
the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for
this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify
under oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an
absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any
trial court; and (c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the
courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties
incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of
the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof. Verily, a plain reading of the
foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of
Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice
law. Hence, respondent’s continuous discharge of his functions as such
constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court’s
order of suspension against him.
Page 507 of 682

Same; Same; Willful Disobedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Court;

Disbarment; Suspension; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case —
are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.—
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law, to wit: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC), in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if,
through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.—As
a final note, it must be stressed that “[d]isbarment of lawyers is a
proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members
of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline
erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most
vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The
Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to
impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming the errant lawyer is possible.”
Page 508 of 682

A.M. No. P-14-3222. August 12, 2014.*

(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3609-P) PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE
B. LAGADO and CLERK OF COURT II JOSEFINA C. EMPUESTO,
both of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, MAHAPLAG, LEYTE,
complainants, vs. CLERK II BRYAN ANTONIO C. LEONIDO,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases;
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray;
unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.—Dishonesty is
the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and
lack of fairness and straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that
makes people unfit to serve the judiciary.
Same; Same; Misconduct; Dismissal from Service; To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have
a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.—
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In
order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
Same; Same; Dishonesty; Grave Misconduct; The Supreme Court (SC)
notes that Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are classified as grave
offenses punishable by dismissal for the first offense.—As to the proper
penalty to be imposed on Leonido, the Court notes that Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct are classified as grave offenses punishable by
dismissal for the first offense. Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal
from service carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and -controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
Same; Court Personnel; Those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects
Page 509 of 682
the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it.
—It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects
the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it.
The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and
it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which
would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even
tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such,
the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of
justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
Page 510 of 682

G.R. Nos. 194339-41. April 20, 2015.*

TERESITA A. CIRON, petitioner, vs. MA. MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, in her official capacity as Ombudsman, FLORIZA A.
BRIONES and TERESITA P. BUTARDO- TACATA, in their official
capacities as Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer II of the
Office of the Ombudsman, NONNA O. BELTRAN, 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor, RAUL E. CONTRERAS, City Prosecutor, both of
National Prosecution Office, Iriga City, and SANTIAGO D.
ORTEGA, JR., respondents.
Ombudsman; Doctrine of Noninterference; The Supreme Court (SC) has
decide whether an Information should be filed. In this relation, it is
settled that the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed.—At the outset, it must
be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether an Information should be filed. In
this relation, it is settled that the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed. Nonetheless,
this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Revival of Actions; Actions; Information;
“Complaint” for purposes of reviving a case must then refer to
Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.— The Court is
not oblivious to the fact that Bañares II, where criminal cases were
involved, uses the phrase “file a new complaint.” It must be clarified,
however, that Bañares II and Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco, 234 SCRA 455 (1994), merely state the rule that when an order
dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may
no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court’s
power to modify or amend; instead, the action must be instituted anew.
Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary
investigation in order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, it must be
emphasized that “complaint” in civil cases is different from a
“complaint” in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the
initiatory pleading filed in court, whereas in criminal cases, what is filed
in court is an Information and not a complaint, which is filed before the
public prosecutor for purposes of conducting a preliminary
investigation. Thus, “complaint” for purposes of reviving a case must
then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.
Page 511 of 682

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has, in several cases, held that
criminal cases which have been dismissed without prejudice may be
reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final, or
thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense.—Verily, the Court
has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been
dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the
order of dismissal becomes final, or thereafter, by filing a new
Information for the offense. The Court, therefore, disagrees with Ciron’s
view that a new complaint for preliminary investigation had to be filed
before the charges against her could be revived.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Instances When a New
Preliminary Investigation Must be Conducted to Accord the Accused the
Right to Submit Counter-affidavits and Evidence.— Anent the argument
that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled
that the same is only required in order to accord the accused the right
to submit counter-affidavits and evidence only in the following
instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some
of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may
no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged;
(b) where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to
that of a principal. Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this
case, the Court holds that the OCP-Iriga, through Beltran and Contreras,
need not conduct another preliminary investigation before it can issue
the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent
Informations in court.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Noninterference; Courts cannot
interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and in the determination of probable cause where the
Ombudsman’s discretion prevails over judicial discretion except when
there is grave abuse of discretion, which does not obtain in this case.—
The Court emphasizes that in our criminal justice system, the public
prosecutor, which is the Office of the Ombudsman in this case,
exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal
case should be filed in court. Courts cannot interfere with the
Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations
and in the determination of probable cause where the Ombudsman’s
discretion prevails over judicial discretion except when there is grave
abuse of discretion, which does not obtain in this case.
Page 512 of 682

G.R. No. 203993. April 20, 2015.*

PRISCILO B. PAZ,** petitioner, vs. NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSALITY, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It should be emphasized, as it
has been time and again, that the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of
facts, and is thus not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals.—It should be
emphasized, as it has been time and again, that this Court is not a trier
of facts, and is thus not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact by the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions, none of which
was established herein.
Page 513 of 682

G.R. No. 209537. April 20, 2015.*

THE PLAZA, INC., petitioner, vs. AYALA LAND, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments;
Compromise Agreements; The Compromise Judgment, covering the
surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well as the
demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials
salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory, unless a
motion is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be taken from the
order denying the motion.”—At the onset, it should be pointed out that
Civil Case No. 01-1352 — the case from which the present petition
originates — comes before the Court at its execution stage. Notably, the
Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the
subject premises, as well as the demolition period of the Building and/or
removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is, by nature,
“immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event
an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion.” With no
such motion having been filed, the RTC is bound to issue a writ of
execution to carry out the said judgment to its full force and effect. In
Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Vda. de Hernandez, 67 SCRA
256 (1975), the duty of courts dealing with final and executory
judgments was explained as follows: [T]he court cannot refuse to issue
a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or
order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after
final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact
or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the
parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that
the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court;
or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Judges have the
ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce a
compromise agreement.—Although the fixing of a period of demolition
would have been merely incidental to the execution of the Compromise
Judgment, as it covered, among others, the demolition of the Building,
the parties’ explicit agreement on said period precluded the RTC from
resolving Plaza’s Motion to Fix. As the CA aptly observed, to allow the
RTC to fix such period would allow it to amend a substantial part of the
parties’ agreement. Verily, judges have the ministerial and mandatory
duty to implement and enforce a compromise agreement. Absent any
appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify,
impose conditions different from the terms of a compromise agreement,
or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good
faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion, as in this
case.
Page 514 of 682

Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Cause of Action; In Genova v.

De Castro, 407 SCRA 165 (2003), the Supreme Court (SC) stated that a
party’s violation of a compromise agreement may give rise to a new
cause of action, which may be pursued in a separate action as it is not
barred by res judicata.—In Genova v. De Castro, 407 SCRA 165 (2003),
the Court stated that a party’s violation of a compromise agreement
may give rise to a new cause of action, which may be pursued in a
separate action as it is not barred by res judicata: [P]etitioner’s violation
of the terms of the compromise judgment gave rise to a new cause of
action on the part of respondent, i.e., the right to enforce the terms
thereof. When she failed to obtain this by mere motion filed with the
trial court, she was constrained to institute the proper suit for
ejectment. The filing of a separate case based on a cause of action that
arises from the application or violation of a compromise agreement is
not barred by res judicata in the first action. Noticeably, Plaza’s Motion
for Restitution is not one of the remedies that can be availed against
ALI’s purported violation of the Compromise Agreement. On the
contrary, the same is a new cause of action arising therefrom.
Page 515 of 682

G.R. No. 213214. April 20, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENE
SAMUYA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.—In order to convict a person
charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish
beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing
does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
Same; Treachery; Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.—Among the qualifying circumstances found in Article 248 of the
RPC is treachery. Under Article 14 of the same Code, there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375 (1999), the Court held that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, 351
SCRA 549 (2001), it was explained that a frontal attack does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be
appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the
deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; It is settled that without
unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete.—The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic
requirement in a plea of self-defense, either to justify the commission of
a crime or to mitigate the imposable penalty. It is settled that without
unlawful aggression, there can be no selfdefense, whether complete or
incomplete. For unlawful aggression to justify or mitigate a crime, the
same must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely threatening and intimidating attitude,
towards the one claiming self -defense.
Same; Murder; Damages; Civil Liability; Awards in Case of Death
Resulting from the Crime of Murder.—On the matter of damages, case
law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs
of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than
the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to
the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c)
moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was
committed with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances.
Page 516 of 682
Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages; While records do not show

that the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually expended
for burial and funeral expenses, prevailing jurisprudence nonetheless
allows the Supreme Court (SC) to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 to the victim’s heirs as it cannot be denied that
they suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime committed.—While
records do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the amount
actually expended for burial and funeral expenses, prevailing
jurisprudence nonetheless allows the Court to award temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the victim’s heirs as it cannot
be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime
committed. And lastly, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid is imposed
on all monetary awards.
Page 517 of 682

G.R. No. 213216. April 20, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICKY
ARGUTA alias “JOEL” and WILSON CAHIPE alias “SIWIT,”
accused-appellants.
errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law. Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court
deems it appropriate to modify accused-appellants’ conviction from
Simple Rape to Qualified Rape, as will be explained hereunder.
Same; Same; Case law provides that the act of holding a bladed
instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least,
intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to
bring her into submission.—In this case, records reveal that accused-
appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied her up
before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent.
Jurisprudence holds that force or intimidation, as an element of Rape,
need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant’s objective is
accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was
irresistible or not becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from
the lens of the victim’s perception and judgment and it is enough that
the victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist her
assailant’s advances. In this regard, case law provides that the act of
holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or,
at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is
sufficient to bring her into submission.
Same; Same; Considering that the crime was committed by two (2)
persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of a bladed
weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple
Rape to Qualified Rape.—The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
findings of fact made by the courts a quo that accused-appellants are
guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a deadly weapon,
as the same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the
assessment and findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence, as in this case. Nevertheless, considering that the crime was
committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the
Page 518 of 682
use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their

conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.
Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 provides that “[p]ersons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL), as amended.”— Anent the proper penalty to be
imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that “[p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.” Pursuant thereto,
accusedappellants should be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Page 519 of 682

G.R. No. 216098. April 21, 2015.*

BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, DD, PABLO R. MANALASTAS,
JR., PhD, MARIA CORAZON AKOL, CONCEPCION B. REGALADO,
HECTOR A. BARRIOS, LEO Y. QUERUBIN, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN,
FELIX P. MUGA II, PhD, ATTY. GREGORIO T. FABROS, EVITA L.
JIMENEZ, and JAIME DL CARO, PhD, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, represented by Acting
Chairperson CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATIC-TIM
CORPORATION, represented by Smartmatic Asia-Pacific
President CESAR FLORES, respondents.
G.R. No. 216562. April 21, 2015.*
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its Acting
Chairperson ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATICTIM
CORPORATION, respondents
Same; By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest
by giving the public the best possible advantages through open
competition.—By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public
interest by giving the public the best possible advantages through open
competition. Under Section 5(e), Article I of the GPRA, public bidding is
referred to as “Competitive Bidding,” which is defined as “a method of
procurement which is open to participation by any interested party and
which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-bid
conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and
opening of bids, evaluations of bids, post-qualification, and award of
contract, the specific requirements and mechanics of which shall be
defined in the [GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)].”
Case law states that competition requires not only bidding upon a
common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same
subject matter, and the same undertaking, but also that it be
legitimate, fair and honest and not designed to injure or defraud the
government. The essence of competition in public bidding is that the
bidders are placed on equal footing which means that all qualified
bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.
Another self-evident purpose of competitive bidding is to avoid or
preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
public contracts.
Same; Government Procurement; It is an established public policy, as
well as a statutory mandate that all government procurement shall be
done through competitive public bidding.—It is an established public
policy, as well as a statutory mandate that all government procurement
shall be done through competitive public bidding. However, as an
exception, Article XVI of the GPRA sanctions a resort to alternative
methods of procurement, among others, via direct contracting.
Same; Direct Contracting; Words and Phrases; Direct contracting,
otherwise known as “Single Source Procurement,” refers to “a method
Page 520 of 682
of Procurement that does not require elaborate Bidding Documents

because the supplier is simply asked to submit a price quotation or a
pro forma invoice together with the conditions of sale, which offer may
be accepted immediately or after some negotiations.”—Direct
contracting, otherwise known as “Single Source Procurement,” refers to
“a method of Procurement that does not require elaborate Bidding
Documents because the supplier is simply asked to submit a price
quotation or a pro forma invoice together with the conditions of sale,
which offer may be accepted immediately or after some negotiations.”
Same; Same; Government Procurement Reform Act; Under Section
50(a), Article XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA),
direct contracting may be allowed when the procurement involves
goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the
proprietary source — that is, when patents, trade secrets, and
copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the same item.—Under
Section 50(a), Article XVI of the GPRA, direct contracting may be
allowed when the procurement involves goods of proprietary nature,
which can be obtained only from the proprietary source — that is, when
patents, trade secrets, and copyrights prohibit others from
manufacturing the same item. The applicability of said condition was
explicated in the GPPB Manual as follows: This is applicable when the
goods or services being procured are covered by a patent, trade secret
or copyright duly acquired under the law. Under the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 8293), the registered owner of a
patent, a copyright or any other form of intellectual property has
exclusive rights over the product, design or process covered by such
patent, copyright or registration. Such exclusive right includes the right
to use, manufacture, sell, or otherwise to derive economic benefit from
the item, design or process.
Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; Even if it is assumed
that Smartmatic-TIM is the proprietary source of the services or that the
intended repair and refurbishment would necessarily entail a
modification of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) hardware and
software of which its existing intellectual property rights cover, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is still not bound to engage
Smartmatic-TIM on an exclusive basis.—A perusal of the aforementioned
patent and copyright documents reveals that Smartmatic-TIM’s existing
intellectual property rights do not cover the services subject of these
cases. No evidence has been presented to show that it possessed
intellectual property rights over the method, process, system, program,
or work of servicing the said PCOS machines for their repair and
refurbishment. Accordingly, Smartmatic-TIM cannot be said to be the
services’ proprietary source, thus, negating its purported exclusivity as
the COMELEC claims. At any rate, even if it is assumed that Smartmatic-
TIM is the proprietary source of the services or that the intended repair
and refurbishment would necessarily entail a modification of the PCOS
hardware and software of which its existing intellectual property rights
cover, the COMELEC is still not bound to engage Smartmatic-TIM on an
exclusive basis. Based on the 2009 AES Contract, SmartmaticTIM would
grant the COMELEC a perpetual, but nonex clusive license to use,
Page 521 of 682
modify, and customize the PCOS systems and software, including the
right to alter and modify the source code itself, for all future elections,
when the latter exercises its option to purchase (which it eventually
did), with certain limitations.
Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; With the warranty on
manufacturing defects having lost its effect, there is no way that the
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) engagement of another service
contractor would constitute a breach of that warranty.—With the
warranty on manufacturing defects having lost its effect, there is no
way that the COMELEC’s engagement of another service contractor
would constitute a breach of that warranty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive
manufacturer and distributor of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence to show
that it is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the
same. Smartmatic-TIM’s certification — aside from being self-serving
and, thus, of doubtful probative value — is not evidence of the
company’s exclusive capability.—While Smartmatic-TIM may be the
exclusive manufacturer and distributor of the PCOS machines and
software in the Philippines, there is no evidence to show that it is the
sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same.
Smartmatic-TIM’s certification — aside from being self-serving and, thus,
of doubtful probative value — is not evidence of the company’s
exclusive capability. A business dictionary defines “certification” as a
“formal procedure by which an accredited or authorized person or
agency assesses and verifies (and attests in writing by issuing a
certificate) the attributes, characteristics, quality, qualification, or
status of individuals or organizations, goods or services, procedures or
processes, or events or situations, in accordance with established
requirements or standards.” Paralleled against this definition, the
certification thus operates only as a formal assurance that any work
performed by the issuer’s employees would conform to its own
established requirements and standards, for which the client, based on
the issuer’s goodwill and reputation, is led to expect a certain quality of
work. With the COMELEC appearing to rely solely on Smartmatic-TIM’s
certification, and more importantly, absent the conduct of an initial
industry survey (which again may, in itself, be considered as a ground
to invalidate the resultant contract as above explained), it remains
uncertain if the repair and refurbishment of the PCOS machines can be
accomplished by other equally capable service providers at more
advantageous terms to the government. With this, the Court concludes
that the third condition — similar to the previous two conditions —
which would justify a resort to direct contracting under Section 50,
Article XVI of the GPRA had not been complied with.
Same; Same; It has already been resolved that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) failed to comply with any of the conditions by
which its selected mode of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would
have been allowed.—It has already been resolved that the COMELEC
failed to comply with any of the conditions by which its selected mode
Page 522 of 682
of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would have been allowed.

Meanwhile, it has not argued that any other alternative method of
procurement can be applied. This notwithstanding, the COMELEC
attempts to go beyond the scope of the GPRA and extend Section
52(h)’s application based on two (2) practical considerations, namely:
(a) the alleged tight schedule of conducting a public bidding and having
the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished in time for the 2016 elections;
and (b) the great risk of having the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished
by any third party provider in view of the highly technical nature of the
goods.
Same; Same; Automated Election System; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) could have already had the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines inspected and diagnosed by its own in-house
personnel as early as the time it had resolved to reuse the same.—At
the outset, it should be underscored that the COMELEC could have
already had the PCOS machines inspected and diagnosed by its own in-
house personnel as early as the time it had resolved to reuse the same.
The COMELEC’s ITD could have even proceeded to conduct preventive
maintenance procedures, which it admits it is capable of under its
memorandum dated May 14, 2014
Same; Same; Same; It appears that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) could have just procured the “the tools for repair and parts
for replacement,” and have the repair and refurbishment done by its
own in-house personnel.—In fact, as may be above gleaned, it appears
that the COMELEC could have just procured the “the tools for repair and
parts for replacement,” and have the repair and refurbishment done by
its own in-house personnel. Note that a sufficient number of ITD
personnel could have well been trained by Smartmatic-TIM itself on
matters related to the repair, refurbishment, tuning up and
maintenance of the PCOS machines, as well as the electronic
transmission facility, pursuant to Item No. 8.2.4, Part V of the 2009 RFP.
Same; Same; Same; Smartmatic-TIM’s training obligation — an
obligation that was incipiently required in the Request for Proposal (RFP)
to which all bidders at that time were subjected to and, in fact, included
in the 2009 Automated Election System (AES) Contract’s project scope
— spans both aspects of preventive maintenance and repair. With this,
the Supreme Court (SC) is in a quandary as to why the services subject
of these cases would still have to be procured by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from an outside service provider, let alone under
an exclusive direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM.—
Clearly, Smartmatic-TIM’s training obligation — an obligation that was
incipiently required in the RFP to which all bidders at that time were
subjected to and, in fact, included in the 2009 AES Contract’s project
scope — spans both aspects of preventive maintenance and repair. With
this, the Court is in a quandary as to why the services subject of these
cases would still have to be procured by the COMELEC from an outside
service provider, let alone under an exclusive direct contracting
arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM. Curiously, Smartmatic-TIM has been
communicating with the COMELEC about its proposed extended
Page 523 of 682
warranty as early as 2013. Hence, unless the COMELEC was already

bent on pursuing its current deal with Smartmatic-TIM, then the latter’s
training obligation should have been enforced. To the Court’s mind, this
would have been the more prudent course of action: ideally, this would
not only narrow down the COMELEC’s task to the procurement of the
necessary tools and replacement parts, but also provide it with a
considerable degree of sustainability by minimizing — if not eliminating
— its reliance on SmartmaticTIM with respect to the upkeep of the PCOS
machines.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing on record convinces the Supreme Court
(SC) that there is no other service provider which is capable of servicing
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines without the need to
reverse engineer the same.—Nothing on record convinces this Court
that there is no other service provider which is capable of servicing the
PCOS machines without the need to reverse engineer the same. Neither
is this Court convinced that reverse engineering, if done properly, would
impair the machines’ integrity or put “back to zero” the know-how
already accumulated. The bid guidelines may very well qualify the
COMELEC’s desired body of work, and the bidding process itself screens
the capability of potential bidders to comply with the same. As it was in
its earlier asseveration, the COMELEC is quick to assume the worst but
its assumptions remain unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the COMELEC’s
arguments at this juncture are denied altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Warranty; The services of repair and refurbishment
cannot be procured from Smartmatic-TIM through an “extended
warranty” mode, unless the Supreme Court (SC) assents to a blatant
circumvention of the procurement law.—The Extended Warranty
Contract (Program 1) cannot be validated by the mere expedient of
characterizing the same as a part of the 2009 AES Contract. The
services of repair and refurbishment cannot be procured from
Smartmatic-TIM through an “extended warranty” mode, unless this
Court assents to a blatant circumvention of the procurement law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An extended warranty gives a prolonged
warranty to consumers to provide the additional service of replacing or
repairing goods, the defects of which are directly related to how the
item was manufactured.—An extended warranty gives a prolonged
warranty to consumers to provide the additional service of replacing or
repairing goods, the defects of which are directly related to how the
item was manufactured. As an “extension,” the defect to be repaired
should occur within the extended period covered in the agreement. In
these cases, the warranty period for manufacturing defects had, as
above discussed, lapsed a long time ago, or last March 30, 2013, which
follows the one (1) year warranty period for the PCOS machines,
reckoned from March 30, 2012 when the 2012 Deed of Sale was
executed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has failed to justify its reasons for directly contracting with Smartmatic-
TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under Section 50,
Article XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) exists; its
Page 524 of 682
claims of impracticality were not supported by independently verified

and competent data; and lastly, its perceived “warranty extension” is, in
reality, just a circumvention of the procurement law.—There are no
qualms about the task of having the PCOS machines repaired and
refurbished. However, there are serious and unignorable legal flaws
about how the COMELEC intends to pursue this undertaking. Bluntly,
the COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for directly contracting
with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under
Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA exists; its claims of impracticality
were not supported by independently verified and competent data; and
lastly, its perceived “warranty extension” is, in reality, just a
circumvention of the procurement law. For all these counts, the
conclusion thus reached is that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a
result, its Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended Warranty Contract
(Program 1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts paid
to Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public
funds sourced from taxpayers’ money, should be returned to the
government in accordance with the procedures contained in existing
rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these cases does not
prohibit the COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew or other
alternative method of procurement with any service contractor, subject
to compliance with the conditions provided in the GPRA and all the
pertinent rules and procedures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the parties herein agree that the
subject “goods” of the Extended Warranty Contract neither pertain to
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines nor the software
program, but to the services, particularly diagnostics, preventive
maintenance, repair, and replacement of the PCOS machines previously
bought from Smartmatic-TIM.—To put things into perspective, however,
the parties herein agree that the subject “goods” of the Extended
Warranty Contract neither pertain to the PCOS machines nor the
software program, but to the services, particularly diagnostics,
preventive maintenance, repair, and replacement of the PCOS machines
previously bought from Smartmatic-TIM. Here, it has been duly proved
that Smartmatic-TIM has proprietary rights over the PCOS machines’
hardware and software, but whether these proprietary rights extend to
the services contracted remains to be seen. It is likewise premature at
this point to draw a conclusion on whether or not Smartmatic-TIM is the
sole distributor of the services to be rendered. This is in view of the fact
that the COMELEC, as correctly pointed out by the ponencia, failed to
comply with two key requirements prior to directly contracting with
SmartmaticTIM, namely: the conduct of (a) an initial industry survey,
and (b) a pre-procurement conference. On this point alone, the
Extended Warranty Contract ought to be nullified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is undisputed that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the right to reverse engineer,
disassemble, decompile, alter, modify, or transmit the technology it
purchased in any form or by any means, but, as can be gleaned, these
rights to alter and/or modify the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
Page 525 of 682
machine hardware, and the software embedded thereon, pertain

exclusively to COMELEC.—It is undisputed that the COMELEC has the
right to reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile, alter, modify, or
transmit the technology it purchased in any form or by any means, but,
as can be gleaned, these rights to alter and/or modify the PCOS
machine hardware, and the software embedded thereon, pertain
exclusively to COMELEC. In the same vein, the exception under Article
10 indeed allows for the exploitation and reproduction of the technology
transferred but only if it is performed by COMELEC itself. To be sure, the
provisions, as couched, do not evince that the said rights mentioned
thereon are actually transferrable. On the contrary, the language of the
2009 AES Contract prohibits the same.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is still premature at this point to
rule that performing the auxiliary services will necessarily affect the
source code.—While I maintain my position that the hardware and
software of the PCOS machines are closely intertwined — the software
being embedded on the hardware, I echo the concern that it is still
premature at this point to rule that performing the auxiliary services will
necessarily affect the source code. The initial industry survey, after all,
may reveal that these services may actually be rendered without
altering the software’s algorithms, proving the COMELEC’s fears to be
unfounded. Thus, should the COMELEC opt to conduct an initial industry
survey, I implore the Commission to include a technical study to
ascertain the veracity of its claim. If it were to be discovered that the
said auxiliary services cannot be performed by entities other than by
COMELEC and Smartmatic -TIM without necessarily altering the source
code, the Commission cannot then contract out the said services except
to Smartmatic-TIM. This is so because the rights granted to COMELEC to
alter and/or modify the Source Code under Article 9 of the 2009 AES
Contract, to reiterate, is nontransferable and cannot be performed by
any other entity in its stead, lest the Commission contravene Articles 9
and 10 of the 2009 AES Contract, and violate Smartmatic-TIM’s
intellectual property rights.
Page 526 of 682

G.R. No. 191667. April 22, 2015.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M.
CACAYURAN, respondent, MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, LA UNION,
intervenor.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties
should be joined in a suit.—Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit, viz.:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties-in-interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An indispensable party
is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.—“An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by
the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.” Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It must be stressed that the failure to
implead any indispensable party to a suit does not necessarily result in
the outright dismissal of the complaint.—Nevertheless, it must be
stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to a suit
does not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint. In
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., 695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court
definitively explained that in instances of nonjoinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the
case: The nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or
on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with
the order. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be
indispensable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.—Be that as
it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the
Municipality’s status as an indispensable party even at this stage of the
proceedings. Indeed, the presence of indispensable parties is necessary
Page 527 of 682
to vest the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on

jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as it
has now come to the fore that any resolution of this case would not be
possible and, hence, not attain any real finality due to the nonjoinder of
the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent
actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court’s,
and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all
indispensable parties to the case and its immediate disposition on the
merits. With this, the propriety of the Municipality’s present intervention
is now mooted.
Page 528 of 682

G.R. No. 193659. June 15, 2015.*

SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA,
petitioners, vs. ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN, respondent.
Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Words
and Phrases; Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection.—Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin
property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is
legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant
to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal
easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands, which obliges
lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which naturally
and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not
those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth
carried by the waters, viz.: Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which
they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct
works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the
higher estate make works which will increase the burden. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been
aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary
adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden created by
such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the
easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter
wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the National
Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708(a) thereof which
reads: Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—(a)
Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not
more than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside
lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; While moral damages may be
awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are
only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should,
therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done.—In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory
negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral
damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded
Page 529 of 682
whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate

cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to
ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the
wrong done.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.—Anent the
issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded
every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. In this case, the
Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara (thru their
compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have acted in bad faith in
pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of
bad faith is negated by the fact that both parties have valid contentions
against each other. Thus, absent cogent reason to hold otherwise, the
Court deems it inappropriate to award attorney’s fees in favor of either
party.
Same; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; The
underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
—In view of Sps. Sonkin’s undisputed failure to observe the two (2)-
meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the
order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate
drainage system within their property, the Court likewise deems it
proper, equitable, and necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely
impleaded as respondent before the Court, to comply with the aforesaid
rule by the removal of the portion of her house directly abutting the
partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that
a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held liable only
for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
Page 530 of 682

A.C. No. 10628. July 1, 2015.*

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, respondent.
Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers
who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.—The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is a special privilege
burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public’s
faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
Same; Same; Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility
and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public
or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls
short of the standards imposed upon them.—It must be emphasized
that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such
that a lawyer’s words and actions directly affect the public’s opinion of
the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of
nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in
their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this
case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando’s brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should
have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they
pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It
was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently reminded the
members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.—
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings,
as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded
the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando
transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.
Page 531 of 682

G.R. No. 206423. July 1, 2015.*

LEONCIO ALANGDEO, ARTHUR VERCELES, and DANNY
VERGARA, petitioners, vs. The City Mayor of Baguio, HON.
BRAULIO D. YARANON (to be substituted by incumbent City
Mayor, HON. MAURICIO DO MOGAN), JEOFREY MORTELA, Head
Demolition Team, CITY ENGINEER’S OFFICE, and ERNESTO
LARDIZABAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides for three (3) ways by which an appeal from the Regional Trial
Court’s (RTC’s) decision may be undertaken, depending on the nature of
the attendant circumstances of the case.—On the preliminary
procedural issue, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides for three
(3) ways by which an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be
undertaken, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of
the case, namely: (a) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a petition for
review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly
filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second
mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The
third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules is filed with the Court
only on questions of law.
Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,”
Distinguished.—There is a “question of law” when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is
a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct, is a question of law.
Same; Building Official; National Building Code of the Philippines; It is
the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority to
order the demolition of the structures under the National Building Code
of the Philippines (NBCP).—To this, it bears noting that it is the Building
Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority to order the
demolition of the structures under the NBCP. As held in Gancayco v. City
Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853 (2011): [T]he Building Code
clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished.
The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the
Building Official.
Page 532 of 682

G.R. No. 207639. July 1, 2015.*

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or V-SHIP NORWAY and/or
CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. CARLOS L. FLORES, JR.,**
respondent.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; It is only upon the
lapse of two hundred forty (240) days from repatriation, or when so
declared by the company-designated physician, that a seafarer may be
deemed totally and permanently disabled.—At the outset, the Court
notes that petitioners correctly ascribed error on the part of the CA in
holding that respondent’s inability to obtain gainful employment for
more than 120 days after his repatriation, and that the failure of the
company-designated physician to declare him fit to work or to give him
a final disability rating within the same period ipso facto rendered
respondent’s disability to be permanent and total. In Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court held
that the company-designated physician is given a leeway of an
additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the
seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the
nature of the latter’s disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240
days from repatriation, or when so declared by the company-designated
physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.
Same; Same; Same; Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of the two
hundred forty (240)-day period, the seafarer is still incapacitated to
perform his usual sea duties and the companydesignated physician had
not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total
or permanent, the conclusive presumption that the seafarer is totally
and permanently disabled arises.—Records reveal that after respondent
was repatriated on April 18, 2009, he underwent continuous medical
care from the company-designated physician. He was even given an
interim disability rating of Grade 7 (moderate residual or disorder) on
July 17, 2009, and thereafter, went through further tests and
procedures. However, after October 12, 2009, respondent’s treatment
stopped without him recovering from his ailment. Notably, the
companydesignated physician neither issued to respondent a fit-to-work
certification nor a final disability rating on or before December 14,
2009, the 240th day since respondent’s repatriation. Case law instructs
that, if after the lapse of the 240-day period, the seafarer is still
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company-
designated physician had not yet declared him fit to work or
permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the conclusive
presumption that the seafarer is totally and permanently disabled
arises. Perforce, it is but proper to hold that respondent was
permanently and totally disabled, and hence, entitled to the
corresponding benefits stated under the CBA.
Page 533 of 682

G.R. No. 214466. July 1, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO
BALCUEVA y BONDOCOY, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Elements of.—The elements of
Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the
victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or
when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by
means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
Page 534 of 682

G.R. No. 215764. July 6, 2015.*

RICHARD K. TOM, petitioner, vs. SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ,
respondent.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.—As traditionally described, grave abuse of discretion refers
to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. In Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341 (2011), the Court
explained that: The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific
meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
“evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.” Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is
restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.”
Page 535 of 682

G.R. No. 202645. August 5, 2015.*

FORTUNATO R. BARON, MANOLO B. BERSABAL, and RECTO A.
MELENDRES, petitioners, vs. EPE TRANSPORT, INC.** and/or
ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.— Preliminarily, it
should be pointed out that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely reexamine the
evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the
divergence in the findings of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one
hand, and that of the CA on the other — as in this case — is a
recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize the records to
determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction,
erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held
that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The
existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or
quasijudicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment of work does not per se
sever the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect
of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of employment.—
Abandonment connotes a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part
of the employee to resume his employment. Notably, “abandonment of
work does not per se sever the employer-employee relationship. It is
merely a form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for
termination of employment. The operative act that will ultimately put an
end to this relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying
with the procedure prescribed by law.” For a valid finding of
abandonment, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable cause; and (b)
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
Page 536 of 682

second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested

by some overt acts.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest
his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have abandoned his
work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint
for illegal dismissal is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus
negating any suggestion of abandonment.—In this case, no proof was
adduced by respondents to prove their theory of abandonment. Nothing
on record would show that petitioners’ absence from work was
deliberate and unjustified, with a clear intent to sever the employment
relationship. On the contrary, such intention is belied by the fact that
shortly after petitioners ceased from working, they immediately
instituted the complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to
have abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an
employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of his
desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.
Indeed, it would be illogical for petitioners to have left their job and
thereafter seek redress by filing a complaint against their employer.
Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Voluntary Arbitrators; Article
272 of the Labor Code provides that all unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), including violations of said agreement, are under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators.—What was referred to the grievance machinery
was the unfair labor practice case filed by the petitioners before they
were terminated, which contains issues that are different and distinct
from their cause of action for illegal dismissal. It bears to note that
Article 223(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, is explicit that the LA
shall refer to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as
provided in the CBA, those cases that involve the interpretation of said
agreements. Further, Article 272 of the same Code provides that all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the CBA, including violations of said agreement, are under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators. As such, petitioners cannot be faulted in invoking
the grievance machinery even after they had been dismissed in
compliance with the provisions of the CBA, to which they were bound.
Same; Separation Pay; Since reinstatement is no longer feasible in view
of the enmity between the parties, the award of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement is in order.—All told, since petitioners’ abandonment
was not proven by respondents in this case, the NLRC correctly ruled
that the former were illegally dismissed. Consequently, the CA
committed reversible error when it held otherwise.
Page 537 of 682

G.R. No. 205705. August 5, 2015.*

DOMINADOR M. APIQUE, petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE APIQUE
FAHNENSTICH, respondent.
Banks and Banking; Joint Accounts; A joint account is one that is held
jointly by two (2) or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical
persons or entities.—A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or
more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities.
Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the
said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code,
which provides: Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as
well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests.
Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions
belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
Same; Same; The common banking practice is that regardless of who
puts the money into the account, each of the named account holder has
an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may deposit
and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or
consent of the other, during their lifetime.— The common banking
practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account,
each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire
balance, and any of them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or
wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other, during their
lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right
against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and
the purpose for which the account was opened and how it will be
operated.
Same; Civil Procedure; Answer; Waiver of Defenses; Settled is the rule
that defenses which are not raised in the answer are deemed waived,
and counterclaims not set up in the answer shall be barred.—Corollarily,
the Court cannot subscribe to Dominador’s claim for payment of
compensation as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline
based on the principle of quantum meruit, which was not raised as an
affirmative defense or counterclaim in his answer to the complaint.
Settled is the rule that defenses which are not raised in the answer are
deemed waived, and counterclaims not set up in the answer shall be
barred.
Page 538 of 682

G.R. No. 211263. August 5, 2015.*

OKS DESIGNTECH, INC., represented by ZAMBY O. PONGAD,
petitioner, vs. MARY JAYNE L. CACCAM,** respondent.
Certiorari; It is well-settled that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—It
is well-settled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not
a trier of facts and does not routinely examine the evidence presented
by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings
of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA, on
the other, is a recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize
the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling that respondent was not illegally dismissed.
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held
that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The
existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or
quasijudicial act is snared with the quality of whim and caprice,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Fixed-term employment could not be construed as a
circumvention of the law on security of tenure.—In light of the
foregoing, the Court laid down the following indicators under which
fixed-term employment could not be construed as a circumvention of
the law on security of tenure: (a) The fixed period of employment was
knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force,
duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee
and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or (b) It
satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
exercised by the former or the latter.
Same; Same; Case law dictates that even if an employee is engaged to
perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business of the employer, the same does not preclude the fixing of
employment for a definite period.—An examination of the contracts
entered into by respondent reveals that her employment was clearly
Page 539 of 682
limited to a fixed period and did not go beyond such period. She,
however, asserted that she is deemed a regular employee in view of the
nature of her employment as an accountant, an activity that is
necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the company.
This notwithstanding, case law dictates that even if an employee is
engaged to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the
usual trade or business of the employer, the same does not preclude
the fixing of employment for a definite period. There is nothing
essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and
the nature of the employee’s duties. In St. Theresa’s School of
Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 110 (1998), it was explained:
Article 280 [now,]
Page 540 of 682

G.R. No. 208984. September 16, 2015.*

WT CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF
CEBU, respondent.
G.R. No. 209245. September 16, 2015.*
PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. WT CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
respondent.
Certiorari; It is a settled rule that questions of law may be brought
before the Supreme Court (SC) on petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—At the outset, it must be pointed out that
a determination of whether or not there was a perfected oral contract
between the Province of Cebu and WTCI is a question of fact which is
beyond the scope of the Court’s power in a petition for review on
certiorari, subject to certain exceptions which do not obtain in this case.
It is a settled rule that questions of law may be brought before this
Court on petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC,
when affirmed by the CA, as in this case, are entitled to great weight
and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, the Court affirms the
liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI in the amount of
P257,413,911.73 which corresponds to the value of the additional
works.
Same; Same; Contracts of Service; Liabilities arising from construction
contracts do not partake of loans or forbearance of money but are in the
nature of contracts of service.—Verily, the Court has repeatedly
recognized that liabilities arising from construction contracts do not
partake of loans or forbearance of money but are in the nature of
contracts of service. In Federal Builders, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists,
Inc., 734 SCRA 379 (2014), the Court ruled that the liability arising from
the nonpayment for the construction works, specifically the construction
of a diaphragm wall, capping beam, and guide walls of the Trafalgar
Plaza in Makati City, do not partake of a loan or forbearance of money
but is more in the nature of a contract of service. The Court, therefore,
sustains the CA’s ruling that the rate of legal interest imposable on the
liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI is 6% per annum, in accordance
with the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994) (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.).
Same; Interest Rates; The legal interest rate of six percent (6%) shall be
imposed from the finality of the herein judgment until satisfaction
thereof.—The Court agrees with the CA that the legal interest rate of 6%
shall be imposed from the finality of the herein judgment until
satisfaction thereof. This is in view of the principle that in the interim,
the obligation assumes the nature of a forbearance of credit which,
pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. as modified by Nacar v. Gallery
Page 541 of 682

Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), is subject to legal interest at the rate of
6% per annum.
Page 542 of 682

G.R. No. 212920. September 16, 2015.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. NIPPON
EXPRESS (PHILS.) CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Withdrawal of Appeals; When
the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals
made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the
discretion of the court.—A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of
Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of provisions governing the
procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall
suppletorily apply: Sec. 3. Applicability of the Rules of Court.—The Rules
of Court in the Philippines shall apply suppletorily to these Rules. Rule
50 of the Rules of Court — an adjunct rule to the appellate procedure in
the CA under Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which are
equally adopted in the RRCTA — states that when the case is deemed
submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of
the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court.
Page 543 of 682

A.C. No. 10783. October 14, 2015.*

ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, complainant, vs. ATTY.
CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, respondent.
Notary Public; A notary public must observe the highest degree of care
in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity
of the notarial system.—The act of notarization is impressed with public
interest. As such, a notary public must observe the highest degree of
care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity
of the notarial system.
Same; Jurat; Words and Phrases; A jurat is, among others, an attestation
that the person who presented the instrument or document to be
notarized is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the
Notarial Rules.—A jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person
who presented the instrument or document to be notarized is personally
known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Notarial Rules: SEC. 6.
Jurat.—“Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents
an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; (c) signs the instrument or document
in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation
before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
Same; Notarial Rules; The requirement therefor, as stated under Section
2(h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments
acknowledged before the notary public.—It should be clarified, however,
that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit
to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own
records, the requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2(h), Rule VI
of the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged before
the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which contain a
jurat and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to
the Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be no administrative infraction
on this score. Nevertheless, Basilio’s aforediscussed violations of the
Notarial Rules are grave enough to warrant sanctions from the Court.
Page 544 of 682

A.C. No. 8507. November 10, 2015.*

ELENA BIETE LEONES VDA. DE MILLER, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROLANDO B. MIRANDA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; The notarial seal
converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which
it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its
genuineness and due execution.—A notary public is empowered to
perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the
performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of
the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial
seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its
genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be
treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public
exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must
inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.
Page 545 of 682

G.R. No. 201830. November 10, 2015.*

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON. CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as Tanodbayan, and HON.
GERARD A. MOSQUERA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, petitioners, vs. ROGER F. BORJA, respondent.
G.R. No. 201882. November 10, 2015.*
LERMA S. PRUDENTE and DAMASO T. AMBRAY, petitioners, vs.
ROGER F. BORJA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final
Judgments; It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.—It is well-settled that
once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. Such judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
Same; The dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule that a
criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.
—The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 had been dismissed upon the Ombudsman’s
manifestation that it lacked basis to prosecute him is of no moment. As
correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the criminal
case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in
consonance with the rule that a criminal case is separate from an
administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to each case. Moreover, in criminal cases,
the guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had, while liability in
administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of
substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; The
elements for the commission of graft and corrupt practices under
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, are different from what
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which
is an administrative offense.—Besides, the elements for the commission
of graft and corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, are
different from what constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, which is an administrative offense. The following are the
essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019: (1) The
Page 546 of 682
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions; (2) He must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) That his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.
Same; Same; Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has
been consistently held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and
integrity of the public office, although not necessarily related or
connected to the public officer’s function.—Conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service has been consistently held to pertain to acts
that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, although not
necessarily related or connected to the public officer’s function. Thus,
while the absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability for graft and
corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it does not
automatically absolve Borja of administrative liability for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that the only
question material to the latter is whether the public officer’s acts
tarnished the image or integrity of the public office. At this juncture, the
Court deems it fit to emphasize that a public office is a public trust. As
such, public officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Page 547 of 682

G.R. No. 208844. November 10, 2015.*

F & S VELASCO COMPANY, INC., IRWIN J. SEVA, ROSINA B.
VELASCO-SCRIBNER, MERCEDEZ SUNICO, and JOSE SATURNINO
O. VELASCO,** petitioners, vs. DR. ROM MEL L. MADRID, PETER
PAUL L. DANAO, MANUEL L. ARIMADO, and MAUREEN R.
LABALAN, respondents.
Same; Same; Same; The case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc.
v. Bitanga, 362 SCRA 635 (2001), instructs that an owner of shares of
stock cannot be accorded the rights pertaining to a stockholder — such
as the right to call for a meeting and the right to vote, or be voted for —
if his ownership of such shares is not recorded in the Stock and Transfer
Book.—The case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. v. Bitanga,
362 SCRA 635 (2001), instructs that an owner of shares of stock cannot
be accorded the rights pertaining to a stockholder — such as the right
to call for a meeting and the right to vote, or be voted for — if his
ownership of such shares is not recorded in the Stock and Transfer
Book.
Page 548 of 682

G.R. No. 209284. November 10, 2015.*

RENEE B. TANCHULING, and the HEIRS OF VICENTE N. Y.
TANCHULING, namely: REBECCA TANCHULINGTAN, RITA
TANCHULING-MAPA, ROSEMARIE TANCHULING-SALINAS, and
VINCENT RAYMOND B. TANCHULING, petitioners, vs. SOTERO C.
CANTELA, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Simulation takes place when
the parties do not really want the contract they have executed to
produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation or vices
of declaration may be either absolute or relative.—“Simulation takes
place when the parties do not really want the contract they have
executed to produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings.
Simulation or vices of declaration may be either absolute or relative.”
Article 1345 of the Civil Code distinguishes an absolute simulation from
a relative one; while Article 1346 discusses their effects, as follows: Art.
1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former
takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter
when the parties conceal their true agreement. Art. 1346. An absolutely
simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
binds the parties to their agreement.
Same; Same; Same; The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is
that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties.—In
Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 657 SCRA
555 (2011), the Court explained that “[i]n absolute simulation, there is a
colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended
to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the
parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void,
and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given
under the contract.” In this case, the Court agrees with the RTC that the
subject deed was absolutely simulated. The parties never intended to
be bound by any sale agreement. Instead, the subject deed was
executed merely as a front to show the public that Sps. Tanchuling were
the owners of the properties in order to deter the group of John Mercado
from illegally selling the same.
Same; Same; Same; Fraud; It is well-settled that fraud is never
presumed but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence by the
same party who alleges it.—The undated deed, which serves as a
counter-agreement to, and which was simultaneously executed with,
the subject deed, unmistakably evinces absolute simulation. While
Cantela posits that he was tricked into signing the undated deed as it
was supposedly surreptitiously inserted by Sps. Tanchuling into the
copies of the subject deed at the time of their signing, nothing, aside
Page 549 of 682
from his self-serving assertions, support his account. It is well-settled

that fraud is never presumed but must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence by the same party who alleges it. Besides, Navarro
and Botero, who equally witnessed the signing of the undated deed,
never testified on any irregularity. Notably, the fact that the undated
deed was not notarized is rendered irrelevant by Cantela’s own
admission of the document’s execution, which, unless proven to be
fraudulent, must be presumed to be fair and regular, as in all private
transactions.
Page 550 of 682

G.R. Nos. 217126-27. November 10, 2015.*

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A common
requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition
taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.—A common requirement to both a petition for
certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior
to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since
a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; Exceptions.—As a
general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the
lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered
as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower
court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari
[or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. x x x.” In
this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for
certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.
These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Page 551 of 682
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter

may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.— Albeit raised for the
first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless
proper to resolve the issue on the CA’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be
preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same
determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It
is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by
this Court to be heard on this issue, as he, in fact, duly submitted his
opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman’s Memorandum.
That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against
ruling on this issue.
Same; The second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the
Supreme Court (SC) on pure questions of law. —On the other hand, the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or
application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly
relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has
the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase
“application for remedy” or the word “findings” refers to; and (2) it does
not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court,
save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The
task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity.
Same; Statutory Construction; In case of doubt as to what a provision of
a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation
of the law.—As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of
the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute
of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation
of the law.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14,
Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against
issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of
remedy” against the same.—As a general rule, the second paragraph of
Page 552 of 682
Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against

issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of
remedy” (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify,
the phrase “application for remedy,” being a generally worded
provision, and being separated from the term “appeal” by the
disjunctive “or,” refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba
sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a
general sense. By the same principle, the word “findings,” which is also
separated from the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would
therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final
or provisional), except a decision. The subject provision, however, crafts
an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural
vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
remedy against “the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,” a Rule 45
appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
Court on “pure questions of law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of
Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot
be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts.—The concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman
from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power — that is, a provisional writ of
injunction against a preventive suspension order — clearly strays from
the concept’s rationale of insulating the office from political harassment
or pressure.
Same; While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court (SC).—
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the
jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits
and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this
Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial
power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil.
523 (1911), the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the
court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in
a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and
justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter.” While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
Page 553 of 682
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested

unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) rules that when Congress
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(WPI) to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon the Court’s constitutional rule-making authority.—With
these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances,
which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created
under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure
which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely
prescribed the means of implementing an existing right since it only
provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s right inesse
which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending
litigation.
Same; Judicial Power; To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged,
this, even by statute.—It should be pointed out that the breach of
Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s
ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can
easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive
relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the
court’s acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial
power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power,
especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a
court’s inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding’s course.
As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is
accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof
should be unclipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged,
this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional
injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of
procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over
the same.
Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation.—The law sets forth two (2) conditions that
Page 554 of 682
must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive

suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt
is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the
first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondent’s
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking,
condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied
forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense.”—Generally speaking, condonation has been
defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.”
The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of
complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon —
is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under
the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service Commission
v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation
doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there
is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.—The Court, citing Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
Same; Same; For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are
stated in Section 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as
the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on
October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992.—For local elective
officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an
elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
(LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on
January 1, 1992: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action.—An
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c)
Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prisión mayor; (e) Abuse
of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and
sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code
Page 555 of 682

and other laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Same; Same; Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) states
that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case
shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position.—
Related to this provision is Section 40(b) of the LGC which states that
those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position: Section 40.
Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position: x x x x (b) Those removed from office
as a result of an administrative case.
Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides
that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office: Section 52.
Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The penalty
of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office,
and bar from taking the civil service examinations. In contrast, Section
66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed
the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to
his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of
the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein
states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the
fact of reelection: Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x.
x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy
of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications
required for the office. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the
above cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that
the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
Same; Same; Same; Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for
a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term.—The concept of public office
is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for
a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability
arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President
Page 556 of 682
in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to
administrative offenses.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective
local official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of
reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the
theory that the liability is condoned.—At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC
prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the
unexpired portion of the elective local official’s prior term, and likewise
allows said official to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar to
People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237
[1942]), and Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418
[1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer
cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term.
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the
elective local official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact
of reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports
the theory that the liability is condoned.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.—This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now rendered obsolete
by — the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from
Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as
Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,
257 SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999), and
Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), which were all relied
upon by the CA. It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010): Judicial decisions assume the same
authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide
by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
Same; Same; Same; It would be a violation of the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to
abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become
apparent.—It would be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation
Page 557 of 682
doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively

discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is
simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution
which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that
public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
Same; Same; Same; The condonation doctrine is a peculiar
jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective
officials to escape administrative liability.—The condonation doctrine is
a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of
elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that
the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus,
this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must
ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial
obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of
elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that
paramount public interest is involved.
Same; Same; Same; In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is
wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to
uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding
supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.—The
defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local
officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To
provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that “for
the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the
Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on
the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a
hundred cases of alleged misconduct — involving infractions such as
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct —
were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and
prosecutorial powers.” Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case
is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review. In any
event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of
the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the
Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render
the subject of discussion moot.
Same; Same; View that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the
preventive suspension order in connection with criminal investigations
of government officials or employees because such authority rests in
the courts in which the criminal cases are filed. —It is important to note,
however, that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive
suspension order in connection with criminal investigations of
government officials or employees because such authority rests in the
courts in which the criminal cases are filed.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension; View that the Supreme Court (SC)
notably stated in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009),
and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 360 (2006), that “suspension
from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the
Page 558 of 682
services of the person they voted into office” in the context of

determining the propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension
order.—As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482
SCRA 360 (2006), as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The
Court notably stated in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that “suspension from
office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services
of the person they voted into office” in the context of determining the
propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension order. In other
words, the statement only served to remind the Ombudsman to issue
the preventive suspension orders with utmost caution in view of the
gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent elective local official.
Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of condonation.
Page 559 of 682

G.R. No. 210215. December 9, 2015.*

ROGELIO S. NOLASCO, NICANORA N. GUEVARA, LEONARDA N.
ELPEDES, HEIRS OF ARNULFO S. NO- LAS CO, and REMEDIOS M.
NOLASCO, represented by ELE NITA M. NOLASCO, petitioners,
vs. CELERINO S. CUERPO, JOSELITO ENCABO, JOSEPH ASCUTIA,
and DOMILO LUCENARIO, respondents.
Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal obligations,
either party may rescind — or more appropriately, resolve — the
contract upon the other party’s substantial breach of the obligation/s he
had assumed thereunder.—In reciprocal obligations, either party may
rescind — or more appropriately, resolve — the contract upon the other
party’s substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed
thereunder. This is expressly provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil
Code which states: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is
implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even
after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Same; Contracts; Rescission; More accurately referred to as resolution,
the right of rescission under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of
faith that violates the reciprocity between the parties to the contract.
—“More accurately referred to as resolution, the right of rescission
under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the
reciprocity between the parties to the contract. This retaliatory remedy
is given to the contracting party who suffers the injurious breach on the
premise that it is ‘unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his
promises when the other violates his.’” Note that the rescission (or
resolution) of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as
would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement.
Ultimately, the question of whether a breach of contract is substantial
depends upon the attending circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; For a contracting party to be entitled to rescission
(or resolution) in accordance with Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the
other contracting party must be in substantial breach of the terms and
conditions of their contract.—For a contracting party to be entitled to
rescission (or resolution) in accordance with Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, the other contracting party must be in substantial breach of the
terms and conditions of their contract. A substantial breach of a
contract, unlike slight and casual breaches thereof, is a fundamental
breach that defeats the object of the parties in entering into an
agreement. Here, it cannot be said that petitioners’ failure to undertake
Page 560 of 682
their obligation under paragraph 7 defeats the object of the parties in

entering into the subject contract, considering that the same paragraph
provides respondents contractual recourse in the event of petitioners’
nonperformance of the aforesaid obligation, that is, to cause such
transfer themselves in behalf and at the expense of petitioners.
Page 561 of 682

G.R. No. 213229. December 9, 2015.*

FILINVEST ALABANG, INC., petitioner, vs. CENTURY IRON
WORKS, INC., respondent.
Certiorari; At the outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.—At the
outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable, absent any of the exceptions recognized by case law.
This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by a trial
court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
ignored. Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon
this Court.
Same; Contracts; Fixed Lump Sum Contracts; In fixed lump sum
contracts, the project owner’s liability to the contractor is generally
limited to what is stipulated therein.—In a fixed lump sum contract, the
project owner agrees to pay the contractor a specified amount for
completing a scope of work involving a variety of unspecified items of
work without requiring a cost breakdown. The contractor estimates the
project cost based on the scope of work and schedule and considers
probable errors in measurement and changes in the price of materials.
Otherwise stated, in fixed lump sum contracts, the project owner’s
liability to the contractor is generally limited to what is stipulated
therein.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1724 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
parties from stipulating on additional works to the project covered by
said fixed lump sum contract which would entail added liabilities on the
part of the project owner.—It must be clarified that Article 1724 of the
Civil Code does not preclude the parties from stipulating on additional
works to the project covered by said fixed lump sum contract which
would entail added liabilities on the part of the project owner. In fact,
the said provision allows contractors to recover from project owners
additional costs in fixed lump sum contracts, as well as the increase in
price for any additional work due to a subsequent change in the original
plans and specifications, provided that there exists: (a) a written
authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the
written changes in work; and (b) written agreement of the parties with
regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in work or
design modification. Jurisprudence instructs that compliance with these
two (2) requisites is a condition precedent for recovery and hence, the
absence of one or the other condition bars the claim for additional
costs. Notably, neither the authority for the changes made nor the
Page 562 of 682

additional price to be paid therefor may be proved by any evidence

other than the written authority and agreement as above mentioned.
Page 563 of 682

G.R. No. 221318. December 16, 2015.*

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, represented by REPRESENTATIVE JAMES
MARK TERRY L. RIDON and MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I.
ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON
OF THE ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT
OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN
Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARYGENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN;
CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF
ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMA- MAYAN (AGHAM); and SINING
MARIA ROSA L. MARFORI, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Suffrage is a privilege granted by the
State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good.—As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine
Islands v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, it has been recognized that “[t]he right to
vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the
evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of
the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants.
But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise
in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit
classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.”
Same; Same; One must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second,
he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in
the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election.—Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the
current parameters for the exercise of suffrage: Section 1. Suffrage may
be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Dissecting the provision, one must
meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be
disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines
for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
Same; Same; Biometrics; Words and Phrases; Biometrics refers to a
quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an
individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or
Page 564 of 682
such other identifiable features. —RA 8189 primarily governs the

process of registration. It defines “registration” as “the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a
qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the [ERB].” As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA
8189 was passed in order “to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters.” To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances
in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was
signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy considerations
behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of
the registration process: Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is the policy
of the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list
of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. “Biometrics
refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of
an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris,
and/or such other identifiable features.”
Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit
themselves for biometrics validation.— Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367
respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for
biometrics validation: Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation.—
Registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall
submit themselves for validation. Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics
Registration.—The Commission shall implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters. Under Section 2(d) of RA 10367,
“validation” is defined as “the process of taking the biometrics of
registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured.”
Same; Same; Same; Deactivation; Words and Phrases; The consequence
of noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the
registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding
precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process
as required by [Republic Act (RA) No. 10367].”—The consequence of
noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the
registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding
precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process
as required by [RA 10367].” Section 7 states: Section 7. Deactivation.—
Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing
of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections
shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied) Notably,
the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation,
neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the law
creates artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There is no
favor accorded to an “obedient group.” If anything, noncompliance by
the “disobedient” only rightfully results into prescribed consequences.
Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the
laws, which only works “against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality.”
Page 565 of 682
Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; The public has been sufficiently
informed of the implementation of Republic Act (RA) No. 10367 and its
deactivation feature.—It deserves emphasis that the public has been
sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and its
deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February
22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after. Accordingly, dating to
the day of its publications, all are bound to know the terms of its
provisions, including the consequences of noncom pliance. As
implemented, the process of biometrics validation commenced on July
1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the
October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a massive
public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-No-Boto, from May 2014 until
October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters
were reminded to update and validate their registration records. On top
of that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process
more convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls
across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers and
declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the
National Capital Region and in highly urbanized cities. Considering
these steps, the Court finds that the public has been sufficiently
apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of
deactivation in case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of
procedural due process.
Same; Same; As the constitutional body specifically charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should be given sufficient
leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections.—
This Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with
the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that
must be followed by the approval of applications by the ERB. Thereafter,
the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. These
steps are necessary for the generation of the final list of voters which, in
turn, is a prerequisite for the preparation and completion of the Project
of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP contains
the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered precinct,
the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative
districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the names and
locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct
are assigned. The POP is necessary to determine the total number of
boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms
and supplies to be procured for the election day, the number of vote
counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the
budget needed. More importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for
the finalization of the Election Management System (EMS) which
generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the
voting jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and
provinces. The EMS determines the configuration of the canvassing and
consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the
constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement and
Page 566 of 682
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an

election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, the COMELEC
should be given sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the
upcoming elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the requirement of biometric
registration is not an additional qualification but rather a means to
ensure and protect the identity of the voter.—The requirement of
biometric registration, therefore, is not an additional qualification but
rather a means to ensure and protect the identity of the voter. Names
are deactivated because these do not correspond to real persons. Thus,
there is no disqualification inasmuch as fictitious names or names of the
deceased do not represent real persons. A ghost cannot be disqualified
because it does not exist.
Page 567 of 682

A.M. No. P-14-3241. February 4, 2015.* (formerly OCA I.P.I. No.

11-3672-P)
MARY-ANN** S. TORDILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 27,
complainant, vs. LORNA H. AMILANO, COURT STENOGRAPHER
III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR,
Administrative Law; Failure to Pay Just Debts; Penalties; Willful failure to
pay just debts is classified as a light offense, with the corresponding
penalty of reprimand.—Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known
as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” provides that a public employee’s
failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Section 22,
Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by
Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Rules), defines “just debts” as those: (a) claims
adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims the existence and justness
of which are admitted by the debtor. Under the same Rules, willful
failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, with the
corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “just debts” may refer not
only to claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor, as
respondent in this case.—Clearly, under the Rules, the term “just debts”
may refer not only to claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor,
as respondent in this case. As such, the OCA’s classification of
respondent’s infraction as simple misconduct — instead, of willful
refusal to pay just debts — was therefore erroneous.
Page 568 of 682

G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015.*

vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (as then
Ombudsman), DON M. FERRY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M.
ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, OFELIA I. CASTELL, and RAFAEL A.
SISON, public respondents, RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL I.
TINIO, and ANTONIO R. ROQUE, private respondents.
Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the
there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.—At the outset, it must be
stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be
filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial
mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should
be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.—Verily, Preliminary
investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or
not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The
presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
preliminary investigation level.”
Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in
determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving
at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.
Page 569 of 682
—In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the

elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of
probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case
against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable
cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more
than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or
accusations and the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are
better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. In
sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict
individual respondents of violating Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint against them.
Page 570 of 682

G.R. No. 205039. October 21, 2015.*

SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN and CLAUDINE
MARGARET SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. RAFFY TULFO, BEN
TULFO, and ERWIN TULFO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; In the landmark case of Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Supreme Court (SC)
has already explained that the writ of amparo, under its present
procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise known
as “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” was intended to address and,
thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.—In the landmark case of
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court
has already explained that the writ of amparo, under its present
procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise known
as “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” was intended to address and,
thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof: As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined
to these two instances or to threats thereof. x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Indeed, while amparo (which literally means
“protection” in Spanish) has been regarded as a special remedy
provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters of
protection are not the same in every jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; Words and
Phrases; “Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally
characterized as “killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,” while “enforced
disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity,” “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.”—In our jurisdiction, the contextual
genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as
a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. “Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are
generally characterized as “killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,” while
“enforced disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of Republic Act
No. 9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity,” “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
Page 571 of 682
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those

persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.” In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618
(2012), the Court held that it must be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case
has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation. Notably, the same requirement of
government participation should also apply to extralegal killings,
considering that the writ of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to “hold public
authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and
enforce our laws, to a high standard of official conduct and hold them
accountable to our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people
should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened
or violated, they will find vindication in our courts of justice.” Stated
differently, the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant
to balance out the government’s incredible power in order to curtail
human rights abuses on its end.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-912-SC’s
first paragraph, does state that the writ of amparo is a remedy to
protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to
avail of it, the same section’s second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete
cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security.—
While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s first
paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to
life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same
section’s second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights
specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection
to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should
indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the
provision. Clearly applicable is the statutory construction rule that
“clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a
harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this case, procedural
rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the
statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.”
Page 572 of 682

G.R. No. 202877. December 9, 2015.*

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR
MINING, INC., petitioners, vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is a fundamental rule that
the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even
if none of the parties raised the same. —It is a fundamental rule that
the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even
if none of the parties raised the same. The reason for the rule is that a
court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. Cast against
this light, the Court finds that the CA improperly took cognizance of the
case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the reason that
the OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one which
could be classified as an exercise of its quasijudicial authority, thus
negating the CA’s jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdictional
parameter that the appeal be taken against a judgment, final order,
resolution or award of a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasijudicial functions” is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the said Rule.
Same; DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-21; Section 55 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 2010-21 requires a publication/posting/radio
announcement of a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
application.—Section 55 of the same DENR issuance requires a pub li
cation/posting/radio announcement of an FTAA application. Any adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to the said FTAA should be filed directly to
the Regional Office, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
concerned, within ten (10) days from the date of publication or from the
last date of posting/radio announcement. The said adverse claim,
protest, or opposition shall then be resolved by the POA of the DENR,
whose ruling may then be appealed to the proper tribunals. To this, it
bears pointing out that Section 55 explicitly exempts “previously
published valid and existing mining claims or FTAA applications
originating from Exploration Permits that have undergone the
[publication requirement]” from the aforesaid publication requirement.
Page 573 of 682

G.R. No. 206942. December 9, 2015.*

VICENTE C. TATEL, petitioner, vs. JLFP INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JOSE LUIS F. PAMINTUAN, and/or PAOLO
C. TURNO, respondents.
Labor Law; Security Guards; Temporary Off-Detail; With respect to cases
involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not
sever employment relationship between a security guard and his
agency.—The onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on the employer, and
the failure to discharge the onus would mean that the dismissal was not
justified and was illegal. The burden of proving the allegations rests
upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive, and
convincing. Specifically with respect to cases involving security guards,
a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment
relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has
the right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right
to his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to
change his assignment or transfer him where his service, as security
guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary “off-detail” or the
period of time security guards are made to wait until they are
transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute
constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond
six (6) months. The onus of proving that there is no post available to
which the security guard can be assigned rests on the employer.
Same; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; Jurisprudence has
placed upon the employer the burden of proving that an employee was
not dismissed or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was for a valid or
authorized cause.—Jurisprudence has placed upon the employer the
burden of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed,
that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause. In this case,
respondents have adequately discharged this burden, proving that they
did not dismiss Tatel. Accordingly, the burden of proof has shifted to the
latter to establish otherwise, which he, however, failed to do. Apart from
mere allegations, Tatel was unable to proffer any evidence to
substantiate his claim of dismissal. On the contrary, records are bereft
of any indication that he was prevented from returning to work or
otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents.
Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.—Since Tatel was not dismissed, he
is not entitled to backwages and separation pay. Article 293 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines states that “[i]n cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of [an] employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
Page 574 of 682
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without

loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” As such, there
being no dismissal in this case, petitioner is not entitled to either
backwages or separation pay.
Same; Same; Abandonment; The mere absence or failure to report for
work, even after notice to return, does not necessarily amount to
abandonment.—To constitute abandonment of work, two (2) elements
must be present: first, the employee must have failed to report for work
or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by
some overt act. The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned
his or her work rests on the employer. The mere absence or failure to
report for work, even after notice to return, does not necessarily
amount to abandonment. Abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute
abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified
intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. The operative act is
still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
Page 575 of 682

G.R. No. 218891. September 19, 2016.*

EDMUND BULAUITAN y MAUAYAN,** petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
Same; Same; Same; A search under the strength of a warrant is
required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises sought
to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their absence
that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.—A search under the
strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant
of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is
only upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2)
persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. In
People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003), the Court held that a departure from
the said mandatory rule — by preventing the lawful occupant or a
member of his family from actually witnessing the search and choosing
two (2) other witnesses observe the search — violates the spirit and
letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with the vice of
unreasonableness, rendering the seized articles inadmissible due to the
application of the exclusionary rule.
Page 576 of 682

G.R. No. 220333. November 14, 2016.*

ANTONIO GAMBOA y DELOS SANTOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal in criminal cases opens the
entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to
correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned.—At the outset, it must be stressed
that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it
is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in
order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value.—Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure
police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.
Same; Same; Same; The saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165
applies only where the prosecution has recognized the procedural
lapses on the part of the police officers or Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.—As a
general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR.
However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved. The aforementioned saving
clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 applies only where
the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the
police officers or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the cited
justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been
preserved.
Page 577 of 682
Same; Same; Same; When police officers do not turn over dangerous
drugs to the laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they
must identify its custodian, and the latter must be called to testify.—
When police officers do not turn over dangerous drugs to the laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify its
custodian, and the latter must be called to testify. The custodian must
state the security measures in place to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved, which did
not take place in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Case law states that the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects.—Case law states that, the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For
indeed, however, noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our
campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action
that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
Page 578 of 682

A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P. February 21, 2017.* (formerly OCA I.P.I.

No. 09-31-SCC-P)
JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., petitioner, vs. RAHIM A.
ARABANI, Junior Process Server, and ABDURAJI G. BAKIL, Utility
Worker I, both from Shari’a Circuit Court, Maimbung, Sulu,
respondents. A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P. February 21, 2017.*
(formerly A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC) JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI,
JR., 4th Shari’a Circuit Court, Maimbung, Sulu, petitioner, vs.
RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., Clerk of Court, 4th Shari’a Circuit Court,
Maimbung, Sulu, respondent. A.M. No. SCC-11-17. February
21, 2017.* (formerly A.M. No. 10-34-SCC) Clerk of Court
RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., Process Server RAHIM A. ARABANI and
Utility Worker I ABDURAJI G. BAKIL, all of 4th Shari’a Circuit
Court, Maimbung, Sulu, and Utility Clerk SHELDALYN** I.
MAHARAN, 5th Shari’a Circuit Court, Patikul, Sulu, petitioners,
vs. JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., 4th Shari’a Circuit Court,
Maimbung, Sulu, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Daily Time Records;
Case law holds that falsification of Daily Time Records (DTRs) is an act
of dishonesty and is reflective of respondent’s fitness to continue in
office and of the level of discipline and morale in the service, rendering
him administratively liable in accordance with Section 4, Rule XVII of the
Civil Service Rules.— Dishonesty is defined as the “disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity.” As
correctly ruled by the OCA, Abduraji and Rahim are guilty of dishonesty
by committing irregularities in the punching of Rahim’s bundy card/DTR
on three (3) occasions, i.e., on the subject incidents. The punching of a
court employee’s DTR is a personal act of the holder which cannot and
should not be delegated to anyone else. Moreover, every court
employee has the duty to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of
his arrival at and departure from the office. Thus, case law holds that
falsification of DTRs is an act of dishonesty and is reflective of
respondent’s fitness to continue in office and of the level of discipline
and morale in the service, rendering him administratively liable in
accordance with Section 4, Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules.
Same; Same; Same; Falsification of Official Documents; Under Section
22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents
(such as Daily Time Records [DTRs]) and dishonesty are both grave
offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time
offenders.—Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules,
falsification of official documents (such as DTRs) and dishonesty are
both grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for
first time offenders. Nonetheless, while it is the Court’s duty to sternly
wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed
out those who are undesirable, it also has the discretion to temper the
harshness of its judgment with mercy, taking in mind that the objective
for discipline is not their punishment, but the improvement of the public
Page 579 of 682

service, and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the
government.
Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Mitigating Circumstances; Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.—Section 48, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. Among the
circumstances jurisprudentially held as mitigating include, among
others, the erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, high
performance rating, and the fact that the infraction complained of is
his/her first offense. Thus, in several cases involving first time
offenders, as Abduraji and Rahim in this case, the Court has reduced the
imposable penalty of dismissal to suspension of six (6) months without
pay. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopts the penalty
recommended by the OCA, and accordingly suspends Abduraji and
Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay.
Same; Court Personnel; Insubordination; Words and Phrases;
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a
superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed, and imports a willful
or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the
Judge.—Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order,
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed, and imports
a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the Judge. In this case, the Court finds to be likewise
well-taken the OCA’s recommendation for the dropping of the said
charges against Abduraji and Rahim considering the perceived absence
of intent on their part to deliberately defy Judge Arabani’s authority as
the head of office. However, they should be reprimanded for their
failure to comply with Judge Arabani’s memorandum requiring them to
explain the subject incidents in writing, which constitutes a violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense punishable with
reprimand for the first offense
Same; Same; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations;
Penalties; Reprimand; Violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations is only a light offense punishable with reprimand for the first
offense.—Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is only a
light offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
Nonetheless, in addition to such noncompliance, Rodrigo likewise failed
to secure the signature of Judge Arabani on his bundy cards for the
months of March to September 2010 when they are required to be
certified correct by the Presiding Judge. Rodrigo’s avowed reason for his
failure to leave his bundy cards on the designated rack having been
found to be unjustified, the forfeiture of his entire salary for the said
months should have been in order, if not for the Certification dated
October 5, 2010 issued by Mirad, Clerk II/Timekeeper of the 4th SCC of
Maimbung, Sulu, certifying the number of absences incurred by Rodrigo
Page 580 of 682
for the months of April through September 2010, which Judge Arabani
submitted, thus, impliedly admitting that Rodrigo was present on the
working days not so indicated therein.
Same; Vacation Leave; The grant of vacation leave (VL) shall be at the
discretion of the head of department/agency.—The failure of Rodrigo to
specify the number of working days of leave applied for and the
inclusive dates in his leave application filed on April 12, 2010, which
merely indicated the type of leave as “SPL [special privilege leave] &
VL” (vacation leave), is not a mere formal defect that may be remedied
by the expedience of subsequently stating the specific dates of leave. It
must be pointed out that leave of absence for any reason other than
illness of an official or employee or of any member of his immediate
family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. Hence, the
grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of
department/agency.
Same; Same; While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in
advance does not ipso facto render an employee administratively liable,
the unauthorized leave of absence becomes punishable if the absence
is frequent or habitual.—While the mere failure to file a leave of
absence in advance does not ipso facto render an employee
administratively liable, the unauthorized leave of absence becomes
punishable if the absence is frequent or habitual. An officer or employee
in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave
credit under the Leave law at least three (3) months in a semester or at
least three (3) consecutive months during the year.
Same; Court Personnel; Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit
themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours.—Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall
commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of
their office during working hours. Court personnel should strictly
observe the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every
moment thereof to inspire public respect for the justice system. Thus,
court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly
observe official time because the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of
its employees. Loafing results in inefficiency and nonperformance of
duty, and adversely affects the prompt delivery of justice.
Same; Penalties; Frequent Unauthorized Absences; Section 23(q), Rule
XIV of the Civil Service Rules punishes “[f]requent unauthorized
absences, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty during
regular office hours” with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.—
Section 23(q), Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules punishes “[f]requent
unauthorized absences, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during regular office hours” with suspension for six (6) months and
Page 581 of 682
one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the
second offense. Records are bereft of showing, however, that Rodrigo
had been previously found guilty of such offense. Consequently, the
Court deems it proper to impose upon him the penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day suspension. The OCA’s recommendation for the
forfeiture of salary for the months of February (sic; not the month
complained of) and March, 2010 must be, therefore, modified
accordingly.
Same; Judges; Sexual Harassment; The distasteful act by Judge Arabani
of making a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showing it
to an employee of the court of which he is an officer constitutes sexual
harassment.—The distasteful act by Judge Arabani of making a drawing
of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showing it to an employee of the
court of which he is an officer constitutes sexual harassment. It is an act
that constitutes a physical behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with
lewd insinuation. To the Court’s mind, Judge Arabani deliberately utilized
this form of expression, i.e., drawing, to maliciously convey to Sheldalyn
his sexual desires over her; hence, his conduct cannot be classified as a
mere display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under
Section 53(C)(4), Rule X of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, such as one
who is caught watching or reading pornographic materials. Rather,
Judge Arabani’s behavior should be classified as an analogous case
(Section 53[B][5]) of verbal abuse with sexual overtones under Section
53(B)(4) of the same issuance, which thus, qualifies the same as a less
grave offense.
Page 582 of 682

G.R. No. 203124. June 22, 2015.*

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, herein represented by MR. RODOLFO
BADIABLE, in his capacity as the ICOProvincial Treasurer,
Province of Leyte, petitioner, vs. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Certiorari; In
petitions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the
service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the
petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the
respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.—Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed
before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating
the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the
voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction. In the
case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated
November 4, 2009 indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s
certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the
petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by
filing its comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence,
the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the instant
case.
Same; Same; Proof of Service; The Rules require that the petition filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) should include proof of service to the
other party.—Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before
the CA should include proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the
purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of the pendency of an
action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already been notified of the
same and had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose
would have already been served. Considering that in this case, the CA
had already issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009 directing EDC
to file a comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be
denied that EDC was already aware of the certiorari proceedings before
the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over its person. The CA,
therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural
mishap and resolved the case on the merits in the interest of
substantial justice.
Page 583 of 682

G.R. No. 213383. June 22, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNIE
INCIONG y ORENSE, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Unlawful
Aggression; No self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since
there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.—In
order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be
able to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. An
accused who invokes self -defense has the burden to prove all the
aforesaid elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression.
Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense, unlawful
aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. No self-defense
can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the
accused will have to prevent or repel.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is present when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.—Similarly, treachery
as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this
case, a credible eyewitness account established that accused-appellant,
upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak
against the latter, leaving him unable to defend himself or evade the
attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant would
be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own person, hence,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use
of an unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the information, the
Court shall no longer delve upon its significance in this case, the same
not having been appreciated by the courts a quo.
Page 584 of 682

G.R. No. 213792. June 22, 2015.*

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
G.R. No. 213886. June 22, 2015.*
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over
Same; Homicide; Elements of.—The crime of Homicide is defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads: Art. 249. Homicide.
—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of
homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of
Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide
or Infanticide.
Same; Same; Intent to Kill; Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal
law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act
and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.—
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the
crime committed is different from that intended and where the felony
committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to
cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender
result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is
well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.
Page 585 of 682

Same; Same; Same; Since intention is a mental process and is an

internal state of mind, the accused’s intention must be judged by his
conduct and external overt acts.—Be that as it may, the penalty for the
crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and
Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence
of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a
mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused’s intention
must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the
aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac,
given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and
punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus,
evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm,
and not to end the life of Aro.
Page 586 of 682

G.R. No. 187487. June 29, 2015.*

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. and GEORGE C. GO,
petitioners, vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., substituted by
PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV-AMC], INC.,** respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; General Denial; A general denial does
not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.”—A reading of
the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the
execution of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of
the above quoted rule. The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their
Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations of
the Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to
suit plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial
as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it
is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does
not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.” Neither does it
become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad
conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are
intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.”
Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Case law enlightens that [t]he
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means
that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such
as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him.—Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the
defendant “sets forth what he claims to be the facts,” which
requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case.
Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial
under oath” requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the
proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had
impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the
documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent. To this, case
law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears
admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by
another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively
eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of
the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that
the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures
were unauthorized.”
Same; Same; Suretyship; Although the contract of a surety is in essence
secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable
Page 587 of 682
for the debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or

personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit
therefrom.—As established through the CSA, Go had clearly bound
himself as a surety to Go Tong Electrical’s loan obligation. Thus, there is
no question that Go’s liability thereto is solidary with the former. As
provided in Article 2047 of the Civil Code, “the surety undertakes to be
bound solidarily with the principal obligor. That undertaking makes a
surety agreement an ancillary contract as it presupposes the existence
of a principal contract. Although the contract of a surety is in essence
secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable
for the debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or
personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit
therefrom. Let it be stressed that notwithstanding the fact that the
surety contract is secondary to the principal obligation, the surety
assumes liability as a regular party to the undertaking,” as Go in this
case.
Page 588 of 682

G.R. No. 206866. September 2, 2015.*

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC),
petitioner, vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as
Overall Deputy Ombudsman, FIDEL C. CU, CARMELITA B. ZATE,
and MARY LOU S. APELO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Ombudsman; Principle of Non-
Interference; Probable Cause; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently
refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not
an Information should be filed.—At the outset, it must be stressed that
the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this
there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; Preliminary investigation is
merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the person charged should be held responsible for it.—Verily,
preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation]
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the
prosecution’s] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of
the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the
validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
Same; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.—Cu and Zate were
accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials, the
elements of which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or
promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and (b) that the
offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable
for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Manifest Partiality; Elements
of.—All private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e)
Page 589 of 682
of RA 3019. The essential elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
Page 590 of 682

G.R. No. 215348. June 20, 2016.*

ELDEFONSO G. DEL ROSARIO and JOSEFINO R. ORTIZ,
petitioners, vs. CRISTINA OCAMPO-FERRER, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or
Noninterference; Under the doctrine of judicial stability or
noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court,
the various trial courts of a province or city, having the same equal
authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with
their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.—At
the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial
stability or noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a
coequal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the
same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments. In Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 414 (2015), the Court had
the opportunity to thoroughly explain the said doctrine in this manner:
The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular orders
or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having
the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for
the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction
over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an
execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that
all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law and the
rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a
remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to
another coequal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the
action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of
and which this Court has operationalized through a petition
for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. x x x x It is not a
viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is
issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO
enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not
merely the executing sheriff. x x x As already mentioned above, the
appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the
Page 591 of 682
issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek
redress through a higher judicial body.
Page 592 of 682

G.R. No. 216452. June 20, 2016.*

TING TRUCKING/MARY VIOLAINE A. TING, petitioner, vs. JOHN C.
MAKILAN, respondent.
Certiorari; It is settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law.—At the
outset, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper
venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. The rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted
where the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and
the CA, on the other hand, are contradictory, as in this case. There is
therefore a need to review the records to determine whether the CA, in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, in ruling that respondent was not
illegally dismissed.
conferred upon it.—To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes,
grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia,
its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Page 593 of 682

G.R. No. 186050. June 21, 2016.*

ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN
BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID, petitioners, vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO,
NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, GEN. JESUS
VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, LT. P/DIR. EDGARDO
DOROMAL, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer
of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN, and
several JOHN DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 186059. June 21, 2016.*

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,
GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, and POL.
SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN, petitioners, vs. ARTHUR BALAO,
WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR,
and BEVERLY LONGID, respondents.**
Constitutional Law; Amparo Rule; Writ of Amparo; Under Section 20 of
the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not dismiss, the
case should it determine that it could not proceed for a valid cause.—
Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive,
and not dismiss, the case should it determine that it could not proceed
for a valid cause, viz.: Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases.—The
court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its
determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of
petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A
periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by
the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party,
order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall
be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the
lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order
archiving the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the
Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule
not later than the first week of January of every year.
Same; Same; Same; The Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases,
provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the
witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar
analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing
and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain
in these cases.—Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a
procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of
cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds
exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is
kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which
action thereon can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the
archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as
when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to
Page 594 of 682
similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively
hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not
obtain in these cases.
Page 595 of 682

G.R. No. 218665. July 20, 2016.*

JULIUS BAUTISTA, ARSENIO LARANANG, REYNALDO BALDEMOR,
CARMELITA MANAYAN, NORMA FLORES, CONSUELO ESTIGOY,
CARMELITA VALMONTE, SIMEON MARTIN, MAGDALENA GADIAN,
JOSE GINNO DELA MERCED, JOVEN SILAN, JR., JULIO DIAZ,
GIDEON ACOSTA, and WENCESLA BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. LT.
COL. BENITO DONIEGO, JR., LT. COL. ALFREDO PATARATA, and
MAJOR GENERAL GREGORIO PIO CATA PANG, respondents.
Certiorari; The Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a
petition for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and
other lawful fees.—For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following
requisites must be complied with: (a) the petitioner must have invoked
the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; (b) he must have
filed his petition for review within the reglementary period; (c) he must
have paid the necessary docket fees; and (d) the other parties must
have perfected their appeals in due time. In this regard, the Rules of
Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the
appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of
the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect
the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the
docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear
and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the
payment of the docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA
cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Page 596 of 682

A.C. No. 8560. September 6, 2016.*

CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S. REYES, complainant, vs.
ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA, respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity.—Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the
tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in
this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Same; Same; Same; It has been established that respondent habitually
watches pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside
the office premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and full
view of his staff. Obviously, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot
countenance such audacious display of depravity on respondent’s part
not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for — the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP) where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary — but also because it shrouds the legal profession
in a negative light.—Without a doubt, it has been established that
respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-
issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours, and
with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, the Court
cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity on
respondent’s part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the
reputation of the government agency he works for — the CAAP where
he was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary — but also
because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer
in the government service, respondent is expected to perform and
discharge his duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to
showcase these standards, and instead, displays sheer
unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the government position
he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by
himself and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever
anyone would pass by or come near his table is of no moment, because
the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of this case, remains. The
legal profession — much more an engagement in the public service
should always be held in high esteem, and those who belong within its
ranks should be unwavering exemplars of integrity and professionalism.
As keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such as respondent, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who
have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be
Page 597 of 682
more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the

weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case.
Same; Good Moral Character; Sexual Harassment; Watching
Pornographic Materials; Penalties; Suspension from Practice of Law;
Respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual
watching of pornographic materials while in the office and his acts of
sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the circumstances
of this case, the Court deems it proper to impose upon respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years.—Jurisprudence provides that in similar administrative cases
where the lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties
ranging from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 517
SCRA 600 (2007), the lawyer was reprimanded for his distasteful act of
suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and kissing
her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña, 708 SCRA 13 (2013), the lawyer
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for
rubbing the female complainant’s right leg with his hand, trying to
insert his finger into her firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and pressing his finger against her
private part. While in Guevarra v. Eala, 529 SCRA 1 (2007), and Valdez
v. Dabon, Jr., 775 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court meted the extreme penalty
of disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital
affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his
habitual watching of pornographic materials while in the office and his
acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court deems it proper to impose upon
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
Page 598 of 682

G.R. No. 221047. September 14, 2016.*

MICHAEL A. ONSTOTT, petitioner, vs. UPPER TAGPOS
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts acquire jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through
the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority.—Courts
acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through
their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.
Same; Same; Same; The filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.—In Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, 588 SCRA 612
(2009), it was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special
appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth
in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where
a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to
the court for resolution.”
Same; Legal Interest; Words and Phrases; “Legal interest” is defined as
interest in property or a claim cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a
legal owner who has legal title to the property.—“Legal interest” is
defined as interest in property or a claim cognizable at law, equivalent
to that of a legal owner who has legal title to the property. It must be
one that is actual and material, direct and immediate, not simply
contingent or expectant. Moreover, although the taxable person who
has actual and beneficial use and possession of a property may be
charged with the payment of unpaid realty tax due thereon, such
assumption of liability does not clothe the said person with the legal
title or interest over the property.
Page 599 of 682
G.R. No. 198928. December 3, 2014.*

CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Taxation; Tax Refunds; During the period December 10, 2003 (when
Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to
October 6, 2010 (when the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
[Aichi], 632 SCRA 422 [2010], case was promulgated), taxpayers-
claimants need not observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period
before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input Value-
Added Tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after
the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6,
2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.—Recently, in Taganito Mining
pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632
SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA
336 (2013), cases in the following manner: Reconciling the
pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must
therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi
case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-
day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input
VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e.,
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case, records disclose
that CBK Power filed its administrative and judicial claims for issuance
of tax credits on March 29, 2005 and April 18, 2005, respectively or
during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA489- 03 was in place, i.e., from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the
expiration of the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the
CTA, which was timely filed. In view of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc
erred in dismissing CBK Power’s claim on the ground of prematurity and,
thus, its ruling must be corrected accordingly.
Page 600 of 682

G.R. No. 220399. August 22, 2016.*

ENRIQUE Y. SAGUN, petitioner, vs. ANZ GLOBAL SERVICES AND
OPERATIONS (MANILA), INC., GAY CRUZADA, and PAULA
ALCARAZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is a meeting of minds between two (2)
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service.—A contract is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service. There is no contract
unless the following essential requisites concur: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established.
Same; Same; In general, contracts undergo three (3) distinct stages.
These are negotiation, perfection or birth, and consummation.—In
general, contracts undergo three distinct stages. These are negotiation,
perfection or birth, and consummation. Negotiation begins from the
time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the
contract and ends at the moment of their agreement. Thereafter,
perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree
upon the essential elements of the contract. Finally, consummation
occurs when the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the
contract, culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
Same; Same; An employment contract is perfected at the moment the
parties come to agree upon its terms and conditions, and concur in the
essential elements thereof.—An employment contract, like any other
contract, is perfected at the moment the parties come to agree upon its
terms and conditions, and thereafter, concur in the essential elements
thereof. In this relation, the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
Same; Same; When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its
effectivity shall take place only if and when the event which constitutes
the condition happens or is fulfilled.—In the realm of civil law, a
condition is defined as “every future and uncertain event upon which an
obligation or provision is made to depend. It is a future and uncertain
event upon which the acquisition or resolution of rights is made to
depend by those who execute the juridical act.” Jurisprudence states
that when a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its effectivity
shall take place only if and when the event which constitutes the
condition happens or is fulfilled.
Same; Same; A perfected contract may exist, although the obligations
arising therefrom — if premised upon a suspensive condition — would
yet to be put into effect.—While a contract may be perfected in the
manner of operation described above, the efficacy of the obligations
created thereby may be held in suspense pending the fulfillment of
Page 601 of 682
particular conditions agreed upon. In other words, a perfected contract

may exist, although the obligations arising therefrom if premised upon a
suspensive condition — would yet to be put into effect.
Same; Same; In a contract with a suspensive condition, if the condition
does not happen, the obligation does not come into effect. —In a
contract with a suspensive condition, if the condition does not happen,
the obligation does not come into effect. Thus, until and unless
petitioner complied with the satisfactory background check, there exists
no obligation on the part of ANZ to recognize and fully accord him the
rights under the employment contract.
Page 602 of 682

A.M. No. P-16-3541. August 30, 2016.* (formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
12-3915-P)
SYLVIA G. CORPUZ, complainant, vs. CEFERINA B. RIVERA, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del
Sur, Branch 12, respondent. A.M. No. P-16-3542. August 30,
2016.* (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4049-P) PRESIDING JUDGE
RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Davao City, Branch 7, complainant, vs. CEFERINA B. RIVERA,
Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Davao del Sur, Branch 12, respondent. A.M. No. P-16-3543.
August 30, 2016.* (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4074-P) IRINEO F.
MARTINEZ, JR., complainant, vs. CEFERINA B. RIVERA, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del
Sur, Branch 12, respondent.
OCA I.P.I. No. 14-2731-MTJ. August 30, 2016.*

CEFERINA B. RIVERA, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Davao del Sur, Branch 12, complainant, vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, respondent.
Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.— Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either
to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office.
Page 603 of 682

G.R. No. 221848. August 30, 2016.*

FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. REY RUECA CASTILLO, respondent.
Ombudsman; As a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded
due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA).—As a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman
are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are
accorded due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the CA.
In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what administrative
offense was committed by respondent, the OMB and the CA are one in
finding that respondent committed a misconduct.
Same; Grave Misconduct; In grave misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.—In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule
must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of
an established rule is properly characterized merely as simple
misconduct.
Same; Same; Grave Misconduct is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for first time offenders.—The Court finds respondent
guilty of Grave Misconduct which is classified as a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even for first time offenders, with all the
accessory penalties. By jurisprudence, the Court has additionally
imposed the forfeiture of all other benefits, except accrued leave
credits, salaries and allowances earned up to the time of dismissal.
Page 604 of 682

G.R. No. 224943. March 20, 2017.*

JORGE B. NAVARRA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The Court of Appeals
(CA) correctly ruled that his failure to object to the alleged defect in the
Information before entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such
defects, especially since objections as to matters of form or substance
in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.—
Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner assails the validity or
regularity of the Information filed against him on the ground that it
allegedly did not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out by
the CA, petitioner never raised such issue prior to his arraignment. In
fact, a reading of the records shows that petitioner only raised the same
after he was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on appeal
before the CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his failure to object to
the alleged defect in the Information before entering his plea amounted
to a waiver of such defects, especially since objections as to matters of
form or substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. Hence, petitioner can no longer be allowed to raise this issue
before the Court.
Page 605 of 682

A.C. No. 8085. December 1, 2014.*

FELIPE LAYOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA,
respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer must keep abreast of all the
developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the
same, as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence.— Under
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the
lawyer’s duty to serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and
diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the developments in his
client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence.
Same; Same; The lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning
and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the client’s cause.—
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his
client of whatever important information he may have acquired
affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate
review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the
case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in
the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how
the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the
lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a
wholehearted fealty to the client’s cause.
Same; Same; A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.—It must be stressed that public
interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the
prosecution or defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his
client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering
justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing
criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance
with one’s oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an
imperative.
Page 606 of 682

G.R. No. 180364. December 3, 2014.*

TZE SUN WONG, petitioner, vs. Kenny Wong, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasijudicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA) under this rule.—Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or
final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be
appealed to the CA under this rule.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party, where an appeal would be
slow, inadequate, and insufficient, and in case of urgency.”—Case law
explains that “[a] remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.” In this
relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would
be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x and x x x in case of
urgency.” In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal
before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to
the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies,
the first being a subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and,
eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While
these remedies remained available to him, the Court deems that they
would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain
imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of
deportation. The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his
direct resort to certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; In a special civil action for certiorari brought
against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the
burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a
reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.—“In a special civil
action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case,
the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal
committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned
order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse
must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
Page 607 of 682
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or

quasijudicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
Page 608 of 682

G.R. No. 214506. October 19, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OSCAR
PARBA y SOLON, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.—In order to convict a person
charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was
killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.—One of the
circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
offended party might make. In People v. Gunda, 715 SCRA 505 (2014), it
was explained that when the attack against an unarmed victim is so
sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant
was about to do, there is treachery.
Same; Alibi; To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.—Anent Parba’s alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It
is well-settled that alibi as a defense is inherently weak and unreliable
owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To
establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; A distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3)
kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers were consistently held not too far
to preclude the possibility that the accused was present at the locus
criminis.—A distance of one and a half (1 1/2) to two (2) kilometers was
held not too far to traverse by walking. Likewise, a distance of about
two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers were
consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused
was present at the locus criminis. Surely then, a distance of 100 meters,
as in this case, is not the “physical impossibility” contemplated to
satisfy the defense of alibi. Moreover, considering its doubtful nature,
clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to support the alibi of
an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of weight in law. Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
Page 609 of 682

crime, especially in cases where the testimonies of the witnesses are

categorical, consistent and untainted by ill will.
Page 610 of 682

G.R. No. 220605. September 21, 2016.*

COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES, INC.,** petitioner, vs.
BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION-CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT
ORGANIZATION-ALU, respondent.
Labor Law; Arbitration; In the context of labor law, arbitration is the
reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding.—In the context of labor law, arbitration is
the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding. However, in view of the nature of their
functions, voluntary arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity; hence,
their judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are not
so exempt from judicial review when so warranted. “Any agreement
stipulating that ‘the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and
unappealable’ and ‘that no further judicial recourse if either party
disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award may be
availed of’ cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power of
judicial review which is inherent in courts.”
Page 611 of 682

G.R. No. 216023. October 5, 2016.*

DR. RESTITUTO C. BUENVIAJE, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOVITO R.
and LYDIA B. SALONGA, JEBSON HOLDINGS CORPORATION and
FERDINAND JUAT BAÑEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; Specific performance and
“rescission” (more accurately referred to as resolution) are alternative
remedies available to a party who is aggrieved by a counterparty’s
breach of a reciprocal obligation.— Specific performance and
“rescission” (more accurately referred to as resolution) are alternative
remedies available to a party who is aggrieved by a counterparty’s
breach of a reciprocal obligation. This is provided for in Article 1191 of
the Civil Code, which partly reads: Art. 1191. The power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party
may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
Same; Same; Specific Performance; Words and Phrases; Specific
performance is defined as “[t]he remedy of requiring exact performance
of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to
the precise terms agreed upon.”—Specific performance is defined as
“[t]he remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms
agreed upon.” It pertains to “[t]he actual accomplishment of a contract
by a party bound to fulfill it.”
Same; Same; Rescission; Resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code
will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such
substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object
of the parties in making the agreement. lease the parties from further
obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception
and restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has
been made. Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return
of the benefits that each party may have received as a result of the
contract, is thus required.” Notably, resolution under Article 1191 of the
Civil Code “will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only
for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the
very object of the parties in making the agreement. Ultimately, the
question of whether a breach of contract is substantial depends upon
the attending circumstances.”
Same; Contracts; Principle of Relativity of Contracts; Under Article 1311
of the Civil Code, it is a basic principle in civil law on relativity of
contracts, that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered into
it and it cannot favor or prejudice third persons. —In this case, it is
undisputed that Sps. Salonga were not parties to the above mentioned
contract. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, it is a basic principle in
civil law on relativity of contracts, that contracts can only bind the
Page 612 of 682
parties who had entered into it and it cannot favor or prejudice third
persons. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
successors in interest, heirs and assigns. Thus, absent any privity of
contract as to them, there is no basis to hold Sps. Salonga liable for any
of the obligations stated under the said contract to sell. At this juncture,
it should be further made clear that the imputation of joint or solidary
liability against a particular person — such as that insistently claimed
against Sps. Salonga by Buenviaje — first presupposes the existence of
that person’s obligation. On the active side, the joint or solidary nature
of an obligation is an aspect of demandability; it pertains to the extent
of a creditor’s entitlement to demand fulfillment against any or all of his
debtors under one particular obligation. Based on case law, a solidary
obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. On
the other hand, a joint obligation is one in which each debtors is liable
only for a proportionate part of the debt, and the creditor is entitled to
demand only a proportionate part of the credit from each debtor.
Same; Partnership; Articles 1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code pertain to
the obligations of a copartner in the event that the partnership to which
he belongs is held liable.—There is no perceptible legal basis to hold
them solidarily liable under Articles 1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code.
These provisions, which are found under Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IX,
Book IV of the Civil Code on Partnership, respectively state: Article
1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the
authority of his copartners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not
being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting
or omitting to act. x x x x Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily
with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Articles 1822 and 1823. Evidently, the foregoing legal provisions pertain
to the obligations of a copartner in the event that the partnership to
which he belongs is held liable. In this case, Buenviaje never dealt with
any partnership constituted by and between Jebson and Sps. Salonga.
As previously mentioned, the subject CTS, which was the source of the
obligations relative to the completion and delivery of Unit 5, solely
devolved upon the person of Jebson. As there was no partnership privy
to any obligation to which Buenviaje is a creditor, Articles 1822 and
1824 of the Civil Code do not apply.
Same; Contracts; Rescission; Words and Phrases; Rescission (as
contemplated in Articles 1380 to 1389 of the Civil Code) is a remedy
granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to
secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract, even if
this should be valid, by restoration of things to their condition at the
moment prior to the celebration of the contract. It implies a contract,
which even if initially valid, produces a lesion or a pecuniary damage to
someone.—Pursuant to Articles 1177 and 1313 of the Civil Code,
creditors are given remedies whenever their debtors perform acts or
omissions or enter into contracts that tend to defraud the former of
Page 613 of 682
what is due them. Such remedy comes in the form of rescission under
Articles 1381(3) in relation to Articles 1383 and 1384 of the Civil Code.
Rescission (as contemplated in Articles 1380 to 1389 of the Civil Code)
is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third
persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a
contract, even if this should be valid, by restoration of things to their
condition at the moment prior to the celebration of the contract. It
implies a contract, which even if initially valid, produces a lesion or a
pecuniary damage to someone. In the rescission by reason of lesion or
economic prejudice, the cause of action is subordinated to the existence
of that prejudice, because it is the raison d’être as well as the measure
of the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant makes good the
damages caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as
expressly provided in Articles 1383 and 1384.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; In order that moral damages under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code may be awarded, there must be pleading
and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.—In
order that moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code may be
awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. In Mahinay v. Velas quez, Jr., 419 SCRA 118
(2004), the Court explained: While no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of
the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant’s
acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. In Francisco v. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear
testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if
the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be
awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court held that “additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the
Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings,
grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom.”
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Even when a claimant is compelled to
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.—As to
attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees
Page 614 of 682

conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
Page 615 of 682

G.R. No. 214875. October 17, 2016.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARIEL
LAYAG, accused-appellants.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability
of Final Judgments; In Bigler v. People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the
Supreme Court (SC) explained that it has the power to relax the
doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special
or compelling circumstance warranting the same.—The Court is
constrained to re open the case despite the finality of the August 3,
2015 Resolution. In Bigler v. People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the Court
explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of immutability of
judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance
warranting the same, viz.: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates
this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the
immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the court
has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the
demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Same; Civil Liability; Separate Civil Actions; Layag’s civil liability in
connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on
sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil
action against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules.—Upon Layag’s death pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that
Layag’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA,
may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may
file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.
Page 616 of 682

G.R. No. 219584. October 17, 2016.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PLACIDO
GOCO y OMBROG, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal in criminal cases
opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned. —At the outset, it must be
stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned
or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) mirror the content of Section 21 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165 but adds that the said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 — under justifiable
grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team.—In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the
chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must
follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) mirror the content
of Section 21 of RA 9165 but adds that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that
noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 — under
justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.
Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the apprehending team must
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable
Page 617 of 682
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.—As a general rule, the
apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR. However, their failure to do so does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Chain of custody means the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals from the moment of seizure, to receipt of the same
by the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and finally to the
presentation of the drugs or chemicals in court for destruction.—Chain
of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the moment of seizure, to
receipt of the same by the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and
finally to the presentation of the drugs or chemicals in court for
destruction. The chain of custody requirement is strictly applied when
the evidence sought to be presented is not distinctive and not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard applies to evidence susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination, and substitution or exchange. In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule. One of the physical characteristics of shabu is that it is fungible in
nature, and similar in appearance to substances used by people in their
daily activities. As it is not readily distinguishable from other
substances, and from other samples of shabu, the chain of custody
requirement must be strictly complied with in order to render it
improbable that the seized items are exchanged with another, or
contaminated, or tampered with.
Same; Same; Same; In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement,
the prosecution must identify the persons who handled the seized items
from seizure up until their presentation in court as evidence.—In order
to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify
the persons who handled the seized items from seizure up until their
presentation in court as evidence. To do so, the prosecution must
present testimonies about every link in the chain, in such a way that
every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and
from whom they were received, where they were and what happened to
them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he or she
received them, and their condition upon delivery. The witnesses must
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there was no change in
the condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the
chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Page 618 of 682

Same; Same; Same; Marking; Marking the drugs or other related items
immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the
chain of custody as it is the starting point in the custodial link.—Verily,
marking the drugs or other related items immediately upon seizure
from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody as it is the
starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a
twin purpose, first is to give the succeeding handlers of the specimen a
reference, and second to separate the marked evidence from the corpus
of all other similar or related evidence from the moment of seizure until
their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating
switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence. The police officers’
failure to mark the seized items may lead to the acquittal of the
accused based on reasonable doubt.
Page 619 of 682

G.R. No. 213488. November 7, 2016.*

TOYOTA PASIG, INC., petitioner, vs. VILMA S. DE PERALTA,
respondent.
Labor Law; Wages; Commissions fall within the definition of wages
pursuant to prevailing law and jurisprudence.—In this case,
respondent’s monetary claims, such as commissions, tax rebates for
achieved monthly targets, and success share/profit sharing, are given to
her as incentives or forms of encouragement in order for her to put
extra effort in performing her duties as an ISE. Clearly, such claims fall
within the ambit of the general term “commissions” which in turn, fall
within the definition of wages pursuant to prevailing law and
jurisprudence.
Same; Burden of Proof; The allegation of nonpayment of monetary
benefits places the burden on the employer, to prove with a reasonable
degree of certainty that it paid said benefits and that the employee
actually received such payment or that the employee was not entitled
thereto.—Respondent’s allegation of nonpayment of such monetary
benefits places the burden on the employer, i.e., petitioner, to prove
with a reasonable degree of certainty that it paid said benefits and that
the employee, i.e., respondent, actually received such payment or that
the employee was not entitled thereto.
Same; Presumptions; It is well-settled that the failure of employers to
submit the necessary documents that are in their possession gives rise
to the presumption that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its
cause.—In fact, during the proceedings before the LA, petitioner was
even given the opportunity to submit pertinent company records to
rebut respondent’s claims but opted not to do so, thus, constraining the
LA to direct respondent to submit her own computations. It is well-
settled that the failure of employers to submit the necessary documents
that are in their possession gives rise to the presumption that the
presentation thereof is prejudicial to its cause.
Page 620 of 682

G.R. No. 219430. November 7, 2016.*

JINKY S. STA. ISABEL, petitioner, vs. PERLA COMPAÑIA** DE
SEGUROS, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review on Certiorari; To
justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner
must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.—To justify the grant of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily
discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
Same; Willful Disobedience; Willful disobedience or insubordination, as a
just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the
concurrence of at least two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.—Willful
disobedience or insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an
employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites,
namely: (a) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge.
Page 621 of 682

G.R. No. 221897. November 7, 2016.*

ISIDRO QUEBRAL, ALBERTO ESQUILLO, RENANTE SALINSAN,
JEROME MACANDOG, EDGARDO GAYORGOR, JIM ROBERT
PERFECTO, NOEL PERFECTO, DENNIS PAGAYON, and
HERCULANO MACANDOG, petitioners, vs. ANGBUS
CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ANGELO BUSTAMANTE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In a Rule 45 review, the
Supreme Court (SC) examines the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s
(CA’s) Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under
Rule 65.—In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the correctness of
the CA’s Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors
under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of
law.
Same; Civil Procedure; Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides
that where pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt
shall be considered as the date of filing.—Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court provides that where pleadings are filed by registered mail, the
date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or
the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. Based on
this provision, the date of filing is determinable from two sources: (1)
from the post office stamp on the envelope or (2) from the registry
receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing
of the pleadings.
Same; Same; When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an earlier
date but is not authenticated, the later date stamped on the envelope
shall be considered as the date of filing.—The Court previously ruled
that if the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former
may be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that
the envelope or registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are
duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented. When
the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an earlier date but is not
authenticated, the Court held that the later date stamped on the
envelope shall be considered as the date of filing.
Same; Same; Employers claiming that their workers are project-based
employees have the burden to prove that these two (2) requisites
concur: (a) the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project
or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified
at the time they were engaged for such project.—To safeguard the
rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to
preclude them from attaining regular status, jurisprudence provides that
employers claiming that their workers are project-based employees
have the burden to prove that these two requisites concur: (a) the
employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking;
and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they
were engaged for such project.
Page 622 of 682

Same; Same; When no other evidence is offered, the absence of

employment contracts raises a serious question of whether the
employees were sufficiently apprised at the start of their employment of
their status as project employees.—The Court previously ruled that
although the absence of a written contract does not by itself grant
regular status to the employees, it is evidence that they were informed
of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project
employees at the start of their engagement. When no other evidence is
offered, the absence of employment contracts raises a serious question
of whether the employees were sufficiently apprised at the start of their
employment of their status as project employees.
Same; Section 11, Rule X, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code requires the employer to keep all employment records
in the main or branch office where the employees are assigned.—
Section 11, Rule X, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code (Rules) requires the employer to keep all employment
records in the main or branch office where the employees are assigned.
It also prohibits the keeping of employees’ records elsewhere.
Same; Project Employees; The submission of the termination report to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) “may be considered”
only as an indicator of project employment.—It is clear that the
submission of the termination report to the DOLE “may be considered”
only as an indicator of project employment. By the provision’s tenor, the
submission of this report, by and of itself, is therefore not conclusive to
confirm the status of the terminated employees as project employees,
especially in this case where there is a glaring absence of evidence to
prove that petitioners were assigned to carry out a specific project or
undertaking, and that they were informed of the duration and scope of
their supposed project engagement, which are, in fact, attendant to the
first two (2) indicators of project employment in the same DOLE
issuance above cited.
Petition for Review; Appeals of cases decided by the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are taken by
filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.—Appeals
of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Section 2, thereof, provides that such petitions shall be
accompanied by, inter alia, material portions of the record which would
support the allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of non-
forum shopping.
Same; Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of
reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.—Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that
the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
Page 623 of 682

where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the

client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
Page 624 of 682

G.R. No. 221770. November 16, 2016.*

NANITO Z. EVANGELISTA** (substituted by his Heirs,
represented by the Surviving Spouse, LEOVIGILDA C.
EVANGELISTA), petitioners, vs. SPOUSES NEREO V. ANDOLONG
III and ERLINDA T. ANDOLONG*** and RINO AMUSEMENT
INNOVATORS, INC., respondents.
Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance
of evidence.—In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Also, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This
principle equally holds true, even if the defendant was not given the
opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Preponderance of evidence is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of
the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible
evidence.’—“Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater
weight of the credible evidence.’ Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.”
Same; Respondents’ failure to present the documents in their
possession — whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.—Respondents opted not to shed light on the issues at hand
as they, unwittingly or otherwise, waived their right to present evidence
in this case. In this light, the Court is thus left with no option but to rule
that the respondents’ failure to present the documents in their
possession — whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.
Page 625 of 682

A.C. No. 11323. September 14, 2016.*

NICOLAS ROBERT MARTIN EGGER, complainant, vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO P. DURAN, respondent.
Attorney-Client Relationship; Case law instructs that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client’s case and accepts money representing legal fees from
the latter.—A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in
January 2014, complainant and Reposo had already forged a lawyer-
client relationship with respondent, considering that the latter agreed to
file a petition for annulment of marriage in their behalf, and in
connection therewith, received the aggregate amount of P100,000.00
representing legal fees. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client’s case and accepts money representing legal fees from
the latter, as in this case. Respondent’s contention that he only has a
lawyerclient relationship with Reposo but not with her husband, the
complainant, is belied by the letter dated April 25, 2014 signed by no
less than Reposo herself which shows that she and complainant jointly
sought the services of respondent to work on their annulment case, but
had to eventually withdraw therefrom on account of respondent’s failure
to render any actual legal service despite their agreement and payment
of legal fees amounting to P100,000.00.
Same; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free.—Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Same; Respondent’s act of agreeing to handle complainant’s case,
coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment of P100,000.00,
already established an attorney-client relationship that gave rise to his
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.— Respondent admittedly breached
this duty when he failed to prepare, much less file, the appropriate
pleading to initiate complainant and Reposo’s case before the proper
court. Respondent’s additional contention that his failure to file the
petition was due to complainant and Reposo’s failure to remit the full
acceptance fee of P150,000.00 is not an excuse to abandon his client’s
cause considering that his duty to safeguard his client’s interests
commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the case
or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. To
reiterate, respondent’s act of agreeing to handle complainant’s case,
coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment of P100,000.00,
already established an attorney-client relationship that gave rise to his
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Indubitably, respondent’s neglect of
a legal matter entrusted him by complainant and Reposo constitutes
Page 626 of 682
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively

liable.
Same; The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.—
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality, as well as of professional ethics.
Same; Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers
neglected their client’s affairs and at the same time failed to return the
latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Supreme Court
(SC) imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law.—Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers
neglected their client’s affairs and at the same time failed to return the
latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
Same; While the Supreme Court (SC) has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination
of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.—The Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering
respondent to return the amount of P100,000.00 he received from
complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that “while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondent
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that
this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and
not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.” Hence, since
respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the
Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
Page 627 of 682

G.R. No. 223254. December 1, 2016.*

ROSALIE SY AYSON, petitioner, vs. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES,
INC., and FAIRWAYS AND BLUEWATER RESORT AND COUNTRY
CLUB, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 223269. December 1, 2016.*
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and FAIRWAYS & BLUEWATER
RESORT & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioners, vs. ROSALIE SY
AYSON, respondent.
Certiorari; The findings of Fil-Estate and Fairways’ bad faith, as well as
their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees, are all factual matters which are not within the ambit of the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.—Verily, the finding of Fil-Estate and Fairways’ bad faith as well as
their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees, are all factual matters which are not within the ambit of the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In this regard, it has long been settled that factual findings of the
trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal, save for certain exceptions, which Fil-Estate and
Fairways failed to show in this case — at least regarding this issue.
Page 628 of 682

G.R. Nos. 212014-15. December 6, 2016.*

RICHARD A. CAMBE, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 212427-28. December 6, 2016.*
SENATOR RAMON “BONG” REVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, through its SPECIAL PANEL OF
INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO
D. BALIGOD, and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents. SENATOR RAMON “BONG” REVILLA,
JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 212794-95. December 6, 2016. *
RICHARD A. CAMBE, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213477-78. December 6, 2016. *
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-
MORALES in her official capacity as Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213532-33. December 6, 2016. *
RONALD JOHN LIM, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIOMORALES in
her official capacity as Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 213536-37. December 6, 2016. *
JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-
MORALES in her official capacity as Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION,
respondents.
MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE
NARAG PAULE, and MARILOU DIALINO BARE, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
Administrative Cases; Public Officers; In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,
547 SCRA 658 (2008), the Supreme Court (SC) explained that: [T]here
are three (3) kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer
for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of
his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that]
[t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,
Page 629 of 682

simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be

the subject of all three kinds of remedies.—The administrative aspect of
the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA’s audit
is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the
charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against
them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the
filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, 547 SCRA 658 (2008),
this Court explained that: [T]here are three kinds of remedies that are
available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of
his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3)
administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same
offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies. x x x x It is
clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from
each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two
will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings.
Same; Same; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, an audit
disallowance may not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons.—As
correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, “an audit disallowance may
not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or
criminal prosecution of the responsible persons.
Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper
even without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is
consistent with the ruling in [Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 642 SCRA
210 (2011)] that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct
and separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary
complaint.” In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion
in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe’s
motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe’s petition in G.R. Nos.
212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now proceeds to
resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable
cause against all petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Probable cause is
determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is
“merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the person charged should be held responsible for it.—It should be
borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a
preliminary investigation which is “merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it.” It “is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the prosecution’s evidence.” Therefore, “the validity and
merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than
Page 630 of 682
at the preliminary investigation level.” Accordingly, “owing to the

initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of
evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.” In this
light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
“probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,” and that even an
invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the
proceedings is improper.
Same; Forgery; Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his signatures in the
documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized
that the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery] should
be ventilated in a full-blown trial.—Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his
signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must
be emphasized that “the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue
of forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is
highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature
cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to
determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must
conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such],
Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the
court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine.” Accordingly, Sen.
Revilla’s evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported
handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at
this stage of the proceedings. Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed
that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents in their handwriting
analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 565 (1998),
this Court ruled that “[w]ithout the original document containing the
alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison
which would establish forgery,” and that “[a] comparison based on a
mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results.” Furthermore, it may not be amiss to
state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has
yet to be tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be
subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution
should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui’s
findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own
handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.
Same; Same; The Ombudsman’s own factual finding on the absence of
forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should
be regarded with utmost respect.—It is significant to emphasize that the
Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla’s
signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution: “[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after
a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned
Page 631 of 682
signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures

of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine
that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish,
were written by one and the same hands.” Verily, the Ombudsman’s
own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose
of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect.
“[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence,” as in this case. The Ombudsman’s
finding on the absence of forgery further gains credence in light of the
July 20, 2011 Letter signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA
(Confirmation Letter).
Same; Same; Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that although the
whistleblowers would sometimes forge the legislators’ signatures, such
were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement
with the said legislators.—Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that
although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the legislators’
signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her
prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that
this authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds
since the documents required for their release need not pass through
the legislator’s respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of
authority gives the legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging
of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim
their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy’s testimony
completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to
authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As such, even
if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean that
the legislators did not authorize such forgery.
Same; Conspiracy; It is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and
Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were
employees of Janet Lim Napoles (JLN) Corporation — the epicenter of
the entire Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) operation —
and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles
to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions,
follow up the release of the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) with the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and/or facilitate the
withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the Non-Governmental
Organizations’ (NGOs’) accounts.—The testimonies of the
whistleblowers — which the prosecution submitted before the
Ombudsman — are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen.
Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of
the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be
pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla,
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen.
Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with Napoles in the
plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas,
Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they
were employees of JLN Corporation — the epicenter of the entire PDAF
operation — and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked
by Napoles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial
Page 632 of 682
transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or
facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs’
accounts.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Evidence; In Reyes v.
Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354 (2016), citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748
SCRA 1 (2015), the Supreme Court (SC) had unanimously ruled that the
testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John
Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged
with the embezzlement of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of
evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation.
—Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers’ testimonies
based on the res inter alios acta rule. However, in Reyes v.
Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354 (2016), citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748
SCRA 1 (2015), this Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of
the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher
Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the
embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that
technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during
preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that
the objection on res inter alios acta should falter: Neither can the
Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based
on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the
course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court
sanctioned the Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay evidence, which
would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence,
during the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the
testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by
the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule
should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
Same; Same; Witnesses; The fact that Luy did not personally know Sen.
Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone
handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did
not personally know of his involvement.— Relatedly, it should be
clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or
that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone
handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did
not personally know of his involvement. Because of their functions in
JLN Corporation as above stated, it is evident that they had personal
Page 633 of 682
knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the
select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly, they
personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with
Sen. Revilla’s Office, which lasted for a considerable amount of time,
i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their testimonies
should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Case law holds that
once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance
of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect
to Sen. Revilla and his co-petitioners), any question on the prosecution’s
conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.—Taking together
all of the above stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend
to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed attended the
disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and that he had a hand in such
anomalous releases, being the head of Office which unquestionably
exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly
observed, “[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a
Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his
priority projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles’] Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in consideration for the remittance
of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact
that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be ‘ghost projects,’ and
that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles
and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus
unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.”
Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. For
the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of
at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed,
accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of overt acts
stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen. Revilla should
likewise stand trial for Plunder. Besides, case law holds that once the
trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to
Sen. Revilla and his co- petitioners), any question on the prosecution’s
conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.
Same; Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood,
played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).—Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood,
played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the
mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman,
Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and “offer to
‘acquire’ his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange for a ‘commission’ or
kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.” Once Napoles
was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla’s PDAF, she and/or her
staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically
indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are
released by Sen. Revilla’s Office, Napoles would then give a down
Page 634 of 682
payment from her own pockets for delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of
his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen.
Revilla’s behalf. Once the SARO and/or the Notices of Cash Allocation
(NCA) regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the
promised “kickbacks” to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or
Cambe would endorse Napoles’ NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded
projects, all of which turned out to be “ghost” or “inexistent”; thus,
allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; It has been long-settled that while the
primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private
individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to
have conspired with said officers in committing the same. —That a
private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder
and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those
crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-
settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if
they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the
same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears
that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the systematic
pillaging of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her
as a coconspirator for the aforementioned crimes.
Same; Same; Whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as
one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said
whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others, received the
checks issued by the implementing agencies (IAs) to the Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and deposited the same in the
bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was
also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’ house.—
Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator
of KPMFI which was one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that
was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF allocations.
Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as
one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said
whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others, received the
checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the
bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was
also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’ house.
Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that,
in all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit
the crimes charged.
Same; As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan,
some of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of
Cash Allocation (NCAs) issued in the perpetuation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam were issued by the Office of
Relampagos as Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working — a
finding that they themselves did not dispute.—As pointed out by the
Page 635 of 682
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs

issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued by the Office
of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare
are all working — a finding that they themselves did not dispute. More
significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively identified Relampagos, et
al. as Napoles’ “contact persons” in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report
found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs.
Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos, et al.’s manifest
partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that
evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must
stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Same; View that the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution
especially since the “whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the
lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’ NonGovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) to the corresponding implementing agencies (IAs) along with all
other Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Documents.—As
Revilla maintained all along, his involvement/participation in the release
of his PDAF was limited only to the identification and selection of
projects or programs listed in the the GAA and communicating such
selection to the Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance and the
Senate President. Any endorsement made by him does not and cannot
sway these IAs to act per his will and contrary to legal requirements. It
is, therefore, perplexing that Revilla’s involvement in the PDAF scam is
hinged on apparently worthless “endorsements” of Napoles-controlled
NGOs. Further, the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution
especially since the “whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the
lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’ NGOs to the IAs along with all
other PDAF Documents. Suñas testified that they prepared these
endorsement letters, upon which Revilla is now being indicted.
Same; View that even a cursory glance at some of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Documents questioned by Revilla
reveals a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the
naked eye of an ordinary person.—In fact, even a cursory glance at
some of the PDAF Documents questioned by Revilla reveals a forgery so
obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person. A prime example is the “endorsement” letter addressed to
Gondelina Amata of the NLDC dated October 23, 2009, supposedly
signed by Revilla. Compared to the standard signatures submitted by
Revilla, the signature contained therein lacks the cursive flourishes of
his true signatures and instead contains sharp and blunt strokes.
Similarly noticeable is the variance of the letterheads used in these
various endorsement letters, with some containing supposed bar codes
of Revilla’s office, others simply a number.
Same; Handwriting Experts; View that where the genuineness of the
documents is crucial to the respondents’ defense, it is more prudent, as
stressed in People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999), to allow the opinion
of handwriting experts.—At the very least, the Azores and Pagui findings
should have impelled the Ombudsman to consider the veracity of the
signatures on the PDAF documents given that these experts’ findings
Page 636 of 682
uniformly detail discrepancies between the signatures in the PDAF

documents and Revilla’s admitted genuine specimens of writing. That
the Ombudsman failed to even require NBI handwriting experts to study
the questioned signatures renders the immediate dismissal of the two
handwriting expert’s certifications highly suspect. Where the
genuineness of the documents is crucial to the respondents’ defense, it
is more prudent, as stressed in People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999),
to allow the opinion of handwriting experts.
Same; Same; View that the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman falls
short of the threshold requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved
as positively as the commission of the felony itself. The quantum of
evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy is a “facile device by
which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.”—As
discussed above, besides the admittedly falsified and forged PDAF
documents, there is no concrete proof showing that Revilla pulled off
any “overt act” in furtherance of the supposed conspiracy with Napoles.
Other than saying that without Revilla, the scheme would have
supposedly failed, the Ombudsman has been unable to point to
concrete set of facts to support her conclusion as to the complicity of
Revilla to the conspiracy in question. Thus, the conclusion reached by
the Ombudsman falls short of the threshold requirement that conspiracy
itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony
itself. The quantum of evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy
is a “facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold.” For this reason, I submit that the testimonies of
Revilla’s co respondents cannot be taken against him. Yet, the
Ombudsman repeatedly and freely cited the previously withheld
counter-affidavits of Revilla’s co- respondents in finding probable cause
to indict him for Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Same; Same; Audio Evidence; Electronic Evidence; View that Section 1,
Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that an audio
evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is
presented, explained, or authenticated.—A closer look of Cunanan’s
testimony, which was a critical part of the Ombudsman’s Resolutions,
bares the infirmity of his claim. While he could have easily asked for a
written confirmation of the authorization given by Revilla to Cambe,
Cunanan himself admitted that he, instead, supposedly sought
verification over the telephone. Yet, an audio recording of the alleged
telephone conversation was not presented or even mentioned. Not even
a transcript of the alleged telephone conversation was attached to
Cunanan’s Counter-Affidavit. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a
telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is presented, explained,
or authenticated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) had
previously declared that the person with whom the witness was
conversing on the telephone must first be reliably identified before the
telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given
probative value.—Given that no audio evidence of the telephone
Page 637 of 682
conversation was presented, much less “identified, explained or

authenticated,” the occurrence of the alleged telephone conversation is
rendered highly suspect, if not improbable, and any testimony thereon
is inadmissible and of no probative value. But granting, arguendo, that
Cunanan did call Revilla’s office, it still begs the question of how he
could have recognized or confirmed the identity of the person he was
speaking with over the phone and not face-to-face. There is no
indication, and Cunanan never even hinted, that he was closely familiar
with Revilla’s voice that he can easily recognize it over the phone in a
single conversation. This Court had previously declared that the person
with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first be
reliably identified before the telephone conversation can be admitted in
evidence and given probative value.
Same; Same; View that as gathered from the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution, the fact of Cambe, acting on his own as a public officer,
amassing or acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) through any of the means provided
under the plunder law or acting in violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019 has not been demonstrated.— Interestingly, the March 28, 2014
Joint Resolution of the respondent Ombudsman did not once mention
the examination report of Atty. Pagui, nor did it squarely address the
allegation of forgery. It immediately dismissed the argument by saying:
Forgery is not presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery. Further, as gathered from the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution,
the fact of Cambe, acting on his own as a public officer, amassing or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) through any of the means provided under the plunder
law or acting in violation of RA 3019 has not been demonstrated
Same; Same; Principal by Indispensable Cooperation; View that
evidence shows that there is probable cause to believe that Lim
cooperated in order to divert the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) to their own pockets. By rendering assistance in the delivery of
money, Lim is deemed to have conspired in the illegal transaction.
Under these circumstances, Lim is as much liable as the principal
because of his overt and indispensable cooperation in perpetuating the
scam.—While preparation or segregation and the actual delivery are
separate acts, they are interconnected with a common objective. It is
immaterial, thus, whether Lim only prepared or segregated the money,
actually delivered it or both. The fact is, there is probable cause to
believe that he performed a role in the consummation of the crime of
Plunder. Further, evidence shows that there is probable cause to believe
that Lim cooperated in order to divert the PDAF to their own pockets. By
rendering assistance in the delivery of money, Lim is deemed to have
conspired in the illegal transaction. Under these circumstances, Lim is
as much liable as the principal because of his overt and indispensable
cooperation in perpetuating the scam. At this juncture, it is necessary to
state that Revilla is not the only named public officer involved in this
issue. There are others against whom the Ombudsman found probable
cause. Thus, Lim, being a private individual, may be charged with
Page 638 of 682
Plunder, there being probable cause to believe that he acted in concert

with some public officers.
Page 639 of 682

G.R. No. 218466. January 23, 2017.*

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO
NACIONAL, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent. G.R. No. 221425. January 23, 2017.* PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANNY RAMOS,
ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a. “JOHN,” “KONYONG” SALONGA and
SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ “INONG” @ DIONISIO NACIONAL,
accused-appellants.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Unlicensed Firearm; Under
Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.”—Under Section 1 of RA No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” There are two (2) requisites to establish such
circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have
the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the
Information lies with the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; As the Information alleged that accusedappellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-
bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the
Supreme Court (SC) cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance. —In this case, while it is
undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to
his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police
officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and
(b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not
such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the
courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information
alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing
Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation.
Page 640 of 682
Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use
of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
Page 641 of 682

G.R. No. 224834. March 15, 2017.*

JONATHAN Y. DEE, petitioner, vs. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT
LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED,
and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance
Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as
Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc., respondents.
G.R. No. 224871. March 15, 2017.*
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED,
BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as
Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of
Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., petitioners, vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E.
SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T.
VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and
BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Obiter Dictum; Words and
Phrases; An obiter dictum is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a
judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.—In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court had
the opportunity to define an obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects
as follows: [An obiter dictum] “x x x is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It
does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is
made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks the
force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no
binding force for purposes of res judicata.”
Same; Same; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Filing Fees; The deletion of
Section 21(k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section
7(a) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for actions where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7(b)(3) [fees for all other
actions not involving property] of the same Rule to cases involving
intra-corporate controversies for the determination of the correct filing
fees.—Verily, the deletion of Section 21(k) of Rule 141 and in lieu
thereof, the application of Section 7(a) [fees for actions where the value
of the subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for
actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or
7(b)(3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the same
Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the
Page 642 of 682
determination of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a
dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court’s
recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy
may or may not be capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other
hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter which
is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
Same; Same; Retroactivity of Laws; While the Supreme Court (SC) is not
unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 0402-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of
this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive
effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the instant
consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule,
i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law.—While the Court is not unaware
that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October
5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case,
such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to
make them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated
petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141,
and not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA, 373 SCRA 524 (2002), the
Court thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural
rules, viz.: The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been
held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation
and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the
obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the
application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their
enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights.
A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions — those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
Page 643 of 682
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.”
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action
as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Supreme Court (SC) finds
that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket
fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)
(3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the
Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016.— Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al.
should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with
the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141 [fees for
all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in
conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.
Page 644 of 682

A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA. June 6, 2017.*

RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES ALLEGING ILLICIT
ACTIVITIES OF A CERTAIN ATTY. CAJAYON INVOLVING CASES IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY.
I.P.I. No. 17-248-CA-J. June 6, 2017.*
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF SYLVIA ADANTE CHARGING HON.
JANE AURORA C. LANTION, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT OF
APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, and ATTY. DOROTHY CAJAYON
WITH “SYSTEMATIC PRACTICES OF CORRUPTION.”
Administrative Complaints; Attorneys; Judges; Under the Rules of Court,
administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of regular
and special courts as well as Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations.—Under the Rules
of Court, administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of
regular and special courts as well as Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations.
Page 645 of 682

G.R. No. 225634. June 7, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALLAN JAO y
CALONIA and ROGELIO CATIGTIG y COBIO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Delivery of Dangerous
Drugs; Elements of.—For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal
Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven that the accused
passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by
law; and that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note
is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. On
the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must prove that the accused is in possession of an item
or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such possession
is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused Pending
Appeal; Upon Catigtig’s death pending appeal of his conviction his
criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused.—While Jao’s criminal liability
remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with respect to Catigtig
in view of his supervening death pending appeal. As already adverted
to, in a letter dated February 9, 2016, the Bureau of Corrections
informed the CA that Catigtig had already died on August 7, 2015,
attaching thereto a duplicate copy of Catigtig’s Certificate of Death
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General. Paragraph 1, Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code, states: Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. In People v. Egagamao, 799
SCRA 507 (2016), the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the
death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows: From
this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: 1. Death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” Thus, upon Catigtig’s death
pending appeal of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As
such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared
closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 223708. June 28, 2017.*

Page 646 of 682
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORIETO

MONROYO y MAHAGUAY, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; It is settled that a
designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense.—Preliminarily, although the three
Informations designated the crime committed only as “Acts of
Lasciviousness,” the facts alleged therein pertain not only to violations
of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5(b) of RA 7610, otherwise
known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act.” It is settled that a designation in the
information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to the law violated does
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged. As the Court had ruled, the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the legal
provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the information. In the present
case, the recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations of Acts
of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b)
of RA 7610.
Same; Child Abuse Law; Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse;
Elements of.—The elements under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 are: (1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2)
the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age. In Quimvel v. People, 823 SCRA 192
(2017), the Court held that the allegation of “force and intimidation” is
sufficient to classify the minor victim as one who is “exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.”
Same; Same; Same; Lewd; Words and Phrases; The term “lewd” is
commonly defined as something indecent or obscene.— Common to
both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness.
The term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent or
obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual
desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is a
mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or
lascivious.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that an
appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for scrutiny on any
question, even one not raised by the parties as errors, and that the
appeal confers the appellate court with full jurisdiction over the case,
enabling the court to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.—Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
entire case for scrutiny on any question, even one not raised by the
Page 647 of 682
parties as errors, and that the appeal confers the appellate court with
full jurisdiction over the case, enabling the court to examine records,
proper provision of the penal law. Thus, given that the circumstances of
minority and relationship were alleged and proven in this case, the
Court examines Monroyo’s criminal liability for Qualified Rape as
charged.
Page 648 of 682

G.R. No. 191049. August 7, 2017.*

TOMAS P. ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. OROPHIL SHIPPING
INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., ENGINEER TOMAS N. OROLA and/or
HAKUHO KISEN CO., LTD., respondents.
Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
Likewise, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.—In
labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by
Likewise, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA
committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s certiorari petition
since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner is
not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
Same; Seafarers; Work-Related Illness/Injuries; Section 20(B) (4) of the
2000 Philippine Overseas Employment AdministrationStandard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) declares that “[t]hose illnesses not
listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-
related.” The legal presumption of work-relatedness was borne out from
the fact that the said list cannot account for all known and unknown
illnesses/diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated
by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the
law to signify that the noninclusion in the list of occupational diseases
does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits.—
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, “any sickness resulting to disability or death
as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied” is deemed to be a
“work-related illness.” On the other hand, Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000
POEA-SEC declares that “[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.” The legal
presumption of work-relatedness was borne out from the fact that the
said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases
that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working
conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify that
the noninclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate
to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. Given the legal
presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such
legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. “The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.”
Page 649 of 682
Same; Same; Same; The presumption provided under Section 20(B)(4)

is only limited to the “work-relatedness” of an illness. It does not cover
and extend to compensability.—The presumption provided under
Section 20(B)(4) is only limited to the “workrelatedness” of an illness. It
does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists
a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of
compensability. The former concept merely relates to the assumption
that the seafarer’s illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease,
may have been contracted during and in connection with one’s work,
whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive
compensation and benefits upon a showing that his work conditions
caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. This can
be gathered from Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC which already
qualifies the listed disease as an “occupational disease” (in other words,
a “workrelated disease”), but nevertheless, mentions certain conditions
for said disease to be compensable.
Same; Same; Same; Compensable Illness; The established work-
relatedness of an illness does not, however, mean that the resulting
disability is automatically compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer,
while not needing to prove the workrelatedness of his illness, bears the
burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability
under Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).—The Court
thus clarifies that there lies a technical demarcation between work-
relatedness and compensability relative to how these concepts operate
in the realm of disability compensation. As discussed, work-relatedness
of an illness is presumed; hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial
burden of proving the same. Rather, it is the employer who bears the
burden of disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully
proves that the illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside
of his work (meaning, the illness is preexisting), or that although the
illness is preexisting, none of the conditions of his work affected the risk
of contracting or aggravating such illness, then there is no need to go
into the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the
name itself implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer’s illness
has a possible connection to one’s work, and thus, allows the seafarer
to claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the same is not listed as an
occupational disease. The established workrelatedness of an illness
does not, however, mean that the resulting disability is automatically
compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer, while not needing to
prove the workrelatedness of his illness, bears the burden of proving
compliance with the conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of
the 2000 POEA-SEC. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his
claim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The seafarer will, in all instances, have to
prove compliance with the conditions for compensability, whether or not
the work-relatedness of his illness is disputed by the employer.—
Notably, it must be pointed out that the seafarer will, in all instances,
have to prove compliance with the conditions for compensability,
whether or not the workrelatedness of his illness is disputed by the
Page 650 of 682
employer: On the one hand, when an employer attempts to discharge

the burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness (i.e., by
either claiming that the illness is preexisting or, even if preexisting, that
the risk of contracting or aggravating the same has nothing do with his
work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer to prove
otherwise (i.e., that the illness was not preexisting, or even if
preexisting, that his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating
the illness). In so doing, the seafarer effectively discharges his own
burden of proving compliance with the first three conditions of
compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that (1)
the seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein; (2) the
disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the
described risks; and (3) the disease was contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. Thus,
when the presumption of work-relatedness is contested by the
employer, the factors which the seafarer needs to prove to rebut the
employer’s contestation would necessarily overlap with some of the
conditions which the seafarer needs to prove to establish the
compensability of his illness and the resulting disability. In this regard,
the seafarer, therefore, addresses the refutation of the employer
against the work-relatedness of his illness and, at the same time,
discharges his burden of proving compliance with certain conditions of
compensability. On the other hand, when an employer does not attempt
to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-
relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of proving
compliance with the conditions of compensability, which does not only
include the three (3) conditions above mentioned, but also, the distinct
fourth condition, i.e., that there was no notorious negligence on the part
of the seafarer. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts to the
employer to now disprove the veracity of the information presented by
the seafarer. The employer may also raise any other affirmative defense
which may preclude compensation, such as concealment under Section
20(E) of the 2000 POEA-SEC or failure to comply with the third-doctor
referral provision under Section 20(B)(3) of the same Contract.
Same; Same; Disability Benefits; Permanent Total Disability; The
seafarer is declared to be on temporary total disability during the one
hundred twenty (120)-day period within which he is unable to work.
However, a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than
120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, is considered as a
total and permanent disability.— The seafarer is declared to be on
temporary total disability during the 120-day period within which he is
unable to work. However, a temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules, is considered as a total and permanent disability. This
exception pertains to a situation when the sickness “still requires
medical attendance beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240 days”
in which case, the temporary total disability period is extended up to a
maximum of 240 days.
Same; Same; Compensable Illness; In Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation, 738 SCRA 120 (2014), it was held that the preexisting
Page 651 of 682
nature of the seafarer’s illness does not bar compensation if the same
was aggravated due to his working conditions.—In Canuel v. Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation, 738 SCRA 120 (2014), it was held that the
preexisting nature of the seafarer’s illness does not bar compensation if
the same was aggravated due to his working conditions:
Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or disease
was preexisting at the time of the employment but rather if the disease
or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to
presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer’s]
employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it
was preexisting at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just
that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an
employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect
condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free
from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment
certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the
health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes
the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury
which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the
injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which
compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the
employee is unimportant and recovery may be hard for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.
Same; Same; Same; Question of Fact; View that whether the illness
suffered by the seafarer is related to his work onboard the vessel is a
question of fact.—Whether the illness suffered by the seafarer is related
to his work onboard the vessel is a question of fact. The findings of the
NLRC on this point, as affirmed by the CA, are therefore beyond the
scope of our review in a Rule 45 proceeding. In general, we only review
its findings when these are relevant to our determination of whether or
not the CA was correct in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC. To emphasize, both the CA and the NLRC found no
substantial evidence to prove that the illness suffered by petitioner had
a reasonable connection with his work as an Able Seaman. The LA, on
the other hand, did not have any specific finding on the issue of work-
relatedness. Given these premises, I find it proper to accord great
weight and deference to the factual conclusions of the CA and the
NLRC; in particular, their observation that no sufficient evidence was
presented by petitioner.
Same; Same; Work-Related Illness/Injuries; View that jurisprudence has
expanded the definition of “work-related illness” to include other
illnesses that are not listed, but are proven to have been caused or at
least aggravated by the particular working conditions involved.—Based
on these two provisions, seafarers are only entitled to disability
compensation once they prove that (a) they suffered from an injury or
illness during the term of their employment contract; (b) their injury or
illness is considered “work-related” under the Standard Terms and
Conditions; i.e., their illness is consistent with the conditions in Section
32-A. When applicable, other procedural requirements must also be
complied with. Jurisprudence has expanded the definition of “work-
Page 652 of 682
related illness” to include other illnesses that are not listed, but are
proven to have been caused or at least aggravated by the particular
working conditions involved. Accordingly, a claimant suffering from an
illness that is not included in the enumeration in Section 32-A may be
granted disability benefits for as long as the conditions in that provision
are met. While specific conditions are set forth for certain enumerated
illnesses, four general requirements must be met for all other illnesses
in order for disability benefits to be awarded to the claimant.
Same; Same; Same; View that while only probability and not absolute
and direct connection is required, it must be emphasized that
“[p]robability of work-connection must at least be anchored on credible
information and not on self-serving allegations.”—While only probability
and not absolute and direct connection is required, it must be
emphasized that “[probability of work connection must at least be
anchored on credible information and not on self-serving allegations.”
Here, petitioner has failed to provide the required credible information
upon which the Court could have based its assessment of the
probability of his claim. He alleges that he underwent physical exertion
while on duty, and that he was on call 24 hours a day to keep track of
weather conditions. His allegations are insufficient, since the records
are bereft of any proof that these risks caused or aggravated his
specific illness.
Same; Same; Disability Benefits; Attorney’s Fees; View that in seafarers’
claims for disability benefits, the Supreme Court (SC) has awarded
attorney’s fees only in cases where claimants were forced to litigate and
incur expenses to protect their rights and interests.—In seafarers’
claims for disability benefits, this Court has awarded attorney’s fees
only in cases where claimants were forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect their rights and interests. In light of my conclusion
that petitioner has no right to be paid disability benefits, I find no basis
to grant his claim for attorney’s fees.
Page 653 of 682

G.R. No. 224204. August 30, 2017.*

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RAMON
AND ANNABELLE SABADO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Indispensable Parties; Words and
Phrases; Case law defines an indispensable party as one whose interest
will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom
no final determination of the case can be had.—Case law defines an
indispensable party as “one whose interest will be affected by the
court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the
other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.” “Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.”
Same; Same; Same; An indispensable party is one who has an interest
in the subject matter of the controversy which is inseparable from the
interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication cannot be
made without affecting such interest.—The Court cannot subscribe to
the CA’s conclusion that since HTPMI retained ownership over the
subject property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an
indispensable party to the case. As adverted to earlier, an indispensable
party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties,
and that a final adjudication cannot be made without affecting such
interest. Here, the only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who
between the litigating parties has the better right to possess de facto
the subject property. Thus, HTPMI’s interest in the subject property, as
one holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner’s
rights under the Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or
rescission of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual
possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the
courts can certainly proceed to determine who between petitioner and
respondents have a better right to the possession of the subject
property and complete relief can be had even without HTPMI’s
participation.
Page 654 of 682

OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3800-RTJ. June 19, 2017.*

OSCAR C. RIZALADO, complainant, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G.
BOLLOZOS, Regional Trial Court, Br. 21, Cagayan de Oro City,
Misamis Oriental, respondent.
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT DATED JUNE 27, 2011 OF OSCAR C.
RIZALADO AGAINST JUDGE GIL BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RELATIVE TO G.R.
NO. 188427 (CYNTHIA G. ESPANO, ET AL. vs. DR. OTHELLO C.
GUZMAN, ET AL.).
OTHELLO C. GUZMAN, RICARDO GUZMAN, MARIO C. GUZMAN,
SR., and ROSARIO GUZMAN RIZALADO, complainants, vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, respondent.
OSCAR C. RIZALADO, complainant, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G.
BOLLOZOS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro
City, Misamis Oriental, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Bias and Partiality; Bare allegations of bias
and partiality are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and
without fear or favor.—It is well-settled that “in administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. x x x. Bare allegations of bias
and partiality are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and
without fear or favor. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.”
Same; Same; To hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would
be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable.—The Court concurs with the OCA’s opinion in this case that
if Guzman, et al. indeed believed that respondent’s issuances pertaining
to G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409) were tainted
with irregularity, they should have availed themselves of the
appropriate judicial remedies and refrained from filing these
administrative cases against respondent. It bears to stress that
respondent is legally clothed with judicial discretion in the disposition of
cases, which involves the exercise of judgment. As a judge, he must be
allowed reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view
Page 655 of 682
of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the
applicable law on the matter. “To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming
he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative
sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.”
Page 656 of 682

G.R. No. 218592. August 2, 2017.*

CHRISTOPHER FIANZA a.k.a. “TOPEL,” petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
Criminal Law; Acts of Lasciviousness; In instances where the child
subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve
(12) years of age, the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but suffer the higher penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section
5(b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.—The Court deems it
appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which Fianza
was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
considering that the victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time of
the incidents. In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse
through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age, the
offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer
the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in
accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
Same; Same; Elements of.—Before an accused can be convicted of child
abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the
requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must
be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder. The
elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the
lascivious act is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) by
using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another
person of either sex. On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements: (a) the
accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b)
the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is below eighteen (18)
years old.
Same; Lascivious Conduct; Words and Phrases; Lascivious conduct is
defined under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse
Cases).—Lascivious conduct, on the other hand, is defined under
Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases) as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person. In the present case, the existence of all the
elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as well
Page 657 of 682
as the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on two
(2) occasions in July 2010 and on November 30, 2010, Fianza induced
AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him. The
only point of dispute is with regard to the existence of the second
element of sexual abuse, i.e., whether or not the lascivious conduct was
performed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
Same; Other Sexual Abuse; A child is deemed subjected to other sexual
abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult.—A child is deemed subjected to other sexual
abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult. Case law further clarifies that lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there
is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues
the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. Corollary thereto,
Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual
abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of
forms. It is defined as: [T]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that Fianza’s acts were
attended by coercion or influence within the contemplation of Section
5(b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.—With the foregoing
parameters considered, the Court finds that Fianza’s acts were attended
by coercion or influence within the contemplation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old at the
time of the incidents, hence, considered a child under the law. Section
3(a), Article I of RA 7610 defines children in this wise: (a) “Children”
refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition[.] Case law states that a child,
such as AAA in this case, is presumed to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act.
Same; Same; A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when
the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
intimidation, or influence of any adult.—It is likewise wellsettled that it
is sufficient that the acts or omissions constituting the offense be stated
in the information in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute, albeit in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged and for the court to pronounce judgment. In the instant case,
the Informations not only referred to the specific section of RA 7610 that
was violated, but also stated that: (a) AAA was an 11-year-old minor at
the time of the offense; and (b) Fianza committed lascivious conduct by
forcing AAA to masturbate his penis. To reiterate, a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or intimidation, or influence of any adult.
Page 658 of 682
Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; View that a first sexual affront, on its

own, cannot be automatically considered a violation of Section 5(b),
absent a showing that the child is already a child “exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse” at the time the sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct was committed, or that the
circumstances prior to or during the act of complained of already
constitutes the first instance of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
so as to convert the child into a child “exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.”—It is my position that insofar as the
first Information (pertaining to the July 2010 incident against AAA) is
concerned, Petitioner cannot be convicted for violation of Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and
consequently suffer a penalty of reclusion temporal as provided for in
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, precisely because, as illustrated in
my Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel v. People, 823 SCRA 192 (2017), a
first sexual affront, on its own, cannot be automatically considered a
violation of Section 5(b), absent a showing that the child is already a
child “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse” at
the time the sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct was committed, or
that the circumstances prior to or during the act of complained of
already constitutes the first instance of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct so as to convert the child into a child “exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.” Here, the record is bereft of any
allegation or proof that when the July 2010 incident took place, AAA was
already a child “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse”; neither is there any fact from which inference can be made that
the relationship between the Petitioner and the victim amounts to
coercion or influence. Thus, I submit that the accused, in the first
instance, should only be held liable for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC.
Same; Other Sexual Abuse; View that petitioner, for the second
instance, was correctly charged and convicted for a violation of Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation
to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, because, this
time, the child, at the time the act complained of was committed,
already qualifies as one subjected to “other sexual abuse” — thereby
furnishing the essential element for a conviction under Article 336 of
the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610.—Petitioner, for the second instance, was correctly charged
and convicted for a violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of
Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610,
because, this time, the child, at the time the act complained of was
committed, already qualifies as one subjected to “other sexual abuse”
— thereby furnishing the essential element for a conviction under
Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. Considering that the specific class of
lascivious conduct in Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 requires allegation that
the acts were performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse, I respectfully submit that insofar as the
first incident of July 2010 is concerned, the facts of the case warrant
Page 659 of 682
Petitioner’s conviction only for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336

of the RPC. Inasmuch as the child was already subjected to “other
sexual abuse” at the time the second sexual affront occurred on
November 30, 2010, I raise no objection to Petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, insofar as the second incident is
concerned.
Page 660 of 682

G.R. No. 192442. August 9, 2017.*

BENEDICT N. ROMANA, petitioner, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME
CORPORATION/EDUARDO U. MANESE and/or PRINCESS CRUISE
LINE, LTD., respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Work-Related Illness/Injury;
Under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), “any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied” is
deemed to be a “workrelated illness.” On the other hand, Section 20(B)
(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC declares that “[t]hose illnesses not listed in
Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.”—
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, “any sickness resulting to disability or death
as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied” is deemed to be a
“work-related illness.” On the other hand, Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000
POEA-SEC declares that “[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.” The legal
presumption of work-relatedness was borne out from the fact that the
said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases
that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working
conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify that
the noninclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate
to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. Given the legal
presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such
legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. “The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; For both listed occupational disease and a
non-listed illness and their resulting injury to be compensable, the
seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence compliance with
the conditions for compensability.—It is apparent that for both listed
occupational disease and a non-listed illness and their resulting injury to
be compensable, the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial
evidence compliance with the conditions for compensability. At this
juncture, it is significant to point out that the delineation between work-
relatedness and compensability in relation to the legal presumption
under Section 20(B)(4) has been often overlooked in our jurisprudence.
This gave rise to the confusion that despite the presumption of work-
relatedness already accorded by law, certain cases confound that the
seafarer still has the burden of proof to show that his illness, as well as
the resulting disability is work-related.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Compensable Illness/Injury;
Workrelatedness of an illness is presumed; hence, the seafarer does not
bear the initial burden of proving the same. Rather, it is the employer
who bears the burden of disputing this presumption; The seafarer, while
Page 661 of 682
not needing to prove the work-relatedness of his illness, bears the

burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability
under Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).—To address
this apparent confusion, the Court thus clarifies that there lies a
technical demarcation between work-relatedness and compensability
relative to how these concepts operate in the realm of disability
compensation. As discussed, work-relatedness of an illness is
presumed; hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial burden of
proving the same. Rather, it is the employer who bears the burden of
disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully proves that the
illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside of his work
(meaning, the illness is preexisting), or that although the illness is
preexisting, none of the conditions of his work affected the risk of
contracting or aggravating such illness, then there is no need to go into
the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the name
itself implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer’s illness has a
possible connection to one’s work, and thus, allows the seafarer to
claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the same is not listed as an
occupational disease. The established work-relatedness of an illness
does not, however, mean that the resulting disability is automatically
compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer, while not needing to
prove the work-relatedness of his illness, bears the burden of proving
compliance with the conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of
the 2000 POEA-SEC. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his
claim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When an employer attempts to
discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of workrelatedness
(i.e., by either claiming that the illness is preexisting or, even if
preexisting, that the risk of contracting or aggravating the same has
nothing do with his work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the
seafarer to prove otherwise (i.e., that the illness was not preexisting, or
even if preexisting, that his work affected the risk of contracting or
aggravating the illness).—When an employer attempts to discharge the
burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness (i.e., by either
claiming that the illness is preexisting or, even if preexisting, that the
risk of contracting or aggravating the same has nothing do with his
work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer to prove
otherwise (i.e., that the illness was not preexisting, or even if
preexisting, that his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating
the illness). In so doing, the seafarer effectively discharges his own
burden of proving compliance with the first three (3) conditions of
compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that (1)
the seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein; (2) the
disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the
described risks; and (3) the disease was contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. Thus,
when the presumption of work-relatedness is contested by the
employer, the factors which the seafarer needs to prove to rebut the
employer’s contestation would necessarily overlap with some of the
Page 662 of 682
conditions which the seafarer needs to prove to establish the

compensability of his illness and the resulting disability. In this regard,
the seafarer, therefore, addresses the refutation of the employer
against the work-relatedness of his illness and, at the same time,
discharges his burden of proving compliance with certain conditions of
compensability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When an employer does not attempt
to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-
relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of proving
compliance with the conditions of compensability.— When an employer
does not attempt to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption
of work-relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of
proving compliance with the conditions of compensability, which does
not only include the three (3) conditions above mentioned, but also, the
distinct fourth condition, i.e., that there was no notorious negligence on
the part of the seafarer. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts to the
employer to now disprove the veracity of the information presented by
the seafarer. The employer may also raise any other affirmative defense
which may preclude compensation, such as concealment under Section
20(E) of the 2000 POEA-SEC or failure to comply with the third-doctor
referral provision under Section 20(B)(3) of the same Contract.
Subsequently, if the workrelatedness of the seafarer’s illness is not
successfully disputed by the employer, and the seafarer is then able to
establish compliance with the conditions of compensability, the matter
now shifts to a determination of the nature and, in turn, the amount of
disability benefits to be paid to the seafarer.
Same; Same; Same; Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is
the test of proof in disability compensation proceedings.—It is therefore
speculative to conclude that his exposure to “benzene, formaldehyde,
hydrocarbons, chemicals, crude oil, gasoline, lubricants and other
harmful cleaning solutions” may have caused, aggravated, or
contributed to his brain tumor. Probability, not the ultimate degree of
certainty, is the test of proof in disability compensation proceedings.
Nevertheless, probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least,
be anchored on credible information. A mere possibility will not suffice,
and a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment
caused the disease.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) ruled in a
number of cases that for an illness to be compensable under the 2000
Philippine Overseas Employment AdministrationStandard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC), two (2) elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must have been work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or
illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment
contract.—We ruled in a number of cases that for an illness to be
compensable under the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1)
the injury or illness must have been work-related; and (2) the work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer’s employment contract.
Page 663 of 682

Same; Same; Same; Same; Work-Related Illness/Injury; View that case

law provides that the legal presumption of workrelatedness in favor of
the claimant holds only to the extent that it allows compensation even
for a nonoccupational disease, as long as the four (4) conditions under
Section 32-A are established.— Section 32-A, there fore, sets the
parameters of causality or reasonable linkage be tween the injury or
illness suffered and the work conditions of the claimant. Accordingly,
case law provides that the legal presumption of work-relatedness in
favor of the claimant holds only to the extent that it allows
compensation even for a nonoccupational disease, as long as the four
conditions under Section 32-A are established. It is my view that this
principle finds basis in the plain text of the 2000 POEASEC and settled
evidentiary rules in compensation proceed ings.
Page 664 of 682

G.R. No. 197797. August 9, 2017.*

HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR, namely: JOSE PEÑAFLOR, JR. and
VIRGINIA P. AGATEP, represented by JESSICA P. AGATEP,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ARTEMIO and LYDIA DELA CRUZ,
namely: MARILOU, JULIET, ROMEO, RYAN, and ARIEL, all
surnamed DELA CRUZ, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage; It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute owner of the property
if no redemption is made within one (1) year from the registration of the
certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem.—It is well-settled that
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes
the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one
[(1)] year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those
entitled to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of
ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil
Code, not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi[.]
Same; Same; Same; Possession being an essential right of the owner
with which he is able to exercise the other attendant rights of
ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale may demand possession as a matter of right. —“Possession being
an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the
other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of
right. This is why Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7
reads: In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where
the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made
without violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in
the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under
Section 194 of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property
encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case
the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees
specified in paragraph 11 of Section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended by
Act No. 2866, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that
a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
Page 665 of 682

Same; Same; Same; Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court — which
is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages as per Section 6 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3135 — provides that upon the expiration of the
redemption period, the possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor.—Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court — which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages as per Section 6 of Act No. 3135 — provides that upon the
expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the property shall
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. “In
China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), it
was held that for the court’s ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession to cease, it is not enough that the property be held by a
third party, but rather the said possessor must have a claim thereto
adverse to the debtor/mortgagor: Where a parcel levied upon on
execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the
procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of
said adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third
party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor,
the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need
not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. Specifically, the Court held that to
be considered in adverse possession, the third-party possessor must
have done so in his own right and not merely as a successor or
transferee of the debtor or mortgagor: The exception provided under
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a
right, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own
right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Same; Same; Same; Where a third party has raised in an opposition to
the writ of possession or in a motion to quash the same his actual
possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse to that
of the debtor or mortgagor the procedure is for the trial court to order a
hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably
with the time-honored principle of due process.—Where a third party
has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession or in a motion to
quash the same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership
or a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor — as in this case
— the procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to determine
the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-
honored principle of due process. Notably, when this opposition is
made, the proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession loses its
nature of being an ex parte, and instead, turns adversarial, so as to
give: On the one hand, the third-party claimant the opportunity to
Page 666 of 682
present evidence of his title showing his independent right over the
subject property adverse to the judgment obligor/mortgagor; and on the
other hand, the mortgagee the opportunity to rebut said evidence in
order to sustain the issuance of the writ and gain possession of the
subject property pursuant to his consolidated title.
Same; Ex-Parte Proceedings; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence
describes that “[a]n ex parte proceeding merely means that it is taken
or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one (1) party, and
without notice to or contestation by any party adversely affected.”—
Jurisprudence describes that “[a]n ex parte proceeding merely means
that it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one
party, and without notice to or contestation by any party adversely
affected.” Clearly, this is not the case when an opposition is made by a
third-party claimant against the issuance of a writ of possession, from
which the court is compelled to now order a hearing to determine the
nature of the former’s adverse possession.
Same; Writ of Possession; The purpose of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession under Republic Act (RA) No. 3135, as amended by RA
No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who has already
shown a prima facie right of ownership over the subject property (based
on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess
the foreclosed property; It is only upon a credible showing by a third-
party claimant of his independent right over the foreclosed property
that the law’s prima facie deference to the mortgagee’s consolidated
title should not prevail. Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not
suffice.—It should be clarified that the purpose of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who has already
shown a prima facie right of ownership over the subject property (based
on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess
the foreclosed property. To reiterate, “[p]ossession being an essential
right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other attendant
rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right.” Thus, it
is only upon a credible showing by a third-party claimant of his
independent right over the foreclosed property that the law’s prima
facie deference to the mortgagee’s consolidated title should not prevail.
Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not suffice. As jurisprudence
prescribes, the demonstration by the third-party claimant should be
made within the context of an adversarial hearing, where the basic
principles of Evidence and Civil Procedure ought to be followed, such as:
(1) it is the claimant who has the burden of proving his claim; (2) the
claim must be established through a preponderance of evidence; and
(3) evidence not presented or formally offered cannot be admitted
against the opposing party. In this case, none of these principles were
followed for the CA considered evidence that were not only submitted in
a totally different case against an entirely different party, but are also
innately inadequate to — at least — prima facie show the source of the
third-party claimant’s independent title, all to the detriment of the
Page 667 of 682

mortgagee who had already consolidated his title to the contested

property. The reversal of its ruling is therefore in order.
Same; Same; Same; Writ of Possession; View that a hearing is
conducted only to determine whether or not possession by a thirdparty
claimant is really adverse for purposes of issuing a writ of possession. If
the possession is adverse within the definition of the law, the court shall
defer or quash the issuance of a writ of possession; otherwise, it shall
proceed to issue the writ.—A hearing is conducted only to determine
whether or not possession by a third-party claimant is really adverse for
purposes of issuing a writ of possession. If the possession is adverse
within the definition of the law, the court shall defer or quash the
issuance of a writ of possession; otherwise, it shall proceed to issue the
writ. This rule is explained in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad, 71 Phil. 340
(1941), which reads in relevant part as follows: But where a party in
possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his
possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a
mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was
begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by
enforcing the decree. Thus, it was held that only parties to the suit,
persons who came in under them pendente lite, and trespassers or
intruders without title, can be evicted by a writ of possession. The
reason for this limitation is that the writ does not issue in case of doubt,
nor will a question of legal title be tried or decided in proceedings
looking to the exercise of the power of the court to put a purchaser in
possession. x x x The petitioner, it is held, should be required to
establish his title in a proceeding directed to that end.
Same; Same; Same; View that in determining whether or not possession
is indeed adverse, the court must look into the nature of the possession
by the third-party claimant and determine if the latter’s claim is indeed
adverse, as defined above, and is bona fide and in good faith.—In
determining whether or not possession is indeed adverse, the court
must look into the nature of the possession by the third-party claimant
and determine if the latter’s claim is indeed adverse, as defined above,
and is bona fide and in good faith. To provide a better understanding of
when possession is adverse, jurisprudence on who is not an adverse
claimant is informative. In Planas v. Madrigal & Co., 94 Phil. 754 (1954),
the Court held that an adverse claimant must not be a mere transferee
or possessor pendente lite of the property in question. Roxas v. Buan,
167 SCRA 43 (1988), held that a successor-in-interest of the judgment
obligor cannot be considered an adverse claimant. In Rivero de Ortega
v. Natividad, 71 Phil. 340 (1941), the Court stated that an adverse
possessor must be one who did not acquire possession from a person
who was bound by the decree; rather, the adverse claimant must be a
mere stranger who entered into possession before the foreclosure suit
began.
Same; Same; Same; View that the third-party claimant need not prove
ownership in the proceedings. All that needs to be shown with a
preponderance of evidence is that the third-party claimant is in
possession of the property and is asserting a right adverse to that of the
Page 668 of 682
debtor/mortgagor with respect to the possession.—It is apparent that

the third-party claimant need not prove ownership in the proceedings.
All that needs to be shown with a preponderance of evidence is that the
third-party claimant is in possession of the property and is asserting a
right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor with respect to the
possession as discussed above. Once such evidence is shown, the court
must defer the issuance of a writ of possession and let the parties file
the proper judicial action. The matter of whether or not the third-party
claimant is indeed the lawful owner or better possessor of the property
is a matter that must be threshed out in a separate proceeding. It bears
to emphasize that the mandated separate proceeding is founded on the
underpinnings of the exception in substantive law, particularly Art. 433
of the Civil Code. Under this provision, as explained in Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 22 (2002), one who claims
to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the
appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. Art. 433 requires
nothing less than an ejectment or reivindicatory action to be brought
even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessors of a property
enjoy in their favor the legal presumption of a just title, which must be
overcome by the party claiming otherwise. An ex parte petition for the
issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not,
strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as con templated above. Even if
the petition may be considered a judicial proceeding for the
enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure
sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court. In an ordinary lawsuit, one
party “sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.”
Same; Same; Same; View that Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Prime Neighborhood Association, 587 SCRA 582 (2009), has ruled that a
third party’s possession of the property is legally presumed to be
pursuant to a just title. It must be borne in mind that the foregoing legal
presumption may be overcome by the purchaser only in a judicial
proceeding for recovery of the property. —As has been said, all that
third-party claimants in foreclosure proceedings need to show is that
they are in possession, and that their possession is adverse to the claim
of the judgment obligor. In other words, they simply have to show that
they have a valid claim of ownership together with their possession, not
that they in fact have ownership. Here, the second SC judgment itself
shows, at the very least, that Artemio has indisputably been in
possession of the subject property since 1968. The ponencia points out
that the second SC judgment was limited to the issue of possession
against his sister, Carmelita. Nevertheless, possession of the property
by Artemio gives him a presumptive title over it, considering that the
debtor/mortgagor (Nicolasa) did not have any title in her name and was
not in possession of the property at the time she mortgaged it.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood
Association, 587 SCRA 582 (2009), has ruled that a third party’s
possession of the property is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just
title. It must be borne in mind that the foregoing legal presumption may
Page 669 of 682

be overcome by the purchaser only in a judicial proceeding for recovery

of the property.
Same; Same; Same; View that a third party claiming ownership of the
subject property need not prove the validity of the claim in the
proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession.— At the outset, it
cannot be emphasized enough that a third party claiming ownership of
the subject property need not prove the validity of the claim in the
proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession. What needs to be
shown is simply possession of an adverse character as against the claim
of the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure case. In other words, what
needs to be shown is a bona fide claim, not proof of ownership per se.
The veracity or truth of that claim must be threshed out in a separate
proceeding, as discussed above.
Page 670 of 682

G.R. No. 221991. August 30, 2017.*

JOSELITO PERALTA y ZARENO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; To establish the corpus
delicti of Illegal Possession of Firearms, the prosecution has the burden
of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned
or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess or carry the same.—The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal
possession of firearms is the accused’s lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by
law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess or carry the same. In this case, the prosecution had proven
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements,
considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as
the one holding a .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with
magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized from him and later
on, marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence at
the trial; and (b) the Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the
Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which
declared that Peralta “is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with
Serial Number 4517488 per verification from the records of this office as
of this date.”
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; Three (3) Instances When
Warrantless Arrests May be Lawfully Effected.—A lawful arrest may be
effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should — as a general rule — be complied with: Section 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. The aforementioned provision
identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of
Page 671 of 682
a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Same; In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section
5(a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.—In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a),
Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b), Rule 113 requires for
its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
Page 672 of 682

G.R. No. 223731. August 30, 2017.*

ROBELITO MALINIS TALAROC, petitioner, vs. ARPAPHIL
SHIPPING CORPORATION, EPIDAURUS S.A., and/or NATIVIDAD
PAPPAS, respondents.
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily
discretion conferred upon it.—To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Labor Disputes; In labor
disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. —In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Guided by the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in
granting respondent’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in awarding petitioner total and permanent
disability benefits.
Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Guidelines to be
Observed When a Seafarer Claims Permanent and Total Disability
Benefits.—In sum, the following guidelines are observed when a
seafarer claims permanent and total disability benefits: 1. The
company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment
on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the
time the seafarer reported to him; 2. If the company-designated
physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes
permanent and total; 3. If the company-designated physician fails to
give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or
seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden
to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated
physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of
Page 673 of 682

240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total,
regardless of any justification.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, a seafarer shall be entitled to
compensation if he suffers from a work-related injury or illness during
the term of his contract.—As a rule, a seafarer shall be entitled to
compensation if he suffers from a work-related injury or illness during
the term of his contract. Under the 2010 POEASEC, a “work-related
illness” is defined as “any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions
set therein satisfied.” Corollarily, Section 20(A)(4) thereof further
provides that “[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract
are disputably presumed as work-related.”
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence provides that [p]robability, not the
ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings.—Records reveal that petitioner’s back pain — generalized
disc bulge and disc protrusion, non-listed illnesses — occurred only
while he was onboard the vessel. While said illness was claimed to be
degenerative in nature, the company doctor herself acknowledged that
it may be aggravated or precipitated by heavy work or lifting/pushing or
pulling of heavy objects, a manual task basically demanded from a
seafarer. Since there was no proof to show that these activities were not
performed by petitioner while he was onboard or were not part of his
duties while the ship was at berth as advanced by respondents, it can
be safely concluded that the arduous nature of his job may have caused
or at least aggravated his condition more so since he was declared fit to
work prior to his deployment, hence, work-related. Jurisprudence
provides that “[p]robability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the
test of proof in compensation proceedings. And probability must be
reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored on credible
information,” as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; As case law states,
without a valid final and definite assessment from the company-
designated physician, the law already steps in to consider petitioner’s
disability as total and permanent.—In this case, there was no showing
that petitioner duly received a conclusive and definitive assessment for
his lumbar spondylosis. The May 14, 2013 medical report was a
confidential document, which was not shown to have been received by
him. In fact, respondents did not respond to his initial query regarding
the true state of his condition and whether or not he would be able to
return to his pre-injury capacity and resume work despite his back pain.
Thus, although petitioner did consult an independent physician
regarding his illness, the lack of a conclusive and definite assessment
from respondents left him nothing to properly contest and perforce,
negates the need for him to comply with the third-doctor referral
provision under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. As case law
states, without a valid final and definite assessment from the company-
designated physician, the law already steps in to consider petitioner’s
disability as total and permanent.
Page 674 of 682

G.R. No. 224549. August 7, 2017.*

SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH and DIRK FAHRENBACH,
petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; As a rule, the
Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark
in the evaluation of evidence adduced during trial.—It must be
emphasized that as a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during trial.
This rule, however, allows exceptions, such as instances when the
findings of fact of the trial court are conflicting or contradictory with
those of the CA, as in this case where the conflicting findings of facts of
the MCTC on one hand, and the RTC and the CA on the other, warrant a
second look for the proper dispensation of justice.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Unlawful Detainer; It is well-
settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible
entry or unlawful detainer cases is who between the parties is entitled
to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.—It is
well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is who between the parties is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute. The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any
claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth
in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or
actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical
possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the
defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that the law does not
require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before it can be said that he is in possession thereof.— In this case,
respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the
subject lot. Records disclose that respondent occasionally visited the
subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in September 1995.
She even paid the lot’s realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey
authority thereon. In fact, she submitted old photographs showing
herself on the subject lot, the identity of which petitioners did not
contend. Notably, jurisprudence states that the law does not require a
person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it
can be said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor, 591 SCRA
350 (2009), the Court held that “visiting the property on weekends and
holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. The fact of her
residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of
possession of the subject property.” In contrast, petitioners themselves
claim that they began occupying the subject lot only in August 2005,
after Alvarez executed the corresponding Deed of Sale in their favor.
Hence, in light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that respondent had
prior de facto possession.
Page 675 of 682
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
judgment in cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as
arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises.—With regard to the rent due respondent,
the CA correctly held that since petitioners disturbed respondent’s
possession of the subject lot, rent is due respondent from the time
petitioners intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the judgment in cases for forcible entry shall include
the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises. However, in Badillo v. Tayag,
400 SCRA 494 (2003), the Court clarified that reasonable amount of rent
in suits for forcible entry must be determined not by mere judicial
notice, but by supporting evidence. Here, since the RTC indeed failed to
cite any document showing the assessment of the subject lot, any
increase in the realty taxes, and the prevailing rental rate in the area,
the CA correctly remanded this aspect to the RTC for proper
determination.
Page 676 of 682

G.R. No. 224631. August 23, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUPERTO
RUBILLAR, JR. y GABERON, accused appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal in criminal cases
opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.—At the outset, it must be
stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned
or unassigned. “The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
proper provision of the penal law.”
Same; Same; Sweetheart Theory; The “sweetheart theory” is an
affirmative defense often raised to prove the nonattendance of force or
intimidation.—In the present case, Rubillar’s invocation of the
“sweetheart theory” is essentially an admission of him having carnal
knowledge with AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual.
Thus, it is crucial to determine whether or not AAA indeed consented to
the sexual act, considering that the gravamen of Rape is sexual
congress with a woman without her consent. Stated differently, the only
question left for the Court to resolve is whether the prosecution has
proven the second element beyond reasonable doubt. The “sweetheart
theory” is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the
nonattendance of force or intimidation. As aforestated, it is “effectively
an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places
on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by
substantial evidence.”
Same; Same; Same; A woman who was sexually abused by a lover has
no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused in a
rape trial because admitting such relationship would not negate her
allegation of rape, as the Supreme Court (SC) has consistently ruled
that “a ‘love affair’ does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be
sexually violated against her will.”—The “sweetheart theory” operates
to impair the victim’s testimony or create doubt on her version of the
facts when the defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship
between the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it.
Notably, a woman who was sexually abused by a lover has no
practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused in a rape
trial because admitting such relationship would not negate her
allegation of rape, as the Court has consistently ruled that “a ‘love
affair’ does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated
against her will.” Nonetheless, if she denies the relationship but it was
found existing, she runs the risk of tainting her testimony when her
version of the facts is inconsistent with the presence of an intimate
Page 677 of 682

relationship between them. The Court proceeds to resolve this case with
this mindset.
Same; Same; Getting off at the public market to do the errands of her
mother is not usual for someone who has been raped.—The Court adds
that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is significant in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of
rape. In this case, while about to leave the motel, AAA could have ran
away instead of boarding Rubillar’s motorcycle. Also, getting off at the
public market to do the errands of her mother is not usual for someone
who has been raped. Moreover, AAA stated that she left her family’s
house because she did not want her mother and others to be involved
in the alleged rape incident, but Kalan testified that she left the house
to elope with “Berang” (Rubillar’s alias). Plainly, AAA’s act of leaving
home to elope with her alleged malefactor is uncharacteristic of one
who has been raped and seeks retribution for it.
Same; Same; While it is true that not all victims react the same way
after suffering forced coitus, it appears highly unlikely for a victim of
rape to cry out that she was sexually abused and, thereafter, to elope
with her offender.—The value of a witness’s testimony should be
compatible with human knowledge, observation, and common
experience, such that whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. While it is
true that not all victims react the same way after suffering forced
coitus, it appears highly unlikely for a victim of rape to cry out that she
was sexually abused and, thereafter, to elope with her offender.
Otherwise stated, the testimonies of Kalan and Caio rendered AAA’s
testimony highly suspect. At this point, it is worthy to note that AAA
failed to give any reason why her two close friends would testify against
her claim of rape in court.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) reminds the members of the
bench of their solemn duty to decide cases based on the law and to free
themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman claiming to have been sexually abused and demanding
punishment for the abuser.—The Court reminds the members of the
bench of their solemn duty to decide cases based on the law and to
“free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman claiming to have been sexually abused and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands
justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice according to law.” As elucidated in People v. Palentes, 716
SCRA 106 (2014): The testimony of the offended party x x x should not
be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be
concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim
of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and
after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought
to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
Page 678 of 682

undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that
their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
Page 679 of 682

G.R. No. 221620. September 11, 2017.*

TERESA R. IGNACIO, represented by her Attorney-inFact,
ROBERTO R. IGNACIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE CITY
TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, VICTOR B. ENDRIGA, OFFICE OF
THE CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, THE REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ATTY. FELIXBERTO F. ABAD, and
ALEJANDRO RAMON and RACQUEL DIMALANTA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Case law holds that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined from the nature of
action pleaded as appearing from the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.— Jurisdiction is defined
as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In
order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Case law holds that jurisdiction is conferred by
law and determined from the nature of action pleaded as appearing
from the material averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. Once the nature of the action is determined, it remains
the same even on appeal until a decision rendered thereon becomes
final and executory.
Same; Same; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Local Tax Cases;
Cases decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which involve issues
relating to the power of the local government to impose real property
taxes are considered as local tax cases, which fall under the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).—Based on the above
cited provision of law, it is apparent that the CTA’s appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs becomes operative
only when the RTC has ruled on a local tax case. Thus, before the case
can be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the RTC must be
in the nature of a tax case, or one which primarily involves a tax issue.
In National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas, 741
SCRA 505 (2014): Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to
review by appeal the decisions, rulings and resolutions of the RTC over
local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is evident from
a perusal of the Local Government Code (LGC) which includes the
matter of Real Property Taxation under one of its main chapters.
Indubitably, the power to impose real property tax is in line with the
power vested in the local governments to create their own revenue
sources, within the limitations set forth by law. As such, the collection of
real property taxes is conferred with the local treasurer rather than the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Thus, cases decided by the RTC which
involve issues relating to the power of the local government to impose
real property taxes are considered as local tax cases, which fall under
the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. To note, these issues may, inter
alia, involve the legality or validity of the real property tax assessment;
protests of assessments; disputed assessments, surcharges, or
penalties; legality or validity of a tax ordinance; claims for tax
Page 680 of 682

refund/credit; claims for tax exemption; actions to collect the tax due;
and even prescription of assessments.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; For res judicata to absolutely bar a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.—Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. It also refers to the rule that an existing final judgment or
decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction,
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. For res
judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.—Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively
availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously
or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other
court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another. To determine whether a party violated the
rule against forum shopping, it is crucial to ask whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia, as a
ground for the dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious.—As compared to the doctrine of res judicata, which had been
explained above, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Its requisites are:
(a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same
Page 681 of 682
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs

prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of
the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
Page 682 of 682

Perlas-Bernabe Cases Syllabus

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KMB HOTINGOY | PERLAS-BERNABE JURISPRUDENCE SYLLABI

G.R. No. 203466. February 25, 2015.*

appropriated did not pass to the employee perpetrator, the offense

G.R. No. 191703. March 12, 2012.*

G.R. No. 186469. June 13, 2012.*

G.R. No. 190875. June 13, 2012.*

Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for

the process of its registration, which circumstance does not obtain in

G.R. No. 180308. June 19, 2012.*

Constitutional Law; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Article VI, Section 21 of

G.R. No. 190144. August 1, 2012.*

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Parties; Section 5, Rule

G.R. No. 191792. August 22, 2012.*

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA); The benefits of a

G.R. No. 196883. August 22, 2012.*

G.R. No. 189774. September 18, 2012.*

ROMULO PANTI, ORLANDO TUPAZ, ZENAIDA SALDUA, ROWENA

Administrative Law; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Administrative

prohibition declared by a presidential issuance, ratiocinating that: The

G.R. No. 171633. September 18, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; Jurisprudence dictates

G.R. Nos. 187308 and 187517. September 18, 2013.*

title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the

G.R. No. 170018. September 23, 2013.*

therein. This is in consonance with Section 73(c) of RA 6657 which

G.R. No. 171206. September 23, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204603. September 24, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal

G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Petitioners had the burden of

G.R. No. 196112. February 26, 2014.*

Telecommunication Industry; Public Service Act; National

the services he is required to furnish to the customers, and whether or

G.R. No. 192984. February 28, 2012.*

against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they

Same; Civil Procedure; Motions; A motion without a notice of hearing is

A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC. March 6, 2012.*

G.R. No. 179382. January 14, 2013.*

G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013.*

A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013.*

G.R. No. 191667. April 17, 2013.*

G.R. No. 168137. August 7, 2013.*

G.R. No. 171904. August 7, 2013.*

G.R. No. 183014. August 7, 2013.*

G.R. No. 198457. August 13, 2013.*

A.M. No. P-13-3147. July 2, 2014.*

G.R. No. 183901. July 9, 2014.*

Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; It is

an effective forbearance on the part of the State; Beginning July 1,

G.R. No. 178343. July 14, 2014.*

G.R. No. 198226. July 18, 2014.*

G.R. No. 190706. July 21, 2014.*

intent to deceive, actual or probable, determined through a judicious

G.R. No. 203434. July 23, 2014.*

G.R. No. 191053. November 28, 2011.*

to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive

A.M. No. P-11-3011. November 29, 2011.*

be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an

G.R. No. 175552. July 18, 2012.*

G.R. No. 178584. October 8, 2012.*

G.R. No. 194366. October 10, 2012.*

with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings

G.R. No. 183774. November 14, 2012.*