People v Tabuso

G.R. No. 113708 October 26, 1999THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ARQUILLOS TABUSO y SISTER @ BULAG,
accused-appellant. PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:
That on or about July 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
with three others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ROBERTO BUGARIN Y PIGAR by
shooting the latter with a gun hitting him on the right armpit and right shoulder, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Issue:
whether or not the presence of the person in the scene of the crime make him a co-conspirator,
Held:
Mendoza and appellant Tabuso are cousins. However, sole relationship does not necessarily make them
conspirators, absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuso was in the scene of the crime. Finally, the
prosecution further theorized that appellant acted as a lookout during the commission of the felony. But such
a theory is incredible because Tabuso is known in Sevilla Street, Tondo, as "Bulag" or blind because of an eye
defect. Considering his deformity, which is undisputed, the Court entertains great doubts over his ability or
efficacy to perform the role of a supposed lookout. Absent enough evidence to establish conspiracy, acquittal
of accused-appellant is in order since his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Ladonga

G.R. No. 141066 17February2005
This Case is in reference to the application of Art 8 and 10 of the Revised Penal Code

"B.P. Blg 22- Bouncing Checks Law"

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known
as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in the
pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743,
post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first
week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check
No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated
to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest her conviction on the grounds that she was not a party to
the agreement and that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court of Appeals with
regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.

In determining if she is liable for the same crime it must be proven that there was conspiracy
It was not proven by direct evidence even by the witness testimony that Evangeline Ladonga was merely
present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral
certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence
for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the
requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

HELD:

The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the
charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.

People vs. Martin Simon G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of Prohibited Drugs
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
FACTS:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer.
The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up by the police
at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but
he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when
he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money or
the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated
appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment
was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion
on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. To
sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must, therefore, be established
beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez,
who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there were 2
other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana
only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its
dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as
the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize
such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be
imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with
the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted
the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions
of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the
same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by
and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court applied first part of the
aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of
arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range have fixed through
the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set
the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.

MANABAN v. CA
G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006
Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
At around 1:00 am on Oct. 11, 1996, Joselito Bautista’s daughter was rushed to UP Health Center.
Needing money, Bautista (member of UP Police force) went to withdraw money from the ATM at BPI Kalayaan
Branch where accused Ramonito Manaban was on duty. It was alleged that he had taken alcoholic drinks before
that. Bautista failed to withdraw and that his card was captured because he had entered a wrong pin. He then
started kicking and pounding the machine. Manaban asked him the problem and suggested that Bautista return
the next morning. This angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding the machine. Manaban urged him
to calm down but continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he
fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he
confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista. Several police
officers arrived at the crime scene where they saw Bautista lying on the ground, still breathing.
They noticed that a .38 caliber pistol was tucked in Bautista’s waist. Bautista was shot at the back. Manaban
allegedly admitted the shooting. They brought Bautista to East Avenue Medical Center where he died. The NBI
medico-legal officer testified that Bautista was shot at the back, the muzzle of the gun at about more than
24inches away from the entry point, and that the wound incurred by him was fatal as the bullet hit the right
lung and lacerated parts of the liver, stomach and the pancreas. He deduced that assailant must have been
behind the victim. Manaban testified that after he fired the warning shot, Bautista allegedly raised his shirt and
showed his gun which was tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped back and told Bautista not to draw his gun,
otherwise he would shoot. However, Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward Manaban, who again warned
Bautista not to come near him or he would be forced to shoot him. Bautista suddenly turned his back and was
allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he would be shot first, Manaban pulled the trigger and shot
Bautista. Manaban declared that it did not occur to him to simply disable the victim for fear that Bautista would
shoot him first.

ISSUE:
Whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Bautista.

HELD:
NO. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon
a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat
is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as
evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked
holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already
pointing his service firearm atBautista. These circumstances clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful
aggression on Bautista's part. The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he
turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at
Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering
that Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a
policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun which was
still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was about
to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering
that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at Bautista. Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must
face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent
such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking
the life or inflicting injuries on another.

People vs Alconga
Facts:
On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing black jack against Maria De
Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind
Barion and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he
expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29 when Alconga was doing his job as a home guard. While the said accused was
seated on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came along and said “Coroy, this is your breakfast” followed by a
swing of his “pingahan”, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench
with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the
accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen.
While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger
and hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow to the accused who was
able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to hand fight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and
having sustained several wounds ran away. He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one which slashed the cranium.
The deceased fell face downward besides many other blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.

Issue:
Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga

Held:
No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide. The deceased ran and fled w/o having to
inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver
shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased absolutely. Alconga had
no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he
is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the superior fighter and his safety was
already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, self-defense would have been
valid, but that is not the case in the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of
Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of homicide with no mitigating circumstance of Provocation. Note:
Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. “It should be
proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stir one to its commission”

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of
a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the
case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.

Ruling:

1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-
defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -
- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not
arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

Exequiel Senoja vs. People

Callejo, Sr., J.19 October 2004

Leon Lumasac- died Miguel Lumasac-brother of the deceased

Two-phased event; drunk; Senoja sided with Miguel instead of Leon; kolonyal knife

RTC-Homicide; CA-Homicide; SC-Homicide

*Unlawful aggression had ceased after the aggressor walked away in the first phase

© SENOJA V. PEOPLE

Facts: Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja (they were brothers), Jose Calica and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin
in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal. Leon Lumasac suddenly barged in, holding a bolo and was looking for his
brother Miguel whom he suspected of drying up the ricefield he was plowing. However, when Senoja
(Exequiel) approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he embraced Leon and Jose took Leon’s bolo. After
the confrontation, Leon wanted to get his bolo back because he wanted to go home. After getting it back, Leon
walked out of the place followed by Senoja. Suddenly, Senoja stabbled Leon at the back. When Leon turned
around, Senoja continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground. Then petitioner ran towards the barangay
road and threw away the knife he used to stab Leon. Petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the
affirmative defense of self-defense. His version said that after the commotion inside the house, Leon left but
with a threat that something will happen to Senoja. Senoja followed Leon as the latter was making his way
home. When Leon realized that Senoja was following him, Leon walked back towards him and suddenly hacked
Senoja at the left side of his head and right thigh. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon, Senoja drew
his colonial knife and stabbed Leon in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his
death.

Issue: W/N Senoja merely acted in self-defense

Held: No, Senoja is guilty of HOMICIDE. The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or
incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two essential requisites were present. Unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non to self-defense, complete or incomplete. The right of self-
defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The right begins where necessity does, and ends where it
ends. There is however, a perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense. Selfdefense excuses the
repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should
be a defense against a present unlawful attack. Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is right and not a
crime. x x x It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real
threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided in imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. But
what then is the standard? We rule that the test should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due
exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to
exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. After the danger has passed,
one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life. IN THIS CASE, there were two events
concerned: 1) The arrival of Leon who was armed with a bolo and 2) When Leon demanded for his bolo
because he wanted to go home already after the commotion inside the house, and then eventually left with a
threat. Quoting the appellate court, the SC said that the victim had already left the hut. At that point in time, the
victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted a
confrontation this time. It was Senoja who was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their
confrontation

EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 525 SCRA 254, G.R. NO. 158053, June 21, 2007
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
CAs’ Resolution dated January 31, 2001 and the CA Resolution dated April 14, 2003 which denied
Razon’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: On August 1, 1993 around midnight, PO1 Francisco Chopchopen was walking towards Upper Pinget
Baguio City when he was met by taxi cab driver, Edwin Razon. Razon told Chopchopen that he was held up by
three men at Dreamland Subdivision. When Chopchopen asked Razon if he stabbed Benedict Gonzalo, 23 years
old and a polio victim, he answered no and when questioned by SPO2 Bumangil, he was held up by two men
and he stabbed Gonzalo in self-defense. Razon brought out a fan knife and told Bumangil that it was the knife
he used to stab Gonzalo. A search was conducted on the taxi cab a colonial knife with bloodstains was found
under a newspaper near the steering wheel. An autopsy conducted on the body of the victim showed that he
sustained 3 stab wounds, wound on the abdomen killed Gonzalo, as it penetrated the small intestines, pancreas
and the abdominal aorta, causing massive hemorrhage and loss of blood. On trial, the RTC convicted him of
homicide, it was found out that while there was unlawful aggression by Gonzalo who poked a knife on Razon’s
neck, such aggression ceased when Razon was able to grab the knife from Gonzalo and freed his right hand from
the hold of Gonzalo’s two companions who stepped out of the taxicab followed by Gonzalo. Razon could had
have started the engine and just left the place. But he did not. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Gonzalo,
Jr. the amount of P12,770.00 by way of actual damages; P50,000.00 by way of moral damages; and P10,000.00
by way of attorney's fees. On appeal, the CA required him, through his counsel Atty. Rigoberto Gallardo to file
an appellant's brief. Two motions for extension of time were filed by Atty. Gallardo.

Instead of filing the brief, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Razon. CA then directed
Razon to cause the entry of appearance of a new counsel or manifest whether he wanted the court to appoint
a counsel de oficio to defend him, since no compliance has been filed by Razon his right to be represented by
counsel has been waived; but on July 25, 2001, Razon filed with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration which was
later on denied by the CA; hence, this appeal. ISSUES/RULING: 1. Whether the CA was correct in dismissing
petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief. NO, the CA gave Razon sufficient opportunity to file his
appellant's brief. Instead of complying, however, he chose to ignore the many directives of the CA and puts the
blame on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was allegedly guilty of gross negligence. Even if the Court were
to admit that Atty. Gallardo was negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client except when
the negligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.

No such excepting circumstance can be said to be present in this case because as properly observed by the
appellate court, Razon himself was guilty of negligence. While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system,
a party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on appeals, mindful of the fact
that an appeal is purely a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Both courts and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. 2. Whether petitioner acted in
self-defense in killing Gonzalo. NO. It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is
committed.

Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression by the injured party already ceased
when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured
by the accused. As to the damages certain modifications were made. RTC failed to award the heirs of Gonzalo,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without
need of proof other than the fact of commission of murder or homicide. Actual damages is replaced by
temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00. In this case, Gonzalo's heirs were only able to present receipts
amounting to P4,925.00. This is consistent with the ruling of the Court in People v. Werba, citing People v.
Villanueva which held that in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than P25,000.00 are proved
during the trial, the award of temperate damages ofP25,000.00 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a
lesser amount. As to moral damages, the RTC correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00, as the prosecution
was able to show that the father of the victim, Benedicto Gonzalo, Sr., suffered mental and emotional anguish
due to the untimely death of his son. Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the heirs of a victim upon
sufficient proof of mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injury. RTC was correct in
awarding P10,000.00 as attorney's fees to the heirs of the victim. As provided for in Art. 2208 (11) of the Civil
Code, attorney's fees may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.