ARE HOFSTEDE’S CULTURE DIMENSIONS STABLE OVER TIME?

A GENERATIONAL COHORT ANALYSIS

Sjoerd Beugelsdijk
Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Groningen
PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, the Netherlands.
Corresponding author: s.beugelsdijk@rug.nl

Robbert Maseland
Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Groningen
PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, the Netherlands.

André van Hoorn

Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Groningen
PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, the Netherlands.

Acknowledgements: The first author thanks the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research

(NWO) for their financial support (VIDI Grant 452-11-010).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336893

 ARE HOFSTEDE’S CULTURE DIMENSIONS STABLE OVER TIME?

A GENERATIONAL COHORT ANALYSIS

Abstract

Quantitative culture research is dominated by Hofstede’s framework, which is based on survey

data collected in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As countries develop economically,

modernization theory predicts shifting societal values, which likely affect country’s scores on

Hofstede’s culture dimensions. We examine how Hofstede’s dimensions have developed over

time by replicating Hofstede’s dimensions for two generational cohorts using data from the

World Values Survey. Results show that, on average, societies score higher on Individualism and

Indulgence versus Restraint, and lower on Power Distance. Cultural change is absolute rather

than relative, however, so that countries’ culture scores relative to each other are hardly affected.

Country pair cultural differences (i.e., cultural distances) are relatively stable. We discuss the

implications of our findings for culture research in business and management.

Keywords: Hofstede, Culture, Cohort, World Values Survey, Stability, Cultural change, Cultural

distance

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336893

1. Introduction

A significant part of international business research revolves around culture and,

especially, cultural differences (Hofstede, 1994; Tung, 2008). Quantitative culture studies rely on

various frameworks, such as Hofstede (1980, and 2001), Schwartz (1994, and 2006), GLOBE

(House et al., 2002; House et al., 2004), Trompenaars (1993), or the World Values Survey

(Inglehart, 1990, and 1997). Although not without criticism (Ailon, 2008; Baskerville, 2003;

McSweeney, 2002; Taras et al., 2009; Taras et al., 2010), Hofstede ‘s framework in particular

continues to dominate the field (see Kirkman et al. 2006 for an overview) The appeal of

Hofstede’s culture framework is reflected in the very high number of citations to his studies,

ranking his work among the most highly cited works in social science.1

One recurring concern in culture research is the temporal stability of culture and cultural

differences (Leung et al., 2005; McSweeney, 2009; Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010).

Theories on cultural change have predicted convergence, stability (divergence), or combinations

of both (Inkeles, 1960; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Ralston et al., 1997; Webber, 1969). Concerns

about temporal stability apply particularly to Hofstede’s culture framework, both because of its

widespread use and because Hofstede’s culture dimensions are based on survey data collected

more than 40 years ago. The question rises whether culture measures developed in the late 1960s

and the early 1970s are still representative of today’s globalized societies. If we were to discern

similar sets of national culture dimensions for contemporary societies, to what extent are the

country scores on these dimensions stable over time?

1
Google scholar generates more than 30,000 citations to Hofstede’s 1980 book, and more than

10,000 to the second edition published in 2001 (September 2013).

2
 To test whether shifts in countries’ scores on the Hofstede dimensions can be observed,

we follow sociological theory to apply a longitudinal approach and consider two separate

generational cohorts. We use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) covering more than

340,000 individuals from almost 100 different countries, with data collected between 1981 and

2008. The first cohort is used to replicate Hofstede’s dimensions and is based on an analysis of

the values of individuals belonging to the working population at the time of Hofstede’s original

study in the late 1960s, early 1970s.

A carefully designed ecological correlational analysis, factor analysis, and subsequent

reliability analysis allow us to replicate three of the four original Hofstede dimensions

(Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Power Distance, but not Masculinity/Femininity), as

well as two dimensions that Hofstede added to his framework later (Long-Term Orientation and

Indulgence versus Restraint). Based on this replication, we also derive the national culture scores

for a second, non-overlapping cohort (mostly belonging to the current working population) and

compare the country scores on the dimensions between the two generational cohorts.

We find, first of all, that Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture can be replicated for

different generational cohorts. Second, we find that national cultures have changed. Specifically,

results show that societies have become on average more Individualistic, more Indulgent / less

Restrained, and less hierarchical, as reflected in the lower score on Power Distance. Country

scores on Uncertainty Avoidance and Long-Term Orientation do not change very much on

average. Third, results show that this change has been absolute and not relative. Countries move

along the same path, with differences between them being stable. Finally, we find that average

cultural distance between countries has stayed the same, with a notable exception for the United

States for which we find that cultural distance to other countries has become smaller.

3
 These findings contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we respond directly to an

oft–heard disclaimer in extant culture research concerning the temporal stability of (Hofstede’s)

culture dimensions. Rather than making a generic claim that Hofstede’s dimensions are (not)

outdated, we sought to address this issue empirically and show that the overall picture on cultural

change is more subtle. Second, we contribute to cultural distance research. Shenkar (2001) has

eloquently drawn attention to the assumption of stability in cultural distance research. Now, our

research suggests that with few exceptions this assumption is not unrealistic.

In sum, our study shows that Hofstede’s national culture dimensions have not become

irrelevant simply because they were developed 45 years ago. Instead, we call for a better

understanding and increased awareness of when and for what countries the field can still rely on

Hofstede’s framework and when to be more careful in sampling a set of countries.

2. Theory and background

2.1. Culture in international business and management

The study of culture in international business and management studies has a comparative

and an interactive tradition (Beugelsdijk, 2011). Comparative research focuses on showing the

effects of societies’ cultural backgrounds on all kinds of outcome variables, ranging from human

resource practices to national innovation rates and economic performance (Aycan et al., 2000;

Bond & Hofstede, 1988; Johnson & Lenartowicz, 1998; Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994; Ryan et al.,

1999; Shane, 1993). In this literature, researchers most frequently use the framework developed

by Hofstede (1980, and 2001) to study “levels of culture.” As Hofstede’s framework identifies a

4
set of universal cultural dimensions on which all societies can be located, it allows for

intercultural comparisons.

Interactive culture research deals not with the direct effects of countries’ cultures on

outcomes, but rather focuses on the question how managers and multinational enterprises

(MNEs) deal with or are affected by the fact that they are operating in different cultural contexts

(Beugelsdijk, 2011). Researchers in this tradition have primarily studied culture as a source of

distance. Cultural distance, or the degree of difference between national cultures, is an important

input for psychic distance (Beckerman, 1956; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006) and for the liability of

foreignness experienced by MNEs operating abroad (Bae & Salomon, 2010; Eden & Miller,

2004; Zaheer, 1995). Indeed, many studies have shown the importance of cultural distance for a

range of issues in international business and management (see Tihanyi et al., 2005 for an

overview). Cultural distance is most frequently operationalized by looking at the differences

between country scores on Hofstede’s dimensions (Kogut and Singh 1988).

2.2. Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture

Basing himself on attitudinal surveys conducted in IBM subsidiaries in 72 countries

between 1967 and 1973, Hofstede (1980) was one of the first to use factor analysis to reduce

cultural diversity to country scores on a limited number of cultural dimensions. Hofstede’s work

provided researchers with a consistent and parsimonious quantification of cultural differences

between countries, causing a surge in empirical studies about the impact of culture on MNE

activities and performance (Kirkman et al., 2006). Although competing frameworks and

dimensions have appeared since (Schwartz, 1994; Trompenaars, 1993; House et al., 2004), none

5
of these has yet reached the level of influence that the Hofstede framework has. Hofstede (1980)

originally identified four dimensions of national culture: Power Distance, Uncertainty

Avoidance, Individualism (or Individualism/Collectivism), and Masculinity/Femininity. The fifth

and sixth dimensions, Long-Term Orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint, have been added

later. Only the original four dimensions are based on the surveys conducted at IBM, while scores

for the latter two dimensions are based on items and data from the World Values Survey (WVS).

Power Distance (PDI) reflects the extent to which society accepts that power is

distributed unequally. Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), measures the degree to which members of

society are comfortable in unstructured situations. Highly uncertainty avoidant cultures are

characterized by a strong need for predictability and control over the environment. Individualism

(IDV) denotes the extent to which society sees people mainly as individuals looking after

themselves (high individualism), or primarily as members of tightly knit communities (low

individualism). Masculinity/Femininity (MAS) reflects the emphasis in society on caring for

others, solidarity, and quality of life (Femininity), as opposed to achievement and success

(Masculinity).

Long-Term Orientation (LTO) has its roots in a study by the Chinese Culture Connection

(1987) project, which sought to remedy the potential Western cultural bias in the original IBM

survey by running a separate survey designed by an independent team of Asian researchers

(Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The project confirmed the existence and relevance of the four

Hofstede dimensions, but also identified a fifth, until then unknown dimension. Initially this fifth

dimension was labeled Confucian Dynamism to reflect the Confucian nature of the values it

included. However, Hofstede (1991) changed the name of this dimension into the more general

Long-Term Orientation. Cultures scoring high on Long-Term Orientation tend to be more future-

6
oriented, accepting delayed gratification of material and social needs. Such cultures are

characterized by strong persistence and thrift, whereas short-term oriented cultures value respect

for tradition and social obligations more.

Whereas the original Long-Term Orientation scores are available only for a limited

number of countries, Hofstede et al. (2010) recalculated this dimension using values items from

the WVS, increasing the number of countries for which scores on this dimension are available to

93. Hofstede et al.’s (2010) book also introduces a sixth dimension called Indulgence versus

Restraint (IVR), originally discovered by Minkov (2007, see also Minkov 2011). This dimension

was also identified on the basis of WVS items and reflects the degree to which societies have

strong norms regulating and suppressing the instant gratification of human drives.

2.3. Cultural stability and change

The argument that culture is stable (e.g., Hofstede, 2001) is related to the so-called culturalist

perspective (Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011; Khalil 2010), which claims that value differences

are deeply rooted in history and drive societal developments rather than the other way around

(Weber, 1904/5; Huntington, 1996). According to Hofstede (2001), value systems have their

origins in ecological factors. After that, however, they lead to the emergence of particular

institutions in society, such as family structures, law, education systems, and political structures.

These institutions in turn reinforce the values underlying them, as they direct socialization of new

generations and shape the evolution of knowledge in society. Such symbiosis between institutions

of a society and the mental models held by its population creates a strong degree of stability in

both culture and formal institutions (Hofstede, 2001; North, 1992, and 2005). In the culturalist

7
perspective, countries’ scores on the dimensions identified by Hofstede thus reflect a long

historical evolution. As Hofstede (2001, p. 12) puts it, culture is “the crystallization of history in

the minds, hearts, and hands of the present generation.” Because each society has its own

particular history that cannot be changed, societies will exhibit value differences that are highly

persistent over time.

Doubts about cultural stability are fuelled by a large literature on societal value change

during processes of modernization and globalization. Building on Marx’s view of social

consciousness as a reflection of a society’s economic structures (Marx, 1846), modernization

theorists have long argued that continued economic development goes hand in hand with

predictable changes in norms, values and beliefs (Bell, 1973; Inglehart, 1990, and 1997;

McClelland, 1961; Nash, 1964). Most notably, the shift from industrial to post-industrial society

brings about fundamental changes in people’s daily experiences, which are reflected in changing

worldviews (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Whereas industrial structures require rational, hierarchical forms of organization and

matching attitudes towards authority, in a service-dominated, post-industrial economy

information processing and communication become much more important. As a result, values

such as self-expression and autonomy get stressed (Inglehart, 1990). This shift in emphasis would

translate in higher individualism and lower power distance in the Hofstede framework. In

addition, increasing levels of welfare imply that entire generations in developed countries grow

up taking material security and survival for granted. Since people tend to attach more value to

objects that are in short supply, these generations tend increasingly to emphasize issues like

quality of life, freedom, and aesthetics over economic and physical security (Inglehart, 1997;

8
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Leung, 2006). Indeed, the Hofstede dimensions are not immune to such

changes, as they relate to economic development levels (Hofstede, 2001; Tang & Koveos, 2008).

Apart from changing economic conditions, globalization in the sense of increased contact

between societies is also likely to affect the evolution of national cultures (Zaheer et al., 2012).

More in particular, exposure to Western media, education systems, management techniques, and

consumer goods has been suggested to cause a global convergence of cultures. When new

generations grow up being exposed to American culture (Hollywood, MTV) and socialized in

Western education programs in their formative years, these experiences are likely to leave an

imprint on their values. As they gradually replace their parents, society experiences cultural

change in the direction of a more Americanized, global culture (Ritzer, 2004). More recently, the

shift of economic weight towards Asia has caused some to predict cultural convergence towards

Asian values and beliefs in the near future (Sheth 2006). Combined with economic development,

these processes may cause a narrowing of cultural differences. Heuer et al. (1999), for example,

show that this is the case for US and Indonesian managerial values, which move towards each

other under the influence of globalization and economic growth.

The above arguments imply that, on the one hand, cultural change is likely, but that, on

the other hand, cultural differences can be expected to persist as well. Under the influence of

economic and technological developments, societies are likely to become more individualistic,

less permissive of hierarchies, and more focused on indulgence and enjoying life. However, these

changes are largely the same for all societies, while the fundamental differences rooted in a

society’s cultural and institutional legacy remain. The upshot is what Ralston (2008) labels static

crossvergence: convergence in the sphere of economic and political values coinciding with

continued diversity in the cultural sphere (cf. McGrath et al., 1992). In this scenario, “cultures

9
change, (but) they change in formation” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 36). As a result, the positions of

national cultures relative to each other do not change. Formal translation of these theoretical ideas

gives us the following two hypotheses on cultural change:

Hypothesis 1. National cultures change over time in the direction of individualism and

postmaterialist values.

Hypothesis 2. Differences in national culture between countries are stable over time

Hypothesis 1 predicts that we can observe absolute changes in countries’ cultures when

comparing older and younger generations, while Hypothesis 2 implies that all countries move in

parallel trajectories, leading to stable relative cultural positions of countries.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 deal with levels of cultures in terms of countries’ absolute (H1) and

relative (H2) scores on Hofstede’s dimensions. As mentioned, a key issue in international

business and management research concerns the effect of cultural distance on a variety of issues

and phenomena. If cultures change in formation due to pressures attributable to modernization,

cultural distance will not be affected at all. However, if globalization means that cultures also

move towards each other, we can expect cultural distance to decrease across the board. Again,

however, this development could well be the same for all cultures. Therefore, even though

absolute distance may decline, relative cultural distances for different country pairs may not be

affected. If both Australia and Brazil are becoming more like the US, the cultural distance

between Australia and the US will remain, say, twice as large as the cultural distance between

Brazil and the US.

10
 Similar to the first set of hypotheses on levels of culture scores, we formulate two

hypotheses on cultural distance that capture these theoretical insights. The first hypothesis

concerns the evolution of cultural distance in absolute terms (H3), while the second distance

hypothesis predicts that relative country rankings on cultural distance do not change (H4):

Hypothesis 3. Cultural distance decreases over time.

Hypothesis 4. Relative cultural distance is stable over time.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that we can observe absolute changes in the cultural distance between

country pairs when comparing two generations, while Hypothesis 4 implies that all countries

move in similar trajectories, leading to stable relative cultural distances between countries.

3. Empirical approach

3.1. Measuring cultural change

Methods for measuring cultural change fall into three main categories. First, value change

has been studied by means of new survey instruments. The GLOBE project (House et al., 2004),

for instance, has been heralded as a more recent source of information on cultural dimensions and

countries’ positions on them (Hutzschenreuter & Voll, 2008; Javidan et al., 2006) that can be

compared to the results reported by Hofstede (1980, and 2001).

Second, using the same survey instrument, measurements at different points in time may

be compared to see whether values change or are stable. Heuer et al. (1999) investigate the

stability of Hofstede’s value measures by exposing MBA students and middle-level private sector

managers from Indonesia and the US to a survey similar to Hofstede’s IBM study.

11
 A downside of these approaches is that survey measures are not completely identical

complicating comparisons. The vigorous debate about whether the GLOBE and Hofstede

frameworks measure the same things illustrates this point (Hofstede, 2006; Javidan et al., 2006;

Smith, 2006; Maseland & van Hoorn, 2009). In addition, the costs of conducting a survey of the

size of Hofstede’s IBM study are too high to engage in such an endeavor on a regular basis

(Zaheer et al., 2012).

A third approach involves replicating value survey results with different types of data that

are available at later points in time. Tang and Koveos (2008), for instance, report a strong cross-

sectional relationship between some of Hofstede;s culture dimension scores and per-capita

income levels and other institutional factors. They subsequently use this finding to calculate

updated dimension scores using time-series data on income per capita. The extrapolation of

cross-sectional relations to relations within countries over time is highly questionable, however.

What is more, the approach is only useful if culture dimensions can be replicated by means of

readily available data that contains little information other than information on cultural

differences. Replications of cultural dimensions on the basis of a factor like income, for example,

are of limited value unless one is able to show that is it is income as a proxy for culture that is

responsible for the patterns found and that the patterns are not due to income itself. That is a very

hard sell.

For these reasons, we follow a fourth approach to assess value change. We compare

different generations within the same survey (cf. Inglehart, 1990, 1997). The approach is based

on the socialization hypothesis, which finds that “one’s basic values reflect the conditions that

prevailed during one's pre-adult years” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 68) and remain largely stable after

that. The process of socialization implies that basic value change takes place through the

12
replacement of one generational cohort by another. By comparing the values of the generational

cohort included in Hofstede’s IBM study to the values of a generational cohort that has come

after them, we are thus able to assess whether cultural values have remained stable or have

changed significantly.

3.2. Data and procedure

We use combined data from the World Values Survey or WVS and the European Values

Study or EVS (European Values Study Group & World Values Survey Association, 2006; World

Values Survey Association, 2009). This data set gives us the largest database on values with the

broadest country coverage possible. Moreover, as the most recent fifth and sixth dimensions

(Long-Term Orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint) are also based on the WVS data set

(e.g., Hofstede et al., 2010), it is consistent to continue using the WVS for the replication of the

other (original) Hofstede dimensions as well.

Many items included in the WVS and EVS have binomial answers categories (0/1), in

which case we take the fraction of people in one of the two categories and calculated country

averages. A limited number of questions further has nominal answer categories with three or

more possible answer categories for respondents to choose from. We recode these items and

calculated country averages as the fraction of respondents in each of the possible answer

categories. Finally, for continuous survey items using a Likert-type scale we take the average

country score. We exclude questions on outcome variables such as income and the number of

13
children. A careful analysis of all questions in the WVS and EVS using the “Integrated

questionnaire WVS-EVS 1981-2008 v 2011-06-09” yields 233 value-related survey items.2

Based on the timing of Hofstede’s original IBM study, between 1969 and 1973, we define

two generational cohorts. The first cohort includes everyone potentially sampled in the IBM

survey, and refers to the working population between 1969 and 1973. Setting the age of the

working population at 15-65, our first cohort includes all WVS respondents born in or before

1958 (i.e., all individuals that were at least 15 by the time of Hofstede’s second survey). The

second, non-overlapping cohort consists of people born after 1958. Table 1 summarizes the key

characteristics of both birth cohorts. The first birth cohort is strictly meant to replicate Hofstede’s

dimensions as this cohort overlaps with the cohort from which Hofstede sampled values data in

his original study. The second cohort, then, allows us to examine changes over time.

<< Insert Table 1 about here >>

We start with the first generational cohort. For each of the 233 value-related survey items

we calculate the ecological correlations with the four original Hofstede dimensions

(Individualism, Masculinity/Femininity, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance). As

mentioned, Long-Term Orientation and Indulgence are two recent dimensions that are already

based on WVS questionnaire items. Hence, for these two dimensions we simply calculate country

averages on the WVS items that Hofstede used.

For the original four dimensions, we first look at absolute correlations larger than 0.6. In

the entire WVS database, we find one correlation that is larger than 0.9, four correlations between

2
All codebooks and data are available from the website of the WVS,

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

14
0.8 and 0.9, 21 correlations between 0.7 and 0.8, and 56 correlations between 0.6 and 0.7. In case

of an item with a high ecological correlation but a small sample size (e.g., N = 15), we excluded

the values item in question.3 We subsequently optimized the replicated dimensions based on

maximization of the correlation with the original Hofstede dimension, the face validity of the

WVS questions (see below for more on that), a factor analysis, and a reliability analysis.

The first rule is that our factor analysis of the items chosen to replicate a specific Hofstede

dimension should have only one Eigenvalue larger than 1 and should thus fit into one overall

dimension. The second rule is that the Cronbach’s alphas that we calculate for each of the

replicated dimensions should have an optimal score, and cannot be increased further by leaving

out one or more values items. The third rule is that none of the values items is included more than

once, i.e., that none of the items is used to replicate more than one of Hofstede’s dimensions. In

other words, each replicated dimension consists of a unique set of WVS questions. At the end of

this iterative process we rescale our replicated dimensions on a 0-100 scale, to match Hofstede’s

procedure for calculating country scores on his dimensions.

Using the same set of WVS items, we calculate the scores on the replicated dimensions

for the second cohort, also on a 0-100 scale (using the same re-scaling formula that we used for

the first cohort). Value change is then easily assessed as the absolute difference in countries’

scores on the replicated dimensions between the first and the second generational cohort.

3
A small sample size means that a particular values item has not been presented to respondents in

all countries covered by the WVS but only to, say, European or Islamic countries.

15
4. Replicating Hofstede’s dimensions

Using the above data and procedure, we are able to replicate three of the four original

Hofstede dimensions as well as the two recently added dimensions that were already derived

from WVS data. We find only one item in the WVS database that correlates substantially (.79)

with Masculinity/Femininity. This item asks for the degree to which the respondent agrees that a

wife must always obey her husband. Although this question does not contradict the meaning of

Hofstede’s Masculinity/Femininity dimension, it is available for only 12 countries. Hence, we are

not able to provide a meaningful replication of the Masculinity/Femininity dimension. We are,

however, able to replicate Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-Term

Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint in a meaningful way. Table 2 presents an overview

of the characteristics of the replicated dimensions of national culture.

<< Insert Table 2 about here >>

Hofstede’s Individualism dimension correlates with four WVS items. The first item

concerns the extent to which the respondent agrees that private ownership of business should be

increased. The second item is the fraction of people who disagree with the statement that one of

the main goals in life is to make one’s parents proud. The third and fourth item concern the extent

to which people in a country find abortion and homosexuality justifiable. These four items are

consistent with how Hofstede describes the meaning of Individualism and its implications.

Hofstede (2001) relates this dimension to autonomy and self-orientation (p. 227), the right to a

private life (p. 227), weak family ties (p. 236), less conformity behavior (p. 236), individual

incentives (p. 245), and market capitalism and competition (p. 251). Each of the four items

included in the replicated dimension can be related to one or more of the characteristics

16
mentioned by Hofstede. Hence, the replicated Individualism score has high face validity. Scores

on the replicated dimension are available for 84 countries (many more than for Hofstede’s

original dimension score), has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81, and correlates 0.77 with Hofstede’s

original Individualism dimension.

The replication of Hofstede’s Power Distance dimension yields a factor comprising three

WVS items. The first item is Inglehart’s Materialism index.4 The second item asks respondents

whether they feel that one must always love and respect one’s parents. The third item concerns a

statement as to whether nationals are privileged over immigrants when jobs are scarce. These

three items are strongly related to the description that Hofstede has given of Power Distance:

informal lenience towards rule of civil morality, parents teaching children obedience, presence of

authoritarian values and leadership, and the existence of hierarchy and privileges in society

(Hofstede, 2001, p. 107). The replicated Power Distance dimension is available for 80 countries,

has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83, and correlates 0.72 with the original Power Distance dimension.

In addition, just as in Hofstede’s (1980, and 2001) original work, we observe a negative

correlation between the replicated Individualism and Power Distance dimensions. The original

Hofstede Individualism and Power Distance dimensions correlate -0.65, while our two replicated

dimensions correlate -0.78. Moreover, again just like in Hofstede’s original work (Hofstede,

1980), a factor analysis shows that Individualism and Power Distance are part of one larger

4
Inglehart’s materialism index is a composite index based on four items included in the WVS

and has been used to measure the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1990,

and 1997, and Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

17
factor. We follow Hofstede and “continue treating them as two dimensions because they are

conceptually distinct” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 62).

The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension can be replicated using four WVS items. The first

two items capture the confidence that people in a country have in political parties and the justice

system. High Uncertainty Avoidance is associated with low confidence in these two institutions.

The third item concerns the degree to which people agree with the statement that the country is

run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the

people?. The fourth item measures the degree of trust or, better, lack thereof. High Uncertainty

Avoidance is associated with a large fraction of people saying that generally speaking you need

to be careful in dealing with people. These four items fit Hofstede’s description of the

Uncertainty Avoidance dimension quite well. In case of high Uncertainty Avoidance, children

learn that the world is hostile (Hofstede, 2001, p. 169), and Uncertainty Avoidance is associated

with a fear of failure (p. 169), and a preference for tasks with no risks (p. 169). Moreover,

citizens lack confidence in civil service (p. 180) and feel that the law is usually against them (p.

180). The replicated Uncertainty Avoidance dimension is available for 59 countries, has a

Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.76 and correlates 0.67 with Hofstede’s original dimension.

Since the scores reported by Hofstede et al. (2010) for Long-Term Orientation and

Indulgence versus Restraint are already based on WVS items, we simply follow the way in which

they have been constructed and use the same set of WVS items for our replications of these two

dimensions.

The three questions included in the replication of Long-Term Orientation concern the

importance of service to others, the importance of thrift as a quality to teach children, and the

18
degree to which one is proud of one’s nationality. Higher scores of Long-Term Orientation are

associated with lower importance to service to others, a higher importance of thrift, and a lower

national pride. The replicated Long-Term Orientation dimension is available for 39 countries, has

a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.57, and correlates 0.94 with Hofstede’s WVS-based Long-Term

Orientation measure (Hofstede et al., 2010).5 The reason why this correlation is not 1 (after all

they are both based on the same three questions) is two-fold. First, we distinguish between

cohorts, while Hofstede et al. (2010) do not. Second, our analysis is based on the combined set of

all five WVS and EVS waves, whereas Hofstede et al. (2010) mainly draw on the 1998-1999

wave. The correlation of our replicated dimension with the original 1991 Long-Term Orientation

measure is 0.83 (N = 14).

Three items make up the Indulgence versus Restraint dimension. These items concern the

extent to which people feel that leisure time is important in their life, people’s level of happiness,

and how much freedom of choice and how much control people feel they have over their life.

Higher scores on Indulgence versus Restraint are associated with increased importance of leisure

time, higher levels of happiness, and higher levels of freedom of choice and control. The

replicated Indulgence versus Restraint dimension is available for 96 countries, has a Cronbach’s

alpha of 0.79, and correlates with the original Indulgence versus Restraint dimension at 0.92. The

reason why this correlation is not equal to 1 is because our replication, just like with Long-Term

5
Cronbach’s alpha below 0.7 indicates that internal consistency may not be acceptable, according

to common criteria (George & Mallery, 2003; see, also, Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).

We retain this dimension to keep our work congruent with the latest version of Hofstede’s

dimensional framework (Hofstede et al., 2010).

19
Orientation, is based on cohorts, while Hofstede et al.’s (2010) original measure does not

consider specific cohorts.

5. National culture scores and changes over time

Following Hofstede (1980, and 2001), we rescale each replicated dimension so that

country scores for the first cohort are between 0 and 100. The formula that we use for this

rescaling are also used to calculate country scores on the five replicated dimensions for the

second cohort so that we can compare country scores between the two cohorts. Table 3 presents a

detailed overview of dimension scores for all countries, separately for the two generational

cohorts. The bottom part of Table 3 presents the mean scores. A comparison of the first (mean

birth year = 1941) cohort with the second (mean birth year = 1971) cohort suggests that societies

have, on average, become more individualistic (+9 points on a 0-100 scale), less based on power

relationships (-12), and more indulgent (+8). Average changes in country scores on the

Uncertainty Avoidance and Long-Term Orientation dimensions are limited. These changes are in

line with our expectations.

<<Insert Table 3 about here>>

What does this average change in culture imply for the relative position of countries

versus each other? In order to answer this question, we examine correlations between the

replicated country dimension scores of the first and the second cohort. Doing so, we find that all

correlations are larger than 0.9. The correlation between country scores for the first and second

cohort is 0.97 for Individualism, 0.96 for Power Distance, 0.97 for Uncertainty Avoidance, 0.98

for Long-Term Orientation, and 0.93 for Indulgence versus Restraint. These high correlations

20
between Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 scores suggest that countries’ relative cultural profiles are rather

stable. Countries that scored in a particular way on a dimension in the first cohort tend to do so in

the second cohort as well.

Obviously, considering average changes across countries masks country-specific changes

that can be substantially smaller or larger than the average trend across countries. Countries that

have went through (and are still going through) massive societal transformation such as China are

likely to exhibit more rapid changes in some dimensions of national culture than are countries

such as the US in which societal transformation have been much more modest during the

socialization period of the two cohorts that we study. We thus compare the country scores of the

US and China for Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 as shown in Table 3.

With the exception of Long-Term Orientation (+11 versus an average of +5), changes in

the US have indeed been modest and are generally in line with average developments across all

countries in our sample. Individualism in the US increased by 4 points (versus +9 on average),

but the US was already much more individualistic than the average country. Power Distance in

the US decreased by 3 points (versus -12 on average) but the US’ score on Power Distance was

already relatively low. The change in Uncertainty Avoidance in the US is modest (+2 compared

to an average of +3) and a similar finding holds for Indulgence versus Restraint (+3 versus an

average of +8). Note, though, that the US already scored quite highly on Indulgence versus

Restraint in the first cohort. Overall, the picture for the US is that developments are in line with

global developments but less pronounced. This finding implies that the difference between the

US culture and the “average global culture” has become smaller in the second cohort compared to

what it was for the first cohort.

21
 For China, we observe a massive change in Power Distance that is in line with the average

change in our sample (-11 versus -12), a below average increase in Individualism (+4 versus +9),

and a substantial increase in Uncertainty Avoidance (+9 versus +3). We find that these changes

across the two cohorts are mostly due to China’s economic transformation, the gradual rise of

incomes, and the improved material position of many Chinese. In line with Inglehart’s (1977, and

1990, and 1997) predictions, such economic transformations are associated with a process of

modernization. Cohort scores on Power Distance reflect this effect most directly, as replicated

Power Distance scores are based on countries’ scores on Inglehart’s Materialism index.

Concerning the other major value shift in China, the one on Uncertainty Avoidance, it

should be noted that China had a very low score in the first cohort (13 on the 0-100 scale). As

Inglehart has described at various places (Inglehart 1977, and 1990, and 1997), the process of

socio-economic development is not only associated with reduced Power Distance, but also with a

more critical attitude towards the government and political institutions in general. Such a shift

gets reflected in a lower score on the WVS item capturing confidence in political institutions,

which, in turn, gets reflected in China’s increased score on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension.

Overall, we conclude that Hofstede’s dimensions can be replicated in a meaningful way.

Moreover, results show that on average all societies have become more Individualistic, more

Indulgent and less Restraint, and less Power Distant, conform our expectations. As such, we find

that the empirical evidence supports our first hypothesis (H1). Also, we observe that even though

cultures change, the correlations between the dimension scores of the first and second cohorts are

very high. This suggests that cultures tend to change in formation, conform our second

hypothesis (H2). The extent to which cultures change and societal values shift is country specific,

22
however, and to answer the question whether cultural distance is stable over time we need to dig

deeper.

6. Cultural differences and cultural distance between countries over time

We answer the question on the temporal stability of cultural distance in two steps. First,

we consider a composite indicator of the overall cultural distance and examine if and how

country scores on this distance measure have changed over time. If so, this is an indication of an

absolute change in cultural distance (H3). Second, we investigate whether the distance scores of

the first and second cohort are correlated, in order to see whether relative positions have changed

(H4).

Our composite indicator of cultural distance is the measure introduced by Kogut and

Singh (1988). This cultural distance measure has been used in many cultural distance studies in

international business and management research, and is by far the most popular instrument to

measure cultural distance (see Tihanyi et al., 2005). Despite the criticism raised against some of

its statistical properties (Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010), we use this distance measure to

ensure that our work is comparable to existing cultural distance research. Moreover, as part of the

critique on the measurement of cultural distance (specifically the Kogut-Singh index) concerns its

assumption of temporal stability, we “tweak” only one dimension of the measurement of cultural

distance, namely the possibility of cultural change, and avoid making other changes. Obviously,

we use the same formula for the two generational cohorts, so that we can compare distance across

the two cohorts as a way to test the assumption that cultural distance is stable.

23
 We calculate the cultural distance between each home and host country for which the

Hofstede dimensions are available. We start by fixing our base country from which to calculate

distance to partner countries, focusing on the US as base country. The scores between the US and

each partner country are transformed into a composite cultural distance index using the formula

provided by Kogut and Singh (1988):

4
CD j ( I ij I iUS ) 2 / Vi / 4 , (1)
i 1

where CDj represents host country j’s cultural distance from the US, Iij host country j’s score on

Hofstede’s ith cultural dimension, IiUS the score of the US on dimension i, and Vi the variance in

country scores on dimension i, which is included to make the squared country differences on each

dimension of national culture mutually comparable.

Inputs for the four dimensions are our replicated scores on Individualism, Power

Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Indulgence versus Restraint. We are able to calculate

cultural distance scores for 56 countries when using these dimensions. We chose not to use Long

Term Orientation because scores on this dimension are available for only 39 countries, and

because this dimension has a relatively low Cronbach’s alpha (see above). We note, though, that

adding a fifth dimension to the composite distance indicator does not change our overall findings,

as the correlations between the four-factor and five-factor cultural distance indicator are larger

than 0.94 (detailed calculations are available upon request). Hence, we continue with the four

replicated dimensions mentioned above and calculate cultural distances for the first and the

second cohort with the US as our base country.

24
 For the first cohort, mean cultural distance with the US as base country equals 2.3. The

mean cultural distance for the second cohort equals 1.7. The lowest cultural distance is obviously

to the US (distance = 0), and we observe the highest cultural distance for the US-Pakistan country

dyad (distance = 5.9). The correlation between the cultural distances in the two cohorts is 0.93

(for 56 countries). Our finding that, on average, cultural distance to the US has decreased when

comparing Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 is, of course, in line with our previous finding that country

scores on the replicated Hofstede dimensions indicated that US culture has followed global

developments and moved toward the world average.

Figure 1 ranks cultural distance to the US for both generational cohorts and all countries

in our sample (N = 2 x 56). The dotted line represents cultural distance scores for the first cohort.

Starting at the top with the US, which has a cultural distance score of zero, the culturally closest

country is Canada followed by Australia. Cultural distance to the US increases “clockwise.”

Pakistan actually has the highest cultural distance to the US in both cohorts. Our finding that

cultural distance has on average become smaller in the second cohort is reflected in Figure 1 by

the observation that, with few exceptions, the bold line for the second cohort falls inside the

dotted line for the first cohort.

<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>

The exceptions are Norway, Sweden, and Azerbaijan, for which we find an increase in

cultural distance to the US. For Azerbaijan, this increase is modest, but for the two Scandinavian

countries the increase in cultural distance to the US has been more pronounced. A closer analysis

reveals that this increase is mostly due to a more than average drop in the Power Distance scores

of both countries across the two generational cohorts (25 points lower for Norway and 18 points

25
lower for Sweden). As these countries were low in Power Distance to begin with, this substantial

drop in Power distance causes cultural distance to increase somewhat, even when the these

countries and the US have grown more similar to each other on other national culture dimensions.

Following the same procedure as for the US, we have further calculated the cultural

distance for each country pair in our sample, separately for the first and second cohort and again

using four replicated Hofstede dimensions (Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty

Avoidance, and Indulgence versus Restraint). The average cultural distance in the 56x56 country

pairs is similar for both cohorts. To be precise, mean cultural distance equals 1.96 (N = 3136; SD

= .90) in the first cohort and 1.97 (N = 3136; SD = 0.94) in the second cohort. Correlations

between cultural distance scores in both cohorts are .93. Hence, in contrast to our Hypothesis 3,

average cultural distance has not decreased over time. Relative cultural distance has not changed

either (cf. Hypothesis 4).

The reduction in cultural distance for the US is thus not symptomatic for a global process

of cultural convergence that leads to a reduction in mean cultural distance to all countries. Rather,

the reduced average cultural distance to the US (from 2.3 to 1.7), and a global average cultural

distance of 1.9, re-confirms our earlier finding that the US has moved towards the global cultural

average.

7. Conclusion

We sought to establish whether national cultures have changed over the past decades, and

whether changes in cultural values have invalidated the continued use of Hofstede’s (1980, and

26
2001; Hofstede et al., 2010) dimension scores and the cultural distance measures derived from

them. Embedded in sociological theory, the main goal of this paper has been exploratory.

On the question of cultural change, modernization theory predicts that, as countries grow

richer, levels of individualism will increase and postmaterialist values will become more

important. Our findings are cautiously in line with these predictions, as we find average increases

in Individualism and Indulgence versus Restraint, and a reduction in Power Distance. Follow-up

research could focus on explaining the observed country-specific changes in the Hofstede

dimensions. For example, given the strong theoretical argument that economic development is

coupled with Individualism (Inglehart, 1990), a logical next step would be to relate the changes in

Individualism to processes of economic development (see, also, Tang & Koveos, 2008). Such an

endeavor is possible now that we have replicated Hofstede dimensions of national culture for two

generational cohorts.

With regard to the continued validity of Hofstede’s (2001) framework, the question is

whether relative positions of countries on national culture dimensions have changed over time.

Our results indicate that they have not. Correlations between countries’ dimension scores of the

two generational cohorts that we study are remarkably close to 1. This finding suggests that

although cultural change has occurred, it has occurred in the same way for all societies, leaving

countries’ relative positions largely unaffected.

What about cultural distance? On this point, the evidence is mixed. Overall, we have no

indication that cultural distance has decreased over time. For distances towards the US,

specifically, however, we do find a reduction in the average cultural distance. Perhaps

surprisingly, this decrease in distance seems driven by a process of the US shifting towards the

27
center of the global distribution rather than the world moving closer to the US. Since the US

occupied a rather extreme position in the distribution initially, this shift towards the middle has

had no major effects on the relative distances of partner countries towards the US. Overall, we

find a strong correlation between cultural distance calculated for the first cohort and cultural

distances calculated for the second cohort, which indicates that relative cultural distances are

highly stable over the time period studied.

When interpreting these results, two limitations have to be kept in mind. First, although

we find strong indications of temporal stability of relative cultural differences and cultural

distance, these results obviously apply to sample averages. Indeed, it may very well be that

individual countries have escaped the general trend that we uncovered and have, in fact, changed

relative positions. For international business and management research this caveat has an

important implication, namely that samples should be designed carefully, especially in

comparative case studies. Selecting a country for one’s sample that has happened to undergo

extraordinary cultural change could by itself be the driver of any result found.

A second limitation is that our generational cohort analysis does not allow us to separate

generational effects from age effects. The generational effects that we found might be due to the

difference in mean age between the two cohorts. In that case, the differences in values between

the first and second cohorts that we observed may not be attributable to a generational shift in

values. Once the younger cohort has achieved the same age as the older cohort in our analysis,

the members of this younger cohort might express the same values as their predecessors. We

readily acknowledge this point, but point out that this limitation likely creates a bias in the

direction of seeing too much cultural change rather than too little. Given that our results suggest

28
stability of relative cultural differences and distance, we thus do not believe that this limitation

seriously affects our results.

All in all, our findings imply that, in spite of cultural change, the continued validity of the

Hofstede (1980, and 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010) dimension scores and the cultural distance

measures derived from them is not in question. Relative cultural differences measured 45 years

ago serve as a good proxy for cultural differences today. Similarly, cultural distance measures

based on surveys conducted in the 1960s and 1970s (Kogut & Singh, 1988) still provide a good

overall indication for relative cultural distances today. If there is an issue with the validity of

these measures (Shenkar, 2001), it is not due to the assumption of temporal stability.

29
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Figure 1
Cultural distance to/from the US for two cohorts (rank order based on Cohort 1).

39
Table 1: Cohort characteristics.

Cohort 1 Cohort 2
Definition of cohort 1902-1958 After 1958
Average birth year 1941 1971
Number of respondents 171,379 173,447

40
Table 2: Characteristics of replicated culture dimensions.

Indulgence
Power Uncertainty Long-Term
Individualism versus
Distance Avoidance Orientation
Restraint

Characteristics of Cohort 1

N 84 80 59 39 96

Cronbach’s
.81 .83 .76 .57 .79
alpha

Correlation
with original
.77 72 .67 .94 .92
Hofstede
dimension

41
Table 3: Replicated country scores on Hofstede’s dimensions for the two generational cohorts.

Cohort 1: Average birth year 1941 Cohort 2: Average birth year 1971

Power Distance

Power Distance
Individualism

Individualism
Uncertainty

Uncertainty
Long-Term

Long-Term
Orientation

Orientation
Indulgence

Indulgence
Avoidance

Avoidance
Restraint

Restraint
versus

versus
Country
Albania 46 95 71 77 0 50 89 71 78 22
Algeria 9 95 23 55 15 80 29 54
Andorra 100 86 108 88
Argentina 41 55 99 25 69 49 44 102 31 77
Armenia 25 82 96 17 38 78 94 36
Australia 66 20 71 83 80 17 71 84
Austria 42 78 19 83
Azerbaijan 32 100 68 37 31 98 65 36
Bangladesh 10 98 34 35 43 10 89 40 41 37
Belarus 33 80 80 12 53 65 86 36
Belgium 47 61 19 68
Bosnia and Herzegovina 36 56 60 85 40 42 51 68 95 56
Brazil 31 82 84 77 32 74 87 77
Bulgaria 46 86 80 18 67 78 84 39
Burkina Faso 16 32 21 32
Canada 65 28 61 30 82 75 20 60 34 86
Chile 23 73 70 35 70 32 61 78 40 72
China 17 91 13 85 52 21 80 22 85 57
Colombia 13 86 90 21 89 91
Croatia 54 64 70 48 74 41 81 64
Cyprus 39 80 54 83

42
 Cohort 1: Average birth year 1941 Cohort 2: Average birth year 1971

Power Distance

Power Distance
Individualism

Individualism
Uncertainty

Uncertainty
Long-Term

Long-Term
Orientation

Orientation
Indulgence

Indulgence
Avoidance

Avoidance
Restraint

Restraint
versus

versus
Country
Czech republic 74 70 76 49 90 54 79 62
Denmark 10 72 -4 86
Dominican republic 23 59 100 65 27 51 96 71
Egypt 0 99 11 28 0 93 14 31
El Salvador 7 89 90 10 88 88
Estonia 42 60 82 30 58 51 83 51
Ethiopia 17 50 25 50
Finland 74 39 63 75 92 30 58 89
France 69 49 55 85 29 64
Georgia 24 92 85 37 27 84 90 55
West Germany
Germany 68 43 75 60 93 10 75 68
Ghana 6 73 11 75
Greece 62 62 41 68
Guatemala 16 91 8 83 20 82 12 84
Hong Kong 39 100 47 51 96 52
Hungary 49 90 80 42 55 82 80 59
Iceland 48 76 40 85
India 26 85 54 44 38 27 84 54 46 41
Indonesia 5 92 60 57 64 5 84 67 55 70
Iran 8 84 59 16 53 15 81 67 27 59

43
 Cohort 1: Average birth year 1941 Cohort 2: Average birth year 1971

Power Distance

Power Distance
Individualism

Individualism
Uncertainty

Uncertainty
Long-Term

Long-Term
Orientation

Orientation
Indulgence

Indulgence
Avoidance

Avoidance
Restraint

Restraint
versus

versus
Country
Iraq 30 27
Ireland 61 71 36 82
Israel
Italy 52 62 41 68 36 64
Japan 51 68 63 93 43 71 50 70 115 58
Jordan 2 100 51 13 70 5 91 51 16 67
Kyrgyzstan 13 81 83 51 21 75 75 66
Latvia 42 65 92 24 59 52 93 42
Lithuania 30 79 84 32 50 68 89 53
Luxembourg 32 70 16 73
Macedonia 40 87 93 82 38 48 76 101 96 49
Malaysia 32 74 30 79
Mali 21 44 30 51
Malta 85 75 75 82
Mexico 33 65 78 26 80 43 54 80 32 85
Moldova 20 87 86 73 24 31 79 89 82 48
Morocco 100 65 17 35 90 75 22 43
Netherlands 85 2 60 94 -13 74
New Zealand 71 27 72 91 83 24 75 91
Nigeria 13 82 73 23 70 10 80 69 22 76
Northern Ireland 63 76 41 82

44
 Cohort 1: Average birth year 1941 Cohort 2: Average birth year 1971

Power Distance

Power Distance
Individualism

Individualism
Uncertainty

Uncertainty
Long-Term

Long-Term
Orientation

Orientation
Indulgence

Indulgence
Avoidance

Avoidance
Restraint

Restraint
versus

versus
Country
Norway 71 27 43 70 92 3 39 87
Pakistan 14 98 73 45 3 12 87 73 44 5
Peru 22 71 98 22 61 20 65 97 25 59
Philippines 29 91 62 22 58 32 83 58 27 60
Poland 24 80 84 43 37 70 85 60
Portugal 77 50 53 60
Puerto Rico 23 58 72 0 100 38 46 80 6 99
Romania 36 88 87 43 50 71 89 57
Russia 27 85 81 23 44 77 89 51
Rwanda 10 51 12 61
Saudi Arabia 12 74 35 56 15 71 39 59
Serbia and Montenegro 36 94 75 66 34 54 76 80 77 48
Serbia 59 34 60 60
Singapore 22 91 62 77 30 72 59 74
Slovakia 52 84 76 43 66 71 79 54
Slovenia 63 67 84 51 89 51 87 74
South Africa 35 84 58 29 67 33 78 59 33 68
South Korea 34 98 70 95 59 44 84 79 104 71
Spain 45 70 63 44 57 75 38 73 58 65
Sweden 90 0 55 60 80 110 -18 52 51 92
Switzerland 71 40 60 78 92 27 58 83

45
 Cohort 1: Average birth year 1941 Cohort 2: Average birth year 1971

Power Distance

Power Distance
Individualism

Individualism
Uncertainty

Uncertainty
Long-Term

Long-Term
Orientation

Orientation
Indulgence

Indulgence
Avoidance

Avoidance
Restraint

Restraint
versus

versus
Country
Taiwan 31 98 73 70 48 95 74 77
Tanzania 12 76 30 43 8 76 35 39
Thailand 22 59 24 70
Trinidad 17 88 23 91
Turkey 21 66 70 31 24 47 75 45
Uganda 22 77 32 62 28 80 32 63
Ukraine 29 87 84 11 44 77 90 39
UK 55 33 73 73 18 77
US 59 35 67 18 83 63 32 69 29 86
Uruguay 52 55 65 74 63 37 77 80
Venezuela 21 77 89 13 97 19 69 87 19 102
Viet Nam 19 76 0 57 62 23 77 1 60 64
Zambia 21 47 28 60
Zimbabwe 14 88 23 33 15 81 20 30

Number of countries 84 80 59 39 96 84 80 59 39 96
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 -18 1 6 5
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 110 98 102 115 102
Mean 34 70 71 43 56 43 58 74 48 64
Standard deviation 22.2 24.4 18.3 28.2 22.1 27.3 27.6 18.3 29.0 19.0

46

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