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How Emerging Forms of

Capitalism Are Changing


the Global Economic Order
C h r is t o p he r A . M c N a l l y

I S S U E S

Analysis from the East-West Center


No. 107
S umma r y The US model of free-market capitalism has been a dominant
February 2013
force in the post-communist world order, setting the agenda for economic
The East-West Center promotes better rela-
tions and understanding among the people governance and development. That supremacy, however, was severely tarnished
and nations of the United States, Asia, and the
Pacific through cooperative study, research, by the 2008 global financial crisis, increasing the potential for new challenges
and dialogue. Established by the US Congress
in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for from alternative economic models. Now, models of capitalism espousing more
information and analysis on critical issues of
common concern, bringing people together to state involvement as practiced in Brazil, Russia, India, and, especially, in China
exchange views, build expertise, and develop
policy options. The Center is an independent, are contenders on the political economic landscape of the world. They are
public, nonprofit organization with funding from
the US government, and additional support engineering rapid growth by adapting core tenets of the free-market capitalist
provided by private agencies, individuals,
foundations, corporations, and governments model and embracing globalism. At the same time, they maintain state owner-
in the region.

Papers in the AsiaPacific Issues series feature


ship of key enterprises and varying degrees of state control over the financial
topics of broad interest and significant impact
relevant to current and emerging policy debates.
sector. While these practices certainly challenge the free-market status quo, the
The views expressed are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Center.
mentality that views free-market vs. state-controlled capitalism as a zero-sum

game appears unrealistic. Instead, a productive course would be to view these

new systems as viable ways to organize capitalist production and market institu-

tions, triggering over time measured shifts in the global policy consensus.
2
Analysis from the East-West Center

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of the 1980s. Already some argue that the Washington
2008, the future of the world economic order does Consensus is rapidly fading. For example, the Nobel
not seem as clear as it once did. The Cold War was Laureate in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, contends that
in essence a competition between capitalism and the Washington Consensus and its underlying ideol-
communism. The defeat of communism seemingly ogy of market fundamentalism are “dead.”2 Others,
established the supremacy of free-market capitalism. though, are less convinced.
Today, however, a new dynamic is playing out—this The political economist Colin Crouch insinuates
Today a new time between different models of capitalism. that declaring the death of neoliberalism is premature,
dynamic is playing Up until fairly recently, free-market capitalism since the neoliberal order relies on the power and per-
out between remained dominant in setting the agenda for global sistence of large multinational corporations domiciled
different models economic governance and development. This model in advanced economies. Even in the aftermath of the
of capitalism holds that markets should be responsible for the allo- global financial crisis of 2008, these corporations have
cation of all goods, services, labor, and finance, with sustained their deep influence over governments and
the state taking a highly limited role in economic the global political economic order.3
governance. Although also based on a market system, In answering the question of whether the neolib-
the models of capitalism prevalent in continental eral global economic order is actually in decline or
Northern Europe and Japan have been seen as tra- not, three distinct questions must be analyzed: First,
ditionally distinct from the neoliberal model. They is there a politico-economic system that actually chal-
are based on governing labor and capital markets not lenges the neoliberal model at present? Second, if so,
only by market-based means, but also with the aid of what is this system? And, finally, what is the exact
central coordination among the interests of capital, nature and logic of how this rival system is challeng-
the state, and, in Europe, labor. ing the neoliberal global economic order?
More recently, a third model of capitalism has The analysis concludes that, yes, there are at
come to the fore. Espousing a more state-centric present rival politico-economic systems. Moreover,
form of development in emerging market economies, refurbished forms of state capitalism are, indeed, the
especially the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, most likely challengers to the Washington Consensus.
China, and South Africa (together known as BRICS), However, refurbished state capitalisms differ from
the state here takes an activist role in managing eco- earlier forms of state capitalism in that they have
nomic development, including the employment of adapted many aspects of the neoliberal model and
industrial policy, financial and regulatory tools to fos- deeply integrated with the global economic system.
ter industrial catch-up, and technological upgrading. China’s example is used to illustrate how such new
These models are referred to as new forms of state forms of state capitalism are pragmatic in nature. The
capitalism or refurbished state capitalisms. emergence of refurbished state capitalisms is therefore
Over the past thirty years, free-market capitalism producing a dynamic mix of mutual dependence and
or the neoliberal model of capitalism profoundly competition with the still dominant neoliberal model
influenced the agenda for governance and reforms of capitalism.
in developing countries. Known in the international To emphasize, the nature and logic that under-
arena as the Washington Consensus, due to its em- lie how refurbished state capitalisms challenge the
brace by the World Bank, International Monetary neoliberal global economic order are fundamentally
Fund, and other institutions promoting economic different from those underlying the Soviet challenge
reforms, many claimed that this model would be during the Cold War. The competition between new
triumphant in bringing development and prosper- forms of state capitalism and neoliberal free-market
ity to all.1 Confidence in this consensus was badly capitalism is not zero-sum. Practitioners of refur-
shaken, if not shattered, by the financial collapse bished state capitalisms own immense amounts of
of 2008. Today, the future of the world economic global financial assets and are dependent on open-
order seems more uncertain than at any time since market access to advanced economies for their
3
Analysis from the East-West Center

industrialization and technological upgrading. In neoliberal model might emanate from the refurbished
this sense, refurbished state capitalisms represent state capitalisms of emerging market economies,
an “in-system” challenge. Their emergence does not especially from China, which seems to be producing
imply that the neoliberal global economic order will a truly monumental alternate model of capitalism.
become unhinged, but rather that the gradual and
measured shift in the global consensus that is on-
Refurbished State Capitalisms
going will continue.
State capitalist systems have been conceived of in
many different ways. The concept has been associ-
Global Convergence, Capitalist Variation
ated with a range of political economic frameworks,
The conception that there are fundamentally different ranging from communism, Stalinism, and socialism
models of capitalist development dates back at least to neo-corporatism, mercantilism, and fascism.
to the 1960s, later giving rise to comparative capitalism Generally, state capitalism denotes a political econ-
approaches, especially the “Varieties of Capitalism” omy in which the state directs and controls key pro-
framework.4 These approaches hold that, despite ductive forces in an economy, yet employs capitalist
convergent pressures emanating from globalization, practices such as market competitive pressures, stock
fundamental differences can be found among nation- market listings, and material incentives for corporate
al (and local) capitalist institutions. There is a duality executives. Neoliberal free-market principles contrast
shaping the global capitalist system in that it can most visibly with state capitalist practices. It must
impose considerable constraints and influences on be noted that twenty-first-century state capitalism
individual political economies, yet it is also populated is not derived from socialist central planning, but,
by political economies with substantially different rather, represents a form of state-coordinated capital-
historical legacies and institutional arrangements. ism particular to each government that practices it.
This duality, moreover, means that diverse formations Refurbished state capitalisms, as a result, encompass
of capitalism on the national and regional level have a rather diverse range of capitalist systems.
to be seen as codependent on the global level.5 Despite this variety, the central feature of refur-
The comparative capitalisms literature makes bished state capitalisms is that the state dominates
The state
clear that there are, indeed, rival political economic the economy not due to some ideological principle,
dominates the systems globally. This has become even more appar- but for purely practical political gain. These systems,
economy not ent with the demise of communism. As capitalism’s therefore, do not imply a purely state-owned economy.
for ideological ideological competitor faltered, a previously neglected Refurbished state capitalisms can incorporate large,
principle but problem was brought to the fore: the divergence privately owned productive forces, although the state
and potential competition among capitalist political tends to exert considerable control over the allocation
for practical
economies themselves. There are varieties of capital- of credit and investment that affects the private sector.
political gain ism, and these shape innovative performance, the And all of these models include a large swath of state
nature of welfare systems, and social equity, as well ownership in industry, finance, and other key sectors.
as economic governance philosophies. In contrast to earlier forms of state capitalism,
Several generic varieties have been distinguished, however, refurbished state capitalisms are not tradi-
especially the neoliberal free-market model, as in the tional mercantilists relying on a closed economy. All
United States and Great Britain, and models of coordi- the leading practitioners of this model today, includ-
nated capitalism, as in Germany and Japan.6 Advanced ing China, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
industrial economies espouse different models of and India, are deeply enmeshed in the international
capitalism. And while coordinated models of capital- trading system and practice different degrees of open
ism have challenged the neoliberal model over the past trading and investment relations.
three decades, none of these challenges was fundamen- Given the differing fundamental views regarding
tal. Rather, a true challenge to the Anglo-American markets, the role of the state, and the ultimate goals
4
Analysis from the East-West Center

of economic governance, some argue that refurbished tools, state ownership, directed finance, and a host of
state capitalisms are likely to generate a formidable industrial policy approaches. China exemplifies this
challenge to the neoliberal global economic order led new breed of refurbished state capitalism in the early
by the United States. The economist Pat Choate, Ross twenty-first century and is often seen as the world’s
Perot’s vice-presidential running mate in 1996, holds leading practitioner of it.
that the battle in the twenty-first century will be state
versus market capitalism. In his view, market capital-
‘The battle in Illustration: China’s Refurbished
ism is losing badly to state-owned enterprises, most
the 21st century State Capitalism
notably in China.7
will be state Ian Bremmer, the president and founder of Eurasia China’s refurbished state capitalism represents a com-
versus market Group, likewise argues that the neoliberal model of plex fusion of Western, Asian, socialist, and Chinese
capitalism’ organizing the international political economy will historical and modern elements. In particular, China’s
come under increasing duress due to a proliferation historical background as both socialist and impe-
of state capitalist practices in the developing world rial frames its state-centric approach to economic
and beyond. In contrast to the neoliberal model, management. Most fundamentally, China’s emergent
refurbished state capitalisms do not employ markets capitalism encompasses a unique duality of state-led
primarily for efficiency gains, but for political purpos- capitalism juxtaposed with entrepreneurial network
es, especially to enhance national power.8 And Joshua capitalism. Top-down, state-guided development
Cooper Ramo, the former senior editor and foreign dominates, but bottom-up a myriad of medium- and
editor of Time magazine, who coined the term Beijing small-sized private firms have used entrepreneurial
Consensus, believes that this new potential global strategies to create highly flexible production and
consensus consists of authoritarian governments that knowledge networks with global reach.
resist the neoliberal mantra, particularly that of priva- This is not to imply that China is an economic
tization and free trade.9 monolith without regional variation. Quite the op-
All of these analysts see refurbished state capital- posite: China represents a heterogeneous political
isms as espousing starkly different ideas, interests, and economy with considerable local variation. However,
institutions from the ideal, typical neoliberal model. throughout China various arrangements that enable
State capitalist practitioners share a belief in state bottom-up networks of private entrepreneurs to coex-
power, including the use of industrial policy tools and ist with a powerful and intrusive local and central
state-sponsored corporate interests. They also view state apparatus persist. This somewhat paradoxical
markets with more skepticism than neoliberal models combination of state guidance with vibrant private
of capitalism, often actively “managing” markets for entrepreneurship relies, in part, on informal personal
specific policy ends. relations (guanxi) that enable private Chinese busi-
The prominent role of the state in these emergent nesses to link up with each other and with state
forms of capitalism places them largely outside the va- officials, building trust and compensating for insti-
rieties of capitalism that the rules-based international tutional uncertainty and a lack of impartial legal
order has so far accommodated in the post–World mechanisms.10 This networked element is most ap-
War II era. Consequently, their emergence could parent in China’s small- and medium-sized private
lay bare highly differing perspectives on economic enterprise sector, where myriads of companies can
governance, challenging the existing global economic collaborate to create economies of scale, access tech-
order. Yet, refurbished state capitalisms have adopted nology and finance, and penetrate world markets.11
various capitalist practices, including monetary incen- China’s capitalism also incorporates several neolib-
tives, capital markets, and economic internationaliza- eral economic elements, such as openness to foreign
tion. These are hybrid systems, relying on material investment and trade. This has allowed China to inte-
incentives, market competitive pressures, and other grate global manufacturing into its economy, especially
capitalist institutions, while also using strategic trade in terms of exports and technological innovation.
5
Analysis from the East-West Center

Many Chinese policies thus stand in marked contrast Barack Obama warned him that he wanted to make
to East Asia’s earlier developers, especially Japan, sure “everybody is working by the same rules of
Taiwan, and South Korea. In other respects, though, the road when it comes to the world economic
China has followed quite closely in the footsteps of its system.”12 US Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.
East Asian forerunners, using programs of subsidized was somewhat blunter in his criticism, declaring
investment in key leading industries, an export-led that the United States and China could cooperate
growth strategy, and the suppression of domestic con- “only if the game is fair.”13 Xi acknowledged these
sumption to encourage high savings and investment US concerns and stressed that China had taken ac-
rates. Perhaps most significantly, China uses exchange tive steps to meet concerns over intellectual property
rate controls to maintain an undervalued currency rights protection and trade imbalances. Yet he also
that fosters export performance, just as Japan, Taiwan, stressed that Washington should “provide a level
and South Korea did before it. playing field for Chinese enterprises to invest in the
Despite some liberal impulses, therefore, China’s United States.”14
development policies feature a substantial role for the Both sides argued that the “playing field” is not
state and have emphasized the development of domes- level and the “game” not fair. This sense of mutual
tic industry and technology. Crucial sectors ranging blame is not surprising given the rather differing
from telecoms to airlines, oil and gas, and all min- natures of Chinese and American capitalism.
eral exploitation and processing tend to be majority China’s refurbished state capitalism has undoubtedly
state-controlled. China’s refurbished state capitalism created increasing concerns over the vast amounts
also has combined indicative state-centered planning of subsidies and cheap capital that can rapidly be
with localized economic experimentation and vibrant deployed to foster new industries in potentially
market competition. It incorporates, from top-down, leading sectors. Conversely, Xi is correct in not-
a large and powerful state enterprise sector; from ing that the US investment environment has not
bottom-up, entrepreneurial networks with consider- been exactly welcoming for Chinese firms. Often
able flexibility and global reach; and, from outside-in, based on national security grounds, US authorities
a significant openness to the forces of globalization, have hampered large-scale Chinese investments in
including high levels of foreign trade, direct invest- America. For example, the US House Intelligence
ment, and knowledge transfers. Committee noted in October 2012 that Chinese
China represents a hybrid that is now the leading telecom equipment makers Huawei and ZTE are a
form of refurbished state capitalism. However, this risk to US national security, and recommended that
does not imply that the present Chinese model is the government block acquisitions by the two firms
fixed or sustainable into the indefinite future. Rather, and that American companies avoid doing business
China’s state it merely elucidates that China’s emergent political with them.15
economy represents a form of refurbished state One could argue that both systems clash because
capitalism has
capitalism that is already the second largest global they employ somewhat mercantilist measures to
created a deep economy. As with the refurbished state capitalisms foster new leading sectors, though with differing
symbiosis with of Russia, India, and others, China’s puts less trust institutions and governance philosophies. However,
the US economy in markets and more trust in state guidance. It thus on closer inspection, China’s state capitalism encom-
distinguishes itself from the neoliberal model not passes features that have created a deep symbiosis
only in terms of institutional arrangements, but also with the US economy. China’s vibrant and globally
in terms of its economic governance philosophy. enmeshed private sector has allowed its economy
to become a key component of the Western-led
economic system. China’s capitalism, thus, has as-
The Blame Game
similated multifirm, multinational global production
When Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited and knowledge networks. According to the political
Washington, DC, in February 2012, US President economist Edward Steinfeld, this perhaps indicates
6
Analysis from the East-West Center

that China’s refurbished state capitalism is not a how a more state-centric and controlled approach
fundamental threat to the neoliberal order.16 to global economic governance is gaining in promi-
Undoubtedly, the way China’s state capitalism nence. In this respect, China’s emphasis on close
challenges the US-centered neoliberal global eco- control over finance and active state support for
nomic order is fundamentally different from the developing new leading sectors, such as renewable
Soviet challenge during the Cold War. China is and alternative energy, is providing enticing models
deeply enmeshed in the global political economy to emulate in developing countries. Moreover, the
and owns immense amounts of global financial Chinese government under the Twelfth Five-Year
assets, most significantly US Treasury debt. Both Plan is attempting to build comprehensive social
models of capitalism are simultaneously codepen- and medical insurance systems, thereby altering and
dent and in rivalry.17 rebalancing the nature of China’s domestic political
economy while striving for more social equity.
To come back to the three analytical ques-
Analytical and Policy Implications:
tions posed at the outset: First, there are clearly rival
Codependent Competitors
political economic systems at present. Refurbished
China’s reemergence is creating a powerful, new, and state capitalisms as practiced in China, Brazil, and
dynamic form of capitalism. Yet China is merely India constitute a new global competitive force.
at the leading edge of the world’s emerging practi- Second, refurbished state capitalisms are the most
tioners of refurbished state capitalism. Other such likely challengers to the Washington Consensus.
systems in India, Russia, Brazil, and beyond also They are already confronting the existing interna-
have experienced healthy economic growth. This tional architecture much more directly than they did
The shift in shift in economic and financial power away from the before 2008, as seen in the deliberations of the G-20
economic advanced economies of Europe, the United States, (Group of Twenty).
and financial and Japan that has been ongoing throughout the However, to address the third question—the
power away 2000s seems to have accelerated. Since 2006, for nature and logic of how refurbished state capitalisms
from advanced example, both China and India emerged as the top are challenging the neoliberal global economic
two contributors to global economic growth.18 Ulti- order—it is important to understand how they
economies seems
mately, the rapid rise to prominence of refurbished are fundamentally different from the communist
to have accelerated state capitalisms implies a powerful shift in the forces challenge during the Cold War. Refurbished state
shaping the geo-economic landscape of globalization. capitalisms differ from earlier forms in that they have
Despite the dominance of the Washington Con- adapted many neoliberal tenets and are deeply inte-
sensus over global economic governance for the last grated with the global economic system. Refurbished
thirty years, refurbished state capitalisms have been state capitalisms are consequently producing a mix of
able to prosper. They clearly lack an adherence to the codependence and competition with the still domi-
ideology of market fundamentalism. Rather, they nant neoliberal global order.
tend to employ market forces pragmatically, and To reiterate, refurbished state capitalisms are not
often for specific policy ends such as fostering new, outside of the neoliberal global economic order. They
technologically advanced leading sectors. In the are, to a considerable extent, “in-system” players.
Chinese model, for instance, markets have been giv- They are not purely state-driven systems in which the
en a greater role over time in the allocation of goods state controls all aspects of the economy. Rather,
and services, as well as in introducing competitive refurbished state capitalisms are somewhat paradoxi-
pressures. However, an emphasis on retaining state cal, often appearing ambiguous and contradictory.
control over key aspects of the economy, including While they have adapted highly liberal and quintes-
the allocation of finance, has remained intact. sentially capitalist elements of economic governance,
A new and messier reality is emerging. China’s they also retain crucial state powers to intervene in
refurbished state capitalism, in particular, points to major economic affairs.
7
Analysis from the East-West Center

There is, thus, a real danger in taking the neoliberal fundamental trend of refurbished state capitalisms
conception of capitalism on which the Washington and adapt. Major economic powers, both new and
The smart response Consensus is based as the only acceptable form of old, must recognize that, yes, there are deep differ-
is to acknowledge capitalism. A level-headed view must acknowledge ences concerning the nature and logic of capitalism.
the fundamental that there are a variety of ways to organize capitalist However, all forms of capitalism have benefited from
trend of refurbished production and markets. Capitalism is a heteroge- the openness and expansiveness of the neoliberal
state capitalisms neous force, coming in many shapes and hues. Refur- global economic order. The large doses of cooperation
bished state capitalisms all differ from the established and shared authority that emerged as globalization
and adapt
neoliberal and coordinated models of capitalism, yet accelerated have to be nurtured while recognizing
there are also substantial differences among the politi- differences.
cal economies of China, Brazil, India, Russia, and The desired outcome is, thus, gradual and mea-
beyond. What binds these state capitalist practitio- sured shifts in the global policy consensus. Already,
ners is that they have to varying degrees embraced this consensus has started to move away from the
competitive markets and open investment and trad- pure neoliberal stance of the 1990s to embrace more
ing systems, while experimenting with a multitude state-managed solutions.19 All major economic play-
of pathways to economic success utilizing different ers are, for example, rethinking financial liberaliza-
institutional arrangements and policies. tion and starting to reemphasize aspects of financial
The view that refurbished state capitalisms are regulation and the control of credit flows.
engaged in a zero-sum struggle with the neoliberal In the final analysis, the continued success of
global order for economic power is, therefore, impre- refurbished state capitalisms is likely to alter the in-
cise. Even worse, this perspective could bring about ternational political economy. Hopefully, this reality
exactly the fraying consensus that it predicts. As the does not hinder efforts at better understanding both
“blame game” illustrates, this is becoming a distinct practically and theoretically that capitalism is not a
danger as new economic players stake out fresh posi- single set of economic policies and principles, but a
tions and perspectives that are complicating interna- heterogeneous force offering a variety of institutional
tional economic coordination. solutions to the challenges facing the global economic
It would be futile to attempt to hold back these system. A focus on what works, rather than a set of
monumental changes and bolster the neoliberal ideological principles, could facilitate international
global economic order as it exists. Rather, the smart cooperation and strengthen international governance
response for developed economies, especially the mechanisms such as the International Monetary
United States and Europe, is to acknowledge the Fund and the G-20.

Notes
1
The original formulation of the Washington Consensus was 5
Wolfgang Streeck, “E Pluribus Unum? Varieties and Common-
presented by John Williamson and prescribed ten broad sets of alities of Capitalism,” MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/12 (Köln: Max-
orthodox economic policy recommendations. See John Williamson, Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2010).
“What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in Latin American 6
Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism; for an excellent critique
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? ed. John Williamson (Wash- of the shortcomings of this literature and its limited classification
ington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), ch. 2. of varieties of capitalism, see Jonas Pontusson, “Varieties and
2
Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of Commonalities of Capitalism,” in Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties
the World Economy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 296. of Approaches, ed. David Coates (Basingstoke, UK, and New York:
3
Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 163–188.
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011). 7
Aaron Task, “U.S. Is ‘Losing Badly’ But Can Win War vs. State-
4
See inter alia, Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Variet- Sponsored Capitalism, Pat Choate Says,” Daily Ticker (Yahoo
ies of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Finance), September 8, 2010, http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker
Advantage (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bruno (article removed). Pat Choate, Saving Capitalism: Keeping America
Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Oxford, UK: Oxford Strong (New York, N.Y. Vintage Books, 2009).
University Press, 2003).
8
Analysis from the East-West Center

8
Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War 14
Chris McGreal, “Obama Friendly but Firm with Xi Jinping
Between States and Corporations? (New York: Portfolio, 2010), 5. on White House Visit,” Guardian, February 14, 2012, http://
9
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/14/obama-friendly-firm-xi
Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf -jinping (accessed February 21, 2012).
(accessed October 12, 2012). 15
Tom Orlik, “No Way for Huawei in U.S.,” Wall Street Journal
10
This aspect of China’s emergent capitalism is sometimes referred (online), October 11, 2012.
to as Chinese “network capitalism” or “guanxi capitalism.” See Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Economic
16

Christopher A. McNally, “China’s Changing Guanxi Capitalism: Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Private Entrepreneurs between Leninist Control and Relentless Press, 2010).
Accumulation,” Business and Politics 13, issue 2 (August 2011): For further development of this argument, see Christopher
17

doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1339. A. McNally, “Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the


Peter J. Williamson and Ming Zheng, “The Global Impact of
11
International Political Economy,” World Politics 64, issue 4
China’s Emerging Multinationals,” in China’s Emergent Political (October 2012): 741–776.
Economy: Capitalism in the Dragon’s Lair, ed. Christopher A. 18
Arvind Virmani, “Global Economic Governance: IMF Quota
McNally (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), 83–101. Reform,” IMF Working Paper WP/11/208, (International
Mark Lander and Edward Wong, “With Edge, U.S. Greets
12
Monetary Fund, July 2011): 12, http://www.imf.org/external
China’s Vice President,” New York Times, February 15, 2012, 1. /pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11208.pdf (accessed August 15, 2012).
13
Lander and Wong, “With Edge.” Miles Kahler, “Asia and the Reform of Global Governance,”
19

Asian Economic Policy Review 5, no. 2 (2010): 178–193.

About this Publication Recent AsiaPacific Issues About the Author

The AsiaPacific Issues series reports on No. 106 “More Security for Rising China, Less Christopher A. McNally is an associate
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