GUERZON V CA

FACTS:

Petitioner executed with Basic Land oil Energy Corp (later acquired by Shell) a “Service Station Lease”
and “Dealer’s Sales Contract”. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the latter
contract and issued a Certificate of Authority in Petitioner’s favor. After the contract, respondent Shell
wrote Guerzon informing him that they are not renewing the contract. A copy of said letter was
furnished to BEU. Thereafter, BEU (F.C. Caasi, Jr , officer-in-Charge of the Mindanao Division Office of the
Bureau of Energy Utilization) issued an order directing petitioner to vacate the premises and to show
cause in writing why no administrative order and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted for his
violations.

On April 22, 1986, pursuant to the order of April 15, 1986, respondent SHELL, accompanied by
law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together
with the requisite equipments and accessories, and turned them over to the control of the personnel of
respondent SHELL who accompanied them.

On May 9, 1986, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a complaint
for certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. 10619) to
annul the disputed order dated April 15, 1986 of respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., but on September 18,1986
this complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of
equivalent category as the Regional Trial Court

ISSUES:

 W/N Bureau of Energy Utilization has jurisdiction to eject the petitioner from the gasoline
service station leased
 W/N the BEU has the authority to order petitioner to vacate the premises

RULING:

Jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate
case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that
would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization.
It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Bureau of Energy Utilization, like
its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes
between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it
such power.

As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the
Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition
of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations.
Viewed from any angle, respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., in issuing the assailed order, acted beyond his
authority and overstepped the powers granted by P.D. No. 1206, as amended. The assailed order was,
therefore, null and void.

While the order dated April 15, 1986 is null and void, the Court, however, finds itself unable to
issue the writ of mandatory injunction prayed for ordering respondent Shell to restore possession of the
service station and the equipment and facilities therein to petitioner. Petitioner himself had admitted in
his petition that his dealership and lease agreements with respondent Shell had already expired.
Recognized the validity of the termination of the agreements, he requested for their renewal. However,
this request was denied.

FREEMAN INC. (petitioners) v SEC et al (respondents)

Facts:

In 1986 and 1987, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN), was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corporation as
evidenced by two (2) promissory notes. Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman, Inc., signed as co-maker
in both promissory notes. When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted collection
suit against FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian. EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary attachment.

On 27 May 1988, private respondents Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, Dionisio Saw, Lina S. Chua, Lucila S.
Ruste and Evelyn Saw filed an answer in intervention claiming that they owned the minority interest in
FREEMAN.

On 30 January 1989, a writ of execution was issued. Two (2) parcels of land belonging to
FREEMAN were levied upon and sold at public auction. The highest bidder was one of the petitioners,
Freeman Management and Development Corporation (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT), which thereafter
registered its certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.

On 23 May 1989, before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties
purchased at the auction sale, private respondents, representing the minority shareholdings of
FREEMAN, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the dissolution of
FREEMAN, accounting and reconveyance of the properties sold at the public auction.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was a
duplication of the case pending in the SEC. But the motion was denied. On 7 January 1992, on motion on
private respondents in SEC Case, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the consolidation of
ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction sale of
31 March 1989, the redemption period having expired on 7 April 1990

ISSUE:
WON the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the
order of its Hearing Officer granting the writ of injunction enjoining consolidation of ownership in
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT

RULING:

Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals should be understood in the light of two(2) basic legal
principles. First, that administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such
can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.14
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, provides the cases over which the SEC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. These include controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and, between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. Section 6 of the same decree
empowers the SEC to issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in
all cases in which it has jurisdiction.

The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority stockholders is well within the
jurisdiction of the SEC to resolve in accordance with P.D. No. 902-A. However, the inclusion in the SEC
case of FREEMAN MANAGEMENT of which private respondents are not stockholders for the purpose of
compelling it to reconvey to FREEMAN the properties originally owned by the latter but were levied
upon and sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a matter outside of the limited
jurisdiction of the SEC. The petition for reconveyance of properties against FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is
not an intra-corporate controversy since private respondents have no shares or interests whatsoever in
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT, a corporation separate and distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing
dissolution proceedings in the SEC.

The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as
highly important in judicial stability and in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction.15 The SEC is at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such,
one would have no power to control the other.16 Moreover, in the instant case, judgment was rendered
by the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44404 approving the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE
on one hand, and FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other. A writ of execution was issued against the
defendants to enforce the judgment and two (2) properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction.

CITY OF BAGUIO vs NINO

FACTS: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino a parcel of land identified as
Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City. Francisco
Niño, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23,
1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of
November 11, 1976. Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not
succeed. The decision of the Director of Lands having become final and executory, the then-Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and
those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever
improvements they may have introduced thereto." Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed,
prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall, later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a
Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of
the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Niño. The
DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police
Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government, but on July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of
Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio
City Police Officer-InCharge Donato Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Niño and his herein co-
respondents. Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The RTC
denied the petition. However the Court of Appeals granted the petition on appeal. Mayor Mauricio
Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing the amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of
the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the
structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned
with the proper court. Petitioners contend that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution
does not need a hearing and court order which Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. That an
administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of
Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes
the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not a special court order is needed for the demotion of the respondents' structures

RULING: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency
may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. There is, however, no explicit provision granting the
Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the
Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition - which the Amended Order of
Execution, in substance, is. Indeed, while the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the
disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. The rationale is
evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have
the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited
to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of
making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be
within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. In fine, it is the court sheriff which is
empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents on, and turn over possession of, the
lot to Narcisa.

ESPIRIDION v CA

FACTS:

On April 30, 1999, SBDB filed an amended ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession over a
parcel of land purchased by SBDB in a public auction held on August 26, 1999. Spouses Constantino
Espiridion and Remedios Espiridion and spouses Renato Ramos and Erlinda Ramos, mortgaged the
subject property to (Second Bulacan Development Bank )SBDB as security for a P4,200,000 loan. They
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, hence, SBDB extrajudicially foreclosed
the property. SBDB subsequently acquired the property as the lone bidder in the public auction held on
August 26, 1997. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. As a
consequence, ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of SBDB.

Petitioners anchored their defense on the alleged nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
They claimed that SBDB failed to comply with several requirements of extrajudicial foreclosure: no
application for extrajudicial foreclosure was filed with the office of the clerk of court of the RTC of
Makati City; the docket fees were not paid and no raffle of the publication of the notice of foreclosure
sale was made.

The trial court declared that it could not rule on the propriety or validity of the foreclosure sale
and, as such, presumed that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was done in a regular manner. It only
resolved the issue of SBDBs entitlement to a writ of possession. Invoking the rule that the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale of mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and that it is ministerial on the
court to issue such writ upon ex-parte petition by the purchaser, the court a quo granted SBDBs petition.
It was elevated to CA but such petition was denied.

ISSUE:

WON acted with grave abuse of its discretion?

RULING:

No abuse of discretion may properly be imputed to the appellate court. The issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the
buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial
function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection
with such issuance is misplaced.

A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. Thus:

“The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment”

Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

Where the court acts on a matter that is within its jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion must be shown
to nullify the act. In this case, since the issuance of the writ of possession did not involve an exercise of
discretion, no abuse of discretion could have been committed by the trial court. Thus, the instant
petition for certiorari has no leg to stand on.

DOH v CAMPOSARIO

FACTS:

Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former employees of the Department Of Health –
National Capital Region (DOH-NCR). Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the
DOH Resident Ombudsman Ringpis against Dir. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio
Cabrera, and respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles
of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from
Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

Thereafter, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against
respondents and their co-respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge
against the respondents and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA
3019.

Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to
investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to
the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). Consequently, the PCAGC took
over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution finding respondents
guilty as charged. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 390 dismissing the respondents from service as
recommended by the PCAGC in their resolution. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health issued an Order
disposing of the case against respondents and Cabrera dismissing them from service.

Respondents and Cabrera filed their separate appeal with the CSC which was both denied. Respondents’
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabrera’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents, however, received the resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration on November 2001 which was promulgated on. Thus, Horacio Cabrera
was able to appeal to the CA the CSC’s resolutions ahead of respondents. The petition of Cabrera was
granted by the CA setting aside the resolutions of the CSC and exonerated Cabrera of the administrative
charged against him. Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC of their appeal, respondents brought the
matter to the CA which nonetheless used the same legal bases for annulling the CSC’s Resolution
against respondents and held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only
to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of health
failed to comply with administrative due process.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving
respondents

b) Whether or not the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents

c) Whether or not a Department Secretary may utilize other officials and report facts from which a
decision may be based

d) Whether or not the Health Secretary has the competence and authority to decide what action
should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated

e) Whether or not the Order of Health Secretary is valid

RULING:

a) YES. PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.
Executive Order No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its
provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential,
not non-presidential, appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its “Whereas” clauses, the EO
“specifically tasked the PCAGC to investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption”
More pointedly, Section 3 states that the “Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative
complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees.
The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The
investigation was authorized under AO No. 298, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into
the administrative charges filed against respondents.The Investigating Committee was composed of all
the members of the PCAGC. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non- presidential
appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12. which created the PAGC. Non-presidential
appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential
appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC.

b) YES. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the
former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. Note that
being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. While the Chief
Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretary’s
disciplinary authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the
secretary’s appropriate action.

c) YES. As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials
to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the
secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151
nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any
administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining
authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

d) YES. The health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should
be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated.
However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior independent
consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person
administratively charged. In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing
respondents pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the
issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case.
He even noted a violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. On the other hand, Health
Secretary Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commission’s Resolution.
She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to Respondents
Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
e) NO. While the Health Secretary has the power as mentioned above, Due process in
administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision
must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration
of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved. The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had
not been observed in the present factual milieu. Furthermore, The Order of Secretary Reodica denying
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration also failed to correct the deficiency in the initial Order. She
improperly relied on the President’s findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the
administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive
recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health secretary who
should have followed the manner in which the President had rendered his action on the
recommendation. The President’s endorsement of the records of the case for the “appropriate action”
of the health secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like
that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a
legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired. Inasmuch as the health secretary’s twin
Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in refusing to discuss the merit of
the PCAGC’s or the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations. Such a discussion should have been made by
the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the CA. In representation of petitioner, the Office
of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve
dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents,
but solely due process.

ADJUDICATION

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. the assailed decision of the court of appeals is modified in
the sense that the authority of the ad hoc investigating committee created under administrative order
298 is sustained. Being violative of administrative due process, the orders of the health secretary are
annulled and set aside.