ACCEPTED

11-18-00320-CV
ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
EASTLAND, TEXAS
12/17/2018 4:45 PM
SHERRY WILLIAMSON
CLERK

NO 11-18-00320-CV
IN THE FILED IN -
11th COURT OF --
---APPEALS
ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS EASTLAND, - --
--- TEXAS
- - ---- cc ------
12/17/18
- I4:45:08
- D -- PM
EASTLAND, TEXAS ---- VO ------
SHERRY --WILLIAMSON
----
---- Clerk
In re MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Realtor
___________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
MOTION FOR REHEARING 11th COURT OF APPEALS
EASTLAND, TEXAS
___________________________________________________________________
12/14/18 10:08:08 PM
SHERRY WILLIAMSON
TO THE HONORABLE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS: Clerk

Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. files its Motion for Rehearing, and would

show the court the following:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The request presented to the Court arises from a breach of a settlement

agreement between Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. [“Memorial Park”]

and John Green which has been fully adjudicated in the Travis County District

Court over the past 4 years, which was found to have been properly brought

in Travis County on appeal filed by Green.

2. In 2008, John Green, a 2-time convicted felon, performed certain

construction work for Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. After having been

paid over $49,000, Green falsely claimed to have been paid only $40,000,

and filed a $9,700 lien against all of Memorial Park’s properties.

1
 3. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the trial court erroneously

found that Green had been paid only $40,000.

4. In 2011, this Court held that the “trial court had erred”, and found that

“Green had been paid $49,000” and sustained all 3 of Memorial Park’s

arguments.

5. On January 31, 2014 Memorial Park, learned that Green had a lien on its

property, and in order to complete financing on a $4.5 Million property

without further delay, paid Green $19,275.13 pursuant to a settlement

agreement entered into with Green.

6. Memorial Park requested, Bert Massey, President of Brown County Abstract,

Inc., to facilitate a settlement of the lien, which the lien and the legal services

were “paid in full” as reflected in the closing documents.

7. Green breached the agreement by not providing a “release of lien”.

8. Memorial Park was informed that the settlement monies had been paid

without a release of lien being provided. 1 Considering Green’s history and

since Green was a transient with no real property in the State of Texas,

recovery of the monies paid by Memorial Park would likely prove futile.

1
At the August 13, 2018 hearing, Bert Massey testified that it was not customary to pay a lien without a
contemporaneous release of lien being provided. Nor was he ever informed that Green had provided the lien.

2
 9. At the time of the breach of the settlement agreement, Green was residing

in Austin, Texas. Suit was, therefore, filed in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373;

styled Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. v. John Green; In the 126th Judicial

District, Travis County, Texas.

10.On February 7, 2014, in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373, a Temporary

Restraining Order was granted against Green as to the cashing of the check

issued to Green by the title company.

11.To date, Green has not provided Memorial Park with the release of lien, nor

has the title company returned the $19,275.13 to Memorial Park.

12.On March 13, 2014, a “permanent injunction” was granted to Memorial Park.

13.Green appealed, and upon referral, the Seventh District Court of Appeals

issued its opinion on March 25, 2016 which upheld the judgment of the trial

court as modified. Green was further ordered to pay all costs. 2 [App. “A”]

2
On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals found specifically that jurisdiction was “proper in
Travis County, Texas” and that the claims brought by Memorial Park were claims “based upon
conduct occurring after final disposition of the Brown County lawsuit.”

3
 14. In Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373, Memorial Park again sought injunctive

relief, 3
in particular, a motion for “anti-suit inunction” which the Travis

County District Court granted on January 24, 2017. [App. “B”]

15. In order to err on the side of caution, Memorial Park, re-filed its claims

against Green in Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451; styled Memorial Park

Medical Center, Inc. v. John Green; In the 126th Judicial District Court, Travis

County, Texas, and again, sought and obtained injunctive relief against

Green, in particular, a Temporary Restraining Order, and thereafter, other

injunctive relief.

16. Green avoided service in Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451 despite that Robert

Reich had represented Green in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and in the

matter before the Brown County court.

17. The Travis County District Court granted Memorial Park its request for

service by publication on September 27, 2017, which was perfected on

November 24, 2017, along with providing continued notice to Reich as

instructed by the court.

3 Green sought to execute on the $9,020 lien in the Brown County court which it is important to
note that the Travis County court had already denied Green’s motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and request for transfer of venue which were upheld specifically on appeal by the
Seventh Court of Appeals.
4
18. On December 22, 2017, in Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451, the court again

granted Memorial Park with an “antisuit injunction”. [App. “C”]

19. On February 23, 2018, Green was commanded to “immediately desist and

refrain from taking any action to enforce the alleged $9,020 judgment

against [Memorial Park], and in accordance to the ‘anti-suit injunction’

order.” Despite counsel for Green being noticed for the hearing, Green failed

to attend the scheduled hearing.

20. On March 8, 2018, a Temporary Injunction Order was entered by the court

again commanding Green to “desist and refrain from taking any action to

enforce or execute on the alleged $9,020 judgment against [Memorial Park]

pending the trial on the merits, and in accordance to the December 22, 2017

‘anti-suit injunction’ order previously granted in this matter.” Again, counsel

for Green was noticed for this hearing but Green did not appear.

21. On April 30, 2018, the court again granted “permanent injunction” in Cause

No. D-1-GN-17-002451, prohibiting Green specifically from seeking to

enforce the alleged $9,020 judgment in Cause No. CV0904121; styled John

Green v. Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.; in the 35th Judicial District

Court, Brown County, Texas. Counsel for Green was noticed for this hearing

but Green nor his counsel appeared. [App. “D”]

5
22. Green has ignored all notices and rulings by the Travis County District Court

in particular, the “anti-suit injunctions” entered against Green in both Cause

No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. No. CV0904121, and the April 30,

2018 “permanent injunction” hearing.

23.Memorial Park sought and was granted enforcement of the permanent

injunction on October 23, 2018 which notice was again provided to counsel

for Green. [App. “E”]

24. Seven (7) different Travis County District Court jurists have granted

injunctive relief to Memorial Park eight (8) times, in addition to the ruling as

to jurisdiction by the Seventh Court of Appeals which Green has ignored.

Moreover, the Seventh Court of Appeals upholding the Travis County court

denying Green’s motion to transfer venue and objection to jurisdiction.

25. In addition, despite Memorial Park’s reasonable reliance on the numerous

injunctive relief granted by the Travis County District Court over the past 4

years, Memorial Park has been sanctioned recently by the Brown County

court and counsel for Memorial Park ordered jailed for 30 days. [App. “F”]

26. It will be shown that the sanctions against Memorial Park by the 35th Judicial

District Court were made despite that this matter was clearly settled by

agreement 4 years prior; Memorial Park having paid the $19,275.13 on

6
 January 31, 2014 which has not been returned; Green failing to provide the

“release of lien” pursuant to the settlement agreement; and despite the

ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals denying Green’s motion to transfer

venue and challenge to jurisdiction, and upholding specifically Travis County

having jurisdiction as to the matter and ruling that Memorial Park’s claims

and injunctive relief were “properly”filed and obtained in Travis County. And

as importantly, despite that the post-judgment discovery (which was the

basis of the contempt order) was attempted, and provided to Green by

Memorial Park as attested to specifically by counsel for Memorial Park and

Louis Starzel of Starzel Legal Services which no evidence was presented by

Green contradicting the sworn testimonies of William Ruth and Louis Starzel.

27. On August 24, 2018, the Honorable Mike Wallach (by assignment) issued a

ruling which he declared that “there was no evidence of a ‘settlement’ of the

action” which contradicts the very language used by counsel for Green in its

prior filing, and the substantive testimony of the witnesses. The court went

on to hold (without a motion before the court by Green) that “the ‘Order’ of

April 30, 2018 from the 126th Judicial District Court of Travis County is ‘void

and unenforceable’.” [App. “G”]

7
28. It will be shown that the actions by Green taken in the 35th Judicial District

Court constitutes an improper “collateral attack” on the judgments by the

Travis County District Court which the issue of “jurisdiction” has already been

determined by the Seventh Court of Appeals, and the claims brought by

Memorial Park arising from Green’s breach of the settlement agreement

cannot be “re-litigated” in Brown County since they were “properly” brought

in Travis County and have already been adjudicated in Travis County, and the

time period prescribed by statute has already passed.

29. Memorial Park, therefore, requests that this Court to command the

Honorable Brad Underwood and the Honorable Mike Wallach (presiding by

assignment) to honor the various judgments and injunctive relief granted to

Memorial Park; stop the improper “collateral attack” on the Travis County

judgments; and vacate the August 24, 2018 and October 16, 2018 order since

they were based upon a clear abuse of discretion in violation to the injunctive

relief granted by the Travis County District Court which the Seventh District

Court of Appeals has already ruled specifically that the matters of dispute

(arising from Green’s breach of the settlement agreement) had been

properly brought by Memorial Park in the Travis County, and the Travis

County District Court has jurisdiction as to the matter.

8
 ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

The Seventh Court of Appeals has already held that Memorial Park’s claims

(arising from the breach of the January 31, 2018 settlement agreement) were

properly brought in Travis County, Texas 4 and Travis County has jurisdiction as to

this matter which seven (7) different jurists of Travis County have granted

Memorial Park with injunctive relief eight (8) times over the past 4 years.

This matter has already been adjudicated. Green has not only been found to

have breached the January 31, 2014 settlement agreement but has ignored the

various injunctive relief granted to Memorial Park in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-

000373 and Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451.

Despite counsel for Green being noticed on all matters before the Travis

County District Court and having represented Green in Cause No. No. D-1-GN-14-

000373, Green has taken no action to set aside or appeal either of the “anti-suit

injunction” orders granted in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-

4 On March 25, 2016, the Seventh Court of Appeals (upon referral) made this determination
based upon the Court finding that the settlement agreement had been entered into 3 years after
“final disposition of the Brown County lawsuit”, and involved a breach of contract claim as to
Green failing to provide the release of lien pursuant to the settlement agreement which was
separate and apart from the underlying suit. Therefore, suit was “properly” brought in Travis
County.
9
1-GN-17-002451, or appeal the “default judgment” and “permanent injunction”

order in Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451 despite counsel for Green having been both

noticed of the hearing and provided copies of the orders as well as the orders being

filed in this matter.

For this reason, Green has waived his ability to raise a complaint as to the

injunctive relief granted for appellate review pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

Mc Ewen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706 ((1961).

By counsel for Green’s own filing and admissions, a “settlement agreement”

as to the $9,020 judgment lien was entered into by Green’s counsel and Bert

Massey, President of Brown County Abstract, Inc. which it cannot be disputed now

based upon the ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals that it was not proper for

Memorial Park to have filed suit against Green in Travis County where Green was

residing at the time of the breach of the agreement.

Nor can it be disputed that the matter was not fully adjudicated and a

judgment and injunctive relief was granted to Memorial Park which Judge Wallach

seeks to now improperly set aside rather than Green taking such action in the Travis

County District Court where these judgments and injunctive relief originated.

10
 As to the August 24, 2018 ruling by the Honorable Mike Wallach, it remains

concerning why the Brown County court has taken it upon itself (without even a

motion before the court) to turn a “blind eye” to the obvious “settlement” of the

underlying $9,020 judgment which counsel for Green has readily acknowledged

that a “settlement agreement” was entered into in Green’s own filings5 and

disregard prior testimony given on May 25, 2017; also attested to by both Bert

Massey, President of Brown County Abstract, Inc. as well as attested to by

Memorial Park. To claim that a “settlement” was not entered into goes against the

great weight of the evidence and contradicts counsel for Green’s own admissions.

Regardless of the “splitting of hairs” and terminology used by the court,

Memorial Park requested and Massey agreed to facilitate a “settlement” of the

matter in order for the matter to be resolved in exchange for a “release of lien” to

be provided to Memorial Park. Since Memorial Park paid the “amount it would

take to get the release of lien” but did not receive it (after being told that the check

had been paid to Green the previous week), Memorial Park took appropriate legal

action in Travis County where Green was residing.

5
Green’s filing reads: “with the authorization from Mr. Ruth, made a separate agreement between Brown County
Abstract Company, Inc. and Robert Reich , Green’s attorney for obtaining a release”. Furthermore, Reich’s May 25,
2017 testimony states, “I told him [Massey] what amount it would take to get a Release of Lien, and that was it.”

11
 There is no dispute that the $19,275.13 was provided to Memorial Park, and

Memorial Park paid the amount “in full” which satisfied its obligations pursuant to

the agreement. And, it was Green who did not fulfill his obligations pursuant to

the agreement by not providing the “Release of Lien” pursuant to the agreement

and admitted to by counsel for Green on May 25, 2017.

It can also not be disputed that the Travis County District Court apparently

agreed that injunctive relief was necessary and granted Memorial Park’s

Application for Temporary Restraining Order on February 7, 2014. Injunctive relief

was again granted on March 8, 2018 and April 30, 2018. 6

In its attempt to nullify the settlement agreement, the Brown County court

did not even address the “anti-suit injunction” orders prohibiting Green from taking

any action as to the matter. Nor did the Brown County court address the

jurisdictional ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals which held that the dispute

had been “properly filed” in Travis County which also upheld the denial of Green’s

challenge to jurisdiction and motion to transfer venue, or the fact that this matter

has been fully adjudicated in Travis County over the past 4 years.

6
Despite that counsel for Green was present at each of these hearings, at no time was the Release of Lien
provided or offered to Memorial Park. Nor was it provided or offered to Brown County Abstract, Inc.

12
 As to the August 24, 2018 ruling, for the Brown County court to take it upon

itself, in an attempt to nullify all the judgments, rulings and injunctive relief granted

by the Travis County (and the Seventh Court of Appeals) over the past 4 years, and

declare that “there is no evidence of a ‘settlement’ of this action” without even a

motion by Green, and despite the testimonies of all parties and witnesses for

purposes of allowing Green to proceed forward against Memorial Park, is a clear

abuse of discretion; especially, when the “anti-suit injunction” orders granted in

both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451 were not

even addressed, and have not been set aside or appealed.

Likewise, even assuming the Brown County court had authority to nullify the

April 30, 2018 “permanent injunction” order for purposes of allowing Green to

proceed forward against Memorial Park, when there was not even a motion by

Green before the court, it stands to reason that such action would not be proper in

light of the various injunctive relief granted to Memorial Park eight (8) times by

seven (7) different Travis County jurist over the past 4 years, and in light of the

Seventh Court of Appeals ruling.

13
 Therefore, for the Brown County court to purport that the “Order of April 30,

2018 from the 126th District Court of Travis County is void and unenforceable” is a

clear abuse of discretion; especially, when the “anti-suit injunction” orders granted

in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451,

prohibiting such action, were not even addressed, and have not been set aside or

appealed.

Nor was the issue of notice to Green and his counsel addressed by the Brown

County court. Nor the timeliness of any motion to set aside any of the rulings by

the Travis County District court addressed, even had a motion been filed by Green.

For these reasons, Memorial Park files it writ of mandamus requesting this

Court to command the Honorable Mike Wallach and the Honorable Brad

Underwood, sitting by assignment to honor the Travis County District Court’s

judgments and refrain from assisting Green and/or participating in violating the

Travis County District court’s judgments and injunctive relief granted to Memorial

Park. Seagraves v Green, 288 S.W.417, 424-25 (Tex. 1930); In re TDFPS, 210 S.W.3d

612 (Tex. 2006).

14
 As noted in the August 24, 2018 ruling by the Brown County court, Memorial

Park has filed of record the various judgments and injunctive relief granted by the

Travis County District Court with the 35th Judicial District Court and has asked that

the court honor the judgments and injunctive relief granted.

Based upon the rulings in question, it is apparent that the Brown County

court is not only not honoring the Travis County judgments and rulings, but

improperly seeking to nullify all judgments, injunctive relief and rulings, including

the ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals as to jurisdiction for purposes of

wrongfully allowing Green to proceed forward against Memorial Park. Such action

is the very basis for which Memorial Park sought and obtained injunctive relief from

Green which for suspect reasons sought to avoid litigating the matter in Travis

County in both suits, and relied upon the Brown County court to be an advocate.

This is evident by the Brown County court imposing sanctions upon counsel

for Memorial Park, despite counsel’s reasonable reliance upon the injunctive relief

granted to Memorial Park by the Travis County District Court, as well as the Seventh

Court of Appeals which upheld specifically that Travis County has jurisdiction, and

Memorial Parks claims were properly filed in Travis County.

15
 In light of this matter having been litigated in Travis County for the past 4

years, the numerous injunctive relief orders granted to Memorial Park, and

especially the ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals stating specifically that

Memorial Park’s claims were properly brought in Travis County, only raises the

question as to why the Brown County court seeks to assist Green in removing this

case from Travis County to Brown County.

Regardless, it is simply more concerning in light of the sanctions against

counsel for Memorial Park, and the fact that a settlement agreement was entered

into and paid which clearly nullifies the $9,020 judgment, and provided for any

disputes arising from the settlement to be filed according to the law which was

upheld specifically by the Seventh Court of Appeals. For the Brown County court

to attempt to nullify the settlement (and allow Green to take action against

Memorial Park in Brown County) not only contradicts the basis for which all rulings

and judgments were based upon in Travis County but undermines the ruling of the

Seventh Court of Appeals as well. This constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.

Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex 1996). Memorial Park has no other

remedy of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992)

16
 Considering that Memorial Park entered into a valid and enforceable

settlement agreement (as admitted to by counsel for Green) as to Green’s $9,020

judgment, and Memorial Park having timely paid the $19,275.13, satisfying its

obligations pursuant to the settlement, the Seventh Court of Appeals was correct

in its ruling that Memorial Park had properly filed its claims against Green in Travis

County where Green was residing at the time of the settlement, and that Travis

County District court has jurisdiction. Not the Brown County court.

Therefore, any action to nullify these judgments and rulings is nothing more

than a “collateral attack” by another court of equal jurisdiction as more fully

described below.

Specifically, in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-1-GN-17-

002451, “anti-suit injunction” orders were granted to Memorial Park as to Green

seeking to execute on the alleged $9,020 judgment obtained in the 35th judicial

District Court which is now barred pursuant to the January 31, 2014 settlement

agreement which this matter has now been fully adjudicated in Travis County

where Green was domiciled and Memorial Park having first filed its suit against

Green and obtaining injunctive relief beginning on February 7, 2014.

17
 The Texas Supreme Court has observed that an “anti-suit injunction” is

appropriate to:

1. Address a threat to the court’s jurisdiction;

2. Prevent the evasion of important public policy;
3. Prevent multiplicity of suits, or
4. Protect a party from vexatious or harassing litigation.

Gonzales v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615, 623 (Tex. 2005) Ex parte Evans,

939 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Tex. 1997) Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649,

651 (Tex. 1996) Ford v. Wied, 823 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1992)

As described above, the action by Green falls specifically within the intent

and purpose of an “anti-suit injunction” which is to stop a “challenge to a court’s

jurisdiction” and to “eliminate a multiplicity of suits”.

Further, the Travis County District Court has granted “anti-suit injunctions”

against Green twice in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and in Cause No. D-1-

GN-17-002451, prohibiting Green specifically from taking any further action in

Brown County, Texas, which the jurisdictional issue was also specifically upheld by

the 7th Court of Appeals, rendering Green’s actions in Brown County in violation of

the injunctive relief granted as well as in violation of the jurisdiction established in

Travis County which was not even addressed in the court’s August 24, 2018 ruling.

18
 What is important to note is that an “anti-suit injunction” was granted to

Memorial Park in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 on January 24, 2017 when Green

was represented by counsel, but Green wholly failed to take any action to set aside

or appeal the “antisuit injunction” order. 7

Therefore, the court raising a “due

process of law” in support of its ruling is not even applicable to the injunctive relief

granted which was never contested, appealed or set aside.

The Travis County District Court had authority to grant the “anti-suit

injunction” in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 since a court retains jurisdiction in

order to enforce final judgments even after its plenary power expires. Arndt v.

Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982); Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins.

Co., 234 S.W.3d 788, 795, (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, no. pet.)

Nor has the December 22, 2017 “anti-suit injunction” order granted in D-1-

GN-17-002451 been set aside, declared null or void or appealed which as stated,

the Brown County August 24, 2018 ruling does not even address.

7Even though Green was clearly represented by counsel in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 (and
who represents Green in Brown County), counsel for Green refuses to represent Green in Cause
No. D-1-GN-17-002451, or will disclose Green’s residency. Based upon the instructions of the
Travis County court, counsel for Green is noticed on all filings. Further, Green has appeared at
no hearings in Travis County or Brown County since 2009.
19
 Regardless of any errors or the April 30, 2018 “permanent injunction” being

voidable, Green took no action to set aside, declare void or appeal the “anti-suit

injunction” orders granted in both Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-

1-GN-17-002451, or contest the same as to the April 30, 2018 “permanent

injunction” in Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451 despite Green having received notice

of the injunctive relief sought and that Green was represented by counsel in Cause

No. D-1-GN-14-000373, which the Brown County court fails to even address. See

McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961); Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. v Mc Donald,

141 Tex. 555, 174 S.W.2d 951

Even assuming the April 30, 2018 “permanent injunction” could be set aside,

Brown County is not the proper venue for this action or determination to be made.

Nor should it allow Green to proceed forward against Memorial Park in light of the

settlement agreement, or the other injunctive relief granted to Memorial Park

which was not even addressed by the Brown County court.

The rulings and judgments by the Travis County District Court have been filed

with the 35th Judicial District Court and notice provided to Green’s counsel. Green

has therefore, waived his right to raise a complaint, and has waived his right to

contest any of these rulings by appellate review pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 33.1

20
 Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that:

Unless a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is void, it is not subject to

collateral attack in another court of equal jurisdiction. Austin Independent School

District v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973)… All errors other than

jurisdictional deficiencies render the judgment merely voidable, and such errors

must be corrected on direct attack. When time for direct attack by appeal has

elapsed, a bill of review in the court rendering the initial judgment is the exclusive

remedy to attack the judgment. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1985).

Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985)

Green has done neither. Green failed to contest any of the Travis County

District Court’s orders or file a bill of review, but has instead persisted to proceed

forward only in the Brown County court despite that the matter was settled; the

matter has been fully adjudicated; and despite the appellate court ruling.

For the Brown County court to make a such a ruling on whether a settlement

agreement had been entered into and to declare any ruling by the Travis County

District court void in direct contradiction to all the judgments and injunctive relief

granted in Travis County after the matter had been fully adjudicated in Travis for

the past 4 years is simply abuse of the court’s discretion.

21
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920,

(Tex. 1996); In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tex. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).

Coupled with the injunctive relief relied upon, considering that this was only

a $9,020 judgment involving a 2-time convicted felon and that Memorial Park

timely paid the $19, 275.13 “in full” pursuant to the settlement agreement, Green

did not timely provide the release of lien (or provide it at anytime thereafter) and

the settlement monies have not been returned, sanctioning counsel more than the

amount of the dispute and ordering counsel to jail for 30 days; especially, when

both counsel and Louis Starzel of Starzel Legal Service had attempted, and provided

the “post judgment” discovery to Green as attested to by counsel for Memorial

Park and Louis Starzel, the rulings by the court not only go against the great weight

of the evidence, but clearly subject to injunctive relief that had not been set aside

at the time that this ruling was made.

Further, it cannot be disputed that the Seventh Court of Appeals has already

resolved the jurisdictional question and held specifically that the Travis County

District Court has jurisdiction over this matter in its March 25, 2016 Opinion

Memorandum pursuant to the appeal filed by Green.

22
 The Seventh Court of Appeals made this determination based upon the Court

finding that the settlement agreement had been entered into 3 years after “final

disposition of the Brown County lawsuit”, and involved a breach of contract claim

as to Green failing to provide the release of lien pursuant to the settlement

agreement which was separate and apart from the underlying suit. Therefore, suit

was “properly” brought in Travis County. Hernandez v. Del Ray Chem. Int’l, 56

S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist..] 2001, no pet.]

Therefore, based upon the ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals, it is a

moot issue as to what court has jurisdiction. This has already been established, and

accordingly, this matter has been fully adjudicated.

Furthermore, it is clearly improper for any of these Travis County

judgments, rulings and injunctive relief, to be attempted to be set aside through

the Brown County court when any and all objections should have been brought in

Travis County where these judgments originated, and were not only not timely

made, but never made. Nor was there any motion by Green before the Brown

County court to set aside the April 30, 2018 “permanent injunction”; even had it

been proper and not prohbited by the “anti-suit injunction”.

23
 Such action by the Brown County court is nothing more than an improper

“collateral attack” on the Travis County District Court’s jurisdiction which has

already been established by Eleventh Court of Appeals; an improper “collateral

attack” on the Travis County District Court default judgments; an improper

“collateral attack” on the “antis-suit injunction” orders granted in both Cause No.

D-1-GN-14-000373 and Cause No. D-1-GN-17-002451; and an improper “collateral

attack” on the April 30, 2018 “permanent injunction” order in Cause No. D-1-GN-

17-002451 enjoining Green specifically from taking any further action as to the

enforcement of the $9,020 lien in the Brown County court which the enforcement

of the “permanent injunction” was upheld specifically on October 23, 2018.

The action taken by the Brown County court is clearly inconsistent with the

rulings and judgments by the Travis County District Court and the Seventh Court of

Appeals, and goes against the great weight of the evidence. In particular, it is

evident that a “settlement agreement” of some kind was entered into for purposes

of eliminating the $9,020 judgment (as recognized specifically in the ruling by the

Seventh Court of Appeals and the basis of the 8 injunctive relief orders) as admitted

to by counsel for Green, but instead of the Brown County court recognizing the

settlement agreement and honoring the 4 years this dispute has been adjudicated

in Travis County sought to improperly obtain jurisdiction and prolong litigation.

24
 Irrespective of the action taken, Green remains subject to the injunctive

relief granted to Memorial Park, which Memorial Park has relied upon since having

first filed its suit and obtaining injunctive relief against Green on February 7, 2014

PRAYER

For these reasons, Memorial Park asks that this Court to grant its writ of

mandamus and for the 35th Judicial Court to honor the January 31, 2014 settlement

agreement; honor the judgments and injunctive relief granted to Memorial Park

by the Travis County District Court; uphold the jurisdiction of the Travis County

District Court pursuant to the jurisdictional ruling by the Seventh Court of Appeals,

and for any other relief which the Court deems necessary.

25
 Respectfully submitted,

/S/ William W. Ruth

_________________________
William W. Ruth
SBN: 00788334
1406 E. Main, Suite 200
Fredericksburg, TX 78624
Tel: 325-642-9802
Williamwruth@verizon.net
ATTORNEY FOR MEMORIAL PARK
MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
Of Counsel:

Charles Scarbough
104 Pine Street
Abilene, Texas 79605
Tel: 325-672-8477

Karen L. Landinger
Cokinos Young
City View Tower
10999 West IH 10, Suite 800
San Antonio, Texas 78230
Tel: 713-535-5500

26
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 14, 2018, I served a copy of Realtor’s motion on the

parties counsel of record by efiling the same to the following parties:

/s/ William W. Ruth

______________________________
William W. Ruth

Robert Reich
309 North Fisk
Brownwood, Texas 76801
Tel: 325-642-1569
rereich@harrisbb.com

27
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2), this motion

contains 5,411 words, excluding the portion of the motion exempted by Rule

9.4(i)(1).

/s/ William W. Ruth

______________________________
William W. Ruth

28
29
APPENDIX "A"

21
 lJn t!tbe
C!Court of ~peals
~ebentb llistritt of ~exas at amatillo
No. 07-15-00143-CV

JOHN GREEN, APPELLANT

V.

MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL CENTER, INC., APPEi ,I ,EE

On Appeal from the 126th District Court

Travis County, Texas
Trial Court No. D-l-GN-14-000373, Honorable Tim Sulak., Presiding

March 25, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before QUINN, CJ., and CA.MPBEIL and PIRTLE,.U.

Through nine issues, appellant John Green challenges the trial court's disposition

of a suit brought by appellee Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. In this court, M e morial

Park filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, contending Green's

notice of appeal was untimely. The motion and Green's response were carried with the

case. Finding our jurisdiction attached, we will modify the judgment of the trial court and

as modified, affirm .
 Background

This litigation follows an earlier suit between the parties, litigated in Brown

County. Green there obtained a money judgment against Memorial Park and

foreclosure of mechanic's and materialman's liens on two parcels of land. The

judgment was affirmed on appeal in July 2013, after a small remittitur. 1

In the current suit, Memorial Park filed its original petition against Green in Travis

County on February 7, 2014. Among other allegations, the pleading alleged Green's

liability "and/or" that of his attorney2 for actual damages, exemplary damages, attorney's

fees, and costs of court under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section

12.002.3 Beneath the heading, "Application for Temporary Restraining Order,"

Memorial Park requested injunctive relief restraining Green from "executing its Abstract

of Judgment and/or taking any action until this matter is fully litigated." Elsewhere in the

paragraph, Memorial Park requested that the court set its "request for permanent

1
See Memorial Park Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Green, No. 11-11-00159-CV, 2013 Tex.
App. LEXIS 7871 (Tex. App.-Eastland June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Memorial
Park Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Green, No. 11-11-00159-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9168 (Tex.
App.-Eastland July 25, 2013, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (consent to remittitur).
2
An attached affidavit of Memorial Park's trial counsel stated in part. "Memorial
Park is in the process of obtaining financing, and the filing(s) by Green and his attorney
has placed a cloud of title upon Memorial Park's property and has delayed, complicated
and harmed Memorial Park. The parties involved in the financing and/or preparing the
closing documents required that suit be initiated against Green as to this matter. For
this reason, suit has been brought against Green and/or his attorney for filing the claims
which has harmed Memorial Park."
3
See TEX. c,v. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN.§ 12.002 (West Supp. 2015); James V.
Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (explaining
this section "forbids the filing of a fraudulent lien and allows a party injured by a
fraudulent lien to recover damages").
2
injunction for a full trial, and after the trial, issue a permanent injunction against

[Green]." Finally, Memorial Park sought "reasonable and customary legal fees."

A temporary restraining order issued against Green and his attorney on February

7, 2014. The order concluded by setting a hearing for February 18, 2014, "to show

cause why a permanent injunction, effective until final judgment in this cause should not

be granted as prayed for." (emphasis ours)

On February 14, 2014, before being served, Green filed a "motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction and for sanctions." According to the motion, the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over Memorial Park's suit because "this is an in rem proceeding involving

real property in Brown County .. . ." Other reasons for the asserted lack of jurisdiction

were that the action was barred by res judicata and that Green did not reside in Travis

County.

At the February 18 hearing, the court orally denied Green's "plea to the

jurisdiction" and granted a temporary injunction. But after learning that Green had not

been served, the court withdrew the temporary injunction and extended the temporary

restraining order.

After the hearing, Memorial Park tendered a proposed order for signature,

decreeing a permanent injunction. The court refused to sign the draft and instead

signed an order extending the temporary restraining order. In part the order directed,

"The parties and their agents ... to appear before this court on March 4, 2014, at 2:00

p.m., to show cause why a temporary injunction, effective until final judgment in the

3
cause should not be granted as prayed for." The order did not contain a ruling on

Green's motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions.

On February 26, Green filed a motion to transfer venue to Brown County,

alleging venue in that county was mandatory.

On March 4, the court conducted a brief, argument-only hearing. At the hearing,

the attorney for Memorial Park announced the purpose for the hearing was to continue

the temporary restraining order. He later added, "We're .. . only trying to hold this

money in counsel's escrow account until we can have this matter litigated." He

continued, "[T]he only matter before the Court is just to extend the injunction. And that's

all we are asking for, Your Honor, is to extend this injunction until Mr. Green can be

served or through a posting or-or have that adequately indicate to the Court that we

followed the Court's order in trying to get him served through a proper-means of

process server here in this town." Green's counsel argued for reconsideration of issues

of juri~diction and venue. The hearing concluded with the court's oral rendition that

Green's motion to reconsider issues of jurisdiction and venue was denied "and the

injunction [was] extended."

After the March 4 hearing, on March 13, the court signed an order decreeing

"[Memorial Park's] motion for permanent injunction" is granted and "[Green's] motions"
4
are denied. (emphasis ours)

4
The instrument is entitled "Order'' and its body states, in its entirety:

On the 4th day of March, 2014, came to be considered Plaintiff's motion

for permanent injunction and Defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdictio n, request for sanctions transfer of venue, and motion for

4
 Based on their conduct, the parties at least initially considered the March 13

order interlocutory. Within the following thirty-day period Green did not file a notice of

appeal or a post-trial motion or request extending the appellate timetable.5 On April 14,

2014, Memorial Park filed a first amended original petition. 6 The body of the pleading

no longer requested declaratory and injunctive relief but added a claim that Green

tortiously interfered with an existing contract, apparently a refinancing agreement. Also

added was a request, besides that under section 12.002, for exemplary damages. The

prayer requested injunctive relief "and that on final judgment, [Memorial Park] have

judgment against [Green]."

In a motion filed September 19, 201 4 , Green requested clarification of the March

13 order or a judgment nunc pro tune recognizing that a temporary injunction rather

than a permanent injunction had been granted. These motions were heard on October

9. The court denied Green's motion to clarify or for judgment nunc pro tune.

Memorial Park filed a document on February 2, 2015, entitled "motion to dismiss

Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 12.02 (sic) remedy and claim for tortious

interference." This pleading concluded with the statement Memorial Park "hereby

reconsideration. The court after hearing arguments of counsel and

considering the pleadings and the evidence was of the opinion that
Plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction should be granted, and denied
Defendant's motions.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DESCRIBED (sic)

that Plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction be granted, accordingly,
and Defendant's motions be denied.
5
See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; TEX. R. c,v. P. 329b.
6
In a subsequent pleading, Memorial Park alleged that its April 14 pleading was
filed "by oversight."

5
nonsuits" its claims under section 12.002 and for tortious interference. No mention was

made of Memorial Park's general claim for an award of attorney's fees. In a brief,

argument-only hearing that same day the following exchange occurred:

The Court: And is it correct that you wish to nonsuit all claims?

[Counsel for Memorial Park]: Yes.

The Court: All right. That's granted.

The following day, February 3, 2015, the trial court signed an "Order of

Dismissal" decreeing: "As the Court granted a permanent injunction on March 13, 2014,

and as [Memorial Park] made an oral announcement of nonsuit in open court and on the

record before the beginning of trial, and as [Green] has a motion to dismiss on file, this

case is DISMISSED."

The court held another brief hearing on March 2, 2015. At issue was a motion

Green filed on February 18 to modify the order of dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 329b. The gist of the motion was for modification of the order to state

whether the March 13 order as a permanent injunction continued. The court expressed

uncertainty as to its jurisdiction and declined to take action on the motion to modify or a

motion by Memorial Park, apparently filed on the day of the hearing, requesting "costs,

inclusive of attorney's fees, for frivolous pleadings of defendant."

Green filed a notice of appeal on March 3, 2015, and the case was transferred to

this court by order of the Supreme Court of Texas. 7

7
See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).

6
 Analysis

We turn first to the question of our jurisdiction. Fundamental to the inquiry is

whether the March 13 order finally disposed of the entire litigation. If so, Memorial

Park's notice of appeal was untimely and we are without jurisdiction. But if the March

13 order was not final, the February 3, 2015 dismissal order, after Memorial Park

nonsuited all its claims, terminated the litigation. In that instance, the notice of appeal

was timely filed.

"[l]n cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a

judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if

either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of

its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all

claims and all parties." Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex.

2001). An appellate court determines the finality of a judgment by the language of the

judgment. Id. at 199. A judgment rendered after a conventional trial on the merits

carries a presumption of finality. Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals,

722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (citing N. E. lndep. Sch. Dist. v.

Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. 1966)). Otherwise, no such presumption arises.

Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 199-200. "If there is any doubt as to the judgment's finality,

then finality must be resolved by a determination of the intention of the court as

gathered from the language of the decree and the record as a whole, aided on occasion

by the conduct of the parties." Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. 2010)

(per curiam) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203) (internal quotation marks,

bracketing, and capitalization omitted); see Crites v. Collins, 284 S .W .3d 839, 840 (Tex.

7
2009} (per curiam) (stating where there has been no traditional trial on the merits, 'To

determine whether an order is final, courts and parties must examine the express

language of the order and whether the order actually disposes of all claims against all

parties . . . . If neither examination indicates that the order is final, then the order is

interlocutory and unappealable").

The mere insertion of the words "permanent injunction" into an interlocutory order

does not transform the order into a final judgment. The March 4, 2014 hearing was not

a conventional trial on the merits so the March 13 order enjoys no presumption of

finality. It neither disposes of all claims and parties before the court8 nor states "with

unmistakable clarity" its finality as to all claims and all parties. An order that does not

dispose of all claims, even though it grants a permanent injunction, is interlocutory and

unappealable. El Caballero Ranch, Inc. v. Grace River Ranch, LLC, No. 04-15-00127-

CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10805, at *9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 21, 2015, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Young v. Golfing Green Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., No. 05-12-

00651-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10625 (Tex. App.-Dallas December 21, 2012, no

pet.) (mem. op.)); BCH Dev., LLC v. Lakeview Heights Addition Prop. Owners Ass'n,

No. 05-15-00274-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7499, at *2-3 (Tex. App.- Dallas July 21,

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from an order

granting partial summary judgment and granting a permanent injunction); Aurora Loan

Services v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No. 05-11 -01362-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS

982, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Aloe Vera of Am.,

8
As noted, at the time of the March 4 hearing Memorial Park, in addition to its
request for an injunction, sought declaratory relief, money damages, and attorney's
fees.

8
Inc. v. CIC Cosmetics Int'/ Corp., 517 S.W.2d 433, 435-36 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1974, no

writ) ("an order granting a permanent injunction may be interlocutory rather than final if it

does not dispose of all issues made by the pleadings"). We overrule Memorial Park's

motion to dismiss and find we possess jurisdiction of Green's appeal.

Sufficiency of the March 13 Order as an Injunction

In his issues one through five Green challenges the propriety of the March 13

order purporting to grant a permanent injunction. Because his issues are variations on

a general contention the trial court erred by signing the March 13 order, we will discuss

the complaints collectively.

The granting or denial of a permanent injunction following a bench trial is

ordinarily a decision left to the trial court's sound discretion, and appellate review of that

decision is limited to whether in reaching its decision the trial court clearly abused its

discretion. Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787, 791 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). "A trial court has no discretion in determining what

the law is or applying the law to the facts of the case." In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut.

Ins. Co., No. 03-15-00527-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10163, at *3-4 (Tex. App.- Austin

Sept. 30, 2015, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and

unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or misapplies the law to

the established facts of the case. Id.

"An injunction must be as definite, clear, and precise as possible and, when

practicable, it should inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing

9
without calling on him for inferences or conclusions about which persons might well

differ and without leaving anything for further hearing." Webb v. Glenbrook Owners

Ass'n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 384 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Villalobos v.

Holguin, 146 Tex. 474, 480, 208 S.W.2d 871, 875 (1948); Hellenic Inv. v. Kroger Co.,

766 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ)). Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 683 provides in part:

Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe
in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained ; and is binding only
upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
otherwise.

TEX. R. C1v. P. 683; see Computek Computer & Office Supplies, Inc. v. Walton, 156

S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (the injunction itself must provide

specific information without reference to other records). "[l]t is the character and

function of an order that determine its classification." Del Valle lndep. Sch. Dist. v.

Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 {Tex. 1992).

The March 13 order is not in the form of a permanent injunction. It by no means

compels or mandates any conduct and otherwise fails to comply with Rule 683. The

trial court abused its discretion by attempting to issue the March 13 order as a

permanent injunction. That error was not harmless because it necessarily left Green to

guess what he was compelled to do or not to do. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); TEX. R. C1v. P.

683; Webb, 298 S.W.3d at 384.

10
 We sustain Green's challenge of the propriety of the March 13 order as an

injunction, and find a permanent injunction never issued. We modify the trial court's

February 3, 2015 order of dismissal by deleting the recital, "As the Court granted a

permanent injunction on March 13, 2014, and[.]"

Denial of Motion for Sanctions

Green finally argues the trial court erred by failing to render a sanction order

against Memorial Park and its attorney for filing the original petition that alleged a claim

barred by res judicata and subsequently for filing a motion that falsely represented the

judgment Green relied on for his claim preclusion defense was reversed on appeal.

The bases Green relied on for seeking sanctions were Civil Practice and

Remedies Code Chapter 9 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. A trial court's award

or denial of sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d

609, 614 (Tex. 2007). To determine whether the denial of a motion for sanctions

amounts to an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court examines the entire record,

including any findings of fact and conclusions of law, considers the conflicting evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and draws all reasonable inferences

in favor of the court's judgment. Id. at 249-50 (citing In re C.Z.B., 151 S.W.3d 627, 636

(Tex. App.- San Antonio 2004, no pet.)). The movant for sanctions shoulders the

burden of showing a right to relief. GTE Commc'n Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d

725, 729 (Tex. 1993).

Chapter 9 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is limited to matters not

covered by Rule 13 or Chapter 10. See TEX. c,v. PRAC. & REM. CODE§ 9.012(h); Nath

11
v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 362 n.6 (Tex. 2014) (citing Low, 221 S.W.3d

at 614). Here Green alleged Memorial Park's attorney signed a petition he knew was

groundless, brought suit for the purpose of harassment, and filed a notice of nonsuit

containing false statements. We therefore look to Rule 13.

In relevant part, Rule 13 provides:

The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that

they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
their knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless
and brought for the purpose of harassment.

Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed
in good faith . No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for
good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.
"Groundless" for purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and
not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law ... .

TEX. R. C1v. P. 13. Notably, a court may not impose Rule 13 sanctions for

groundlessness alone. Instead, the document in question must be groundless and

brought in bad faith, brought for the purpose of harassment, or false when made. Nath,

446 S.W.3d at 362-63.

Memorial Park's original petition can be read as relating to claims based on

conduct occurring after final disposition of the Brown County lawsuit. Arguably, then,

res judicata might have no effect. Hernandez v. Del Ray Chem. Int'/, 56 S.W.3d 112,

116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ("a judgment in one suit will not

operate as res judicata to a subsequent suit on the same question between the same

parties where, in the interval, the facts have changed, or new facts have occurred which

may alter the legal rights or relations of the parties").

12
 ,-

As for the challenged statements in Memorial Park's notice of nonsuit, their

accuracy was a question of fact. We have no findings of fact by the trial court. When

resolving factual issues or matters committed to the trial court's discretion, we may not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Strom v. Memorial Hermann Hosp.

Sys., 110 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (citing

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). On this record,

no abuse of discretion by the trial court, in overruling Green's motion for sanctions, is

shown. Green's issue challenging the denial of sanctions is overruled.

Green's Remaining Issues

Green's remaining issues concern other interlocutory rulings by the trial court.

We find that, on the record before us, discussion of those issues is not necessary to

disposition of the appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1

Conclusion

,, Having found our jurisdiction proper and the March 13 order not a permanent
_fj>
injunction and having modified the February 3, 2015 order of dismissal by deleting its

recital that a permanent injunction was granted, and having overruled Green's other

issues necessary to our disposition, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as

modified. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (a court of appeals may "modify the trial court's
judgment and affirm it as modified").

James T. Campbell
Justice

13
APPENDIX "B"

22
 I Filed in The District Court
,. f
I of Travis County, Texas

CAUSE NO. D:..1 -GN-14-000373

. °' .
JAN 1 If 20\7 NNR
M.
L.,Pritc, District Clerk

MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL CENTER, INC. § IN TUE DISTRrCT COURT

§
Vs §. 1261'b JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
JOHN GREEN § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER

STATEOFTEXAS §

COUNTY OF §

On the .i.,.'-/ day of January, 2017. came to be considered Plaintiffs Request for

Anti-suit injunction, Application for T1:mporary Restraining Order, and Other Relief

After considering the evidence and revie"yjng the file, consisting of the Seventh

District Court of Appeals March 25, 2016 Opinion affinning the 126th Judicial District

Court's jurisdiction and judgment, as modified; the February 7, 2014 Temporary

Restraining Order; March 13, 2014 Order. and October 30, 2014 Order Denying

Defendant's Motion to Clarify Orders or Defendant's Motion for Nuc Pro Tune, it appears

to the Court that Plaintiff's requests should be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant John Green be commanded to

obey the order of this court and to immediately desist and refrain from taking any action to

enforce any alleged ju~ent against Plaintiff and/or taking any action to obtain a n y ~
o ✓oz- Jllo~
moniefy°aid by Plaintiff on deposit with Brown Cotmty Abstract and Title in Brnwnwood,
Texas.
,,.) 'V'D
IT MURTHER ORDERED that Defendant appear before this court at L..:....
(1/t',.f~
..c:)._ J&namy
am/~vn • 2017 to show cause why an llljtmctmn,
· · ~ · unti·1 ftmal
· euecuve

judgment in this cause shorild not be granted as prayed for.

1
\\II\\\ 11\\\ 11\1\ I\\\\ II\\\ 11\\1 \\II\ \I\\\ \II\\ II\\ \II\
005002870 ~
~
•' .

A bond in the amount of$250was paid by Plaintiff on February 7, 2014. Therefore,

no additional bond is necessary.

ISSUED at Z: 0'.2 ~ t his ~day of Januaty, 2017.

2
APPENDIX "C"

23
 h- f-~N-f ~ -oro 313 Fifed In The Otstl'lctCourt
of Travis County, Texas

CAUSE NO. O-1-GN-17-002451 At

DECJ-2.mr
VJ~L • ti.
Velva L Price, 7strictcieri<
MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL CENTER, INC. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Vs § 126Th .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
JOHN GREEN § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER

On tile 2-~day of December, 2017. came to be considered Plaintiffs Request for

Judicial Notice in Cause No. D-l-GN-14-000373: its Request for Enforcement of January

24, 2017order granting anti-suit injunction in Cause No. D- I-GN-14-000373;..al-ld ' •n ..the

~rtug4Mctx19f;al Park·£ Appl-ieation frn,-Tcii~SJc••ioicg Or:der iR this caus~

attiUfi. -- '(!!SJ
After considering the evidence and re\iewing the file, consisting of the Seventh

District Court of Appeals March 25. 2016 Opinion affirming the 12611' Judicial District

Court·s jurisdiction and judgment, as modified in Cause No. D-l -GN-14-000373; the

February 7, 2014 and January 24, 20 I 7 Temporary Restraining Orders granted to Plaintiff

in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000373: March 13. 2014 Order and October 30. 2014 Order

Denying Defendant's Motion to Clarify Orders or Defendant's Motion for Nuc Pro Tune

in Cause No. D-l-GN-!4-000373. it appears ro the Court that the requests brought by

Plaintiff should be GRANTED.

IT IS! THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant John Green be commanded to

obey the order of the court in Cause No. D-1-GN-14-0003 73and to immediately desist and

refrain from taking any action to enforce any alleged judgment against Plaintiff pursuant

to Plaintiff's request for antisuit injunction granted by the court on January 24. 2017.
., •'!r"
✓ •J\·• D"lot. •·~· -,•·.,- - - - '!' •;--:
 IT S FURTIIEnERED that Del< • appcsir ~ c o u r t at ,7\
USC w hy n injuncti 1. dlcc ·vc ll Ofinal~'
j udgment in th1 , ausc should nnt

A bond in the amount or $250 was paid hy Plaintiff nn Fchruary 7. 20 I ➔ in Cause

~o. D-I -GN-14-000373. Therefore. no a<lditional bond is necessary.

ISSUED atf!li-r!J)/pm on this ;lcA.. Jay of December. 2017.

APPENDIX "D"

24
 ,-....
,;;.

Filed in The District Court

ofTravis County, Texas

MAY - 2 2018 JC
Ar. \II . t"'1- .-1-;.~.,.
Cause No. D-11-GN-i!i-0®24§1 0· I Y !f-.,,., _
Velva L. Price, Dist1ici Clerk

lV'ilif"llrOruAJL PMl_~ W"JEDICAL CENTERs JINC. § TIN THE ll))lf§'fRil.CT COURT

§
§
V§. § 126TH jlJDKCiAL
§
.n<O>MN GREEN § TR.AVK§ cou~nnr, TIEXAS

On this the _ _ day of April, 2018 came to be heard Plaintiff Memorial Park Medical

Center, Inc.'s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Default Against John Green.

After considering the pleading, motions ai--id affidavits in support thereof, ai,d the

arguments of the parties, the Court finds the following:

motion for default as to its breach of contract and tortious interference claims against John Green,

an.d grants permanent injunction against Green as to the enforcement of the alleged $9,020

judgment against Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc arising from Cause No. CV0904121; styiecl

Joli..!i. C-reen v. Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.; 35 th Judicial District Court, Brown Count'J,

Texas.

BJE KT FW'lI'iBDER OP..DlEP..ETI) that t}ijs court: GP..ANT§ the damages and attorney fees
C--(L
set forth in the motionandattached A.ffidavit of William R u ~ requ~st for damages

and attorney fees, and sets this case for hearing as to damages and attorney fees on

_ _ _ _ _____ _, 2018 at _ _ _ am/pm.

SIGNED AND ENTERED this the 3ftday of April, 2018.

. • . ,. .i
APPENDIX "E"

25
 Filed in The District Court
of Travis County, Texas

OCT 24 2018JC
At ~: 10 AM.
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-17-002451 Velva L. Price, District Clerk

MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

CENTER, INC., §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
JOHN GREEN, §
Defendant. § 9gTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF

JUDGMENTS AND REQUEST FOR DAMAGES, ATTORNEY FEES, AND
SANCTIONS

On October 15, 2018, the Court heard Plaintiff Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.' s

Supplemental Motion for Enforcement of Judgments and Request for Damages, Attorney Fees,

and Sanctions (the "Motion"). Defendant John Green did not appear. Plaintiff appeared through

· its attorney, William Ruth. After reviewing Plaintiffs Motion, the pleadings on file, the evidence,

the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinions that Plaintiffs

Motion as to the enforcement of the Order signed on April 30, 2018 in the above-numbered cause

should be and is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Enforcement of

Judgments and Request for Damages, Attorney Fees, and Sanctions as to the enforcement of the

Order signed on April 30, 2018 in the above-numbered cause is GRANTED .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff be awarded$ 1[{),.yfJ{; in attorney fees.

All other relief requested not herein granted is DENIED.

""': ..-: .,:_. . :L

,,, /,,

Signed this ~ 0 dayofOctober2018 .

_/

WDGE PRESIDING
KARIN CRUMP
APPENDIX "F"

26
 At_l&c~2_M
OCT 1 7 2018

NO. CV-0904121

JOHN GREEN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff, §
§
V. § 35TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL §
CENTER, INC. §
Defendant. § OF BROWN COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

On August 13, 2018, the Cou1t considered Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt. After

considering the pleadings, evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel the Court finds William

W. Ruth has willingly ignored the Comi's orders and intentionally and willfully attempted to prolong

this litigation and has violated the Court's order on more than one occasion.

The Court further finds William W. Ruth has used or attempted to use ex-parte

communications with the sitting Court and it therefore appears to the Court that the Motion should be

GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that William W. Ruth is held in contempt of court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that William W. Ruth pay attorney fees totaling $6,500,

being $2,500 as ordered in the ruling on this Motion for Contempt and in satisfaction of the $1,500 as

ordered at the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel heard November 30, 2016 and the $2,500 as

ordered at the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt heard September l l, 2018 in which

William W. Ruth represented the Defendant, Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. and as attorney of

record for the Defendant.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that William W. Ruth be confined in the Brown County

Jail for a te1m of 30 days, which is probated for sixty (60) days to allow time for payment of attorney

fees and for William W. Ruth to provide answers for Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc., to

Interrogatories in Aid of Judgment to Robert E. Reich as ordered.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CONTEMPT Page 1
 SIGNED on _({)j;-__16_, 2018.

APPROVED AS TO FORM;

.~ , , . .
~-~"~-
. -- - - -
Attorney for Plaintiff John Green
Email: rereich@harrisbb.com
309 N . Fisk
Brownwood, Texas 76801
Tel. (325) 642-1569
Fax. (325) 643-3105

William W. Ruth
Attorney for Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.
William W. Ruth
Email: wi1liamwruth@verizon.net
1406 E. Main Street
Fredericksburg, Texas 78624
Tel. (325)642-9802
Fax. (325)641-0527
APPENDIX "G"
 MIKE WALLACH
DISTRICT JUDGE
348TH Juo1c·1At DISTRICT o, TEXAS
TOM VANDERGRIFF CML CouRTS BloG.
100 N. CALHOUN
MICHELE flAVllU!W FORT WORTH, TEXAS 78198-0291 ANNETTE Bos
COURT COORDINATOR' (8171 884,2715 COURT REPOIITEA
(817) 884•2715 (8t7) 884-1790

August 24, 2018

Robert E. Reich, via email jmckibben@haynesfinn.com

309N. Fisk
Brownwood, Texas 76801
·'::~ IE-MAULED
William W. Ruth, via email wiUiamwruth@verizon.net ::J.;;;.J ?ciN-1 ¥:
1406 E. Main, Suite 200
Fredericksburg, Texas 78624

Re: Cause No. CV-0904121

John Green vs. Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.

Dear Counsel:

At the conclusion of the hearing on August 13, 2018, the Court took the pending matters
under advisement and promised to make rulings on those matters and write a letter regarding the
rulings. The Orders accompany this letter, which will serve to provide a general explanation of
the Court's rulings, although it should not be construed to represent findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

1. Memorial Park's Request for Judicial Notice oflnjunction (filed May 3, 2018)

During the hearing, the Plaintiff did not contest that the document attached to the Motion
(Order dated April 30, 2018 in Travis County Cause #D-1-GN-17-002451) was a true,
correct, and authentic copy of the docwnent that it purports to be and, in fact, offered
another copy of the document during cross-examination of Mr. Ruth. The Court therefore
taJces Judicial Notice that the document attached to die Request for Judicial Notice is, in
fact, a true, correct, and authentic copy of the document. In doing so, the Cowt does not
find anything beyond it being a true, correct, and authentic ~opy, including the validity or
enforceability of the matters addressed in the document.

2..Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.'s Supplemental Response and Supplemental

Motion for Reconsideration of Che January 17, 2017 and June 5, 2018 Orders,
Motion to Show Cause Why John Green and Robert Reich Should Not be
Sanctioned For Making Material Misrepresentations and Omissions To the Court
- 1-
 £
and Violating The April 30, 2018 Order of the 126th Judicial District Court, Motion
in Support of Judge Wallach Recusal and Motion for Continuance (filed July 18,
1018) and Memorial Park's Motion to Enforce Judgment (ided June 1, 2018) and
Memorial Park's Request for Notice (filed June 13, 2018)"

a. "Motion in Support of Judge Wallach Recusal.,

1bere is no currently pending Motion for Judge Wallach Recusal. All previously filed
Motions for Recusal have either been overruled by the Judge assigned to hear such
motions or have been withdrawn by Mr. Ruth and denied as moot.

b. The Court finds the "Order" of April 30, 2018 from the 126th District Court of Travis
7 County is void and unenforceable.

First, the "Order" (in the second Travis County case) fails to comply with Rule 683,
Tex. R. Civ. P. because it does not set forth the reasons for its issuance, is not specific
in its terms, is overly broad in its terms, and does not describe in reasonable detail and
not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained. See Green v. Memorial Park Medical Center, 2016 WL 1179207 *4-5
(Tex. App.--Amarillo 2016, no pet.) ("Green 2"); Fleming v. Ahumada, 193 S.W.3d
704, 115 (Tex. App.--Corpus ~hristi-Edinburgh 2006, no pet.).

Second, the "Order'' is void and unenforceable as the lack of compliance with Rules
109a and 244, Tex. R. Civ. P., renders it inconsistent with principles of due process of
law. Service by publication should be a last resort for service as it is the least Jikely
means by which to give actual reasonable notice to a defendant. In re: E.R., 385
S.W.3d 552,560 (Tex. 2012). The purpose of appointing an attorney ad litem under
Rule 244 is to assure that the defendant served by citation has effective
representation. Isaac v. Westheimer Colony Ass 'n Inc., 930 S.W. 2d 588, 590-91
1996, writ denied).

The purpose of having the court sign a statement of the evidence under Rule 244 is to
assure that a defendant served by publication and later defaulted can assess whether
the Court properly entered a default judgment based on legally sufficient evidence.
Byrnes v. Sampson, 14 Tex. 79, 85, 11 $.W. 1073, 1076 (1889). If this case were a
direct attack on the "Order," the failure to appoint an attorney ad )item and have a
statement of the evidence approved and signed by the Judge would be reversible error
as failing to strictly comply with the requirements for service by publication under the
Rules. Isaac, supra; Jackson v. Jackson, 2018 WL 3998627 {Tex. App.-San Antonio
2018, no pet.); In re Marriage of Ellis, 2008 WL 3834103 fu I (Tex. App.--
Texarkana 2008, no pet.).

This case, however, presents a collateral attack, not a direct attack, on the Order. In
collateral attacks on judgments, if the judgment is regular on its face and recites
proper service, there is a presumption of proper service. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.
2d 927, 929-30 Tex. 1965). However, if the judgment does not recite that service was
proper, the record may be reviewed for sufficiency of service. Hopkins v. Cain, 109
Tex. 591, 143 S.W. 1145 (1912). In this case, the "Order" contains no reference to
service so a review of the record is appropriate. That review reveals that the Travis
County Court failed to appoint an attorney ad J_item and failed to sign and approve a

- 2 -
 statement of the evidence as required by ~ule 244. Therefore, there was a failure to
strictly comply with the rules providing for service by publication, rules which were
designed to provide for due process of law. Failure to provide due process of law is a
constiMional deficiency which can be raised at any time. In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d at
556. Personal jurisdiction is a vital part of a v~id judgment and it is dependent on
citation being issued and served in a manner prescribed by law. If service is invalid, it
is of no effect and cannot establish a court's jurisdiction. Judgments that are void for
lack of service of process may be challenged at any time. In. re E.R. 385 S.W.3d at
566.

I_n this case, the judgment is silent as to whether process was properly issued and
served. Therefore, a review of the record is in order. The Travis County Court did not
appoint an attorney ad !item for Green and did not approve and sign a statement of the
evidence. It is uncontroverted that Green did not appear or participate in the Travis
County proceedings, resulting in the issuance of the Order. As a result, Green was
deprived of due process of law and a collateral attack on the enforceability of the
Order is in order.

c. In Green 2, the Court of Appeals held that the "permanent injunction" issued in the
first Travis County trial court was unenforceable as a pennanent injunction.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the rest of
the case because Memorial Park had taken a non-suit of those claims. Any prior
restraining order or temporary injunction was effectively voluntarily dismissed with
the non-suit as they were, at best, interlocutory orders.

"). d. There is no evidence of a "settlement" of this action. The evidence adduced at the
hearing demonstrated that Green obtained a final judgment against Memorial Park
Medical Center, Inc., which was affirmed as modified by the Court of Appeals in the
principal amount of $9020. See Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. v. Green, 2013
WL 3336609 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2013, no pet.) ("Green l"). According to Mr.
Reich and Mr. Bert Massey, who handled the discussions for Memorial Park Medical
Center, Inc., with Bill Reich on this matter, Mr. Massey did not attempt to negotiate a
settlement of the Judgment. Instead, Mr. Massey asked Mr. Reich for a "payoff" on
the amount owing on the Judgment at that time. While a check was issued from Mr.
Massey's title company in that "payoff'' amount. the check was tendered to Mr. Reich
with the mutual understanding that the check would not be negotiated by Green until
Green could come to Mr. Reich's office and sign a Release of Judgment. Prior to that
occurring, Memorial Parle obtained a temporary restraining order in Travis County
which prohibited Green from cashing that check. While both Mr. Ruth and Mr. Reich
castigated each other for not trying to resolve the issue of why the matter was not
resolved initial)y, the simple matter is that neither one did, and the check became
stale. Thus, there was never a payment of the Judgment or an unconditional tender
and acceptance constituting an accord and satisfaction of the Judgment. It was simply
an unsuccessful attempt to pay the Judgment. Jeanes v. Hamby, 685 S.W. 2d 695
(Tex. App.--Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Blaylock v. Akin, 619 S.W. 2d 207, 209-10
(Tex. App.--Texarkana 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).

e. With regard to the sanctions for Memorial Park failing to provide answers to Green's
interrogatories, the record is clear that this matter had been addressed by this Court on

-3 -
 multiple hearings. The original Motion to Compel was filed on September 30, 2016.
By letter dated December 7, 2016 and order dated December 28, 2016, the Court
(Judge Hadaway) granted the Motion to Compel, ordering Green to answer the
interrogatories by January 17, 2017 and to pay $1500 sanctions by that date.
Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider on January 11, 2017, and on January 17,
2017, the Court (Judge Hadaway) denied the Motion to Reconsider. On Februaryl5,
2017, Green filed a Motion for Contempt, and on May 31, 2017, this Court (Judge
Hoffinan) entered an order which required Defendant to produce the interrogatory
answers at a hearing to be held on June 23, 2017 and to pay the $1500 attorneys' fee
sanctions previously awarded.

On June 4, 2018 this Court, with the undersigned presiding, held a hearing on Green's
Motion for Contempt filed February 15, 2017. All parties were given due and timely
notice of the hearing, and Mr. Ruth advised the Court in writing before the hearing
that he would intentionally not be attending the hearing. The Court heard evidence
from Mr. Reich and concluded that the Defendant had still not comp1ied with the
previous orders requiring the Defendant to serve interrogatory answers and pay the
previously-ordered monetary sanctions. The Court t~ereupon entered an order
sanctioning the Defendant for non-compliance with the Court's orders and for
violation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure providing for post judgment
discovery, ordered the Defendant to serve answers to the interrogatories in question,
and to pay additional monetary sanctions. The Defendant had every opportunity to
appear and present evidence, but knowingly chose not to attend and present evidence.

The Court finds that the positions taken at the hearing on August 13, 2018, are
repetitive of the unsuccessful positions taken in earlier hearings, and the Court deems
the Motion to not only be repetitive. but also frivolous. The Defendant had multiple
opportunities over five years to purge itself of th~ risk of contempt, but chose to
disregard the Court instead.

f. Regarding Defendant having allegedly sought injunctive relief with the Third Court
of Appeals, this Court has received no orders from the Third Court of Appeals, and
Defendant offered none in evidence, regarding the granting of any injunctive relief by
that Court of Appeals.

g. Regarding Defendant having no legal counsel, this Court previously advised all
counsel in writing that any attempt to withdraw as counsel in this case would require
that the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Jll' Judicial Administrative
Region would need to be followed. Mr. Ruth has been the attorney of record for the
Defendant since the beginning of the case, and there has been no motion or order
allowing his withdrawal as counsel nor the substitution of new counsel. Since Mr.
Ruth continues to be licensed to practi~ law _in Texas, he is still the attorney of
record for the Defendant.

h. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph III. E, the Defendant offered no evidence
in support of such allegations, which have previously been asserted in previous
motions to recuse and which have either been ove.mued by the duly appointed judge
to hear those matters and/or withdrawn by the Defendant. Although Mr. Ruth has
made allegations of prior r~used judges having had ex parte communications with
opposing counsel, the record reflects that these judges voluntarily recused themselves,
 no evidence was offered regarding these matters and the orders of a judge who should
have recused himself are not void or fundamental error. In re Union Pacific
Resources, 969 S.W. 2d 427,428 (Tex. 1998).

Sincerely,

Mike Wallach

mer
Attachments: 7 orders listed below

cc: Danielle Jordan

Jennifer Aaron

Attachments:

Order Denying Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.' s Response and Motipn for Reconsideration
of the January 17, 2017 and June 5, 2018 Orders

Order on Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.' s Request to Set for Hearing, Notice of Filing
Trans~ript of Robert Reich in Support of Settlement and Dismissal of Suit and Attorneys' Fees

Order on Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.' s Request for Judicial Notice of Injunction

Order Denying Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. 's Motion to Quash and Request
Enforcement of Anti-Suit Injunction

Order Denying Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. 's Motion to Enforce Judgment

Order Denying Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.'s Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Show
Authority Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 12

Order Denying Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc.'s Request for Judicial Notice

- 5 -
STATE OF TEXAS §

COUNTY OF GILLESPIE §

VERIFICATION

BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared

William Ruth, the affiant, a person whose identity is known to me. After I

administered an oath, affiant testified as follows:

11
My name is William W. Ruth. I am over 18 years of age, of sound mind,

and capable of making this verification. The facts in this verification are within my

personal knowledge and true and correct.

I am the attorney for relater. All the documents included with this petition

for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Injunctive Relief are true copies of what

they purport to be."

William W. Ruth
STATE OF TEXAS §

COUNTY OF GILLESPIE §

BEFORE ME, personally appeared on this the } Lf+h day of December, 2018,
William W. Ruth, known to me to be the person whose name appears on this
Verification and subscribed by William W. Ruth and who states that he has read
the foregoing and its true and correct.

,""'"'""",
,'\,-f<Y PIJ!?('' CHELSEA DENNIS
f~°,~·
·······•.l\ Notary Public, State of Texas
§•! i*~ Notary 10# 11102086
\ -;.,,>..,1:···
,;:... ~···t.1-'t-$
..·~ j My CommiS&ion Expires
,,,,,f..~!..~,,,,,, OCTOBER 5, 2020

Notary Public, State of Texas