[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY.

TANTUICO ] 1

30. In the matter of the intestate estate of the law Kaw Singco. Sy Oa vs. Co Ho this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a
G.R. No. L-4844, June 30, 1943 deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue." (Rule 75, section 1.)
Ponente: Moran, J.:
Aldaba DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
Motion for reconsideration denied.
TOPIC: Venue – Sec 1, Rule 73, Meaning of the term “resides”

DOCTRINE:
The place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue.

FACTS:
Sy Oa is the administratrix of the intestate estate of Kaw Singco. During the
intestate proceedings, Co Ho filed an opposition alleging that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the proceedings where not filed in the
province where the deceased last resided.
The Supreme Court held that the question involved in the case was a
question on venue which in turn hinges on a question on fact and not on jurisdiction
over the subject-matter.
Co Ho seeks reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the last place of residence of the deceased is an element of
jurisdiction?

HELD:
The Supreme Court declines to follow the view that in probate cases, the
place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. Section 600 of Act. No. 190 (The Code of Civil Procedure), provides
that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had
last resided could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate
court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as the Supreme Court have
said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter
is another. The law of jurisdiction - Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 - confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First
Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Therefore, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon

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31. "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Andres
Eusebio"
G.R. No. L-8409, December 28, 1956
Justice Conception
Zalameda
TOPIC: Venue - Meaning of term "resides"
DOCTRINE:
The estate of the deceased persons shall be settled in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death.
FACTS:
- Eugenio Eusebio filed with CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio.
- Amanda, Juan, Delfin, Vicente, and Carlos objected to said petition, stating that
they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly filed.
- Lower court overruled the objection and granted the petition. It held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the
acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. Hence, the
oppositors appealed; and the appeal hinges on the situs of residence of Andres
Eusebio.
- It is not disputed that Andres had always been domiciled in San Fernando
Pampanga. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus
Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España
Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). Before Andres died, he was still able to contract
marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in
UST hospital. Two (2) days later, he died of "acute left ventricular failure secondary
to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not decedent Andres Eusebio intended to stay in Quezon City
permanently? [NO!, he did not intend. San Fernando Pampanga is his domicile and
residence hence the petition filed by Eugenio should be dismissed on ground of
improper venue.]
HELD:
No.
 It is apparent that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in
the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that
"a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained"
 - There is no direct evidence of the intent of the decent to stay
permanently in QC. Neither does the decedent appear to have manifested
his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who
took the witness stand, did not testify thereon.
 - The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been advised to do so "due to his illness", in the very
words of herein appellee. It is not improbable that said advice was given
and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and could
have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health",
even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home."
 - Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live
with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
again, in the deed Exhibit 2, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga,
as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by
the decedent in acknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was
issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1,
signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, stated
that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
 - Apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had
decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly
and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile has not been
offset by the evidence of record.
 II. Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue?"
 - In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants for
the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio".
That case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14,
1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the
children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein),
moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the
present case. The CFI of Pampanga granted the motion and relied upon the
above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

 - SC stated: Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome
of the case at bar because it did not pass upon the question of domicile or
residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision
of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more
courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to
deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely
because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which
jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the
will of one of the parties.
 - The Court discussed, in brief, that if proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the
question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first
case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue. Should
it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had
been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and
the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper
court.
 Re: issue of admissibility of appellant’s evidence (Exhibits 1&2)
 SC said: At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to
prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that
venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed
him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is
Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits
1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with
the issue under consideration.
 DECISION: The decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had NO authority, therefore, to
appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained
appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition. The order
appealed from is hereby REVERSED.
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32 and 33. Rosa Cayetano Cuenco v. CA
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
Ponente: Teehankee
Arquillo
TOPIC: Venue; Exclusionary Rule
DOCTRINE:
The Rule, (Sec. 1, Rule 73) does not state that the Court whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, the Rule
provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. It indicates
that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion
of all other courts.
FACTS:
 Jesus Cuenco died on Feb. 25, 1964 and was survived by his widow
(Petitioner Rosa) and their 2 minor sons, and by his children from his first
marriage (Respondents herein) which are all of legal age and residing in
Cebu. He died in Manila Doctors’ Hospital.
 Lourdes Cuenco (One of the Respondents) filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with CFI Cebu alleging that Cuenco (Decedent) died
intestate in Manila; that he was a resident of Cebu; and left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The Cebu Court issued an
order directing due notice be given to all heirs and interested persons, and
ordering the publication at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation
in Cebu.
 Rosa learned about the intestate proceeding in the Cebu Court prompting
her to file an Opposition as well as a Petition for Appointment of Special
Administrator.
 On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of
that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." This Order was not reconsidered,
challenged, or opposed by the Respondents but instead they filed in
Quezon City Court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, this was promptly
denied by said court.
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  The Quezon City Court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." They
also established that the residence of the late senator at the time of his
death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
 Instead of appealing the Order of the Quezon City Court, respondents filed
a SCA of certiorari and prohibition to bar the Quezon City Court with the
Respondent CA. CA rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. Stating
that Sec. 1, Rule 73 fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covering both intestate and testate
proceedings. Thus, according to CA, the proper Court is Cebu Court, since
it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked, and which first
attached.
 Simply put, CA stated that Quezon City Court have no authority in issuing
such Order when the settlement of estate was first filed in the Cebu Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON CA erred in ordering the Quezon City Court to refrain from
proceeding after the Cebu Court renders it decision - YES
HELD:
 Supreme Court stated that CA erred in issuing a writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City Court from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
 The Court held that under the Judiciary Act, CFIs (RTC now) have original
jurisdiction over all matter of probate, both testate and intestate estates.
While Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue. As
such, Sec. 1, Rule 73 provides, “the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.”
 The Court furthered that “…the residence of the deceased or the location
of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue.” The Rule does not state that the Court whom the estate
or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. Rather,
the Rule provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts. It indicates that the court with whom the petition is first
filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
 Such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold
the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.
 THUS, since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the
consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be
left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts.
 The Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first
filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the
Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine
the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper
venue.
Thus, it would be unjust and inequitable that Rosa, who under all the applicable
rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes
Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on
5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within
fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964)
timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is
admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate,
would be compelled under the CA decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and
submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or
by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding —
when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings is Quezon
City, where the decedent and Rosa had their conjugal domicile.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
 [ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 5

34. URIARTE v CFI
G.R. No. L-21938| May 29, 1970
J. Dizon
Asuncion
TOPIC: Doctrine of Precedence of Probate Proceedings
DOCTRINE: Testate proceedings for settlement of estate take precedence over
intestate proceedings.
FACTS:
 Vicente Uriarte instituted an intestate proceedings before the Negros
Court for the settlement of estate of Don Juan Uriarte claiming that : (1) he
is a natural son and sole heir of the deceased; (2) during lifetime of the
decedent, Uriarte had instituted a civil case in the same court for his
compulsory acknowledgement as natural son
 With such petition, the Negros Court appointed PNB as special
administrator but it was disclosed that PNB was never actually qualified as
special administrator
 On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, opposed the intestate proceedings
filed by Vicente on the ground that the deceased had executed a last will in
Spain which is duly authenticated and submitted to Negros Court
 On August 28, 1962, Juan Zamacoma, commenced a special proceeding for
the probate of the alleged last will in MANILA (testate proceeding) and
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the deceased had left a last
will so there was no legal basis to proceed with the intestate proceeding in
Negros Court
 Vicente opposed such Motion to Dismiss on the ground that since Negros
was first to take cognizance of settlement of estate, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
 RULE: Testate proceedings for settlement of estate take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
- It has been repeatedly held that if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before the court, it is found that decedent had
left a last will, the proceedings for probate of the decedent should
replace the intestate proceedings EVEN IF at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed. The administrator being
required to render that account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
- LIMITATION: Should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as intestacy.
 IN THIS CASE, although an intestate proceeding has already instituted in
Negros Court wherein PNB was appointed as administrator, it does not
deprive the Manila Court, where a testate proceeding is filed, to assume
jurisdiction by virtue of doctrine of precedence of testate proceedings.
- HOWEVER, to avoid multiplicity of suit especially if several courts
would be involved, Juan Uriarte should have submitted the will for
probate in Negros Court EITHER in separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for such purpose.

ISSUE:
WON the intestate proceedings filed in Negros Court shall proceed in lieu of the
testate proceedings instituted in Manila. (NO)

NO. THE TESTATE PROCEEDINGS IN MANILA SHALL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS IN NEGROS.

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35. MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS to the probate court the question of title to property.". Here, the probate court is
[G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000] competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing
Ponente: Buena, J. parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most
Bacina expensive and inexpedient.

TOPIC: Venue and Jurisdiction in estate proceedings.
Where community property is involved.
DOCTRINE:
When the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal
partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court, which has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs.
FACTS:
 Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in
this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and
sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva. During their lifetime, they acquired a property
particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less,
with address at Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records,
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter
executed a holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31,
1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix.
 After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion
before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the
occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property at Balut,
Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof.
Menandro refused to vacate.
 In the appellate court, the Regional Trial Court’s order was set aside for
having been issued beyond the latter’s limited jurisdiction as a probate
court.
Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent
since the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the
same way, when the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the
conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within
the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to
be distributed among the heirs.
Sec. 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court states:
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either."
The court ordered that the case be returned to the probate court for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucresia prior to settlement of the
estate of Teodoro.

ISSUE/S:
WON probate courts can adjudicate title to properties claimed to be part of the
estate which are claimed to belong to outside parties? - NO

HELD:
On the Issue of venue and jurisdiction in estate proceedings where community
property is involved:
Menandro, cannot be considered an outside party for he is one of the three
compulsory heirs of the decedent. As such, he is very much involved in the
settledment of Teodoro’s estate. By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule,
"when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit

36. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v JOSEPHINE LUCERO
G.R. No. L-60101, August 31, 1983
Ponente: J. Escolin
Bernal
TOPIC: Settlement of Estate when a person is presumed dead
DOCTRINE: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the rule on presumption of death does not step in, and the
rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
FACTS:
● On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern
Minicon plying the Hongkong-Manila route. Under the contract, his
employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would
automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila,
unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary,
while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
● While the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila, Capt. Lucero sent
three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office stating that the vessel is
experiencing problems due to strong winds.
● Acting on these radio messages, vessels were dispatched to give assistance
to Eastern Minicon. Radio messages were also sent to the Philippine Coast
Guard and other vessels traversing the Hongkong-Manila Route. However,
the collective efforts of all parties yielded negative results. Subsequently,
the Lloyds of London, insurer of the Eastern Minicon, declared the loss of
the vessel, and sought to pay the corresponding death benefits to the heirs
of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused
to accept the same.
● Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board for payment
of her accrued monthly allotment and for continued payment of said
allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of
Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by
her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that
the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
● On the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no
longer entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had
already confirmed the total loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the
company's insurance claim and [b] the Company, with the approval of the
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 7
Board, had likewise paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of
the other seamen The Company further invoked the provisions of Article
643 of the Code of Commerce.
● The Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs. Josephine
Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the
presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period
provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired.
● NLRC affirmed the decision and cited Article 391, stating that the person to
be presumed dead should first "not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel" before he can be presumed dead for all purposes.
ISSUE/S:
WON the courts were correct in applying article 391 and concluding that Capt.
Lucero cannot be considered presumably dead because the 4 year period set by law
has not yet expired? NO
HELD:
On the Issue between Civil Action and Specpro: No application in this case.
Civil action and Specpro are different….
● No application in this case.
On the issue with respect to pleading: Settlement of Estate when a person is
presumed dead.
A pleading in Specpro…
● No application in this case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
It is undisputed that the Company received three (3) radio messages from Capt.
Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of
that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea
water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and
they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this message, nothing
more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.
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There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite
logically. are sufficient to lead the Court to a moral certainty that the vessel had
sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule
on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the
rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro "Where
there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence
controls." The Court cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for,
the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that
Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on
February 16, 1980.
37. Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw.
37. CONSUELO SORS
G.R. No. L-1780, August 31, 1948
Ponente PADILLA, J.:
Biag
TOPIC: Doctrine of Precedence of Probate Proceedings; Settlement of Estate
where a person is presumed dead
DOCTRINE:
The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not
heard from in seven years is dead, may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be
made the subject of an action or special proceeding.
FACTS:
 Consuelo Sors pleaded under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas
Szatraw, a Polish citizen.
 She claims the following: they were married in Manila on November, 1936
and bore a child named Alexis Szatraw,born on 8 September 1937
 They lived together from the time they were married until February, 1940,
when her husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends,
departed from the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and
never returned.
 She made inquiries of his whereabouts from her husband's friends and
countrymen
 She learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai and that he
and the child had not been seen and could not be found
 That she exerted effort in finding her husband but to no avail.
 And that because of her husband's absence for more than seven years
during which she has not heard any news from him and about her child,
she believes that he is dead.
 Consuelo prays for that: (1) her husband be declared dead and that her (2)
parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive, be preserved.
 TC: dismissed the petition
o Court said that it is not for the settlement of the estate of the
absentee.
o rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a person
unheard from in seven years is dead, does not create a right upon

which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated.
The petitioner has appealed.
ISSUE/S:
WON the presumption of death can be made subject of an action or a special
proceeding independently to a case - NO
HELD:
 The SC held that the rule invoked by the petitioner is merely one of
evidence which permits the court to presume that his husband is dead
after the fact that he had been unheard from in seven years had been
established.
 This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in
an action or in a special proceeding that can be tried by a competent court.
 Independently of such an action or special proceeding mentioned above,
the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding.
 In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed
for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
 There is also no prayer for the final determination of his right or status or
for the ascertainment of a particular fact.
 The court expressed that the petition does not pray for a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he
be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years –
which the court cannot grant.
 Such presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement
to that effect is still a prima facie presumption and can still be disputable
and subject to contrary proof.
 The petition is for such a declaration then is useless and of no benefit to
the petitioner. And the courts should not waste its time for such a
meaningless act
 The court stressed that if the reason why the petitioner prayed for such
declaration is to terminate his marital bonds with husband, then what she
believes in is wrong.
 If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or
granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily
be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from
in seven years to be presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why
a petition such as the one presented in this case should not be allowed.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 9
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
The order appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs is made,
because no adverse party appeared in this Court and in the court below.
38. In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively
dead. ANGELINA L. GUE vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-14058. March 24, 1960
Montemayor, J
Bonifacio
TOPIC: Settlement of Estate where a person is presumed dead additional reading.
DOCTRINE:
A judicial declaration that a person is presumed to be dead, solely because the
person has been missing for years, is not authorized by law.
FACTS:
 Spouses Angelina and William Gue, and their children left the Philippines
for Shanghai and lived there from 1946 to January of 1949. Angelina and
their children went back to the Philippines and William was scheduled to
follow. William never returned to his family hence Angelina started making
inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to whether
her husband had already returned to the Philippines. No information as to
the whereabouts of her husband was found
 On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the CFI of Manila
asking the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William
Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 1 of the Civil Code.
1
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
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  She alleged that since January of 1949 William Gue had not been heard of,
neither had he written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to
his whereabouts, and that despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to
locate him.
 The CFI dismissed the petition, hence Angelina filed an appeal.
ISSUE/S:
WON the petition should be granted. - NO
HELD:
A person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision in the
Civil Code was repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be
repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption
of death was available to any party.
Following the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81
Phil., 461, a case similar to the present, the Supreme Court held:
A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed
order dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.
39. In the matter of Declaration of Civil Status of Lourdes Lukban v Rep of the Phil.
GR No. L-8492 Feb 29, 1956
J. Bautista Angelo
Intia
TOPIC: Settlement of estate where a person is presumed dead
DOCTRINE:
 Judicial declaration of death is different from declaration that a person is
presumed dead.
abcdef
FACTS:
 This is a petition before CFI Rizal by Petitioner to be declared a widow as
her husband Francisco is presumed dead and has no legal impediment to
contract subsequent marriage
 Pet Lourdes contracted marriage with Francisco. Few weeks after,
Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then nothing has
heard from him despite diligent search made by Lourdes.
o She also inquired from his parents and friends but no one knows
his whereabouts
o Because of that she believes that he is already dead as it has been
more than 20 years have passed and she intends to marry again
 OSG opposed the petition on the ground that such is not authorized by law
 CFI: In favor of OSG. Dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S:
2. WON the Petitioner’s husband can be declared dead - NO
HELD:
A petition for declaration that a person is presumed to be death cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law.
 Thus, if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding, much
less can the court can determine the status of the petitioner as a widow
since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the
husband.
 [ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 11

Special proceeding as defined is an application or proceeding to establish the status 40. REPUBLIC V CA
or right of a party or a particular fact. G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005
 BUT such remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek declaration of CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
death of the husband. Ceballos
 In the present case, what is the petitioner trying to do here is to establish a
presumption of death.  which cant be done by the court. Why? TOPIC: c. Not to be confused with Presumption of Death for the Purpose of
o Because a judicial presumption to that effect even if final and Remarriage
executory would still be prima facie presumption and still
disputable. DOCTRINE:
 IF it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would The instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary
not certainly deny a declaration to that effect. action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the
o The case didn’t mention any evidence adduced by the Petitioner presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the
to support her claim of the death of her husband. That’s why what enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
she is only asking maybe is a presumption, which the court cannot Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced
declare. against any person.

AFFIRMED
FACTS:
 Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, FILED WITH THE RTC of ORMOC for the
declaration of presumptive death of her spouse Clemente P. Jomoc
 The RTC of Ormoc Granted the said petition since Clemente left his wife for
more than 9 years already and thus cited Article 41 Par.2 of the Family
code:
o “xxx For the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.xxx”
 The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal but was thereafter denied on the
ground that no record of appeal was filed and served as required by and
pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
 It thus filed for certiorari with the CA and contended that the declaration
of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a
record on appeal

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  The CA denied the appeal because of such procedural lapse since It failed (i) Change of name;
to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural
children;
ISSUE/S: (l) Constitution of family home;
3. WON a petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of a person is a (m) Declaration of absence and death;
special proceeding thus a record of appeal is necessary?- Yes, (n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

HELD: On the other hand:

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one by which
a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
of redress of a wrong while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule
is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320,
March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant
petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The
petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death
of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc.
It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action
that can be enforced against any person
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of
the absent spouse.

Under Rule 72:

By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the
RULE 72 petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo,
OF GENERAL RULES the petition for that purpose is a summary proceeding, following above-quoted Art.
41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are
provided for in the following: Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked
by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat; Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees; (a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
(e) Adoption; by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption; taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons; judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
(h) Habeas corpus; adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
 [ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 13

proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the 41. REBUSQUILLO v. GUALVEZ
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
filed and served in like manner. Velasco, Jr J
Dimla
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate
court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy TOPIC: Distinction Between Civil Action and Special Proceeding and
of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of Summary Settlement of Estates
its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the DOCTRINE:
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING: law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby real agreement. (Art. 1346, NCC)
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in
light of the foregoing discussion. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper
when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only
warranted when there is only one heir.

FACTS:

 Petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco

(Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo.

 In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio
Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria).

 Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six
legitimate children, and one illegitimate child. His wife Victoria eventually
died intestate on June 30, 1983.

 On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City

 In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her
daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law
Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that
the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot.

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 It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what
she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of respondents.
 Petitioner then filed an action to annul the two documents before the RTC.
 In the respondents’ answer, they admitted the execution of the affidavit
and deed, but they argued that it was with the consent of all the heirs of
Eulalio and Victoria, and that such was agreed to be done to facilitate the
titling of the property.
 Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the
other heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact,
[petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the
delinquent taxes paid by [respondents].
 The RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not
therefore solely entitled to their estate. CA reversed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication and the sale are valid
HELD:
No. The petition is granted. Both the affidavit and the deed of sale are void.
On the Issue between Civil Action and Specpro:
 It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court
had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to
determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse.
 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring
administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-
trial
 In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in
Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
to name an executor therein.
 In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial
 An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole
heir of the decedent. (Sec. 1, Rule 74, ROC). As admitted by respondents,
Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by
respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of
representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured
herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is the only daughter and
sole heir of spouses Eulalio and Victoria. The falsity of this claim renders
her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.
 In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more
reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment
on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As
pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only
proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second
sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that
self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:

 Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
 In effect, Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the
absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not
the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self- Adjudication is void, the
subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have
the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion.
 What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership
of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents
and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the
ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence,
the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
 The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present
case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only
executed to facilitate the titling of the property.
 The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the exceptions provided in the
second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the
parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said,
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for
being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement. 1
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March
30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 15
42. JOVITA YAP ANCOG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.112260, June 30, 1997
J Mendoza
Laurente
TOPIC: Summary Settlement of Estates - Rule 74 (Mode)
DOCTRINE: No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof”.
FACTS:
 The parcel of land in Bohol, was formerly the conjugal property of the
spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap died, leaving
his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita
Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his
heirs.
 In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of
Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated
on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez applied again
for a loan to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the bank's
lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an
extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of
facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted,
Atty. de la Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs,
with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old,
signed. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan
was approved by the bank.
 Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. She brought an
ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's husband and son to
evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure
to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private
respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
 Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of their mother's plan to sell the
land. On June 6, 1985, they led this action for partition in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3094. As private
respondent Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their
mother, Caridad was impleaded as a defendant.
 Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and
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 therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument they did not
really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but
only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover
expenses for Caridad's school fees and for household repairs.
 RTC dismissed petitioners' claim that the extrajudicial settlement was
simulated and held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that
even without the need of having title in her name Rosario Diez was able to
obtain a loan using the land in question as collateral, the court held that
the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated for the purpose
of enabling her to obtain another loan. Petitioners failed to overcome the
presumptive validity of the extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
 The court instead found that Ancog had waived her right to the land, as
shown by the fact that on February 28, 1975, petitioner's husband,
Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent Diez.
 The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed.
The registration of the land under private respondent Rosario Diez's name
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners had
ten (10) years from April 13, 1961 within which to bring an action to
recover their share in the property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr. was a minor at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed,
his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
 Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and
sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case. The appellate court
emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been
simulated in order to obtain a loan, as the new loan was merely "in
addition to" a previous one which private respondent Diez had been able
to obtain even without an extrajudicial settlement. Neither did petitioners
adduce evidence to prove that an extrajudicial settlement was indeed
required in order to obtain the additional loan. The appellate court held
that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's educational attainment
(Master of Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable that she would
sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against
petitioners? YES.
2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the
property? NO.
HELD:
1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The record
reveals that there was an intention on the part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their
interest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been
initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082, CC, every act
which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be
partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other
transaction.
2.)No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At
the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was
not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land
in his mother’s name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451,
CC, which provides that “when land passes by succession to any person and he
causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by
implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resulting
trust arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the
parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time the
transaction out of which it is sought to be established. For prescription to run in
favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known
to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. A cestui que
trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time when
the trust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must be counted from
the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. Since this action by Gregorio,
Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their
mother’s effort to sell the property, his claim cannot be considered barred either by
prescription or by laches.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the
time the trust is repudiated. Although the registration of the land in private
respondent Diez's name operated as a constructive notice of her claim of
ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of repudiation adverse to petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the property was precisely not included by
the parties in the partition. Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been
informed of her exclusive claim over the entire property before 1985 when he was
notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their mother's plan to sell the property.
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust
must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and
proved by clear and conclusive evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the
determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.

43. BENATIRO v. HEIRS OF CUYOS
G.R. No. 161220, July 30, 2008
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Margallo
TOPIC: “No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof”.
DOCTRINE:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that
has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has
already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of
the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
FACTS:
 Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano, and Enrique. Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land.
 Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels
of land filed before the trial court petition for Letters of dministration. The
petition was opposed by Gloria's brother, Francisco, who was represented by
Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
 In the hearing, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared as
both manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their
case. The trial court on even date issued an Order appointing Gloria as
administratrix of the estate.
 Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all
the heirs to cause their appearance where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs,
only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend that since
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 17
some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided
to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
 Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those
present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to
which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer.
 Administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of
land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of
Columba.
 The heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos- Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-
Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-
in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that the Tax Declarations
were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled
and new Tax Declaration were issued in Columba's name; and that later on,
Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued
in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently
transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro,
son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba.
 Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order alleging the trial
court order was null and void of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular, that no meeting
ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of
their parents and that they never received any payment from the supposed
sale of their share in the inheritance, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud
caused them to be deprived of their property.
 CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order finding that there was no
transfer of money and the Deed of Sale was not even furnished.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled
the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court — an official act which
enjoys a strong presumption of regularity — based merely on belated allegations of
irregularities in the performance of said official act. –NO
HELD:
 We find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there
is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud,
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 but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process. A void
judgment never acquires finality.
 In his Commissioner's Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the
appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in
the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by
sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the
conference.
 It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference;
however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of
those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference,
namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report,
based on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given
addresses.
 There is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged
subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the
scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs.
 Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for
the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since
they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the
alleged meeting.
 We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of
the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in
the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that
respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption.
 The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates
a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate
in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and
Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
44. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA v. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACIOM
G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006
J. Puno
Martinez
TOPIC: Rule 69 and When Judicial Administration is Necessary
DOCTRINE: ; In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate
FACTS:
 Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion had 6 children
o Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in
favor of his six children.
o When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land:
(1) Lot 2299 and
(2) Lot 705
 Leandro sold a portion of Lot 1 to Lazaro Adviento
 A dispute between 2 of the children Emilia (petitioner) and Mary (one of
the who respondents rose over the eastern half of Lot 707)
o Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento
i. When he died his 2 daughters Agripina and Carolina
succeeded him
ii. Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of Emilia over the one-
half eastern portion of Lot 707.
iii. Agripina died single and without any issue
 Before her death Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, the entire lot which she later sold to Felipa and
Jilaria
 Emilia and her family stayed in the US for 10 years
o Upon return she built a house made of strong materials on the
eastern half-portion of Lot 70
o She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon
 Emilia sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common
by her and respondents
 Emilia filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City for partition,
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
against respondents, praying, among others, for:
o the partition of Lots 2299 and 705;
o the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
respondent Carolina over Lot 707,the deed of absolute sale in
favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244;
 [ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 19

o a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707
and damages
Carolina: contended that Leandro’s estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.
 Also claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was
necessary for such settlement.
o RTC: nullified Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of
absolute sale of Lot 707
o Also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of
Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate.
o Dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages
 REASON: it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by Emilia without any
(prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the
properties should first be effected
In situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the
estate, partition is inappropriate.
 The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by
operation of law, at the moment of death of the decedent.
 There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, Emilia
has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage?
 While Emilia points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and
she and Carolina (and her 6 children) are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses”
including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been
properly settled.
 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot
be done in an action for partition.

CA: upheld the dismissal of Emilia’s action for partition for being premature.
ISSUE/S: WON a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate is needed before the
properties can be partitioned or distributed - YES
HELD:
Partition is premature when ownership of the lot 705 is still in dispute
 there’s a pending case in the CA where issues cannot be deciphered.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting
of all expenses for which the estate must answer
 If it is any consolation at all to Emilia, the heirs or distributees of the
properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of
accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of
the estate’s obligations.

Two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69:
a) by agreement under Section
b) through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under
Sections 3 to 6.
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to
the decedent’sestate.

Section 8 of Rule 69 provides:

that there shall be an accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits)
in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of
expenses for which property belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable,
such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

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45. AVELINO v. CA
G.R. No. 115181, March 31, 2000
Ponente
Nepomuceno
TOPIC: Rule69: Partition
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among
themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. His heirs, are not
required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the
late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina
Avelino.
 The other private respondents all surnamed Avelino are likewise
compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of
Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma.
Socorro.
 October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
Antonio Avelino, Sr.,. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of
the estate.
 On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by
filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
1. SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are
all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition
2. SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no
debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age." With this finding, it is our view that
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate
and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition
may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them
may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.

ISSUE/S:
4. Petitioner argues: Whether or not partition of the estate is possible in the
instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and
extent of the decedent's estate

HELD:
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78
Exceptions:

46. VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RITA PEREIRA NAGAC
G.R. No. 81147 | 1989-06-20
GANCAYCO, J.:
Obnamia
TOPIC: Rule 69 - Ordinary civil action for partition
DOCTRINE:
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the Court. In such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
FACTS:
 Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away without a will.
 He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private
respondent.
 Private respondent instituted before the RTC, Special Proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira, alleging respondent alleged the following:
o that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased; that the deceased left no will;
o that there are no creditors of the deceased;
o that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from PAL,
the PAL Employees Association, the PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association, and the SSS, as well as savings deposits with PNB and PCIB,
and a 300 square meter lot;
o and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (petitioner) had been working
in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms
part of the estate of the deceased.
 Petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss alleging –
o that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative,
o that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said
estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 21
 RTC appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the
amount of P1,000.00.
o The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal
properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three
months after receipt of the order.
 Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix. Petitioner
contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons:
o firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim
she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the
exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits;
o secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with
the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as
supported by several receipts; and,
o finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially
settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only
surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties
form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She
points out that This function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira
for purposes of administration. (The resolution of this issue is better left to the
probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending.)
(2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there
are no debts left by the decedent. NO.
HELD:
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to
the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a
handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot
order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved
from the estate of the deceased.
(GO2) 2018 - 2019

The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, in any. The function
of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court.
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion
that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration
of the estate of the deceased.
In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to the properties
left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings
where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.

However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira
the parties Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration, We find the administration proceedings
instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding
dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new
action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.

An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition.

It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate

has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to
an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons.

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the

estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors
will depend on the circumstances of each case.

The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as

administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of

47. SEBIAL V SEBIAL
G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
Aquino, J.
Ollero
TOPIC: Estates of Small Value
DOCTRINE:
In as much as the value of the decedent's estate is less than five thousand pesos
and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the
limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule
74 effective on January 1, 1964).
FACTS:
 Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu.
 With 1st wife, Leoncia Manikis, begot three children named Roberta,
Balbina and Juliano.
 With 2nd wife, Dolores Enad, begot six children named Benjamina,
Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.
 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified
petition for the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she
be appointed administratrix thereof.
 Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of
Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children.
 Lower court appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that
the decedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one
hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged
partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective. Letters of
administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial and a notice to creditors
was issued.
 The oppositors filed a motion to terminate the administration proceeding
on the grounds that the decedent's estate was valued at less than six
thousand pesos and that it had already been partitioned and, therefore,
there was no necessity for the administration proceeding.
 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate
allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land with a total value
of P9,000, all located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 23
 The administratrix also filed a motion to require third persons, Lorenzo
Rematado, Demetrio Camillo, and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro
Recuelo, to deliver to her the parcels of land in their possession.
 The oppositors also filed their inventory of the conjugal assets of their
parents consisting of two parcels of land.
 The court then inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another
inventory. In compliance, she reproduced her inventory and added two
other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits
of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of
the first marriage. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said
inventory.
 Lower Court approved the second inventory because there was allegedly a
"prima facie evidence to show that" the parcels of land and two houses
listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate and directed that the heirs
of Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels of land should
deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in
her possession and administration of the same.
 Oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the
grounds:
(1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed beyond
the three-month period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court;
(2) that the said inventory is not supported by any documentary evidence
because there is no tax declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name;
(3) that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent
because they were demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the
materials thereof were appropriated by the administratrix and her
brothers and sisters;
(4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the inventory was fake,
fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven parcels of land
amounted only to P3,080;
(5) that Gelacio Sebial's estate should be settled summarily because of its
small value as provided in section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6)
that an ordinary action is necessary to recover the lands in the possession
of third persons.

ISSUE/S:
WON the estate may be settled summarily with its small value
HELD:
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Yes. In as much as the value of the decedent's estate is less than five thousand
pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under section 2,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not
necessary (the limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in
section 2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964).
Summary settlement is called for, probate court should ascertain value of estate left
by deceased by preponderance of evidence.—While the verified petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the
decedent’s estate was “5k”, in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000.
Indeed, one of the lower court’s omissions was its failure to ascertain by
preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still an estate
to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not such a
determination.
WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court's order granting the administratrix's motion for
the delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other order approving
the amended inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on the
ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c) this case is remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down
in this decision.
(Good to know lang)
As to the approval of the inventory:
Probate court retains jurisdiction to approve inventory of assets of decedent even if
presented after 3-month period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court.—The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84)
of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper
Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent’s estate and retains
that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed
after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to
approve it. However, an administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the inventory
may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2. Rule 82, Rules of Court).
As to prescription among co-heirs:
Generally, prescription does not run among co-heirs.—Generally prescription does
not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly or implied recognizes the
coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the moment that a coheir claims
absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies the
others any share thereto, the question involved is no longer one of partition but
that of ownership.
48. TAN v. BENOLIRAO
G.R. No.153820, October 16, 2009
Pahudpod
TOPIC: Sec. 4 Rule 74 of ROC
DOCTRINE:
Section 4, Rule 74 expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful
participation in the real estate notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate and
to issue execution thereon. All this implies that, when within the amendatory
period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the heirs has
the authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate
proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so.
FACTS:
 Respondents are owners of subject property, sold it to Petitioner under a
Contract to Sell
 Under the provisions of Contract, petitioner is to pay 200k down-payment
and would pay the remaining balance within the agreed period.
 Meanwhile, one of the respondents died- his estate was settled by his heirs
through an extrajudicial settlement. By virtue of said settlement a new TCT
over the property was issued with a Section 4, Rule 74, viz:
“any liability to credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other
persons having right to the property, for a period of two (2)
years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew,
Romano and Dion, all surnamed Benolirao”
 Petitioner failed to pay the remaining balance within the agreed period,
which prompted the respondents to send him a demand letter.
 Tan, in blatant refusal of the respondents’ demands, wrote a letter stating
that the annotation constituted an encumbrance on the property hence he
can no longer be required to pay the purchase price considering that
respondents would no longer deliver a clean title to him.
ISSUE/S:
WON the questioned annotation constituted an encumbrance that justifies the
return of the down-payment.
HELD:
YES, the annotation placed on the new TCT constituted an encumbrance on the
subject property.

An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the
distribution and partition of a decedents real properties to warn third persons on
the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The
annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property in
favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property
despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be
subject to the rights of excluded parties. The cancellation of the sale would be the
logical consequence where: (a) the annotation clearly appears on the title, warning
all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with the rights of heirs; and
(c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the two-year
period provided by law.
In this case, By the time Tans obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price
arose on May 21, 1993 (on account of the extensions granted by the respondents),
a new certificate of title covering the property had already been issued on March
26, 1993, which contained the encumbrance on the property; the encumbrance
would remain so attached until the expiration of the two-year period. Clearly, at
this time, the vendors could no longer compel Tan to pay the balance of the
purchase since considering they themselves could not fulfill their obligation to
transfer a clean title over the property to Tan.
GRANTED, return 200k down-payment.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 25
49. PEDROSA v. CA
G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001
J. QUISIMBING
Pobe
TOPIC: Sec. 4. - Remedies of heirs/persons deprived of lawful participation in the
estate; 2-year lien.
DOCTRINE:
Lien does not apply to one “who has not participated therein [the
extrajudicial partition] or had no notice thereof.
FACTS:
 On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de
Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal
adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa which was
later on granted.
 On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate,
adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
 Private respondents then filed an action to annul the adoption of
petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein
respondent Rosalina as defendants.
 CFI: denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption.
Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals.
 While the said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the
estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar.
 Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar
had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
 The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen
parcels of land. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen,
Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina.
 Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition,
respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.
 On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the
adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss.
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  CA: dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of
petitioner.
 Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their
share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying
that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood
relatives.
 Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said
complaint was filed on January 28, 1987.
 Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between
the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed.
 RTC: dismissed the complaint.
 CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition had already prescribed
 A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent
and vicious.
 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions
of Article 1003 of the Civil Code.
 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not
aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an action to annul
the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid
since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time
they executed the deed of partition.
 The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26)
years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to
prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents.
 The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is
patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith
with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

HELD: NO. The complaint for annulment has not prescribed

 Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a TWO (2) year prescriptive period

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1[19] of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,
i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
 Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial
partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
 The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in
Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with
the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
 Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28,
1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action
against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
 The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud.

50. BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP v. CA and FELISA SINOPERA
G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958
J. Labrador
Quiroz
TOPIC: How jurisdiction is acquired in estate proceedings
DOCTRINE:
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74 , is applicable when this 2 concurrent
conditions are met:
(1) Applies only to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition;
(2) When the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians
FACTS:
 Teodoro Tolete died intestate. He left four parcels of land in San Manuel,
Pangasinan.
 He left as heirs his widow Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
nieces who are children of his deceased brothers and sisters.
 Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia executed an affidavit stating that
the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children, no ascendants, no
acknowledged natural children, and no other relative neither except his
widow, Leoncia de Leon herself, who was the legitimate wife of the
deceased.
 ^This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
 On the same day, Leoncia executed a deed of sale of all the parcels of land
in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
 Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup
for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan.
 Subsequently, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration
of the estate of Teodoro Tolete.
 Having secured her appointment as administratrix, Felisa brought a
complaint against Sampilo and Salacup in the CFI.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 27
 Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. The said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering
the subject lands.
 The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to
execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired
no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo
acquired any right to the said properties.
 CFI: Rendered judgment in favor of Felisa Sinopera, declaring that:
a. Leoncia’s affidavit, the deed of sale to Sampilo, and the deed of sale to
Salacup are all null and void;
b. Felisa as owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in
question; and
c. The usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties
terminated.
 CA: Modified the judgement. Ruled that:
a. The annulment of the affidavit of adjudication was correct;
b. But the annulment of the deeds of sale insofar as one-half of the
properties conveyed is concerned AND in adjudicating one-half of the
same to the heirs of the deceased is premature;
c. Therefore, the deeds of sale are null and void only insofar as the
properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to
Leoncia de Leon.
 Sampilo and Salacup appealed to the SC. Their main contention was that
Felisa Sinopera’s right of action as administratix has prescribed and lapsed
because it was not brought within the prescriptive period of 2 years as
provided in Secs. 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the RoC.
ISSUE/S:
WON Felisa Sinopera’s right of action has prescribed and lapsed. NO.
HELD:
 Section 1 of Rule 74 provides: it is required that if there are two or more
heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement.
 Section 4 of Rule 74’s title "distributees and estate" indicates the persons
to answer for any rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement.
 However, there is no express mention of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or
knowledge thereof.
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  There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of
the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear
that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right
or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand
their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
 But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of
the death of the decedent or of the settlement, it is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of
two years.
 ^To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not
take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision
to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process
of law.
 The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement,
or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic
be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third
persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of
the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such
effect is made, either directly or by implication.
 The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of 2 years from
such extrajudicial partition, is applicable when this 2 concurrent
conditions are met:
(1) Applies only to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition;
(2) When the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
 Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it
in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
51. HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY
vs. HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC
G.R. No. 124320 | 1999-03-02
PURISIMA, J.:
Ramos
TOPIC: When Judicial Administration is Necessary
DOCTRINE:
The determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property.
FACTS:
 Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and
Lot No. 1132 in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
o executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay.
o discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled
in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development
Corporation ("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT")
225254 and 225255.
o filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; As Alternative
Reconveyance of Realty.
 Private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds –
o that the complaint failed to state a cause of action,
o that plaintiffs did not have a right of action,
o that they have not established their status as heirs,
o that the land being claimed is different from that of the defendants, and
o that plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches.
 The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court, holding that
petitioners "have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays - that
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."
 It is petitioners' submission that the respondent court should have proceeded
with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same
case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case
could proceed. - YES

HELD:
The determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.
The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not
in an independent civil action.
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 29
52. FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH
ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ,
respondents
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008
PUNO, C.J
Saliva
TOPIC: When Judicial Administration is necessary – The General Rule
DOCTRINE: (nothing about the ruling that tackles the designated topic.)
FACTS:
 The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land with an aggregate
area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu According to
petitioners Faustino Reyes et al, they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes
who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera (part of
spouses Cabrera)
 Petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of
Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the
subject parcel of land.
 The petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and
Confirmation) over the same property. (new TCTs were issued)
 Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his
minor daughter Deborah Ann, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest
Spouses Cabrera owned 1/2! pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of
land .
 That Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters – Graciana, who
died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and
mother of respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights
and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land.
 Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the
sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land.
 Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann
by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners Peter and
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 Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m to Spouses Fernandez also their co- the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their
respondents in the case at bar. claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject
 After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show
subject parcel of land. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is
them from doing so (affidavits, extra-judicial settlement with sale of a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties
estates and certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners) in interest.
 Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the DISPOSITIVE PORTION / RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the decision of the
“repartition and resubdivision” of the subject property. Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
 The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the No costs. SO ORDERED.
ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and
foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they cannot
inorder to demand the partition of the real property without first being
declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action,
as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for
the purpose the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the
trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case. Thus, this appeal

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary
civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of
Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new
transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents?
(YES!)

HELD: this Court finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and
Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the
"Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates
of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being
asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they
claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as
stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.

Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.
 [ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 31

53. Ypon v. Ricaforte

G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013 54. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA v. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACIOM
Perlas-Bernabe G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006
Santos J. Puno
Martinez
TOPIC: When Judicial Administration is necessary; General Rule
Repeat case – see no. 44
DOCTRINE:
The rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.

FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance 55. ISABEL PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL, JR. v. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
against Gaudioso BELTRAN
 They allege that Magdaleno died intestate and childless G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005
 Gaudioso, the respondent, claimed to be the sole heir of Magdaleno and Carpio Morales, J.
executed an affidavit of self-adjudication which caused the cancellation of Sumanga
the certificates of title in question
 RTC: Petitioner failed to state the cause of action against Gaudioso TOPIC: When Judicial Administration is Necessary; The Exceptions
 Directly appealed before the SC
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE/S: Section 2, Rule 74. “xxx if there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.”
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper. (exception to the general rule)

HELD:
 YES, dismissal by the RTC was proper
 As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs
sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title
and reconveyance, from granting the same.
PETITION IS DENIED
FACTS:
 Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.) contracted two marriages.
 The first marriage is with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (April 1950), the herein respondent, and
the second marriage is with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a
boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (Sept. 1949), the petitioners herein.
 By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights
executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father, a
parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of “Jose Q.
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.

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 Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
 In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of
land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila
Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
 In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in her
name, alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and
accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in
their (petitioner’s) name.
 A Pre-Trial Order was issued, citing the following issues to be resolved, to
wit:
o Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal Sr., is valid
o Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila
P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.
o Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can
still be contested by plaintiffs.
o Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.
 After trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial
order, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right as putative heirs had
not been established before a probate court.
 Citing the case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the Supreme
Court in this case ruled that the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding, not an ordinary
civil action.
 Thus, the court, not being a probate court, is without jurisdiction to rule
on plaintiff’s cause to establish their status and right herein.
 On appeal to CA, the petitioners cite the case of Carino vs. Carino. In this
case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case.
 However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court held
that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two marriages,
whereas in the instant case, the main issue is the annulment of title to
property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON the petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their
status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s
Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name – NO
HELD:
 In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in
Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
to name an executor therein.
 Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.
 A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of a deceased.
 It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject
of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

 In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by
the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during
the pre-trial. No costs. SO ORDERED.
[ SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | ATTY. TANTUICO ] 33
56. HEIRS OF GABATAN
G.R. 150206, March 13, 2009
Justice De Castro
Zalameda
TOPIC: Exceptions- When Judicial Administration is necessary
DOCTRINE:
To prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment.
FACTS:
• The respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in
Cagayan de Oro City which she inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the only
child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
• Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, his land was
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan,
for administration.
• It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the
same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the
subject property.
• Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter
of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. They further contend that Juan Gabatan died single in
1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two
sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa.
• These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50)
years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the
whole world including respondent.
• October 20, 1995 = the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent
• CA affirmed such decision declaring that respondent’s claim of filiation
with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial.
The proof was a Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration
which was signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan
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Gabatan. Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;
HELD:
No.
 Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record
of birth appearing the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment – in the absence of these, any proof that the child enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child – only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is the anyone allowed to present
other porrof admissible under the Rules of Court of the proof of paternity
and filiation
 The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
 To prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our
laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented
proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the
respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of
Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
 However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which
would have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
 Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses but none of these
witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to
Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They
were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth.
These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or
heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.
 Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and
the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale presented
by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the
heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan.
 However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its
contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously
and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a mere
photocopy and not being properly authenticated. After a close scrutiny of
the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Court cannot uphold
the admissibility of the same.
 Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and
there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would
be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public
record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be
established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del
Rosario, we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A
party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
 In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima
Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale)
plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of
the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public
office.
57. REBUSQUILLO v. GUALVEZ
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
Velasco, Jr J
Dimla
Repeat case see no. 41