RAMON D. VILLANUEVA JR.

JD-1B

HURTADO v CALIFORNIA 110 US 516

Facts of the case

The State of California tried and convicted Hurtado on an information for murder. An information is a written set of accusations made
by a prosecutor. Hurtado maintained that California denied him an indictment by a grand jury. A grand jury indictment is based on
majority vote of the grand jurors on presentation by the prosecutor.

Question
Does a state criminal proceeding based on an information rather than a grand jury indictment violate the 14th Amendment's due
process clause?

Conclusion
No, this was not a violation of due process. Any legal proceeding that protects liberty and justice is due process. The majority
opinion, authored by Matthews, reasoned that the Constitution cannot be locked into static conceptions bound by time and place.
The Court also took the position that nothing in the Constitution is superfluous. Since the Fifth Amendment contains both a
guarantee of grand jury proceedings and a guarantee of due process, the latter cannot embrace the former.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the
Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or
occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for
other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally
to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is
regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory
but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the
people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not
obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide
the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take
up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of
the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department
or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people
who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
Ople vs. Torres

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No.
308 or the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System issued
by President Fidel V. Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights
of the citizens of privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:

Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification

with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:

"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights

"Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law."
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged."

"Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of
A.O. No. 308.

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No.
308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over
what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void for
being unconstitutional.
 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R No. 148560 November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted under an Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of
the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is
the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:
1) Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2) Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3) Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.

Held:
In the question whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional. The court held that it is not, As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely
tracks the language of law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which the
petitioner is alleged to have committed. The court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous
that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution first if it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid and secondly when, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In the
second issue under Sec. 4 of Rule of Evidence it states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder,
it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In
a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The court answered that Plunder
as defined in RA 7080 is to be considered as malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
“willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. The application
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum
in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise
known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 David vs Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, On the same day, the President issued G.
O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed against the
respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement
encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a
“chilling effect” to the citizens.

Issue: 1.Whether PP 107 is void because of its “overbreadth”

2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

Held: No. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the
US Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment” (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[105] it was held:
It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when
‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at
the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive – falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct .”[106] Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and
only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”[107] The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional
rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be
heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court.[108] A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating
its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its
face,” not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is
the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,[109] it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,…ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
A facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness is likewise unwarranted.

Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ”[110] It
is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on
their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP
1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
2. The Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration
does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ong vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 126858 Sept. 16, 2005 Presumption of Innocence, Forfeiture
Proceedings
NOVEMBER 16, 2017

FACTS:

Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then
Commissioner of the BIR, has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income.

Ong submitted an explanation and analysis of fund sourcing, reporting his net worth covering the calendar
years 1989 to 1991 and showing his sources and uses of funds, the sources of the increase in his net worth and
his net worth as of December 13, 1991.

Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1988-1990,
income tax return for 1988, bank certificate showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Bank, certificate from
SGV & Co. showing that he received retirement benefits from the latter, a document entitled
Acknowledgement of Trust showing that he acquired one of the questioned assets for his brother-in-law, and
other documents explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned assets.

ISSUE:

Does the presumption of innocence apply to forfeiture proceedings?

RULING:

No. The presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to criminal prosecutions and not to
forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA 1379
because statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular inference follows from the proof of a
particular fact, one fact becoming prima facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid, the effect of the
presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof upon the adverse party.

The presumption of innocence clause is not violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that property acquired
by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to establish
a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused.
TANADA VS. TUVERA 146 S 446
Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number
of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court
decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered
the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general
force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must
be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless
otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws.


 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996

Facts:

The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government owned and controlled corporation issued
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which application to the PITC for importation from the
People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of the
Philippine Products to China carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer
from PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of importation from PRC being applied for, or simply at one-to
one ratio.

Two domestic corporations, Remington and Firestone, both applied for authority to import from PROC, which
were granted, but later on were withheld for failure to comply with the require one to one ratio of import and
export.

They filed a complaint asserting that the administrative order is unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that the order
was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. PITC elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:

The order was not valid.

The PITC is a line agency of the Department of Trade and Industry which was the primary coordinative,
promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the country’s trade. The PITC as an integral
part of the DTI was given the task of the implementing the departments’ program. It has the authority to issue
the questioned order and may legally exercise that authority under the supervision of the DTI. The grant t
quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies are not unconstitutional. It has become necessary to create
more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its activities. Because hey specializes in the field
assigned to them, they can deal and dispatch problems with more expertise than the legislature or the courts
of justice.

In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue the Administrative Orders as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation; however, it does not imply that the order was valid. First, it was never published, thus it
is not effective. Second, the same is inconsistent with the declared policy of the government to then effect that
it will develop and strengthen trade relations with the PROC. Since the order was a unnecessary barrier to
trade, the same is not a valid exercise of its authority.
Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982]

Second Division, Aquino (J); 4 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical Research Department) became vacant when the
incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-in-rank to the vacant position, both holding positions of
Scientist Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy, UP), and MS Pharmacy
(1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered
medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years.
On the other hand, Dr. Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has served for
21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the position.
Dr. Anzaldo protested against such recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee found such protest to
be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST Commissioner, however, did not resolve the issue. The position
was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the position
effective 4 January 1978, after thorough study and screening of the qualifications of both doctors and upon
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes). The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment. Dr.
Venzon appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo
Clave, who was concurrently the Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who
reiterated Dr. Afable’s decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose
A. Melo recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in conflict
with the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The Resolution was made
in pursuance to Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6 October 1975), which provides that
"before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5
January 1980, after denial of her motion for the reconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of
the President of the Philippines. Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980 revoked Dr.
Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave
himself and Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's protest.
In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for
reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special civil action of certiorari.

Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the recommendation of the Presidential Executive
Assistant, who is himself, in the appointment of Dr. Venzon.

Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave implemented the 23 August Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 12 )

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the
appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service
Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring
with himself . It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales
Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil
Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the
person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

Taft (CJ):

Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill,
charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the
mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of
unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the
court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that
the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of
Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme
Court refused Tumey's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a
petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the appellate court be
reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the
reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US
Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly
directed.

Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of
the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly
violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the
person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct
personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his
behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the
result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service
only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common
law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that
they may be properly ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of
receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not
fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that
the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the
mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant
here. The statutes were drawn to

Narratives (Berne Guerrero) stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to
organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The
inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations.
The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to
questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment
on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias,
or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the
right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the
disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of
his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
75 People v. CA [GR 118882, 26 September 1996]

Resolution of Third Division, Melo (J); 4 concur

Facts: The are no preliminary facts provided regarding CA-GR SP No. 31733, "People vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al." (in
Court of Appeals), Criminal Case 93-01-38, "People vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al.," and Criminal Case 93-01-39, "People of the
Philippines vs. Jane C. Go" (both in RTC branch presided by Judge Pedro Espina, Branch 7, RTC, 8th Judicial Region:
Tacloban) in the present resolution; except the fact that Jane Go is the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review with urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 31733 in so
far as it denied People’s prayer for the inhibition of Judge Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, and
enjoining the judge from conducting further proceedings in such criminal cases, before the Supreme Court. On 3 April
1995, the Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and Roger Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go
to comment within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro S.
Espina from taking further action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until further orders from the Court. Reyes,
Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and Go failed to file their respective comments within the reglementary period, nor within the
second deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that sanction relating to delay in the submission of the
comments may not amount to much, and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-
39, the Court resolved to dispense with the latter's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.

Issue: Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different special civil proceeding is enough basis to
render the Judge to be partial or bias in the present criminal case.

Held: One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an
impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant,
including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. The Judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent
law. Herein, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as
to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Special Civil Action 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office
level against Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor
of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. It would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.