People v Beltran (1985) case digest
G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming;
CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL PUZON alias Noling;
CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy,
accused-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and
double attempted murder with direct assault evidence shows that in
Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a
jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them,
"Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother).
They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had
brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor. The newly elected
Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly
there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente,
and Mayor also suffered injuries.
I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat.
Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and
both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the
double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
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1. PEOPLE v DOLLANTES (151 SCRA 592) June 30, 1987G.R. 70639
FACTS
Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. The Barangay Captain
delivered a speech to start a dance for an approaching fiesta in the evening
of April 21, 1983. While the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech, the
accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a
dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his
knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people
present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and
reprimanded him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the
accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed
the latter on the left arm. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes,
who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain
at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the
Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. When
the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused took turns in
kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around
said dead body. The Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the
different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his
dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who
examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of severe hemorrhage
and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds.
ISSUE
WON, the accused is guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in
authority resulting to murder
HELD
When a Barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was
making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the Barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority.
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ALBERTO v. DE LA CRUZ
98 SCRA 406 (1980)
Concepcion, J. / alo
SUBJECT MATTER:​Public Disorders > Delivering Prisoners from Jail
CASE SUMMARY:
Orbita was prosecuted for violating Art. 156 of the RPC by helping Denaque,
a prisoner, to escape while working on the guest house of the provincial
jailer, Gov. Cledera. During trial, counsel filed a motion to include the names
of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda, Assistant Provincial Warden, in the
criminal charge against Orbita, believing that the two also helped and
connived in the escape of the prisoner. Respondent judge directed the
petitioner (fiscal) to conduct further investigation. Petitioner found no cause
to charge Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda. However, upon filing of Orbita of
an MR, the respondent judge ruled otherwise and ordered the inclusion of
the names of the two in the criminal charges. Petitioner filed for recourse.
The SC held that Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted
under Art. 156 of the RPC since offenders under this article is usually
committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined
or helps him escape. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the
province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be
prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article 156 of the RPC. Also,
the two cannot be prosecuted under Art. 223 of the RPC since in order to be
guilty under this article, it is necessary that the public officer had consented
to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge.
Petition granted.
DOCTRINES:
v Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by
removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by
helping such a person to escape.
v In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that
the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the
prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a
prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the
commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner.
FACTS:
v Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working
at the Guest House of Governor Cledera (Provincial Jailer) on September
12, 1968
v The Governor’s residence at that time is being rented by the province and
its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur
v The detainee worked at the Governor’s residence by virtue of an order of
the Governor which was implemented by Lt. Esmeralda(Assistant Provincial
Warden). It was the accused, Eligio Orbita (Provincial Guard), himself who
handpicked the group of prisoners to work at the Governor’s residence on
September 12, 1968
v Neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or
entrusted with the duty of conveying and guarding the detainee from the jail
to the residence of the governor
v In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, Orbita, was prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of
Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code
v In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the
cross-examination of Esmeralda, the defense brought forth and confronted
the witness with a notepurportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking
Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at
his house. Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who
handed the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the
signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was
made and signed by Gov. Cledera.
v Believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of
Gov. Cledera to Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally
guilty of the offense for which that accused Eligio Orbita had been charged,
the defense counsel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the
information so as to include Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda as defendants
therein.
v The respondent Judge, Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz, directed the office of
Edmundo Alberto (Fiscal), within 15 days from date, to cause the further
investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of Article
156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to
determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province
and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of
Denaque's escape from judicial custody.
v Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in
Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case
and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no
prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence,
they cannot be charged.”
v On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated
December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate
this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this
case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and
Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is warranted.
v Respondent Judge ruled to let the charges be so amended by including in
the information the author or writer of the said note containing orders and the
person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions
of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code.
v The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the
motion was denied on February 18, 1970. Hence, the instant recourse.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape
of Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code​(NO)
2. WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape
of Denaque under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code​(NO)
HOLDING:
1. ​NO. ​Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two
ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment;
and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away
a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active
compensation of the person released. To help in the escape of a Person
confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with
the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate
his escape.
The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is
liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is
the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden,
they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article
156 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. ​NO. ​In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the Penal Code, it is
necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the
escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the
escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential
condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of
the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does
not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not
guilty of the crime.
For sure no connivance in the escape of Denaque from the custody of the
accused Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose
Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that
the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the
guest house; and that it was the accused Orbita who picked the men to
compose the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and
Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article
punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite
amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.
DISPOSITIVE: ​The orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970
in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio
Orbita, accused are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent
Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with
the trial of the case. Without costs.
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TOPIC: ​Crimes Against Public Order: Evasion of Service of Sentence
Tanega v Masakayan
GR No. L-27191
Date of Promulgation​:​ February 28,1967
Ponente​:​ Sanchez, J.
Petitioner: ​Adelaida Tanega
Respondent: ​Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan, In His Capacity As Judge Of
The Court Of First Instance Of Rizal, Branch V, And The Chief Of Police Of
Quezon City
Nature​: ​original petition for certiorari and prohibition
Digest By:​PSPambid
Doctrine: Art 157. ​Elements of evasion of service of sentence include:
(3) he evades service of sentence ​by escaping during the term of his
sentence​. Prescription of penalties commences only if the convict
escapes.
Brief: ​Petitioner was convicted of slander and was sentenced to arresto
mayor. She failed to show up when a warrant for her arrest was issued,
and was never arrested. After a year, she claims that the prescription of
the penalty has already prescribed. Respondent judge ruled otherwise.
SC concurs.
Facts​:
·​ ​Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City.
· ​She was found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance where
she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended
party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
· ​The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on January 11, 1965,
directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30
a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This
prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for
her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
·​ ​Petitioner was never arrested.
· ​Petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965
and March 23, 1965. (Ground: Penalty has prescribed.)
· ​On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty
imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of
prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias
warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue: ​WON Prescription of sentence has commenced
Held: ​NO
Ratio:
·​ ​Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.
· ​By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by
final sentence" ​prescribe in one year​.
· ​The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93
provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence".
·​ ​Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
o​ ​ the offender is a convict by final judgment;
o​ ​he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";
o ​he evades service of sentence ​by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
· ​Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape
shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, ... "
· ​evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail
breaking"
· ​Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the prescription of
penalty does not run in her favor.
Dispositive​:
Petition DISMISSED.
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EN BANC[G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.]THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINOABILONG,
defendant-appellant.FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September,1947, in the City of Manila,
Philippines,Florentino Abilong, the accused, being thena convict sentenced
and ordered to servedestierro during which he should not enterany place
within the radius of 100 kilometersfrom the City of Manila for
attemptedrobbery, evaded the service of said sentenceby going beyond the
limits made against himand commit vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing apenalty on the accused under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does notcover evasion of
service of "destierro."
RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" usedin the English text is a wrong or
erroneoustranslation of the phrase "sufriendo privacionde libertad" used in
the Spanish text. It isequally clear that although the SolicitorGeneral
impliedly admits destierro as notconstituting imprisonment, it is a
deprivationof liberty, though partial, in the sense that asin the present case,
the appellant by hissentence of destierro was deprived of theliberty to enter
the City of Manila. Under thecase of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in
thebrief of the Solicitor General that "it is clearthat a person under sentence
of destierro issuffering deprivation of his liberty andescapes from the
restrictions of the penaltywhen he enters the prohibited area."
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Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD
OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with
multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed
the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him
for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against
him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny,
or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted
by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of
his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or
prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine
whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated.
To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
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People vs Dioso
132 SCRA 616
FACTS: Accused Dioso and Abarca were members of the" Balang
Mindanao" gang. While serving their sentence at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, they killed their fellow inmates namely: Gomez and Reyno
who were members of Happy Go Lucky gang who have been suspected as
authors of the slaying of their gangmate. Both accused voluntarily
surrendered and entered plea of guilty that they inflicted fatal blows while
Gomez was lying down under a mosquito net and Reyno was taking his
breakfast. The trial court found them guilty and imposed death penalty for
the crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not a quasi- recidivist who committed murder be
imposed a death penalty despite the presence of mitigating circumstances.
HELD: Yes, a quasi a recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death
penalty despite the presence of mitigating circumstances.
RATIO: The Supreme Court ruled that it is thus noted that in their briefs, no
attempt was made to impugn the lower court's conclusion as to their guilt.
Instead, they seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial
court by invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
The court finds no necessity to discuss at length the effects of such
mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the
accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while
serving sentence for a prior offense. As such the maximum penalty
prescribed by law for the felony (murder) is death, regardless of the
presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the
complete absence thereof. But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is
constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the
accused to reclusion perpetua.
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PEOPLE v KONG LEON(48 O.G. 664)The making of false coins of a
foreign country is punishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coins from
circulation therein.
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DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE(3 SCRA 650)
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario,
Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years and 1 day of prisión mayor, and to pay a fine of P5,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate
part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which
was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prisión mayor. The case
is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the
Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill
Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper
money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury
notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had
been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded
in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June
23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more
counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. The only question raised in this
appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes
a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains
that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession
thereof cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of
Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar
erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No.
F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit 6 in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit
G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329 of Exhibit H.
Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the
figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased
and/or altered, with knowledge of such erasure and alteration, and with
the intent to use such notes of the Philippines, is punishable under
Art. 168 in relation to Art.166, subdivision (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus,possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government
where one of the digits of the penultimate had been altered and changed
from 9 so as to read 0 is punishable.
OR
After showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario three Philippine P1 bills
and one Philippine P2 bill,and inducing him to believe that the same were
counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were
genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of
each of which had been altered and changed, the accused had succeeded
in obtaining P1,700 from him for the avowed purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. Accused
were convicted of illegal possession of forged treasury notes by the trial
court, which decision was upheld by the appellate court.In the instant petition
appellant del Rosario maintains that, being treasury notes of our
government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal.
Issue: Whether or not the possession of altered genuine treasury notes
constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the RPC.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any
of the “the figure, letters, words or sign contained” in which had been erased
and/or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by
petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision 1, of the
RPC.Decision: Decision AFFIRMED.
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People of the Philippines vs. Galano 54 OG 5897
Facts: Pat. Villanueva disclosed that at least nine persons were running after
the appellant; that he saw bloodoozing from the appellant’s lips; that Lilia
Cruz handed to him the one peso bill paid to her by the appellant forfour
ballot eggs, complaining that it was fake as the word “Victory” was only
written in ink; and, that he examined the peso bill and really found that the
word “ Victory” was written in ink.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant was correctly accused of and convicted
under Article 166, in relation to Article 169 of the RPC.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The alteration or even destruction of a demonetized paper bill
would harm no one but the holder.However its utterance by giving to it the
similitude of a true and genuine legal tender of the Victory series shows the
intention to deceive and defraud. The forgery here committed comes under
the first paragraph of Article 169 of the Code. This provision does not only
contemplate situations where a spurious, false or falsified document or
instrument is given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but
also to situations involving originally true and genuine documents which
have been withdrawn or demonetized, or have outlived its usefulness.
Decision: Judgment AFFIRMED.
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Estela Romualdez Case, 57 Phil 148
Facts:
The accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabuhay were charged with the
crime of falsification of public and official documents.
The accused Estela Romualdez was the secretary of Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court. The latter was then
the Head of the Bar Examination Committee. Because of such functions, she
had under her care the computations and other papers and documents for
the admission of the candidate to the Bar held in the month of August and
September 1926. At that time, aside from the Committee of Bar Examiners,
a Committee of Correctors was also appointed. The work of the Committee
of Bar Examiners was to prepare the test questions on their respective
subjects and a memorandum of authorities and legal provisions as well as
jurisprudence as sources of the questions. The work of reviewing and
grading the test booklets were entrusted to the Committee of Correctors who
were furnished the notes and set of rules.
The information filed alleged that the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay conspired together and erased the grade of 58% given by the
correctors to the composition in Remedial Law and replaced it and, instead,
wrote 64%. She also crossed out and replaced the grade of the latter in Civil
law from 63% and wrote 75%. With the said changes, Mabunay obtained
an average of 75%. In the said examination, the Supreme Court considered
the Grade of 70% as 75% as passing average.
The accused Estela Romualdez contended that she has the authority to
make such alteration, both in her capacity as the private secretary of the
Chairman of the Examination Committee and as the correctors and at the
same time supervisor of the Correctors. The authority was given by the then
Chairman himself, Justice Norberto Romualdez. She further contended that
she did not know Luis Mabuhay and the first time he saw him was on the
first day of the trial. Furthermore, she alleged that her revision of the
compositions of her co-accused was due only and solely to a happy
coincidence.
Issues:
1. Whether Estela Romualdez was guilty of Falsification; and
2. Whether Estela Romualdez was authorized to make the alterations.
Held:
1. Yes. The acts of the accused Estela Romualdez were covered by
paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code. She made
the alterations in the grades given by the "correctors" in the papers
in question in such a way as to make it appear that said
"correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the
grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades
opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she
had made the alterations. She, in that way, attributed to the
"correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them.
2. No. If it be admitted that the accused E. R. was given the authority
which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not
authorized to change the grades now in question because when
she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged
to her co-accused.
The Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee was presumed to have
discharged his duties in accordance with the law and it was inconceivable
that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give the accused
Estela Romualdez the unlimited authority which she claimed to have
received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade on any paper,
without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere
statement of such claim showed that it was preposterous.
-------------------------------------------------
Luague vs. CA
Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, convicting the petitioner of
three counts of falsification of commercial documents.
Facts: Iluminado Luague, died at G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital on January 24,
1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972. The
Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased’s salary warrants to the
Superintendent of schools who forward them to the District Supervisor,
Florencio Guillermo.
The paychecks were delivered; Florencio Guillermo signed the
payroll-warrant registers certifying that on his official oath, each employee
whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary warrant indicated
opposite his name on February 7, 17, and 25, 1972. Pilar Luague, the
petitioner, signed the salary checks of her deceased husband.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he
asked appellant to return the treasury warrants issued in the name of her
husband Illuminado, further claiming that appellant promised to do so, but
actually did not. Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants had been
encashed by appellant. The appellant used it to pay debts incurred for the
illness and death of her husband.
For signing the name of her husband as payee on three treasury warrants
for purpose of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. The appellant was
charged with 3 counts of estafa thru falsification of document but was
convicted of falsification only.
The petitioner contends that she acted in good faith or had no
criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband’s paychecks.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents
Held: No. The petitioner was acquitted.
The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts:
That the petitioner signed her husband’s name to the checks because they
were delivered to her by no less than her husband’s district supervisor long
after the husband’s death which was known to the supervisor; that she used
the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband’s last
illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the
money as an advance payment for her husband’s vacation and sick leave
credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks.
Also, there was no damage incurred against the government as the
deceased employee deserved the salary his wife availed of. Even if there
was falsification when she signed for her husband, this was done with the
knowledge of her deceased husband’s supervisor that the husband was
indeed dead.
Ifthe accused acted in good faith when she signed herspouse's name to
the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouse’s
last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to
them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to
such encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the
accused should be acquitted to such crime.
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CANNOT FIND CABIGAS v PEOPLE
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PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO
(81 SCRA 120)If the falsification is resorted to for the purposeof hiding
the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate
offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the
money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his
co-accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the
province for various projects when in fact no such materials were
delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused
used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes
committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and
malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting
one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
RULE 120 – JUDGMENT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ​plaintiff-appellee, vs.​LICERIO P.
SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT,
defendants. ​JUAN SAMSON,​defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-33254 ​&​ G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978, AQUINO, ​J.
It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding
the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
FACTS:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the
prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an
employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with
Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6)
forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge
fund for P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts: upper
part, to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by
the governor's representative; middle part; Paragraph 1, by the creditor;
Paragraph 2, by the provincial engineer; Paragraph 3, by the provincial
treasurer; Paragraph 4, by the auditor; Paragraph 5, by the provincial
treasurer. In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works
projects. And following paragraph 5, is the receipt of the signed by the
creditor. According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left
margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov.
Treasurer. By ​Juan Samson.​ "
The lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and
Samson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official
documents. Thus, Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
However, Sendaydiego died; hence, his appeal as to his criminal liability was
dismissed. The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the ​civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the CFI, which convicted him of three complex
crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the
Court resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from
the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code and, for that purpose, his counsel is
directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action
for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
ISSUE:
Whether or not several falsification and malversation are separate
offenses and thus constitute six separate or distinct offenses.
HELD:
Penalties​. —
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate
crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not
cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave
felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It
is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses
In the instant cases, the provincial, as the custodian than of the money
forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or
misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used
as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.The falsifications cannot
be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or
distinct offenses.
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes
a separate crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a
co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.As already stated, he is
presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession
of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies
from the provincial treasurer.
The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
Sendaydiego's appeal; civil liability of his estate.​ —
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato
N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the
usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after
Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure
because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,
approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial
treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was
already settled since the treasurer had already signed the voucher.
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention
that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers
before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed
the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial.
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the
vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. The
bookkeeper was instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told
him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego
that the payment should be made in cash. There were instances when the
treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan
Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the
provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the cash
payments. As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments
should be made in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of
the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of
attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive
the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness,
who should be present when the payments were received, was blank. The
trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with
Samson.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the best witness on how
and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the
preliminary investigation was started. Nonetheless, the facts proven by the
prosecution show that Sendaydiego had a tie-up with Samson and that he
acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.
The Court also held that evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego
is not the same as that against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was
charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a
principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the
treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before
they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by
the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have
been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and
oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of
Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond
reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability for his estate for the
amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal​. —
Our searching study of the record fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that
he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary
investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge
Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112, in allowing a CFI to conduct a preliminary
investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found
probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the
corresponding information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted
the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded
insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the
preliminary investigation.The inferior court after terminating the preliminary
investigation is not obligated (​por delicadeza)​ to remand the case to the
Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the
case on the merits. The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case
without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
The Court found that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by
the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and
authentic signatures.But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did
not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand
in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used ​two forms of signature.​ His supposed genuine
signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the
genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an
arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers
evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the
signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He
used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six
vouchers were received by him the expert admitted that a person may have
two forms of signature.
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in
the six vouchers were Samson's signatures.Fernandez, the handwriting
expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers
were written by only one person.
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or
collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co.,
hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial
engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for
payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those
circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven
to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection
with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession
of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the
forger.Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions
with the provincial government and another form of signatures of his valid
transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications
perpetrated in these cases.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the
circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his
assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego
and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the
proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner
office, instead of in the cashier's office. The trial court said that the fact that
Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson.”
----------------------------------------
SIQUIAN v PEOPLE(171 SCRA 223)
Falsification of public document is committed when the accused issues
a certification which states that funds are available for the position to
which a person is appointed and the accused knows that, in reality,
the position itself doesnot even exist and no funds had been appropriated
therefor. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is
not necessary when the falsified document is apublic document. In
falsification of public documents,the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to
third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial.
2. Siquian v. People
Facts:
Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, the municipal
mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job in the office of the mayor. Siquian then
appointed her as a clerk in the office of the municipal secretary and even
said that her salary would be included in the budget. Accompanying her
appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds
through a form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the
requirements of the latter.
It should be noted that the Municipal council of Isabela, failed to
enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As
such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed
re-enacted. No such position existed then.
Carreon worked for five months and was supposed to receive her
salary of P120. She approached the municipal treasurer to ask for the
money but the latter said that there was no money yet. She then sued
Siquian for falsification of a public document.
The RTC and CA ruled in favour of Carreon. Siquian interposed the
defense of a lack of criminal intent.
Issue:
Was Siquian guilty of falsification of public documents?
Ruling:
Yes.
He was found guilty under par 4 of art 171, “making untruthful statements in
a narration of facts”; the elements of which are: (a) That the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) that he has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.
In this case, all the elements for falsification were met especially when
Siquian stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa
Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did
not even exist and no funds had been appropriated. It is further bolstered by
the fact that when the budget was deemed re-enacted, there is no such
position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Carreon
was appointed. And there is also no appropriation made in the Annual
Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus rendering
Siquian's statement in his certification utterly false.
Siquian also had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of such facts.
Under the civil service rules and regulations, a certification of the availability
of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of
office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an
officer authorized by law to issue the certification, Siquian has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said
certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for
the position being filled up.
He also took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document.
Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either
making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a
document. In this case, Siquian was charged with the duty of issuing the
certification necessary for the appointment of Carreon.
Lastly, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not
necessary when the falsified document is a public document. The SC relied
on the Go Tiok case in stating that wrongful intent on the part of an accused
to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification
of public document. This is because the principal thing punished in falsifying
public documents is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Siquian cannot raise the defense of good faith. He presides at all meetings
of the municipal council and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by
the municipal council. He was also aware that there was no budget and no
such position (clerk of municipal secretary) existed.
-------------------------------------------------
PEOPLE v VILLALON(192 SCRA 521)
The charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law since falsification of a public
document may be a means of committing estafa because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime
of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by
the commission of estafa andnot by the falsification of the document,
hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is
only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
SUMMARY: De Guzman was charged with estafa thru falsification of public
document on March 29, 1974. As the attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera
(complainant), in 1964, De Guzman forged his signature on the special
power of attorney (SPA) to use it to mortgage Carrera’s parel of land and
obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power of Atty. and
mortgage contract) were later registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the land was bought by someone
else, and Carrera only knew about it when an action for ejectment was filed
against him by the new owner in 1972. The trial court dismissed the case
against De Guzman on the grounds that the said crime, which was
punishable by prision correcional, already prescribed, pursuant to Art. 90 of
the RPC. The SC affirmed the challenged decision of the trial court, ruling
that the crime prescribed upon the public registry of the power of attorney
which is considered a notice to the whole world.
FACTS:
- Mariano and Severo Carrere were owners of a parcel of land in
Pangasinan.
- Feb. 5, 1964 – Carrera executed a SPA with De Guzman, naming him as
his attorney-in-fact
- Feb. 13, 1964 – De Guzman mortgaged Carrera’s property with the
People’s Bank and Trust Co. using the SPA and got the P8,500 loan.
- The mortgage foreclosed and the land was sold to Ramon Serafica and
Vileta Quinto. Carrera discovered that his land belonged to someone else
when the former filed an action for his ejectment.
- A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant, stating that:
a) The crime charged would not lie because of complainant’s partial
testimony. Mariano testified that it was his brother, Severo, who asked him
to sign the SPA to authorize De Guzman to mortgage one half of their land.
b) Since the most serious crime in the complex crime was estafa, the penalty
of prision correctional will be imposed but because it is a correctional
penalty, it has already prescribed. More than 10 years had passed from the
commission of the crime, which became public knowledge upon its registry,
to the filing of information.
- Prosecution’s counter:
a) Mariano’s testimony was intended to show that the authority to mortgage
only extended up to the one half portion pertaining to his brother, not
Mariano’s share.
b) Information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered is
January 1972 when Serafica filed the action for ejectment which was when
the crime was discovered. It was not alleged because it was thought to be
merely evidentiary.
- Presiding Judge Castaneda of CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the case.
People’s motion for recon denied by Villalon.
- Special civil action for certiorari raised to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/n the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in law and in fact
COURT: YES. a) Falsification is only the means necessary to commit the
estafa because before the falsified document is used to defraud another, the
crime of falsification was already consummated. The damages were caused
by the commission of estafa.
b) The alleged authorization given to De Guzman to get a loan from the
Bank only pertains to the half owned by Mariano’s brother. In his testimony,
Mariano only quoted his brother.
2. W/n the crime has prescribed
COURT: YES.
a) The start of the prescriptive period was when the falsified SPA was
registed in the Registry of Deeds on Feb. 13, 1964. In a crime of falsification
of public document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the
offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the
document was registered with the Register of Deeds.
Citing People v. Reyes, the Court said that registration in a public registry is
a notice to the whole world. The record is a constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Also,
in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery," it was held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken
place from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds
and that this rule applies in criminal and civil cases.
VERDICT:​ Petition dismissed.
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DAVA v PEOPLE
(202 SCRA 62) G.R. 73
A blank form of the driver's License which is filled up with personal data
and the signature of the registrar of the San Fernando LTC agency
was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, becomes a public
document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172.The driver's
license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage
caused to another person or at least intent to cause such damage has
become immaterial since the principal thing being punished is the violation
of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then the holder of
non-professional driver's license No. 1474427[1] with official receipt No.
7023037,[2] bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E.
Roxas, causing death to the former and physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to the Mandaluyong
Police headquarters where his driver's licensed was confiscated by Cpl.
Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's licensed to the fiscal's
office in Pasig, Rizal. The license was thereafter presented as prosecution
evidence in the criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Pasig.[3]
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father
of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with
plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an
exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava,
Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
appre​hending Dava for driving without a license.[4] The Ministry of Defense
later indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway
Patrol Group (CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and
S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car
described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide Department Store near
the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his
companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver
for his license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No.
2706887[5] with official receipt No. 0605870[6] issued by Agency 2L
Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source
of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon
City for questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of
his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating
therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false
representation in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as
a legal license".[7] In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16,
1978, Lising stated that he was "about to book him for violation of Section 31
of Rep Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's
License above-mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity" and therefore a case for
falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of the Revised
Penal Code should be filed against Dava.[8] Lising concluded that Dava's
driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the xerox copy
of Dava's licensed which was attached to the record of the criminal case in
Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did
"not tally".
-------------------------------------
People vs. Cortez 73 OG 10056
Contention of the State:
Accused Cortez introduced himself to a meat shop, presenting an ID card
bearing another name. He claimed to be authorized to waive inspection of
books for P400.00. When the owner or victim learned that the accused was
not a real BIR agent, he and the authorities set up a string operation. Cortez
was apprehended after taking the money.
Issue:
Whether Cortez should be convicted of robbery or the crime against public
interest known as the Usurpation of Authority.
Resolution:
Cortez knowingly and falsely represented himself as an officer or agent (BIR
agent). Thus, the crime committed by the accused was usurpation of
authority thru falsification of a public document by a private individual. It is
not robbery because there was no force or intimidation.
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GIGANTONI v PEOPLE(162 SCRA 158)
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence
the allegation that an accused falsely represents himself. It is essential
to present proof that one actually knows at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense that he is already dismissed from the
service. An argument that it makes no difference whether the accused
was suspended or dismissed from the service, “for both imply the
absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform
acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of” is
correct only when an accused is charged with Usurpation of Official
Function but not if one is charged with Usurpation of Authority.
-------------------------------------------
LEGAMIA
FACTS:
· Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes. Corazon wasknown as
Corazon L. Reyes; she styledherself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced
her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. They also had a child.
· After Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the
AgriculturalCredit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed
"Corazon L. Reyes." The voucherevidencing payment of Michael's claim in
the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L.Reyes.
· For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio,
Felicisima Reyes whowas married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to
Corazon's prosecution
· Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.5.
· She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an
indeterminate prison term ofonly (1) year and fine but recommended
executive clemency.
ISSUE:
· WON the petitioner violated the law for using an alias to get death
benefits? – ​NO
HELD/RATIO:
· It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent
herself as the wife and usethe name of the man she is living with despite the
fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is
not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon.
· The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his
family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. Yet none of
the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is
not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our
cultural environment that the law must be construed.
· In the case at bar, ​Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost
20 years​. He introduced her tothe public as his wife and she assumed that
role and his name without any sinister purpose orpersonal material gain in
mind.
· ​She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for
Michael who as a boy of tenderyears was under her guardianship​.
Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon
had done especially because some of them probably had their own
Corazons
DECISION:
· Petitioner acquitted
SEPARATE OPINION:
· Concur with the decision for the ske of the son, but practice should not
be encouraged if there is no impediment, common-law husbands must marry
their wives
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DIAZ ​v PEOPLE
(191 SCRA 86)
A person who stated under oath in his application to take a police
examination that he had never been convicted of any crime,
when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions,
committed perjury. The elements of the crime of the crime
of perjury are:
1) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter 2) that the statement or
affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to
receive and administer oath 3) accused made a willful and consideration for Ouano's refraining from takingpart in the public auction,
deliberate assertion of falsehood 4) that a sworn and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeededin causing another
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the
priceof the property auctioned In so doing, theycommitted the felony of
made for a legal purpose.
machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the
Revised Penal Code, supra.That both Ouano andEchavez did these acts is
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a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only one bid that of Echavez
was entered forthe 'land inconsequence of which Echavez eventually
OUANO v CA(188 SCRA 799) Once two persons have promised to
acquired it.The agreementtherefore being criminal in character, the parties
share in a property subject to an issue as a consideration for one to
not only have no action against each otherbut are both liable to prosecution
refrain from taking part in the public auction, and have attempted to cause
and the things and price of their agreementsubject to disposal according to
and succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from an auction
the provisions of the criminal code. This,in accordance with the so-called
in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned,
pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
machination in public auctions under Art 185 of the RPC has been
committed. Causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in
--------------------------------------------------
order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned is an
act constituting the crime of machination in public auctions.

OUANOvs. CA,188 SCRA799

Facts: Theappellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered

underRFC (DBP). Said property was offered for bidding for the secondtime
because the first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s protest. It appears that
prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only
Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they woulddivide the
property inproportion to their adjoining properties.To ensure success oftheir
enterprise,they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be
interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The
latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and
Ouano's wife paid itP2,000 as reimbursement for itsexpenses.

Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction punishable

under the RPC.

Held: These actsconstitute a crime, asthe Trial Court has stressed. Ouano
andEchavez had promised to share in the property inquestion as a