1.
Atienza v Board of Medicine (BOM)
“Wrong Kidney”
Principles:
a. The rules of evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as
the BOM
b. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all while the probative value
of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue.
Facts:
On Feb. 4, 1995, Private respondent Editha Sioson
went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) due to her
lumbar pains for check-up. In 1999, she
underwent diagnostic laboratory tests which
revealed that her right kidney is normal. However,
her left kidney is non-functioning and non-
visualizing. She then underwent a kidney
operation.
Private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as
complainant), filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the BOM
against the doctors who allegedly participated in
the fateful kidney operation. It was alleged that
the gross negligence and/or incompetence
committed by the doctors consists of the removal
of private respondent’s fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
Private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as
complainant, filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence attached to it are Exhibits A to D, which
she offered for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated.
 Ex. A - photocopy for the X-Ray request form
(Dec 12, 1996) with interpretation of
ultrasound results which is identical to the
certified photocopy of the document marked as
Annex 2 of Dr. Lantin’s counter-affidavit
 Ex. B - a certified photocopy of the X-ray
request form (Jan 30, 1997) which also
happens to be the same as or identical to the
certified photocopy of the document marked as
Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III.
 Ex. C - the certified photocopy of the X-ray
request form (March 16, 1996) also marked as
Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries
which are the interpretation of the results of the
examination.
 Ex. D - the certified photocopy of the X-ray
request form (May 20, 1999), which is also
marked as Annex 16 which are appended as
Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-
affidavits filed by Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally
offered in evidence by Editha are mere
photocopies and (1) violate the best evidence rule;
(2) have not been properly identified and
authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and
(4) are incompetent to prove their purpose and
petitioner also contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.
Nevertheless, BOM admitted Editha Siosons
(Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
and denied petitoner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible as evidence
Ruling:
BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of
evidence.
It is well-settled that the rules of evidence
are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that: It is the safest
policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful
or technical grounds, but admitting them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for
the reason that their rejection places them beyond
the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later
to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.
From the foregoing, the Court emphasized the
distinction between the admissibility of evidence
and the probative weight to be accorded the same
pieces of evidence:
 Admissibility of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not the
 circumstance (or evidence) is to be
considered at all.
 The probative value of evidence refers to
the question of whether or not it proves an
issue.
Furthermore, the admission of the exhibits did not
prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because the fact sought to be proved, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated
on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
Likewise, the best evidence rule is
inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the
Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred
from the previous building, x x x to the new
building.
Ultimately, since the originals cannot be
produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas
formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the
BOM shall determine the probative value
thereof when it decides the case.
2. Gomez v Gomez
Forged deeds of donation
Facts:
Consuelo Ariston Angel
Augusto (Special
Maria Rita Jesus Ariston Jr Administrator of
intestate Consuelo)
On February 15, 1980, Augusto Gomez as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez instituted two cases involving different
parcels of land and property belonging to the
deceased Consuelo Gomez.
Consuelo, Ariston Sr. and Angel Gomez were sister
and brothers, respectively. Maria-Rita Gomez-
Samson, Jesus Gomez and Ariston Gomez, Jr. are
the children of Ariston, Sr. while Augusto Gomez
is the child of Angel.
In the first of the two cases, Augusto alleged that
certain parcels of land (2 parcels located in
Marikina and 1 in Pasig) owned by Consuelo were
transferred fraudulently by donations inter vivos in
favor of Maria-Rita and Jesus; and Augusto wanted
the subject Deed of Donation Intervivos declared
false and null and void and be replaced by titles in
the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo.
In the other case, Augusto alleged in his complaint
that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute
owner of certain personal properties such as
shares of stock in different corporations, jewelry,
collector’s items, cars (1978 Mercedes Benz 200
and 1979 Toyota Corona) and P200,000 in cash
and that a fraudulent Deed of Donation Intervivos
was executed by Consuelo in favor of the Aristons.
Augusto also wanted to have such deed cancelled.
Both complaints were consolidated and were
dismissed by the trial court and was also affirmed
by the CA. Thus, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari to SC.
Issue:
Among several issues presented, the core issue as
determined by SC is whether petitioner Augusto
was able to prove that the Deeds of Donation were
merely intercalated into two sheets of paper
signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
Ruling:
NO.
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner
Augusto on the matter is the testimony of Zenaida
Torres, Document Examiner of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Respondents, on the other hand, presented their
own expert
witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document
Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory.
Other direct evidence presented by respondents
includes testimonies positively stating that the
Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in
their completed form in the presence of Notary
Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that
of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of
the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr.
(Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of
Donation.
Weight and Credibility of the Expert
Witnesses
Zenaida Torres's testimony, was that she had
examined the two Deeds of Donation, Documents
No. 401 and No. 402, and her findings were that
the signatures were indeed those of Consuelo.
However, she opined that they were not typed or
prepared in one continuous sitting because the
horizontal lines had some variances horizontally.
Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines
did not show any variance. IDSETA
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court
that the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in
one sitting:
 Regarding non-typing in one continuous
sitting, she admitted that she had never
seen the typewriter used to type the
Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to
get hold of it, before she made the report;
 Further, Torres fell apart during cross-
examination as admitted that she had not
taken any specialized studies on the matter
of "Questioned Documents," except on one
or two seminars on "Questioned
Documents. In effect, insofar as the issue
of typewriting in one sitting or not, is
concerned, the testimony of Torres was
completely discredited
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to
the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
 Cruz testified on this point that the
Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in
one continuous sitting. He elucidated
clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.
He was able to determine that the
typewriter used was the elite typewriter, by
showing that when his typewriting
measuring the instruments were placed
over the documents, there were twelve
(12) letters that went inside one inch,
which is a characteristic of an elite
typewriter.
 Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of
the typewriter ink is the same, thru the
entire documents and further concluded
that both the horizontal and vertical
alignments are in agreement.
Petitioner also alleges that the signature
"Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the
typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." In this
second round of analysis of the respective
testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz,
the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:
 The trial court again sided with Francisco
Cruz who testified, citing authorities, that it
is impossible to determine accurately which
came first, because there were no
intersections at all.
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida
Torres, having positively maintained that the
handwritten signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in
both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the
typewritten name, cannot possibly be overcome
by the opinion of Francisco Cruz putting in issue
the fact that Torres was a court-appointed expert,
as opposed to Cruz who was merely designated by
respondents.
 On the first point, SC agrees with petitioner
that positive evidence is, as a general rule,
more credible than negative evidence.
However, the reason for this rule is that the
witness who testifies to a negative may
have forgotten what actually occurred,
while it is impossible to remember what
never existed.
 While we cannot say that positive evidence
does not carry an inherent advantage over
negative evidence when it comes to expert
witnesses, the process by which the expert
witnesses arrived at their conclusions
 should be carefully examined and
considered.
 Expert testimony no doubt constitutes
evidence worthy of meriting consideration,
although not exclusive on questions of a
professional character. The courts of
justice, however, are not bound to submit
their findings necessarily to such
testimony; they are free to weigh them,
and they can give or refuse to give them
any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the
other elements of conviction which may
have been adduced during the trial.
Alleged patent irregularities on the face of
the assailed Deeds of Donation
Petitioner, also presents circumstantial evidence
and arguments to prove claiming that there are
patent irregularities on the face of the assailed
Deeds of Donation. All these alleged irregularities
are more apparent than real with none of these
alleged irregularities connotes fraud or foul play.
It is true that the condition and physical
appearance of a questioned document constitute a
valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in light
of surrounding circumstances, may help in
determining whether it is genuine or forged.
However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our
personal examination of the exhibits, had revealed
such a questionable physical condition.
Payment of donor's tax before the death of
Consuelo
Petitioner claims that the CA seriously erred in its
finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid the
donor's tax of the properties subject of the
donation
The party asserting a fact has the burden of
proving it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated
conjectures based on the evidence he presented.
Neither did petitioner present any evidence that
the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified
or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a
public official had regularly performed his duties
stand. This is in contrast to respondents' direct
evidence attesting to the payment of said tax
during the lifetime of Consuelo as ruled by CA.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have
been given to the testimony of the notary public,
Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same
judge whom this Court had dismissed from the
service in Garciano v. Sebastian.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not
suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of
such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in
exactly the same way the testimony of other
witnesses must be examined for its relevance and
credibility.
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the
assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED.
3. State of Missouri v William Arthur Ball
“All money are the same”
Principle:
There is no logical connection between the fact of
possession of the dollar bills on one hand and
robbery on the other. As it stands, such evidence
shall be excluded on the ground of irrelevancy.
Facts:
At 2:30 pm on October 15, 1958, two colored men,
one tall (William Ball) and the other short, entered
the Krekeler Jewelry Store. Ball bought a cigarette
lighter and looked at other items while the other
man moved about in the store. Later in the day, at
about 5:50, as the owner, John Kreler, was placing
items in the safe prior to closing, the two men
came back and after drawing a long barreled blue
.38 gun against the owner, they took watches and
rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and
$140 in cash from the register.
About 3 weeks after the robbery, Ball was seen by
police officers and just as he was about to be
cuffed, he shoved the officer and attempted to run
away. He was apprehended when one of the
officers fired shots at him, hitting his legs,
buttocks and his back.
When Ball was finally arrested, the officers took
from his person a brown felt hat which was
recognized by the jewelry store owner, a
windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and
shoes. These items were considered to be relevant
and admissible in evidence.
However, in his motion for new trial, Ball objects
that a police officer was permitted to testify that
$258.02 in currency were taken from his person
along with other personal effects such as a
crusifixion, small pen knife and a black leather
wallet. He argued that these were irrelevant and
immaterial as it neither tended to prove nor
disprove any of the issues involved in this case.
Such currencies and personal effects were even
neither identified by the store owner nor by any
other person as the money allegedly stolen from
the store.
Issue:
Should the currencies taken from Ball be
considered relevant and thus, admissible in
evidence?
Ruling:
No. The mere possession of a quantity of money is
in itself no indication that the possessor was the
taker of money charged as taken, because in
general all money of the same denomination and
material is alike, and the hypothesis that the
money found is the same as the money taken is
too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.
In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from
the record that the money in Ball’s possession at
the time of his arrest came from or had some
connection with the robbery and in the absence of
a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the
robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence
was not in fact relevant.
The admission of the evidence infringed the right
to a fair trial and for that reason, the judgment is
reversed and the case remanded.
4. Lopez vs Heesen
(This is a case decided by the New Mexico
Supreme Court. Selling of a hunting rifle
model which has a defect.)
Facts:
Sears Roebuck was engaged in designing,
manufacturing and selling of hunting fire arms.
Sears sold the Higgins Model 51 Hunting Rifle in
1958. The thing about his model is its design has
a defect. This model is deemed negligently
designed. In fact, its safety device was considered
unsafe and dangerous among gun enthusiasts.
The case started when appellant Jesse Lopez filed
a suit against appellee Robert Heesen alleging that
one fateful day of October of 1958, Heesen
assaulted and shot appellant Lopez with a shotgun
thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds
and injuries to appellant all to his damage in the
total sum of $80.000. Heesen denied the
allegation of the complaint and demanded for a
jury trial. And in this trial the gun company Sears
Roebuck who sold the defected gun to Heesen was
joined as party-defendant.
The amended complaint alleged that on October
14, 1958 Sears sold to Heesen one of said Higgins
Model 51 Hunting Rifles, the one that was
negligently designed or manufactured by Sears,
and that appellee Sears negligently failed to warn
appellee Heesen of the dangerous and defective
condition of the rifle.
The appellant introduced evidence tending to
prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model
51 rifle is easy to knock off safety, making the rifle
dangerous. Frank Doyle, his witness, said that the
safety device, without telescopic sight, is not a
safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it
is too prone to be knocked from “safe” to “fire”
position.
The witness of the appellee, La Violette, on the
other hand, testified that safety device on the
Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard
Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of
Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the
advantages of the safety device of the Higgins
Model 51 rifle. The witness, Thomas Raymond
Robison, Jr., testified that the Higgins Model 51 is
good and practical in the filed for a prudent hunter
and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an
expert witness called by defendant testified that
the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation,
and that the Colt Firearms Company has an
excellent reputation.
Now, the appellant contends that: 1) the trial court
committed error in permitting testimony as to the
general reputation of other firearms companies
who use the same modified leaf safety device as
the Higgins Model 51 in which the witness for
appellee, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., that such
companies had an excellent reputation in the small
arms field. Objection was made to this testimony
on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and
irrelevant to any issue in the case; 2) trial court
erred in permitting evidence to be introduced as to
the poundage pressure required to move the
safety levers of various rifles from “safe” to “fire”
position.
(You see an issue arose with regard to the
pressure required to move the safety lever form
“safe” to “fire” position. And appellee Sears
showed that the poundage pressure required to
move the safety lever on a Higgins Model 51 from
“safe” to “Fire” measured 2 ½ pounds. The
evidence discloses that the pound pressure
required to move the safety lever on other similar
devices was sometimes little less and sometimes
more than the Higgins Model 51...
In other words they couldn’t outright determine
whether the 2 ½ pound pressure would be enough
in order for the rifle to be safe. And that means
they needed an expert opinion on this...
The QUESTION is.. is expert opinion or shall we
say Opinion Evidence be admissible in court as
adduced evidence by any party?
This is a clear case of OPINION EVIDENCE because
this is an ultimate ISSUE OF FACT. Where the fact
to be determined is whether the safety device on
the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous and defective
or unsafe and was properly the subject of expert
testimony. Nakit.an ra ni nako. Nice siya haha)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of other firearms
companies who use the same device are
admissible as evidence in court.
RULING:
1) Under Rule 21-1-1(43) (a) the rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs, the basis
being that any evidence which throws light on the
question in issue should be admitted, leaving it to
the trial court to hold the hearing within
reasonable bounds. We hold that the testimony as
to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who
manufacture the safety device on the Higgins
Model 51 and the reputation of Marlin Firearms
Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company and Jefferson Corporation, who
manufacture rifles which have the same modified
leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was
relevant to the issue whether the safety device on
the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting this testimony.
2) Under this circumstances, it was proper for the
appellee to show that poundage pressure required
to move the safety lever on Higgins Model 51 from
“safe” to “fire” measured two-and-one-half
pounds, and also to show the poundage pressure
required in rifles with identical safety devices
because the Doyle’s testimony was introduced
under appellant’s contention that the Higgins
Model 51 rifle was unsafe and thus the issue arose
as to the pressure required to move the safety
lever from “safe” to “fire” position.
The thing about opinion evidence is its
admissibility in court depends on the facts of the
case at hand. In other words, there is no clear cut
basis that expert opinions adduced as evidence in
ultimate issues of facts can outright determine the
outcome of the case. In fact it does not attempt or
have the power to usurp the functions of such in
this case, the jury. As stated in the case, the jury
may still reject these expert opinions and accept
some other view. Its admissibility all depends on
the jury’s assessment on how expert the expert
opinion is. Besides, opinion evidence offered by
both parties in this case was not binding upon the
jury and they were so instructed.
The opinion evidence in this case were admitted
on the basis that it aided the jury to understand
the problem and led them to the truth on the
ultimate facts.
5. People vs. Marti
“Marijuana Leaves in a Gift Box”
Principle:
a. Exclusionary Rule on evidence
obtained in violation against
unreasonable searches and
seizures
b. Evidence procured by individuals
effected through private seizure is
deemed admissible
c. Self-serving denials deserve no
weight in law
d. Evidence, to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the
common experience and
observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the
circumstances.
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, Andre Marti and his
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to an Export Forwarder
to send 4 gift wrapped packages to a friend,
Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes
attended to their concerns and asked the
appellant Marti if she could examine and inspect
the packages. However, Marti assured her that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves, merely gifts.
Before delivery to the Bureau of Customs,
Anita Reyes’ husband, Job Reyes, opened the
boxes, following standard operating procedures.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emitted. He
squeezed the bundles and felt dried leaves inside.
Thereafter, Job Reyes reported the shipment to
the NBI and requested a laboratory examination
of the samples. The samples were brought to the
Narcotics Section of the NBI. Job was invited by
the NBI to bring the other packages, where Job
opened the packages in the presence of the NBI
agents. Dried marijuana leaves were found inside
all four packages.
An Information was filed against Marti for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial insued, and Marti was
found guilty. Upon appeal, appellant assigns the
following errors:
1. Evidence was obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication, thus it
should be held inadmissible in
evidence
2. His rights under the constitution while
under custodial investigation were not
observed (Not related to discussion)
3. No credence in his explanation as to
how the four parcels came into his
possession
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of his
rights against unreasonable search and
seizure that would lead the evidence to be
deemed admissible or inadmissible
2. Whether or not his explanation should be
given consideration
Ruling:
1. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the
Constitution provide:
"Section 2.The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
"Section 3.(1)The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2)Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
Exclusionary Rule is laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by
the US Federal SC, and in our SC, in Stonehill v.
Diokno. This rule declares as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant. In several cases, the SC
adhered to this rule, and in these cases, the
evidence were so obtained and procured by the
State acting through its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies. However, in the
case at bar, the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without
any intervention and participation of State
authorities. It is a principle, that in the absence of
governmental interference, the rights under the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
It is clear from the facts that the search was done
by Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, following standard operating procedures.
In fact, he took samples to send to the NBI. The
mere presence of the NBI did not convert the
reasonable into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. To repeat,
violations against unreasonable search and seizure
may only be invoked against the State by an
individual who unjustly exercises sovereign
authority. It can never be invoked against an act
done by a private individual, acting in his personal
capacity.
Similarly, the admissibility of evidence procured by
an individual effected through private seizure,
equally applies to appellant’s rights to privacy and
communication.
2. Appellant contends that he was not the
owner of the packages as he was merely
requested by a certain Michael, a German
National, whom he met at a pub in Ermita.
In their 30-minute conversation, the
request was made and he was given P2,000
to ship the packages as Michael had to
leave the country the next day.
SC finds that the testimony is self-serving and
contrary to human experience as the story can
easily be fabricated. It is not normal for a
stranger to entrust the shipment of the
packages to a person he just met in a span of
30 minutes. As to why Marti agreed to do the
errand, he failed to explain. Denials, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are considered as negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight to the testimony of a credible witness.
Appelant was also previously convicted of
possession of hashish in Germany, and the
supposed recipient of the package was likewise
convicted for drug abuse in Zurich. Evidence to
be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common
 experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.
6. Waterous Drug Corp. V. NLRC
“Overpriced purchase of medicines”
FACTS:
Antonia Melodia Catolico,was hired as a
pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation. She filed before the Office of the
Labor Arbiter a case for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal and illegal suspension against the
petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. A case in
point is medicine purchased with YSP of ten (10)
bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit.
Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the
price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is
priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per
bottle (or total of P640.00). YSP sent a check
contained in the envelope which payable to
Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. I
It is furthered argued that the envelope was
opened by another employee and should therefore
not be admissible as evidence for violation of the
guaranteed constitutional right on the privacy of
communication. Catolico was required to answer
in writing the charges made against her and was
subsequently dismissed from service without any
hearing conducted. Labor Arbiter decided in favour
of private respondent who declared the dismissal
and suspension illegal, for failure by petitioners to
prove their allegations against private respondent
and to show any investigation was conducted, and
was therefore, dismissed without just cause and
due process. The complaint for unfair labor
practice was however dismissed by the Labor
Arbiter.
NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit, and affirmed the labor arbiter's findings, but
with modification on the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
suspension as the same was already included in
the computation of the aggregate of the awards in
the amount of P35,401.86. It declared that the
check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the
Constitution.Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioners filed this special
civil action for certiorari, with the allegations that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and
that due process was duly accorded to private
respondent. In addition, petitioner further alleged
that the Commission gravely erred in applying
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in
the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to the immunity of ones person from interference
by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
ISSUE:
W/N the check drawn by YSP is admissible as
evidence. YES 2. W/N Catolico was unjustly
dismissed. YES
HELD:
As regards the constitutional violation upon which
the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason
to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti
that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true,
as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.
Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment. It is evident from the
Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was
dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for
petitioners, their evidence does not establish that
there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C.
Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's
inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit:
4. My findings revealed that on or before the
month of July 31, 1989, Ms.
Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure,
made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to
supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets
at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg.
which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine
the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per
bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting
Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita
Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice
and she said that the difference was refunded
through their check voucher no. 629552 which was
shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico,
through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal
was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes
never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to
this case; thus, we have to reject the statements
attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence
carries no probative value.
The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's
participation in the purchase. If the price increase
was objectionable to petitioners, they or their
officers should have disapproved the transaction.
Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for
their predicament but themselves. This set of facts
emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation
proposed by petitioners. Catolico's dismissal then
was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which
in no case can justify an employee's dismissal.
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided
by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence must
rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion.
7. People of the Philippines V. Eric
Guillermo
“Chop-chop”
FACTS: Guillermo has been found guilty of murder
by the Trial Court of Antipolo City with evident
premeditation and treachery thereby sentencing
him to suffer death penalty. The facts show that
Guillermo killed his employer Victor Keyser, owner
of Keyser Plastics, by hitting him with a piece of
wood and thereafter cutting his limbs with a
carpenter’s saw.
Keyser Plastics shares its building with Greatmore
Corp. where prosecution witness Campos is
employed as a security guard. According to
Campos, the spaces of the two companies are
separated by a wall, the lower part of which is
made of cement but the upper part is made of
lawanit boards. The upper part made of lawanit
has two large holes which would allow a person on
one side of the wall to see the other side. He
further said that on the day of the crime, he both
saw the accused and the victim enter the premises
of Keyser Plastics at around 8:00 am. At around
10:00 am, he heard some loud noises from Keyser
Plastics but he did not pay attention thinking it was
just the sound from the machines. He was,
however, interrupted when the accused looked
through one of the holes and calmly told him that
the accused has killed his employer and needed
help in disposing the body. Shocked by this,
Campos immediately called the police.
After succeeding in persuading Guillermo to give
them the keys to the locked gate, the police
accosted the accused who told them “Sir, hindi ako
lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito.” When
asked where the victim’s body was, Guillermo
pointed to some cardboard boxes where the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso was found,
while the victim’s head was inside a cement bag.
When the police asked how he did it, the accused
answered that he first hit the head of the victim
and then dismembered the body. The accused
then turned over a blood-stained coconut lumber
and a saw. When asked as to his motive, he
answered that Keyser had been maltreating him
and his co-workers. He expressed no regret for his
actions. At the police station, however, the
custodial investigation was conducted without
appraising the accused of his constitutional rights
and his right to counsel.
While in police custody, Guillermo was interviewed
on separate occasions by two TV reporters,
namely: Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN and Kara David
of GMA. Appellant admitted to David that he
committed the crime and never gave it second
thought. He also disclosed to David the details of
the crime. When asked why he killed his employer,
Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for
years, did not feed him properly, and treated him
like an animal. Both Abelgas and David said that
Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over
his alleged misdeed during the course of their
respective interviews with him.
During the trial, Guillermo’s defense consisted of
denial, that he was a victim of a police frame-up.
He said that he was a stay-in employee and that
on the day of the crime, he was asked to work
overtime during the afternoon. Since his employer
did not arrive, he fell asleep and was awakened by
the police asking him to open the gates. According
to him, the police immediately handcuffed him and
looked around the premises and returned carrying
boxes and sacks. He said he was then brought to
the police station where he was advised to admit
having killed his employer since there was no
other person to be blamed. When he was made to
face the media reporters, he said the police
instructed him what to say.
Having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death, Guillermo’s case was brought for automatic
review to the SC.
ISSUE/S: 1) W/N the prosecution’s evidence is
sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
2) W/N the death penalty is appropriate in
accused’s case
RULING: 1) Yes.
The accused contends that any evidence gathered
from him during the custodial investigation,
including his confession, is inadmissible due to the
fact that he was not properly informed of his
rights. He was only made to read said rights in the
wall of the precinct.
The contention has merit. However, there are
other instances, aside from the custodial
investigation, that accused had voluntarily
admitted the crime. First, he admitted the crime
to Campos, whose testimony was not countered
by the defense. Second, he admitted the crime to
members of the media on two separate occasions.
Third, he voluntarily confessed before the police
could enter the scene and before any questions
were posed to him.
Therefore, while the confession during the
custodial investigation is inadmissible because of
the disregard of the accused’s constitutional
rights, the other instances wherein he admitted to
committing the crime are admissible since the
rights enumerated in the Constitution are meant
to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive
power as would lead an accused to admit
something false but are not intended to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth
outside the sphere of such power.
2) No.
The aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery were not sufficiently
proven.
The autopsy revealed that the traumas in the head
were found on the front, left, and right side of the
head but none were found at the back of the head.
Moreover, there was no witness to testify as to
how the head was hit by the accused.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply
proved by the prosecutions evidence which shows
that the victims corpse was sewn by appellant into
7 pieces. Under the RPC, outraging or scoffing at
the corpse is a qualifying circumstance.
Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
In this case, the corpse of thee victim was
dismembered by the accused who sawed off the
head, limbs, and torso. The Information
categorically alleges this qualifying circumstance,
when it stated that the appellant thereafter, cut
into pieces using said saw one Victor Keyser. This
being the case, as proved by the prosecution,
accused is guilty not just of homicide but of
murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances in the instant case, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed upon accused.
(Basin lang I-ask, gi-reduce ang damages. Moral
damages P500k to P50k, exemplary P300k to
P25k, compensatory P500k deleted because of
lack of proof, civil indemnity P50k, and attorney’s
fees P25k.)
8. VILLAFOR vs SUMMERS [1920]
(physical examination for pregnancy sa
adulterer)
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.
(Section 17, Article III)
FACTS: Emeteria Villaflor and her paramour,
Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of
adultery before the CFI in Manila. On trial before
the Judge, Hon. Pedro Concepcion, upon the
petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of
Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria
Villaflor (petitioner herein) to submit her body to
the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The
accused refused to obey the order on the ground
that such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision relating to
self-incrimination (Section 17, Article III).
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and
was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
As a result, petitioner now prays that a writ of
habeas corpus be issued to restore her to her
liberty.
ISSUE/S: WoN the compelling of a woman to
permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant violates the
constitutional right providing that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. –NO, the privilege only applies to
testimonial compulsion, not to a physical
examination.
RULING:
(naa’y taas na discussion on some opposing
decisions sa courts sa US but wala nalang nako i-
include. Ang gist is conservative courts would deny
physical examination since they view it as violative
of the right against self-incrimination; while more
progressive courts allow physical examination. We
follow the progressive view since we see the
absolute protection of an accused as a loose
extension of the constitutional guaranty.)
A legal shield was raised against odious
inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused
person by which to extort unwilling confessions
with the ever present temptation to commit the
crime of perjury – nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare. The kernel of the privilege as
disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness
against himself was deemed contrary to the
fundamentals of republican government, the
principle was taken into the American
Constitutions, and from the United States was
brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as
wide — but no wider — a scope as it existed in old
English days. The provision should here be
approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with
a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its
benefits and its abuses.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our
position is to go back once more to elements and
ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal
trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal
laws is to purge the community of persons who
violate the laws to the great prejudice of their
fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of
evidence, and constitutional provisions, are
then provided, not to protect the guilty but to
protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be
so rigid as to embarrass the administration of
justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No
accused person should be afraid of the use of any
method which will tend to establish the truth. For
instance, under the facts before us, to use torture
to make the defendant admit her guilt might only
result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no
evidence of physical facts can for any
substantial reason be held to be detrimental
to the accused except in so far as the truth is
to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty
person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that
under the due process of law cause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and
inherent right to the possession and control of his
own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense
of decency and propriety to have to decide that
such inviolability of the person, particularly of a
woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway
Co. vs. Botsford said, "To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a
trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested
by the same court, even superior to the
complete immunity of a person to be let alone
is the inherent which the public has in the
orderly administration of justice.
Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of
witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are
put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the
witness in public estimation does not exempt him
from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice
of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the
public welfare for refined notions of delicacy,
law and justice cannot hesitate.
Once again we lay down the rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is
that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether
facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided
as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an
examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarass the patient any
more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made
by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of
the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to
the request of the assistant fiscal for an
examination of the person of the defendant by
physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it
should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to
the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore
legal.
9. Pascual vs. Board of Medical
Examiners
Keywords: Medical Malpractice; Administrative
case; Punitive nature; Self-incrimination; Witness
stand
Principle: A respondent in an administrative case
may not be compelled to take the witness stand
without his consent if such case, while
administrative in character, possesses a criminal
or penal aspect.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed with the CFI of
Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners alleging that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, he,
who was the respondent in such malpractice case,
would be made a witness.
He objected, through his counsel, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself. Board of Medical
Examiners (respondent) stated that at the next
scheduled hearing, Pascual would be called upon
to testify as witness, unless he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
Pascual alleged that in ruling to compel him to take
the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion for failure to
respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding
against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss
of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.
The lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Board and ordered the latter
to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon
petitioner’s posting of a bond amounting to P500.
According to the Board, the right against self-
incrimination is available only when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness. Pascual's remedy is to object once he is
in the witness stand. Respondent Board, denied
that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
A motion for intervention was filed by Salvador
Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the
complainants in the administrative case for
malpractice against Pascual. Their answer in
intervention sustained the power of Board of
Medical Examiners, which for them is limited to
compelling the witness to take the stand, to be
distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to
compel a witness to incriminate himself. They
likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
The lower court found the claim of Pascual to be
well-founded and prohibited the Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself."
Issues:
1. WON a respondent in an administrative case be
compelled to take the witness stand without his
consent.
2. WON the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to
which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred.
Held:
Lower court decision was AFFIRMED.
1. NO. If the administrative case is
punitive in nature, as in this case.
In the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, an administrative
charge for unexplained wealth having been filed
against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the
complainant requested that petitioner be ordered
to take the witness stand. Petitioner refused to be
sworn as a witness and was charged for contempt.
SC found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that "the accused in a
criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand."
While the matter referred to an a administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, the Anti-Graft Act
authorizes the forfeiture of whatever property a
public officer or employee may acquire, in
proportion to his salary and his other lawful
income. As such, there is clearly the imposition of
a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a
criminal or penal aspect.
In this case, petitioner would be similarly
disadvantaged. Since he could suffer the
revocation of his license as a medical
practitioner and result in the loss of the
privilege to practice the medical profession.
An American Supreme Court opinion is then made
reference in the case at bar: In the language of
Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends
its protection to lawyers as well as to other
individuals, and that it should not be watered down
by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting
it."
2. NO. Allowing a witness to object to
questions the answers to which could
lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred is merely one
aspect to the right against self-
incrimination.
The constitutional guarantee also protects as well
the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the SC
has held that, "the accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." In Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, the SC reaffirmed the doctrine stating
that it is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand — with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The constitutional guarantee, along with other
rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the
truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. "The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Equal emphasis was also made of a person's right
to privacy. According to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force to surrender to
his detriment."
In an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent
Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently
with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.
10. Manuel F. Cabal V. Ruperto Kapunan
One liner: Proceedings for forfeiture of property
are deemed criminal or penal, and hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal cases from
the obligation to be witness against themselves
are applicable thereto.
Facts:
Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed
with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-
complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an
officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies,
giving false statements of his assets and liabilities
in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". The
following month, the President of the Philippines
created a committee of five (5) members to
investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint and submit its
report and recommendations as soon as possible.
The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take
the witness stand in the administrative proceeding
and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in
support of his aforementioned charge of
unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the
order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and
be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to
answer such questions as may be incriminatory.
This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully
refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the
witness stand.
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of
Manila, for such action as he may deem proper.
The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey
the order of the Committee to take the witness
stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of
respondent Judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with
respondent Judge a motion to quash, on the
following grounds:
(1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority
nor personality to file said char and the
same is null and void, for, if criminal,
the charge has been filed without a
preliminary investigation, and, civil, the
City Fiscal may not file it, his authority
in respect of civil cases being limited to
representing the City of Manila; (2) that
the facts charged constitute no offense
for section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, upon which the
charge is based, violates due process,
in that it is vague and uncertain as
regards the offense therein defined and
the fine imposable therefor and that it
fail to specify whether said offense shall
be treated also contempt of an inferior
court or of a superior court (3) that
more than one offense is charged, for
the contempt imputed to petitioner is
sought to be punished as contempt of
an inferior court, as contempt of a
superior court an as contempt under
section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court;
(4) that the Committee had no power to
order an require petitioner to take the
witness stand and be sworn to, upon
the request of Col. Maristela, as witness
for the latter, inasmuch as said order
violates petitioner's constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Motion to quash denied.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter
alia, that the investigation being conducted by the
Committee above referred to is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied
upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary
investigations is inapplicable to contempt
proceedings.

Issue:
WON the proceedings before the aforementioned
Committee is civil or criminal in character such
that if it is criminal, then the right to self-
incrimination is applicable. (ANS: Forfeiture
proceedings are criminal in character although
technically a civil proceeding; defendants may
invoke right to self-incrimination)
Ruling:
Although the said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of
the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes
the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property.
However, such forfeiture has been held to partake
of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to
be witnesses against themselves are applicable
thereto.
It has frequently been held upon constitutional
grounds under the various State Constitution, that
a witness or party called as witness cannot be
made to testify against himself as to matters which
would subject his property to forfeiture.
In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it
was held that the information, in a proceeding to
declare a forfeiture of certain property because of
the evasion of a certain revenue law, “though
technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and
effect a criminal one”, and that suits for penalties
and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled
in a criminal to be a witness against himself.
In this case, while it is an administrative
proceeding, it is criminal in nature in the sense
that if he be found guilty, he stands the risk of his
property being forfeited and be dismissed from
service. Thus, he may not be forced to take the
witness stand like an accused in a criminal case.
11. BELTRAN v. SAMSON
KEY WORDS: handwriting
There is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition [against self-
incrimination] is directed not merely to giving
of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by
word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact
which the accused has a right to hold secret.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein
the petitioner Beltran [who is a municipal
treasurer] complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal
to take dictation in his own handwriting from the
latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is
he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified. [NOTE: at this time, there was still no
information filed, this is still on the preliminary
investigation stage with the fiscal]
But the respondents contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch
as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and
later granted by the court below, and against
which the instance action was brought, is based on
the provisions of Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down
in the cases of People vs. Badilla; United
States vs. Tan Teng; United States vs. Ong Siu
Hong, cited by counsel for the respondents, and in
the case of Villaflor vs. Summers cited by the
judge in the order in question.
The fiscal under Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to
be present at the investigation of any crime
of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the
fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3
of the Jones Law which reads: "Ni se le obligara a
declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal" and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in
section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted
first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law,
which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor
shall he be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."
ISSUE:
W/N compelling the petitioner to write in his
handwriting under the fiscal’s dictation violates
his constitutional right against self-
incrimination? –YES
HELD:
The Court finds the present action well taken,
and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
As to the scope of the constitutional provision
(par.3 sec.3 jones law), this privilege is not
limited precisely to testimony, but extends
to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the
constitutional provision that no man accused of
crime shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward
their relaxation so great when the suspicion of
guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it
is the duty of courts liberally to construe the
prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to
refuse to permit any steps tending toward their
invasion. Hence, there is the well-
established doctrine that the constitutional
inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than
by word of mouth, the divulging, in short,
of any fact which the accused has a right to
hold secret.
But however the question is whether the writing
from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for
the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
Thus, it must be considered that it has been
settled that whenever a defendant, at the trial of
his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that
a certain writing or signature is in his own hand,
he may on cross-examination be compelled to
write in open court in order that the jury may be
able to compare his handwriting with the one in
question. It was so held in the case of
Bradford vs. People inasmuch as the
defendant, in offering himself as witness in
his own behalf, waived his personal
privileges.
Similarly, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com.,
where the judge asked the defendant to write his
name during the hearing, and the latter did so
voluntarily. The defendant had the legal
right to refuse to write, but he preferred to
accede to the request voluntarily.
But however the cases abovementioned so
resolved cannot be compared to the one now
before us. We are not concerned here with a
defendant, for it does not appear that any
information was filed against the petitioner
for the supposed falsification, and still less is
it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and
under cross-examination. This is only an
investigation prior to the information and with a
view to filing it. And let it further be noted that
in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant
performed the act voluntarily.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is
something more than moving the body, or
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
Except that it is more serious, we believe the
present case is similar to that of producing
documents of chattels in one's possession.
And as to such production of documents or
chattels, which to our mind is not so serious as
the case now before us, the same eminent
Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says:
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of
Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows
 that the production of documents or
chattels by a person (whether ordinary
witness or party-witness) in response to
a subpoena, or to a motion to order
production, or to other form of process
treating him as a witness (i. e. as a
person appearing before the tribunal to
furnish testimony on his moral
responsibility for truth- telling), may be
refused under the protection of the
privilege; and this is universally
conceded."
We say that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious
than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness
is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier.
While it cannot be contended in the present case
that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime
would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not
be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen
or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of herein, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by
the constitution. It might be true that in some
cases criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison
d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this
court and cited on behalf of the respondents
[these are the cases the judge and the fiscal
cited in favor of their position], it should be
remembered that in the case of
People vs. Badilla, it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned
by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to
have waived their constitutional privilege, as
they could certainly do.
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating
evidence, while absolute when claimed,
may be waived by any one entitled to
invoke it." As in the case of United
States vs. Tan Teng where the defendant did not
oppose the extraction from his body of the
substance later used as evidence against him.
And in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers, it was
plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its
decision on the reason of the case rather than on
blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of
the case there consisted in that it was a case of
the examination of the body by physicians, which
could be and doubtless was interpreted by this
court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner
therein to furnish evidence by means of
a testimonial act. In reality she was not
compelled to execute any position act, much less
a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from
something, preventing the examination; all of
which is very different from what is required of
the petitioner in the present case, where it is
sought to compel his to perform a positive,
testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of
his handwriting for the purpose of comparison
12. US vs Tan Teng
Keywords: rape; gonorrhoea, chinamen
Principle: The prohibition that a person shall not
be compelled to be a witness against himself, is
simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of his guilt.
FACTS:
The defendant was charged with the crime of
raping, Olivia Pacomio, a girl, 7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles
S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of
the offense of abusos deshonestos.
The facts of the case are, on the 15th day of
September, Oliva was staying in the house of her
sister located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in Manila. On
said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling
who have the habit of visiting the house of her
sister. Oliva after taking a bath, returned to her
room where he was followed by defendant who
asked for some face powder. After using the
powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva on
the flower, and placed his private parts upon hers.
Several days after, the sister of Oliva discovered
that the Oliva was suffering from gonorrhoea. It
was during this time that Oliva related to her sister
what happened.
The sister at once foot an investigation to find the
Chinamen. A number of Chinamen were collected
wherein Oliva was called to identify the
perpetrator. Defendant was not present at first but
when he arrived, Oliva identified him.
Defendant was arrested and was stripped of his
clothing. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from his body and was turned
over to the Bureau of Science (BOS) for scientific
analysis wherein he was found to be suffering
gonorrhoea.
During trial, defendant objected to the
admissibility of the testimony of Oliva by reason of
his age, however the trial court held that she had
sufficient knowledge and discernment, thus her
testimony deserves full credit.
Also, he contended the result of the scientific
examination made by the BOS as it was not
admissible in evidence. To admit such evidence is
to compel defendant to testify against himself.
ISSUE: WON the examination conducted by BOS
was in violation of the right of Tan Teng against
self-incrimination.
SC:
No, it is not.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from
the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt.
The doctrine contended for by appellant would
prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his
identity. Such an application of the prohibition
under discussion certainly could not be permitted.
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the
court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege
granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does
not call upon the accused as a witness — it does
not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. Evidence obtained in this way from
the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
In this case, evidence clearly shows that the
defendant was suffering from the venereal
disease, and that through his brutal conduct said
disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a
rape cases, it is always difficult to secure positive
and direct proof. Such crimes as the present are
generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In
cases of rape the courts of law require
corroborative proof, for the reason that such
crimes are generally committed in secret. In the
present case, taking into account the number and
credibility of the witnesses, their interest and
attitude on the witness stand, their manner of
testifying and the general circumstances
surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that
both parties were found to be suffering from a
common disease, the accused is guilty of the crime
of "abusos deshonestos”.
13. People vs Salanguit GR 133254-55,
April 19, 2001
Officers should be careful as their slight mistake
will absolve a person of his crime. (referring to
the marijuana possession in the case)
FACTS:
Mr. Roberto Salanguit was charged with violation
of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). On December
26, 1995 in Quezon City he wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possessed 11.14g of Metamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and 1,254g of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug. This was confiscated by virtue of
the search warrant.
On Dec. 25, 1996, Inspector Aguilar applied for the
warrant in Branch 90 of Dasmarinas Cavite, this
was supported by his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he
was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu
was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room.
The warrant is issued by Judge Dolores Espanol.
They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped
in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of
the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and
those contained in a small box with a total weight
of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other
hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing
425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found
to be marijuana.
The accused contested the conviction in three
grounds:
First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered on the ground that the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid.
Second, the admissibility of the marijuana
allegedly seized from the accused pursuant to the
plain view doctrine.
Third, employment of unnecessary force by the
officers.
ISSUE:
 WON the marijuana seized is justified on
the ground of plain view doctrine by the
searching party.
HELD:
FIRST, accused proposed the invalidity of the
search warrant using three grounds: one, no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia.
Second, search warrant issued for more than one
specific offense. And lastly. Place to be searched
was not described with sufficient particularity.
To rebut the first ground, the court held that the
fact that there was no probable cause to support
the application for the seizure of the drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant was void. The fact would
be material only if the drug paraphernalia was in
fact seized by the police officer. None was taken
by the searching party. The search warrant is only
void in so far as it authorized the seizure of the
drug paraphernalia but valid as to the seizure of
the metamphetamine hydrochloride. In Aday vs.
Supreme Court, the invalid portions of the search
warrant are severable from the authorization of
the named articles. In conclusion, the first part of
the search warrant authorizing the search of the
accused’s house for undetermined quantity of
shabu is valid even though the second part of the
search for the drug paraphernalia is not.
To rebut the second ground, even though the
possession or use of shabu and the possession of
drug paraphernalia are punished under two
provisions of RA 6425, still the Court follows
similar jurisprudence. In People vs Dichoso, it is
said that the argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drug Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are
prohibited and regulated and defines and penalizes
categories of offense which are closely related or
which belong to the same class. Accordingly, one
search warrant may thus be validly issued for the
violation of Dangerous Drug Act
To rebut the third ground, that the search warrant
failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the rule is that
a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched. While the address stated
in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact
that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160
contained several documents which identified the
premises to be searched. Also police officers who
raided appellant's house under the leadership of
Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not
have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides
in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where
appellant lives.
SECOND. (this is the part of the case that is
relevant to the subject of EVEDENCE) The
contention of the accused that the search warrant
authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. This is
a correct contention by the accused and help by
the carelessness of the police officers in writing the
report.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects
within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.
For the doctrine to apply, there must be the
requisites present: (a) prior justification; (b)
inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence
before the police.
The court discussed first the “prior justification and
discovery by inadvertence”
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has
been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no
longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found.
In the case at bar the police failed to allege in the
case the time when the marijuana was found, be
it prior to or contemporaneous with the shabu
subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an
area within his immediate control.
Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been
recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid.
The court discussed second the “apparent
Illegality of the evidence”
The court explained that the marijuana bricks were
wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. And pointed a
jurisprudence of People v. Musa in which we
declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by
NARCOM agents because the said drugs were
contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication
of its contents.
THIRD, The claims that undue and unnecessary
force was employed by the searching party in
effecting the raid.
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure:
Right to break door or window to
effect search. — The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the
policemen had clambered up the roof of his
house to gain entry and had broken doors
and windows in the process is unsupported
by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of
disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented
by accused-appellant to attest to the truth
of his claim.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-
64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko
guilty of possession of illegal drugs under
§16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act
14. PEOPLE v DAMASO
The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has
no probative value.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was
originally charged in an information filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of subversion, together 6 other persons.
Such information was later amended to exclude all
other persons except the accused-appellant Basilio
Damaso from the criminal charge.
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a
Philippine Constabulary officer and some
companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the
group apprehended 4 persons. When interrogated,
the persons apprehended revealed that there was
an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They found subversive
documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and
other items. L
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan,
Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of
Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They
interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of
Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked
with Bernie Mendoza aka Basilio Damaso, herein
appellant. She guided the group to the house
rented by appellant. When they reached the
house, the group found that it had already been
vacated by the occupants.
The Barangay Captain of the place was requested
to point out the new house rented by appellant.
The group again required Morados to go with
them. When they reached the house, the group
saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that
they already knew that she was a member of the
NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when
she saw Morados she requested the group to go
inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the
Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox copiers and a computer
machine. They also found persons who were
companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita
Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group
requested the persons in the house to allow them
to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one
of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard,
maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d)
Laguna and other items.
They confiscated the articles and brought them to
their headquarters for final inventory. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to
the headquarters for investigation. Said persons
revealed that appellant was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated therefrom.
Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal
possession of firearms. The prosecution presented
as witnesses Lt. Quijardo and M/Sgt Gomez to
attest to this fact.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence is admissible or not on
grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial, or
irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant
HELD:
NO, the evidence is inadmissible.
1. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the
same person as the lessee of the house where the
M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found
or the owner of the said items. The testimonies are
hearsay because the witnesses testified on
matters not on their own personal knowledge.
* The Solicitor General, however, argues that
while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same
are admissible because of the failure of counsel for
appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay
testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into
thinking that since these testimonies are admitted
as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
cannot be given credence.
2. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case
against him still will not prosper, the reason being
that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. Although, there are instances when
a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid
[(1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a
moving vehicle, and (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view] but none of the exceptions is present
in this case.
* Solicitor General claims that the group of Lt.
Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon
invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados, helper of the appellant, so technically
speaking, there was no search as the group was
voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion;
that besides, a search may be validly conducted
without a search warrant with the consent of the
person searched as in this case, appellant's helper
and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to
look around the appellant's house; and that since
the evidence seized was in plain view of the
authorities, the same may be seized without a
warrant.
The Court is not persuaded. The constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived
by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do
so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the
records show that appellant was not in his house
at that time. There is no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the
appellant's helper, or if it was true that she was
his helper, that the appellant had given her
authority to open his house in his absence. As a
consequence, the search conducted by the
authorities was illegal. It would have been
different if the situation here demanded urgency
which could have prompted the authorities to
dispense with a search warrant. But the record is
silent on this point.
3. There is a discrepancy between the description
of the evidence and the evidence actually
presented. In the amended information, the gun
was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no.
1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore
a different serial number which is 1249985.
*The Solicitor General contends that the
discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
The Court does not think so. This glaring error
goes into the substance of the charge. Its
correction or lack of it could spell the difference
between freedom and incarceration of the
accused-appellant.
Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from
the gun described in the amended information, the
corpus delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact
that a crime has actually been committed) has not
been fully established. This circumstance coupled
with dubious claims of appellant's connection to
the house (where the gun was found) have totally
emasculated (weakened) the prosecution's case.
The evidence in hand is too weak to convict the
accused-appellant of the charge. ACCORDINGLY,
the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and the appellant is ACQUITTED
15. Robin Padilla V. Ca and People of the
Philippines
Robin Padilla case
FACTS: Enrique Manarang and Danny Perez were
inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto.
Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from
the rain that had interrupted their ride on
motorcycles. While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero
with the plate number PMA 777, running fast down
the highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident considering the
inclement weather. True enough, immediately
after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast followed by a sickening
sound of the vehicle hitting something. The two
went out to investigate and immediately saw the
vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the
highway giving it a slight tilt to its side. Manarang,
being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic
group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating
Council, decided to report the incident to the PNP
of Angeles City. Manarang went to the location of
the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody. He asked Cruz to look after the victim
while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle. He called the
Viper through the radio once again reporting that
a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA
777 was involved in a hit and run accident. The
police then positioned themselves near the south
passage of the Abacan bridge since it was the only
passable route going north.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of the police near
Abacan bridge. The police vehicle cut into the path
of the vehicle forcing it to stop.
One police officer went to the vehicle and
instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while
raising both his hands. They recognized the driver
as Robin C. Padilla. Appellant was wearing a short
leather jacket such that when he alighted with
both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side
of his waist was revealed. The police then
confiscated the gun. As the most senior police
officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed
out to appellant the fact that the plate number of
his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the
hood were dented. Appellant, however, arrogantly
denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and
pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying
'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko'. Because appellant's
jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's
back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so
when appellant turned around as he was talking
and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated
the magazine from appellant. Suspecting that
appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the
vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle
by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle.
He saw a baby armalite rifle lying at the front by
the driver's seat. He asked appellant for the
papers covering the rifle and appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado
modified the arrest of appellant by including as its
ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO
Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional
rights.
At the police station, appellant voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol
and a magazine. Appellant also voluntarily
surrendered a black bag containing two additional
long magazines and one short magazine.
During the investigation, appellant admitted
possession of the firearms stating that he used
them for shooting. He was not able to produce any
permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover
the three firearms. Later on, a certification was
issued by the chief of the Record Branch of the
Firearms and Explosives Office that the firearms
and ammunition found in the possession of the
appellant were not registered in his name.
ISSUE/S: W/N the appellant’s arrest was illegal
and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule
RULING: No. The seizure of the firearms and
ammunition were valid as warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
(Pakapin lang na the arrest was a valid warrantless
arrest falling under either Sec. 5(a) in flagrante
delicto or Sec. 5(b) hot pursuit. Paragraph (a)
requires that the person be arrested (i) after he
has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii)
in the presence of the arresting officer or private
person.Both elements concurred here, as it has
been established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run - an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. The policemen's
warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no supervening
event or a considerable lapse of time between the
hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Moreover, after having stationed themselves at
the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's
report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
number, and the dented hood and railings thereof.
These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved
in the hit and run incident.)
The five (5) well-settled instances when a
warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,
are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the
elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent,
and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.[48]
3. search of a moving vehicle.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
The authorities stumbled upon petitioner's
firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed. The seizure of
the revolver and the M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist
and back pocket respectively, when he raised his
hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the
Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag
containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure,
and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions
were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner,
their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful
arrest was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search of the passenger compartment
and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the
nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered
test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The
products of that search are admissible evidence
not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when, as in
this case, the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before
the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the
hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle
are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
The firearms and ammunitions being admissible as
evidence, the petitioner was found guilty of simple
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
16. People v Aminnudin
“Onboard with Mary Jane (marijuana)”
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984
after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers
earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying a marijuana.
He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer
had pointed to him. The PC officers simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspected articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
They were verified as marijuana leaves and an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. The information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen. They were
both arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The fiscal
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali absolving her after a thorough
investigation.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana and alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested, immediately
handcuffed and his bag was confiscated without a
search warrant. (he also claimed that he only sells
watches which the trial court rejected given he was
only carrying two watches and has travelled to Jolo
for that purpose, spending for the fare and other
expenses)
It is not disputed and in fact admitted by the PC
officers who testified that they had no warrant
when they arrested Aminnudin. Their only
justification is the tip received from a reliable and
regular informer. According to the testimony of the
chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol Jr,
they received the intelligence report pertaining to
the coming of Aminnudin to Iloilo with marijuana
on June 25 on June 23 or 2 days before the arrest.
He also testified that they did not try to secure a
search warrant because they were sure that the
operation will yield a positive result and that the
search warrant is not necessary.
Issue: W/N the confiscated bundles of marijuana
are admissible in evidence
Ruling:
No.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest
or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify
the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca where it
was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of
the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no urgency as it is
clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."
Here, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant
is innocent, the constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is
not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be
admitted, and should never have been considered
by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence,
the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally
seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
Accused appellant is acquitted.
17. People v Zenaida Quebral
Arrest based on an informer; applicability of
the Amminudin case
FACTS:
On 7 September 2007, the Chief of the Drug
Enforcement Unit called Galvez and other police
officers to a briefing regarding a police informer’s
report that two men and a woman on board an
owner type jeep with a specific plate number
would deliver shabu to Michael Salvador.
On the morning of September 8, 2002, PO3 Galvez
and six other police officers went to the North
Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit, watching out for
the owner type jeep mentioned. At around 4:00
p.m., such a jeep, bearing the reported plate
number and with two men and a woman on board,
came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the
two men as accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove
the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez
and the woman as accused-appellant Zenaida
Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded
to the town proper of Balagtas and entered a
Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from
which accused- appellant Michael Salvador
alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked
to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a
white envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3 Galvez,
who was watching from about 15 meters in a
tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move. The
police officers alighted from their vehicles and
surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope
from Michael, opened it, and saw five plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance
which he believed was shabu. Arrest then ensued.
A criminal case was filed for violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
RTC found the accused all guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment.
Accused questioned the legality of the search,
invoking the case of Aminnudin. They also argued
that the police officers cannot say that what they
saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two men
and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas
station. A third man approached the jeep, spoke
to the woman and she handed him a folded white
envelope that appeared to contain something.
These acts do not constitute a crime per se.
Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal.
The subsequent search of their persons, not being
based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid search and arrest?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was more a search
preceding an arrest. Probable cause was
established through the confidential report of the
police informer corroborated with what the police
witnessed before the search and arrest. The police
acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. Since the seized shabu resulted from
a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against
the accused.
The case of People v. Aminnudin[ cannot apply to
this case. In Aminnudin, the informant gave the
police the name and description of the person who
would be coming down from a ship the following
day carrying a shipment of drugs. In such a case,
the Court held that the police had ample time to
seek a search warrant against the named person
so they could validly search his luggage. In the
present case, all the information the police had
about the persons in possession of the prohibited
drugs was that they were two men and a woman
on board an owner type jeep. A search warrant
issued against such persons could be used by the
police to harass practically anyone.
18. Rosete v Lim
(depositions for civil case parallel with 2
criminal case—rule on civil case applies)
Principle:
As a general rule, in civil or administrative
proceedings, the defendant may not refuse to take
the stand altogether and the right against self-
incrimination may only be invoked the moment
incriminating questions are asked.
However, as an exception, when the civil or
administrative proceeding is penal in nature, the
rule in criminal cases where the defendant may
refuse to take stand is applicable.
Facts:
On December 5, 1995, respondents, Juliano Lim
and Lilia Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment,
Specific Performance with Damages against AFP-
RSBS (AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System), Espreme Realty, Alfredo Rosete, Maj.
Oscar Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI and Register of
Deeds of Mindoro Occidental. It asked, among
other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by
AFP-RSBS over certain parcels of land in favor of
Espreme Realty be annulled. Parallel to this civil
case are two criminal cases pending before the
City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and Pasig
City involving the same set of facts.
On May 28, 1997, respondents filed a Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of
petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. In
response, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion and Objection to Take Deposition, arguing
that, since there are two criminal cases pending
involving the same set of facts, to permit the
taking of the deposition would be violative of their
right against self-incrimination because by means
of oral deposition, respondents would seek to
establish allegations of fact in the complaint which
are also the allegations of fact in the complaint
affidavits in the said criminal case. The lower court
denied the objection and scheduled the taking
thereof.
Issue:
W/N the constitutional right against self-
incrimination of Mapalo and Rosete would be
violated by the taking of their deposition in the civil
case although they are also respondents in
another criminal case with identical set of facts
Ruling:
No.
Under Sec 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself”. This right is accorded to every
person who gives evidence in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceedings.
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled
that he can refuse outright to take the stand as a
witness. An ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action), on the other hand, may not disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court or to
refuse to testify altogether. His right against self-
incrimination can be claimed only when a specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. However, this rule admits of an
exception and that is when such civil or
administrative proceeding partakes of the nature
of a criminal proceeding.
In this case, the case is civil, it being a suit for
annulment, specific performance with damages.
The fact that there are two criminal cases pending
which are allegedly based on the same set of facts
as that of the civil case will not give them the right
to refuse to take the witness stand and to give
their depositions as they are not facing criminal
charges in the civil case.
19. People vs Bokingco
Killing the owner of a pawnshop and
apartments.
Doctrine: Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator.
FACTS:
The victim, Noli Pasion and his wife, Elsa, were
residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in
Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop,
which formed part of his house. He also
maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the
back of his house.
The accused Bokingco and Col killed Noli Pasion
(Noli) using a claw hammer with treachery and
evident premeditation. Bokingco enetered a guilty
plea while Col opted for a not guilty plea. Bokingco
confessed to the crime during the pre-trial.
Pasion was the employer of the killers. He
employed them to construct an apartment
building. Dante Vitalicio was the brother in law of
Pasion. He was living in one of the apartments
owned by his broher. He was a witness to the
crime and was himself attacked by Bokingco but
was able to save himself with the help of another
worker. Both victims were brought to the hospital
but Pasion already expired.
Elsa the wife of Pasion testified that she was in the
master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house
when she heard banging sounds and her
husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed
and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col
blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside
their house but Col suddenly ran towards her,
sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp
object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when she
bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. Col then
instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop
but Elsa informed him that she does not know the
combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money
but Col dragged her towards the back door by
holding her neck and pulling her backward. Before
they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the
screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na
siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away
with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No.
3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor,
bathed in his own blood.
Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to
kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several
days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.
Bokingco defended himself by saying that Pasion
who was drunk at the time went to his room and
asked him why he was not at the construction site,
he said he just stayed at his room for the whole
day prompting Pasion to hit him in the head. This
caused Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion.
He then fled the scene and was captured in
Mindanao. He admitted that he harbored ill-
feelings against Pasion.
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction
workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned
on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions
from his salary.
He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was
apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon
reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed
to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted
that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well.
Trial court found the two guilty of murder with the
presence of two aggravating circumstance of
NIGHTTIME and ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE. Penalty
given was death.
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. There
sentence was downgraded to reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
1) Whether the qualifying circumstances were
properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco
of murder and
2) Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
RULING:
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and
killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and
dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial
confession taken during the preliminary
investigation where he admitted that he and Col
planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he
testified in open court that he was only provoked
in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the
head. On the basis of his extrajudicial confession,
Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by
evident premeditation and treachery.
No Treachery
For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution
must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and
that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. Nobody witnessed the
commencement and the manner of the attack.
While the witness Vitalicio managed to see
Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed
to see the victim at that time. Bokingco admitted
in open court that he killed Pasion. Treachery
cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to
murder in the absence of any proof of the manner
in which the aggression was commenced.
No Evident Premeditation
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the
prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites: (a) the time when the
offender was determined to commit the crime; (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung
to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval
of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to
show how and when the plan to kill was hatched
or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out. In the instant case, no proof was
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was
devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only
retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the
head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that
he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution
failed to establish that Bokingco planned the
attack.
Exrajudicial Confession during preliminary
investigation no admissible.
It was during the preliminary investigation that
Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill
Pasion. Bokingco’s confession was admittedly
taken without the assistance of counsel in violation
of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
In the instant case, the extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible against Bokingco
because he was not assisted at all by counsel
during the time his confession was taken
before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the
commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident
premeditation. Having ruled however that evident
premeditation has not been proved, the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be
properly appreciated. There was no evidence to
show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to
facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works
for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the
trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there
was no showing that he took advantage of said
trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to
homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of
the prosecution to prove the presence of the
qualifying circumstances.
No conspiracy. Ergo, Col was acquitted.
The trial court pinned Col as conspirator. This
Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper
deference to the factual findings of the trial court,
owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.
However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely:
1) when the trial court’s findings of facts and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and
value likely to change the outcome of the case
have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3)
when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. The second exception
obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by
direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and
Bokingco be proved. As a rule, conspiracy must be
established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the
commission of the crime. The finding of conspiracy
was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants
fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody
witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col
was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was
being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at
Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the
pawnshop vault.
Based on the testimony of Elsa, Col sprayed
something in her eye when she ran to check what
was making a strange sound in the masters
bedroom. She was then asked to give the
password of the vault and a sharp object was
poked under her chin. At most, Col’s action can be
equated as attempted robbery. Elsa testified that
she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had
been killed and that they had to leave the place.
This does not prove that they acted in concert
towards the consummation of the crime. It only
proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in
their efforts to escape from the crimes they
separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is
to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion
even before he sought Col. Their moves were not
coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop.
Rule in Evidence – connected with our subject
In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible against him, it is likewise
inadmissible against Col, specifically where he
implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator provided
that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than by such act or declaration.49 In order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that first, the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; second,
the admission relates to the common object; and
third, it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we
have previously discussed, we did not find any
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession
has no probative value and is inadmissible in
evidence against Col. Bokingco’s judicial
admission exculpated Col because Bokingco
admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the
latter hit him in the head. All told, an acquittal for
Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
20. Jaime Dela Cruz vs. People
“You Can’t Just Drug Test Me”
Facts:
On January 31, 2006, the NBI received a
Complaint from Corazon and Charito as Corazon’s
live-in-partner, Ariel, was picked up by several
unknown men believed to be police officers for
allegedly selling drugs. A number was given to the
complainants and they were told to go to the
Gorordo Police Office along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. They met police officer James who demanded
from them P100,000, and later lowered to
P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After
the meeting, the complainants went to the NBI
office to file a complaint and narrate the
circumstances. While at the NBI Office, Charito
received a call from James to bring the money
ASAP. NBI verified the text messages received by
the complainants and immediately formed a team
to implement an entrapment operation. This took
place at the Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen.
Maxilom and Gorordo Avenue. The officers were
able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked
PhP500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which
was made part of the amount demanded by
"James" and handed by Corazon. James was
required to submit urine for drug testing and it
yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous
drugs.
James denied the charges and testified that he was
arrested for extortion while eating at the Jollibee
branch.
Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.
Both the RTC and CA found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating RA 9165.
Dela Cruz argues that the CA overlooked
prevailing jurisprudence stating that drug testing
conducted under similar circumstances violates a
person’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not the drug test conducted is
legal
Ruling: Drug test done was not legal as it was
conducted without ground upon any existing law
or jurisprudence.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous
drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent
provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A
person apprehended or arrested, who is
found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum
of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense,
subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time,
he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a
fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That
this Section shall not be applicable where
the person tested is also found to have in
his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section
11 of this Act, in which case the provisions
stated therein shall apply.
In the RTC level, petitioner’s objection regarding
the admissibility of evidence was disregarded by
the RTC reasoning that a suspect cannot invoke
his right to counsel upon extraction of urine as it
does not need any testimony against himself.
Further, the lower court adds that extracting urine
is merely a mechanical act and does not fall under
custodial investigation.

The RTC’s argument is erroneous.

First, the drug test in Sec. 15 does not apply to

persons apprehended or arrested for ANY unlawful
act, BUT ONLY for unlawful acts listed under Article
II of RA 9165. Petitioner Dela Cruz was arrested
for extortion, thereafter, he was required to
undergo a drug test by the NBI without his
consent. Article II of RA 9165 does not include
extortion. To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not
listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note that accused
appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.

Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable

non-testimonial compulsion. Despite the fact that
petitioner never raised the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment, this does not mean that
he has waived his right to question the
inadmissibility of evidence taken during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
There are cases where non-testimonial compulsion
has been allowed, however, the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal
cause of the arrest. However, in the case, there
is no connection of obtaining a urine sample to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."

Finally, the drug test was a violation of Dela Cruz’

right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for
a lawyer before the test. However, all his efforts
were not given credence and these are contrary to
the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination.

Drug testing cannot be condoned on all arrested

persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made.