8. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R.

Nos.213163-78, 15 March 2016

Facts: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy
(Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds
sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the
total amount of P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a
Complaint for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, (NBI
Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field
Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, (FIO Complaint).

On March 28, 2014, OMB issued a 144-joint resolution finding probable cause against petitioners 1
count of Plunder and 15 counts of violation of Ra 3019.

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying, among others, the MR filed by
petitioners. This led to the filing of the 4 petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212593-94,
G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, and G.R. Nos. 213475-76, commonly assailing the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-13-0318 and
OMB-C-C-13-0396.

Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan, charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder; and Reyes,
Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third Division.

On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case, "along with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the
accused," stating that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman
and the supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused.

On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against them, and several
others, and consequently, setting their arraignment. The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the MR of
the judicial finding of probable cause against them and requested that their arraignment be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the
Sandiganbayan acted on their MR through the latter's Resolution dated November 14, 2014, declaring
that the presence of probable cause against them had already been settled in its previous resolutions.
Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing
the September 29, 2014 and November 14, 2014 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue/s: WON there is a grave abuse of discretion in judicially determining the existence of probable
cause?
Held: NO. There is no grave of discretion in judicially determining the existence of probable cause.

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case
to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. As discussed in
the case of People vs Castillo,

There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment
of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.