BILL OF RIGHTS CASES

1. MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

Facts:

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the
former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of
a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an
ordinance to be enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?

Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is
lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the
President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered
to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its
functions are administrative in nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is
illegal.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

2. Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991

Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal
Corporations

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60

which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income
does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the
Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to
alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the
equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1.Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2.Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3.Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,

which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them
the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any
definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited

number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably

classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of
our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family
is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened
by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.

3. BELTRAN VS. SECRETARY OF HEALTH G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005

FACTS:
RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by
regulating blood banks in the country. Section 7thereof provided for the phase-out of
all commercial blood banks within 2 years after its effectivity. The Act was passed
after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of diseases, and
that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to
have blood transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine
National Red Cross. Prior to the expiration of the commercial blood banks’ licenses,
they filed a petition assailing the constitutionality and validity of RA 7719 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations, for discriminating against freestanding blood
banks in a manner, which is not germane to the purpose of the law.

ISSUES:
1. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause.
2. W/N Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and
property.

HELD:
1. NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks operate
for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and encourage voluntary
blood donation. On the other hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by profit
and treat blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification and the consequent
phase-out of blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to provide
the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase-out of commercial blood banks
based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe. Three, the Legislature
intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address
the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only
to existing conditions. Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks
without exception.

2. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the
law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase-out commercial blood banks. This
action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for
the interest of the public.

DOCTRINE:
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited; but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
permitted.

4. CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the
Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid
as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women
as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City
likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) Must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) Must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) Must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) Must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

5. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights

FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance”
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini
hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled
that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
 6. ACEBEDO OPTICAL VS CA, G.R. No. 100,152, March 31, 2000

FACTS:
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the
permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo
dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo
basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses
only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the
permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was
subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the
validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is
estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the
imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such
conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is
actually a contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise
of police power.

HELD:
NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to
practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry).
The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal
application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police
power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits,
he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra
vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege –
estoppel does not apply.

7. ABS-CBN VS PMSI, G.R. No. 175769-70, January 19, 2009

FACTS:
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI) is a signal provider which has cable and
satellite services. It is providing its satellite services through Dream Broadcasting
System. PMSI has its “Free TV” and “Premium Channels”. The Free TV includes ABS-
CBN, GMA-7, and other local networks. The premium channels include AXN, Jack TV,
etc which were paid by subscribers before such channels can be transmitted as feeds to
a subscriber’s TV set which has been installed with a Dream satellite.

ABS-CBN is a television and broadcasting corporation. It broadcasts television

programs by wireless means to Metro Manila and nearby provinces, and by satellite to
provincial stations through Channel 2 and Channel 23. The programs aired over
Channels 2 and 23 are either produced by ABS-CBN or purchased from or licensed by
other producers. ABS-CBN also owns regional television stations which pattern their
programming in accordance with perceived demands of the region. Thus, television
programs shown in Metro Manila and nearby provinces are not necessarily shown in
other provinces.
In May 2002, ABS-CBN sued PMSI for allegedly engaging in rebroadcasting and
thereby infringing on ABS-CBN’s copyrights; that the transmission of Channels 2 and 23
to the provinces where these two channels are not usually shown altered ABS-CBN’s
programming for the said provinces. PMSI argued that it is not infringing upon ABS-
CBN’s copyrights because it is operating under the “Must-Carry Rule” outlined in NTC
(National Telecommunications Commission) Circular No. 4-08-88.

ISSUE: Whether or not PMSI infringed upon the copyrights of ABS-CBN.

HELD:
No. The “Must-Carry Rule” under NTC Circular No. 4-08-88 falls under the limitations
on copyright. The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news,
information, education, sports event and entertainment programs other than those
provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a well
informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-
economic growth. The very intent and spirit of the NTC Circular will prevent a
situation whereby station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to
make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views
on public issues, people, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed –
contrary to the state policy that the (franchise) grantee like ABS-CBN, and other TV
station owners and even the likes of PMSI, shall provide at all times sound and
balanced programming and assist in the functions of public information and education.

PMSI was likewise granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section
4 of which similarly states that it “shall provide adequate public service time to enable
the government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on
important public issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming;
promote public participation such as in community programming; assist in the
functions of public information and education.

The “Must-Carry Rule” favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It
prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting organization
especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television
companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs
available to city viewers.

8. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS SPOUSES RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402,

February 23, 2011

FACTS:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land
records with an area of 985 square meters, was used for Loakan Airport being operated
by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents
agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite
repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as defense the issuance of
President Marcos that had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport, that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the
deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of
the affirmative defense. After the RTC likewise denied the ATO’s motion for
reconsideration on December 10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special civil action for
certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

Subsequently, February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the spouses
Ramos.

Hence, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the
State’s consent.

Ruling:

The petition for review has no merit.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity
or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, viz:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign,
can do no wrong. Moreover, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of

the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual,
government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because
of the number of suits that the State has to defend against.

According to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit:

[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far
greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of
our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required
to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such
an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of

its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.

The need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing

governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The
immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental
or incidental to such function; It has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a
business.

Contrary to appellants’ conclusions, it was not merely the collection of landing and
parking fees which was declared as proprietary in nature by the High Court in
Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport operations as a whole, as well.
Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals
(167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in
Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from
suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It went on to explain
in this wise:

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation,
not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a
business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel
and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of
public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro,
supra, p. 207.]

in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25), it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with
private or non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of
the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro
case states:

Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act
in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain
corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for
by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far
of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation.
(59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207]

Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport

operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the
immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly
governmental functions.

Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent
has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as
the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.

With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the
obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos
spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.

11. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE, 235 SCRA 630, August 25, 1994, G.R.
No. 115455

FACTS:
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the
imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of
contracts.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the
contract clause under Art. III, Sec. 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the
sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity
of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is
only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the
parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to
make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax
exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and
substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the
Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes
- beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the
principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to
an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected
under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of
prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARTI, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It
was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused
and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the
courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him
took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was
filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in
the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged was AFFIRMED.

13. ZULUETA VS. CA, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents
and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

14. ARMANDO YRASUEGUIVS VS PAL, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

FACTS:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration
Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him
to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which
he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight
check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered
terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied
with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.

NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that
the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the
result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means
that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational

qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is
valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew
is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

15. ANG TIBAY VS CIR, 69 PHILS 635

FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned
the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members
of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood)
were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements
of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

16. BIRAOGO VS. TRUTH COMMISSION, GR NO. 192935, December 7, 2010

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such
bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUE:
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

17. FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14
thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective
official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA
9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of
candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.

Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the
constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials
undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).

The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend
that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA
9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were
contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee
was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular
already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said
1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC,
it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no
meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was
instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities
made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.

On Equal Protection

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.

In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine

The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by

the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses
of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether
House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been
in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be
inquired into by the Court.

18. QUINTO VS COMELEC, GR NO. 189,698, February 22, 2010

FACTS:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public

appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office
or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give
effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause.

Held:Yes.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
 In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are
created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather
than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that
the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to
their campaign rather than to their office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes
of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary,
or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the
Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past,
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of
his office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the

functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The
public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from

the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of
the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates
the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in

the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

19. DUNCAN ASSO. of Detailman-PTGWO VS. GLAXO, GR. NO. 162994, September 17,
2004

FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee
Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the
employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District
Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place
in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson
asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their
respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was
denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending,
he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The
prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it
has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or
wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to
comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial
and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to

when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there
is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of
these conditions are present in the instant case.

20. PT & T VS NLRC, GR. NO. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21,
1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She
was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on
leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion
of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.
She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed
down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it
was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized
that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing,
according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de
Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As
stated in the labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to

require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code
on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public
policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also
imperatively required.