How Not to Deconstruct a

Dominican: Derrida on God

and "Hypertruth"
Ian Almond

Godis not perhapsso mucha regionbeyondknowledge,as something

priorto thesentenceswe speak.
-Foucault, TheOrderof Things(cited in Marion 1994:570)

The debate between negative theology and deconstruction, in all its

variants,has been going on for some time now (Has deconstruction,once
so confidently anti-theological,actuallybeen pre-empted by a series of
medievalthinkers?Does negativetheology conform to a "metaphysicsof
presence"?Do thinkers such as Dionysius and Eckhart reallyextol an
utterlyunknowableGod?).'As followersof the debatewill be aware,Der-
rida still sees MeisterEckhartand the discourseof negativetheology,even
in its most apophatic of moments, as the keeper of a secret. In fairness
to Derrida, his insistence upon the subtle yet inherent logocentrism in
Eckhartand Dionysius has not been dogmatic, a blind sticking-to-one's-
guns.2In essaysdevoted exclusivelyto the apophaticprojectsuch as "De-
nials" (1987) and "Post-Scriptum"(1993) Derrida takes great pains to

IanAlmondteachesEnglishLiterature
atErciyesUniversity,
Kayseri,
Turkey.
1 See,amongstothers,KevinHart'sTrespass of theSign(1989)notto mentionhis morerecent
essayin PhilipBlond'sPost-secular
Philosophy (1998),HaroldCoward's anthologyDerridaandNega-
tiveTheology (1992),andalsoa recentarticlebyCarlson(1998)on theunspeakability of God/death in
Derrida/Blanchot andEckhart/Porete,"ThePovertyandPoetryof Indiscretion."
2 Fora differentandsomewhathostileversionof Derrida'sreluctanceto acknowledge theopen-
nessandnon-logocentricity of negativetheology,see MornyJoy's"DivineReservations" (Coward:
255-283),whichpaintsanamusingly originalbutslightlybizarrepictureof a solitary,prodigalskep-
tic,unwillingto returnoncemoreto thehomeof hisJewishheritage: "Derrida remainsonthethresh-
old. He cannotcomehome-though it seemshe is enticed,fascinated.Derridais the exile,the
outsider... Lashedto the mastheadof reason,he will not succumbto the sirensongof experi-
ence"(263).

Journal of the AmericanAcademyof ReligionJune2000 Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 329-344

@2000 The AmericanAcademyof Religion

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
330 Journalof the AmericanAcademyof Religion

point out his admirationfor the corpusof negativetheology-a "corpusat

once open and closed,"andwrittenin a language"thatdoes not ceasetest-
ing the verylimits of language"(quine cessede mettrea l'dcpreuve leslimites
memedu langage[Coward:295, 299; Derrida 1993:55]).Awareof claims
that he is subscribing(as Kevin Hart has said) to an orthodox, "classic"
versionof negativetheology-a versionthatwould simplybe the negative
half of a Hegelian dialectic-Derrida has been keen to distance himself
from a naive readingof Eckhartand Dionysius and to acknowledgethe
complexityand difficultyof theirthought.
Such an acknowledgment,however,has not led Derridato withdraw
his basic-and long-abiding-objection to negativetheology:that, after
all its negations, de-negations, and auto-deconstructions,the apophatic
is still concernedwith (to use Foucault'sphrase) a region beyond knowl-
edge. It still keeps "in reserve... some hyperessentiality"(elle semblerd-
server... quelquesuressentialitd) and therebyultimatelyre-affirmsthe on-
totheologic (Coward: 77; Derrida 1987,540). What I want to do in this
article is, first of all, to examine the various ways in which Derridahas
strengthenedand elaboratedhis position on negativetheology-in par-
ticularon MeisterEckhart;and, secondly,to show how the versionof Eck-
hart Derrida rejects as logocentric, although by no means a simplistic,
"classical"model of the negativetheologian,remainsneverthelessa selec-
tive readingof his work,basedon a certainnumberof the more orthodox,
"safer"moments in his sermons,as opposed to other passagesthatwould
be less easilyappropriatedinto a metaphysicsof presence.
In the original discussion following Derrida's1971 lecture "LaDif-
f6rance,"BriceParainwas one of the firstto stand up and declare:"[Dif-
fdrance]isthe source of everythingand one cannot know it. It is the God
of negative theology."3Derrida'spassionate response, both interrupting
and interrupted,does tell us somethingabout the depth of his conviction:
"It is and is not-it is above all not-... ."Why does Derridarefuse to
exceptfiguressuch as Eckhartand Dionysiusfromhis critiqueof the logo-
centric tradition?Why, for Derrida, will deconstruction alwaysremain
analogousto negativetheologybut alwaysmaintainan "infinitedistance"
from it?
Derrida'sobjectionsto the apophaticdiscourse,fleshedout in his two
later essays,are four in number:firstly (and most importantly),the dis-

3 Taken from"TheOriginalDicussionof 'LaDiff~rance"' in Wood(1988).StephenMoore,cit-

remarkin hisPoststructuralism
ingParain's andtheNewTestament (1994),addssomewhat flippantly:
"Perhaps he hadwandered in lateor,morelikely,fallenasleep.Severalpagesintohispaper,Derrida
hadalreadysaidof diffirance.. ."(23).If anauthor's
disclaimer is enoughto dissuadeMoorefrom
thinkingonethingabouttheauthor's textinsteadof another,thenperhapshisownrationalfaculties
havefallenasleep.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 HowNot toDeconstruct
Almond: a Dominican 331

courseof negativetheologymanifestsitself in the form of a promise-the

promise to impart a secret, to unveil a mystery,a promise that defers as
much as it refers.Secondly,the frequentinsistencein negativetheologyon
the necessityof purity-one must be pure in orderto receivethe secret,in
orderto be worthyof the promise-also arousesDerrida'ssuspicionsof a
self-presentidentity.Thirdly,such discoursesarealwaysdirected-Derrida
notes how both Dionysius and Eckhartbegin and end their writingswith
prayers,as though to "orient"the addresstowardsits correctdestination
and not just "anywhere."Such an insistence on purity and preparation,
saysDerrida(fourthly),ultimatelyprovokesa prohibitionof all discourse,
a theology that exhorts silence and commandsnot to speak.For Derrida,
all four of these motifs in negativetheology-the promise of the secret,
the guiding prayer,the purity of the reception, and the silencing inef-
fable-are characteristicof logocentricdiscourses.

1. THE PROMISE OF THE SECRET

To begin with the secret. In Eckhart'swritings, writes Derrida, "one
may saythat no mysteryis made of the necessityof the secret,"a fact that
implies finding "theplace properto the experienceof the secret"(le lieu
proprea l'experiencedu secret[Coward:89; Derrida1987:552]).Therecan
be no denyingthat, in certainpassages,Eckhartdoes indeed speakof the
Godhead in terms of a secret-or as Derridawould say,a hyperessenti-
ality kept foreverin reserve."Godis a word: an unspokenword" (Got ist
ein wort,ein ungesprochenen wort),saysEckhartin Misit dominusmanum
suam (Davies: 128;Largier:564). The word 'secret/mystery'(Geheimnis)
occurs again in sermons such as Homo quidam nobilis-"the hidden
secretsof His hidden deity,""themysteryof the eternalGodhead"(Clarke:
216-217),which would seem to confirm Eckhartas the keeperof a secret.
All of the excerptsfrom Eckhartthat Derridacites-and Derridamakes
use of two sermons in particularin "Denials,"Quasistella matutinaand
Renovaminispiritu,are selectedwith this notion of a reservehyperessen-
tialityin mind:
ButwhenI saidthatGodis not a beingandis aboveBeing[iiberwesen],
I havenot deniedHim being [ich im niht wesenabgesprochen] but,
rather,I haveexaltedBeingin Him [ichhanesin imgehoehet].(78)
Goodnessis a garmentunderwhichGodis hidden,andthewillappre-
hendsGodunderthegarmentof goodness.(115)
Whenwe apprehend Godin Being,weapprehend Himin hisparvis[the
outer sanctuaryof the temple],for Beingis the parvisin which He
resides.(121)

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
332 Journalof the AmericanAcademyof Religion

"Isit arbitraryto still call truth or hyper-truththis unveilingwhich is per-

haps no longer an unveiling of Being?"asks Derrida. "I do not believe
so"(114). The selections from Eckhartthat Derridaquotes all reflectthis
notion of a hidden "hyper-truth"(sur-veritg). Whetherthe metaphoris the
nakednessof God that lies under the garmentor the penetraliumthat lies
in the inner sanctuaryof the temple,Derridais keento stressthe moments
in Eckhartwhere a hidden, greatertruth is concealedbeneaththe visible.
Hence, the faintlyFreudianirony of the essaytitle in English: "Denials."4
Negative theology vigorously denies what is secretly true. No surprise,
therefore,that Derridasees Eckhart'sdenial of onto-theology as an ulti-
mate affirmation.
Thus, Derridapresents a version of Eckhart,who, on the one hand,
"radicallycontests the tradition from which [he] seems to come"(con-
testeradicalementla traditiondont il sembleprovenir),but, on the other,
whose "hyperbole"still remains"faithfulto the originaryonto-theological
injunction"(fidele.... l'injonctiononto-thdologiqueoriginaire[Coward:
309;Derrida1993:78-79]).Althoughthe word "dialectic"does not appear,
it is a remarkthat reinforcesKevinHart'sassertionthat,to a certainextent,
Derrida'sunderstandingof Eckhartis still coloredby Hegel.This does not
mean that Derrida'sversionof Eckhartis invalid-but simplythatthereis
still anotherEckhart,one who can be constructedby citing differentpas-
sagesfrom the ones Derridapresentsto us in "Denials."
For example, Derrida has never cited or alluded to Eckhart'scele-
bratedprayer:"IaskGod to freeme of 'God"'(Her umbes6 biteichgot, daz
er mich ledicmachegotes [Davies:207; Largier:560])-a prayerin which
Eckhart'sattemptto de-limit 'God'-that is, to free God from 'God'-is
most clearlyexpressed.Eckhartattempts to free God from 'God' in the
sameway Derridawishes to free the text from the book. And yet it is a de-
limitationthat Derridacan only ever see as a deferral,a negation "in the
name of a way of truth."(Coward:310). To "defer"here would mean to
chain the "meaning"or illusory "presence"of a certain sign to another
one--the same old logocentric trick that, Derridainsists, western meta-
physicshas been playingsince Plato. If this were all Eckhart'sapophatics
amounted to-simply "pushing"God one proposition away from any-
thing we can say about Him-then Eckhartwould be no differentfrom
any of the other figures (Plato, Rousseau,Saussure)Derridahas decon-
structed. In contrast, to "de-limit"would be to refuse to hand on the
"meaning"of the inadequatesign onto a second one (a "hyperessential
God,"for example),but ratherto dispensewith the possibilityof meaning

4 I say "faintly,"
for Derridastresseshis wish to understandthe notion of denial"prioreven to its
elaborationin the Freudiancontext"(95).

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Almond:How Not to Deconstructa Dominican 333

completely-not to insist on a secret,an as yet undiscoveredname/image/

qualityof God, but ratherto invokea spacethat ultimatelyhas no names,
images, or quality.To de-limit God, in this sense, is truly to acknowledge
His infinitepossibility.
Of course, this is a gesture that Derrida is visibly reluctant to ac-
knowledge on Eckhart'spart. WhereverEckhartde-limits, Derridawill
alwayssuspect him of deferring.WheneverEckhartclaims to abandon
onto-theology, Derrida will always suspect him of really "savingit for
later."It is preciselythis conviction of Derrida's-that Dominicans can
deferbut they can'tde-limit, a conviction based on a selectivereadingof
Eckhart'sworks-which we are callinginto question.
Consideragain, for anotherexample, a key passagefrom the sermon
Nolite timereeos,a passageDerridahas never cited. Nolite timereis a ser-
mon Derridais fond of quoting-he cites a line from it in his essay on
Jabes (the first line of the passage below-see Derrida [1978:71]), and
again in his essay on Levinas(1978:146).Derridahas never mentioned,
however,the final and most important passage in this short, three-side
sermon:
God'becomes'Godwhenall creaturesspeakGodforth:there'God'is
born.WhenI was still in the ground,in the depths,in the flow and
sourceof the Godhead,no one askedmewhereI wishedto go orwhatI
wasdoing.Butas I flowedforth,all creaturesuttered'God.'... Thisis
howallcreatures speakof God.Andwhydo theynot speakof the God-
head?All thatis in the Godheadis One,andof this no-onecanspeak.
Godacts,whilethe Godheaddoesnot act.Thereis nothingforit to do,
thereis no actionin it.... Thedifference betweenGodandtheGodhead
is thatoneacts,theotherdoesnot.If I returnto 'God'butdo not remain
there,thenmy breakthrough is farbetterthanmy flowingout. ... But
when I enterthe ground,the bottom,the flow and the sourceof the
Godhead,no-one asksme whereI comefromandwhereI havebeen.
Thereno-onehasmissedme,andthereGod'unbecomes.'(Davies: 234)
God"becomes" and "unbecomes": By insistingon the nameless,silent non-
place beyond and before "God," Eckhart de-ontologizes God by robbing
Him of what Aquinas would have called "His highest name"-Being
(esse).Aquinas'svia eminentiae,we will recall,insisted that names could
be used of God, but in an imperfect manner.5God is denied the names
"Being""Love""Goodness"only to re-possessthem on a higherlevel,in
an infinitelyungraspableway-it is preciselythis idea of a Thomisthyper-
essentialitythat Derridawishes to attributeto Eckhart.While there are

5 Foran excellentsummaryof this,see McGinn's

introduction"Meister
Eckharton Speaking
aboutGod"(McGinn:15-30).

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
334 Journalof theAmericanAcademyof Religion

many passagesin both the Germanand LatinworkswhereEckhartwould

seem to agreewith his Dominican brother,the above-citedpassageis not
one of them. The Godheadbeyond God is the non-placewherenamesand
attributesare not re-affirmedbut dissolved.Concepts of God are not re-
formulatedbut dismantled.It is difficultto see how any kind of Hegelian
relive could breakthroughto the truthless, nameless abyss of the God-
head-or, indeed,what mannerof "hyperessentiality" it could everexpect
to find there.
For another example of a sermon that Derrida never mentions,
and yet which would underminethe re-assuring,re-affirmingversion of
Eckhartproposedin "Denials,"one could look at SurrexitautemSaulusde
terra.It is a sermon in many ways about nothingness, about the divine
nothingnessthat God is and the creaturelynothingnessthat createdthings
are. The subject is the moment after the blinding conversion of Saul on
the road to Damascus, taken from Acts 9:8 "Paulrose from the ground
and with open eyes saw nothing."Eckhart'ssermon deals with this word
"nothing"(nihil) in a varietyof ways, revealingat once an extraordinary
multiplicityof meanings:
It seemsto me thatthislittlephrasehasa fourfoldmeaning.First,when
he roseup fromthe ground,with open eyeshe sawnothing,andthis
nothingnesswas God.Indeedhe sawGod,andthatis whathe callsa
nothingness.Second,whenhe roseup, he sawnothingbut God.Third,
in allthings,he sawnothingbutGod.Fourth,whenhe sawGod,he saw
allthingsasa nothingness.
Michdiinket,daz diz wOrtelinviersinnehabe.Einsin ist:da er afstuontvon
der erden,mit ouffenenougensach er niht, und daz niht wasgot;d6 ergot
sach,daz heizeter ein niht.Der andersin:d6 er afstuont,d6 ensacher niht
wangot.Der vierde:d6 ergotsach,d6 sacher alliu dincals ein niht.(Schfir-
mann: 122;Largier:64)

HereEckhartmakesuse of the two kinds of nothingnessin his thought-

the inimitable,unspeakableno-thingnessof God and the creaturelynoth-
ingness of createdbeings whose entire existence depends on God. Eck-
hart'sunderstandingof God as a "nothingness"(ein niht) concerned a
God that is like no-thing. God'sradicalincommensurability,the fact that
there is literally(followingAvicenna'sdictum) no-thing that can be simi-
lar to God promptsEckhartto call Him a niht.Might not this nihtstill be
a Derridean"hyperessentiality"-or, more accurately,a "hypernullity"?
Whateverwe think or say or write about God, the secret of what He "is"
will alwaysbe different,will alwaysbe other.Is this not a classicexample
of the deferred"hyper-truth"? A second passagefrom the same sermon
shows us why this might not be so:

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Almond: a Dominican
HowNot toDeconstruct 335

Tosee [God]one mustbe blindandone mustdivestGodof everything

thatthereis. A mastersays:to speakof Godin anysimileis to speakof
him in an impuremode.Butwhoeverspeaksof Godthroughnothing-
nessspeaksof himto thepoint.
Whenthe mindpenetrates intothe One,enteringin puredereliction
of
[verworfenheit] itself,it findsGodas in a nothingness.A manhada
dream,a daydream: it seemedto himthathewasbigwithnothingnessas
a womanis with child.In this nothingness,Godwasborn.He wasthe
fruitof nothingness.Godwasbornin nothingness.Thisis whyit says:
"Paulrosefromthegroundandwithopeneyessawnothing."

... swerdaz sehensol, der muoz blint sin und muozgot al abnemenvon
ihte. Ein meistersprichet:swer von gote redet bi deheinerglichnisse,der
redetunlaterlichevon im. Der aberbi nihtevongote redet,der redeteigen-
lichevon im.
Swennediu sele kumetin ein und si ddinne tritetin ein laterverwor-
fenheit ir selber,ddvindet si got als in einem nihte. Ez dahte einen men-
schenals in einen troume-ez was ein wachendertroum-, wie ez swanger
wiirdevon nihte als eine vrouwemit einem kinde,und in dem nihte wart
got geborn;derwas diu vruhtdes nihtes.Gotwartgebornin dem nihte.Dd
vonspricheter:"erstuontrf von dererden,und mit ouffenenougensacher
niht."(Schtirmann:
126;Largier:
71)
We shall return to what Eckhart means by "impure mode" in a
moment.When Derridainsistedthat diff6rancewas unnameable,but "not
becauseour languagehas not yet found or receivedthis name"(1982:26),
he was distinguishingdiff6rancenot just from Heidegger'sBeingbut also
from the God of negativetheology.Diff6rance,Derridahas famouslysaid,
is older than both Being and God (1982: 22). Despite Eckhart'sfrequent
declarationthat God is nameless(namloz),Derridastill suspectsEckhart's
God of ultimatelypossessing a secret, originaryname, a secret identity:
"Torespond to the true name of God. ... It is to this end that the nega-
tive procedure refuses, denies, rejects all the inadequate attributions"
'
(. .. rdpondreau vrai nom de Dieu ... C'est cettefin que la procedure nega-
tive refuse, nie, rejettetoutes les attributions inadequates[Coward: 310; Der-
rida 1993: 82]). Despite passages such as the one cited, where Eckhart
presentsa God divested"of everythingthat there is"-a silent, nameless,
primordialnothingnessthat is the sourceof all names-Derrida still sees
in Eckhartthe return (relive) to a "hyper-truth,"one which would re-
inscribethe very attributesthat had been temporarily"denied."
There are eighty-three sermons in Quint's edition of the Deutsche
Werke-it is obviously not our intent to castigateDerridafor not having
quoted from everyone of them. Nor is the intention simply to label Der-
rida'sEckhart"wrong"or "incomplete"-onthe contrary,manyEckhart

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
336 Journalof the AmericanAcademyof Religion

scholarswould agreewith the dialecticalreadingof Eckhart'sdenegations.6

Our aim is simplyto point out how the body of Eckhart'stexts, to use Der-
rida'sown words, "definitivelyescapeany exhaustivetreatment"(se dero-
*
bent ddfinitivement toute exhaustion[Kamuf:173;Derrida 1972:183]).
There is no single Eckhartone can incontestablydeduce from the ser-
mons, no morethan thereis a singlenegativetheology,a fact Derridahim-
self acknowledgeson more than one occasion.7
As soon as Derridahas establishedhis logocentricreadingof Eckhart,
where the abyss of the Godhead would become the secret location of
the hyperessentialityof God, then the restof his objections-that negative
theology is obsessedwith purity,that it alwayscalls on prayerto guide its
discourses, and that its primary function is not to encouragediscourse
but to silence it-follow on fairlylogically.If one insists on interpreting
negative theology not as a de-limitation of God but ratheras a deferral
of God'ssecret ousia,then such words as 'purity,''prayer,'and 'silence'are
going to be understoodin their conventionalmeanings,as opposedto the
highly original and unorthodox use that a different reading of Eckhart
would makeof them.

2. PURITY
For example,the notion of "purity"becomes an ever-recurringmotif
in "Denials,"as Derridauses it to show how negativetheology still con-
forms to logocentric assumptions of presence. Taking the example of
Moses profferedby Dionysius in his MysticalTheology,who "wasordered
first to purify himself, and then to separatehimself from those who were
not pure"(Coward:92) before going up onto the mountain to talk with
God, Derrida sees this emphasis on purificationas the most important
logocentricsymptom in negativetheology.He cites, furtherto supporthis
argument,Dionysius'srecommendationthat the soul should be soft and
virginal,like wax (keros),in orderperfectlyto receivethe imprint of God
(120). Derrida'spoint is clear:for the purity of the divine presenceto be
experienced,uncontaminatedby worldly things, the soul itself must be
pure and virginal-what Eckhartwould call "God-colored"(gotvar)-an
aversiontowardsthe "impure"that would seem to be the epitome of the
veryonto-theology it seeksto deconstruct.

6 McGinn,admittedlysomewhatguardedly,
agreesthat "theterm dialectic,at least understoodin
its Neoplatonicform, is, I believe,a more appropriateword to characterizethe dynamicsof Eckhart's
way of speakingabout God" (McGinn:26).
7 See in particular"Denials"(82),where Derridaconsidersthe "voluminousand nebulous mul-
tiplicityof potentialsto which the single expression'negativetheology'yet remainsinadequate."

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 HowNot toDeconstruct
Almond: a Dominican 337

However,Derrida actually misreads the word "purity"here-or at

least fails to take into account another interpretationof the word, one
that would no longer understandpurity as conformity with a pure self-
presencebut ratheras the preludetowardsunion with a divine nothing-
ness. Without a doubt, Eckhartoften insists in his sermons (particularly
IntravitJesusin quoddamcastellum)on the necessity of remaining"vir-
ginal and free"(ledicund vri) towardsGod. Only likenesscan bring about
union, as the Scholasticssay;therefore,"hewho wishes to receivethe vir-
ginal Jesusmust himself be virginaland free."(Schtirmann:4) However,
the notion of purity/virginityhere does not mean the receptionof a pres-
ence or the conformity of the soul to a certainidentity, a certaincolor,
a certainessence. On the contrary,to be "pure"in Eckhartmeans to be-
come a kind of abyss-to be unattachedto images,"freeand disengaged"
from all logoi,to be "emptyand free as God is empty and free in him-
self"(Davies:163). If God is a divine nothingness,then the soul too must
become a kind of nothingnessif it is to acheiveunion with Him-such is
this notion of purity in Eckhartwhich Derridafailsto allowfor.
One might even say it is a desire for purity that Derrida himself
displays in his attempt to disassociate deconstruction from the "locu-
tions, detours and syntax"of negativetheology.In a passagefrom "Post-
Scriptum,"which relateshow negativetheology fulfills"theontotheologi-
cal promise it seems to break"(la promesse... onto-theologiquequ'elle
paraftrenier[Coward:310;Derrida1993:81]),Derridawrites:
Conversely, I trust,no text thatis not [negativetheology]is someway
contaminated with negativetheology,andevenamongthosetextsthat
apparently do not have,wantor believetheyhaveanyrelationwiththe-
ologyin general.(italicsmine)
Inversement,je n'encroisaucunquinesoiten riencontaminede the'ologie
negative,et meme parmiceuxqui apparemment n'ont,ne veulentou ne
croientavoiraucunrapport avecla thdologieengeneral.
Derrida'spoint is this: if negativetheology insists that one can only know
what God is throughwhat He is not, then all discourse-even that which
claims not to have "anyrelation with theology in general"-potentially
becomesa statementabout God. Whatis of interestto us here,however,is
how the word 'contaminated'becomes involved in this potential onto-
theologicalre-appropriationof all discourse.Derrida'sreferenceto "those
texts that apparentlydo not ... want ... any relation with theology in
general"presumablyincludeshis own writings-writings that attemptto
enact a critiqueof onto-theology yet neverthelessremain"somewaycon-
taminatedwith negativetheology."Why "contaminated"? one feels forced
to ask. Is this becausethe "purity"of the deconstructiveproject must be

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
338 Journalof the AmericanAcademyof Religion

maintained?And not be infiltrated (and possibly hijacked)by negative

theology?
Such questions, no doubt, lead us onto the familiar and somewhat
exhaustedissue of the statusof deconstruction.The point, however,is not
to resurrectonce more the contours and conclusions of an alreadywell-
documenteddebate (Gasche,Rorty,Norris,et al.) but simplyto highlight
how even Derrida cannot escape a notion of "purity"and "contamina-
tion."In his desireto keep an "infinitedistance"betweenhis own writings
and those of negativetheology,he has to preservethe "purity"of his own
discourse, of diffrrance,and keep it free from any form of metaphysi-
cal "contamination."WheneverDerridais forcedto differentiatehis own
work from the variousmotifs (and motives) of the apophatic,this notion
of "purity"must inevitablybe invoked-even if it concerns a "purity"
bereftof any notion of identityor logos, the verykind of "purity"Derrida
failed to recognize in Eckhart:an unattachmentto images, a nameless
emptiness,a logos-freeabyss.

3. PRAYERS
In addition to the motif of the secret and the insistence on purity in
Eckhartand Dionysius'swritings, anotherproof of a "hyperessentiality"
in negativetheology cited by Derrida is the use of prayers.For Derrida,
no matterhow "subversive" and "deconstructive" the writingsof negative
to
theology appear be, they are alwaysdirected.For all their radicaluse of
languageand questioning of the onto-theo-logic they are still addressed
towardsa destination,towardsa hyperessentiality.To illustratethis, Der-
rida shows how dependentDionysius is on the guiding prayer."Itis nec-
essaryto start with prayers,"he writes in the Divine Names (3:680, cited
in Coward:112). The fact that Dionysius begins his writings with both
an opening prayerand an encomium (a kind of hymnal celebration-
"O holiest of holies") implies a desired readingof the text-in much the
sameway the prefaceattemptsto announcethe pathwayand trajectoryof
the text it precedes.
An experiencewhichmustyet guidethe apophasistowardsexcellence,
not allowit to sayjustanything.... Thisexperienceis thatof prayer.
Uneexperience doit encoreguiderl'apophaseversl'excellence,nepas la
laisserdiren'importe quoi... Cetteexperience
estcelledelapridre.(Cow-
ard:110;Derrida1987:571)
The encomium("Thou hyperessentialand more than divine Trinity"),
saysDerrida,"qualifiesGod and determinesprayer,determinesthe other"
(Coward:111;Derrida 1987:572).It directs the prayer,and the text that

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Almond: a Dominican
HowNot toDeconstruct 339

followsit towardsa certainpresence,towardsa certainplace.In doing so it

not only determinesGod but also gives its messagea single, incontestable
meaning. The opening prayertogether with the encomiumensures that
the messageof the text does not simplywanderoff anywhere(like one of
Derrida'slost postcards)by addressingit to a predetermineddestination.
Negativetheology,Derridais keen to remind us, cannot simply "sayjust
anything."
On behalf of negativetheology there are two ways of respondingto
this third objection of Derrida's.One is to point out that in certain mo-
ments of The Mystical Theologyand The CelestialHierarchyDionysius
declaresthatwe can"sayjust anything"about God. He makesthe remark-
able assertion that to call God "drunk"and "hungover"is more "suit-
able"than callingHim "good"or "wise,"for "incongruousdissimilarities"
make us more aware of God's ineffabilitythan equally finite adjectives
such as "almighty"and "all-knowing"(Mystical Theology3:1033B;Celestial
Hierarchy2:141B)."Everything... can be a help to contemplation,"insists
the Areopagite-although here, admittedly,the sense is not so much "Say
anythingyou wish"but rather"CallGod anythingyou want to-it is all
equallyfalse."
The second responsewould be to make Jean-LucMarion'spoint that
praying to God is not the same as talking aboutGod or sayingwhat God
"is."(Marion 1977:249-250).Derrida is well awareof this: "Neitherthe
prayernor the encomiumis, of course, an act of constativepredication.
Both havea performativedimension... ."(Ni lapridreni la louangene sont
certesdes actes de predicationconstative.Toutesdeux ont une dimension
performative... [Coward:111;Derrida1987:572]).Nevertheless,although
Derridais willing to acknowledgethe performativestatusof the prayer,he
remainsinsistent that the Dionysian encomium"preservesan irreducible
relationshipto the attribution."In other words, Dionysius'svarioustexts
emphasizing the unspeakability,namelessness,and radicalotherness of
God are ironicallyunderminedfrom the startby an opening predication
of God. Dionysius'sworkson the indescribabilityof God begin paradoxi-
cally with a description of God-an encomiumthat addresses God as
"trinity"and "hyperessential."
Do such prayersexist in Eckhart?And do they havethe same "consta-
tive"function?Eckhart,like most preachers,endshis sermonswith pray-
ers ratherthan beginningwith them. He seemsto havedisplayed on more
than one occasion a strikinglyhonest expectationof incomprehension(at
the end of one sermon: "Thereare many people who do not understand
this. That is not surprisingto me";or, at the end of another:"If anyone
has understood this sermon, I wish them well"[Clark:180;Schtirmann:
184]). Therefore,he seldom praysfor understandingon behalf of his con-

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
340 Journal of the AmericanAcademyof Religion

gregation. Eckhart'sbrief prayers mostly involve asking God for di-

vine help in becoming more like Him or in understandingbetter what
God "is.
Once again, the argumentforks:With Derrida'sThomist reading of
Eckhart,one could simply see the prayersat the end of the Dominican's
sermons as examples of what Derrida calls "counter-signatures"-ways
of confirming that the text just preached,however radicallyapophatic,
is ultimately returned to the re-affirmedonto-theological God. This is,
indeed,a relativelyvalidinterpretationof Eckhart'sprayers-however,it is
not the only one. Prayerssuch as "MayGod ... help us that we may be
preparedto receivethe best of gifts"(Clark:175), readin light of a differ-
ent Eckhart,would act as a prelude towardsthe "emptyingof the soul."
Suchis Eckhart'sprayerof preparation-de-essentializing, as opposed to
re-affirming.Eckhart'sprayerdoes not simply return his sermon to the
all-too-familiarGod of onto-theology but ratherasks that the selemight
become the kind of nothingnessthat the Godheadis. If Eckhart'sprayers
do indeed guide the soul, they guide it to a point whereit no longer needs
a guide-which is preciselywhy Eckhartmakeshis famous prayer"Ibeg
God to rid me of 'God.'"Eckhart'sprayersdo not "direct,"they de-limit;
they do not "determine,"they empty.Farfrom invokingthe very concept
of God Eckhartdeemed idolatrous,Eckhart'sprayersinitiate the break-
throughto the nameless,silent darknessof the Godhead.

4. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCOURSE

Of all Derrida'sobjectionsto negativetheology'skinshipwith decon-
structionhis fourthand finalone is perhapsthe strongest-partly because
silence is so often extolled as the end of negative theology and partly
because of Eckhart'sown frequentadmonishmentsagainst "chattering"
(klafen)about God-admonishments that for Derridaonly serve to re-
inforcenegativetheology'sessentialraisond'etre:"... to speakin orderto
command not to speak"(. .. parlerpour commanderpour ne pas parler
[Coward:121;Derrida 1987:583]).Once we realizethat nothing we can
say in our finite and imperfect language can adequatelyrepresentGod,
that nothing in our inadequatevocabularycan convey the incommensu-
rablehyperessentialityof God, then "welearnto read ... and finallyto be
silent"(119).
Thus, Derrida sees negative theology as ultimately prohibiting dis-
course,as ultimatelydiscouragingtalkabout God. Derridasees this as the
most convincing proof of both Eckhart'sand Dionysius'sultimate com-
mitment to metaphysics,a conviction that whateverwe saywill neverbe
enough to conveythe illusory"fullpresence"of God-and, therefore,we
should not speakat all.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Almond:How Not to Deconstructa Dominican 341

That Eckhart extols silence as "the finest thing we can say about
God"(Das schoenstede dermenschegesprechenmagvongotte [Davies:236;
Largier:190]) cannot be denied. Neither can the frequencywith which
Eckhartcommends the superiorityof silence over discourse in sermons
such as Renovaminispirituand Eratisenim aliquando.What can be said,
however,is that there are two differentreasons in Eckhartwhy the indi-
vidual should remain silent about God-and Derridaonly reallyconsid-
ers the first.
Eckhart'sfirst silence is, as Derrida rightfully claims, the silence of
inadequacy.It is the silenceof the finite in the presenceof the infinite,the
silenceof the speechlessin the faceof the incommensurable.It is a silence
born partly out of a sense of the fallibilityof one's discourse and (more
importantly)out of a sense of respect.Not surprisingly,Derrida sees in
such respectan all-too-familiarhomagetowardsan "ineffableplenitude."
It is a silence that belongs to many other similar calls for reticence in a
varieyof authors:Wittgenstein's"whereofone cannot speak,thereof one
must remainsilent";Augustine'sdivine contradictions,"tobe passedover
in silence"ratherthan "resolvedverbally";8the silence of Kierkegaard's
Abraham,who "walksthe narrow path of faith no-one can advise or
understand"(Kierkegaard: 95). In all such instancesit is our respectfor the
inexpressible"hyper-truth"that forbidsus to speak.
Eckhart'ssecond silence, however,is not reallytaken up by Derrida.
Having establishedEckhart'sGod beyond God as just another infinitely
deferredsecret,Derridacan only ever see the Dominican'ssilence as self-
censure.In doing so, Derridamissesthe much more profoundmotivation
behind the silence in Eckhart'sthought:silence is not merelyunderstood
as a resignationto ineffabilitybut also as a preludetowardsunion with the
silent, namelessnothingnessof the Godhead.
A central feature of the Godhead is silence: the Godhead is a dis-
course-freezone, a place where languagecannot happen. Caputo writes
that "while Eckhartspoke of a primal Word, he wanted to say that the
truest languageof all was absolutelysilent" (224). Only through silence
can one remainin the Godhead-indeed, silenceis a preconditionof one's
entry into it and of one'sremainingthere:
WhenI was still in the ... sourceof the Godhead,no-one askedme
whereI wasgoing.... Butas I flowedforth,allcreaturesuttered'God.'
(Davies:234)
"WhenI flowed out, all creaturessaid 'God' ": as soon as one leavesthe
Godhead,languagecan name, significationcan occur, God can be called
"God"again.Once we arewilling to understandEckhart'sGodheadnot as

8 Foundin Augustine'sChristianDoctrine,1:6.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
342 Journal of the AmericanAcademyof Religion

a secrethidden awayin a box but ratheras a silent darknessanteriorto all

our conceptionsof God, then Eckhart'scall for reticenceis no longerpro-
hibitivebut rather imitative. In typically Scholasticfashion, union can
only come about throughlikeness.If the soul wishes to be one with God,
it must become "emptyand free as God is empty and free in himself."In
the same way, if the soul wishes to breakthroughinto the silence of the
Godhead,then it must become a kind of silenceitself.
Within such a readingof Eckhart,the exhortationto silence in nega-
tive theology is no longer the faintly totalitarianmuzzle Derrida paints
it to be but rathera means towardsunion with the divine, no longer the
frowning prohibition of "chatter"about God but ratherthe possibility
of finallydwellingin the silenceof the Godhead,no longer the veto on all
discourse about God but rather an attempt to reach the same state of
silenceas God'sgroundand therebygain accessto it.

The aim of this article, therefore,has been straightforward:to show

how Derridain his dealingswith negativetheology has been more inter-
ested in an Eckhartwho defers than one who de-limits. Our attempt to
presentan alternativeEckhartto the Thomistversion Derridaoffersus-
the "safe"version Derridaclearlysees as representativeof negativetheol-
ogy in general-has perhapsforcedus to dwellon the more "unorthodox"
moments in Eckhart'ssermons.Hermeneuticallyspeaking,Eckhart'stexts
are no differentfrom any of the other texts Derridahas examined:they
are resistentto all totalization.Derrida'sintelligentand coherentcritique
of Eckhartremains,for all its worth, underminedby the passagesDerrida
does notcite, by the sermonshe has not read.
Of course,whethersuch a readingof Eckhartcan escapethe descrip-
tion of metaphysical"hyperessentiality" while at the sametime remaining
within a recognizablyChristianframework-such a question lies outside
the scope of this article. Certainly,Leibniz recognizedvery early on the
potential dangers of negative theology, with its metaphors "almost in-
clining to Godlessness."The word 'almost'is interesting-and does sug-
gest why a numberof recent Christianresponsesto postmodernityhave
expressedan interestin negativetheology,even to the point of adoptinga
similartone.' However,as we havesaid,the aim of this articlehas not been

9 Leibnizis writing in a letter to Paccius,28th January1695-from L. Dutens'sLeibnitiiopera,

Geneva,1768,6:56, and cited by Derridain Coward:284. ForChristianresponsesto the postmodern
that make use of the apophatic,see Kevin Hart'sessay "JacquesDerrida:The God Effect"in Blond
(1998), not to mention Zornado (1998), who advocatesa "Christiancriticism"that will deconstruct
oppressiveand violent "cataphaticvalue systems"(162).

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 HowNot toDeconstruct
Almond: a Dominican 343

to consider how "Christian" Eckhart's sermons actually are but rather to

re-inforce a single thesis: that the version of Eckhart Derrida presents in
"Denials," an Eckhart who ultimately returns God to theology, will always
be undercut by an "other" Eckhart who de-limits the certainty of God, as
opposed to deferring it, an Eckhart who refuses to understand God simply
as "God."

REFERENCES

Blond, Philip,ed. Post-secularPhilosophy.London:Routledge& Kegan.

1998
Caputo,JohnD. TheMysticalElementin Heidegger's
Thought.New York:
1978 FordhamUniversityPress.
Carlson,ThomasA. "ThePovertyand Poetryof Indiscretion."Christianity
1998 and Literature47/2.
Clark,JamesM. MeisterEckhart.London:Nelson & Sons.
1957
Coward,Harold,ed. Derrida and Negative Theology.Albany:State Univer-
1992 sity of New YorkPress.
Davies, Oliver,ed. MeisterEckhart:SelectedWritings.London:Penguin.
1994
Derrida,Jacques La Dissemination.Paris:Editionsdu Seuil.
1972
1978 Writingand Difference.Trans.by Alan Bass. London:
Routledge& Kegan.
1982 "LaDifference."In Margins Of Philosophy.Trans.by
Alan Bass.Brighton:HarvesterPress.
1987 "CommentNe Pas Parler:Denegations."In Psyche:In-
ventionsde l'autre.Paris:EditionsGalilee.
1993 Saufle nom.Paris:EditionsGalilee.
Hart, Kevin The Trespassof the Sign. Cambridge:CambridgeUni-
1989 versityPress.
Kamuf,Peggy,ed. A DerridaReader:Betweenthe Blinds.Exeter:Harves-
1991 ter Wheatsheaf.
Kierkegaard,Soren Fearand Trembling.
Trans.by AlistairHannay.London:
1985 Penguin.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
344 Journalof theAmericanAcademyof Religion

Largier,Nikolaus,ed. Meister Eckhart:Werke.Frankfurt am Main: Kohl-

1993 hammer.
Marion, Jean-Luc L'idoleet la distance.Paris:Grasset.
1977
"A Relief for Theology: Metaphysicsand Phenome-
1994
nology."CriticalInquiry3.
McGinn,Bernard.ed. MeisterEckhart:Teacherand Preacher.Mahwah, NJ:
1986 PaulistPress.
Moore, Stephen Poststructuralism
and theNew Testament.Minneapolis:
1994 FortressPress.
Pseudo-Dionysius TheCompleteWorks.Trans.by Colm Luibheid.London:
1987 SPCK.
Schiirmann,Reiner MeisterEckhart.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.
1978
Wood, David, ed. Derridaand Differance.Coventry:ParousiaPress.
1988
Zornado,Joseph "Freeplay:ChristianHierarchies."Christianityand Lit-
1998 erature47/2.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.54 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 04:35:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions