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NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST

Table of Contents
1. ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON ........................................................... 2
2. WILGEN LOON v. POWER MASTER .................................................................................... 4
3. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION vs ICAO .......................................... 7
4. BUILDING CARE CORPORATION vs MACARAEG .............................................................. 9
5.CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHIL., INC VS BENJAMIN BALTASAR ...................................11
6.EMMANUEL M. OLORES VS MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE ..............................................13
7. BERGONIO vs. SOUTH EAST..............................................................................................16
8. EUGENIO S. ARABIT VS. JERADINE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC. ..........................................19
9. MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A. BAUTISTA vs. JOSELITO A.
CARO .......................................................................................................................................21
10. CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR. VS. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, ET. AL. ...................23
11. PHILIPPINE TOURISTERS, INC VS. MAS TRANSIT WORKERS UNION-ANGKLO-KMU
G.R. No. 201237, September 3, 2014 .......................................................................................25
12. RICARDO AZUELO VS. ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. ..............................27
13. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN vs. FLORENTINO FERNANDEZ .....................................29
14. METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO N. HILONGO .....31
15. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. vs. Picar, Jr., .............................................................33
16. Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. vs. Ledesma, ........................................................34
17. MANILA MINING CORPORATION v. AMOR .....................................................................36
18. DELA ROSA LINER, INC. v. BORELA ................................................................................38
19. TOYOTA ALABANG, INC v. EDWIN GAMES .....................................................................40
20. ROSALES v. NEW A.N.J.H. ENTERPRISES ......................................................................42
21. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA ...............................................45
22. CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC. vs. JOSEPH BASSO .................................................48
23. Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) Nestlé Philippines, Inc. Chapter (Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division) vs. Nestlé Philippines, Inc. ...........................................................................50
24. QUANTUM FOODS, INC. v. MARCELINO ESLOYO and GLEN MAGSILA ........................52
25. De Ocampo vs. RPN-9/Radio Philippines, Inc. ....................................................................57
26. Guillermo vs. Uson ..............................................................................................................59
27. Fontana Development Corporation vs. Vukasinovic, ...........................................................63
28. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE vs. OLORES, ....................................................................65
29. Dee Jay's Inn and Café v Ma. Lorina Raneses ....................................................................67
30. Buenaflor Car Services, Inc., v. Cezar Durumpili David, Jr., ................................................70
31 C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries (Maryhurst, Maryheights, Maryshore and Maryhill) School of
Theology, Inc. vs. Perez; ...........................................................................................................72
32. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA vs. PAJARON and CARBONILLA
G.R. NO. 207156, 16 JANUARY 2017. .....................................................................................73
33. Dutch Movers, Inc., et. al. vs Edilberto Lequin, et. al., .........................................................75
34. Luis Doble Jr. vs ABB, INC./NITIN DESAI, ..........................................................................77
35. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES v. FRANKLIN CUAL ..........................................80
36. GENPACT SERVICES vs REYES ......................................................................................82
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1. ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON

GR Nos. 178034 & 178117, Oct. 17, 2013

FACTS: This is a Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of a Court of Appeals decision
granting respondents Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond; directing them to post a bond of P10
Million; and ordering the NLRC to give due course to their appeal and to conduct further
proceedings.
McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against the respondents. The respondents opposed the complaint, contending
that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a company for the
management of hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship. The
Labor Arbiter declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment, and thus
entitled to receive from the respondents the following amounts his salary and benefits for the
unexpired term of their employment contract, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. Respondents appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC- they filed their
Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the
amount of P100,000.00.

NLRC: Respondents were ordered to post additional bond but instead of complying,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. A TRO effective for 60 days was
issued enjoining the NLRC from enforcing its orders. After the TRO expired and respondents still
failed to post additional bond, the NLRC dismissed their appeal.

CA: Subsequently, the CA allowed the respondents' motion to reduce appeal bond and
directing the NLRC to give due course to their appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the motion to reduce bond may be granted? (Court’s resolution: Guidelines)

RULING: It depends. No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious

grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award. The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC); Non-compliance with the requirement renders the decision of
the Labor Arbiter final and executory. Although the general rule provides that an appeal in
labor cases from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond, the Court has relaxed this requirement under certain
exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their merits. These
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circumstances include: (1) the fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) the
prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of
the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. The Court
hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed: (a) The filing of a
motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the following
conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the
posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary
award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees; (c) Compliance with the
foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter’s decision to the NLRC; (d) The NLRC retains its
authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the final amount of
bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of
“meritorious grounds”, and “reasonable amount”; and (e) In the event that the NLRC denies
the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the amount of the provisional
bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (10) days from notice of the NLRC order
within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.

The suspension of the period to perfect the appeal upon the filing of a motion to reduce bond
to clarify, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the filing of a motion to
reduce bond, coupled with compliance with the two conditions, shall suffice to suspend the
running of the period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter’s decision to the NLRC.

Applied in this case: By such haste of the NLRC in peremptorily denying the respondentsÊ
motion without considering the respondentsÊ arguments, it effectively denied the respondents
of their opportunity to seek a reduction of the bond even when the same is allowed under the
rules and settled jurisprudence. It was equivalent to the NLRC’s refusal to exercise its
discretion, as it refused to determine and rule on a showing of meritorious grounds and the
reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.

Disposition: In lieu of a remand of the case to the NLRC, the complaint for illegal dismissal filed
is DISMISSED. McBurnie failed to show through any document such as payslips or vouchers that
his salaries during the time that he allegedly worked for the respondents were paid by the
company. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between McBurnie and the
respondents, McBurnie could not successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less illegally
dismissed, by the latter.
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2. WILGEN LOON v. POWER MASTER

G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013

FACTS: Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as
janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint
for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the
spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The petitioners alleged in
their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service
incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. Petitioners amended their complaint and included
illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from
service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.

Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except
when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents' behalf. The respondents' counsel
also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference. However, the respondents neither filed
any position paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of
the pendency of the case.

LA: Partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. The LA further concluded that the petitioners
cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because they did not show any
notice of termination of employment. They were also not barred from entering the
respondents' premises.

NLRC: Both parties appealed the LA's ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. In a
resolution, the NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents. It maintained that the LA
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents through their voluntary appearance.

However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal
on the ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did
not actually receive the LA's processes. It also admitted the respondents' unverified
supplemental appeal on the ground that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater
interest of substantial due process. Furthermore, the Rules of Court do not require the
verification of a supplemental pleading. The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were
lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful disobedience.

CA: affirmed the NLRC's ruling.

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The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration prompting the petitioners to file the
present petition.

CONTENTIONS:
P: Argued that the CA committed a reversible error when it did not find that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion. They also point out that the respondents posted a bond
from a surety that was not accredited by this Court and by the NLRC. In effect, the respondents
failed to perfect their appeal before the NLRC. They further insist that the NLRC should not have
admitted the respondents' unverified supplemental appeal.

R: Respondents stress that the petitioners only raised the issue of the validity of the appeal
bond for the first time on appeal. They also reiterate their arguments before the NLRC and the
CA. They additionally submit that the petitioners' arguments have been fully passed upon and
found unmeritorious by the NLRC and the CA.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the CA erred when it did not find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the respondents' appeal;

a) Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the NLRC; and

b) Whether the NLRC properly allowed the respondents' supplemental appeal

2) Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of evidence for the first
time on appeal;

RULING:
1.a) YES. The respondents perfected their appeal with the NLRC because the revocation of the
bonding company's authority has a prospective application. Contrary to the respondents' claim,
the issue of the appeal bond's validity may be raised for the first time on appeal since its proper
filing is a jurisdictional requirement. The requirement that the appeal bond should be issued by
an accredited bonding company is mandatory and jurisdictional. The rationale of requiring an
appeal bond is to discourage the employers from using an appeal to delay or evade the
employees' just and lawful claims. It is intended to assure the workers that they will receive the
money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal.

In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation. At that time, Security Pacific was still an accredited bonding company. However,
the NLRC revoked its accreditation later. Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not
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prejudice the respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. In Del
Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., we ruled that a bonding company's revocation of
authority is prospective in application.

However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an accredited bonding company in
compliance with paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. This provision
states that "a cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or
posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated or the award satisfied."

b.) YES. Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental appeal.
Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly intended for
the assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. Also, a supplemental appeal is merely an addendum to the verified memorandum
on appeal that was earlier filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for verification has
substantially been complied with.

2. NO. A party may only adduce evidence for the first time on appeal if he adequately explains
his delay in the submission of evidence and he sufficiently proves the allegations sought to be
proven.

In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. However,
this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of
procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any
delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations
sought to be proven.

Guided by these principles, the CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in arbitrarily admitting and giving weight to the respondents' pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal.

A. The respondents failed to adequately explain their delay in the submission of evidence

We cannot accept the respondents' cavalier attitude in blatantly disregarding the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. Notably, the respondents' delay was anchored on their assertion that they were
oblivious of the proceedings before the LA. However, the respondents did not dispute the LA's
finding that Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on their behalf. The respondents also failed to
contest the petitioners' assertion that the respondents' counsel appeared in a preliminary
mandatory conference.
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B. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven

Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Why the respondents' photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were
not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the
petitioners' claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While
we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse
party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents
to present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their
specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the
opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the
originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents' failure to
present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.

3. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION vs ICAO

GR No. 196047, Jan. 15, 2014

SERENO, CJ.
FACTS: Respondent was an employee of petitioner Lepanto (LCMC) assigned as a lead miner in
an underground mine in Benguet. Sometime on January 2008, respondent did some barring
down, installed some rock bolt supports, and drilled eight blast holes for the mid-shift blast and
8 more for a last round of blast. While waiting for the time to ignite their round, one of the
workers shouted to prepare the explosives, prompting respondent to warn the other miners.
Thereafter, he decided to take a bath and before he could join the other miners, he was frisked
by Security Guard (SG) Papsa-ao. As he was removing his boots, SG Bulwayan forcibly pulled his
skullguard, causing it to fall down along with a detergent soap which was inserted in its harness.
SG Bulwayan then picked up a wrapped object which was turned over to his fellow SG.
Respondent was then charged of “highgrading” (the act of concealing, possessing, or
unauthorized extraction of highgrade material/ore w/o authority). Respondent denied the
charge and was consequently dismissed from work. A case for illegal dismissal was filed.

LA: The LA ruled against petitioner, according to the LA the charge of highgrading was
fabricated. It was concluded that inserting ores in the boots while standing is not in accord with
normal human physiological functioning. It was then absurd that being chased for allegedly
wrapping ore inside his boots, he transferred the same to his skullguard. The normal behavior
should have been to throw the ore.
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NLRC: Petitioner appealed before the NLRC but instead of posting the required appeal bond
they filed a consolidated motion for release of cash bond and to apply bond subject for release
as payment for appeal bond (consolidated motion). They basically request that their previous
bond in a separate case (Siggaao vs LCMC) which was decided in their favor be released and
applied in this case. They cited financial difficulty as a reason for this course of action. But the
NLRC did not consider the consolidated motion as compliance and declared the LA decision to
be final and executory.

CA: The CA basically affirmed the NLRC decision. And further stated that since the payment of
appeal fees and posting of an appeal bond are indispensable jurisdictional requirements,
noncompliance of which resulted in a failure to perfect the appeal.

ISSUE: Was the consolidated motion compliant with the appeal bond requirement under the
Labor Code and the NLRC Rules?

RULING: Yes. The well-entrenched doctrine is that an appeal is not a matter of right but is a
mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only in the manner provided by law and the rules.
Thus, a party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of
the rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost.

The mandatory nature of the requirement was then explained in Viron Garments vs NLRC, that
the intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection
of an appeal by the employer, is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the employer
may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The word “only” makes it
perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the
employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.
So, while it is true that the procedure undertaken by petitioner is not provided under the Labor
Code or in the NLRC Rules, the discretion to determine the applicability of the consolidated
motion, the judge must decide in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the
circumstances of the case. Thus, there was substantial compliance because:

First, the appeal was without question filed within the 10-day reglementary period. Second, it is
undisputed that petitioner has unencumbered amount of money in the form of cash in the
custody of the NLRC (the amount of P400k). A bond is encumbered and bound to a case only for
as long as a) the case has not been finally decided, resolved or terminated or b) the award has
not been satisfied. The money in question is therefore now unencumbered, LCMC should now
have unrestricted access to it, which he may use as he pleases. Third, the amount of the cash
bond is enough to cover the amount in the present case (P345k). Fourth, this ruling is faithful to
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the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement, that is to ensure that workers will receive the
money awarded in their favor when the employer’s appeal eventually fails. It is evident, that
petitioner showed no attempt to evade the posting of the appeal bond but in fact showed
willingness in its compliance.

It must be emphasized however that the court in this case is not even exempting petitioner
from the rule, as in fact it is enforcing compliance with the posting of an appeal bond. The court
is simply liberally applying the rules on what constitutes compliance with the requirement,
given the special circumstances surrounding the case as explained above.

4. BUILDING CARE CORPORATION vs MACARAEG

GR No. 198357, Dec. 10, 2012

PERALTA,J.
FACTS: Petitioners are in the business of providing security services to their clients and hired
respondent as security guard on 1996 assigning her at Genato Building, Caloocan City.
Subsequently, she was relieved of her post and was re-assigned to Bayview Park Hotel but after
such respondent was no longer given any assignment. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. According to respondent, petitioner failed to give her an assignment for more than 9
months which amounts to constructive dismissal. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that
respondent was relieved due to habitual tardiness, persistent borrowing of money from
employees and tenants, and sleeping on the job. Furthermore, respondent was directed to
explain why she committed such infractions but failed to heed such order. Respondent also
failed to meet the client’s standards in her assignment in Bayview. Respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA: The LA dismissed the charged for want of merit.

NLRC: Respondent then filed an appeal to the NLRC but was dismissed due to being filed out of
time, hence the LA decision became final and executory.

CA: Respondent elevated the case to the CA which decided in her favor. The CA directed the
NLRC to conduct further proceedings to determine the amount of monetary liabilities. The case
is then elevated to the SC.

ISSUE: Was the liberal application of the rules of procedure by the CA proper?
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RULING: No. It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of
the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle
that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.

The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a license
for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. To be sure, the relaxation of procedural
rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit
liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules
and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of substantial justice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s
substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the
policy of liberal construction.

In this case, the justifications according to the CA is a) the importance of the issue raised, and b)
the belief that respondent should be “afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities,” considering that the
belated filing of respondent’s appeal before the NLRC was the fault of respondent’s former
counsel. However, neither respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation for the
failure to file in time.

Respondent insists that she had not been remiss in following up her case with her former
counsel. However, it is an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind
the client. The only exception would be, where the lawyer’s gross negligence would result in
the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there was no
such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case
before the LA.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus,
one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the
rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The court cannot condone the
practice of parties who, either by their own or their counsel’s inadvertence, have allowed a
judgment to become final and executory and, after the same has become immutable, seek
iniquitous ways to assail it.
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It should also be borne in mind that the right of the winning party to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case is also an essential part of public policy and the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, such right is just as weighty or equally important as the right of the losing party
to appeal or seek reconsideration within the prescribed period. Thus, when the LA decision
became final petitioners attained a vested right to said judgment, to fully rely on the
immutability of said judgment./CENIZA

5.CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHIL., INC VS BENJAMIN BALTASAR

G.R. NO. 188828. MARCH 5, 2014

PEREZ, J:

FACTS: Co Say, petitioner, is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippines law while Tanawan Port is a single proprietorship owned and managed by Salazar,
respondent. The two parties entered into a Contract of Cargo Handling Services where Salazar
was given the authority to manage and operate the arrastre and stevedoring services of Co Say.

To start the business, the respondents were hired to become personnel of said business.
However, due to lack of clientele, and a couple of months later, Tanawan Port decided to cease
operations by sending letters to the City Treasurer of Legaspi City and the Revenue District
Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue informing them of its intention to close its business
and to surrender its business registration due to serious business losses. The respondents were
called by Salazar to inform them of the intention to close but it was said that Baltasar, one of
the respondents, is trying to find new clients. This effort was, however, futile, that led the
business to finally close resulting to the termination of the respondents but were accordingly
given their separation pay as well as their 13th month.

Respondents filed for illegal dismissal and non-payment of labor standard benefits against
petitioners Tanawan Port, Salazar, Co Say and Efren Co Say before the Labor Arbiter.

Labor Arbiter: Illegal Dismissal for failure to comply with the procedural and substantive
requirements of terminating employment due to closure of business operations. It was not able
to adduce its financial statements to prove that its withdrawal from operation was bona fide in
character. A similar failure to comply with the notice requirement was likewise observed by the
labor officer resulting in the violation of respondents’ right to due process of law. Finally, the
Labor Arbiter declared that Tanawan Port is engaged in labor-only contracting and is merely an
extension of the business personality of Co Say, which is thus, solidarily liable with the former,
the labor-only contractor, for the rightful claims of the employees.
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NLRC: Ruled that the severance from employment was not illegal as the company where they
were working closed due to business losses, and, the closure of business or establishment is
one of the authorized causes recognized by law in dismissing an employee. The NLRC further
ruled that there was sufficient compliance with the substantive requirement in terminating
employment and held that proof of business losses is not necessary since cessation of business
operation is a management prerogative and should not be interfered with by courts or labor
tribunals. The MR by the petitioner was denied.

CA: Reversed the NLRC’s ruling for failure of the petitioner to perfect their appeal and
therefore, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The court said that the NLRC has no
Authority to alter modify or reverse the LA’s decision after it had become final and executory.

Petitioner insists that they have complied with all the requirements for perfecting an appeal,
including the posting of the surety bond within the period for perfecting an appeal, thereby
imputing error to the ruling of the appellate court that no appeal was perfected on time. The
NLRC ruled that petitioners were able to post the surety bond and timely perfect their appeal
before the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period, while the Court of Appeals oppositely
ruled although both findings are based on the same pieces of evidence available on record.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner post the bond on time to perfect their appeal?

RULING: NO. The statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that an appeal from the
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the
appeal shall be perfected only upon: (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2)
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal.

The petitioners received the 7 August 2003 Decision of the Labor Arbiter on 15 September
2003, hence, they had until 25 September 2003 to perfect their appeal. A perusal of the records
reveals an apparent contrariety on the date of the posting of the appeal bond, a material fact
decisive of the instant controversy. While the First Certification indicated that no appeal bond
has been posted as of 2 October 2003, the Second Certification and the Transmittal Letter
stated that a surety bond was posted on 24 September 2003.

The first date, 24 September 2003 was depicted in the Second Certificate as the date of posting
while the date 28 October 2003 was described as the date of receipt by the DOLE-RAB. Apart
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from saying that the appeal bond was timely posted on 24 September 2003, the Second
Certification would also justify why on the date of the First Certification, 2 October 2003, there
was yet no posted appeal bond on record, the reason, although unstated being that the
“posted” bond was “received” only on 28 October 2003.

Without a straight statement, the Second Certification seems to consider posting as mailing
such that the date 24 September 2003 should be the reckoning date that determines timeliness
and not the date 28 October 2003 which was the date of receipt of the surety bond. Even such
insinuation, strained and all, is unacceptable considering the absence of proof of mailing, it
being the fact that there was no mention at all in any of the pleadings below that the surety
bond was mailed.

6.EMMANUEL M. OLORES VS MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE

G.R. NO. 201663 MARCH 31, 2014

PERALTA, J:

FACTS: Emmanuel Olores, petitioner was hired as a part time faculty that later on signed into a
fixed term contract as a part time instructor and finally a fixed term contract as a full time
instructor. Petitioner submitted the final grades of his students to Mr. Bernardo, the hair of the
Humanities Area, petitioner’s subject. However, Bernardo charged petitioner with gross
misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty for employing a grading system
not in accordance with the system because he: a) added 50 pts to the final examination raw
scores; b) added 50 pts to students who have not been attending classes; c) credited only 40%
instead of 60% of the final examination; d) did not credit the essay questions; and e) added
further incentives (1-4 pts) aside from 50 pts. In so doing, [petitioner] gave grades not based
solely on scholastic records.

Petitioner was able to justify this as he was just making adjustments to help students pass as
well as giving incentives to students for job well done. In addition, he also wrote to the HR
manager saying that he should now be granted permanent status. Summer started without
petitioner signing an employment contract.

A tribunal was made in order to investigate the issue and an administrative hearing was
conducted. The culpability of petitioner was established, hence, dismissal was recommended.
The respondent terminated the services of petitioner for grave misconduct and gross
inefficiency and incompetence.
 14

Aggrieved by the decision of respondent, petitioner filed a case for: a) illegal dismissal with a
claim for reinstatement; b) nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay; c)
moral and exemplary damages; d) attorney’s fees; and e) regularization.

Labor Arbiter: Affirmed illegal dismissal but dismissed the claim for regularization .

NLRC: Denied the appeal of the respondent as it was not accompanied by neither cash nor
surety bond thus no appeal was perfected on time citing Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that states:

SECTION 6. BOND.·In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either
be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to monetary award,
exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.

After reconsideration, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision.

CA: CA dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari and held that since petitioner
failed to file a motion for reconsideration against the NLRC decision before seeking recourse to
it via a certiorari petition. The petitioner has not shown that other than this special civil action
under Rule 65, he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against his perceived grievance. CA also denied petitioner’s MR.

Petitioner argues that because the respondent failed to post bond, the NLRC did not acquire
jurisdiction and thus, made the LA’s ruling final and executory. He also argued that the motion
for reconsideration prior to the filing of a certiorari petition admits of certain exceptions, that
is, when the order appealed from is a patent nullity and when there is urgency of relief and that
his case falls in this exception.

Meanwhile, the respondent asserts that the decision of the Labor Arbiter does not impose a
clear and unqualified monetary obligation upon the respondent, thus, it has no obligation to
post a bond. And that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
certiorari petition for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration. It stresses that there is no showing that the instant case falls under one of the
recognized exceptions to the rule of filing a prior motion for reconsideration.
 15

ISSUE: Is the filing of bond necessary to perfect an appeal for the NLRC to acquire jurisdiction of
cases from the Labor Arbiter involving monetary award?

RULING: Yes. Article 223 of the Labor Code states that an appeal by the employer to the NLRC
from a judgment of a Labor Arbiter, which involves a monetary award, may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the NLRC, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from. Sections 4 (a) and 6 of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended, reaffirm the explicit jurisdictional principle in Article 223. Said provision provides:

SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. (a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within
the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself
in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received
the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly type written or printed copies;
and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv)
proof of service upon the other parties.
Xxx

SECTION 6. BOND.·In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves
a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in the amount
to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.

The posting of the bond is, therefore, indispensable to the perfection of an appeal involving
monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not
only mandatory, but
a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the NLRC. Noncompliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and
executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case,
they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s
appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their
obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.

ISSUE: Is a motion for reconsideration a requisite before filing of a certiorari petition in this
case?
 16

RULING: No. The instant case falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that a
motion for reconsideration is necessary prior to the filing of a certiorari petition. The rule is well
settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing
of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion
for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law intends to afford
the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have
lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.

This rule, however, admits of exceptions and one of those is where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.

In this case, the NLRC dismissed the respondent’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed to
file an appeal bond. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC
completely reversed itself and set aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC
had more than enough opportunity to pass upon the issues raised by both parties on appeal of
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution
disposing the appeal. Thus, another motion for reconsideration would have been useless under
the circumstances since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been
duly raised and passed upon by the NLRC./CENIZA

7. BERGONIO vs. SOUTH EAST

G.R. NO. 195227, APRIL 21, 2014

BRION, J;

General Facts:
The case involves the problem on the computation of accrued wages as to where it stops. The
two contested dates are: When employees were ordered back to work through a memo by
their employer on February 24, 2006 or when the CA reversed the findings of the lower court
and declared the dismissal valid on December 18, 2007.

In the beginning, Petitioner-Employee-Bergonio filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal dismissal and suspension against Respondent-Employer- SEAIR.

Months after the decision of the Labor arbiter ordering their reinstatement, the employer-
respondent issued a memorandum on February 21, 2006 directing the petitioner to report to
work on February 24, 2006. But employees failed to return to work on said date.
 17

CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner-employee Bergonio:
Argues that the computation of their accrued wages should not stop until February 24, 2006
but should extend until December 18, 2007, only when the CA declared their dismissal valid.
The Company Memo directing them back to work on February 24, 2006 was merely an
afterthought of SEAIR to comply with the LA’s writ of execution.

There was no intention to reinstate since SEAIR did not immediately provide the memo after
the LA issued the first writ of execution on October 7, 2005. But instead the employer issued
the memo more than four months on February 21, 2006 and only after the LA issue an alias writ
of execution on February 16, 2006.

Furthermore, in respondent’s pleadings they claimed of strained relationships barring their

reinstatement and confirming their lack of intention to reinstate them. Additionally, they were
required to work in another place, in violation of Art.223 par.3 of the Labor Code. Even more
so, the memo was only handed down to Pelaez who did not represent the other petitioners and
only in the afternoon of February 23, 2006.

Respondent-employer SEAIR:
They complied with the LA’s reinstatement order and directed the petitioners to report back to
work which the employees did not heed. Instead of reporting for work as directed they insisted
for a payroll reinstatement, which option the law grants to the employers. And the memo
directing them to report to Clark, Pampanga was only for re-orientation of their respective
duties and responsibilities.

LA RULING:
1. On May 31, 2005, LA ruled that petitioners were illegally dismissed and ordered
reinstatement.
2. On October 7, 2005 LA issued a writ of execution but it was returned unsatisfied.
3. On February 16, 2006 LA issued an alias writ of execution.

NLRC RULING:
1. Respondents appealed to the NLRC which was dismissed.

CA RULING:
1. On December 18, 2007 CA partly granted the respondent’s petition. The CA declared that
petitioner’s dismissal was valid but respondent failed to observe due process.
 18

2. The CA ruled that petitioner’s accrued wages should only be computed up until February 23,
2006 when they were supposed to go to back to work and not up to December 18, 2007 the
CA’s decision finding petitioners validly dismissed. Since the delay in the reinstatement was due
to the employee’s own fault for refusing to comply with the return-to-work memo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may recover the accrued wages until the CA’s reversal of the
LA’s decision?

SC RULING:
Yes. The accrued wages should be computed until the date when the CA reversed the rulings of
the lower courts finding the dismissal valid. Following Art.223, the decision of the LA on
reinstatement is immediately executory, pending appeal. The Employer must reinstate the
employee either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal, and paying his wages or reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is
reversed by the higher court.

Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by exercising the options in
the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employee’s salaries. An order of reinstatement is
immediately self-executory.

If the higher tribunal reverses the findings of the lower court and finds dismissal valid. The
employer is no longer obliged to keep the employee in actual service or in the payroll. And the
employee is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the
LA’s decision.
Employees may be barred from collecting accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing
the reinstatement pending appeal in cases of (1) actual delay – the fact that the order or
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to is reversal; and (2) the delay must no
be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission.

In the case at bar, the Delay of the reinstatement of the employees was due to the unjustified
acts of the employer. The court in its determination considered, the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, employers are required to submit a report of compliance within 10
calendar days from the receipt of the LA’s decision, noncompliance with which signifies a clear
refusal to reinstate.
When the LA issued the February 16, 2006 alias writ of execution and the April 24, 2007 writ of
execution, the 2005 NLRC Rules effective January 7, 2006 was already in place such that the
respondents had become duty-bound to submit the required compliance report; their
 19

noncompliance with this rule all the more showed a clear and determined refusal to
reinstate./James/

8. EUGENIO S. ARABIT VS. JERADINE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC.

GR NO. 181719, APRIL 21, 2014

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
General Facts:
Petitioners were former regular employees of Jardine Pacific Finance Inc. (Jardine). They were
also officers and members of its respective Union. On the claim of financial losses, Jardine
decided to reorganize and implement a redundancy program among its employees. Jardine
thereafter hired contractual employees to undertake the functions these employees used to
perform. The union questioned the termination and replacement by contractual employees.

CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner-Employee:
The dismissal was illegal and with bad faith. Their positions were not superfluous, if their
positions had really been redundant, then Jardine should not have hired contractual workers to
replace them. Jardine was guilty of unfair labor practice since petitioners were union officers.
The act of hiring contractual employees was a restraint on the Union’s right to self-
organization.

The petitioners argue that there is a difference between financial loss and decline of earnings.
What Jardine actually experiences was a decline in capital and not substantial financial losses.
Jardine did not take any remedial measure before it implemented its redundancy program. It
simply hastily terminated the petitioners from service. There was no basis or criteria provided
in choosing the petitioners for inclusion in the program.

Respondent-Employer, Jardine:
The company had been incurring substantial business losses, and it had to lay-off its employees
and reorganize to eliminate positions in excess of what was required. The hiring of contractual
employees was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. If it really had committed to
union busting then it should not have only dismissed the seven petitioners but other employees
who were union officers and members as well. Furthermore, the distinction between
redundancy and retrenchment is not material. It
 20

contended that employers resort to these causes of dismissal for purely economic
considerations.

LA RULING:
Ruled in favour of the former employees. The hiring of contractual workers contradicts the
concept of redundancy. However there is insufficient evidence to prove the claim on unfair
labor practices.

NLRC RULING:
Both parties appealed. The NLRC dismissed the appeals and affirmed the LA’s decision in its
entirety of illegal dismissal.

CA RULING:
Jardine filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA found that Jardine’s act of hiring
contractual employees in replacement of the petitioners does not run counter to the argument
that their positions are already superfluous. Hence the petitioners filed the current petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE #1: What is the nature of a Rule 45 petition?

RULING #1:
Under Rule 45 only question of law may be raised. Thus the court only reviews errors of law
which the CA might have committed. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

This is in contrast with a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65, which Jardine used in its
appeal to the CA, where the review centers on the jurisdictional errors the lower court or
tribunal may have committed.

Thus, the primary question we confront is: did the CA correctly rule that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it found that Jardine validly terminated the petitioners’
employment because of redundancy?

In the case at bar, there was clear legal error for the CA to recognize grave abuse of discretion
when non occurred as further elaborated by the other issues.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not there is no material difference between redundancy or

retrenchment?
 21

RULING #2:
No, there is in fact a difference. The court cannot subscribe to Jardine’s shallow understanding
of the two concepts. Retrenchment and redundancy are two different concepts; they are not
synonymous; thus, they should not be used interchangeably.

Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is
superfluous. Retrenchment on the other hand is an act of the employer of dismissing
employees because of losses in the operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable
reduction on the volume of his business without fault on the employee. Redundancy can
happen even without serious business losses.

ISSUE #3: Whether or not Respondent’s termination of Petitioners was valid.

RULING #3:

No it was not, Jardine failed to provide and use a fair and reasonable criteria in the selection of
employees who will be dismissed from employment due to redundancy. Jardine also did not
exercise good faith in abolishing the redundant positions and also failed to provide fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly
abolished.

Jardine lumped together the seven petitioners into one group whose positions had become
redundant. This move was despite the fact that not all of them occupied the same positions and
performed the same functions. /James/

9. MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A. BAUTISTA vs. JOSELITO A. CARO

G.R. No. 181490, April 23, 2014

FACTS: On January 3, 1994, respondent was hired by petitioner corporation as its Logistics
Officer and was assigned at petitioner corporation’s corporate office in Pasay City. On
November 3, 2004, petitioner corporation conducted a random drug test where respondent
was randomly chosen among its employees who would be tested for illegal drug use.
Respondent avers that at around 11:30 a.m. of the same day, he received a phone call from his
wife’s colleague who informed him that a bombing incident occurred near his wife’s work
station in Tel Aviv, Israel where his wife was then working as a caregiver. Due to such instances,
he was not able to attend the drug test. On November 8, 2004, respondent received a Show
Cause Notice from petitioner corporation through Jaime Dulot (Dulot), his immediate
 22

supervisor, requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be charged with "unjustified
refusal to submit to random drug testing." Respondent submitted his written explanation.

On January 13, 2005, petitioner corporation’s Investigating Panel issued an Investigating

Report finding respondent guilty of "unjustified refusal to submit to random drug testing" and
recommended a penalty of four working weeks suspension without pay, instead of termination,
due to the presence of mitigating circumstances. On January 19, 2005, petitioner corporation’s
Asst. Vice President for Material Management Department, George K. Lamela, Jr. (Lamela),
recommended that respondent be terminated from employment instead of merely being
suspended. Lamela argued that even if respondent did not outrightly refuse to take the random
drug test, he avoided the same. On February 14, 2005, respondent received a letter from
petitioner corporation’s Vice President for Operations, Tommy J. Sliman (Sliman), terminating
him on the same date.

In a decision dated August 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog found
respondent to have been illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the
LA but granted Caro financial assistance on equitable grounds. The CA reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision, save for the grant of damages. Before the SC in this
petition, Mirant alleges that the petition for certiorari filed by Caro should have been
summarily dismissed considering that it lacked the requisite verification and certification
against forum shopping required by the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Did the CA err when it did not summarily dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by Caro
considering that it lacked the requisite verification and certification against forum shopping
required by the Rules of Court?

RULING: No, the CA did not err for not summarily dismissing Caro’s petition.

It is the contention of petitioners that due to respondent’s failure to subscribe the

Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping before a Notary Public, the said
verification and certification cannot be considered to have been made under oath. Accordingly,
such omission is fatal to the entire petition for not being properly verified and certified. The CA
therefore erred when it did not dismiss the petition.

This jurisdiction has adopted in the field of labor protection a liberal stance towards the
construction of the rules of procedure in order to serve the ends of substantial justice. This
liberal construction in labor law emanates from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. Thus, if the rules of procedure will
 23

stunt courts from fulfilling this mandate, the rules of procedure shall be relaxed if the
circumstances of a case warrant the exercise of such liberality. If we sustain the argument of
petitioners in the case at bar that the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed
outright by the CA, the NLRC decision would have reached finality and respondent would have
lost his remedy and denied his right to be protected against illegal dismissal under the Labor
Code, as amended.

10. CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR. VS. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 175293, July 23, 2014

FACTS: The petitioner started his employment with respondent Ateneo de Naga University
(University) in the first semester of school year 1960-1961. At the time of his dismissal, he was a
regular and full-time faculty member of the University's Accountancy Department in the College
of Commerce. Allegedly, he received on February 22, 2000 a letter from respondent Fr. Joel
Tabora, SJ., the University President, informing him that his contract (which was set to expire
on May 31, 2000) would no longer be renewed. After several attempts to discuss the matter
with Fr. Tabora in person, and not having been given any teaching load or other assignments
effective June 2000, he brought his complaint for illegal dismissal. The University denied the
allegation of illegal dismissal, and maintained that the petitioner was a participant and regular
contributor to the Ateneo de Naga Employees Retirement Plan (Plan); that upon reaching the
age of 60 years on June 26, 1999, he was deemed automatically retired under the Plan; and
that he had been allowed to teach after his retirement only on contractual basis.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed
to the NLRC. Simultaneously, they submitted a manifestation stating that neither actual nor
payroll reinstatement of the petitioner could be effected because he had meanwhile been
employed as a Presidential Assistant for Southern Luzon Affairs with the position of
Undersecretary; and that his reinstatement would result in dual employment and double
compensation which were prohibited by existing civil service rules and regulations.

On July 12, 2002, the petitioner, citing the executory nature of the order for his
reinstatement, filed his motion to order the respondents to pay his salaries and benefits
accruing in the period from September 3, 2001 until July 3, 2002. In his order dated October 10,
2002, LA Quinones, explaining that Article 223 of the Labor Code granted to the employer the
option to implement either a physical or a payroll reinstatement, and that, therefore, the
respondents must first exercise the option regardless of the petitioner's employment with the
Government, denied the petitioner's motion. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a notice of partial
appeal, but the notice was denied due course on June 30, 2003. Upon the denial of his motion
 24

for reconsideration, the petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for certiorari. In
the interim, the petitioner executed a receipt and quitclaim in favor of the University respecting
his claim for the benefits under the Plan.

The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision holding that Castro’s execution of the receipt and
quitclaim respecting his benefits under the plan estopped the petitioner from pursuing other
claims arising from his employer-employee relationship with the University. On May 31, 2006,
the CA dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari on the ground of its having been
rendered moot and academic by the August 31, 2005 decision of the NLRC.

In this instant petition, Castro argues that the CA erred in ruling that the dismissal of his
complaint for illegal dismissal by the NLRC had mooted his petition for certiorari; that the sole
issue in his petition for certiorari concerned his claim for salaries and benefits that had accrued
by reason of the respondents' refusal to reinstate him, but the case that had been dismissed by
the NLRC revolved around the validity of his termination; that the CA further erred in ruling that
his execution of the quitclaim and receipt of payment constituted a settlement of his money
claims, considering that his waiver pertained only to his retirement pay.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner's claim for the payment of accrued salaries and benefits for the period
that he was not reinstated was rendered moot and academic by: (a) his receipt of the
retirement benefits and execution of the corresponding receipt and quitclaim in favor of the
respondents; and (b) the dismissal of his complaint for illegal dismissal by the NLRC?

RULING: No. The execution of the receipt and quitclaim was not a settlement of the petitioner's
claim for accrued salaries The text of the receipt and quitclaim was clear and straightforward,
and it was to the effect that the sum received by the petitioner represented ''full payment of
benefits ... pursuant to the Employee's retirement plan." As such, both the NLRC and the CA
should have easily seen that the quitclaim related only to the settlement of the retirement
benefits, which benefits could not be confused with the reliefs related to the complaint for
illegal dismissal.

The Court also holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered
moot and academic. He remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA's order of
reinstatement until reversal thereof. The employee can only be barred from claiming accrued
salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was without the fault of the employer.
Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002, and that
their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his salaries
accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e., September 3, 2001) until his
 25

reinstatement in November 2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to exercise
their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order
of reinstatement was immediately executory.

11. PHILIPPINE TOURISTERS, INC VS. MAS TRANSIT WORKERS UNION-ANGKLO-KMU

G.R. No. 201237, September 3, 2014

FACTS: MAS Transit Workers Union-Angklo-KMU’s (the Union) petition for certification election
was approved (June 14, 2000) by DOLE which prompted MTI to file a motion for
reconsideration that was denied(Feb 2001). Earlier, on September 2000, MTI sold its passenger
buses together with its Certificate of Public Convenience to PTI. The sale of the 50 buses was
approved by LTFRB. In light of this, MTI issued a patalastas (March 7, 2001) apprising its
employees of its sale and transfer of operations PTI and MTI’s intention to pay them separation
benefits. The EEs were advised to apply anew to PTI should they be interested to transfer.
Thereafter, MTI sent each individual respondent a memorandum(March 31, 2001) informing
them of their termination from work, effective on such date, in line with cessation of business
due to the sale.

The union claimed that the sale was intended to frustrate their right to self organization and
that there was no transfer of ownership since the stockholders of both companies are the
same, thus filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, ULP (illegal lockout), damages agaisnt both PTI
and MTI.

MTI denies the allegations, contending that the sale was an effect of the serious financial
reversals it was suffering; that the required report was submitted to DOLE; that several EEs
including some of respondents were paid their separation benefits and that 30 of the
respondents had executed a sinumpaang salaysay where they categorically moved for the
withdrawal of their complaint. PTI, on the other hand denies liability since no EE-ER relationship
exists and that it was neither a predecessor-in-interest of the MTI.

Procedural

The LA ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner then appealed before NLRC, filing a Notice of
Appeal and Appeal Memorandum, accompanied by a Manifestation with Motion for Reduction
of Bond, praying that the bond covering the monetary judgment be reduced due to PTI’s
liquidity problems. MTI did not interpose any appeal.
 26

Respondents opposed the motion and moved for the dismissal of the appeal due to failure to
perfect the same since the bond posted was not equivalent to the full judgment award.

PTI withdrew its initial motion and submitted the approval of a surety bond which was
erroneously issued in favor of MTI thus the filing of a motion seeking to substitute such for
another surety bond issued in favor of PTI.

NLRC dismissed the appeal. PTI filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted since
there was substantial compliance with the the rules. However, PTI was directed to replace the
bond since the bonding company was not authorized to transact in all courts in the Philippines.
The complaint was then subsequently dismissed.

The CA annulled the NLRC judgment and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: When is an appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC perfected?

RULING: For an appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC to be perfected, Article 223 (now
Article 229) of the Labor Code re quires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Such cash or surety bond
must be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission.

ISSUE: May the bond be reduced?

RULING: YES. While posting of the bond is indispensable in the perfection of the appeal in cases
involving monetary awards, the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (the Rules), particularly Section
6, Rule VI thereof, nonetheless allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of (a) the
existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award. No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained
except on such grounds. This reduction is not a matter of right and lies within the discretion of
the NLRC.

In Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corp, the Court held that “meritorious cases” for said purpose
would include “instances in which (1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2)
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a
liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective
of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least exhibited their
willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.”
 27

However, the NLRC is not precluded from conducting a preliminary determination of the merits.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ascribing grave abuse of discretion in the part of the NLRC when the
latter gave due course to PTI’s appeal and issued a modified decision absolving it from liability?

RULING: YES. The absence of grave abuse of discretion in this case is bolstered by the fact that
petitionersÊ motion to reduce bond was accompanied by a P5,000,000.00 surety bond which
was seasonably posted within the reglementary period to appeal. In McBurnie v. Ganzon, the
Court ruled that, “[f]or purposes of compliance with [the bond requirement under the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure], a motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash
or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal,
exclusive of damages, and attorney’s fees.” Seeing no cogent reason to deviate from the same,
the Court deems that the posting of the aforesaid partial bond, being evidently more than ten
percent (10%) of the full judgment award of P12,833,000.00, already constituted substantial
compliance with the governing rules at the onset.

Any initial defects in the bond had been cured when Petitioner posted the supersedeas bond in
timely compliance with NLRC’s order. Verily, the subsequent completion of the bond, in
addition to the reasons above stated, behooves this Court to hold that the NLRC actually had
sound bases to take cognizance of petitioners’ appeal.

12. RICARDO AZUELO VS. ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC.

G.R. No. 192573, OCTOBER 22, 2014

FACTS: Azuelo was employed by Zameco as a maintenance worker. Sometimemin March 2006,
he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non payment of benefits against Zameco. Zameco
submitted its position paper pursuant to the order of the LA. Azuelo, on the other hand was
given several extensions to submit such. However, on the third extension, instead of filing the
position paper, he moved for issuance of a motion for the issuance of an order directing
Zameco to furnish him with copies of the investigation report as regards his dismissal. The LA
dismissed the complaint due to Azuelo’s failure to file his position paper despite the ample
opportunity given to him.

Azuelo once again filed a complaint against Zameco containing the same allegations in his first
complaint. Zameco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.

The LA dismissed the second complaint stating tat the dismissal of the first complaint was with
prejudice and that the proper remedy was to appeal the same and not file a second complaint.
 28

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s order. Azuelo’s faiure to prosecute his action for
unreasonable length of time warranted the dismissal of the first complaint which is deemed to
be with prejudice since the LA did not qualify its nature. Thus the filing of the second complaint
is barred by the dismissal of the first.

The case was elevated to the CA which denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the NLRC
ruling.

ISSUE: Did the the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal due to the unreasonable failure
of the complainant to submit his position paper amounts to a dismissal with prejudice?

RULING: YES. The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 Revised Rules), the rules
applicable at the time of the controversy, is silent as to the nature of the dismissal of a
complaint on the ground of unreasonable failure to submit a position paper by the
complainant. Nevertheless, the 2005 Revised Rules, particularly Section 3, Rule I thereof,
provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court to arbitration proceedings before
the LAs and the NLRC in the absence of any applicable provisions therein.

The unjustified failure of a complainant in arbitration proceedings before the LA to submit his
position paper is akin to the case of a complainant’s failure to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time in ordinary civil proceedings. In both cases, the complainants are
remiss, sans reasonable cause, to prove the material allegations in their respective complaints.
Accordingly, the Court sees no reason not to apply the rules relative to unreasonable failure to
prosecute an action in ordinary civil proceedings to the unjustified failure of a complainant to
submit his position paper in arbitration proceedings before the LA.

In arbitration proceedings before the LA, the dismissal of a complaint on account of the
unreasonable failure of the complainant to submit his position paper is likewise regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another complaint, except when
the LA’s order of dismissal expressly states otherwise.

As already stated, the Order dated November 6, 2006, which dismissed Azuelo’s first complaint
due to his unreasonable failure to submit his position paper is unqualified. It is thus considered
as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to filing of another complaint. Accordingly,
the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed LA’s dismissal of the second complaint
for illegal dismissal. The filing of the second complaint based on the same allegations cannot be
permitted lest the rules on res judicata be transgressed. Indeed, technical rules of procedure
 29

are not binding in labor cases but its non applicability should not be made a license to disregard
the rights of employers against unreasonable or unjustifiable claims.
ISSUE: Did Azuelo seek the wrong remedy in assailing the LA’s Order?

RULING: YES. Considering that the dismissal of Azuelo’s first complaint was already an
adjudication on the merits, he should have filed a verified memorandum of appeal with the RAB
of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga within 10 calendar days from receipt of the said
order pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules instead of re-filing his complaint
for illegal dismissal. His failure to do so rendered the LA’s Order dated November 6, 2006,
which dismissed his first complaint for illegal dismissal, final and executory.

13. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN vs. FLORENTINO FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 211228. November 12, 2014
FACTS:

This case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florentino and Nilda on
May 18, 2000 against University of Pangasinan, Inc. [UPI], its President Cesar Duque, Executive
Vice President Juan Llamas Amor and Director for Student Affairs Dominador Reyes. In a
Decision dated November 6, 2000, Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito (LA Gambito) ruled that
Florentino and Nilda were illegally dismissed by the petitioners. The petitioners interposed an
appeal to the NLRC, which affirmed LA Gambito’s Decision in a Resolution dated June 29, 2001.
The petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated February 21, 2002. Aggrieved, Florentino and Nilda filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA to annul the NLRC’s Resolution dated February 21, 2002. On September
13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition.

UPI appealed the CA’s Decision to the Supreme Court but which was denied by the
Supreme Court in a Resolution dated February 21, 2005. UPI’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated June 6, 2005. As a
consequence, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court declaring its Resolution
dated February 21, 2005 final and executory as of July 11, 2005.

Subsequently, Florentino and Nilda moved for a recomputation of their award to include
their backwages and other benefits from the date of the decision of LA Gambito]up to the
finality of the decision on July 11, 2005. They likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution. The labor Arbiter ruled there is a need to update and upgrade the computation of
money claims and separation pay which has amounted now to P2,165,467.02. UPI filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order but it was denied was denied by LA Flores. The
petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC questioning LA Flores’ Orders basically alleging
 30

that Florentino and Nilda are only entitled to the amount of P756,502.47 awarded by LA
Gambito in the Decision dated November 6, 2000, and not the recomputed amount of
P2,165,467.02. The NLRC granted the appeal. The respondents then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC. Hence, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA. The CA granted the Petition.

ISSUEs:

1. Was there a violation of the principle of immutability of a final and executory judgment
when the computation of awards was updated to include as well backwages and
separation pay corresponding to the period after the rendition of LA Gambito’s decision
on November 6, 2000 up to its finality on July 11, 2005?
2. In computing the backwages and benefits awarded to the respondents, was the
reckoning period interrupted by the NLRC’s reversal of LA Gambito’s finding of illegal
dismissal?
RULING:

1. No. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.

The Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA when it affirmed LA Flores’
Order dated August 22, 2006, which allowed the updating beyond November 6, 2000 of the
computation of backwages and separation pay awarded to the respondents. The CA correctly
ruled that the backwages should be computed from May 9, 2000, the date of illegal dismissal,
up to July 11, 2005, the date of the Entry of Judgment, while separation pay should be reckoned
from the respective first days of employment of Florentino and Nilda up to July 11, 2005 as
well.

2. No. The petitioners argue that even if backwages and benefits were really due, the
computation should not include the period from February 21, 2002 to September 13, 2004,
during which time the NLRC’s disquisition that there was no illegal dismissal stood. The
argument fails to persuade. In Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation, the Court stated that the
increase in the amount that the corporation had to pay “is a consequence that it cannot avoid
as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the LA’s decision.”

Further, in Reyes v. NLRC, et al.,the Court declared that: One of the natural
consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
 31

statutory intent of this matter is clearly discernible. The payment of backwages allows the
employee to recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of wages as a result of
his dismissal. Logically, it must be computed from the date of petitioner’s illegal dismissal up to
the time of actual reinstatement. There can be no gap or interruption, lest we defeat the very
reason of the law in granting the same. Although in Reyes, the issue relates to the delay in filing
of the complaint for illegal dismissal from the time of termination, there is no preclusion to
apply the doctrine that there should be no gap or interruption in the reckoning period during
which the dismissed employee is entitled to backwages and benefits.

14. METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO N. HILONGO

G.R. No. 215630. March 9, 2015

FACTS:
In decision dated April 30, 2010, entitled Alberto Hilongo v. Bee Guards Corp./Milagros
Chan, the Labor Arbiter ruled that herein respondent Alberto N. Hilongo was illegally dismissed.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Aggrieved, Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari before In its Decision dated September 7, 2012,
the CA reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April 30,
2010. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
March 26, 2013. Petitioners no longer appealed to this Court.

Hilongo then filed a motion for entry of judgment and a motion for clarification of
Decision/Resolution praying that the CA’s March 26, 2013 Resolution be clarified and
interpreted to include the amount of the award as stated in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated
April 30, 2010 and additional award computed from May 1, 2010 to March 26, 2013, or the
date the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution dated June 11,
2013, the CA granted the motion for entry of judgment.

After the corresponding entry of judgment was issued on June 11, 2013, the case was
remanded to the Labor Arbiter. On July 9, 2013, respondent Hilongo filed a motion for issuance
of writ of execution alleging that the June 11, 2013 CA Resolution had confirmed that the
amount of P170,520.31 awarded by the Labor Arbiter is not sufficient, and that there is a need
to compute additional monetary awards reckoned from May 1, 2010 up to April 26, 2013 or the
date Hilongo presumed as the date of finality of the decision. The Labor Arbiter directed the
issuance of a writ of execution and ruled that the award of P170,520.31 as stated in the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision dated April 30, 2010 prevails.
 32

Hilongo filed a petition for extraordinary remedy before the NLRC which dismissed the
petition. The NLRC also denied his motion for reconsideration. Hilongo then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which granted his petition. The CA noted that since the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision dated April 30, 2010 had ordered the payment of separation pay, in lieu of
reinstatement, the finality of said decision on June 11, 2013 effectively declares that Hilongo’s
employment relationship with petitioners has ended on said date. Hence, separation pay and
backwages must be computed up to that point to account for the time the illegally dismissed
employee should have been paid his salary and benefit entitlements. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering the recomputation of Hilongo’s monetary
awards?

RULING:
NO. The court cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The recomputation of the consequences
of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only
the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a
violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
Likewise without merit is petitioners’ contention that “it may very well be argued that
the NLRC’s final decision reversing the Labor Arbiter is in fact the final decision that effectively
declared the employment relationship between Hilongo and petitioners as ended on which
date the computation of the separation pay and backwages awarded by the Labor Arbiter
ultimately ceased.” The court notes that the CA, in its Decision dated September 7, 2012, had
reversed the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 2010 and Resolution dated November 23,
2010, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April 30, 2010. Thus, petitioners cannot
claim that the NLRC decision which was set aside with finality is “the NLRC’s final decision” and
“the final decision” that effectively declared the employment relationship between the parties
as ended.
Said CA Decision dated September 7, 2012 became final and executory on April 26,
2013. Thus, the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, effectively ended the employment relationship of the
parties on April 26, 2013, the date the CA decision became final. Since the Labor Arbiter’s
computation of Hilongo’s monetary award was up to the date of his April 30, 2010 Decision
only, the CA properly decreed the computation of additional backwages and separation pay.
However, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
became final on June 11, 2013, contrary to its own finding that it became final and executory on
April 26, 2013.
 33

15. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. vs. Picar, Jr.,

G.R. No. 209383, March 11, 2015

FACTS: Respondent Picar was employed by petitioner Sealion Shipping Limited-United Kingdom
through its local manning agent Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. as Chief Cook onboard
the vessel, “MV Toisa Paladin.” The last contract was for a fixed duration of 3 months which
commenced on September 5, 2010.

On September 24, 2010, Picar experienced high fever, chilling, lumbar back pain, and difficulty
in urinating accompanied with blood. He was referred for medical treatment to the Maritime
Medical Center in Singapore and was diagnosed with Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) and Renal
Calculus. After his checkup, he was required to go back to the vessel and take a rest. On
September 28, 2010, he was brought back to MMC where he was confined until October 1,
2010. On October 2, 2010, he was repatriated.

Upon his arrival in Manila, Picar was referred to Dr. Alegre at St. Luke’s Medical Center. On
October 21, 2010, he underwent sonography of his kidneys and urinary bladder, which showed
renal cyst on his right kidney; calyceal lithiasis, right; and normal urinary bladder; slightly
enlarged prostate gland was noted.” Dr. Alegre repeatedly recommended that he undergo
extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy for the dissolution of his right kidney stone.

On February 23, 2011, Picar consulted Dr. Vicaldo who also diagnosed him to be suffering from
Right Renal Calculus, Essential Hypertension. Dr. Vicaldo considered his illness as work
aggravated/related and declared him unfit to resume work as a seafarer in any capacity.
Picar then filed a complaint for permanent disability compensation, balance of sick wages,
reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

On June 22, 2011, the LA rendered judgment in favor of Picar. The LA found that his illness was
work-related and that the nature of his work as a chief cook contributed to the aggravation of
his condition.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. It ruled that Picar’s disability was
permanent as he was totally unable to perform his job for more than 120 days from his
repatriation.

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA.

 34

In the meantime, Picar moved for the execution of the LA decision. On July 3, 2012, the LA
issued a Writ of Execution for the enforcement and full satisfaction of its decision.
Consequently, petitioners paid the judgment award on August 13, 2012.

In its assailed Decision dated May 2, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition. Citing the case of
Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Madjus, it ruled that the payment by petitioners of
the judgment award constituted an amicable settlement that had rendered the petition moot
and academic.

ISSUE: Was the petition for certiorari before the CA rendered moot and academic by the
satisfaction of the judgment award in compliance with the writ of execution issued by the LA?

RULING: NO. Career Philippines finds no application in this case as it was resolved on equitable
considerations. In the said case, while petitioner employer had the luxury of having other
remedies available to it such as its petition for certiorari pending before the CA and an eventual
appeal to the Supreme Court, respondent seafarer could no longer pursue other claims,
including for interests that may accrue during the pendency of the case. Stated differently, the
Court ruled against the employer because the conditional satisfaction of judgment signed by
the parties was highly prejudicial to the employee. Thus, it was held that the LA and the CA
could not be faulted for interpreting petitioner’s “conditional settlement” to be tantamount to
an amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari.

In this case, petitioners satisfied the judgment award in strict compliance with a duly issued
writ of execution and pursuant to terms fair to both parties. Thus, the equitable ruling in Career
Philippines would certainly be unfair to petitioners in this case as they still have a remedy under
the rules. The CA, therefore, was in error in dismissing the petition for being moot and
academic. /GARA

16. Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. vs. Ledesma,

G.R. No. 197556, March 25, 2015

FACTS: Respondent was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront. On the basis of the
complaints filed by Christe Mandal (a supplier of a concessionaire of Waterfront) and Rosanna
Lofranco (a job applicant), Ledesma was dismissed from employment. From the affidavits and
testimonies of the complainants during the administrative hearings conducted by Waterfront,
the latter found that Ledesma kissed and mashed the breasts of Mandal inside the hotel’s
 35

elevator, and exhibited his penis and asked Lofranco to masturbate him at the conference room
of the hotel.
On August 12, 2008, Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA found that the
allegations leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and concluded that Ledesma was
illegally dismissed.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA ruling and held that Ledesma’s acts of sexual overtures
constituted grave misconduct justifying his dismissal from employment. NLRC also denied
Ledesma’s MR. A copy of the said Resolution was received by Ledesma’s counsel of record
(Atty. Abellana) on March 15, 2010.

On May 17, 2010, or 63 days after Atty. Abellana received a copy of the NLRC’s Resolution, said
counsel filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its
Comment, Waterfront prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it
was belatedly filed.

On August 5, 2010, Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, sought the admission of his
Amended Petition for Certiorari. In the amended petition, Ledesma contended that his receipt
on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning
date of the 60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims
that the petition was timely filed on May 17, 2010.

By its Resolution, the CA admitted Ledesma’s amended petition for certiorari. The CA,
thereafter, rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the NLRC and reinstating the ruling of
the LA.

ISSUE: Was the petition for certiorari timely filed with the CA?

RULING: NO, the unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for certiorari before the CA
within the 60-day period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary
period. As the Rule now stands, with the amendments brought under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration.
 36

In relaxing the rules and allowing an extension, Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
reiterated the necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for the failure to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-day period.

Moreover, contrary to Ledesma’s contention, receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the
reckoning point of the reglementary period. When a party to a suit appears by counsel, service
of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. This is so because
notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his
counsel is not notice in law. Furthermore, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the
client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on
its face.

With the expiration of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, a review of the NLRC
Resolution will be beyond the jurisdiction of any court. No longer assailable, the NLRC
Resolution could not be altered or modified. /GARA

17. MANILA MINING CORPORATION v. AMOR

G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015

FACTS: Respondents Lowito Amor, et.al were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining
Corporation, a domestic corporation which operated a mining claim, in pursuit of its business of
large-scale open-pit mining for gold and copper ore. Environmental laws required for the
storage of waste materials generated by its mining operations called tailings containment
facility. With its temporary shutdown of business operations for reaching out the maximum
level of pumped mining tailings, the DENR-EMB issued a temporary authority for it to be able to
continue operating for another six (6) months and to increase its capacity, however, petitioner
failed to secure an extension permit when said temporary authority eventually lapsed.

Petitioner served a notice, informing its employees and the DOLE of the temporary suspension
of its operations for six months and the temporary layoff of 2/3 of its employees. After the
lapse of 6 months, petitioner again notified DOLE of extending the temporary shutdown of its
operations for another six months.

Respondents the filed the complaint for constructive dismissal and monetary claims in the LA
which LA decided holding petitioner liable for constructive dismissal applying Article 283 of the
Labor Code.
 37

Aggrieved, petitioner filed its appeal before the NLRC and reduction of bond appeal on the
ground that its financial losses in the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up one in
cash and/or surety equivalent to the monetary award.
Respondents also argued that the appeal bond tendered by petitioner was so grossly
disproportionate to monetary award for the same to be considered substantial compliance with
the requirements for the perfection of an appeal from a Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Without addressing the procedural issues raised by respondents, however, the NLRC reversed
the appealed decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It found that the continued
suspension of petitioner’s operations was due to circumstances beyond its control.

Respondents filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari to the CA and the Court reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Decision. Applying the principle that the right to appeal is merely
a statutory remedy and that the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly follow the
requirements therefor, the CA decreed that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had already attained
finality and, for said reason, had been placed beyond the NLRC’s power of review. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in immediately setting aside
the decision of the NLRC without reviewing the merits of the case.

RULING: No. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a
part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must,
therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is
invariably lost. Insofar as appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223
of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that, decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC] by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders. In case of a judgment
involving a monetary award, the same provision mandates that, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from. Alongside the requirement that the appellant shall furnish a copy of
the memorandum of appeal to the other party, the foregoing requisites for the perfection of an
appeal are reiterated under Sections 1, 4 and 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure in force
at the time petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
 38

The issue that has bedevilled labor litigation for long has been clarified by the ruling in
McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., which built on and extended the ruling that while it is true that
reduction of the appeal bond has been allowed in meritorious cases on the principle that
substantial justice is better served by allowing appeals on the merits, it has been ruled that the
employer should comply with the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall
be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not
stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

In this case, we see that with no proof to substantiate its claim, petitioner moved for a
reduction of the appeal bond on the proffered basis of serious losses and reverses it supposedly
sustained in the years prior to the rendition of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Since it is the
posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the NLRC, the rule is settled
that noncompliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.

Note: The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory./ LUMINGKIT

18. DELA ROSA LINER, INC. v. BORELA

G.R. No. 207286, July 29, 2015

FACTS: Respondents Calixto Borela, bus driver, and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed separate
complaints against petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public transport company, for
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries, and other benefits, and violation of Wage Order Nos.
13, 14, 15 and 16.

In a motion, the petitioners asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum shopping.
They alleged that the CA 13th Division disposed of a similar case between the parties after they
entered into a compromise agreement which covered all claims and causes of action they had
against each other in relation to the respondents’ employment. The respondents opposed the
motion, contending that the causes of action in the present case are different from the causes
of action settled in the case the petitioners cited.

LA: Upheld the petitioners’ position and dismissed the complaint on grounds of forum
shopping.
 39

NLRC: Granted the appeal of respondents and held that the respondents could not have
committed forum shopping as there was no identity of causes of action between the two cases.
First complaint: illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice; Second Complaint:
nonpayment/under pay ment of their salaries and monetary benefits, and violation of several
wage orders.
CA: it found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC ruling that the respondents did not
commit forum shopping when they filed their second complaint.

Respondents’ Position: The petition should not prosper as it was belatedly filed. They claim that
according to the petitioners’ counsel herself, her law firm received a copy of the CA resolution
of May 21, 2013, denying their motion for reconsideration on May 28, 2013, and giving them
until June 12, 2013, to file the petition. The petition, they point out, was notarized only on June
13, 2013, which means that it was filed only on that day, or beyond the 15-day filing period.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second complaint is barred by the rule on forum shopping or by the
principle of res judicata.
2. Whether or not the petition was belatedly filed?

RULING:
1. NO. CA 15th Division committed no reversible error when it affirmed the NLRC ruling that
the second complaint is not barred by the rule on forum shopping nor by the principle of res
judicata. As the CA aptly cited, the elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. We concur with the CA that forum shopping and res judicata are not applicable
in the present case. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the
judgment rendered in the previous action will not amount to res judicata in the action now
under consideration. Sufficient basis exists for the NLRC’s and CA’s conclusions that there is no
identity of causes of action between the respondents’ two complaints against the petitioners.
The first complaint involved illegal dismissal/suspension, unfair labor practice with prayer for
damages and attorney’s fees; while the second complaint involves claims for labor standards
benefits · the petitioners’ alleged violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16; nonpayment
of respondents’ sick and vacation leave pays, 13th month pay, service incentive leave benefit,
overtime pay, and night shift differential.
 40

2. NO. The petition for review on certiorari timely filed pursuant to Rule 45, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court. The last day for filing of the petition, as respondents claim, fell on June 12, 2013,
Independence Day, a legal holiday. In Reiner Pacific International Shipping, et al. v. Captain
Francisco B. Guevarra, et al., the Court explained that under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court, as clarified by A.M. 00-2-14 SC (in relation to the filing of pleadings in courts), when the
last day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the filing of
the pleading on the next working day is deemed on time. The filing of the petition therefore on
June 13, 2013, a working day, fully complied with the rules./ LUMINGKIT

19. TOYOTA ALABANG, INC v. EDWIN GAMES

G.R. No. 206612, August 17, 2015

FACTS: Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its vehicle lubricants.
Subsequently, it charged him with qualified theft before the trial court. Two years thereafter,
Games filed a Complainant for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of benefits, and damages against
petitioner. The latter, through counsel, failed to file its Position Paper. Several resettings of the
hearings ensued. During one hearing, petitioner manifested that it had failed to file its Position
Paper because its handling lawyer was no longer connected with the company. Then, in another
hearing petitioner failed to appear and even reneged on submitting its pleading. Accordingly,
the case was declared submitted for decision.

LA: Ruled against petitioner. Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result,
the LA's ruling became final and executory.The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner
sought to quash. It prayed that the proceedings be reopened, explaining that it had failed to
present evidence because of its counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate pleadings. The LA
denied the claims of petitioner. Aggrieved, the latter appealed before the NLRC.

NLRC: The appeal was denied due course because it had failed to show proof of its security
deposit for the appeal bond under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
According to the NLRC, the bonding company's mere declaration in the Certification of Security
Deposit that the bond was fully securedwas not tantamount to a faithful compliance with the
rule, because there must first be an accompanying assignment of the employer's bank
deposit.On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may
be taken from an order of execution of a final judgment. For the NLRC, petitioner's failure to
appeal the LA Decision already made the ruling final and executory.

CA: Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, but the action was
dismissed. Firstly, the CA ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
 41

appeal, given that petitioner had failed to comply faithfully with the bond requirement.
Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final judgment is no longer appealable. Thirdly,
the CA found that petitioner's own negligence had caused it to lose its right to appeal.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive
Relief before the SC. It disputed the finding that it did not show proof of its security deposit for
the appeal bond. It also insisted that its counsel's gross negligence justified the reopening of
the proceedings below. By way of a minute Resolution, SC denied the petition. Hence, the
instant Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the proceedings may be reopened
2. W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in requiring petitioner to post an appeal bond,
because this requirement does not cover an appeal from a decision of the LA denying a motion
to quash a writ of execution.
3. W/N appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and executory judgment.

RULING:
1. NO. The reopening of a case is an extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make a
complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.
Hence, there must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be granted. In this case,
petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. As found by the appellate court, petitioner
was present during the mandatory conference hearing in which the latter was informed by the
LA of the need to file a Position Paper on 15 November 2007. However, petitioner not only
reneged on the submission of its Position Paper, but even failed to move for the filing of the
pleading at any point before the LA resolved the case on 5 February 2008. Moreover, petitioner
had failed to exhibit diligence when it did not attend the hearing on 11 January 2008, or any of
the proceedings thereafter, despite its manifestation that it no longer had any legal
representative. Given the instances of negligence by petitioner itself, the Court finds that the
CA justly refused to reopen the case in the former's favor. Definitely, petitioner cannot now be
allowed to claim denial of due process when it was petitioner who was less than vigilant of its
rights.

2. NO. Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, uniformly states: In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in
 42

amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the rules do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds of rulings of
the LA. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA involves a monetary
award, an employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond. Therefore,
absent any qualifying terms, so long as the decision of the LA involves a monetary award, as in
this case, that ruling can only be appealed after the employer posts a bond. In Computer
Innovations Center v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the underlying purpose of the appeal bond is
to ensure that the employee has properties on which he or she can execute upon in the event of
a final, providential award.

3. No. An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of
only in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an action
must comply with the requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as regards the period,
grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper appeal before the NLRC; and in
Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals from final and executory decisions of the
Labor Arbiter.

In this case, petitioner elevated to the NLRC an already final and executory decision of the LA.
To recall, after petitioner learned of its former counsel's negligence in filing a Position Paper
before the LA, it nonetheless failed to file a motion reconsideration to question the ruling of the
LA that it illegally dismissed Games. At that point, the Decision was already final and executory,
so the LA dutifully issued a Writ of Execution. Petitioner sought the quashal of the writ of
execution and the reopening of its case only at that stage; and only after it was rebuffed by the
LA did petitioner appeal before the NLRC. Based on the timeline, therefore, the LA's adverse
Decision had become final and executory even prior to petitioner's appeal before the NLRC
contesting the denial of the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Consequently, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal based on its clear prohibition under Section 5, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure. Jurisprudence dictates that a final and executory decision of the LA can no
longer be reversed or modified. After all, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, so does the winning party have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.21 On this basis, the CA did not grievously err when it
concluded that the ruling of the NLRC denying petitioner's appeal was not baseless, arbitrary,
whimsical, or despotic.

20. ROSALES v. NEW A.N.J.H. ENTERPRISES

G.R. No. 203355, August 18, 2015
 43

FACTS: Respondent New ANJH Enterprises (New ANJH) is a sole proprietorship owned by
respondent Noel Awayan (Noel). Petitioners are its former employees who worked as machine
operators, drivers, helpers, lead and boiler men. Due to dwindling capital, respondent wrote
the Director of the DOLE regarding New ANJH's impending cessation of operations and the sale
of its assets to respondent NH Oil Mill Corporation (NH Oil), as well as the termination of thirty-
three (33) employees by reason thereof. Petitioners received their respective separation pays,
signed the corresponding check vouchers and executed Quitclaims and Release before Labor
Arbiter Melchisedek A. Guan (LA Guan). LA Guan then declared the “labor dispute” between
New ANJH and petitioners as “dismissed with prejudice on ground of settlement.” Petitioners
however, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with NLRC Regional Arbitration alleging in their
complaint that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil
using the same machineries and with the same owners and management, thus, in
circumvention of their security of tenure.

LA:Executive Labor Arbiter ELA Santos found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed and
ordered their reinstatement and the payment of P1,006,045.87 corresponding to the
petitioners' full backwages less the amount paid to them as their respective "separation pay."

NLRC: Respondents filed their Notice of Appeal with Appeal Memorandum along with a Verified
Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. They also posted 60% of the award ordered by the LA,
P603,627.52, as their appeal bond. Meanwhile, petitioners also filed a Memorandum of Partial
Appeal contending that ELA Santos erred in failing to award them moral and exemplary
damages. The NLRC denied respondents Motion to Reduce Bond for lack of merit and so
dismissing their appeal for non-perfection. The NLRC also granted petitioners' partial appeal.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal
Cash Bond with corresponding payment of additional cash bond.While the motion was opposed
by petitioners, the NLRC, reversed its earlier Decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioners'
complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Orders issued by LA Guan under the doctrine
of res judicata. Further, the NLRC pointed out that the sale of New ANJH's assets to NH Oil Mill
was in the exercise of sound management prerogative and there was no proof that it was made
to defeat petitioners' security of tenure.

CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The appellate court denied the petition
for certiorari, thereby affirming the NLRC's Resolution. It held that private respondents had
substantially complied with the rule requiring the posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the
total award given to the employees. More importantly, so the CA held, the Orders rendered by
LA Guan were considered final and binding upon the parties and had the force and effect of a
judgment rendered by the labor arbiter. Thus, the appellate court declared that the petitioners'
 44

complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata. Aggrieved by the CA's
Decision, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondents substantially complied with the rule requiring the posting of an
appeal bond
2. Whether the complaint for illegal dismissal was already barred by res judicata

RULING:
1. Yes. The CA was correct when it pointed out that Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC provides that a motion to reduce bond shall be entertained "upon the posting of a
bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award." As to what the "reasonable
amount" is, the NLRC has wide discretion in determining the reasonableness of the bond for
purposes of perfecting an appeal. In this case, the NLRC had reconsidered its original position
and declared that the 60% bond was reasonable given the merits of the justification provided
by respondents in their Motion to Reduce Bond, as supplemented by their Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal Cash Bond. The CA affirmed the
merits of the grounds cited by respondents in their motions and the reasonableness of the
bond originally posted by respondents. This is in accord with the guidelines established in
McBurnie v. Ganzon, where this Court declared that the posting of a provisional cash or surety
bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal is sufficient
provided that there is meritorious ground therefor. It is noted that the respondents have
eventually posted the full amount of the award ordered by the labor arbiter. Thus, given the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and the affirmation of the CA of
the reasonableness of the motions and the amount of bond posted, there is no ground for this
Court to reverse the CA's finding that the appeal had been perfected.

2. No. For res judicata to apply, the concurrence of the following requisites must be verified: (1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is-between the
first and the second actions-identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The
petitioners dispute the existence of all of the foregoing requisites. First, petitioners contend
that LA Guan does not have jurisdiction since, in the first place, Noel's letter request for
guidance in the payment of separation pay is allegedly not a "labor dispute." Article 219
(previously Article 212) of the Labor Code defines a "labor dispute" as "any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
 45

and employee." As separation pay concerns a term and condition of employment, Noel's
request to be guided in the payment thereof is clearly a labor dispute under the Labor Code.
The proper payment of separation pay further falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
pursuant to Art. 224 (previously Art. 217) of the Labor Code, as it is mandated as a necessary
condition for the termination of employees. The invocation of the labor arbiter's jurisdiction by
way of a letter request instead of a complaint is of no moment, as it is well-settled that the
application of technical rules of procedure is relaxed in labor cases.
The third requisite is not present. The Orders rendered by LA Guan cannot be considered as
constituting a judgment on the merits. The Orders simply manifest that petitioners “are
amenable to the computations made by the company respecting their separation pay.” Nothing
more. They do not clearly state the petitioners’ right or New ANJH’s corresponding duty as a
result of the termination. The fourth requisite is also absent. While there may be substantial
identity of the parties, there is no identity of subject matter or cause of action. In SME Bank,
Inc. v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 184517, October 8, 2013), the SC held that the acceptance of
separation pay is an issue distinct from the legality of the dismissal of the employees. The
conformity of the employees to the corporation’s act of considering them as terminated and
their subsequent acceptance of separation pay does not remove the taint of illegal dismissal.
Acceptance of separation pay does not bar the employees from subsequently contesting the
legality of their dismissal, nor does it bar them from challenging the legality of their separation
from the service. In the absence of the third and fourth requisites, the appellate court should
have proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioners’ termination.

21. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA

G.R. No. 213729, September 2, 2015

FACTS: Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) hired Alexander P. Bichara (Bichara) as a flight attendant.

Bichara was included in PAL's Purser Upgrading Program in which he graduated. As flight
purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides for his performance evaluation and earn at
least an 85% rating for each ride. However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check rides with ratings
of 83.46% and 80.63%. Consequently, Bichara was demoted to the position of flight steward.

Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL, but no action was taken. Hence, he filed a complaint for
illegal demotion against PAL before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) – Regional
 46

Arbitration Branch. Labor Arbiter (LA) issued a Decision (June 16, 1997 Decision) declaring
Bichara's demotion as illegal, and accordingly, ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position
as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal before the NLRC and later before the Court of Appeals (CA),
both of which, however, upheld LA’s finding. PAL no longer appealed to the Court, thus, it
rendered the June 16, 1997 Decision final and executory.

During the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA, PAL implemented another
retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's employment. This
prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight attendants, represented by
the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), to file a separate
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment with claims for reinstatement and
payment of salaries, allowances, backwages, and damages against PAL. This case was appealed
all the way to the Supreme Court, entitled "Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn. of the Phils. v.
PAL, Patria T. Chiong, and CA" (FASAP case), which remains pending as of the time this decision
was penned.

On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age under the PAL-
FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). On January 31, 2008, Bichara filed a motion for
execution of the LA's June 16, 1997 Decision, which PAL opposed by arguing that the
"complaint for illegal demotion x x x was overtaken by supervening events, i.e., the
retrenchment of [Bichara] in 1998 and his having reached [the] compulsory retirement age in
2005."

In an Order dated February 4, 2009 (February 4, 2009 Order), Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam
(LA Macam) granted Bichara's motion for execution, thus, directing the issuance of a writ of
execution against PAL and/or a certain Jose Garcia to jointly and severally pay Bichara: (a)
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of
service counting from October 28, 1968 up to the present, excluding the period from April 1,
1971 until May 15, 1975, or a period of 35 years; and (b) attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.

LA Macam declared that, notwithstanding the pendency before this Court of the illegal
retrenchment case, i.e., FASAP case, Bichara's termination was invalid, given that: (a) PAL did
not use a fair and reasonable criteria in effecting the retrenchment; (b) PAL disregarded the
labor arbiters' rulings in the illegal demotion and illegal retrenchment cases which were both
immediately executory; and (c) retrenchment was made during the pendency of the illegal
demotion case without the permission of the court where the case was pending. For these
reasons, Bichara was entitled to reinstatement to his position as flight purser. However, since
 47

Bichara may no longer be reinstated in view of his compulsory retirement in accordance with
the CBA, LA Macam, instead, ordered PAL to pay Bichara separation pay with the salary base of
a flight purser.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed LA Macam.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the NLRC’s decision and ordered petitioner
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to pay respondent Alexander P. Bichara (Bichara) salary
differentials, backwages, and retirement benefits.

ISSUES:
1. How should a judgement be implemented? What is the principle of immutability of final
judgements?
2. Was LA Macam correct when he directed the issuance of a writ of execution ordering
the payment of separation pay to Bichara in lieu of reinstatement?
3. May the reinstatement of Bichara be then enforced?
4. What award, if any, is Bichara entitled to?

RULING:
1. A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is
a long and well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with
and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity.
A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which
states that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt to
insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the
rule on immutability of judgments. But this principle has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction
of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

2. NO. The final judgment sought to be executed is the LA's June 16, 1997 Decision which
directed PAL to reinstate Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal demotion to flight
attendant. Evidently, LA Macam went beyond the terms of the June 16, 1997 Decision when
he, in his February 4, 2009 Order, directed the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Unlike illegal dismissal cases, the awards of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement were all hinged on the validity of the employee's
 48

dismissal. Here, the validity of Bichara's termination is the subject matter of a separate case,
i.e., the FASAP case, which is still pending before this Court, and is also beyond the ambit of the
illegal demotion proceedings. Hence, LA Macam exceeded his authority when he ruled on this
issue and directed PAL to pay Bichara separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

3. NO. PAL's supervening retrenchment of its employees, which included Bichara, in July
1998, and his compulsory retirement in July 2005, however, prevent the enforcement of the
reinstatement of Bichara to the position of flight purser under the June 16, 1997 Decision.
Nonetheless, since this Decision had already settled the illegality of Bichara's demotion with
finality, this Court finds that Bichara should, instead, be awarded the salary differential of a
flight purser from a flight steward from the time of his illegal demotion up until the time he was
retrenched. Notably, unlike LA Macam's award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the
award of salary differential is not dependent on the validity of his termination, as it is, in fact,
intrinsically linked to the illegality of Bichara's demotion. Hence, with this direct relation, there
should be no obstacle in rendering this award.

4. (NOTE: This case falls under the exception # 4)

This Court deems the award of salary differential to be the just and equitable award under
the circumstances herein prevailing. Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts when after judgment has been
rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its
execution impossible or unjust, as in this case.

Since Bichara's illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be entitled (a) to
backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of retrenchment up until his
compulsory retirement; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in accordance with the existing
CBA at the time of Bichara's retirement; and (c) attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages,
if any, but only if this Court, in the FASAP case, finally rules that the subject retrenchment is
invalid. Otherwise, he should only be entitled to the above-stated salary differential, as well as
the corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Article 297 (formerly
Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The awards of backwages, and
retirement benefits, including attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, cannot,
however, be executed in these proceedings since they are incidents which pertain to the illegal
retrenchment case, hence, executable only when the FASAP case is finally concluded.

22. CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC. vs. JOSEPH BASSO

G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015
 49

FACTS: Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under
the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Respondent, a US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a
General Manager position by Mr. Braden, Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines. On
November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with respondent
retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter, respondent received a letter from Mr.
Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing him that he has
agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.” Respondent wrote a counter-
proposal that was rejected by CMI.

Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation.
Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since
the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was
returned there.” Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also,
applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply
Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily
submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of
the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties.

ISSUE: Do labor tribunals of the Philippines have jurisdiction over the instant case?

RULING: YES. Labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the
case. That the employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that
it originated from and was returned to the US, does not automatically preclude our labor
tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive
process of service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in
fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a
 50

foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business
address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in
the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our
courts.

Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-
laws issue. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws
case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are
met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. All
these requisites are present here. Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he
and CMI lad physical presence in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a
Philippine branch, while Basso, before his death, was residing here. The labor tribunals can
make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident subject of this case (i.e.
dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding circumstances of which can be
ascertained without having to leave the Philippines.

23. Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) Nestlé Philippines, Inc. Chapter (Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division) vs. Nestlé Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 198675. September 23, 2015

FACTS: On January 13, 1997, herein petitioner union staged a strike against herein respondent
company`s Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division on the grounds of alleged violation of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), dismissal of union officers and members, discrimination
and other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts. As a consequence, respondent filed with the NLRC a
Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress
and Egress Order, and Deputization Order. Subsequently, on April 2, 1997, DOLE Secretary,
issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the strike and certifying the same to the NLRC. On
June 2, 1997, petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, questioning the
above order of the Acting DOLE Secretary. However, after a series of conciliation meetings and
discussions between the parties, they agreed to resolve their differences and came up with a
compromise which was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated August 4,
1998.

On October 12, 1998, the NLRC issued its Decision approving the parties` compromise
agreement and granting their Joint Motion to Dismiss. On January 25, 2010, or after a lapse of
more than eleven (11) years from the time of execution of the subject MOA, petitioners filed
 51

with the NLRC a Motion for Writ of Execution contending that they have not been paid the
amounts they are entitled to in accordance with the MOA. Respondent filed its Opposition to
the Motion for Writ of Execution contending that petitioners` remedy is already barred by
prescription

NLRC denied the application on the ground of prescription. CA dismissed on the ground that it
is a wrong mode of appeal. The CA held that petitioners` appeal involves a pure question of law
which should have been taken directly to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Was the motion of petitioner barred by prescription?

RULING: YES. There is no dispute that the compromise agreement between herein petitioner
union, representing its officers and members, and respondent company was executed on
August 4, 1998 and was subsequently approved via the NLRC Decision dated October 12, 1998.
However, considering petitioners` allegation that the terms and conditions of the agreement
have not been complied with by respondent, petitioners should have moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution. It is wrong for petitioners` counsel to argue that since the NLRC`s Decision
approving the parties` compromise agreement was immediately executory, there was no need
to file a motion for execution.

Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has
the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for
vices of consent or forgery. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the
Rules. In this respect, the law and the rules provide the mode and the periods within which a
party may enforce his right. The most relevant rule in the instant case is Section 8, Rule XI,
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which states that:
Section 8. A decision or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall become
dormant, and may only be enforced by an independent action within a period of ten (10) years
from date of its finality.

As well as pertinent portions of Sections 4(a) and 6, Rule III, of the NLRC Manual on Execution
of Judgment, and similarly, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which can be applied in a
suppletory manner and Article 1144 of the Civil Code may, likewise be applied, as it provides
that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues.
 52

It is clear from the above law and rules that a judgment may be executed on motion within five
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced
by action. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere motion after the
lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and executory),
the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors and
must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular form.
In the present case, the five- and ten-year periods provided by law and the rules are more than
sufficient to enable petitioners to enforce their right under the subject MOA. In this case, it is
clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having been based on a compromise embodied in a
written contract, was immediately executory upon its issuance on October 12, 1998. Thus, it
could have been executed by motion within five (5) years. It was not. Nonetheless, it could have
been enforced by an independent action within the next five (5) years, or within ten (10) years
from the time the NLRC Decision was promulgated. It was not. Therefore, petitioners` right to
have the NLRC judgment executed by mere motion as well as their right of action to enforce the
same judgment had prescribed by the time they filed their Motion for Writ of Execution on
January 25, 2010. It is true that there are instances in which this Court allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.

However, in instances when this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five
years, there is, invariably, only one recognized exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. In
the present case, there is no indication that the delay in the execution of the MOA, as claimed
by petitioners, was caused by respondent nor was it incurred at its instance or for its benefit or
advantage.
Ortiz

24. QUANTUM FOODS, INC. v. MARCELINO ESLOYO and GLEN MAGSILA

G.R. No. 213696. December 9, 2015

FACTS: Petitioner Quantum Foods, Inc. (QFI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
distribution and selling of food products nationwide. It hired Esloyo as Major Accounts
Representative, whose consistent good performance led to successive promotions, until his
promotion to the position of Regional Sales Manager for Visayas and Mindanao in 2004. On the
other hand, it hired Magsila as Key Accounts Representative on a probationary status and gave
him a permanent status on August 31, 2005. In 2006, QFI decided to reorganize its sales force
 53

nationwide following a drastic drop in net income in 2005, and Magsila was among those
retrenched.

Meanwhile, in response to several anonymous complaints against Esloyo for alleged

misbehavior and violations of various company rules and regulations, such as sexual
harassment, misappropriation of company funds, QFI`s auditor conducted an
audit/investigation and submitted an Audit Report. A Show Cause Memorandum was thereafter
issued by QFI Human Resources (HR) Manager irecting Esloyo to explain. Esloyo submitted his
written explanation denying the charges which QFI found to be unsatisfactory.18 Consequently,
Esloyo was informed of his termination from work on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
due to his numerous violations of the company rules and regulations. Aggrieved, Esloyo and
Magsila (respondents) filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal which were subsequently
consolidated. LA found respondents to have been illegally dismissed.

Dissatisfied, QFI filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC
accompanied by: (a) a Motion to Reduce Bond averring that it was encountering difficulty
raising the amount of the bond and finding an insurance company that can cover said amount
during the short period of time allotted for an appeal; and (b) a cash bond in the amount of
P400,000.00 (partial bond).

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for QFI`s failure: (a) to attach a Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping as required by the New Rules and Procedure of the
NLRC; and (b) to post a bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment as mandated
by law.
QFI thereafter moved to admit its Verification/Certification for Non-Forum Shopping and
related documents, explaining that the failure to attach said documents was due to the
inadvertence of its counsel who was just recovering from the open cholecystectomy.
Subsequently, but before the NLRC could act on the Motion to Reduce Bond, it posted a surety
bond from an accredited insurance company fully covering the monetary judgment, which
respondents vehemently opposed.

NLRC denied respondents` motion to dismiss and gave due course to QFI`s appeal brushing
aside technical rules and held that respondents were not illegally dismissed. CA reversed and
set aside the NLRC`s ruling and reinstated the LA`s Decision. It ruled that QFI`s failure to post
the required bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment impeded the perfection
of its appeal and rendered the LA`s Decision final and executory. Thus, the NLRC was bereft of
jurisdiction and abused its discretion in entertaining the appeal.
 54

ISSUE: Was the NLRC correct in accepting the late submission of the certificate of non-forum
shopping and the verification signed by personnel without the requisite board resolution in
QFI`s appeal?

RULING: YES. Relaxation of the technical rules by the NLRC was justified.
Notably, while QFI timely filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal, it was only
accompanied by a partial bond with a Motion to Reduce Bond, and not a bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary judgment. The appeal likewise suffered from the following
deficiencies, inter alia: (a) the verification was signed by QFI HR Manager dela Cruz, without the
requisite board resolution authorizing him to sign for and in behalf of QFI; and (b) it was
unaccompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Nonetheless, QFI subsequently
submitted its Verification/Certification.

In China Banking Corp. v. Mondragon Int`l. Phils., Inc., the Court had the occasion to rule that
the subsequent submission of proof of authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation
justifies the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to be given due
course. Besides, the verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional. Thus, the court or
tribunal may simply order the waiver of strict compliance with the rules, as the NLRC did.
On the other hand, the certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. However, under justifiable circumstances, the
Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

In the present case, it is apparent that the plausible merit of the case was the special
circumstance or compelling reason that prompted the NLRC to relax the certification
requirement and give due course to QFI`s appeal as it, in fact, arrived at a contrary ruling from
that of the LA. It is well to emphasize that technical rules are not binding in cases submitted
before the NLRC. In fact, labor officials are enjoined to use every and reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, in the interest of due process. Consequently, the NLRC cannot be faulted for
relaxing its own rules in the interest of substantial justice.

ISSUE: Did the NLRC correctly admitted the reduced bond of QFI?

RULING: YES. In labor cases, the law governing appeals from the LA`s ruling to the NLRC is
Article 229 of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 229. Appeal
 55

Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders.
Xxxxxxx

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.

In this relation, Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
enumerates the requisites for the perfection of appeal.
While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, in
several cases, the Court has relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified. Thus, the
Rules, specifically Section 6, Rule VI · thereof, allow the reduction of the appeal bond upon a
showing of: (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a
bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
Here, QFI posted a partial bond in the amount of P400,000.00, or more than twenty percent
(20%) of the monetary judgment, within the reglementary period to appeal, together with the
Motion to Reduce Bond anchored on its averred difficulty in raising the amount of the bond and
searching for an insurance company that can cover said amount within the short period of time
to perfect its appeal. Before the NLRC could even act on the Motion to Reduce Bond, QFI
posted a surety bond from an accredited insurance company covering fully the judgment
award.

Case law has held that for purposes of justifying the reduction of the appeal bond, the merit
referred to may pertain to (a) an appellant`s lack of financial capability to pay the full amount
of the bond, or (b) the merits of the main appeal such as when there is a valid claim that there
was no illegal dismissal to justify the award, the absence of an employer-employee relationship,
prescription of claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal. In this case,
the NLRC held that a liberal application of the requirement on the timely filing of the appeal
bond is justified, finding that (a) the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond within the
reglementary period to appeal and the subsequent posting of a surety bond constitute
substantial compliance of the bond requirement; and (b) there is merit in QFI`s appeal.
It should be emphasized that the NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce
bond, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, which
clearly is not extant with respect to the NLRC`s cognizance of QFI`s appeal. Far from having
 56

gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly preferred substantial justice over the rigid and
stringent application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is not a case of grave abuse of
discretion calling for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, warranting the reversal of the CA`s
ruling granting the certiorari petition and the remand of the case to the CA for appropriate
action.

ISSUE: What constitutes a reasonable reduced amount of bond?

RULING: To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that
give parties the chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out,
without however defeating the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant,
all motions to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the
posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the
appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the
meantime that an appellant`s motion is pending resolution by the Commission. In conformity
with the NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing the necessary appeal
bond, shall exclude damages and attorney`s fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the
required percentage shall an appellant`s period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be
deemed suspended.

Hence, the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond equivalent to more than 20% of the monetary
judgment, together with the Motion to Reduce Bond within the reglementary period was
sufficient to suspend the period to perfect the appeal. The posting of the said partial bond
coupled with the subsequent posting of a surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
judgment also signified QFI`s good faith and willingness to recognize the final outcome of its
appeal. In determining the reasonable amount of appeal bonds, however, the Court primarily
considers the merits of the motions and the appeals. It should be emphasized that the NLRC has
full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and its ruling will not be disturbed
unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which clearly is not
extant with respect to the NLRC`s cognizance of QFI`s appeal. Far from having gravely abused
its discretion, the NLRC correctly preferred substantial justice over the rigid and stringent
application of procedural rules.
Ortiz
 57

25. De Ocampo vs. RPN-9/Radio Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 192947. December 9, 2015 (siplon)

LEONEN, J.

Facts: De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, damages,
and attorney's fees against respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several
RPN-9 officers, namely: President Cerge Remonde; News and Current Affairs Manager Rodolfo
Lacuna; and HR Manager Lourdes Angeles. Labor Arbiter Manansala rendered that De Ocampo
have been illegally dismissed. RPN-9 was ordered to pay her separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and full backwages.

Issue: whether petitioner Melanie De Ocampo may still seek a recomputation of and an
increase in the monetary award given her

Ruling: No, she cannot seek recomputation because of the principle of finality of judgment and
by her inactions and pleas. It is basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or
modified as soon as it becomes final and executory; nothing is more settled in law. Once a case
is decided with finality the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, a
final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and
any modified judgment that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose, is null
and void.

The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.

Furthermore, as basic as the principle of finality of judgments is the rule that filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. Unlike an
appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails. The
2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, which were in effect
when the material incidents of this case occurred, explicitly and specifically makes this principle
 58

applicable to decisions of labor arbiters and of the National Labor Relations Commission. In
relation to Rule XI Section 10, Section 9, Section 1, where no restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is issued, the assailed decision lapses into finality. Thereafter, execution
may ensue.

In the case at bar, First, judgment became final and executory on May 27, 2006.
After the filing before the Court of Appeals of RPN-9's Petition for Certiorari, the Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining order preventing, for a period of 60 days, the National
Labor Relations Commission from enforcing its ruling. However, the sixty-day period lapsed
without a writ of preliminary injunction being subsequently issued by the Court of Appeals.44
Thus, on May 27, 2006, the ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala, as affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission, became final and executory on May 27, 2006.45
Conformably, Entry of Judgment was made on July 19, 2006.

Second, none of the exceptions warrant a modification of judgment.

She does not seek a mere clerical correction. Rather, she seeks an overhaul of Executive Labor
Arbiter Manansala's Decision in order that it may award her a total additional sum of
P571,888.83 representing backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay, and accrued interest.
She does not claim it is void, unjust or inequitable. Hence, the Decision having attained finality,
and as this case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances, there
remains no opening for revisiting, amending, or modifying Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala's
judgment.

Third, she is estopped from seeking a modification of Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala's
Decision because of her inaction and her own actions. Petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration, pursue an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission, file a
petition for certiorari before any court, or otherwise assail the whole or any part of the
Decision. It was the respondent RPN-9 who did those. Her inaction revealed that she saw no
reason for the same Decision to be revisited or reconsidered by Executive Labor Arbiter
Manansala himself, by the NLRC, or by any court. She failed to act in a timely manner that is, by
pursuing the appropriate remedy within the duration permitted by the rules. She failed "to
assert a right within a reasonable time, and this warranted a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it [i.e., petitioner] either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." She may
be imputed estoppel by laches.

Fourth, as soon as Entry of Judgment was made, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution. She was quick to file a motion to release the amount. Hence, petitioner's willful
acceptance of the judgment rendered by Executive Labor Manansala is not only something that
 59

may be implied from her omission or inaction. Rather, it is something explicitly affirmed by her
own motions and submissions. Whatever doubt there was, if any, as to her concession to the
monetary award given her was dispelled by the positive assertions and pleas for relief that
petitioner herself made. She cannot avail of the modification she seeks. The most basic legal
principles dictate that Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala's Decision in all its aspects has long
attained finality and may no longer be revisited. Principles of equity require that petitioner be
bound by her own omissions and declarations.

26. Guillermo vs. Uson

G.R. No. 198967. March 7, 2016 (Siplon)
PERALTA, J.

Facts: Mar 11, 1996, Respondent Crisanto Uson was employed as an accounting clerk at Royal
Class Venture. Eventually, he was promoted as accounting supervisor, salary of P13,000/mo,
until he was allegedly dismissed from employment on Dec. 20, 2000.

On Mar. 2, 2001, He filed with the Sub-Regional Arbitration, Dagupan, NLRC, a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal, with prayers for backwages, reinstatement, salaries and 13th month pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Royal Class Venture. Royal Class
Venture did not make an appearance in the case despite its receipt of summons. Labor Arbiter
decided in favor of Uson and ordering the respondent Royal Class Venture granting his prayers.
Royal Class Venture, as the losing party, did not file an appeal of the decision. Consequently,
upon Uson's motion, a Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Labor Arbiter's decision.
On May 17, 2002, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued. But with the judgment still unsatisfied,
a Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued on September 11, 2002.

Again, it was reported in the Sheriff's return that the second alias writ of execution remained
"unsatisfied". THis, Uson filed a Motion for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and
Officers of Respondent Liable for Satisfaction of the Decision. It stated that the ...establishment
erected thereat is not in the respondent's name but JOEL and SONS CORPORATION, a family
corporation owned by the Guillermos...; and that as per complainant's counsel advise that the
respondent has an account at BPO, Magsaysay Branch, Dagupan City. However, upon notice of
garnishment the bank replied that it has no account with the branch.

Labor Arbiter, Rimando, issued an order that officers of a corporation are jointly and severally
liable for the obligations of the corporation to the employees and there is no denial of due
process in holding them so even if the said officers were not parties to the case when the
judgment in favor of the employees was rendered. He pierced the veil of corporate fiction of
 60

Royal Class Venture and held herein petitioner Jose Emmanuel Guillermo (Guillermo), in his
personal capacity, jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the enforcement of the
claims of Uson.

Uson filed a motion for alias writ of execution to which Guillermo filed a comment and
opposition. Guillermo elevated the matter to the NLRC but it was dismissed. He filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, but it was also denied. Hence, this petition.
Guillermo alleged that first, he was impleaded in the case only more than a year after its
decision had become final and executory. Second, he assails that the piercing the veil of
corporate fiction allegedly discriminated against him when he was belatedly impleaded. Third,
he claims that LA has no jurisdiction because it is an intra-corporate controversy, as Uson being
a stockholder and director of Royal Class venture.

Issue:
1. Whether an officer of a corporation may be included as judgment obligor in a labor case for
the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory such
as that the twin doctrines of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" and personal liability of
company officers in labor cases apply

Ruling: Yes. Persons who were not originally impleaded in the case were, even during
execution, held to be solidarily liable with the employer corporation for the latter’s unpaid
obligations to complainant-employees.

A corporation is still an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of its stockholders and from that of other corporations to which it may be connected.
It is not in every instance of inability to collect from a corporation that the veil of corporate
fiction is pierced, and the responsible officials are made liable. Personal liability attaches only
when, as enumerated by the said Section 31 of the Corporation Code, there is a wilfull and
knowing assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, there is gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the corporation, or there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation. Further, in another labor case, Pantranco Employees Association
(PEA-PTGWO), et al. v. NLRC, et al. the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is held to apply
only in three (3) basic areas, namely: (1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate
fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; (2) fraud cases or when the
corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or (3) alter ego
cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a
person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted
as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In
 61

the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable,
such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities. Indeed, in
Reahs Corporation v. NLRC (1997), the conferment of liability on officers for a corporations
obligations to labor is held to be an exception to the general doctrine of separate personality of
a corporation.

The veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors and officers or
even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable solidarily in a
labor case, even after final judgment and on execution, so long as it is established that such
persons have deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment
obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so. When the shield of a
separate corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude
responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor case have not hesitated to step in
and shatter the said shield and deny the usual protections to the offending party, even after
final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in this
instance, does not connote bad judgment or negligence but imparts a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.

In this case, First, Like the A. C. Ransom, and Naguiat cases, the case at bar involves an apparent
family corporation. As in those two cases, the records of the present case bear allegations and
evidence that Guillermo, the officer being held liable, is the person responsible in the actual
running of the company and for the malicious and illegal dismissal of the complainant; he,
likewise, was shown to have a role in dissolving the original obligor company in an obvious
"scheme to avoid liability" which jurisprudence has always looked upon with a suspicious eye in
order to protect the rights of labor.

Second, part of the evidence on record is the second page of the verified Position Paper of
complainant (herein respondent) Crisanto P. Uson, where it was clearly alleged that Uson was
"illegally dismissed by the President/General Manager of respondent corporation (herein
petitioner) Jose Emmanuel P. Guillermo when Uson exposed the practice of the said
President/General Manager of dictating and undervaluing the shares of stock of the
corporation." The statement is proof that Guillermo was the responsible officer in charge of
running the company as well as the one who dismissed Uson from employment. As this sworn
allegation is uncontroverted - as neither the company nor Guillermo appeared before the Labor
Arbiter despite the service of summons and notices - such stands as a fact of the case, and now
functions as clear evidence of Guillermo's bad faith in his dismissal of Uson from employment,
with the motive apparently being anger at the latter's reporting of unlawful activities.
 62

Third, it is also clearly reflected in the records that it was Guillermo himself, as President and
General Manager of the company, who received the summons to the case, and who also
subsequently and without justifiable cause refused to receive all notices and orders of the
Labor Arbiter that followed. This makes Guillermo responsible for his and his company's failure
to participate in the entire proceedings before the said office. The fact is clearly narrated in the
Decision and Orders of the Labor Arbiter, Uson's Motions for the Issuance of Alias Writs of
Execution, as well as in the Decision of the NLRC and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, which Guillermo did not dispute in any of his belated motions or pleadings, including
in his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and even in the petition currently
before this Court. Thus, again, the same now stands as a finding of fact of the said lower
tribunals which binds this Court and which it has no power to alter or revisit. Guillermo's
knowledge of the case's filing and existence and his unexplained refusal to participate in it as
the responsible official of his company, again is an indicia of his bad faith and malicious intent
to evade the judgment of the labor tribunals.

Finally, the records likewise bear that Guillermo dissolved Royal Class Venture and helped
incorporate a new firm, located in the same address as the former, wherein he is again a
stockholder. This is borne by the Sheriff’s Return which reported: that at Royal Class Venture's
business address at Minien East, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, there is a new establishment named
"Joel and Sons Corporation," a family corporation owned by the Guillermos in which Jose
Emmanuel F. Guillermo is again one of the stockholders; that Guillermo received the writ of
execution but used the nickname "Joey" and denied being Jose Emmanuel F. Guillermo and,
instead, pretended to be Jose's brother; that the guard on duty confirmed that Jose and Joey
are one and the same person; and that the respondent corporation Royal Class Venture had
been dissolved. Again, the facts contained in the Sheriff’s Return were not disputed nor
controverted by Guillermo, either in the hearings of Uson's Motions for Issuance of Alias Writs
of Execution, in subsequent motions or pleadings, or even in the petition before this Court.
Essentially, then, the facts form part of the records and now stand as further proof of
Guillermo's bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment obligation.

The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid the obligations to Uson and
frustrate the execution of the judgment award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will
not countenance.

Issue: Whether it is an intra-corporate controversy

 63

Ruling: No. The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Although Uson is also a
stockholder and director of Royal Class Venture, it is settled in jurisprudence that not all
conflicts between a stockholder and the corporation are intra-corporate; an examination of the
complaint must be made on whether the complainant is involved in his capacity as a
stockholder or director, or as an employee.
In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that he was maliciously and illegally dismissed. It raised
no intra-corporate relationship issues. As correctly found by the appellate court, Uson's
complaint and redress sought were centered alone on his dismissal as an employee, and not
upon any other relationship he had with the company or with Guillermo. Thus, the matter is
clearly a labor dispute cognizable by the labor tribunals.

27. Fontana Development Corporation vs. Vukasinovic,

G.R. No. 222424. September 21, 2016

FACTS: Respondent Sascha Vukasinovic, Director for Business Development of Fontana

Development Corporaton, allegedly received a text message from one Jenny Mallari informing
him that Nestor Dischoso and Chief Hotel Engineer Jaime Villareal, both officers of petitioner
FDC, were receiving commissions from company transactions. Thereafter, respondent offered
Mallari money in exchange for evidence that will support her allegations. However, there were
discrepancies with the proofs presented by Mallari. Consequently, respondent recommended
to conduct further investigations on the alleged corruptions of said officers. FDC’s Safety and
Security Department brought Engr. Villareal and Mallari to the NBI Office for questioning.
During the inquiry, Mallari denied that Engr. Villareal asked for commissions from her and
revealed that she merely fabricated the story against Engr. Villareal so that she can ask money
from respondent. Thereafter, FDC received a complaint from Engr. Villareal claiming that
respondent paid Mallari a substantial amount of money to concoct a story depicting Engr.
Villareal as a corrupt employee. Respondent then received a Show Cause/Preventive
Suspension Order from petitioner FDC’s HR Department, informing him of the complaint filed
by Engr. Villareal and directing him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him for violating the provisions of the Company Code of Conduct on Dishonesty. Respondent
did not deny the allegations against him and, instead, admitted that he gave money to Mallari
because it is a common practice in Fontana to give money to informants for vital information.
Thus, petitioner FDC terminated respondent’s employment after finding him guilty of acts of
dishonesty in the form of bribery in any form or manner under petitioner FDC’s Code of
Conduct. The Decision and the Notice of Termination were served. Respondent, however,
refused to acknowledge its receipt and, instead, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
 64

suspension, regularization, nonpayment of salaries, service incentive leave, 13th month pay,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and demands for his reinstatement with
full backwages.

LA: Dismissed for lack of factual or legal basis, and ruled that respondent cannot be regularized
as he is an employee with a legal and valid fixed-term employment and that his dismissal was
for a just cause.

NLRC: Dismissed. NLRC noted that respondent had previously filed another complaint before the
same branch of the NLRC in San Fernando, Pampanga, involving the same facts, issues, and
prayer. This previous case has been dismissed by Labor Arbiter on the ground of forum
shopping. The dismissal was eventually sustained by both the NLRC and the CA. The CA Decision
has become final there being no appeal interposed by respondent.
CA: Dismissed. However, contrary to the Decision of the NLRC, the CA ordered the award of
unpaid salaries to respondent. The CA held that petitioner FDC failed to present evidence to
show payment of the salaries of respondent for the period claimed.

ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in not dismissing the petition for deliberate forum
shopping

RULING: Yes. There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. The test
for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether a final judgment in one case
amounts to res judicata in another or whether the following elements of litis pendentia are
present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter
action pendant or lis pendens.

It should be noted that in his Decision in NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-11, Labor Arbiter
Abdon observed that there is an identity of parties between NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-11
and NLRC Case No. RAB III-1116967-10 which is the complaint incipient in the present
controversy. He pointed out that both complaints show that petitioners Chris Cheng and Man
Choi are similarly impleaded in their capacities as officers of petitioner FDC and that there is
 65

also an identity of causes of action and reliefs prayed for by respondent. To reiterate, Labor
Arbiter’s Decision was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA.

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent filed two labor complaints. It is also undisputed
that the causes of action (illegal dismissal and constructive dismissal) in the respective
complaints in the two (2) cases stemmed from the adverse decision in the administrative case
filed against respondent that resulted to his dismissal from employment. It is well-settled that
once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the
petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court.
This is so because twin dismissal is the punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly
administration of justice. The purpose of the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to prevent
a party from instituting two or more actions or proceeding involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Furthermore, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court mandates that a willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be a ground for summary
dismissal of a case with prejudice. The CA should have dismissed the case outright without
rendering a decision on the merits of the case. Respondent should be penalized for willfully and
deliberately trifling with court processes.

However, the instant case involves an illegal dismissal which is an action that does not survive
the death of the accused. Since the property and property rights of the respondent is only
incidental to his complaint for illegal dismissal, the same does not survive his death.
Nonetheless, considering the foregoing disposition dismissing respondent’s petition before the
CA and ergo his complaint for illegal dismissal, the Court can proceed with the resolution of the
petition even without the need for substitution of the heirs of respondent. / SOTTO

28. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE vs. OLORES,

G.R. No. 225044. October 3, 2016

FACTS: Respondent was a faculty member of petitioner Manila Doctors College. However, he
was dismissed for Grave Misconduct, Gross Inefficiency, and Incompetence, after due
investigation finding him guilty of employing a grading system that was not in accordance with
the guidelines set by MDC. Respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal, money claims,
regularization, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners MDC and its President before
the NLRC claiming that there was no just cause for his dismissal, and that he should be
accorded a permanent appointment after having served as an instructor on a full-time basis for
5 consecutive years. LA declared respondent to have been illegally dismissed after finding that
his act of liberally implementing the guidelines in arriving at his students’ final grades did not
 66

constitute serious misconduct. However, with respect to the claim for regularization, LA found
that respondent failed to meet the requisites for the acquisition of permanent status, as he
became a full-time faculty member, with at least 18 units of teaching load, only on the second
semester of School Year 2008-2009, thereby falling short of the necessary 3 consecutive years
of service as full time teacher. Accordingly, LA ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent but
denied payment of backwages. However, instead of being reinstated, respondent was given the
option to receive a separation pay equivalent to his full month’s pay for every year of service.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC, which was initially dismissed for non-perfection in
a Resolution. However, upon motion for reconsideration, NLRC reinstated and granted the
appeal and, accordingly, reversed Decision of LA complaint a quo for lack of merit. He found
respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Separately, the NLRC ordered the payment to
respondent of service incentive leave pay for a period of 3 years, considering petitioners’ failure
to prove payment thereof. While the case was pending appeal, respondent filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution.

LA: Granted respondent’s motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. emphasized
that an order of reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the
moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a
higher court without fear of refunding what he had received

NLRC: Granted the petition and modified the Order of LA by deleting the award of the supposed
reinstatement backwages. It retained, however, the grant of service incentive leave pay. NLRC
observed that since respondent’s dismissal was eventually determined to be legal, there is no
more basis for either payroll reinstatement backwages or separation pay.

CA: Reveres the resolution of NLRC stating that LA’s order of reinstatement is immediately
executory; thus, the employer has to either readmit the employee to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, or to reinstate him in the payroll; and that even
if such order of reinstatement is reversed on appeal, the employer is still obliged to reinstate
and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court
or tribunal.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly reversed the NLRC ruling deleting the award of reinstatement
backwages in favor of respondent

RULING: Yes. Article 229 of the Labor Code provides that:

 67

“The decision of the LA reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the

reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.”
Verily, the employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is
liable instead to pay the dismissed employee’s salary. However, in the event that the LA’s
decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employer’s duty to reinstate the dismissed
employee is effectively terminated. In this case, the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s Decision is
immediately executory and, hence, the active duty to reinstate the employee---either actually
or in payroll--- devolves upon no other than the employer, even pending appeal. Thus, while
herein respondent may have been given an alternative option to instead receive separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement, there is no denying that, based on the provisions of the Labor Code
and as attributed in jurisprudence, it is his employer who should have first discharged its duty
to reinstate him. Clearly, the statement of such directive is only secondarily followed by the
alternative option given to respondent.

In this case, while petitioners could not actually reinstate respondent at the time of the
issuance of LA’s Decision, as it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to
change teachers in the middle of the semester, petitioners should nonetheless have given
respondent his new teaching load assignments and schedules at the beginning of the
succeeding semester, whether or not respondent was present during such assignment. Had
petitioners done so despite the absence of respondent, it would have indicated their sincere
willingness to comply with the reinstatement order. There was even no proof that petitioners
required respondent to report for assignment of teaching load and schedules. Besides,
respondent’s alleged failure to secure teaching load assignments did not prevent petitioners
from simply reinstating him in the payroll as an alternative. Petitioners also failed to employ the
same. The NLRC’s Decision, which deleted the said award on the notion that the same had no
more basis in view of the eventual ruling declaring respondent’s dismissal to be legal, failed to
take into account the provisions of the Labor Code and existing jurisprudence on the
immediately executory nature of reinstatement, as well as the consequences of noncom
pliance. /SOTTO

29. Dee Jay's Inn and Café v Ma. Lorina Raneses

G.R. No. 191823, October 5, 2016.

Facts: Respondent was a cashier of petitioner DJIC, which is owned and managed by Petitioner
Ferraris. Respondent filed before the SSS office a complaint for non-remittance of SSS
 68

contributions. Respondent also filed before the NLRC City Arbitrator Unit a complaint against
petitioners for underpayment/nonpayment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and moral and exemplary damages.
After conciliation efforts of the labor arbiter failed, On September 8, 2005, Respondent
submitted her position paper to the NLRC. To which, Respondent averred that sometime in
January 2005, she asked from petitioner Ferraris the latter's share as employer in the SSS
contributions and overtime pay for the 11 hours of work respondent rendered per day at
petitioner DJIC. Petitioner Ferraris got infuriated and told respondent to seek another
employment and after learning of respondent's complaints, petitioner Ferraris terminated
respondent's employment on February 5, 2005.
Petitioner’s version on the other hand mentioned that respondent was never
terminated. That when respondent was called to a meeting, Respondent and another employee
Moonyeen denied having incurred a shortage of 400 pesos. This infuriated petitioner and
scolded them. However, Respondent walked out and never come back to work anymore.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners but granted respondent's
claim for 13th month pay. At the same time, Moonyeen filed the same complaint to the NLRC,
but nevertheless the court ruled in favor of petitioners stating on the same ground that she
failed to demonstrate the positive or unequivocal act of termination of her employment.
They both appealed to the NLRC which resulted in having their cases consolidated. The
NLRC ruled to affirm the ruling of the labor arbiter. On appeal, The Court of Appeals ruled that
respondent was illegally dismissed on the basis that doubt should be resolved in favor of labor.
Hence, this petition, petitioners argue that the present case is governed by the 2005
NLRC Rules of Procedure, which supplanted the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, and under the
former it only the causes of action that were pleaded in a complaint would be entertained.
Petitioners insist that they never used "abandonment" as a defense in the termination of
respondent's employment; and they merely alleged that respondent never returned to work
anymore after the scolding incident.

Issue: WON the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure is applicable in this case.

Ruling: No. The record shows that respondent filed her complaint sometime in January 2005
and position paper on September 8, 2005. During said period, the 2002 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, was still in effect. The 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC only took effect on January 7, 2006.

Issue: WON only the causes of action that were pleaded in a complaint would be entertained.
 69

Ruling: No, causes of action in the position papers should be considered as well. Section 4, Rule
V of the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides:
“….The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to
prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or
position papers, affidavits and other documents.”

Stated differently, the parties could allege and present evidence to prove any cause or causes
of action included, not only in the complaint, but in the position papers as well.
The Court observes herein that respondent could not have included the charge of illegal
dismis~al in her complaint because she filed said complaint (which were for various money
claims against petitioners) in January 2005, and petitioners purportedly dismissed her from
employment only on February 5, 2005. However, since respondent subsequently alleged and
argued the matter of her illegal dismissal in her position paper filed on September 8, 2005, then
the Labor Arbiter could still take cognizance of the same.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No. in the case at bar, _the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and even the Court of Appeals, all
consistently found that respondent was not able to present substantial evidence of her
dismissal. They all rejected the joint affidavit of Mercy and Mea, submitted by respondent, for
being partial and biased. It appears that Mercy and Mea executed said affidavits to return a
favor as respondent testified for them in their own cases against petitioners. The Court of
Appeals only deviated from the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC by also disregarding
Eva's affidavit, submitted by petitioners to corroborate their allegations, for being insufficient
to prove abandonment. The appellate court then applied the equipoise doctrine: with all things
considered equal, all doubts must be resolved in favor of labor, that is, respondent. Given the
jurisprudence cited in the preceding paragraphs, the application by the Court of Appeals of the
equipoise doctrine and the rule that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor was
misplaced. Without the joint affidavit of Mercy and Mea, there only remained the bare
allegation of respondent that she was dismissed by petitioners on February 5, 2005, which
hardly constitute substantial evidence of her dismissal. As both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
held, since respondent was unable to establish with substantial evidence her dismissal from
employment, the burden of proof did not shift to petitioners to prove that her dismissal was for
just or authorized cause.
Digest by: JPTeves
 70

30. Buenaflor Car Services, Inc., v. Cezar Durumpili David, Jr.,

G.R. No. 222730 November 7, 2016.

Facts: Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner, In such capacity, he was in
charge of the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, including the authority to sign checks,
check vouchers, and purchase orders.
In the course of its business operations, petitioner implemented a company policy with
respect to the purchase and delivery of automotive parts and products. On August 8, 2013,
Chief Finance Officer David of petitioner's affiliate company, Diamond IGB, Inc., was informed
that ChinaBank had cleared several checks issued by petitioner bearing the words "OR CASH"
indicated after the payee's name. The checks were scanned and was brought to petitioner's
attention through its President Lampa and an investigation was conducted.
On August 22, 2013, Del Rosario readily confessed that upon respondent's instruction,
she inserted the words "OR CASH" after the name of the payees when the same had been
signed by all the authorized signatories. She also implicated De Guzman and Caranto. Her
confession was put into writing in two (2) separate letters both of even date (extrajudicial
confession). as a result respondent along with Del Rosario, De Guzman and Caranto were place
under 30 days preventive suspension. The investigation revealed that there were 27 checks
with the words "OR CASH" inserted after the payee's name and either Vasay or Buenaflor, in
the total amount of Pl,021,561.72.
Respondent vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he has no
control over the company's finance and billing operations, nor the authority to instruct Del
Rosario to make any check alterations, which changes, if any, must be made known to Vasay or
Buenaflor.
On September 20, 2013, they were served their respective notices of termination.
Aggrieved, respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages and attorney's fees against petitioner before
the NLRC.
The LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal among the three except Del Rosario on the
ground the petitioner failed to prove conspiracy among the three. The NLRC ruled finding De
Guzman and Caranto to have been dismissed for cause, but sustained the illegality of
respondent's termination from work. CA affirmed, It ruled that Del Rosario's extra judicial
confession only bound her as the confessant but constitutes hearsay with respect to
respondent and the other co-accused under the res inter alias acta rule, It ruled that Del
Rosario's extra judicial confession only bound her as the confessant but constitutes hearsay
with respect to respondent and the other co-accused under the res inter alias acta rule.
 71

Issue: WON the CA committed reversible error in upholding the NLRC's ruling that respondent
was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: Yes. While there is no denying that respondent holds a position of trust as he was
charged with the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, and as such, is authorized to sign
checks, check vouchers, and purchase orders, he argues, in defense, that he had no control
over the company's finance and billing operations, and hence, should not be held liable.
Moreover, he asserts that he had no power to instruct Del Rosario to make any check
alterations, which changes, if any, must be made known to Vasay or Buenaflor. Although
respondent's statements may be true, the Court, nonetheless, observes that it is highly unlikely
that respondent did not have any participation in the above-mentioned scheme to defraud
petitioner. It is crucial to point out that the questioned checks would not have been issued if
there weren't any spurious purchase orders…Being the approving authority of these spurious
purchase orders, respondent cannot disclaim any culpability in the resultant issuance of the
questioned checks. Clearly, without the approved purchase orders, there would be no delivery
of goods/supplies to petitioner, and consequently, the payment procedure would not even
begin. These purchase orders were, in fact, missing from the records, and respondent, who had
the primary authority for their approval, did not, in any manner, account for them.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent signed the checks prior to their alterations does
not discount his participation. To recall, the checks prepared by Del Rosario were first reviewed
by her immediate supervisor, Finance Manager and Chief Finance Officer, Vasay, and once
approved, the check vouchers and corresponding checks were signed by respondent, followed
by either Vasay, or Vice President for Operations Buenaflor. To safeguard itself against fraud,
the company implemented the policy that all checks to its suppliers should be issued in their
name and not in "cash."

Issue: WON the extra judicial confession of Del Rosario is inadmissible under the res inter alios
acta rule.

Ruling: No. The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that "[t]he rules of procedure and evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure xx x."
In any case, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply in this
illegal dismissal case, the treatment of the extra judicial confession as hearsay is bound by the
exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been
made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as
 72

evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence
of such a fact." Verily, Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession is independently relevant to prove
the participation of respondent in the instant controversy considering his vital role in
petitioner's procurement process. The fact that such statement was made by Del Rosario, who
was the actual author of the alterations, should have been given consideration by the NLRC as it
is directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand. Digest by JPTeves.

31 C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries (Maryhurst, Maryheights, Maryshore and Maryhill) School of

Theology, Inc. vs. Perez;
G.R. No. 220506; 18 January 2017

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
C.I.C.M. illegally dismissed Perez, that much is settled in a different case. This case involves the
computation of separation pay and backwages in lieu of reinstatement. Upon that ruling, Perez
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, C.I.C.M. moved for the quashal alleging the
obligation is paid by the release of cash bond (P272,337.05), LA granted the writ of execution
and ruled that the bond is insufficient and also ruled that there is a need to recompute the
monetary award up until the finality of the SC's decision. From P286,670.58 to P1,847,088.89
less than the cash bond which totaled P1,575,751.84.

NLRC affirmed

CA affirmed

Contentions:
C.I.C.M. claims that the cases cited by CA does not apply since in those cases it was the
employer that appealed the decision and in this case it was the employee, Perez, who delayed
the finality of judgment by filing an appeal.

Perez claims that her appeal should not prejudice her as she had the right to file it.

ISSUE: What is the period to be used in computing the award for separation pay?

RULING: Jurisprudence provides that in case reinstatement is not possible and backwages,
including separation pay must be awarded; the period shall be reckoned from the time
 73

compensation was withheld up to the finality of the Court's decision (Gaco vs NLRC; Surima vs
NLRC; Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods vs CA.)
The reason is explained in Bani Rural Bank, Inc. vs De Guzman that in cases where separation
pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement:
It is the finality of the decision that cuts off the employment relationship and represents the
final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other.

It does not matter who caused the delay by filing an appeal.

The rule is, if the LA's decision, which granted separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, is
appealed by any party, the employer-employee relationship subsists and until such time when
decision becomes final and executory, the employee is entitled to all the monetary awards
awarded by the LA.

OTHER REASONS:
1. If it were otherwise, all employees who are similarly situated will be forced to relinquish early
on their fight for reinstatement, a remedy, which the law prefers over severance of
employment relation.

2. To favor the petitioners' position is nothing short of a derogation of the State's policy to
protect the rights of workers and their welfare under Article II, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution.

NOTES: This case was actually dismissed for failure append the required affidavit of service
which was held as a fatal defect for the petition.

As to the claim that it is petitioner's fault why the amounts ballooned, court said had they not
illegally dismissed respondent, they will not be where they are today. They took the risk and
must suffer the consequences.

32. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA vs. PAJARON and CARBONILLA

G.R. NO. 207156, 16 JANUARY 2017.

FACTS:
Petitioner employed respondents in its shawarma business. Later on they filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter claiming that they had been constructively dismissed.
Petitioner alleged that the respondents abandoned their work and his refusal to readmit them
is justified, he also claims that Carbonilla left without settling his outstanding debt prompting
petitioner to file a case for estafa.
 74

LA ruled in favor of Respondents, found that it is suspicious for Petitioner to file a criminal case
only after the complaints for illegal dismissal has been filed. Respondents were awarded a
P148,753.61 and P49,182.66 respectively representing backwages, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, and other benefits.

Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. Zeñarosa also posted a partial cash
bond in the amount of P15,000.00, maintaining that he cannot afford to post the full amount of
the award since he is a mere backyard micro-entrepreneur. He begged the NLRC to reduce the
bond. NLRC denied the request and ruled that financial difficulties may not be invoked as a valid
ground to reduce bond; at any rate, it was not even substantiated by proof. Moreover, the
partial bond in the amount of P15,000.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award which
totalled to P197,936.27. Petitioners' appeal was thus dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection.
Petitioner also alleges that his immediate posting of the bond should be substantial compliance
and the denial is harsh and oppressive.

ISSUE 1: Is the posting of bond, necessary to perfect appeal the Labor Arbiter's decision to
NLRC?

RULING 1: Yes. It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 229) and the NLRC Rules of
Procedure (Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI) that there is legislative and administrative intent to
strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this
intention. The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure
to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal "is to assure the workers that if they
finally prevail in the case, the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the
employer's appeal and is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay
or evade payment of their obligations to the employees."

ISSUE 2: Is the petitioners entitled to a reduction of the amount of bond?

RULING 2: No. Under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the
reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to the following conditions: (1) the motion to
reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant.
 75

The NLRC correctly held that the supposed ground cited in the motion is not well-taken for
there was no evidence to prove Zeñarosa's claim that the payment of the full amount of the
award would greatly affect his business due to financial setbacks.

The partial bond posted was not reasonable. In the case of McBurnie v. Ganzon, the Court has
set a provisional percentage of 10% of the monetary award
(exclusive of damages and attorney's fees) as reasonable amount of bond that an appellant
should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a motion for a bond's reduction. Only after the
posting of this required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an appeal be
suspended. Applying this parameter, the P15,000.00 partial bond posted by petitioners is not
considered reasonable in relation to the total monetary award of P197,936.27.

ISSUE 3: Did Petitioner's substantially comply with the posting of required bond?

RULING 3: No. The NLRC exercises full discretion in resolving a motion for the reduction of bond
in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount. The
reduction of the bond is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the
sound discretion of the NLRC.
33. Dutch Movers, Inc., et. al. vs Edilberto Lequin, et. al.,
G.R. No. 210032, April 25, 2017

FACTS: This case is an offshoot of the illegal dismissal complaint filed by Edilberto Lequin et. al.
In their Amended Complaint and Position Paper, respondents stated that DMI, a domestic
corporation engaged in hauling liquefied petroleum gas, employed Lequin as truck driver and
the rest of respondents as Helpers. Respondents were informed that DMI would cease its
hauling operation for no reason; as such, they requested DMI to issue a formal notice regarding
the matter but to no avail. Later, upon respondents’ request, the DOLE NCR issued a
certification revealing that DMI did not file any notice of business closure. Thus, respondents
argued that they were illegally dismissed as their termination was without cause and only on
the pretext of closure.
Labor Arbiter - dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
NLRC - reversed and set aside the LA Decision. It ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed
because DMI simply placed them on standby, and no longer provide them with work. The NLRC
Decision became final and executory. The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment on the case.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Execution. Later, they submitted a
Reiterating Motion for Writ of Execution with Updated Computation of Full Backwages. Pending
resolution of these motions, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead stating
that upon investigation, they discovered that DMI no longer operates. They, nonetheless,
 76

insisted that petitioners - who managed and operated DMI, and consistently represented to
respondents that they were the owners of DMI - continue to work at Toyota Alabang, which
they (petitioners) also own and operate.

Given these developments, respondents prayed that petitioners, and the officers named in
DMI’s AOI, which included Edgar N. Smith and Millicent C. Smith (spouses Smith), be impleaded,
and be held solidarily liable with DMI in paying the judgment awards.

LA Savari issued an Order holding petitioners liable for the judgment awards. LA Savari decreed
that petitioners represented themselves to respondents as the owners of DMI; and were the
ones who managed the same. She further noted that petitioners were afforded due process as
they were impleaded from the beginning of this case. Later, respondents filed anew a
Reiterating Motion for Writ of Execution and Approve[d] Updated Computation of Full
Backwages. Petitioners moved to quash the Writ of Execution contending that the LA Order was
void because the LA has no jurisdiction to modify the final and executory NLRC Decision and the
same cannot anymore be altered or modified since there was no finding of bad faith against
them.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter - LA Savari denied petitioner's’ Motion to Quash because it did not
contain any ground that must be set forth in such motion.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission - quashed the Writ of Execution insofar as
it held petitioners liable to pay the judgment awards.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals - reversed and set aside the NLRC Resolutions, and accordingly
affirmed the Writ of Execution impleading petitioners as party-respondents liable to answer for
the judgment awards.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the judgment awards in favor of
respondents?

RULING: Yes. After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that contrary to
petitioners’ claim, Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission, and David v. Court of
Appeals are applicable here. In said cases, the Court held that the principle of immutability of
judgment, or the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, the same can no
longer be altered or modified and the court’s duty is only to order its execution, is not absolute.
One of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event occurring after the judgment
becomes final and executory, which renders the decision unenforceable.
To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired after a judgment has become final
and executory, or to new situation that developed after the same attained finality. Supervening
 77

events include matters that the parties were unaware of before or during trial as they were not
yet existing during that time. In Valderrama, the supervening event was the closure of
Commodex, the company therein, after the decision became final and executory, and without
any showing that it filed any proceeding for bankruptcy. The Court held that therein petitioner,
the owner of Commodex, was personally liable for the judgment awards because she controlled
the company.
Similarly, supervening events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision became final and
executory, which rendered its execution impossible and unjust. Like in Valderrama, during the
execution stage, DMI ceased its operation, and the same did not file any formal notice
regarding it. Added to this, in their Opposition to the Motion to Implead, spouses Smith
revealed that they only lent their names to petitioners, and they were included as incorporators
just to assist the latter in forming DMI; after such undertaking, spouses Smith immediately
transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners, which proved that petitioners were the ones in
control of DMI, and used the same in furthering their business interests.
In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not unmindful of the basic tenet that a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its stockholders, and from other
corporations it may be connected with. However, such personality may be disregarded, or the
veil of corporate fiction may be pierced attaching personal liability against responsible person if
the corporation’s personality “is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud
or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws x x x.”
Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and accordingly, petitioners should be held
personally liable for judgment awards because the peculiarity of the situation shows that they
controlled DMI; they actively participated in its operation such that DMI existed not as a
separate entity but only as business conduit of petitioners. As will be shown be shown below,
petitioners controlled DMI by making it appear to have no mind of its own, and used DMI as
shield in evading legal liabilities, including payment of the judgment awards in favor of
respondents./Yonting

34. Luis Doble Jr. vs ABB, INC./NITIN DESAI,

G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017

FACTS: Petitioner Luis S. Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB, Inc.
as Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. During almost nineteen (19) years of his
employment with the respondent ABB, Inc. prior to his disputed termination, Doble rose
through the ranks and was promoted. As a matter of policy, ABB, Inc. conducts the yearly
Performance and Development Appraisal of all its employees. In the years 2008, 2009, and
2010, he received a performance rating of 4 for superior results. On March 2, 2012, Doble was
 78

informed that his performance rating for 2011 is one (1) which is equivalent to unsatisfactory
performance.
During the meeting, ABB, Inc. President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and Regional
Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of
discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to resign
as Local Division Manager of the PS Division.
Shocked by the abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one
made to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the management, and left him alone in
the conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave
contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble's
employment.

Doble filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, other monetary claims and damages. The Labor Arbiter held that Doble was illegally
dismissed because his resignation was involuntary, and ordered ABB, Inc. and Desai to pay his
backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible. The two (2)
Commissioners of the NLRC Sixth Division voted to grant the appeal filed by ABB, Inc. and Desai,
and to dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the resignation of Doble being
voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims,
damages and attorney's fees. However, one NLRC Commissioner dissented. The CA also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration because (1) the NLRC Decision and Resolution attached
to the petition were certified "photo" copies, unlike the specific requirement for a certified
"true" copy, or a "clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy" of the assailed
disposition, and (2) petitioner's counsel conceded his inability to comply with the MCLE
requirement.

ISSUE:
1. (Procedural aspect) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition on mere technicality despite that petitioner has the most
persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules of procedures to afford him the
opportunity to ventilate his case on the merits?
2. (Substantive aspect) Whether or not Doble was illegally dismissed?

RULING:
1. Yes.
The Court rules that the CA gravely erred when it dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari
and refused to reinstate the same, despite the fact that the two defects noted in the minute
Resolution dated November 29, 2013 have already been substantially rectified.
 79

First, the CA gravely erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the assailed NLRC
Decision and Resolution attached thereto are mere "certified photocopies" and not duplicate
originals or certified true copies. There is no substantial distinction between a photocopy or a
"Xerox copy" and a "true copy" for as long as the photocopy is certified by the proper officer
of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or his duly-authorized representative and that
the same is a faithful reproduction of the original.
In this case, a perusal of the attached NLRC Decision and Resolution shows that they are indeed
certified photocopies of the said decision and resolution. Each page of the NLRC Decision and
the Resolution has been certified by the NLRC Sixth Division's Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty.
Cherry P. Sarmiento, who is undisputedly the proper officer to make such certification.
Moreover, the attached copies of the NLRC Decision and Resolution appear to be faithful
reproductions thereof. Thus, there is substantial compliance with Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which provides that any petition filed under Rule 65 should be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof.
Second, the CA also gravely erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated November 29, 2013 which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground that
petitioner's counsel had conceded his inability to comply with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement. On point is People v. Arrojado where it was held that the
failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case.

2. No. The Court holds that he voluntarily resigned, and was not constructively dismissed.
In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer interposes the defense
of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily
rests upon the employer.
Guided by these principles, the Court agrees with the NLRC that ABB, Inc. and Desai were able
to prove by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following
documents (1) the affidavit of ABB, Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; the
letter of intent to purchase service vehicle; and ABB, Inc. 's acceptance letter, all dated March
13, 2012, (3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment dated March 23,
2012; (5) photocopy of Bank of the Philippine Islands manager's check in the amount of
P2,009,822.72, representing the separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation,
showing payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses, amounting to P805,399.35; and (7)
the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim for a consideration of the total sum of P2,815,222.07.
Since Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation letter, it is incumbent upon him
to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his resignation was not voluntary, but was
actually a case of constructive dismissal, i.e., a product of coercion or intimidation. Coercion
exists when there is a reasonable or well-grounded fear of an imminent evil upon a person or
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his property or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants. The
requisites for intimidation to vitiate one's consent are stated in St. Michael Academy v. NLRC,
thus:
... (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust
or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the
evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is
forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from
the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury to his person or property x x x.
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds that the abovestated requisites are absent,
and that the NLRC has exhaustively discussed that Doble was not coerced into submitting a
resignation letter./yonting

35. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES v. FRANKLIN CUAL

GR No. 207684, July 17, 2017

FACTS: Respondents were all members of Philtranco Workers Union Association of Genuine
Labor Organization (PWU-AGLO). They were all included in a retrenchment program embarked
on by Philtranco on the ground that Philtranco was suffering business losses. Consequently,
PWU-AGLO filed a Notice of Strike with the DOLE, claiming that Philtranco engaged in unfair
labor practices. The parties were unable to settle their differences, thus the case was eventually
referred to the Office of the Secretary of the DOLE. Acting DOLE Secretary Danilo P. Cruz issued
a Decision ordering Philtranco to reinstate their former positions, without loss of seniority
rights, pay backwages. The parties are enjoined to strictly and fully comply with the provisions
of the existing CBA and the other dispositions of this Decision.

The respondents alleged that they were not absorbed by Philtranco despite the fact that the
company was hiring new employees; thus, the respondents, together with other Philtranco
employees, filed a labor complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Antonio Macam found
union president Jose Jessie Olivar (Olivar) to have been illegally dismissed and was entitled to
reinstatement, backwages and attorney's fees. Respondents' appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), on the matter of their exclusion, was unsuccessful. So was their
subsequent petition before the CA which attained finality on May 14, 2010. Thus, they
remained excluded from the award. Significantly, the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA,
found the retrenchment program undertaken by Philtranco in the years 2006 to 2007 as invalid.
On this basis, Olivar was declared to have been illegally dismissed.
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On the belief that the dismissal of their claims due to a technicality was without prejudice to
their refiling of the same complaint, the respondents second NLRC case. This time, Philtranco
submitted its audited financial statements for the years 2006 and 2007.

LA: LA Cueto rendered a decision finding respondents to have been illegally dismissed. In so
deciding, LA Cueto applied the law of the case principle, stating that the first NLRC case is
binding upon Philtranco.

Philtranco appealed to NLRC.

NLRC: Commission the LA.

CA: Reinstated LA’s ruling.
Aggrieved by the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Philtranco timely filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the first labor case involving the union members finding the retrenchment
as illegal constitutes as law of the case involving the same claim for other union officers.
2. Whether issue preclusion or collateral estoppel principle applies in this case.

RULING:
1.NO. We find the law of the case doctrine not applicable in the cases under consideration.
The doctrine has been defined as "that principle under which determinations of questions of
law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such
determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a
rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where
its application will result in an unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is
confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case."

The second NLRC case is certainly not a continuation of the first NLRC case from which
respondents were excluded. It is a separate case instituted anew by respondents because the
prior case was only given due course with respect to the parties who signed the complaint and
position paper. Furthermore, the matter of whether or not Philtranco sufficiently proved its
alleged business losses when it embarked on its retrenchment program is a question of fact and
not a question of law. The appellate court's finding, that the retrenchment undertaken by
Philtranco in 2006-2007 was invalid, may not be invoked as the law of the case.
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While the second NLRC case is separate from the first NLRC case and the NCMB case, it is not
altogether accurate to say that the determinations made in these previously decided cases has
no bearing on the second NLRC case.

2. YES. The SC holds that the LA's decision in the first NLRC case, finding Philtranco's
retrenchment program to be illegal, constitutes res judicata in the concept of collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion. As amply discussed in Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.:
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.

Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in
issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is beyond dispute that the determination on the invalidity of the retrenchment in the first
NLRC case has attained finality. Moreover, records show that the decision was adjudicated on
the merits.

The Court likewise finds that there is a community of interest among the complainants in the
prior labor case and in the present. The only difference between the first NLRC case and the
second NLRC case is Philtranco's submission of its audited financial statements for the years
2006 and 2007 in the second NLRC case. The NLRC treated such belated submission as a
"supervening event. In this case, the Audited Financial Statements could not be considered as a
supervening event because the existence thereof should have been established as early as
February 2007, the time when the retrenchment of petitioners was effected. Unfortunately,
respondents failed to present the same.
COST AGAINST PHILTRANCO.

36. GENPACT SERVICES vs REYES

GR No. 227695, July 31, 2017

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing multinational
clients, including Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). Respondents were hired and employed
to various positions to service Allstate. But when Allstate ended its account with Genpact,
respondents were placed on floating status, and eventually terminated from service.
Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. They allege that after 5
months of “benching” status, they were given the option to either “voluntarily resign” or to be
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“involuntarily terminated on the ground of redundancy”, with severance pay of ½ month basic
salary for every year of service. Left without a choice, respondents chose the latter option and
were made to sign quitclaims. They alleged that their retrenchment was not justified and
Genpact failed to observe the procedural requirements.

Petitioner’s defense is that the termination was due to Allstate’s account cessation and that
they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents but proved futile. Thus, giving them no
choice but to provide them the option of resigning or be separated, which was according to
them made in good faith.

LA: The LA favored petitioners and found the termination due to an untimely cessation of
operations of Genpact’s client. LA pointed out that petitioner tried to remedy respondents’
situation but the same was futile. The offer of separation pay was a sign of good faith.

NLRC: The NLRC affirmed the LA decision. According to the commission the pullout of Allstate
may not mean automatic termination of the employees assigned to such account. But the
efforts made by petitioner showed that the exercise of management prerogative was made in
good faith. RESPONDENTS moved for a reconsideration, which was partly granted by increasing
the separation pay to 1-month salary for every year of service pursuant to the Labor Code. But
what is important is that the NLRC resolution explicitly stated that “NO FURTHER MOTION OF
SIMILAR IMPORT SHALL BE ENTERTAINED”.

CA: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that PETITIONERS’ failure to file an MR
before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to the CA is a fatal infirmity which rendered the
petition dismissible.

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outright dismissing the petition for failure of petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC?

RULING: No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action
that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65
petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower
court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

The ratio for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct
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any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The exceptions are as follows:
a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
d) WHERE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WOULD BE
USELESS;
e) WHERE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND THERE IS EXTREME URGENCY
FOR RELIEF;
f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h) where the proceedings were ex-parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Exceptions (d) and (e) are therefore applicable in this case. The wording of the NLRC resolution
explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further
motions for reconsideration. Making a motion for reconsideration by petitioner an exercise in
futility. Moreover, under Sec. 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules the remedy of filing a motion for
reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also
had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the
tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a
violation of their right to due process.