VAN DORN VS.
ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard
Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this
time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June
8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice
be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared
as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by
virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against
her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
TITLE: IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL V HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA
CITATION: GR NO. 80116, JUNE 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent,
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.
They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent
and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared
that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so
far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
FE D. QUITA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
BLANDINA DANDAN, RESPONDENTS
DECEMBER 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their
marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo
died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed
the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and
petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage
existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir
of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as
heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him
as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to
Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under
Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is
affirmed.
LORENZO LLORENTE, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 124371. NOVEMBER 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
“Paula”) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home
in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in
his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York. Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the certificate stating that the
child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley,
and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951,
the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego
found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December 4,
1952, the divorce decree became final. In the meantime, Lorenzo
returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
Page 1 of the many pages
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three
children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato
on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. CA Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to
the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities
of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed. Will is valid. SC
reversed the decision.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER V. CRASUS L.
IYOY, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 152577. SEPTEMBER 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They
begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of
respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five
visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25,
1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered
to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null
and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One
factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has
established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue: The totality of evidence presented during the trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and
Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.
2nd issue: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen
and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, OCTOBER 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May
24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.
They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
Page 2 of the many pages
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS CASE DIGEST
G.R. NO. 186571, AUGUST 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized
Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to
Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to
Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with
another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took
effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in
the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his
Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage
with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce
must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial
recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is
not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only
a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of
recognition of the foreign divorce decree
HELD:
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in
favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the
benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce
decree as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity
of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the
foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the
registration is still deemed to be void.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, – VERSUS –
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 221029
24 APRIL 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed
a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by
a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a
petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after
due proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that
the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it
opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they
are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code)
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter
no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil.
546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind
Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding
is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree
on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.
AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95
CATEGORY: CIVIL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California
where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen
for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered
himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a
legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an
acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that
under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the
matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is
ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view
of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On
the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear
Page 3 of the many pages
under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased
must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him
in absolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on
the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the
California, and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in
California.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil Code
States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and
is governed by the law of the domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile,
the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to
the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the
Philippine law provides.
MICIANO VS BRIMO
TITLE: JUAN MICIANO V ANDRE BRIMO
CITATION: GR NO.22595, NOVEMBER 1, 1927| 50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a
scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased
(Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that
“it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions,
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to
law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in
his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS 20 SCRA 258
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing his Texas
properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills,
the recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has
no conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law) governing
successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no
compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to
successional rights.
Held:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under
Texas law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in
the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the properties for
succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by
the Philippine law.
SAUDIA VS. CA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA AND HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 89, RTC OF
QUEZON CITY
G.R. NO. 122191 OCTOBER 8, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight
attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with 2 male attendants, and on
the following morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants
attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard
her cry for help. The Indonesian police arrested the 2.
MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back
to Jakarta and help arrange the release of the 2 male attendants.
MORADA did not cooperate when she got to Jakarta.
What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts
which she did not understand as this was in their language. In 1993,
she was surprised, upon being ordered by SAUDIA to go to the Saudi
court, that she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition,
sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with the
2, for what happened in Jakarta.
SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was
wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her
being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against
SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence
of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule.
MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter
of domestic law.
ISSUE:
WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case
HELD:
YES.
On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation
that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of
two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element”. The presence
of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits
of their birth or conception. The forms in which this foreign element may
appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile,
or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess,
events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
Page 4 of the many pages
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.
COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case.
However, the court finds that the RTC of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691,
to wit:
BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred
Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon
City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best
to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of
the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary
difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be
upheld.
The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA
through her act of filing, and SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems
seek to answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of
the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts,
the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be
said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts
of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For
in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm
or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without
basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine
the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury
occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that
private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties
was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not
based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
NOTE:
These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could
be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are
involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will
signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important
in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place
of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of
attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted
or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of “procedure” not going to
the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the
lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign
law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it
falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all
legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, AND THE REST OF 1,767 NAMED-
COMPLAINANTS, THRU AND BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
ATTY. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOVS. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, DECEMBER 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the
Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and
on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended
Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their
recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC)
and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which
is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed
as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers
for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of
the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and
salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and
premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted
to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to
Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to
correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their
answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
Page 5 of the many pages

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt
of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the
case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from
said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October
27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor
rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in
favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC
also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed
earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA.
The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the
claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of
the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa,
Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176,
otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the
provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:
“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night
which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until
seven o’clock in the morning .”
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x
x.”
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on
any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.”
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service
with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not
less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28
days after five continuous years of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect
of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.”
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year
of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for each
year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of
leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of
his service completed within a year.”
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the
parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled
to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of
Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it
is applicable WON complainants’ claim for the benefits provided therein
have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit
(siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and
admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of
the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then
the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of
the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and
BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the
employment contract which provides that the compensation of the
employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total computation
plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation”
therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states
“that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host
country regulation and custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article
1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall
not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where
there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the
employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.”
The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against
the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity
that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to
regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity
to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire
mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific
provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be
governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute
but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties.
Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own
choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question
that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in
that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the
claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided
in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the
forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law.
Page 6 of the many pages
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the
sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the
issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in
the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute
of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not “specifically intended
to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of
the forum should apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with
a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the
face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability,
outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the
substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a
yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the
most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that
the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to
satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks
to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of New
York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama,
it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription
of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local
Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A
“borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply
the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one
form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute
was not run against it.
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many
of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were
deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition of
employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present
(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of
Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall
be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employee’s benefits), there is no common
question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law
of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but
were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his
own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants.
A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other
claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned
their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise
settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in
Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by

the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however,
Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection
to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution

emphasized that:“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing
of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as
provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upon a judgment”

Page 7 of the many pages