Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa(1991)

Bidin, J.

FACTS:
 Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for the Board
of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration (formerly the CID) and
Board of Special Inquiry to set aside two orders issued by different
judges of RTCs and to enjoin public respondent judges from acting on
the ff. civil cases:
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila.Judge dela Rosa
issued an order that denied the Motion to Dismiss and restrained
petitioners from commencing or continuing with any proceedings
that will lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian
o 2nd case: filed by Gatchalian’s wife and minor children in the RTC
of Valenzuela. Judge Capulong issued an that enjoined petitioners
from proceeding with the deportation charges against Gatchalian
 July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children with his wife Chu Gim
Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (William’s father), Elena, and Benjamin.
 June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from
Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson Gatchalian with
Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram from the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs.
 July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his
companions as Filipino Citizens.
 July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry reversed the decision of the latter and
ordered the exclusion of respondent Gatchalian
o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivosustained the validity of said
order.
 1973:Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a
motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. Acting
Commissioner Nituda later issued an order recalling the warrant of
arrest against Gatchalian.
 1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that
Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged
with violation of the Immigration act. The SOJ indorsed the
recommendation and a mission order was issued by Commissioner
Domingo of the CID ordering the arrest of Gatchalian.
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in
the case at bar.
Issue:
WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondent’s
alienage

Held:
NO.
 The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (William’s uncle).
Moreover, the cases did not categorically make any statement that
William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen. Generally, res judicata does not
apply to questions of citizenship except in the following case (stated in
Burca v Republic):
o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
 Such elements are not present in the case at bar.

G.R. No. L-18069

May 26, 1962ALFONSO DY CUENCO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and
THE HONORABLE, THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondents-
appellants.

Facts:

It appears that on May 19, 1951, a counsel for petitioner Alfonso Dy Cuenco
wrote to the Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon the ground that he
had exercised the right to elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV,
section I(4) of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said election
appears in an affidavit dated May 15, 1951, stating, among other things, that
petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his parents
are "Benito Dy Cuenco, Chinese (now deceased)" and "Julita Duyapit, Filipina,
a native of Surigao, Philippines"; that he is "married to Rosalinda Villanueva,
a Filipino," by whom he has four (4) legitimate children; that he renounces all
allegiance to the Republic of China; that he recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines. On the same date, petitioner,
likewise, took the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of
Justice who, on June 18, 1957, rendered an opinion (No. 129) holding that the
alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been sufficiently
established, that said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein
was legally ineffectual and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner sought a rehearing and a reconsideration of said opinion. In the
course of said rehearing he tried to establish that his delay in electing
Philippine citizenship was due to the belief that he was a citizen of the
Philippines. Once again, the Commissioner of Immigration referred the
matter to the Secretary of Justice, who denied the petition for
reconsideration on January 27, 1959.

Issue:

Whether or not is it right to compel them to recognize as valid said election

of Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of
registration

Held:

Pursuant to this provision, two (2) conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship therein mentioned may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen
of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made "upon reaching the
age of majority."

In the case at bar, the only evidence on the political status of petitioner's
mother, Julita Duyapat, consists of a certificate of baptism, stating that Julita
Gonzaga was born in General Luna, Surigao, on July 30, 1881, and that her
parents were Marcelino Duyapat and Consolacion Gonzaga and a picture
showing that she has the features of a Filipina and is attired in the typical
dress of a Filipina. Considering that the writ of mandamus will issue, not to
control the exercise of judgment in the construction of a law and the
application of the facts thereto (Policarpio vs. Veterans Board, 52 Off. Gaz.,
6178; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Autholty, 51 Phil. 796), but merely to exact
compliance with a clear legal duty resulting from an office trust or station
(Viuda e Hijos de C. Zamora vs. Wright, 53 Phil. 613; Ng Gioc Lin vs.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 47 Off. Gaz., 5112), we are not prepared to hold
that the Secretary of Justice erred in finding that said proof is insufficient to
establish that petitioner's mother was a citizen of the Philippines.

It should be noted, however, that he joined a unit of Chinese volunteers and

that he registered himself in the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese.
Moreover, it appears that, as early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew that he
had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be a citizen of the Philippines,
and yet he did not do so until four (4) years later, or in May 1951. The
reasons given by him for such delay were his alleged financial difficulties and
the illness of members of his family. We agree with the Secretary of Justice
that such explanation is patently insufficient to excuse said delay or to
warrant extension of the period to elect Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another

one shall be entered dismissing the petition, with costs against petitioner. It
is so ordered.

Doctrine of Implied Election

There can be acquisition of citizenship under the doctrine of implied
election by having exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age.
That was a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he
participated in elections and campaigned for certain candidates. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine Citizenship.25Fruit
of Poisonous Tree Doctrine Art. III, Sec. 3 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “Sec. 3 (2) Any evidenceobtained in violation of this or the
preceding section (Sec 2) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.”This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
“the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction 23Garcia
vs Executive Secretary, 583 SCRA 119 24CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9
25In Re: Florencio Mallari, 59 SCRA 45

In Re: Mallare A.M. No. 533 September 12 1974

FACTS:
On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, this Courtordered the
investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio Mallare, who wasadmitted to the Philippine
Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpose of determining whetherhis name should be stricken from
the roll of persons authorized to practice law in thePhilippines. After an investigation conducted by
this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, adecision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968,
holding that by preponderance ofevidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban
Mallare, was a Chineseup to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is
likewise aChinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared
excludedfrom the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered
toreturn to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him. Respondent moved
forreconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court. Respondent petitionedthe Court
for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newlydiscovered
evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decision previouslypromulgated. The Court
Resolved to set aside the decision of April 29, 1968 and to grantthe re-opening and new trial
prayed for. Respondent's petition is premised upon threebasic arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's
father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural sonof Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b)
Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipinomother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine
citizenship; and (c) respondent, alegitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is a Filipino citizen and is hereby granted to continue hispractice of law?
RESOLUTION:
Yes. The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person,birth and
residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in theirdeclaration that Ana Mallare
is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, andthat Esteban, her son, was reputedly
born out of wedlock. Such declarations constituteadmissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy
of Esteban Mallare. And even assuming
arguendo
that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien,Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age, constitutes a positiveact of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare wasa registered voter and that as early as 1925 Esteban was
already participating in theelections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are
sufficient to show hispreference for Philippine citizenship. Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the
presentationof a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required
to exercise the option toelect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1,
subsection 4, ArticleIV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana
Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,and no other act would be necessary to confer on
him all the rights and privileges attachedto Philippine citizenship. Neither could any act taken on
the erroneous belief that he is anon-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled

G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014 - DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act

(C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law.Aside from his presentation of
all other requirements, petitioner presented, as witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr.
Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and Juan Go.

Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted

on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test.Dr.
Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioner’s medical examination
results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, said that he had
known petitioner since childhood through his association with the family in
times of celebration. Teresita described him as a peace-loving person who
participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly,
Juan, a businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner
personally.

The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling
that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. But the CA
reversed and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Go’s petition for naturalization should be granted.

Ruling:No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the

application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473.
In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two
(2) character witnesses to support his allegations.

In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines,the Court listed the requirements for

character witnesses, namely:

1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are “credible persons”;
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become
a citizen of the Philippines; and
8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of the
Naturalization Law.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s
witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a
naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence
proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the words of the CA,
“he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the community,
known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and
that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the
worthiness of petitioner.”

Furthermore, the background checks done on petitioner yielded negative

results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household.
In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI
agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino
customs, traditions and ideals.

Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to state his former residence

in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this
omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case.
Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed without prejudice.

Legal Residence vs Actual residence

Legal Residence or Domicile:

‘the country that a person treats as their permanent home, or lives in and
has a substantial connection with.’ Domicile is the legal residence of a
person.
Required:
The place where a person has a fixed residence and pays taxes for this
permanent home is called his domicile
A person’s country of domicile remains his domicile for life whether or not he
lives in that country.
domicile remains his place of birth, which is decided at the time of his birth

Actual residence or Residence:

simply the place where a person is living at present. The place where a
person actually lives is his residence, but it may or may not be his domicile.
Knowing your domicile is important if you are an expatriate for taxation and
inheritance purposes, as laws in these areas become applicable, depending
upon your domicile.
Required:
a place one lives
place where he is actually living is his residence

G.R. No. L-16013 March 30, 1963

JUSTO TAN alias LI SUI, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, opponent-appellant.

Facts:
The only ground relied upon by the Government is that Justo Tan alias Li Sui,
not having resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years,
was not exempt from filing a declaration of intention, and not having filed it,
his petition for naturalization should be denied.
The Government contends that the continuous residence of thirty years in
the Philippines to exempt an applicant for naturalization from filing a
declaration of intention means actual or physical presence in the Philippines
for said length of time and that deducting appellee's stay in Amoy, China,
from 1941 to 1948 or eight years, from the period from 12 August 1926, the
date when he was born, to 24 February 1958, the date when the petition was
filed, the total number of years he had resided in the Philippines is less than
30 years and for that reason he is not entitled to be exempt from filing a
declaration of intention one year before the filing in court of his petition for
naturalization. On the other hand, the appellee maintains otherwise, because
from 1941 to 1948 he was only on vacation in China and had the intention to
return to the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Justo Tan alias Li Sui be granted a petition to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization
Held:
In Dy vs. Republic of the Philippines, 48 Off. Gaz. 4813, this Court held that
the "provision of Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 535, exempting those 'who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before
filing their application' from submitting their declaration of intention as
required by Section 5 of the law,"... contemplates actual and substantial
residence within the Philippines, not legal residence alone, because only by
actual and substantial residence may said qualification be acquired by an
applicant."
The Government contends that the continuous residence of thirty years in
the Philippines to exempt an applicant for naturalization from filing a
declaration of intention means actual or physical presence in the Philippines
for said length of time and that deducting appellee's stay in Amoy, China,
from 1941 to 1948 or eight years, from the period from 12 August 1926, the
date when he was born, to 24 February 1958, the date when the petition was
filed, the total number of years he had resided in the Philippines is less than
30 years and for that reason he is not entitled to be exempt from filing a
declaration of intention one year before the filing in court of his petition for
naturalization. On the other hand, the appellee maintains otherwise, because
from 1941 to 1948 he was only on vacation in China and had the intention to
return to the Philippines.
The decree appealed from is reversed and the petition for naturalization
denied, with costs against the appellee.

Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:

a. naturalization in a foreign country

b. express renunciation of citizenship
c. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country; annulment of Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of finding that his
marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship; Philippine citizenship may be acquired by direct act of Congress;
by naturalization or by repatriation.
 JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also
suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His
motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that
they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time
required comments from the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary
to this basic question.

HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that
is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is
not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to
discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a
foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization
was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.