LOPO – Authority of the Public Officer
Thereafter, Bunye announced to the
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang
Bayan (KBMBPM) ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v. Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
Syllabus: THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
UNDER P.D. NO. 175 TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE COOPERATIVES
DOES NOT INCLUDE THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS OFF COOPERATIVES. — Respondent Secretary of Agriculture
arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are
authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot
take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that
right. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These
powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be
necessary for their just and reasonable execution
Nachura Doctrine: Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate
executive officers, including Cabinet members, completes exhaustion of
administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302], except
in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in
which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive
approval of the President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the
President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies
[Kilusang Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92]
FACTS:
 KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of
vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang,
Muntinlupa pursuant to PD No. 175.
 The Municipal government of Muntinlupa entered into a contract
with KBMBPM for the management and operation of the new
Muntinlupa public market. It provided for a 25-year term, renewable
for the same period, unless terminated by the mutual agreement of
the parties.
 Ignacio Bunye, as acting Mayor, ordered a review of the said
contract for being contrary to BP 337 (Local Government Code).
The COA and the Metro Manila Commission urged to take the
appropriate steps to rescind the contract. Thus, subsequently,
Bunye and the Municipal Council approved Resolution No. 45
K. JORGIO
abrogating the contract.
stallholders that they should pay their market fees to the Market
Commission and no longer the KBMBPM.
 KBMBPM filed a complaint in the RTC of Makati contending that the
Bunye’s acted in excess of his authority in illegally taking over the
public market, and thus constitutes a breach of contract and duty as
a public official.
 Thereafter, two petitions were filed (but only the first one is
connected to Admin, the second one is about Criminal Law ––
Mayor Bunye and his companions allegedly thru force, violence
and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of petitioners at the
second floor of the KBS Building to serve the order of the
respondent Sec. of Agriculture which provides that the KBMBPM is
not operating in accordance with PD No. 23 and thus, shall be
placed under the MANAGEMENT TAKEOVER of Department of
Agriculture to preserve the financial interest of its members.
Subsequently, petitioners contend that the Respondent Secretary
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order.
 Petitioners filed a motion praying that respondent Atty. Rogelio
Madriaga who had assumed the position of Chairman of the Mngt.
Committee be ordered to stop and/or cancel the scheduled
elections of the officers of the KBMBPM and desist from scheduling
any election of officers or Members of the Board of Directors
thereof until further orders on the Court. The elections were,
nevertheless, held and a new board of directors was elected.
ISSUE: WON the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid?
HELD: NO. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing
P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers
of cooperatives. A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17,
Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws, reads: Sec. 17. Removal of Directors
and Committee Members. — Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in
good standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for
the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be heard at the
assembly. Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding
of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of
directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to
due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be
heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that
right. The procedure was not followed in this case. –– Respondent
Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of
the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors
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and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which
grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section
does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only such powers
as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans
and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require
the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with
policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as
may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4)
review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them. The power to summarily disband the board of
directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175
and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which
directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known
better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the
general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department
of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have,
expressly or impliedly. Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument,
that said power includes the power to disband the board of directors and
remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not expressly
required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due
process to the affected parties, herein petitioners. In the instant case, there
was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general
membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not even a semblance of a
hearing. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general
membership of the KBMBPM. There was then violation of due
process.
K. JORGIO
Nachura Doctrine: The authority can be exercised only during the term when
the public officer is, by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office.
In Jandaya v. Ruiz, 95 SCRA 562, where the decision penned by Judge
Marquez was promulgated by Judge Ruiz after Marquez had already retired,
the Supreme Court held that the decision had no binding effect.
FACTS:
 On May 10, 1973, petitioner was convicted of Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and sentenced to suffer 3
months of Arresto Mayor. On appeal, the case was raffled to the
CFI of Bohol, Branch 1, presided over by the Honorable Paulino
Marquez.
 On June 26, 1973, an order was served on petitioner that the
promulgation of the decision would take place on July 6, 1973.
 On June 27, 1973, Judge Paulino Marquez retired from service.
Upon motion of counsel for petitioner, the promulgation of decision
was postponed from July 6 to July 12. Finally on July 16, 1973, the
decision dated June 22, 1973 as prepared and signed by Judge
Marquez was promulgated by respondent Judge.
 Solicitor general has commented that "In the light of . . . settled
rulings, the promulgation made by respondent judge on July 16,
1973 of the decision dated June 22, 1973, signed and prepared
by Judge Marquez who retired on June 27, 1973 is submitted to be
null and void.”
ISSUE: WON this petition shall be given merit
HELD: YES. There are areas in the juristic sphere where the dividing line is
obscure but certainly not this one, except, it would seem, for
respondent Judge. There is no real need to plot it on the legal map for those
whose knowledge of the terrain of the law rises above the superficial. As so
tersely put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Cesar Bengzon: "We
have then that, legally, the decisions of Judge Mañalac were promulgated on
July 3, 1954. Wherefore, because he had left the Bench before that date, his
decisions have no binding effect."
Such a doctrine goes back to a 1917 decision, Lino Luna v. Rodriguez. It did
cite in support thereof several leading American Supreme Court
decisions. A recent case, Jimenez v. Republic, applies with even more
pertinence. The antecedent facts, as set forth in the opinion of Justice
Dulcismo Tongco Jandayan vs. Judge Fernando Ruiz
G.R. No. L-37471, January 28, 1980
Angeles, follow: "Eduardo Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others,
was charged with homicide in an information, dated May 13, 1960, before
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the Court of First Instance of Rizal, criminal case No. 9531, of said court.
The case was heard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding one
of the branches of the court. Admittedly, the decision prepared and signed
by Judge Mencias was delivered to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965.
On the same date, the clerk of court issued and served notice on the
petitioner to appear in court on January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the
sentence. In view that January 21, was declared by the President a special
holiday, the promulgation of the decision could not be carried out on that
day. On January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of
70 and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge Pedro
Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of Judge Mencias.
The former judgeordered that the sentence be promulgated on January 29,
1965, but for some reason, it was postponed to March 1, 1965." Petitioner
Jimenez filed a motion to set aside the decision as well as its promulgation
on the ground of Judge Mencias having retired. Respondent Judge,
however, denied the motion, necessitating the filing of a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The concluding paragraph of the opinion reads: "We hold
that the decision rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot be
validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for the same has become
null and void under the circumstances.”
The latest case in point is Vera v. People, where it was noted by this Court
that a decision of a judge promulgated after his retirement could have been
set aside on the authority of the above two cases of People v. Court of
Appeals and Jimenez v. Republic, EXCEPT for their non-applicability in
view of the failure to raise such an objection in the lower court as well
as in the Court of Appeals. There was no thought, however, of
deviating from the principle that a judge who had retired had no legal
authority to promulgate a decision.
This Court did not feel the need for deciding the petition earlier considering
the comment filed by the respondent Chief of Police of Anda, Bohol, in the
light of its last two paragraphs. Thus: "That as a municipal prisoner,
petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan had served the rest of his sentence in
the municipal jail of Anda, Bohol from August 14, 1973 to October 5, 1973
when the undersigned respondent in his capacity as and Chief of Police of
Anda, Bohol released prisoner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan for having fully
served out his sentence; and that the undersigned only knew of petitioner's
present petition and received the different copies of the pleadings and
resolutions from the Honorable Supreme Court [only after] this undersigned
has already released petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan who had
already fully served his sentence as said above." Hence the habeas corpus
aspect was rendered moot and academic. Nonetheless, this opinion is
handed down to remove any doubt that this Court adheres to the well-
settled doctrine on the matter at issue.
K. JORGIO
Tomas Lao vs. Leticia Abianda To-Chip, Ramon To-Chip and Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 76597, February 26, 1988
Nachura Doctrine: In Lao v. To Chip, 158 SCRA 243, the decision
promulgated by the division of the Court of Appeals was ruled to be null and
void, considering that it was promulgated after the justices had been notified
of the acceptance of their resignation.
FACTS:
 Supervising Land Examiner of said Bureau filed a complaint
against petitioner Tomas Lao with the Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
alleged violation of PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and other
similar acts which was subsequently dismissed
 Alleging that the filing of said complaint publicly put him to shame
as he is a business man with a gross annual income of
P40M, petitioner filed an action for damages based on Articles 20
and 21 of the Civil Code against private respondents
 Lower court awarded petitioner moral damages and attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses where both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
 CA promulgated a decision reversing the lower court's decision and
dismissing the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the validity of the Court of Appeals
decision on the ground that on August 1, 1986, the appellate court
had no jurisdiction to issue said decision as two of the three
members of the First Civil Cases Division had been "effectively
disempowered to sit thereon as of July 31, 1986" as a result of the
reorganization of said court.
 Court of Appeals denied the MR. Said resolution which was also
penned by Justice Luciano and concurred in by Justices Jorge R.
Coquia and Emeterio C. Cui states that the justices who were not
re-appointed because of the reorganization held office in a hold-
over capacity until the newly appointed as well as reappointed
justices took their oath of office before the President at 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of August 1, 1986. As the questioned decision was
promulgated at 11:45 A.M. of August 1, 1986, the justices who were
not re-appointed were still validly performing judicial functions
including the promulgation of decisions.
 Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari raising, among others, the issue of the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to promulgate the decision of August 1, 1986 as
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 "there was no existing quorum and hence no authority to exercise
any judicial power pertaining to the Court of Appeals."
ISSUE: WON CA was without authority to promulgate decision for not having
quorum
HELD: YES, decision is declared null and void. In line with the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals, all the justices tendered their
resignation. The records of the Office of the Court Administrator reveal that
on July 30, 1986, President Aquino accepted the resignations of the justices
of the Court of Appeals. The following day, July 31, 1986, the President
appointed the Presiding Justice and forty-one (41) Associate Justices of said
court.
At 5:20 o'clock in the afternoon of July 31, 1986, this Court received the
communication of the President regarding her acceptance of the
resignations of the Justices of the Court of Appeals. This Court then
informed the justices concerned about said communication. Hence the office
of Justice Gaviola received the notice of the President's acceptance of his
resignation at 8:15 P.M. of the same day while the office of Justice Quetulio-
Losa received such notice at 8:30 A.M. of the following day, August 1, 1986.
From these facts, it is clear that when the decision in question was
promulgated at 11:45 A.M. on August 1, 1986, Justices Gaviola and
Quetulio-Losa had both ceased to be members of the Court of Appeals since
at that time, they had been informed that their resignations had been
accepted by the President. It is therefore, immaterial that the newly
appointed and re-appointed justices took their oath of office at 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of August 1, 1986. What is crucial is that when the questioned
decision was promulgated, two of the three justices necessary to constitute a
quorum in a division had lost their authority to act as justices by reason of
the presidential acceptance of their resignations. To endorse the opinion of
the Court of Appeals that the justices who were not re-appointed were acting
in a hold-over capacity until their replacements shall have taken their oath of
office, will abet, rather than avoid, a disorderly administration of justice.
Time and again, We have ruled that to be binding, a judgment must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed
it. Thus, the promulgation of a decision after a judge retires is null and
void. Fairness, equity and justice demand that the same rulings, although
they involved judges of the lower courts, should be applied with equal force
to cases involving decisions promulgated by the higher courts the justices of
which have resigned.
K. JORGIO
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Garcia y Manabat
G.R. No. 126252, August 30, 1999
Nachura Doctrine: In People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 126252, August 30, 1999, it
was held that although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman’s disability
retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied
that at the time the subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996,
he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC Branch LX of Baguio City, and
had, in fact, continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his
application for retirement was approved in June, 1996. Accordingly, the
decision under review was held to have been validly promulgated.
FACTS:
For detailed sequence of events refer to full text
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, herein
accused-appellant Jesus Garcia was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of five kilos of marijuana. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a
decision on February 20, 1996 finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him to suffer the maximum
penalty of death. In this case, appellant impugned his conviction on the
grounds that: (a) the decision convicting him of the crime charged was not
validly promulgated as the promulgation was made four days after the
retirement of the judge who penned the decision; (b) the uncorroborated
testimony of a prosecution witness is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON appellant was correct when he contends that since the
decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, four (4)
days after the approved retirement of Judge de Guzman, Jr., his decision is
void and has no binding effect.
HELD: NO. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the
judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a decision is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated
by the judge during his incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal
effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in
the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally appointed,
duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto. A judge de jure is
one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested
with all the powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de
facto is one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He
has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in
his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time.
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In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated.
Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was
made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time
his subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the
incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact
continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for
retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when
the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr.
was actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that
time, he has yet to file his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as
early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the term of the judge
has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in
attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the expiration of
his term are void. However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman,
Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time
the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said
decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.
Carroll H. Lamb vs. W.H. Phipps, as Auditor for the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912
Nachura Doctrine: Ministerial: one the discharge of which by the officer
concerned is imperative and requires neither judgment nor discretion [Lamb
v. Phipps, 22 Phil 456], The exercise of ministerial powers may be compelled
[Corpus v. Commanding General, Philippine Army]
Discretionary: one imposed by law upon a public officer wherein the officer
has the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed [Lamb v.
Phipps, supra.]
FACTS:
 Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he
resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he was
assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and
Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all
property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be
allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.
 Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that
Lamb indeed has settled his accounts, refuses to issue the
certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit
K. JORGIO
against the government. However the records also show that
Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the
government.
 The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to
issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor because it is a
suit against the government and the petition states no cause of
action.
 The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did
not do so hence the SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb
intended to make.
ISSUE: WON mandamus may be issued to compel the auditor general to
issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb.
HELD: NO, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded
government employees and there is no averment that Lamb is a bonded
employee other than having custody of government property and funds,
however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this
court in mandamus to the cases where there was no other adequate and
speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our duty, therefore, to give
the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the legislative
intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical
errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute
unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation,
will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read
as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of
the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole enactment.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to
accept a mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real
responsibility of Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that
alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so
desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts,
make an actual examination of the funds and property represented by such
paper accounts or balances.
The duties of the Auditor for the Philippine Island are as follows:
He has exclusive jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source of the Insular
Government, the city of Manila, the provinces, the municipalities, the
townships, the settlements, or any other governmental branch; and his
decisions are final and conclusive except when an appeal is taken therefrom
within one year.
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The Auditor for the Philippine Islands is possessed with exclusive and final
jurisdiction to audit all accounts of the Philippine Government, and if his
judgment is final unless an appeal therefrom is taken and finally reversed by
the Secretary of War, it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion to hold
that he has at least a certain discretion in arriving at an uncontrolled and
independent conclusion as to any accountability of any accountable
employee or official of the Philippine Government.
Auditors and comptrollers, as accounting officers, are generally regarded as
quasi-official officers. They perform mere ministerial duties only in cases
where the sum due is conclusively fixed by law or pursuant to law. Except in
such cases, the action of the accounting officers upon claims coming before
them for settlement and certification of balances found by them to be due, is
not ministerial merely but judicial and discretionary.
For the courts to require an auditor to allow or disallow a claim against or in
favor of the Government would be to substitute the courts as the auditing
officers of the Government. Such a result was not contemplated by a law,
which conferred upon another department of the Government the final and
exclusive jurisdiction to consider claims.
Therefore, the writ of mandamus cannot be used to control the judgment and
discretion of an officer in the decision of a matter which the law gave him the
power and imposed upon him the duty to decide for himself.
Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93661, September 4, 1991.
Nachura Doctrine: In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, 201
SCRA 299, the Supreme Court said that while mandamus will not lie to
control discretion, the writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion, but
not the discretion itself.
Syllabus: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; NOT AVAILABLE TO
CONTROL DISCRETION. — It is settled that mandamus is not available to
control discretion. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion
but not the discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but
not specific action where the act sought to be performed involves the
exercise of discretion.
FACTS:
 UCPB entered into a Contract to Sell to Sharp International
Marketing, the agreement to be converted into a Deed of Absolute
Sale upon payment by the latter of the full purchase price of
K. JORGIO
P3,183,333.33. On May 14, 1988, even before it had acquired the
land, the petitioner offered to sell to the Government for
P56,000,000.00, (later increased to P65,000,000.00). The offer was
processed, resulting in the recommendation by the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution in the DAR for the acquisition of the
property at a price of P35,532.70 per hectare, or roughly
P67,000,000.00. Subsequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed between UCPB and Sharp by virtue of which the former
sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated consideration of
P3,183,333.33.
 DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines created a Compensation
Clearing Committee (CCC) to expedite processing of the papers
relating to the acquisition of the land and the preparation of the
necessary deed of transfer for signature by the DAR Secretary and
the LBP President. Eventually, The DAR Secretary Juico issued an
order directing the acquisition of the estate for the recommended
amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to Sharp.
 On January 9, 1989, Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale. However, the LBP President Vistan
discovered that Sharp had acquired the property from UCPB for
only P3.1 million, requested Secretary Juico to reconsider his
December 29, 1988 order. As a result, Vistan informed Juico that
LBP would not pay the stipulated purchase price Sharp then filed a
petition for mandamus with this court to compel the DAR and LBP
to comply with the contract. This Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed it.
 The petitioners are now back with this Court, this time to question
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. WON there is a perfected agreement between the petitioners and
the Government.
2. WON the petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel
the LBP President to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.
3. WON the LBP President has the authority to refuse to sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
HELD:
1. NO. There is no perfected agreement between the petitioners
and the Government.
R.A. 6657, Sec. 18, "the LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the
DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided in Secs. 16
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 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land."
Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no
contract between Sharp and the Government. The Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was incomplete and
therefore had no binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot
claim any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition
for mandamus.
2. NO. The petitioners are not entitled to a writ of mandamus to
compel the LBP President to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale
since the Deed of Absolute Sale had no binding effect.
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus
to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is
concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue
to control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties,
that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise
of discretion to act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a
specific application
3. YES. The LBP President has the authority to refuse to sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
The Court ruled that the act required of the LBP President is not
merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion. The LBP
has the discretion to agree on the amount stated in the DAS, after
its review and evaluation because it becomes its duty to sign the
deed. But not until then. For, it is only in that event that the amount
to be compensated shall have been "established' according to law.
In this case, the compensation to be approved was not trifling but
amounted to as much as P62 million of public funds, to be paid in
exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier
for only P3 million. Thus, in the exercise of such power of review
and evaluation, it results that the amount of P62,725,077.29 being
claimed by petitioner is not the "amount to be established by the
government." Consequently, it cannot be the amount that LBP is by
law bound to compensate petitioner.
Asuncion vs. De Yriarte
G.R. No. 9321, September 24, 1914
K. JORGIO
DOCTRINES: (1) Judgment is a judicial function, the determination
of a question of law. There is only one way to be right. Discretion is
the faculty conferred upon a court or other officer by which he may
decide either way and still be right. (2) Simply because the duties of
an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow
that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine
questions of law.
FACTS: The chief of the division of archives, the respondent,
refused to file the articles of incorporation, hereinafter referred to,
upon the ground that the object of the corporation, as stated in the
articles, was not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of Act
No. 1459, they were not registerable.
The proposed incorporators began an action in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to compel the chief of the division of
archives to receive and register said articles of incorporation and to
do any and all acts necessary for the complete incorporation of the
persons named in the articles. The court below found in favor of the
defendant and refused to order the registration of the articles
mentioned, maintaining ad holding that the defendant, under the
Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the sufficiency of
the form of the articles and the legality of the object of the proposed
corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment.
ISS
UE:
Wh LOPO – Salary and Requisites
eth
er or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under
the Corporation for registration, to decide not only as to the
sufficiency of the form of the articles, but also as to the lawfulness
of the purpose of the proposed corporation
RULING: YES. Simply because the duties of an official happens to
be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may not, in the
administration of his office, determine questions of law. The
Supreme Court is of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of
archives, when articles of incorporation are presented for
registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as
expressed in the articles are lawful. We do not believe that, simply
because articles of incorporation presented foe registration are
perfect in form, the division of archives must accept and register
them and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no
7
 matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in
the articles. We do not believe it was intended that the division of
archives should issue a certificate of incorporation to, and thereby
put the seal of approval of the Government upon, a corporation
which was organized for base of immoral purposes. The Court is of
the opinion that he may be mandamused if he acts in violation of
law or if he refuses, unduly, to comply with the law. While we have
held that defendant has power to pass upon the lawfulness of the
purposes of the proposed corporation and that he may, in the
fulfilment of his duties, determine the question of law whether or not
those purposes are lawful and embraced within that class
concerning which the law permits corporations to be formed, that
does not necessarily mean, as we have already intimated, that his
duties are not ministerial. On the contrary, there is no
incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are
ministerial and that he has no authority to exercise discretion in
receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise
judgment — that is, the judicial function — in the determination of
the question of law referred to, but he may not use discretion.
If, therefore, the defendant erred in determining the question
presented when the articles were offered for registration, then that
error will be corrected by this court in this action and he will be
compelled to register the articles as offered. If, however, he did not
commit an error, but decided that question correctly, then, of
course, his action will be affirmed to the extent that we will deny the
relief prayed for.
Yap v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010
DOCTRINE: Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of
salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (1) be
authorized by law, and (2) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in relation
to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use directly available
to the general public as a matter of right. the disbursement of public funds,
salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be
granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be
commensurate with services rendered. Compensation and benefits of public
officers are not intended purely for the benefit of officers; neither does
payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfy the public purpose
requirement. This theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that
government officers and employee may be paid enormous sums without limit
K. JORGIO
or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being
paid to someone employed by the government.
FACTS: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department
Manager of the National Development Company (NDC), a government-
owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was appointed by
the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC
as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991 while remaining as a
regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to
honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and
various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit,
the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr.
Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellants
appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department
Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned
allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the
proscription contained in Sec.7 (2) and Sec.8, Art. IX-B of the Constitution.
Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the
questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors. CAO
II affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors findings. Unperturbed, petitioner
sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA arguing
that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his
office and was also authorized by law, namely EO No. 284. Respondent
COA denied appeal and upheld the CAO IIs. Furthermore, it also ruled that
the said allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass
the test of public purpose requirement of the law. It is likewise necessary that
said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Sec.4 of
PD No. 1445 on the use of government funds (Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines).
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose
requirement in affirming the questioned disallowances
RULING: NO. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds
means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a
matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as
benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is directly
related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not
limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is
strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In fact,
this Court has already categorically stated that the term public purpose is not
defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. Public use is now equated with public interest, and that it is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
8
persons. In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of
public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees
should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services
rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees
must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional
allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the
fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and
employees. Petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of public
officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that
the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the
public purpose requirement is wrong. That theory would lead to the
anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid
enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than
that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government.
Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all
times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.
Gloria v. CA
G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999
DOCTRINE: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees which are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation under Sec.
51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal, and after review, the
respondent is exonerated under Sec, 47 of the same Code. No
compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending
investigation, but only for the period of preventive suspension pending
appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.
FACTS: This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged
by public school teachers on different dates in September and October 1990.
Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in
September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not
report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged and
placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded
before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were
found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered
dismissed, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and
Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months. Respondent
Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which
found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
imposed on him a six-month suspension. The other respondents also
K. JORGIO
appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was dismissed because of their
failure to file their appeal memorandum on time.
The CSC affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but
found the other guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this
Court. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the CSC with respect
to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but reversing it
insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor Margallo.
Petitioner contends that the continued suspension of private respondents is
due to their appeal, hence, the government should not be held answerable
for payment of their salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so much store by the
fact that, under the law, private respondents are considered under
preventive suspension during the period of their appeal and, for this reason,
are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not is an employee entitled to the payment of salaries
during the period of suspension
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that as already stated, the Court of
Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries,
allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive
suspension. In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the
preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of
preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is
exonerated. Although employees who are preventively suspended pending
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are
exonerated, the Court does not agree with the government that they are not
entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending
investigation, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining
authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand,
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in
effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be
reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, the
respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his
conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
9

Constantino-David v. Pagandaman-Gania
G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003
DOCTRINE: The Court has, time and again, held that an illegally dismissed
government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back
wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up
to his reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be applied, for
such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making. To withhold her
back salaries and benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service.
FACTS: Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State University
(MSU). She has been holding this position after the confirmation of her
appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. Special Order
No. 477-P dated 28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes
Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the alleged expiration
of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work. She verified the
status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. Respondent
immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of the
termination of her employment. In Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May
2000 the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged
absence without official leave from the time she was removed from her post
in September 1998 as a result of Special Order No. 477-P. Upon
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her removal from
office as illegal and ordered here reinstatement but disallowed the payment
of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the illegal
dismissal. However, MSU refused to employ her back.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the right to back salaries
RULING: YES. The Court held that an illegally dismissed government
employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his
reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having
left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of
his reinstatement. Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or
to render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time
of her reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be applied to
her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking
even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal
K. JORGIO
and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other
benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service.
Galang v. LBP
G.R. No. 175276, May 31, 2011
DOCTRINE: When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his
reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered
as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held. However, the
illegally-terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited
only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his
illegal termination up to his reinstatement.
FACTS: These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by
Isabelo L. Galang and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). Isabelo L.
Galang, the Branch Manager of Land Bank Baliuag, Bulacan was charged
with Dishonesty, Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, Gross Neglect of Duty, Violation of Rules and Regulations, and
Receiving for Personal Use a Fee, Gift or Other Valuable Thing in the
Course of Official Duties or in Connection Therewith when such Fee is Given
by Any Person in the Hope or Expectation of Receiving a Favor or Better
Treatment than that Accorded Other Persons or Committing Acts Punishable
Under the Anti-Graft Laws. Along with Galang, the borrowers also charged
Conrado Ocampo, a Project Analyst in the same branch, for his alleged
participation in soliciting money from them.
The Hearing Officer of Land Bank issued a Joint Resolution dismissing both
charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, Landbank recommended
Galang and Ocampos dismissal to the Board of Directors. The Board of
Directors approved Del Rosario’s recommendation but modified the penalty
to forced resignation with forfeiture of all benefits. Aggrieved, Galang and
Ocampo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The
MSPB sustained the penalty imposed upon Galang and Ocampo but with
modifications. Galang was reinstated in the payroll on August 16, 2001.
However, on December 14, 2001, Galang wrote Land Banks President,
Margarito Teves, complaining that he has yet to receive Personnel Economic
Relief Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA),
Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. He claimed that since this Court found
Land Banks petition for certiorari to be a mere afterthought, he should have
been reinstated on October 1, 1997 after the fifteen (15)-day period to
appeal the Resolution dated September 5, 1997 had lapsed.
10

Galang also insisted that his back salaries be computed based on the
current salary rate prescribed for his previous position. Land Bank expressed
its willingness to pay Galang Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. It, however,
refused to include PERA and RATA as part of his back salaries for 1990 to
1995. When the case reached the CA, the appellate court declared Galang
entitled to PERA, RATA and other benefits attached to his position.
However, it upheld his reinstatement on August 16, 2001 and sustained the
computation of his back wages based on the prevailing rate at the time of his
dismissal. The motions for reconsideration respectively filed by Galang and
Land Bank were likewise denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated October 25, 2006.
ISSUE: What should be the basis of computing Galang’s back salaries?
RULING: Reinstatement is defined as the issuance of an appointment to a
person who has been previously appointed to a position in the career service
and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated
therefrom, or to the restoration of one who has been exonerated of the
administrative charges filed against him. In the present case, Galang was
absolved of the administrative charges against him. Upon motion, the
appellate court ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his back
salaries for five years. It is settled that an illegally terminated civil service
employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five
years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his
reinstatement. Hence, in Galang’s case, he is entitled to back salaries from
July 1990 to June 1995. This is not disputed by the parties. Rather, the
uncertainty centers on when he should be reinstated. Galang was reinstated
in Land Bankss payroll on August 16, 2001. He argues, however, that he
should be reinstated on October 1, 1997, after the fifteen (15)-day period to
appeal the Resolution dated September 5, 1997 had lapsed.
Balitaoasan v. Secretary of DECS
G.R. No. 138238, September 2, 2003
DOCTRINE: Where reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an
act of liberality by the Court of Appeals, the claim for back wages for the
period during which the employee was not allowed to work must be denied.
The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if
he has not rendered any service–no work, no pay. Since petitioner did not
render any service during the period for which he is now claiming his
salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the payment thereof.
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Balitaosan was among the public school
teachers who were dismissed by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño for
K. JORGIO
ignoring the return to work order while participating in the teacher's mass
strike at Liwasang Bonifacio from September to October, 1990.
Records reveal that an administrative complaint was filed against petitioner,
together with a certain Dalangin Sarmiento and Filomeno Rafer, charging
them with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the
Civil Service Law and Rules of Reasonable Office Regulations, refusal to
perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best
interests of the service and absence without leave.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CSC but the appeal and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied. Petitioner then
sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari which
yielded positive results, obtaining for petitioner an order of reinstatement
without, however, any award of backwages in his favour.
Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to backwages.
RULING: NO. The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service. No work, no pay. Since
petitioner did not render any service during the period for which he is now
claiming his salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the
payment thereof. The fact is that petitioner participated in the mass action
which in turn resulted in the filing of charges against him and his subsequent
dismissal later on. His reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an
act of liberality by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for
backwages for the period during which he was not allowed to work must be
denied.
REQUEST OF CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes
A.M. No. 91-6-007-CTA. December 21, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr, J.
DOCTRINE: In Borromeo vs. Civil Service Commission (199 SCRA 924
[1991]), the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to
be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in
favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes.”
Such interpretation in favor of the retiree is unfortunately not called for
nor warranted, where the clear intent of the applicable law and rules
are demonstrably against the petitioner's claim.
Petitioners: --
Respondents:--
11

FACTS:
 Judge Reyes was appointed Associate Judge of the Court of Tax
Appeals on July 31, 1980 and served as such until November 20, 1990.
Beginning November 21, 1990 until his retirement on November 24,
1991, he served as Presiding Judge of said court.
 In his letter request, Judge Reyes asks that, for purposes of his
compulsory retirement from judicial service under R.A. No. 910, the last
step increment of his salary grade be used in the computation of
his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits.
 Judge Reyes cites the Position Allocation List and a salary schedule
(Approved Salary Standardization), both issued by DBM; the Position
Allocation List, which took effect on July 1, 1989, issued pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, provides:
"SECTION 6. Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System.
— All positions in the government covered under Section 4 hereof shall
be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in
accordance with the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System
which shall be prepared by the DBM."
 Under the salary schedule, the salary received by Judge Reyes
corresponds to the first step increment.
 The Court Administrator did not favorably endorse such request,
citing Joint CSC and DBM Circular No. 1, issued on January 1,
1990:
". . . The Circular provides that Step Increments to be granted to
deserving officials and employees shall be based on two (2)
criteria; merit and length of service. MERIT, for those who have
rendered very satisfactory or outstanding performance in assigned
functions for two (2) consecutive rating periods; and LENGTH OF
SERVICE, for those who have rendered continuous satisfactory
service in a particular position for at least three years. Each
department or agency shall adopt its own system and procedure in
the recommendation, evaluation and approval of step increments.
A 2-step increment shall be given to officials and employees with
outstanding performance for two (2) consecutive rating periods.
Moreover, a 1-step increment shall be given to officials and
employees with very satisfactory performance for two (2)
consecutive rating periods and for those officials and employees
on the basis of length of service, for every three (3) years of
continuous satisfactory service in the position."
K. JORGIO
 To support his non-endorsement of Judge Reyes' request, the
Court Administrator gives the following reasons: (1) Section 4(d) of
the above-mentioned circular prohibits the grant of step
increments based on merit for retirement purposes; (2) the
longevity pay granted to judges under Section 42 of B.P. No. 129,
being given on the same premise as step increments based on
length of service, can no longer be given to judges; and (3) there is
no showing on record that Judge Reyes was given a step
increment on merit.
 Judge Reyes, in his Reply, invoked the doctrine of liberal
construction of retirement laws found in Borromeo v. Civil Service
Commission.
ISSUE: WON Judge Reyes’ appeal is meritorious
HELD:
 With respect to the grant of step increments based on merit for
retirement purposes, No.
 The doctrine in Borromeo v. CSC does not apply in this case, in view of
section 4 of Joint Circular No. 1, which provides:
"SECTION 4: Restrictions. — The following restrictions shall be observed in
the grant of step increments:
(d)No step increment based on merit shall be given to an official or
employee on the ground that he is retiring in the near future and for
purposes of enabling him to collect a higher retirement gratuity, except
as he may qualify in accordance with the criteria established under
these Rules."
 In Borromeo, the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that
retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law
should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian
purposes." Such interpretation in favor of the retiree is unfortunately not
called for nor warranted, where the clear intent of the applicable law and
rules are demonstrably against the petitioner's claim. Section 4 is
explicit and categorical in its prohibition and unfortunately for Judge
Reyes applies squarely to the instant case.
 The criteria of merit and length of service call for continuous service in a
particular position or assigned function for at least two consecutive
rating periods or three years, respectively. Judge Reyes has served as
Presiding Judge for only one year and three days. Step increments are
also proscribed if the purpose is to enable a higher retirement gratuity.
12
 Coming as it does after retirement, the request of Judge Reyes appears
to fall under the prohibition.
 With respect to the longevity pay of Judges under Section 42 of
B.P. 129, the Court Administrator believes the two are based on the
same premise. The SC did not necessarily sustain his position but
pending an actual case more squarely in point and the presentation of
more valid arguments based on factual and legal considerations, the SC
reserved a ruling on this issue for the future.
 In his Comment, the Solicitor General assails the validity of the Position
Allocation List issued by the DBM, upon the belief that said List provides
for the step increments for salary grades 30 to 33. He contends that "the
DBM does not possess quasi-legislative power so as to amend what is
clearly provided for by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758, nor does DBM
possess quasi-judicial power so as to interpret a void in the law and fill it
up, i.e., provide for the absence in Section 7 of any provision for rates
beyond step one for salary grade 30."
 The Position Allocation List does not provide for step increments for
salary grade 30. Rather, it is Section 3 of Circular No. 1 which provides
the mechanism for computing such step increments. Nowhere in the
Solicitor General's Comment is Joint Circular No. 1, s. 1990 mentioned.
 The Solicitor-General gives no basis for the discrimination. There
appears to be no valid justification for salary Grades 1 to 29 to be given
eight (8) step increments and for Salary Grades 30 to 33 to be denied
the same benefit. On the contrary, larger step increments and salary
escalations for top officials as compared to rank and file or clerical and
manual workers are sound and established management practices in
big business and industry. The government is the biggest enterprise in
the Philippines.
 To give a detailed pronouncement on the contentions of the Solicitor
General calls for a specific ruling on the quasi-legislative powers of the
Department of Budget and Management. Such a ruling is not necessary
under the facts of this particular case. We likewise reserve it for a case
more in point.
 WHEREFORE, the request of Court of Tax Appeals Presiding Judge
Alex Z. Reyes that the last step of salary Grade 30 be used as the basis
for the computation of his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits is
regretfully DENIED. The Court Administrator is, however, ordered to
prepare and present to the Court a plan providing for merit step
increments for deserving members of the Judiciary.
Profeta v. Drilon
G.R. No. 104139. December 22, 1992
Padilla, J.
K. JORGIO
DOCTRINE: Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes
of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced.
Petitoners: LYDIA M. PROFETA
Respondents: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines
FACTS:
 Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal
Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978.
From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the appointed
Acting President of said College until her promotion to President of the
same college on 1 May 1979.
 On March 5, 1986, she resigned as President of RTC, and the same
was accepted on 21 March. A day before the acceptance of her
courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sick leave.
 On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of
Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology
(hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its
President on 29 March 1989.
 After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989,
petitioner inquired from GSIS as to whether she may be allowed to
extend her services with the government as President of EARIST
beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-
age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146. In answer to her query,
petitioner was advised to return to the service until she shall have
fulfilled 15 year service requirement The GSIS declared that petitioner
was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered
the sufficient number of years of service on the date of her supposed
retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was only
twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only
claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly
compensation for every year of creditable service or to a refund of her
premium contributions with the GSIS.
 On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the DECS Secretary and the
Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner
as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required
fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65)
years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an
13
 additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12)
days.
 In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an
administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
President (OP), for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and
corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, OP
furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an
answer thereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to
conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending
investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. After serving the period of
suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President
of EARIST.
 In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Carino recommended
the compulsory retirement of petitioner.
 For investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, an Ad-
Hoc Committee was created by President Aquino on 12 February 1991,
but the OP dismissed the complaint in a decision dated 23 October
1991|| for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office
of the President also declared petitioner as compulsorily retired from
government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:
". . . (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3
months) were to be added to the respondent's creditable service, together
with the period of two (2) weeks which the respondent's counsel admits in
his Memorandum the respondent had served as Professorial Lecturer, the
respondent should be considered as compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15,
1991, having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about the
said date after reaching the age of 65.
 A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the OP,
assailing the portion of its decision declaring her as compulsorily retired
from the service as of 15 October 1991, alleging that the said office has
no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the
government service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OP is correct in ruling that petitioner is
compulsory retired (NO)
HELD:
 It is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age
pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its computation of a
member's years of service with the government. The computation of a
member's service includes not only full time but also part time and other
K. JORGIO
services with compensation as may be included under the rules and
regulations prescribed by the System.
 The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20
March to 17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer of
approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be
considered as part of her service with the government and it is only but
proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period of
service.
 The SC have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of
petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-
half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her
service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be
considered retired on 30 April 1992.
 The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for
allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of 16
October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should have been allowed to
continue in the service to be able to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement; she was prepared to render services for said
period but was not allowed to do so; she should, therefore, be entitled to
all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during said period (16
October 1991 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for
reinstatement to her former position to enable her to complete the fifteen
(15) year service requirement for retirement purposes is no longer
possible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said
service requirement as of 30 April 1992.
 WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President
dated 23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of
15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby declared to have
been in the service as President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until
30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other
emoluments of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In
addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for
having reached age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of
service to her credit, subject to her compliance with all applicable
regulations and requirements of the GSIS.
GSIS v. Fernando de Leon
G.R. No. 186560, November 17, 2010
Nachura, J.
14

DOCTRINE: Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's
loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the employee
enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to worry
about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature of
"retained wages" of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent
people to enter the government service; and to permit them to retire from the
service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their
vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or
accident.
Petitoners: GSIS
Respondents: Fernando de Leon
FACTS:
 Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the
government. He applied for retirement under RA No. 910, which
provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. The
application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine
years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until
2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension.
 Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension
because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed
GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910;
that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that
having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle
respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS
stopped the payment of respondent’s monthly pension.
 Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying
that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and
to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. He also asked that GSIS
and the DBM be ordered to pay him damages. The CA granted the
petition and ordered GSIS to pay without delay petitioner Atty. Fernando
de Leon, his monthly adjusted pension in accordance with other
applicable law not under RA 910. It is also ordered to pay the back
pensions which should also be adjusted to conform to the applicable law
from the time his pension was withheld. The CA in its decision held that
that it was not respondent’s fault that he was allowed to avail of the
benefits under R.A. No. 910; and that, even if his retirement under that
law was erroneous, respondent was, nonetheless, entitled to a monthly
pension under the GSIS Act. The CA held that this was not a case of
double retirement, but merely a continuation of the payment of
respondent’s pension benefit to which he was clearly entitled.
K. JORGIO
 In its petition, GSIS contends that DBM refused to remit the funds for
respondent’s pension claiming he was not entitled to retire under R.A.
No. 910 and should have retired under another law, without however
specifying which law it was. Respondent sought to convert his
retirement under R.A. No. 910 to one under another law administered by
GSIS. However, this conversion was not allowed because, as GSIS
avers, R.A. No. 8291 provides that conversion of one’s retirement mode
on whatever ground and for whatever reason is not allowed beyond one
year from the date of retirement. It further contended that it relied on the
memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel’s opinion that respondent, not being a judge,
was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910.
 GSIS assails the CA’s Decision for not specifying under which law
respondent’s retirement benefits should be paid, thus making it legally
impossible for GSIS to comply with the directive.
 Respondent argues that allowing him to retire under another law does
not constitute "conversion" as contemplated in the GSIS law. He avers
that his application for retirement under R.A. No. 910 was duly approved
by GSIS, endorsed by the DOJ, and implemented by the DBM for
almost a decade. Thus, he should not be made to suffer any adverse
consequences owing to the change in the interpretation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 910. Moreover, he could not have applied for
conversion of his chosen retirement mode to one under a different law
within one year from approval of his retirement application, because of
his firm belief that his retirement under R.A. No. 910 was proper – a
belief amply supported by its approval by GSIS, the favorable
endorsement of the DOJ, and its implementation by the DBM
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has a clear legal right to the
reinstatement of his retirement benefits. (YES)
HELD:
 The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be
liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement laws, in
particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because
their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and,
hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to
earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and
well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed,
retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of
the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
15
 Respondent’s disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under
R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any
retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law.
 The CA, however, incorrectly held that respondent was covered by R.A.
No. 8291. R.A. No. 8291 became a law after respondent retired from
government service. Hence, petitioner and even respondent agree that
it does not apply to respondent, because the law took effect after
respondent’s retirement.
 Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees
who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option
to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146.
 In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire
under P.D. No. 1146, since this law provides for higher benefits, and
because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in
1992
 Also, PD 1146 specifically mandates that a retiree is entitled to monthly
pension for life. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the
government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere
gratuity but form part of compensation.
 Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements,
he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due
process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus,
a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No
law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process
of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
 It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire
under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
 One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for
relying on petitioner’s interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws,
considering that the latter is tasked to administer the government’s
retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel
knew what they were doing.
 Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent,
he cannot be prejudiced by the same. His right to receive monthly
pension from the government cannot be jeopardized by a new
interpretation of the law.
 Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and
service to the employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy
the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to worry
about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature
of "retained wages" of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice
K. JORGIO
competent people to enter the government service; and to permit them
to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who
have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
 As to GSIS’ contention that what respondent seeks is conversion of his
retirement mode, which is prohibited under R.A. No. 8291, the Court
agrees with the CA that this is not a case of conversion within the
contemplation of the law. The conversion under the law is one that is
voluntary, a choice to be made by the retiree. Here, respondent had no
choice but to look for another law under which to claim his pension
benefits because the DBM had decided not to release the funds needed
to continue payment of his monthly pension.
 Given the fact that respondent is ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910,
the refund by GSIS of respondent’s premium payments was erroneous.
Hence, GSIS can demand the return of the erroneous payment or it may
opt to deduct the amount earlier received by respondent from the
benefits which he will receive in the future. Considering its expertise on
the matter, GSIS can device a scheme that will facilitate either the
reimbursement or the deduction in the most cost-efficient and beneficial
manner.
 While this case was pending, the Congress enacted Republic Act No.
10071, the Prosecution Service Act of 2010, Section 24 of which
provides:
Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and
16 hereof shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of
this Act.
 By virtue of this express provision, respondent is covered by R.A. No.
10071. In addition, he is now entitled to avail of the benefits provided by
Section 23, that "all pension benefits of retired prosecutors of the
National Prosecution Service shall be automatically increased whenever
there is an increase in the salary and allowance of the same position
from which he retired."
 Respondent, as former Chief State Prosecutor, albeit the position has
been renamed "Prosecutor General,"should enjoy the same retirement
benefits as the Presiding Justice of the CA, pursuant to Section 14 of
R.A. No. 10071, to wit:
Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor
General. - The Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries,
allowances, emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the
same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same
retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.34
16
 Furthermore, respondent should also benefit from the application of
Section 16 of the law, which states:
Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors,
and other Prosecution Officers. – x x x.
Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or
retirement benefits or any upgrading of the grades or levels thereof of
any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein to whom said
emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding
prosecutors.
 Lastly, and most importantly, by explicit fiat of R.A. No. 10071, members
of the National Prosecution Service have been granted the retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 910, to wit:
 Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and all other benefits that may be
extended by the way of amendment thereto shall likewise be given to
the prosecutors covered by this Act.
 Hence, from the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 10071, respondent
should be entitled to receive retirement benefits granted under R.A. No.
910.
 Consequently, GSIS should compute respondent’s retirement benefits
from the time the same were withheld until April 7, 2010 in accordance
with P.D. No. 1146; and his retirement benefits from April 8, 2010
onwards in accordance with R.A. No. 910.
Rabor v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995
Feliciano, J.
DOCTRINE: a government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet
completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section
11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be
granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service
requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension
was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. The
Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and
ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. The Court went on to
rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in
respect of retirement statutes. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally
unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances
which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted
to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. The first
administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series
K. JORGIO
of 1990, which states in part, "Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement
for retirement all be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1)
year." The second administrative issuance — Memorandum Circular No. 65
of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 — provides: 'Officials or
employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons
in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.' Medialdea, J.
resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative
regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No.
27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum
Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
The SC concluded that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby
modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government
agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or
disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15)
years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
Petitoners: DIONISIO M. RABOR
Respondents: CSC
FACTS:
 Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the
Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility
worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
 in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Rabor to apply for retirement, since he had already reached the
age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13)
years and one (1) month of government service.
 He responded to this advice by exhibiting a GSIS Certificate of
Membership bearing the phrase "Service extended to comply 15 years
service reqts."
 The CSC Regional Office informed that the extension of services of Mr.
Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the
relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted:
17
 Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years shall not be retained the service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6)
months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr.
Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extendible
 Mayor Duterte then advised Rabor to stop working, pursuant to the
CSC’s letter.
 Rabor requested for the extension of his services in the City
Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years’
service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of
the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the
Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years.
Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the
duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker, but the request
was denied by the Regional Director of CSC. Rabor affirmed to the
Office of the President, which referred his request to the Chairman of
the CSC, who denied the same, reiterating M.C. No. 65 invoked in the
CSC’s letter.
 Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration to CSC and asked for reinstatement
with back salaries and benefits, having been separated from the
government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
 Petitioner Rabor sent another letter to Mayor Duterte, requesting that he
be allowed to continue rendering service in order to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was
once more denied by Mayor Duterte, In this letter, pointing out that,
under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the
part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension
requested because, as he was already nearing his 70th birthday he may
no longer be able to perform the duties attached to the position, and
also, the position was already filled up.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rabor should be allowed to extend his services in
order to comply with the 15 years requirement, by virtue of the Cena ruling
(NO)
HELD:
 The SC ruled first by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
 Cena Case
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of
Malabon, Metropolitan Manila. Before reaching his 65th birthday, for his
total years in the service will just be 11 years and 9 months bythen,
K. JORGIO
Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his
service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to
retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would complete
fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of
sixty-eight (68) years. CSC affirmed his request but for 1 year only so he
filed an appeal to the SC and the SC granted his request. Thus the court
concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire
with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the
"plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-Age Pension shall
be paid to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement
shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with
at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than
fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the
service to completed the fifteen (15) years.
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there
were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe
limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age; the Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990 and Memorandum Circular
No. 65 of the Office of the President. The former limits the extension for
only three years and the latter, only on meritorious reasons, limits up to
6 months only. And Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the
above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering
as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly,
by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No.
65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. Medialdea, J
wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in
the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the
18
 principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions . . . The rule on limiting to one the year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15)
years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to
be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the
law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service
Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
 The question therefore boils down as to whether the ruling, regarding
the validity of CSC M.C No. 27, in the case of Cena can be used as a
basis for granting Rabor’s request. The Court ruled in the negative.
 It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed
and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion)
for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the
inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that
makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies
so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is
a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative
regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
 Like what Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in the ruling of People v.
Exconde case:
 It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes
 The SC also considered that the enabling statute that should
appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law — found in
the Administrative Code of 1987 — and not alone P.D. No. 1146,
otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
K. JORGIO
1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have
reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both
statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146.
 It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting
as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to
promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive
and effective personnel administration in the government." It was also
discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for
government officials and employees" and of "evaluating qualifications
for retirement."
 In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987
Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the
development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the
Civil Service" and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the
effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employees"
 The SC found it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible
extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65)
years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the
foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological
and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings
are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be
expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which
guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension
of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-
Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:
 Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service
Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer
than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the
government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter
the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of
next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment
of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the
various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by
"extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but
are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years
so they may qualify for old-age pension.
 The SC concluded that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby
modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
19
 accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government
agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or
disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years
of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990.
 Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to this case, the
SC held that CSC Resolution dismissing the appeal of Rabor must be
upheld and affirmed.

K. JORGIO 20